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<v Speaker 1>Let's see now if this is true, not that I

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<v Speaker 1>would ever think you Goober's would send me something that's

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<v Speaker 1>not true. I would never think that. But if this

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<v Speaker 1>is true. Eleven eighty four, I found out that the

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<v Speaker 1>weirdo who firebombed the Tesla dealership in Vegas and the

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<v Speaker 1>weirdo who fire bombed people in Boulder, they lived less

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<v Speaker 1>than a mile away from each other. In color lot

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<v Speaker 1>of springs. Things that make you go, hmm, this is

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<v Speaker 1>pretty good. Fifty four to thirty one. The left will continue.

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<v Speaker 1>This is why it is exactly what I just said.

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<v Speaker 1>The left will continue to downplay the riots until they

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<v Speaker 1>get what they want, which is when a national Guard

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<v Speaker 1>or even worse, the Marines kill someone. If that happens,

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<v Speaker 1>we will never hear the.

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<v Speaker 2>End of it.

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<v Speaker 1>Someone on X yesterday described that scenario as the shot

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<v Speaker 1>that will be heard around the world, and that's probably

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<v Speaker 1>be true. Yes, we had the kids that were throwing

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<v Speaker 1>the rocks at cars. Someone got killed, and they were

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<v Speaker 1>just I think just this past week, or maybe it

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<v Speaker 1>was this week, they were convicted, actually think convicted of murder.

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<v Speaker 2>Thirty six oh two. Rights.

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<v Speaker 1>Here's some perspective. There was a Coldplay concert the other

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<v Speaker 1>night there were riots and a Rockies game all at

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<v Speaker 1>the same time. Well, was the riot because the Rocky

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<v Speaker 1>sucks so badly? Or was that a separate riot? Was

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<v Speaker 1>that a riot trying to get rid of Montford? As

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<v Speaker 1>the owner of what was going on, our TD received

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<v Speaker 1>complaints that the trains had stopped running at twelve thirty.

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<v Speaker 1>People were stranded and each didn't know about the other.

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<v Speaker 1>What a world we live in when a riot and

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<v Speaker 1>a Coldplay concert com collide. By the way, there were

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<v Speaker 1>up eighty thousand people the Coldplay concert. Wow, Well, just remember.

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<v Speaker 1>I kind of think my mindset today is that everything

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<v Speaker 1>that's going on is this battle for our minds, and

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<v Speaker 1>that's nothing new that's been going on forever. Advertisers know

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<v Speaker 1>they're in a battle for your mind so that they

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<v Speaker 1>can get your dollar. News is in a battle for

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<v Speaker 1>your ears. Radios and eyes. Radios in a battle for

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<v Speaker 1>your ears. We're all in these great battles, and you're

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<v Speaker 1>just upon in the game of life, says Mondo. So

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<v Speaker 1>there was an FBI crisis last week on social media,

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<v Speaker 1>and it centered around something called prohibited files. Now, as

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<v Speaker 1>much as I've dealt with the FBI in my lifetime.

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<v Speaker 1>I've never heard of this. This was all news to me.

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<v Speaker 1>So it started about a week ago when Grassley, the

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<v Speaker 1>Senator from Iowa, who has been a staunch critical the FBI,

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<v Speaker 1>released a twenty nineteen FBI memo. It was an email

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<v Speaker 1>form in email format. We're in the memo. The author

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<v Speaker 1>of that memo, who was an FBI agent Duh, noted

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<v Speaker 1>that some of the files he was trying to get

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<v Speaker 1>were prohibited access. Prohibited access.

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<v Speaker 2>Now, all of my.

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<v Speaker 1>Clearances that I had, and in all of the forms

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<v Speaker 1>I had to fill out, and all of the cover

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<v Speaker 1>sheets that I ever saw that you know, this is secret,

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<v Speaker 1>this is top secret, this is TSSCI.

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<v Speaker 2>This is.

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<v Speaker 1>FOUO for official use only. I mean, just all the

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<v Speaker 1>different classifications. I'd never heard of prohibited access. And apparently

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<v Speaker 1>these files were related to Crossfire Hurricane, you know, that's

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<v Speaker 1>the FBI code word for.

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<v Speaker 2>The Russia collusion investigation.

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<v Speaker 1>And these files apparently related specifically to Nelly Or, who

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<v Speaker 1>the Center had referred to the Department of Justice for

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<v Speaker 1>obstruction of Congress charges. Now, trust me, you can go

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<v Speaker 1>down a really deep rabbit hole if you don't grasp

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<v Speaker 1>the complex, the complex nature of crossfire hurricane. Every time

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<v Speaker 1>I hear crossfire hurricane, all you can think about is

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<v Speaker 1>the rolling stones. So let me give you some background.

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<v Speaker 1>One of j Edgar Hoover's legacies was creating a record system.

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<v Speaker 1>And this is one hundred years ago probably now, while

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<v Speaker 1>it has certainly been over come by the modern technology

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<v Speaker 1>we use today for filing system I mean when you

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<v Speaker 1>think about a filing system today, I mean I still

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<v Speaker 1>think I still have a file cabinet at home because

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<v Speaker 1>I still have you know, the colored you know, Manila

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<v Speaker 1>folders that have you know, certain records in it. You know,

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<v Speaker 1>I got my tax records. Some of it's all duplicated.

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<v Speaker 1>You know, I have hard copies of my tax returns

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<v Speaker 1>and I have electronic copies of my tax returns. There

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<v Speaker 1>are certain other documents I keep hard copies of and

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<v Speaker 1>electronic electronic copies of. So when you think about filing systems,

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<v Speaker 1>the old filing system by Jay Edgar Hoover really has

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<v Speaker 1>been overtaken by modern technology.

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<v Speaker 2>And you know you got file.

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<v Speaker 1>Folders on your computer. Every field office and FBI headquarters

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<v Speaker 1>maintains an index card file system. So when communications came

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<v Speaker 1>into any of these offices or went out of the offices.

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<v Speaker 1>The FBI agents would index important information from the file

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<v Speaker 1>by underlining that with a red or blue pencil, read

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<v Speaker 1>for subjects of investigations, blew us for references, and then

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<v Speaker 1>the location of the file or the serial record or

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<v Speaker 1>number was then recorded on an index card.

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<v Speaker 2>Remember going to.

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<v Speaker 1>The library, and in the library you'd have the index

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<v Speaker 1>cards where you would go search for, you know, the book. Oh,

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<v Speaker 1>here's the book. I'm going You get the you get

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<v Speaker 1>the index number and go find it. They were kind

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<v Speaker 1>of doing the same thing. So I tried to find

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<v Speaker 1>an example, and here here's the best I can come

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<v Speaker 1>up with. Uh, I think this if if there are

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<v Speaker 1>any FBI agents which I happen to know down in

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<v Speaker 1>Arizona a couple of places we gut FBI agent is listening.

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<v Speaker 1>If this example doesn't work, to send me a text

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<v Speaker 1>message and tell me why it doesn't work.

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<v Speaker 2>Here's an example.

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<v Speaker 1>You might have a file number ninety one a dash

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<v Speaker 1>bs DASH one two, three four DASH one. Say Joe

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<v Speaker 1>bag of doughnuts was the subject of an arm robbery

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<v Speaker 1>investigation in Denver. He would be indexed in red into

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<v Speaker 1>the file ninety one A. That's a designator for armed

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<v Speaker 1>bank robbery, and then it would be you should have

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<v Speaker 1>done ds BS I think would be for Boston, DS

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<v Speaker 1>would probably be for or DV, or DN would be

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<v Speaker 1>for Denver. One, two, three, four would be the file number,

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<v Speaker 1>and then the DASH one that would be the first

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<v Speaker 1>serial that would be in that entirety, entire file. So

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<v Speaker 1>then later in the investigation, an important witness was developed,

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<v Speaker 1>Betty boot It's indexed in the same file as a reference,

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<v Speaker 1>so she would be underlined or highlighted as blue. And

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<v Speaker 1>then a later serial maybe number seventeen or something. So

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<v Speaker 1>then if an agent in outside Denver, maybe in Boston

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<v Speaker 1>or Detroit, wanted to know if there were any FBI

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<v Speaker 1>files on the you know, Joe Bagadonnuts or whoever it

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<v Speaker 1>was that was the robber or on Betty Boop, he

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<v Speaker 1>could send a lead out to every office and into

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<v Speaker 1>the headquarters to check intoses for any files on those individuals.

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<v Speaker 1>So a clerk in Boston or in Denver, or even

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<v Speaker 1>a new agent just checking intoseas and responding to leeds,

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<v Speaker 1>which is I think is something all new agents have

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<v Speaker 1>to do, would go to the card file and see

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<v Speaker 1>that you know, mister Bagadonuts mister bank robber was a

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<v Speaker 1>subject and Betty Boop was a reference, and then he

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<v Speaker 1>could send that information back to whatever field agent was

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<v Speaker 1>asking for it. He consented to Detroit, Boston, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>whoever asked for That system existed until the early nineteen nineties,

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<v Speaker 1>and the nineteen nineties was when they first automated the

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<v Speaker 1>case file system. But even then, just like with me,

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<v Speaker 1>paper files remained relevant because it was going to take

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<v Speaker 1>decades in fact, that they still had paper records to

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<v Speaker 1>this day because to migrate all of those files, paper

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<v Speaker 1>files into the automated case file system, the ACS system,

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<v Speaker 1>that would take you know, probably decades to do. And

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<v Speaker 1>of course then you had the very early system of

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<v Speaker 1>electronic filing was not word searchable. You know, today just

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<v Speaker 1>on my laptop, I can go up here and I

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<v Speaker 1>can I can click on this little magnifier looks like

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<v Speaker 1>a little magnifying glass, and the window pops up on

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<v Speaker 1>my book pro for a spotlight search, and I can

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<v Speaker 1>just type in some keywords and that will return to

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<v Speaker 1>me every file, email, everything that's on this hard drive

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<v Speaker 1>that has those keywords. Well, the early system didn't have that.

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<v Speaker 1>The later systems do so indosing indexing is still relevant

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<v Speaker 1>today because with literally billions of pages of information, a

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<v Speaker 1>word search for Michael Brown or John Doe or John

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<v Speaker 1>Smith but might be useless. Too much information is as

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<v Speaker 1>worthless as no information. I find that to be true

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<v Speaker 1>even in my little laptop here.

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<v Speaker 2>So there are.

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<v Speaker 1>Still rules about indexing related to privacy. Well, let's think

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<v Speaker 1>about these hidden files. Open investigations in the early days

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<v Speaker 1>were kept on the squad in a circular file called

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<v Speaker 1>a rotor. Closed files were kept in a room, maybe

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<v Speaker 1>on different floors, in the field office or at headquarters.

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<v Speaker 1>The informant files were kept in a secure room where

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<v Speaker 1>only a few people had access. You had to check out,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, you had to check out informant files for example,

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<v Speaker 1>and if it wasn't your informant, you had to have

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<v Speaker 1>a good reason to check out that file.

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<v Speaker 2>And then you had.

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<v Speaker 1>Especially sensitive files that might be kept in the special

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<v Speaker 1>Agent in charge's office literally in his office or her office.

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<v Speaker 1>Really sensitive files. Well, originally those were kept in J.

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<v Speaker 1>Edgar Hoover's office. Now reportedly a lot of those files

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<v Speaker 1>were destroyed by Hoover's longtime secretary Helen Gandhy. But I'm

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<v Speaker 1>not going to down that rabbit hole right now. So

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<v Speaker 1>you can see that now in the electronic case file

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<v Speaker 1>age where security of files might be a problem. Because

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<v Speaker 1>most of the FBI is somewhat over thirty thousand employees,

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<v Speaker 1>they're all very honorable people. They don't commit espionage, they

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<v Speaker 1>don't leak sensitive information to the media, they don't lie

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<v Speaker 1>to the FISA court. But not all of them do.

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<v Speaker 1>Even the FBI recognizes that they can't even trust all

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<v Speaker 1>of their own agents. And that gets us to restricted access.

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<v Speaker 1>The FBI created files that were marked restricted access and

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<v Speaker 1>what was then known as silent HIT designators. Now I

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<v Speaker 1>don't know this for sure, but it sounds like the

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<v Speaker 1>silent HIT is now being.

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<v Speaker 2>Also called prohibited access.

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<v Speaker 1>So you had restricted access and now you have prohibited access.

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<v Speaker 2>Now.

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<v Speaker 1>The major feature here seems to be that a false

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<v Speaker 1>negative is created when you do a search that hits

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<v Speaker 1>on one of those restricted or prohibited access files. In

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<v Speaker 1>other words, it returns no information. So if you're searching,

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<v Speaker 1>you're told there's no file, there's no reference to your inquiry.

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<v Speaker 1>Apparently that's not new. Restricted access means that when an

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<v Speaker 1>FBI employed, doesn't that be an agent could be you know,

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<v Speaker 1>a clerk when they run a name or any other information,

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<v Speaker 1>they know a file or a reference exists, they just

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<v Speaker 1>can't see it. But for security reasons, the FBI might

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<v Speaker 1>not want just any employee to know that a file

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<v Speaker 1>even exists, so they created the silent hip feature. Now

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<v Speaker 1>when that happened, and notice is sense somewhere I don't know,

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<v Speaker 1>the head of the office, maybe the head of security

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<v Speaker 1>in the Security Division, I don't know, but that but

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<v Speaker 1>it gets sent somewhere advising something like, hey, special Agent

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<v Speaker 1>Brown in Denver just ran a search for.

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<v Speaker 2>Let's say Helen.

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<v Speaker 1>Or or not Helen or oh what was that damn

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<v Speaker 1>woman's name in Nelly or Nelly or someone you know.

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<v Speaker 1>Special Agent Brown just ran a search with an inquiry

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<v Speaker 1>for Nelly or.

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<v Speaker 2>Now.

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<v Speaker 1>I don't see I'm the one that made the request.

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<v Speaker 1>I see no return. But somebody within the agency, probably

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<v Speaker 1>within the Security Division.

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<v Speaker 2>And my guess is.

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<v Speaker 1>Probably now whether this is still true with Cash Ptel

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<v Speaker 1>and Dan Bongenio, I don't know, but at least with

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<v Speaker 1>Christopher Ray, it was true that somebody in headquarters got

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<v Speaker 1>notified that, uh, oh, somebody's trying to get access. They've

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<v Speaker 1>ran a word surge and they there was a hit

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<v Speaker 1>on a prohibited or restricted access file. Wow, you don't

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<v Speaker 1>infest your own people, law enforcement that they're all looking

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<v Speaker 1>over their shoulders. This is fascinating to me. You remember

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<v Speaker 1>the oh what was this Robert Hanson, the FBI trader.

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<v Speaker 1>He was the head of the FBI counter intelligence that

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<v Speaker 1>sold classified documents to the Soviets for decades, ran himself

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<v Speaker 1>in indices all the time to find out if he

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<v Speaker 1>was the subject of an espionage in thestigation, and in

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<v Speaker 1>fact he was. I'd be shocked if every spy in

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<v Speaker 1>the modern era everywhere hasn't at one time done the same.

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<v Speaker 1>If if I knew that I Heart kept separate files,

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<v Speaker 1>sensitive prohibited restricted files on me on a rod or

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<v Speaker 1>on Redbeard, and I had access to run a search,

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<v Speaker 1>damn right, I would, And you know you do it too.

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<v Speaker 1>For restricted access and prohibited access files make imminent sense

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<v Speaker 1>in that regard. Not everybody with an FBI credential or

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<v Speaker 1>clearance should have access to everything.

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<v Speaker 2>Michael, there is no doubt in my mind that my

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<v Speaker 2>heart has some quote special files on you.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, I see, I don't even want to think about that.

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<v Speaker 1>So remember all this whole controversy that erupted last week

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<v Speaker 1>centers around Crossfire Hurricane and all the communications about that

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<v Speaker 1>Russia Russia Russian investigation. So it makes this whole story

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<v Speaker 1>automatically political. Both pro Trump and anti Trump actions can

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<v Speaker 1>find and acts to grind if they want to. With

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<v Speaker 1>the notion that all files related to Crossfire Hurricane were

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<v Speaker 1>not accessible to FBI agents who were looking and had

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<v Speaker 1>good reason to be looking, and in the case of

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<v Speaker 1>the new memo, it was the Washington Field Office agents

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<v Speaker 1>on a criminal squad who probably had limited at least

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<v Speaker 1>some official knowledge of Crossfire Hurricane at the time, hence

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<v Speaker 1>their frustration. So there are a lot of I shouldn't

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<v Speaker 1>say a lot. There's been a few lawyers on my

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<v Speaker 1>ex speed that I've seen, but a lot of keyboard

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<v Speaker 1>warriors on X also claiming that so called prohibited access

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<v Speaker 1>forwards what is known as the Brady rule. Do you

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<v Speaker 1>remember the Brady rule that should be note in your

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<v Speaker 1>law school notebook. That's the Supreme Court ruling that requires

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<v Speaker 1>the prosecutors the government, if you will to turn over

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<v Speaker 1>any exculpatory information to a defendant, any information that is

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<v Speaker 1>beneficial to a defendant, you're required to give that information

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<v Speaker 1>to them. It's called the Brady rule. Now, the critics

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<v Speaker 1>claim that if the FBI can't find the information because

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<v Speaker 1>it's prohibited, then it can't be turned over under the

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<v Speaker 1>Brady rule. But then there are others that are arguing

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<v Speaker 1>that there are many cases that are going to be

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<v Speaker 1>overturned because of this. I happen to fall on the

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<v Speaker 1>side of that. If this is Brady evidence, if this

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<v Speaker 1>is evidence in favor of showing that Trump was not

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<v Speaker 1>guilty of stuff, or for that matter, anybody else.

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<v Speaker 2>Involved in the Russia collusion oaks, I.

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<v Speaker 1>Don't care whether it's in a prohibited file, a restricted file,

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<v Speaker 1>or prohibited access file.

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<v Speaker 2>I don't care what you call it. You have it.

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<v Speaker 1>And just because if you are the person in charge

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<v Speaker 1>of responding to a subpoena that you don't have access

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<v Speaker 1>to it, that's not an excuse you have to make.

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<v Speaker 1>At least in the private sector, you do. You know,

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<v Speaker 1>sometimes you will get I saw a letter that I

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<v Speaker 1>forget whether it was Comer or Jim Jordan or somebody

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00:20:00.240 --> 00:20:04.680
<v Speaker 1>had sent some person who is the head of some

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<v Speaker 1>NGO and Congress is doing some investigation, and I you know,

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<v Speaker 1>as a lawyer, I've drafted these lawyers these letters, and

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<v Speaker 1>I've received these letters, and we have a clients before

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<v Speaker 1>where it basically says you're under investigation and we want

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<v Speaker 1>you to preserve and then here's a list everything. Well,

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<v Speaker 1>I know that I would advise my client that you

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<v Speaker 1>need to search everywhere all four corners of your business,

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<v Speaker 1>all four corners of your operation, to find any and

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<v Speaker 1>all relevant material. And if I were back in my

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00:20:53.200 --> 00:20:57.039
<v Speaker 1>old days as general counsel at FEMA, and if we

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<v Speaker 1>had files like this one, I would hope that I

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00:21:01.759 --> 00:21:04.440
<v Speaker 1>would know about it. If I didn't, hedge would roll.

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<v Speaker 1>But assuming that I knew about it, if we had

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<v Speaker 1>a subpoena asking for all documentation about Katrina, whatever it

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00:21:16.400 --> 00:21:17.160
<v Speaker 1>might be, I don't care.

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<v Speaker 2>What is nine to eleven whatever, I would.

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<v Speaker 1>Tell them, don't necessarily turn that information over yet, but

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00:21:27.400 --> 00:21:32.039
<v Speaker 1>acknowledge that we have it and we're reviewing it for

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<v Speaker 1>national security purposes. And once we get clearance from the

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00:21:37.160 --> 00:21:41.119
<v Speaker 1>White House, the CIA, the DIA, the NSSAY and everybody,

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<v Speaker 1>we'll give it to you. But I'll tell you we

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<v Speaker 1>have it, and I might give you a general summary

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<v Speaker 1>of what it might be.

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<v Speaker 2>Well, all of this is nonsense. Now, I don't know.

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<v Speaker 1>I would guess that the number of prohibited access files

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<v Speaker 1>that the FBI is probably pretty small. Almost all are

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00:22:02.359 --> 00:22:05.559
<v Speaker 1>probably intelligence cases that will never see the inside of

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<v Speaker 1>a court room because they're classified and a judge, a

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00:22:08.880 --> 00:22:13.000
<v Speaker 1>judge might review them if the judge, you know, in

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00:22:13.079 --> 00:22:16.920
<v Speaker 1>the case, if the judge is handling a national security case,

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00:22:17.200 --> 00:22:19.039
<v Speaker 1>the judge will have a clearance and be able to

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00:22:19.039 --> 00:22:21.559
<v Speaker 1>review them, but that does not mean that the judge

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00:22:21.640 --> 00:22:25.839
<v Speaker 1>is going to release them for the trial. Even high

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00:22:25.880 --> 00:22:30.319
<v Speaker 1>profile criminal cases that do eventually involve prosecutions are assigned

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00:22:30.319 --> 00:22:33.839
<v Speaker 1>to case agents who likely have access to everything and

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00:22:33.920 --> 00:22:39.759
<v Speaker 1>know what's in these prohibited files, and they know what's important,

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00:22:40.160 --> 00:22:41.839
<v Speaker 1>and they know what has to be turned over under

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00:22:41.839 --> 00:22:48.880
<v Speaker 1>the Brady rule. So even in the Grassly memo example,

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<v Speaker 1>there is so much known about Crossfire, Hurricane and Nelly

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<v Speaker 1>or the subject of the memo and the rabbit Hole alert,

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<v Speaker 1>it's I think highly unlikely that anything in a prohibitive file.

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<v Speaker 1>Remember this is back in twenty nineteen. We're talking about

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00:23:06.559 --> 00:23:09.519
<v Speaker 1>twenty twenty five. Now, isn't it amazing how long you have?

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<v Speaker 1>I mean, that seems like yesterday talking about crossfire hurricane,

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<v Speaker 1>the Russian collusion hoax. On the left hand, that seems

331
00:23:17.000 --> 00:23:20.319
<v Speaker 1>like yesterday, and then when you realize that's twenty nineteen,

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00:23:20.640 --> 00:23:26.240
<v Speaker 1>that seems like a century ago. Well back to Crossfire

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<v Speaker 1>Hurricane and Nelly or the subject of that memo, since

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00:23:32.640 --> 00:23:37.880
<v Speaker 1>this was six years ago. I'm guessing, purely guessing that

335
00:23:38.039 --> 00:23:41.720
<v Speaker 1>most of all of the information was a venture eventually

336
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<v Speaker 1>released from prohibited status.

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<v Speaker 2>But my.

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<v Speaker 1>Cynicism about the federal government at large, all government in general,

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00:23:56.480 --> 00:24:01.920
<v Speaker 1>the FBI in particular, I don't know that I really

340
00:24:02.559 --> 00:24:06.240
<v Speaker 1>would say that. I think most of that's been released.

341
00:24:08.359 --> 00:24:13.039
<v Speaker 1>But a complicating factor is this, The Grassy Memo occurred

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00:24:13.119 --> 00:24:17.599
<v Speaker 1>during e turn over in the Crossfire Hurricane investigation from

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00:24:17.720 --> 00:24:20.480
<v Speaker 1>Bob Muller, the Special Council. Remember he got the case

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00:24:20.519 --> 00:24:26.400
<v Speaker 1>back in what twenty seventeen back to the FBI. So

345
00:24:26.480 --> 00:24:30.000
<v Speaker 1>the files have gone back and forth. Now that may

346
00:24:30.039 --> 00:24:35.440
<v Speaker 1>seem innocuous to you, but anytime files are transferred, you

347
00:24:35.559 --> 00:24:38.480
<v Speaker 1>run the risk that they're going to be intercepted, either

348
00:24:39.279 --> 00:24:43.640
<v Speaker 1>you know, overtly or covertly on purpose or accidentally. Those

349
00:24:43.720 --> 00:24:47.640
<v Speaker 1>files are going to get released. Remember how there were

350
00:24:47.680 --> 00:24:51.279
<v Speaker 1>twenty seven phones assigned to Bob Moller. Remember this, It's

351
00:24:51.279 --> 00:24:53.839
<v Speaker 1>so easy to forget all this stuff. Bob Muller had

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00:24:53.880 --> 00:24:57.880
<v Speaker 1>twenty seven I think they were iPhones, and they got

353
00:24:57.920 --> 00:25:03.119
<v Speaker 1>wiped before they returned to Now, why do you suppose

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00:25:03.160 --> 00:25:07.279
<v Speaker 1>that is why?

355
00:25:08.160 --> 00:25:08.319
<v Speaker 2>Now?

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00:25:08.319 --> 00:25:12.039
<v Speaker 1>I think the FBI can be held accountable. Now special

357
00:25:12.039 --> 00:25:15.519
<v Speaker 1>counsels that fade away probably cannot. But maybe in the

358
00:25:15.559 --> 00:25:22.000
<v Speaker 1>future special council should not have prohibited access authority. In fact,

359
00:25:22.680 --> 00:25:26.680
<v Speaker 1>maybe we shouldn't have that classification at all, or if

360
00:25:26.720 --> 00:25:30.599
<v Speaker 1>there is, maybe there ought to be available to somebody,

361
00:25:31.000 --> 00:25:34.720
<v Speaker 1>you know, free. I'll just go back to my homeland

362
00:25:34.720 --> 00:25:38.519
<v Speaker 1>security days. So we had security officers, and I don't

363
00:25:38.519 --> 00:25:41.400
<v Speaker 1>mean like physical security officers. I mean the people that

364
00:25:41.480 --> 00:25:46.279
<v Speaker 1>dealt with clearances and classifications and everything. And so they

365
00:25:46.519 --> 00:25:51.519
<v Speaker 1>had clearances that pretty much gave them access to virtually everything.

366
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<v Speaker 1>They were very well vetted, and they were under incredible restrictions.

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00:26:00.799 --> 00:26:04.759
<v Speaker 1>The FBI at least have those security officers. I don't

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00:26:04.759 --> 00:26:07.519
<v Speaker 1>know whether they do or not. I can't determine whether

369
00:26:07.519 --> 00:26:09.119
<v Speaker 1>they do or not. I mean, I know they have

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<v Speaker 1>to have security officers, I think. To refine my point,

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<v Speaker 1>I'm not really sure they have access to these prohibited

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<v Speaker 1>access files. So does this mean everything is now okay, No,

373
00:26:19.720 --> 00:26:22.759
<v Speaker 1>it does not. Like everything in law enforcement, everything in

374
00:26:22.799 --> 00:26:27.440
<v Speaker 1>the intelligence agencies, there needs to be some guardrails. And

375
00:26:27.480 --> 00:26:32.839
<v Speaker 1>in the case of these restricted and prohibited files, if

376
00:26:33.000 --> 00:26:37.559
<v Speaker 1>the following things don't exist, then they need to be created.

377
00:26:38.599 --> 00:26:39.400
<v Speaker 2>And let's just do this.

378
00:26:39.480 --> 00:26:41.559
<v Speaker 1>Let's take a break early, and I'll go through what

379
00:26:41.599 --> 00:26:43.200
<v Speaker 1>I think they need to do. And I think that

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<v Speaker 1>Bongino and Patel, and quite frankly, I think Senator Grassley

381
00:26:49.960 --> 00:26:53.559
<v Speaker 1>needs to take the lead on this. I'm not criticizing

382
00:26:53.599 --> 00:26:57.440
<v Speaker 1>Patel and Bongino by any means. I'm just saying that

383
00:26:57.680 --> 00:26:59.720
<v Speaker 1>this ought to be done in conjunction with the United

384
00:26:59.759 --> 00:27:05.079
<v Speaker 1>States Senate because they have oversight responsibility and there needs

385
00:27:05.119 --> 00:27:09.839
<v Speaker 1>to be some institutional knowledge about how the FBI maintains

386
00:27:09.880 --> 00:27:14.559
<v Speaker 1>these files. Because when you start as we now are

387
00:27:14.599 --> 00:27:18.960
<v Speaker 1>in this current environment, when we have investigations about sitting presidents,

388
00:27:20.279 --> 00:27:27.079
<v Speaker 1>including the former president, then somebody on Capitol Hill needs

389
00:27:27.079 --> 00:27:31.599
<v Speaker 1>to understand how they keep files. Of course, I kind

390
00:27:31.640 --> 00:27:35.920
<v Speaker 1>of believe this about life in general, not just law enforcement,

391
00:27:36.079 --> 00:27:39.680
<v Speaker 1>not just the intel agencies, not just government. But you know,

392
00:27:39.839 --> 00:27:43.839
<v Speaker 1>you raise your kids, you have guardrails. You know, we

393
00:27:44.319 --> 00:27:48.200
<v Speaker 1>have in this highly regulated industry, we have guardrails.

394
00:27:49.200 --> 00:27:53.200
<v Speaker 2>You know, there was oh, I know what it was.

395
00:27:53.839 --> 00:27:54.599
<v Speaker 2>So there was.

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00:27:54.640 --> 00:28:02.960
<v Speaker 1>A EAS alert on television at the other day, and

397
00:28:03.119 --> 00:28:08.240
<v Speaker 1>I naturally just started mimicking the sound. If I did

398
00:28:08.279 --> 00:28:12.279
<v Speaker 1>that right now on this microphone, that's subject to a

399
00:28:12.480 --> 00:28:18.039
<v Speaker 1>huge fine by the FCC. And I mimicked the tone

400
00:28:18.079 --> 00:28:20.799
<v Speaker 1>simply because I was in charge of the EAES when

401
00:28:20.799 --> 00:28:23.119
<v Speaker 1>I was the under Secretary of Homelandsecurity. So it's kind

402
00:28:23.160 --> 00:28:25.039
<v Speaker 1>of like, I still take the test about it. It's

403
00:28:25.039 --> 00:28:28.519
<v Speaker 1>really stupid. I just believe in guardrails.

404
00:28:29.920 --> 00:28:30.119
<v Speaker 2>Now.

405
00:28:30.160 --> 00:28:35.240
<v Speaker 1>I don't think that all guardrails need to remain permanently.

406
00:28:35.720 --> 00:28:39.480
<v Speaker 1>And I think guardrails change, and some guardrails are effective

407
00:28:39.519 --> 00:28:42.640
<v Speaker 1>and some guardrails aren't. But you can't go through life

408
00:28:42.640 --> 00:28:46.680
<v Speaker 1>without some guardrails. And I think that this action that

409
00:28:46.759 --> 00:28:50.640
<v Speaker 1>we're now learning simply because Chuck Grassley sends a letter

410
00:28:51.160 --> 00:28:58.039
<v Speaker 1>and says, I heard about prohibited access and now six

411
00:28:58.160 --> 00:29:04.480
<v Speaker 1>years later. Now I can't ascertain for sure exactly when

412
00:29:04.559 --> 00:29:13.079
<v Speaker 1>they started doing this, but this is your government, our government,

413
00:29:14.720 --> 00:29:20.880
<v Speaker 1>acting outside any guardrails. Now, I get that again. I've

414
00:29:20.920 --> 00:29:25.640
<v Speaker 1>actually been in briefings where it's at the TSSCI level,

415
00:29:26.119 --> 00:29:28.960
<v Speaker 1>but everything's always on a need to know basis. So

416
00:29:29.359 --> 00:29:31.640
<v Speaker 1>I've actually been inside the Pentagon in the OP center

417
00:29:31.920 --> 00:29:36.359
<v Speaker 1>when we're getting briefed by you know, some operationals guy

418
00:29:36.720 --> 00:29:39.839
<v Speaker 1>that's on a screen somewhere that's sitting in Afghanistan or

419
00:29:39.880 --> 00:29:43.279
<v Speaker 1>wherever the hell he was, and he then says, now,

420
00:29:43.279 --> 00:29:47.359
<v Speaker 1>I want to go to program and they're usually two letters.

421
00:29:47.559 --> 00:29:51.200
<v Speaker 1>I want to go to a program DX. So if

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<v Speaker 1>you're not cleared for program DX, please leave the room.

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<v Speaker 1>And I would pull out my little card, both the

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<v Speaker 1>size of a business laminated business card, and I'd look

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<v Speaker 1>to see if those two letters were on my card,

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<v Speaker 1>and if they weren't, I wasn't ready into that program,

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<v Speaker 1>So I'd get up and leave. And then I so

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<v Speaker 1>I'd go sit outside and wait until they open the door.

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<v Speaker 2>You can come back in. Now, Well, I understand the need.

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<v Speaker 1>To keep some things separate, and you've got to have

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<v Speaker 1>compartment some compartmentalization. But if you're going to do that,

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<v Speaker 1>then Congress needs to know about it, and if we're

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<v Speaker 1>going to do it, for that matter, the President and

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<v Speaker 1>the administration need to know about it. This is another

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<v Speaker 1>example of where I understand why people are distrustful of

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<v Speaker 1>law enforcement. Now I think sometimes that distrust is way overblown.

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<v Speaker 1>But prohibited access this reeks of Jay Edgar Hoover. This

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<v Speaker 1>reeks of we're going to keep secret files on our enemies.

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<v Speaker 1>We're going to keep an enemy's list, And in this case,

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<v Speaker 1>the enemy just happened to be one Donald J.

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<v Speaker 2>Trump.

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<v Speaker 1>So when a case moves to the prospective phase, it

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<v Speaker 1>needs to migrate from prohibited, if it ever should have

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<v Speaker 1>been prohibited in the first place. When a case is closed,

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00:31:22.920 --> 00:31:26.599
<v Speaker 1>it needs to migrate out of prohibited. When an inspector

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<v Speaker 1>General starts an investigation, the file needs to move or

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00:31:29.880 --> 00:31:32.359
<v Speaker 1>at least the inspector General needs to be informed about

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<v Speaker 1>the file. And I think in most cases, I'm not

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<v Speaker 1>willing to say all cases, but I think in most cases,

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<v Speaker 1>when Congress asks at least portions of the file need

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<v Speaker 1>to be made available, and if they're not going to

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<v Speaker 1>be made available, then there needs to be a very

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<v Speaker 1>specific reason why, or the chairman of the oversight committee

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<v Speaker 1>ought to be able to see at least the portion

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<v Speaker 1>is not going to be disclosed. Can I can see

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<v Speaker 1>examples where where the director Cash Pateel or the deputy

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<v Speaker 1>director Bongino might have to brief a member, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>on an intelligence committee rather than just blank and respond

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<v Speaker 1>to a request.

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<v Speaker 2>But I just wanted to bring this to you. This

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<v Speaker 2>all blew up on X last week and I'm just

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<v Speaker 2>now getting around to it. But it's it

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<v Speaker 1>Just seems to me that it's another example of how

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<v Speaker 1>little we understand about just how devious the government is

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<v Speaker 1>the enemy within
