Speaker 1: Let's see now if this is true, not that I
Speaker 1: would ever think you Goober's would send me something that's
Speaker 1: not true. I would never think that. But if this
Speaker 1: is true. Eleven eighty four, I found out that the
Speaker 1: weirdo who firebombed the Tesla dealership in Vegas and the
Speaker 1: weirdo who fire bombed people in Boulder, they lived less
Speaker 1: than a mile away from each other. In color lot
Speaker 1: of springs. Things that make you go, hmm, this is
Speaker 1: pretty good. Fifty four to thirty one. The left will continue.
Speaker 1: This is why it is exactly what I just said.
Speaker 1: The left will continue to downplay the riots until they
Speaker 1: get what they want, which is when a national Guard
Speaker 1: or even worse, the Marines kill someone. If that happens,
Speaker 1: we will never hear the.
Speaker 2: End of it.
Speaker 1: Someone on X yesterday described that scenario as the shot
Speaker 1: that will be heard around the world, and that's probably
Speaker 1: be true. Yes, we had the kids that were throwing
Speaker 1: the rocks at cars. Someone got killed, and they were
Speaker 1: just I think just this past week, or maybe it
Speaker 1: was this week, they were convicted, actually think convicted of murder.
Speaker 2: Thirty six oh two. Rights.
Speaker 1: Here's some perspective. There was a Coldplay concert the other
Speaker 1: night there were riots and a Rockies game all at
Speaker 1: the same time. Well, was the riot because the Rocky
Speaker 1: sucks so badly? Or was that a separate riot? Was
Speaker 1: that a riot trying to get rid of Montford? As
Speaker 1: the owner of what was going on, our TD received
Speaker 1: complaints that the trains had stopped running at twelve thirty.
Speaker 1: People were stranded and each didn't know about the other.
Speaker 1: What a world we live in when a riot and
Speaker 1: a Coldplay concert com collide. By the way, there were
Speaker 1: up eighty thousand people the Coldplay concert. Wow, Well, just remember.
Speaker 1: I kind of think my mindset today is that everything
Speaker 1: that's going on is this battle for our minds, and
Speaker 1: that's nothing new that's been going on forever. Advertisers know
Speaker 1: they're in a battle for your mind so that they
Speaker 1: can get your dollar. News is in a battle for
Speaker 1: your ears. Radios and eyes. Radios in a battle for
Speaker 1: your ears. We're all in these great battles, and you're
Speaker 1: just upon in the game of life, says Mondo. So
Speaker 1: there was an FBI crisis last week on social media,
Speaker 1: and it centered around something called prohibited files. Now, as
Speaker 1: much as I've dealt with the FBI in my lifetime.
Speaker 1: I've never heard of this. This was all news to me.
Speaker 1: So it started about a week ago when Grassley, the
Speaker 1: Senator from Iowa, who has been a staunch critical the FBI,
Speaker 1: released a twenty nineteen FBI memo. It was an email
Speaker 1: form in email format. We're in the memo. The author
Speaker 1: of that memo, who was an FBI agent Duh, noted
Speaker 1: that some of the files he was trying to get
Speaker 1: were prohibited access. Prohibited access.
Speaker 2: Now, all of my.
Speaker 1: Clearances that I had, and in all of the forms
Speaker 1: I had to fill out, and all of the cover
Speaker 1: sheets that I ever saw that you know, this is secret,
Speaker 1: this is top secret, this is TSSCI.
Speaker 2: This is.
Speaker 1: FOUO for official use only. I mean, just all the
Speaker 1: different classifications. I'd never heard of prohibited access. And apparently
Speaker 1: these files were related to Crossfire Hurricane, you know, that's
Speaker 1: the FBI code word for.
Speaker 2: The Russia collusion investigation.
Speaker 1: And these files apparently related specifically to Nelly Or, who
Speaker 1: the Center had referred to the Department of Justice for
Speaker 1: obstruction of Congress charges. Now, trust me, you can go
Speaker 1: down a really deep rabbit hole if you don't grasp
Speaker 1: the complex, the complex nature of crossfire hurricane. Every time
Speaker 1: I hear crossfire hurricane, all you can think about is
Speaker 1: the rolling stones. So let me give you some background.
Speaker 1: One of j Edgar Hoover's legacies was creating a record system.
Speaker 1: And this is one hundred years ago probably now, while
Speaker 1: it has certainly been over come by the modern technology
Speaker 1: we use today for filing system I mean when you
Speaker 1: think about a filing system today, I mean I still
Speaker 1: think I still have a file cabinet at home because
Speaker 1: I still have you know, the colored you know, Manila
Speaker 1: folders that have you know, certain records in it. You know,
Speaker 1: I got my tax records. Some of it's all duplicated.
Speaker 1: You know, I have hard copies of my tax returns
Speaker 1: and I have electronic copies of my tax returns. There
Speaker 1: are certain other documents I keep hard copies of and
Speaker 1: electronic electronic copies of. So when you think about filing systems,
Speaker 1: the old filing system by Jay Edgar Hoover really has
Speaker 1: been overtaken by modern technology.
Speaker 2: And you know you got file.
Speaker 1: Folders on your computer. Every field office and FBI headquarters
Speaker 1: maintains an index card file system. So when communications came
Speaker 1: into any of these offices or went out of the offices.
Speaker 1: The FBI agents would index important information from the file
Speaker 1: by underlining that with a red or blue pencil, read
Speaker 1: for subjects of investigations, blew us for references, and then
Speaker 1: the location of the file or the serial record or
Speaker 1: number was then recorded on an index card.
Speaker 2: Remember going to.
Speaker 1: The library, and in the library you'd have the index
Speaker 1: cards where you would go search for, you know, the book. Oh,
Speaker 1: here's the book. I'm going You get the you get
Speaker 1: the index number and go find it. They were kind
Speaker 1: of doing the same thing. So I tried to find
Speaker 1: an example, and here here's the best I can come
Speaker 1: up with. Uh, I think this if if there are
Speaker 1: any FBI agents which I happen to know down in
Speaker 1: Arizona a couple of places we gut FBI agent is listening.
Speaker 1: If this example doesn't work, to send me a text
Speaker 1: message and tell me why it doesn't work.
Speaker 2: Here's an example.
Speaker 1: You might have a file number ninety one a dash
Speaker 1: bs DASH one two, three four DASH one. Say Joe
Speaker 1: bag of doughnuts was the subject of an arm robbery
Speaker 1: investigation in Denver. He would be indexed in red into
Speaker 1: the file ninety one A. That's a designator for armed
Speaker 1: bank robbery, and then it would be you should have
Speaker 1: done ds BS I think would be for Boston, DS
Speaker 1: would probably be for or DV, or DN would be
Speaker 1: for Denver. One, two, three, four would be the file number,
Speaker 1: and then the DASH one that would be the first
Speaker 1: serial that would be in that entirety, entire file. So
Speaker 1: then later in the investigation, an important witness was developed,
Speaker 1: Betty boot It's indexed in the same file as a reference,
Speaker 1: so she would be underlined or highlighted as blue. And
Speaker 1: then a later serial maybe number seventeen or something. So
Speaker 1: then if an agent in outside Denver, maybe in Boston
Speaker 1: or Detroit, wanted to know if there were any FBI
Speaker 1: files on the you know, Joe Bagadonnuts or whoever it
Speaker 1: was that was the robber or on Betty Boop, he
Speaker 1: could send a lead out to every office and into
Speaker 1: the headquarters to check intoses for any files on those individuals.
Speaker 1: So a clerk in Boston or in Denver, or even
Speaker 1: a new agent just checking intoseas and responding to leeds,
Speaker 1: which is I think is something all new agents have
Speaker 1: to do, would go to the card file and see
Speaker 1: that you know, mister Bagadonuts mister bank robber was a
Speaker 1: subject and Betty Boop was a reference, and then he
Speaker 1: could send that information back to whatever field agent was
Speaker 1: asking for it. He consented to Detroit, Boston, you know,
Speaker 1: whoever asked for That system existed until the early nineteen nineties,
Speaker 1: and the nineteen nineties was when they first automated the
Speaker 1: case file system. But even then, just like with me,
Speaker 1: paper files remained relevant because it was going to take
Speaker 1: decades in fact, that they still had paper records to
Speaker 1: this day because to migrate all of those files, paper
Speaker 1: files into the automated case file system, the ACS system,
Speaker 1: that would take you know, probably decades to do. And
Speaker 1: of course then you had the very early system of
Speaker 1: electronic filing was not word searchable. You know, today just
Speaker 1: on my laptop, I can go up here and I
Speaker 1: can I can click on this little magnifier looks like
Speaker 1: a little magnifying glass, and the window pops up on
Speaker 1: my book pro for a spotlight search, and I can
Speaker 1: just type in some keywords and that will return to
Speaker 1: me every file, email, everything that's on this hard drive
Speaker 1: that has those keywords. Well, the early system didn't have that.
Speaker 1: The later systems do so indosing indexing is still relevant
Speaker 1: today because with literally billions of pages of information, a
Speaker 1: word search for Michael Brown or John Doe or John
Speaker 1: Smith but might be useless. Too much information is as
Speaker 1: worthless as no information. I find that to be true
Speaker 1: even in my little laptop here.
Speaker 2: So there are.
Speaker 1: Still rules about indexing related to privacy. Well, let's think
Speaker 1: about these hidden files. Open investigations in the early days
Speaker 1: were kept on the squad in a circular file called
Speaker 1: a rotor. Closed files were kept in a room, maybe
Speaker 1: on different floors, in the field office or at headquarters.
Speaker 1: The informant files were kept in a secure room where
Speaker 1: only a few people had access. You had to check out,
Speaker 1: you know, you had to check out informant files for example,
Speaker 1: and if it wasn't your informant, you had to have
Speaker 1: a good reason to check out that file.
Speaker 2: And then you had.
Speaker 1: Especially sensitive files that might be kept in the special
Speaker 1: Agent in charge's office literally in his office or her office.
Speaker 1: Really sensitive files. Well, originally those were kept in J.
Speaker 1: Edgar Hoover's office. Now reportedly a lot of those files
Speaker 1: were destroyed by Hoover's longtime secretary Helen Gandhy. But I'm
Speaker 1: not going to down that rabbit hole right now. So
Speaker 1: you can see that now in the electronic case file
Speaker 1: age where security of files might be a problem. Because
Speaker 1: most of the FBI is somewhat over thirty thousand employees,
Speaker 1: they're all very honorable people. They don't commit espionage, they
Speaker 1: don't leak sensitive information to the media, they don't lie
Speaker 1: to the FISA court. But not all of them do.
Speaker 1: Even the FBI recognizes that they can't even trust all
Speaker 1: of their own agents. And that gets us to restricted access.
Speaker 1: The FBI created files that were marked restricted access and
Speaker 1: what was then known as silent HIT designators. Now I
Speaker 1: don't know this for sure, but it sounds like the
Speaker 1: silent HIT is now being.
Speaker 2: Also called prohibited access.
Speaker 1: So you had restricted access and now you have prohibited access.
Speaker 2: Now.
Speaker 1: The major feature here seems to be that a false
Speaker 1: negative is created when you do a search that hits
Speaker 1: on one of those restricted or prohibited access files. In
Speaker 1: other words, it returns no information. So if you're searching,
Speaker 1: you're told there's no file, there's no reference to your inquiry.
Speaker 1: Apparently that's not new. Restricted access means that when an
Speaker 1: FBI employed, doesn't that be an agent could be you know,
Speaker 1: a clerk when they run a name or any other information,
Speaker 1: they know a file or a reference exists, they just
Speaker 1: can't see it. But for security reasons, the FBI might
Speaker 1: not want just any employee to know that a file
Speaker 1: even exists, so they created the silent hip feature. Now
Speaker 1: when that happened, and notice is sense somewhere I don't know,
Speaker 1: the head of the office, maybe the head of security
Speaker 1: in the Security Division, I don't know, but that but
Speaker 1: it gets sent somewhere advising something like, hey, special Agent
Speaker 1: Brown in Denver just ran a search for.
Speaker 2: Let's say Helen.
Speaker 1: Or or not Helen or oh what was that damn
Speaker 1: woman's name in Nelly or Nelly or someone you know.
Speaker 1: Special Agent Brown just ran a search with an inquiry
Speaker 1: for Nelly or.
Speaker 2: Now.
Speaker 1: I don't see I'm the one that made the request.
Speaker 1: I see no return. But somebody within the agency, probably
Speaker 1: within the Security Division.
Speaker 2: And my guess is.
Speaker 1: Probably now whether this is still true with Cash Ptel
Speaker 1: and Dan Bongenio, I don't know, but at least with
Speaker 1: Christopher Ray, it was true that somebody in headquarters got
Speaker 1: notified that, uh, oh, somebody's trying to get access. They've
Speaker 1: ran a word surge and they there was a hit
Speaker 1: on a prohibited or restricted access file. Wow, you don't
Speaker 1: infest your own people, law enforcement that they're all looking
Speaker 1: over their shoulders. This is fascinating to me. You remember
Speaker 1: the oh what was this Robert Hanson, the FBI trader.
Speaker 1: He was the head of the FBI counter intelligence that
Speaker 1: sold classified documents to the Soviets for decades, ran himself
Speaker 1: in indices all the time to find out if he
Speaker 1: was the subject of an espionage in thestigation, and in
Speaker 1: fact he was. I'd be shocked if every spy in
Speaker 1: the modern era everywhere hasn't at one time done the same.
Speaker 1: If if I knew that I Heart kept separate files,
Speaker 1: sensitive prohibited restricted files on me on a rod or
Speaker 1: on Redbeard, and I had access to run a search,
Speaker 1: damn right, I would, And you know you do it too.
Speaker 1: For restricted access and prohibited access files make imminent sense
Speaker 1: in that regard. Not everybody with an FBI credential or
Speaker 1: clearance should have access to everything.
Speaker 2: Michael, there is no doubt in my mind that my
Speaker 2: heart has some quote special files on you.
Speaker 1: Yeah, I see, I don't even want to think about that.
Speaker 1: So remember all this whole controversy that erupted last week
Speaker 1: centers around Crossfire Hurricane and all the communications about that
Speaker 1: Russia Russia Russian investigation. So it makes this whole story
Speaker 1: automatically political. Both pro Trump and anti Trump actions can
Speaker 1: find and acts to grind if they want to. With
Speaker 1: the notion that all files related to Crossfire Hurricane were
Speaker 1: not accessible to FBI agents who were looking and had
Speaker 1: good reason to be looking, and in the case of
Speaker 1: the new memo, it was the Washington Field Office agents
Speaker 1: on a criminal squad who probably had limited at least
Speaker 1: some official knowledge of Crossfire Hurricane at the time, hence
Speaker 1: their frustration. So there are a lot of I shouldn't
Speaker 1: say a lot. There's been a few lawyers on my
Speaker 1: ex speed that I've seen, but a lot of keyboard
Speaker 1: warriors on X also claiming that so called prohibited access
Speaker 1: forwards what is known as the Brady rule. Do you
Speaker 1: remember the Brady rule that should be note in your
Speaker 1: law school notebook. That's the Supreme Court ruling that requires
Speaker 1: the prosecutors the government, if you will to turn over
Speaker 1: any exculpatory information to a defendant, any information that is
Speaker 1: beneficial to a defendant, you're required to give that information
Speaker 1: to them. It's called the Brady rule. Now, the critics
Speaker 1: claim that if the FBI can't find the information because
Speaker 1: it's prohibited, then it can't be turned over under the
Speaker 1: Brady rule. But then there are others that are arguing
Speaker 1: that there are many cases that are going to be
Speaker 1: overturned because of this. I happen to fall on the
Speaker 1: side of that. If this is Brady evidence, if this
Speaker 1: is evidence in favor of showing that Trump was not
Speaker 1: guilty of stuff, or for that matter, anybody else.
Speaker 2: Involved in the Russia collusion oaks, I.
Speaker 1: Don't care whether it's in a prohibited file, a restricted file,
Speaker 1: or prohibited access file.
Speaker 2: I don't care what you call it. You have it.
Speaker 1: And just because if you are the person in charge
Speaker 1: of responding to a subpoena that you don't have access
Speaker 1: to it, that's not an excuse you have to make.
Speaker 1: At least in the private sector, you do. You know,
Speaker 1: sometimes you will get I saw a letter that I
Speaker 1: forget whether it was Comer or Jim Jordan or somebody
Speaker 1: had sent some person who is the head of some
Speaker 1: NGO and Congress is doing some investigation, and I you know,
Speaker 1: as a lawyer, I've drafted these lawyers these letters, and
Speaker 1: I've received these letters, and we have a clients before
Speaker 1: where it basically says you're under investigation and we want
Speaker 1: you to preserve and then here's a list everything. Well,
Speaker 1: I know that I would advise my client that you
Speaker 1: need to search everywhere all four corners of your business,
Speaker 1: all four corners of your operation, to find any and
Speaker 1: all relevant material. And if I were back in my
Speaker 1: old days as general counsel at FEMA, and if we
Speaker 1: had files like this one, I would hope that I
Speaker 1: would know about it. If I didn't, hedge would roll.
Speaker 1: But assuming that I knew about it, if we had
Speaker 1: a subpoena asking for all documentation about Katrina, whatever it
Speaker 1: might be, I don't care.
Speaker 2: What is nine to eleven whatever, I would.
Speaker 1: Tell them, don't necessarily turn that information over yet, but
Speaker 1: acknowledge that we have it and we're reviewing it for
Speaker 1: national security purposes. And once we get clearance from the
Speaker 1: White House, the CIA, the DIA, the NSSAY and everybody,
Speaker 1: we'll give it to you. But I'll tell you we
Speaker 1: have it, and I might give you a general summary
Speaker 1: of what it might be.
Speaker 2: Well, all of this is nonsense. Now, I don't know.
Speaker 1: I would guess that the number of prohibited access files
Speaker 1: that the FBI is probably pretty small. Almost all are
Speaker 1: probably intelligence cases that will never see the inside of
Speaker 1: a court room because they're classified and a judge, a
Speaker 1: judge might review them if the judge, you know, in
Speaker 1: the case, if the judge is handling a national security case,
Speaker 1: the judge will have a clearance and be able to
Speaker 1: review them, but that does not mean that the judge
Speaker 1: is going to release them for the trial. Even high
Speaker 1: profile criminal cases that do eventually involve prosecutions are assigned
Speaker 1: to case agents who likely have access to everything and
Speaker 1: know what's in these prohibited files, and they know what's important,
Speaker 1: and they know what has to be turned over under
Speaker 1: the Brady rule. So even in the Grassly memo example,
Speaker 1: there is so much known about Crossfire, Hurricane and Nelly
Speaker 1: or the subject of the memo and the rabbit Hole alert,
Speaker 1: it's I think highly unlikely that anything in a prohibitive file.
Speaker 1: Remember this is back in twenty nineteen. We're talking about
Speaker 1: twenty twenty five. Now, isn't it amazing how long you have?
Speaker 1: I mean, that seems like yesterday talking about crossfire hurricane,
Speaker 1: the Russian collusion hoax. On the left hand, that seems
Speaker 1: like yesterday, and then when you realize that's twenty nineteen,
Speaker 1: that seems like a century ago. Well back to Crossfire
Speaker 1: Hurricane and Nelly or the subject of that memo, since
Speaker 1: this was six years ago. I'm guessing, purely guessing that
Speaker 1: most of all of the information was a venture eventually
Speaker 1: released from prohibited status.
Speaker 2: But my.
Speaker 1: Cynicism about the federal government at large, all government in general,
Speaker 1: the FBI in particular, I don't know that I really
Speaker 1: would say that. I think most of that's been released.
Speaker 1: But a complicating factor is this, The Grassy Memo occurred
Speaker 1: during e turn over in the Crossfire Hurricane investigation from
Speaker 1: Bob Muller, the Special Council. Remember he got the case
Speaker 1: back in what twenty seventeen back to the FBI. So
Speaker 1: the files have gone back and forth. Now that may
Speaker 1: seem innocuous to you, but anytime files are transferred, you
Speaker 1: run the risk that they're going to be intercepted, either
Speaker 1: you know, overtly or covertly on purpose or accidentally. Those
Speaker 1: files are going to get released. Remember how there were
Speaker 1: twenty seven phones assigned to Bob Moller. Remember this, It's
Speaker 1: so easy to forget all this stuff. Bob Muller had
Speaker 1: twenty seven I think they were iPhones, and they got
Speaker 1: wiped before they returned to Now, why do you suppose
Speaker 1: that is why?
Speaker 2: Now?
Speaker 1: I think the FBI can be held accountable. Now special
Speaker 1: counsels that fade away probably cannot. But maybe in the
Speaker 1: future special council should not have prohibited access authority. In fact,
Speaker 1: maybe we shouldn't have that classification at all, or if
Speaker 1: there is, maybe there ought to be available to somebody,
Speaker 1: you know, free. I'll just go back to my homeland
Speaker 1: security days. So we had security officers, and I don't
Speaker 1: mean like physical security officers. I mean the people that
Speaker 1: dealt with clearances and classifications and everything. And so they
Speaker 1: had clearances that pretty much gave them access to virtually everything.
Speaker 1: They were very well vetted, and they were under incredible restrictions.
Speaker 1: The FBI at least have those security officers. I don't
Speaker 1: know whether they do or not. I can't determine whether
Speaker 1: they do or not. I mean, I know they have
Speaker 1: to have security officers, I think. To refine my point,
Speaker 1: I'm not really sure they have access to these prohibited
Speaker 1: access files. So does this mean everything is now okay, No,
Speaker 1: it does not. Like everything in law enforcement, everything in
Speaker 1: the intelligence agencies, there needs to be some guardrails. And
Speaker 1: in the case of these restricted and prohibited files, if
Speaker 1: the following things don't exist, then they need to be created.
Speaker 2: And let's just do this.
Speaker 1: Let's take a break early, and I'll go through what
Speaker 1: I think they need to do. And I think that
Speaker 1: Bongino and Patel, and quite frankly, I think Senator Grassley
Speaker 1: needs to take the lead on this. I'm not criticizing
Speaker 1: Patel and Bongino by any means. I'm just saying that
Speaker 1: this ought to be done in conjunction with the United
Speaker 1: States Senate because they have oversight responsibility and there needs
Speaker 1: to be some institutional knowledge about how the FBI maintains
Speaker 1: these files. Because when you start as we now are
Speaker 1: in this current environment, when we have investigations about sitting presidents,
Speaker 1: including the former president, then somebody on Capitol Hill needs
Speaker 1: to understand how they keep files. Of course, I kind
Speaker 1: of believe this about life in general, not just law enforcement,
Speaker 1: not just the intel agencies, not just government. But you know,
Speaker 1: you raise your kids, you have guardrails. You know, we
Speaker 1: have in this highly regulated industry, we have guardrails.
Speaker 2: You know, there was oh, I know what it was.
Speaker 2: So there was.
Speaker 1: A EAS alert on television at the other day, and
Speaker 1: I naturally just started mimicking the sound. If I did
Speaker 1: that right now on this microphone, that's subject to a
Speaker 1: huge fine by the FCC. And I mimicked the tone
Speaker 1: simply because I was in charge of the EAES when
Speaker 1: I was the under Secretary of Homelandsecurity. So it's kind
Speaker 1: of like, I still take the test about it. It's
Speaker 1: really stupid. I just believe in guardrails.
Speaker 2: Now.
Speaker 1: I don't think that all guardrails need to remain permanently.
Speaker 1: And I think guardrails change, and some guardrails are effective
Speaker 1: and some guardrails aren't. But you can't go through life
Speaker 1: without some guardrails. And I think that this action that
Speaker 1: we're now learning simply because Chuck Grassley sends a letter
Speaker 1: and says, I heard about prohibited access and now six
Speaker 1: years later. Now I can't ascertain for sure exactly when
Speaker 1: they started doing this, but this is your government, our government,
Speaker 1: acting outside any guardrails. Now, I get that again. I've
Speaker 1: actually been in briefings where it's at the TSSCI level,
Speaker 1: but everything's always on a need to know basis. So
Speaker 1: I've actually been inside the Pentagon in the OP center
Speaker 1: when we're getting briefed by you know, some operationals guy
Speaker 1: that's on a screen somewhere that's sitting in Afghanistan or
Speaker 1: wherever the hell he was, and he then says, now,
Speaker 1: I want to go to program and they're usually two letters.
Speaker 1: I want to go to a program DX. So if
Speaker 1: you're not cleared for program DX, please leave the room.
Speaker 1: And I would pull out my little card, both the
Speaker 1: size of a business laminated business card, and I'd look
Speaker 1: to see if those two letters were on my card,
Speaker 1: and if they weren't, I wasn't ready into that program,
Speaker 1: So I'd get up and leave. And then I so
Speaker 1: I'd go sit outside and wait until they open the door.
Speaker 2: You can come back in. Now, Well, I understand the need.
Speaker 1: To keep some things separate, and you've got to have
Speaker 1: compartment some compartmentalization. But if you're going to do that,
Speaker 1: then Congress needs to know about it, and if we're
Speaker 1: going to do it, for that matter, the President and
Speaker 1: the administration need to know about it. This is another
Speaker 1: example of where I understand why people are distrustful of
Speaker 1: law enforcement. Now I think sometimes that distrust is way overblown.
Speaker 1: But prohibited access this reeks of Jay Edgar Hoover. This
Speaker 1: reeks of we're going to keep secret files on our enemies.
Speaker 1: We're going to keep an enemy's list, And in this case,
Speaker 1: the enemy just happened to be one Donald J.
Speaker 2: Trump.
Speaker 1: So when a case moves to the prospective phase, it
Speaker 1: needs to migrate from prohibited, if it ever should have
Speaker 1: been prohibited in the first place. When a case is closed,
Speaker 1: it needs to migrate out of prohibited. When an inspector
Speaker 1: General starts an investigation, the file needs to move or
Speaker 1: at least the inspector General needs to be informed about
Speaker 1: the file. And I think in most cases, I'm not
Speaker 1: willing to say all cases, but I think in most cases,
Speaker 1: when Congress asks at least portions of the file need
Speaker 1: to be made available, and if they're not going to
Speaker 1: be made available, then there needs to be a very
Speaker 1: specific reason why, or the chairman of the oversight committee
Speaker 1: ought to be able to see at least the portion
Speaker 1: is not going to be disclosed. Can I can see
Speaker 1: examples where where the director Cash Pateel or the deputy
Speaker 1: director Bongino might have to brief a member, you know,
Speaker 1: on an intelligence committee rather than just blank and respond
Speaker 1: to a request.
Speaker 2: But I just wanted to bring this to you. This
Speaker 2: all blew up on X last week and I'm just
Speaker 2: now getting around to it. But it's it
Speaker 1: Just seems to me that it's another example of how
Speaker 1: little we understand about just how devious the government is
Speaker 1: the enemy within