Speaker 1: What's up, everyone, and welcome back to the program. In
this episode, we're going to dive into some core documents
between Virginia Roberts and Prince Andrew, and this is going
to give us a look behind the scenes at what
the official narrative was and what the official argument was
inside of those core documents that led to Prince Andrew
settling with Virginia Roberts. So let's just dive in and
get started with Part one. Case number twenty one dot
CV DOT sixty seven two. Virginia Jeoffrey, Plaintiff against Prince Andrew,
Duke of York in his personal capacity, also known as
Andrew Albert Christian Edward the defendant. Plaintiff, Virginia Roberts. Jeoffrey
brings this action against defendant Prince Andrew, Duke of York
for battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress. In short,
she alleges that the late Jeffrey Epstein and the others
trafficker to Prince Andrew, who took advantage of her situation
by sexually abusing her when she was under the age
of eighteen. Defendant denies Miss Jeoffrey's allegations and attacks her
credibility and motives. He asserts that she was complicit in
Epstein's unlawful activities, but this is a motion to dismiss
Miss Jeoffrey's complaint as legally insufficient, not to determine the
truth or falsicity of charges in her complaint, and defendant
relies mainly, although not exclusively, on a two thousand and
nine agreement between Miss Joffrey and Epstein that settled a
different lawsuit between Jeoffrey and Epstein that defendant now argues
released him from any liability to Miss Jeoffrey. The fact
that the defendant has brought the matter before the court
on a motion to dismiss the complaint as legally insufficient
is of central importance, as it is well known to lawyers,
but perhaps not known to the lay public. The defendant,
by making this motion, placed upon the court the unyielding
duty to assume, for the purpose of this motion only
the truth of all of the plaintiff's allegations, and to
draw in Plaintiff's favor all inferences that reasonably may be
drawn from those allegations. In consequence, the law prohibits the
court from considering at this stage of the proceedings defendant's
efforts to cast doubt on the truth of Miss Joffrey's allegations,
even though his efforts would be permissible at a trial
in a similar vein and for similar reasons. It's not
open to the court now to decide, as a matter
of fact just what the parties to the release in
the two thousand and nine settlement agreement signed by Miss
Joffrey and mister Epstein actually meant. As will appear more
fully below, the court's job at this juncture is simply
to determine whether there are two or more reasonable interpretations
of that document. If there are, the determination of the
right or controlling interpretation must await further proceedings. The facts,
except as otherwise noted, The facts are drawn from Miss
Jeoffrey's complaint. It bears repeating that its allegations are deemed
true for purposes of this motion, whatever a trier of
fact ultimately might decide at a trial. The Epstein sex
trafficking scheme Plaintiff's allegations arise principally from a sex trafficking
scheme orchestrated by the late sex offender Jeffrey Epstein, which
by now has been publicized widely. According to Miss Joffrey's complaint,
Epstein sexually abused more than thirty minor girls in the
United States and overseas from about nineteen ninety nine two
two thousand seven, in concert with paid employees and others,
notably Glayne Maxwell, who recently was convicted in this district
of sex trafficking in connection with the Epstein events, Epstein
and others lured vulnerable young girls into a scheme for
abuse for Epstein's own sexual gratification and for that of
some of his powerful and wealthy friends. Epstein relied on
Maxwell and others to identify and target vulnerable young girls
in numerous settings, including schools, spas, trailer parks, and the street.
Epstein's recruiters lured these girls into his orbit with the
promise of what appeared to be legitimate massuse's positions. Once
manipulated into returning to one of Epstein's residences, however, the
girls were groomed for abuse by Epstein and others through
displays of wealth, power and sexual imagery. Once initial sexual
abuse had occurred, Epstein and Maxwell further manipulated the victims
with a combination of promises, threats, and surveillance. At its height,
Epstein's sexual abuse scheme, managed principally by Maxwell, was transcontinental.
Using his private jet, Epstein traffick dozens of miners for
sexual abuse at his New York mansion, his New Mexico ranch,
his private island in the US Virgin Islands, his Palm
Beach Floorlorida State, and elsewhere. In two thousand and eight,
he pleaded guilty in Florida to procuring a miner for
a prostitution. Again, according to Miss Jeoffrey's complaint, the defendant
first met Epstein in nineteen ninety nine through the former's
close friend, Glen Maxwell. Over the next several years, the
defendant traveled with Epstein and Maxwell on Epstein's private plane
and was a guest at Epstein's numerous homes, including the
private island in the US Virgin Islands, Little Saint James,
and properties in Palm Beach and New York City. Epstein
and Maxwell were guests at the defendant's fortieth birthday party
in two thousand, as well as at birthday parties that
the defendant threw for Maxwell in Sandringham, United Kingdom in
the same year. In two thousand and six, one month
after the Florida State prosecutors charged Epstein with procuring a
miner for prostitution. The defendant invited Epstein to the eighteenth
birthday party of one of the defendant's daughters as recently
as two thousand and therefore, after Epstein had done jail
time in connection with the two thousand and six Florida
charges and registered as a sex offender, the defendant was
photographed with Epstein and State at Epstein's New York City mansion.
Epstein recruits plaintiff Miss jeoffrey'skin plane continues. Maxwell recruited Miss
Joffrey into Epstein's sex trafficking activities in two thousand, when
Miss Joffrey was sixteen years old and employed at the
Marralago Club in Palm Beach. Like other minor girls whom
Epstein and Maxwell targeted, plaintiff initially was recruited to provide
massages and thereafter to engage in a variety of sexual
acts for Epstein. From two thousand through two thousand and two,
plaintiff traveled frequently with Epstein, both within the United States
and internationally on his private plane. In addition to being
on call for Epstein for sexual purposes, plaintiff on other occasions,
was lent out to other powerful men, including the defendant.
The defendants alleged sexual abuse. The complaint alleges, and the Court,
for present purposes is obliged to accept that the defendant
sexually abused Miss Joffrey when she was under the age
of eighteen years old. On one occasion, defendant allegedly forced
plaintiff to have sex with them against her will, at
Maxwell's home in London. Miss Joffrey's complaint includes a reproduction
of a now widely published photograph of Miss Jeoffrey, Prince Andrew,
and Maxwell at Maxwell's home, which plaintiff says was taken
prior to that event. On another occasion, defendant allegedly abused
Miss Joffrey during a visit to Epstein's private island, Little
Saint James. Miss Joffrey alleges also that defendant abused her
at Epstein's mansion on the Upper East Side of Manhattan,
which lies within this judicial district. During that particular encounter,
Maxwell force plaintiff, a child and another victim to sit
on Prince Andrew's lap as Prince Andrew touched her. During
this visit to New York, according to the complaint, the
defendant forced Miss Joffrey to engage in sex acts against
her will and was aware of both of her age
and that she was coerced into a sex trafficking victim.
In each of these encounters, Plaintiff alleges Epstein, Maxwell and
the defendant compelled her to engage in sexual acts by
express or implied threat. In consequence, Plaintiff feared death or
physical injury to herself or another, among other repercussions, if
she disobeyed. Miss Joffrey asserts the defendant's actions caused and
continue to cause her significant emotional and psychological distress and
harm the Florida State prosecution and the Federal non prosecution agreement.
At this point, it's helpful and appropriate to refer to
facts not alleged in the complaint in this case, but
of which the court takes judicial notice. In July of
two thousand and six, a Florida State grand jury indicted
Epstein in a state court on a single count of
felony solicitation of prostitution, which is the Florida State indictment
as will appear. That charge remain pending until mid two
thousand and eight. As previously noted. Defendant's motion in this
case relies heavily on the two thousand and nine agreement
between Epstein and Miss Joffrey, which already is before the
Court as a matter of judicial notice the two thousand
and nine agreement. The two thousand and nine agreement contains
the following paragraph. The Court takes judicial notice only to
the extent of the fact set fourth in this section
of this opinion, and in this case documents for the
existence of contents of the documents, but not for the
truth of assertions the documents contained. Ce in reply to
SKAT Tax Refund Scheme Litigation Number eighteen h CV DASH
zero five zero five to three LAK twenty twenty WL
seven four nine six two seven two z SDNWY December
twenty one, twenty twenty. Indictment State versus Epstein Case number
zero six DASH nine four five four cf. Florida Circuit Court,
July nineteen, two thousand and six, Reprinted in the Department
of Justice Office of Professional Responsibility Report investigation into the U. S.
Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida's resolution of
its two thousand and six two thousand and eight Federal
Criminal investigation of Jeffrey Epstein and its interactions with victims
during the investigation. Example one November twentieth, twenty twenty. The
OPR report contains a great deal of information about how
the NPA came to pass, but the Court does not
take judicial notice of its statements or consider it in
its deciding motion. The first and second parties further stipulate
and agree that this settlement agreement is pursuant and is
in fulfillment of Jeffrey Epstein's obligation to Virginia Roberts or
Jeoffrey pursueant to and in conformity with a non prosecution agreement,
its addendum and its affirmation between Jeffrey Epstein and the
United States Attorney for the Southern District of Florida. Thus,
the terms of the non prosecution Agreement the NPA may
shed light on the meaning of the two thousand and
nine agreement. The Court therefore takes judicial notice of the NPA,
its addendum and affirmation for present purposes. The following terms
of the NPA are of possible interests. Here one Epstein
agreed to plead guilty to the Florida State indictment and
to a state information charging him with the solicitation of
miners to engage in prostitution. Two, the US Attorney's Office
agreed to provide Epstein's attorneys with a list of individuals
whom it had identified as victims as defined in US
Code eighteen, section twenty two fifty five, and, in consultation
within subjects to the good faith approval of Epstein's council,
would select an attorney representative for these persons, who would
be paid for by Epstein. Epstein's lawyers could contact the
identified individuals through that representative. Three, Epstein agreed that if
one or more of the individuals whom the government had
identified as victims elected to sue Epstein under US Code eighteen,
section twenty two fifty five, Epstein would not contest jurisdiction
over him in the Florida Federal Court and would waive
his right to contest his liability. In addition, he would
waive his right to contest damages up to an amount
as agreed to between the identified individual and Epstein, so
long as the identified individual elected to proceed exclusively under
US Code eighteen, section twenty two fifty five and agree
to waive any other claim for damages, whether pursuant to state, federal,
or common law. Epstein's waivers, however, would not apply to
anyone who had not been identified by the government as
a victim, or having been so identified, did not proceed
exclusively under US Code eighteen, section twenty two to fifty
five four. The US Attorney's Office agreed that it would
not prosecute Epstein nor institute any criminal charges against any
potential co conspirators of Epstein, including but not limited to,
for specifically identified persons, if Epstein pleaded guilty to the
Florida charges and otherwise discharged his obligations under the NPA.
The NPA bears signatures dated variously in late September and
in October of two thousand and seven. Miss Jeffreys can
Plan alleges that Epstein pled guilty to the Florida information
and presumably the indictment in two thousand and eight. All right,
we're going to wrap up part one there, and in
the next episode we're going to pick up with part two.
All of the information that go with this episode can
be found in the description box. What's up, everyone, and
welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles. In this episode, we're
gonna pick up right where we left off with the
opinion from Judge Kaplan in the Prince Andrew and Virginia
Roberts aka Virginia Jeoffrey lawsuit, So let's just get right
back to it. Miss Jeoffrey's Florida suit against Epstein. In
May of two thousand and nine, while Epstein was incarcerated
in Palm Beach County, Florida, as a result of his
guilty plea to the Florida state charges, Miss Joffrey sued
Epstein in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida the Florida Case under US Code eighteen,
Section twenty two fifty five, as an alleged victim of
Epstein's alleged federal sex trafficking, sexual exploitation, and child pornography offenses.
Her complaint asserted that Epstein and Epstein's adult male peers,
including royalty politicians, academics, businessmen, and other professionals and personal acquaintances,
had sexually exploited her. Miss Jeoffrey and Epstein entered into
the two thousand and nine agreement entitled Settlement Agreement and
General Release pursuant to which Jeoffrey voluntarily dismissed her action
against Epstein in exchange for five hundred thousand dollars. The
defendant argues that Miss Joffrey's claims against him are barred
by the terms of the two thousand and nine agreement.
The federal criminal case against Epstein. On July second, twenty nineteen,
a grand jury in this district indicted Epstein for an
alleged sex trafficking conspiracy and the substantiative crime of sex
trafficking in violation of Code eighteen, Section fifteen ninety one.
He was arrested on July eighth, twenty nineteen. On August tenth,
twenty nineteen, Epstein was found dead in his cell at
the Metropolitan Correctional Center two thousand and nine agreement. The
two thousand and nine agreement is the crux of Defendant's motion.
It contains six and the fraction pages of substantiative text,
consisting of nine individually labeled provisions. These are an agreement
to dismiss the Florida case. Section one A one and
a half one half page provision, caption general release that
contains additional covenants beyond the releasing language. Section two A
payment Section Section three a confidentiality provision, Section four, covenants
dealing with maintaining Miss Jeoffrey's anonymity, Section five, a no
contact covenant, Section six, a provision relating to govern in
law an enforcement of the agreement, Section seven, A clause
concerning attorneys fees Section eight, and a collection of miscellaneous
provisions Section nine. A number of these provisions bear importantly
on the resolution of this motion, and are discussed in
detail below, so there is no need to quote or
summarize them in great detail here. Suffice it to say,
by the way of introduction, that this motion raises two
pivotal issues regarding the two thousand and nine Agreement. Whether
the two thousand and nine agreement demonstrates that its releasing
language in section two unambiguously applies to this defendant, and
if so, whether the defendant, who is not a party
two nor mentioned in the agreement, is entitled to invoke it.
The two thousand and nine Agreement is far from a
model of clear and precise drafting. Both sides agree that
mister Epstein and Miss Joffrey agreed to its language, it
must have meant something to them, But Miss Joffrey and
the defendant in this case disagree emphatically as to what
it meant with respect to both issues. The discussion one
dismissal on the basis of the two thousand and nine
agreement is not justified. On this motion a legal principles
one materials properly considered, the defendant moves to dismiss pursuing
to Rule twelve B six. As noted previously, the Court,
in this posture must accept as true all well pleaded
factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences
that can be drawn from them in the light of
the most favorable to the plaintiff, with limited exceptions. This
motion must be decided solely on the basis of the
allegations of the complaint, without regard to any extraneous claims
or materials. The two thousand and nine agreement neither appears
in nor is referred to, in the complaint, but the
copy before the Court concededly is authentic. Its wording, as
distinguished from its legal effect, is undisputed, and the Court
consequently has taken judicial notice of it. Moreover, notwithstanding the
general rule that an affirmative defense is not considered at
this stage of the litigation, such a defense may be
raised by a pre aanswer motion to dismiss on Rule
twelve B six if the defense appears on the face
of the complaint, and while the defendant's argument does not
rest on the face of the complaint. Here that is
a distinction without a difference. In light of the fact
that the wording of the two thousand and nine agreement,
again as distinguished from its legal effect, is accepted by
both parties. Accordingly, the Court considers Defendant's argument two governing law.
The two thousand and nine agreement provides that it shall
be governed by the laws of the state of Florida.
The parties agree Accordingly, the Court applies Florida law to
the two pivotal questions that bear on the defendant's release.
Argument B. Analysis of the two thousand and nine agreement one,
whether the defendant is among the purportedly released persons. We
begin by focusing on the first two pages of the
two thousand and nine agreement, which contains sections one and two.
Section one contains the agreement of plaintiff and Jeffrey Epstein
to dismiss plaint gives Florida case upon receipt of a
monetary payment. Section two, which occupies one and one half
typewritten pages contains, among other things, language by which first
parties generally Miss Joffrey and some others released second parties,
generally Epstein and some others, and any other person or
entity who could have been included as a potential defendant
other potential defendants from all and all manner of claims
that said first parties ever had or may have against Jeffrey,
Epstein or other potential defendants. The defendant insists that he
was among the other potential defendants and therefore was released
by Miss Jeoffrey from all and all manner of claims
that she ever had against him. Miss Jeoffrey maintains, with
equal adamancy that she was not among the other potential
defendants that the parties to the two thousand and nine
agreement had in mind. The basic principles of Florida law
that govern in this aspect of the party's dispute are clear.
Unless contract language is unambiguous and free of conflicting inferences,
ambiguity must be resolved as the question of fact. In
other words, unless the terms of an agreement leave no
reasonable doubt about the intent of the contracting parties, The
ambiguity must be resolved by the trier of fact ordinarrowly
a trial jury. The court may not resolve any such
ambiguity on a motion to dismiss the complaint. Whether a
contract is ambiguous is a question of law, specifically, whether
the agreement in whole, or by its terms and conditions,
is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation. That is
so even where both sides insist that language is unambiguous
but ascribe materially different meanings to it. In this case,
everyone agrees that the phrase could have been included as
a potential defendant other potential defendant must mean something. No
doubt that it is so, nor is there much doubt
that better drafting probably could have eliminated any uncertainty as
to the meaning. In fact, however, the meaning of the
phrase is far from self evident. For a number of reasons.
We perhaps should begin with a question of what was
meant by could have been included as a potential defendant,
as opposed to could have been included as a defendant.
One might suppose that whether one was or could have
been included as a defendant not included as a potential
defendant is clear enough, although even that seemingly simple supposition,
as we will see, is not accurate in the context
of this case. But the concept of inclusion as a
potential defendant is even less capable of a definition if
the quoted language from section two of the two thousand
and nine agreement, that is, the phrase could have been
included as a potential defendant was intended to mean someone
who was not actually a defendant when the two thousand
and nine agreement was signed, but who might have been
a defendant previously. If the plaintiff had named him or
her as an actual defendant, then the word potential would
be entirely superfluous. That is so because the language would
mean exactly the same thing or without the word potential.
Put another way, the phrase under consideration would mean exactly
the same thing, even if one deleted the word potentially entirely.
It is a basic rule of contractual construction that a
contract should be constructed whenever possible, in a manner that
gives meaning to every word and phrase. The presumption is
that contracting parties do not include words or phrases for
no purpose. Nevertheless, the parties have briefed this matter as
if the word potential were not in the agreement at all,
and as the Court sees no other appropriate course, it
will do so. As well, it sees no way to
construe it in a manner that would give non redundant
meaning to the word potential. So we come to the
question of what was meant by the phrase could have
been included as a defendant? At one level, of course,
literally anyone could have been included as a defendant. If
the plaintiff had wished to include someone else, anyone else
as a defendant, she easily could have done so. Someone
can be included as a defendant in a lawsuit simply
by including that person's name in the caption of a complaint.
Nothing else is required, But neither party takes that position,
despite the fact it would be consistent with the literal
terms of the two thousand and nine agreement. Rather, defendant
argues that he could have been included as a potential
defendant in the Florida case because Miss Joffrey made a
general reference to Royalty in her Florida complaint, even though
it did not name Prince Andrew as a defendant, nor
even mention his name. Plaintiff rejoins that Prince Andrew could
not have been included as a defendant in the Florida
case because one, he was not subject to a personal
jurisdiction there and two in any case, the claims that
plaintiff brought against Apstein and the Florida case were based
solely on US Code eighteen, Section twenty two to fifty five,
which created a federal civil cause of action in favor
of anyone who while a minor was injured in consequence
of a violation of any of several federal criminal statutes.
As to the latter, she contends that Prince Andrew could
not have been sued in Florida case under any of
the section twenty two to fifty five predicate statutes because
there was no basis for doing so. The party's respective
position show that they agree that the release language, i e.
The phrase could have been included as a defendant applies
only if there is a nexus between the person in
question and the claim Miss Jeoffrey made against Abstein in
the Florida case. They disagree, however, as to the nature
of the requisite nexus. The defendant argues that the nexus
is the applied by plaintiff's complaint in the Florida case.
It charged Jeffrey Epstein to quote the defendant in this
case with sex trafficking and sexual abuse. It alleged that
girls whom Epstein trafficked were abused by others, including unspecified royalty.
That defendant submits is enough. From the plaintiff's standpoint, Defendant's
position is too extreme, As noted, the Florida complaint did
not mention Prince Andrew. Moreover, Miss Joffrey argues in substance
that one could have been included as a defendant only
if that could have been done on the same basis
as the claim in the Florida case was made against Epstein,
violation of one or more of the section twenty two
fifty five predicate criminal statutes, and even then two only
if that person would have been subject to the personal
jurisdiction of the Florida Court. Yet there is no basis
for concluding that defendant would have been subject to the
personal jurisdiction of the Florida Court. Nothing in Miss Jeoffrey's
Florida complaint indicates that the defendant violated any of the
section twenty two to fifty five predicates, nor is it
reference to royalty sufficient remedy this absence, The crux of
the Florida case was that Epstein harm Miss Joffrey by
trafficking her for sex with himself and with others. Indeed,
Defendant's council made clear at oral arguments his view that
the complaint against Epstein was that Epstein traffic Miss Joffrey
to a number of individuals, forced her into sex slavery,
and forced her to have sex or be sexually abused
by many people, including members of academia, including businessmen, and
the category of royalty. There is no suggestion in the
Florida case that this defendant was himself engaged in sex trafficking.
In considering whether the only reasonable interpretation of the phrase
could have been included as a defendant is one advanced
by the defendant, ie that it would be inherently be
unreasonable to construe that phrase as referring only to persons
who could have been sued in the Florida case on
essentially the same theory as was Epstein, and over whom
the Florida Court could have exercised personal jurisdiction. It is
helpful also to consider the context in which the two
thousand and nine agreement was signed to the extent context
can be ascertained on the present record. Of course, we
do not know what, if anything, went through the party's
minds with respect to the specific terms of the two
thousand and nine agreement. Hypothetically, we can imagine that someone
in Epstein's position might have thought at the time this
agreement to settle the Florida case was made. At least
some of the goals of such a person presumably would
have been to end the Florida case, to gain as
much protection for himself as he could against involvement in
similar litigation in the future, and to do so for
an acceptable price. In other words, a possible concern could
have been that one Miss Joffrey, having settled with Epstein,
would sue someone else else two, who in turn might
make a claim against Epstein, a a claim over based
on a contention that Epstein should bear or at least
contribute to, any liability that person might be found to
have to Miss Joffrey. Obtaining a release from Miss Joffrey
of claims against such a person therefore could eliminate the
possibility of a claim over against Epstein. But the objectives
of one in Epstein's position were unlikely to have been
shared by other contracting party. An individual in Miss Jeoffrey's position,
and that matters. The goals of one in Miss Joffrey's
position hypothetically could have included getting as much money as
she could for settling the case and keeping as much
of her freedom to go after other alleged wrongdoers as
she could while still getting an acceptable sum of money.
Limiting the release language to persons who could have been
sued in a particular court on a particular type of
claim could secure that freedom to a substantial degree. The
logic of the situation thus suggests that the parties to
the two thousand and nine agreement had competing goals, and
the muddled release language that they agreed upon suggests that
they may have arrived at something of a middle ground,
a release extending not as broadly as Epstein ideally may
have wanted, and somewhat more broadly than what would have
been best case outcome for Ms. Joffrey. Moreover, it would
not be unreasonable to recognize, among other considerations, that the
settlement amount may have been affected by the views of
both parties concerning the terms of the release. Epstein perhaps
would not have been willing to pay a price demanded
for the broadest possible release of other persons, or short
of that clearer language. Concerning the nexus between other potential
defendants and claims in the Florida case, there are additional
considerations supporting the reasonableness of plaintiff's interpretation of the phrase
could have been included as a defendant. For one thing,
the Florida case was brought in a federal court. The
sole alleged basis of federal jurisdiction was section twenty two
to fifty five of Title eighteen of the United States Code,
which confers subject matter jurisdiction on federal courts only with
respect to claims based on alleged violations of certain federal
criminal statutes. The complaint in the Florida case specifically alleged
that Epstein had committed a number of such violations, but
at nowhere alleges that this defendant committed any. It's not
clear that a claim in the Florida case against this
defendant would have been within the subject matter jurisdiction of
the Florida court, even on a co conspirator or supplemental
jurisdiction theory. It is questionable also whether the Florida court
could have exercised personal jurisdiction over this defendant even assuming
the subject matter jurisdiction existed. All right, folks, we're gonna
wrap up with part two here and in the next
episode we're gonna pick up where we left off. All
of the information that goes with this episode can be
found in the description box.