Speaker 1: Everybody, Welcome to another episode of Eyes on Geopolitics. I'm
Speaker 1: here with Jonathan Hackett, Mick mulroy might be joined by
Speaker 1: Andy Milburn.
Speaker 2: Fingers crossed per usual, a lot.
Speaker 1: Happening, dizzying as ever we left off yet last week,
Speaker 1: Vance and Kushner and Wikoff were gonna meet in Switzerland
Speaker 1: with the Iranian delegation to supposedly hammer out what comes
Speaker 1: next during the sixty day ceasefire. Obviously that's not exactly happening.
Speaker 1: Over the last week, there's been the Iranians hit a
Speaker 1: couple of commercial ships with some drones. We knocked down
Speaker 1: a drone out of the sky, and then we and
Speaker 1: then we hit areas in southern Iran. Iran then shot
Speaker 1: might I might begin the timeline wrong, but like Iran
Speaker 1: shot drones and ballistic missiles like Kuwait and Bahrain. So
Speaker 1: it very much doesn't seem like there's a ceasefire anymore.
Speaker 1: Israel and Lebanon made a deal. I don't know if
Speaker 1: hesbaal A is a exactly game for this deal doesn't
Speaker 1: sound like it. So there's a lot to be, a
Speaker 1: lot to be said. I mean, where are you guys
Speaker 1: track and what are you guys looking at a hacket,
Speaker 1: you can go first.
Speaker 3: Well, it seems that the strikes back and forth between
Speaker 3: Iran and the United States are different than they were
Speaker 3: obviously during the war, which was you know, kind of
Speaker 3: an unrestrained military operation at that time, and now it's
Speaker 3: more tit for tat, which is actually very similar to
Speaker 3: what it looked like back in twenty nineteen, twenty twenty
Speaker 3: around the custom Solo money strike. If people remember that
Speaker 3: time period, there's a lot of escalation in November and
Speaker 3: December leading up to that back and forth, increasing each time,
Speaker 3: and we kind of see something very similar right now,
Speaker 3: which is a little bit more choreographed in my opinion,
Speaker 3: or at least telegraphed. These are not intended to cause
Speaker 3: wide scale damage or destruction to either side. Instead, they're
Speaker 3: a messaging opportunity for each side to demonstrate to the
Speaker 3: other that there is resolve. And this is a key
Speaker 3: component of deterrence, you know. Deterrence requires that the other
Speaker 3: side believes that the threat is credible and the threat
Speaker 3: needs to be public believe to know the threat exists,
Speaker 3: and so we kind of see that playing out right now.
Speaker 3: That's why these strikes are so small precise, specific on
Speaker 3: very narrow targets, and not continuing after each one occurs.
Speaker 3: So I think that's how the best way to probably
Speaker 3: read that is a military extension or an operational extension
Speaker 3: of the discussions going on in Switzerland to demonstrate both
Speaker 3: sides to each other that they're serious in both directions,
Speaker 3: serious about negotiating, but also serious about what happens if
Speaker 3: negotiations fall apart, and they have to both feel that
Speaker 3: they can keep up the reality that that's true on
Speaker 3: both sides.
Speaker 1: Make you there, Yeah, go ahead, go ahead, yeah yeah.
Speaker 4: So I'll start with some positive So obviously there was
Speaker 4: a signing of a ceasefire agreement between Israel and Lebanon.
Speaker 4: I'd agree that Hesba is the problem here, but it
Speaker 4: on the positive front, it does specify the need to
Speaker 4: disarm Hezbola and get Hezbola above the Tawny River, which
Speaker 4: is required by UN resolution anyway, And I think it
Speaker 4: does recognize that the key factor in this is also
Speaker 4: already in proxy. Right, So although Iran is demanding the
Speaker 4: stabilization of the Middle East, Iran is also the biggest
Speaker 4: destabilizing factor in the Middle East. It's kind of like,
Speaker 4: you know, starting the fire and then demanding it be
Speaker 4: put out, and then somehow taking credit for at least
Speaker 4: the parts of the fire that put out. But on
Speaker 4: the positive side, I think that was a good thing,
Speaker 4: and that's off the Secretary of Rubio for getting it
Speaker 4: to where it is. The other positive I would say
Speaker 4: is there does seem to be an attempt now led
Speaker 4: by Sadcom to create an alternative path through the Strait
Speaker 4: of Hormuse. It's obviously closer to go on that said,
Speaker 4: so that they can mitigate against this unwillingness by Iron
Speaker 4: to give up control of the strait, which they clearly
Speaker 4: are not clearly and have no intention. However, I'm told
Speaker 4: by people who I am both served in the US
Speaker 4: Navy and are familiar with transitting there and in a
Speaker 4: commercial capacity that it would only be available to use
Speaker 4: for outflow. Don't know why that's the case. If there's
Speaker 4: somebody that knows. I had to jump off the call
Speaker 4: with them, so I didn't get the details of why
Speaker 4: that's the case. But he said that that path out
Speaker 4: is could get the five hundred plus ships that are stuck,
Speaker 4: but it can't be used I think in mass for inflow.
Speaker 4: If that's the case, it'd be interesting to hear exactly
Speaker 4: why maybe I'll give my friend a lot to this
Speaker 4: I get. But anyway, so that's somewhat positive. Negative is
Speaker 4: it looks like to me that Aron has no interest
Speaker 4: in even doing any part of the MoU except for
Speaker 4: take money. So I don't know how much we've given
Speaker 4: away already, but my advocacy would be stop, don't give
Speaker 4: them any more money, don't allow them make any more money,
Speaker 4: don't give them any more on frozen access, and stop
Speaker 4: talking about three hundred billion, which seems I don't even
Speaker 4: know why that was ever the case. They need to
Speaker 4: preserve that capacity, that carot if you will, for an ironclad, verifiable,
Speaker 4: more restrictive JCPOA period, because if we give all this upfront,
Speaker 4: it's just basic negotiations, right, they're going to have little
Speaker 4: to no incentive to enter another agreement. And everything they're
Speaker 4: saying says they're not going to enter an agreement that's
Speaker 4: more restrictive than the JCPOA they're saying, I mean, Poseskan
Speaker 4: came out said we are never going to give.
Speaker 2: Up in Richmond.
Speaker 4: Well, I'm not going to give up in Richmond. You're
Speaker 4: not going to get a more restrictive JCPOI, because it
Speaker 4: was already pretty restricted, you know, in there. So I
Speaker 4: would say stop any money going to them, potentially get
Speaker 4: ready because we still have the assets in place to blockade.
Speaker 4: Because they have not done anything anything that they were
Speaker 4: supposed to do under this agreement, which was very little
Speaker 4: open the straight same statuses for the war, they have
Speaker 4: not done. So I think we're in solid footing to say, well, well,
Speaker 4: then you're not getting into the benefits and until we
Speaker 4: get through this nuclear discussions and we find out whether
Speaker 4: you're legitimately genuinely negotiating or you're just stalling to the
Speaker 4: end of this administration, which I think many people think
Speaker 4: they're doing. You're not getting any financial incentive. In fact,
Speaker 4: we're going to reimpose sanctions. We're going to put more sanctions,
Speaker 4: and then I'm in with this, and i'd be true
Speaker 4: to hear both your comments on this. There is a
Speaker 4: lot more discussions when I am talking, particularly on foreign media,
Speaker 4: of other countries being willing to join a coalition to
Speaker 4: open force open the strait. I don't know if they
Speaker 4: necessarily in the European countries specifically, I don't know if
Speaker 4: they necessarily mean use ground forces, but willing to contribute
Speaker 4: mind clearing, you know capabilities. Many countries like Germany for example,
Speaker 4: have that capability. There's two standing groups in NATO for example,
Speaker 4: but there's more of a willingness to go. Okay, didn't
Speaker 4: agree with the war, wasn't asked about the war. But
Speaker 4: the Strait is international and it affects my people as
Speaker 4: much as it affects the Americans. I have to do something.
Speaker 4: I'm speaking as if I was a leader of one
Speaker 4: of these countries. So I think there is I think
Speaker 4: there's a growing potential that other countries could become involved
Speaker 4: because of the Strait. We'll have to see what that means.
Speaker 3: Yeah, I think Japan is actually a key you know,
Speaker 3: non European partner in this because they have mind clearing capabilities,
Speaker 3: and they also have operational experience not only in the
Speaker 3: Straight Area but in the Red Sea, so from south
Speaker 3: to north, all along the eastern part of the Arabian Peninsula.
Speaker 3: Their ships have sailed recently on counter piracy missions in
Speaker 3: an integrated capacity with the not only the UK Maritime Organization,
Speaker 3: but also the Combined Maritime Task Force, which is dozens
Speaker 3: and dozens of countries working together. So I think Japan
Speaker 3: would definitely be a key part of that, especially because
Speaker 3: Japan is suffering from this conflict just like everyone else obviously,
Speaker 3: but in particular because of the energy squeeze on Japan,
Speaker 3: on their economy, So there is an incentive for them
Speaker 3: to want to participate, not just you know, morally, but
Speaker 3: economically as well. For the Japanese industrial capacity that's an
Speaker 3: acute problem for them. But also going back to the
Speaker 3: agreement that you're talking about, Mick, there's a fundamental flaw
Speaker 3: in this agreement. No matter how brilliant this agreement comes,
Speaker 3: even if let's say the ideal situation happens and it
Speaker 3: suddenly flops, it flip flops over into this overwhelmingly positive
Speaker 3: thing for the United States and overwhelmingly negative for Iran.
Speaker 3: It's an executive agreement, not a treaty, and that means,
Speaker 3: just like the JCPOA, the next president could come in,
Speaker 3: crumple it up and throw it away, and you have
Speaker 3: to put yourself in the mind of the other side
Speaker 3: of the table. They know that, so they're worried about
Speaker 3: you know, even if this deal turns out and they
Speaker 3: get the three hundred billion, everything's great for Iran. That
Speaker 3: could all go away and get pulled away immediately. So
Speaker 3: if you're thinking like that pragmatically, you'd have to be
Speaker 3: setting up some kind of background structures to protect yourself
Speaker 3: in the case that your negotiating counterpart pulls the rug
Speaker 3: out from under you. And that goes exactly to what
Speaker 3: Possession's talking about with the enrichment. It would be unwise
Speaker 3: for them to stop enrichment even with this agreement, But
Speaker 3: it'd be even more unwise knowing that the agreement itself
Speaker 3: is on flimsy ground and will likely be changed in
Speaker 3: the next presidency. Even if a Republican comes in, it
Speaker 3: will still likely be changed because the current agreement is
Speaker 3: not popular with some of the Republican party. So it's
Speaker 3: possible that.
Speaker 4: No matter who the Secretary of Rubio right exactly doesn't
Speaker 4: look yeah, so no matter who comes in is yeah exactly.
Speaker 3: No matter who comes in, it's going to get shaken
Speaker 3: up and changed in a negative way, probably to Iran
Speaker 3: and so in they're thinking about that. They're saying, what
Speaker 3: structures can we set up behind the scenes so that
Speaker 3: if and when this does happen, we're ready to survive again,
Speaker 3: to continue surviving. They're not stupid. We've seen this. They've
Speaker 3: demonstrated forethought, significant forethought over decades. Again we mentioned this
Speaker 3: last episode. Some of the guys sitting at that table,
Speaker 3: like Aragchi themselves, have sat at the table with Americans
Speaker 3: in the last twenty years every single time. So these
Speaker 3: are experienced negotiators. They've felt what it feels like when
Speaker 3: the US decides to renag on a major agreement. They
Speaker 3: won't allow themselves to be left out in the cold ever,
Speaker 3: and I don't think they ever have. They've always been
Speaker 3: preparing to be betrayed by the by the other side.
Speaker 3: I mean, it's in their ideology that you can't trust
Speaker 3: the West, you can't trust Israel and all this like
Speaker 3: that's built into their ideology. So even if the agreement
Speaker 3: was pure, and they still wouldn't believe it. So you
Speaker 3: have to expect that they're setting things up in the background,
Speaker 3: and we, as pragmatic thinkers in the US government, especially
Speaker 3: on the intel side, have to be thinking about what
Speaker 3: things are just in case this agreement doesn't happen. And
Speaker 3: a lot of those things look like surrogate forces, special
Speaker 3: ways of using the economy to continue having access to cash,
Speaker 3: the ability to keep the shadow Fleet going because right
Speaker 3: now we've removed a lot of the restrictions on their
Speaker 3: ability to ship oil, So we're allowing them to make
Speaker 3: money off of the oil that we have said was
Speaker 3: the terrible thing for them to do, and we're letting
Speaker 3: them do that now. Well, they're not going to just
Speaker 3: stop using their shadow fleet. They're going to continue using
Speaker 3: the shadow Fleet and use regular commercial fleets. It would
Speaker 3: not make sense for them to suddenly just pull the
Speaker 3: plug on this elaborate system of clandestine shipping and receiving
Speaker 3: and financial assets that they've spent blood on and treasure on.
Speaker 3: They're not giving that up, and it would be very
Speaker 3: naive of us on the side of the negotiating table
Speaker 3: to think that that's true. And so there has to
Speaker 3: be something on the west side, not just the United States,
Speaker 3: but also European partners and as you mentioned, any you know,
Speaker 3: international partners like Japan or South Korea coming together to
Speaker 3: ensure that even if this agreement gets crumpled up, there
Speaker 3: are structures on our side in place. They're going to
Speaker 3: help preserve our position there too, because that energy value
Speaker 3: is not going away anytime soon, even if we completely
Speaker 3: change to electric vehicles. You still require petroleum to make plastics.
Speaker 3: A lot of the crude oil that China was using
Speaker 3: was not for energy, it was for producing plastics like
Speaker 3: things you buy on Amazon. That's what that crew oil
Speaker 3: is for. And until we find a solution to replace that,
Speaker 3: we're kind of still dependent on that Straight until we
Speaker 3: change otherwise.
Speaker 4: So on that point, Jonathan, I think there is a
Speaker 4: provision in the MoU I recall where the agreement would
Speaker 4: be also validated with the UN Security accounts. So I
Speaker 4: think they are concerned about the very issue that you
Speaker 4: brought up, which is obviously the case because we tore
Speaker 4: it up in twenty eighteen or threw it away the
Speaker 4: other thing. And I don't know if this would work,
Speaker 4: but if what if the UN passed a resolution specifically
Speaker 4: calling for a coalition to open the Straight, and they
Speaker 4: countries did contribute to a maritime coalition that simply went
Speaker 4: went through the strait, collected all the five hundred plus
Speaker 4: ships and left. I mean, would Iran obviously risky. And
Speaker 4: I don't know that if this is just simply a hypothetical,
Speaker 4: because I don't know that any countries would do it,
Speaker 4: but say they wouldn't they're not attacking Iran, They're simply
Speaker 4: going through an international waterway to ensure it's open so
Speaker 4: they can get their oil that's going to go to
Speaker 4: their country. Right, Would Iran attack where they you know,
Speaker 4: it's coming down, it's coming down the Red Sea, it's
Speaker 4: coming down, it's going into the Gulf of them on,
Speaker 4: it's going getting closer to the straight Would Iran attack
Speaker 4: a blue flagged international coalition of countries who aren't part
Speaker 4: of the war that are simply going into the Persian
Speaker 4: Gulf to collect and escort these ships out, and then
Speaker 4: they just keep doing it, they keep bringing ships in
Speaker 4: and out. Would Arom be willing to then turn its
Speaker 4: military efforts against an international collige.
Speaker 3: I think the only way that would be successful is
Speaker 3: if Pakistan was a key member of that fleet. And
Speaker 3: another point is that the UN has only done I
Speaker 3: believe thirteen missions like this, like UNISAM and Somalia, Manusma
Speaker 3: and Mali for example, and the Operation unifil On in
Speaker 3: northeast Israel, Lebanon, Syria region and und Off another force
Speaker 3: as well. I believe there have been only thirteen since
Speaker 3: nineteen forty six, So it takes a lot of political
Speaker 3: will first of all, to even have it structured and
Speaker 3: then for it to function, that's a whole separate issue.
Speaker 3: In Mali in particular, which was the most recent one
Speaker 3: that I participated in, it was a very challenging, to
Speaker 3: say the least, operation to hold these forces together to
Speaker 3: do something toward a shared outcome, because they kind of
Speaker 3: don't put their individual state interests aside when they go
Speaker 3: in there. So i'd i'd be interested to analyze that more.
Speaker 3: But as I mentioned, with Pakistan, that's important because right
Speaker 3: now Pakistan is really the only actor that has a
Speaker 3: navy that can contribute, because Katar doesn't really, Bahrain doesn't
Speaker 3: really Bahrain wouldn't pticipate anyway Katar might. But Pakistan needs
Speaker 3: to contribute fleet forces and also put the impromatur of
Speaker 3: an actual international force rather than a US backed force.
Speaker 3: This is very important here, So that would need to occur.
Speaker 3: But going again to the fundamental weakness of even this.
Speaker 3: If this is a good idea, but look at UNSCR
Speaker 3: seventeen oh one, which is the two thousand and six
Speaker 3: ceasefire between Hesbola and Israel that was supposed to see
Speaker 3: the withdrawal of Hesbola from the south. The Lebanese armed
Speaker 3: forces were supposed to come in and replace them. Both
Speaker 3: Israel and and Hesbola have violated different components of seventeen
Speaker 3: oh one, and right now they're firing at each other.
Speaker 3: I mean, this is what twenty years later, and that
Speaker 3: UNSCR seventeen oh one is only a page long. It's
Speaker 3: not complicated. So even if the UN did come together,
Speaker 3: the Security Council did come together, that would be a
Speaker 3: good show of unity, which also is something that we
Speaker 3: do need these days. Maybe a UN General Assembly plus
Speaker 3: Security Council joint resolution something like this would be helpful
Speaker 3: to show unity. But in the end, beneath the political
Speaker 3: will for it to actually be carried out, and it
Speaker 3: seems that that will isn't there yet.
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Speaker 4: Yeah. I don't think it's a magic bullet, but the
Speaker 4: current situation isn't working. So if it's not working, it's
Speaker 4: time for other ideas in my opinion. And if that's
Speaker 4: even if the resolution itself set a message and then
Speaker 4: there was an armada that went down there, I'd just
Speaker 4: be interesting to see. Because they're already shooting at commercial ships, right,
Speaker 4: so it can't get much worse than that. They're shooting
Speaker 4: at unarmed civilians and somebody's gonna get I mean, we're
Speaker 4: gonna have a mass cashally event here pretty soon.
Speaker 3: And these civilians are just these are mariners. These are
Speaker 3: guys from the Philippines, you know, from to say shells. Yeah,
Speaker 3: they're in a tough spot anyway, and they're stuck on
Speaker 3: this giant vessel. If any of the listeners have ever
Speaker 3: been on one of these huge container ships, it's very lonely.
Speaker 3: There's like thirteen people on this giant, giant object at sea.
Speaker 3: It's it's terrible. And imagine also living under the threat
Speaker 3: that you might get bombed any day just for being
Speaker 3: in the water and you have nothing to do with it.
Speaker 3: You know, it's got to be tough for them.
Speaker 1: John, let me ask you. We've seen like oil prices
Speaker 1: go down, so somewhere around seventy seventy five bucks. Is
Speaker 1: that sowing up in like Japan, South Korea, like where
Speaker 1: they're really affected, because I remember we were talking about
Speaker 1: it there price per oil back when this was really
Speaker 1: going hot, was you know, one hundred and sixty bucks
Speaker 1: a barrel or something like that. Are they seeing relief
Speaker 1: in terms of prices or is that just like the
Speaker 1: market being the market and not really you know, showing
Speaker 1: like what the reality is and like on the ground.
Speaker 3: Well, you have to remember that oil is a commodity,
Speaker 3: so it's sold down futures, not on current value. So
Speaker 3: what you're seeing is the future assumptions about the market
Speaker 3: that these people purchasing these futures are making so they
Speaker 3: think that for example, in sixty days or a year,
Speaker 3: and it's actually the one year Brent crude benchmark you
Speaker 3: should look at, like what what do people think will
Speaker 3: be going on one year from now? And it's slightly higher,
Speaker 3: I think than current futures of like normal oil futures
Speaker 3: that everyone's looking at, which means people are not pricing
Speaker 3: their risk out as much as we might feel like
Speaker 3: they are. The other thing is that as summer goes through,
Speaker 3: oil prices will decrease just because the blends for summer
Speaker 3: crew change and we're kind of coming up on that period.
Speaker 3: Another very important economic component to match up to these
Speaker 3: futures pricing is we're about to end a quarter fiscal quarter,
Speaker 3: we're about to enter the summertime, and we're about to
Speaker 3: see some huge earnings on tech get released and there
Speaker 3: was just massive sell offs on tech the past month
Speaker 3: and a half that look like kind of a downward
Speaker 3: trend there. Those things are all going to conspire together
Speaker 3: because these things are all backed by energy requirements. So
Speaker 3: if risk comes up anywhere, that energy area, the tech,
Speaker 3: the chips, the AI area, which is massive component of
Speaker 3: the market right now, is going to react in a
Speaker 3: way that's higher than should be. In other words, they're
Speaker 3: more risk sensitive currently because there are more difficult to
Speaker 3: measure factors that are affecting these prices. And I think
Speaker 3: there's a lot of hope right now with p They
Speaker 3: think that we might be on the way to something.
Speaker 3: But remember only in the first week and a half
Speaker 3: of a sixty day negotiating window, and as we get
Speaker 3: closer to that midpoint and toward the end point, especially
Speaker 3: toward August, people will begin to notice more of a
Speaker 3: reality in front of them rather than a dream. So
Speaker 3: if the negotiations don't appear to be improving, well, I
Speaker 3: think you'll see oil futures go back up again, obviously
Speaker 3: even before they're over, before the negotiations are over, because
Speaker 3: the risk will find the correct balance point within the market.
Speaker 3: That's more likely what's going to happen. But unless something
Speaker 3: goes on like Mick mentioned with the securing of the
Speaker 3: Straits with a maritime organization, I don't think the oil
Speaker 3: will be able to recover to pre war levels soon
Speaker 3: because the new risk that's in there, even if hostilities
Speaker 3: go away completely and sustainably, the new problem is that
Speaker 3: Iran is going to exact tolls on vessels. That could
Speaker 3: be direct tolls as they've been advertising, or it could
Speaker 3: be indirect through kind of off market exchanges between Iranian
Speaker 3: activity and other country activity where there's this kind of
Speaker 3: in kind requirement that if you want to pass the Straits,
Speaker 3: you have to do something for us, but it's not
Speaker 3: going to be on the balance sheet. So there might
Speaker 3: be some of that going on as well, which has
Speaker 3: to get priced into that oil price, you know, So
Speaker 3: it's all getting stacked onto that one barrel of oil
Speaker 3: costs more because there are more things affecting that barrel
Speaker 3: as it passes through. So that's something to think about too.
Speaker 3: There are these exogenous or outside factors that are not
Speaker 3: energy related and not war related that are going to
Speaker 3: be baked into that barrel estimate. You know.
Speaker 4: There's another thing that came up this week that I've
Speaker 4: gotten pinged a lot about that isn't talked about as
Speaker 4: much as say the Strait itself or you know what's
Speaker 4: going on Elebanon is there's a component of the agreement
Speaker 4: that says the US is going to pull their military,
Speaker 4: our military from the proximity of Iran. Well, my friends
Speaker 4: that are in the proximity of Iran include our friends,
Speaker 4: I should say the UAE, Guitar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Jaddi, Rabi.
Speaker 4: Even I suppose that's a big win for Ran, it's
Speaker 4: a big loss for those countries. At the same time,
Speaker 4: apparently we're asking those countries to pay to reconstruct the
Speaker 4: very country that attack them, and then we're going to leave.
Speaker 4: So if we go with a letter of the MoU itself,
Speaker 4: I don't know what else will be the proximity of
Speaker 4: or on. Maybe I'm misreading it, but I think most
Speaker 4: people would say these countries are right across the strait, right,
Speaker 4: u A's right there, so and then Qatar's right there,
Speaker 4: So that's got to be the proximity. Are we really
Speaker 4: planning to do that? And if we are, why, because
Speaker 4: that question.
Speaker 3: Turkey is a NATO ally and we have Injulick Base,
Speaker 3: a US occupied NATO base that's on the like Turkeys
Speaker 3: shares a border that it's actually Turkey's border with Iran
Speaker 3: is the oldest border that exists in the world. That's
Speaker 3: an interesting factoid that order is a NATO Iran border.
Speaker 3: Are we are we thinking we're going to withdraw from Turkey?
Speaker 3: I don't think so, and why would.
Speaker 4: We withdraw from these places because Iran wants us to
Speaker 4: That's why we want to be there, you know. Literally,
Speaker 4: if they're that concerned we should go, well, then we're
Speaker 4: definitely not doing And let's remember when it comes to
Speaker 4: us presence overseas. Yes, it does benefit the country, nothing
Speaker 4: wrong with that, but it's for our own purposes. It
Speaker 4: gives us the ability to project power around the world.
Speaker 4: If we want to be the global uh you know,
Speaker 4: power center of the world, we have to have that ability.
Speaker 4: Not that we want to run around starting wars, but
Speaker 4: we want to have the capacity to surge the places.
Speaker 4: So these these are our ben to benefit us. Same
Speaker 4: with in Europe. Right, it's not a charity case for Europe,
Speaker 4: it's not a charity case for the Middle East. But
Speaker 4: it seems that we've given away our ability to stay
Speaker 4: the proximity of Iran, and there's nobody talking about except
Speaker 4: for the countries that assume that's means them. So this
Speaker 4: is gonna be if we get through a lot of
Speaker 4: these more difficult things. Say, for example, Aron just gives
Speaker 4: up their ability control straight. I don't think they're gonna
Speaker 4: do it, but so they do, say peace breaks out
Speaker 4: in Lebanon. Great, we still got plenty of big hurdles
Speaker 4: to get through, and that's a big one. And so
Speaker 4: is the three hundred billion, which I still can't imagine
Speaker 4: any country is going to contribute two.
Speaker 1: Doesn't that just add to like the uh, the thinking
Speaker 1: that are for some people My kind of myself included
Speaker 1: that the MoU is kind of at least some of
Speaker 1: the bits of it are kind of bullshit, like we're
Speaker 1: now ever gonna fucking back out of like Kuwait or
Speaker 1: any of our bases in there around the region ever,
Speaker 1: Like that's never gonna happen, so like, and then like
Speaker 1: you mentioned that three hundred billion dollar reconstruction fund, these
Speaker 1: things sound like pie in the sky like nonsense. Frankly,
Speaker 1: you know what I mean to be I mean, from
Speaker 1: the layman at least watching this, I mean, you guys
Speaker 1: are practitioners, you guys are experts. Like you tell me,
Speaker 1: these things seem like tasks that are literally impossible. Are like,
Speaker 1: are just our deal breakers from either side really, because
Speaker 1: like you said, Iran is not going to give up
Speaker 1: the straight.
Speaker 4: Yeah, I mean, think about it. When a country wins
Speaker 4: a war, they don't negotiate the terms they dictate. Right,
Speaker 4: when a country wins the war, they don't pay to
Speaker 4: reconstruct the other country unless they have removed their adversary.
Speaker 4: So you could say, oh, the Marshall Plan, Yeah, that's
Speaker 4: because we took out Nazi Germany. Right, we weren't paying
Speaker 4: Nazis to stay in place to reconstruct the country. You
Speaker 4: see what I mean? Like, so this is not how
Speaker 4: and I don't think the US has to do this.
Speaker 4: My point is not to say we lost. It's like,
Speaker 4: we don't have an obligation to do any of this stuff.
Speaker 4: We don't have an obligation to reconstruct their country with
Speaker 4: the regime still in place. That's simply going to make
Speaker 4: sure the regime stays in place forever. Don't know why
Speaker 4: we would do that.
Speaker 3: I think also it's a reflection of this very public
Speaker 3: negotiation going on, where normally these kind of maximalist positions
Speaker 3: would be the things that define the edges of what's
Speaker 3: going to be discussed, that would happen privately in a
Speaker 3: secret setting, could be in Switzerland like it was in
Speaker 3: twenty fifteen, and before twenty fifteen. Leading up to that,
Speaker 3: you know, there were days and days when John Kerrey
Speaker 3: and Zari, the Foreign Minister of to Run at the time,
Speaker 3: took walks together privately and discussed the terms, without notes,
Speaker 3: without secretaries, without recording it. It was all private and
Speaker 3: it was carefully quietly done so that they could just
Speaker 3: speak together as representatives of their countries to their interests
Speaker 3: without anyone noticing that, because I'm sure there were some
Speaker 3: crazy terms in that discussion as well, but those crazy
Speaker 3: terms kind of fall away into the background, and they're
Speaker 3: the backdrop of what we're going to get to later.
Speaker 3: And if you've studied, you like best alternative to a
Speaker 3: negotiated outcome and zone of primary agreement and all these
Speaker 3: concepts of negotiation. There's a big piece that one side
Speaker 3: comes in with, another piece the other side comes in with,
Speaker 3: and they don't all align together. It's not a then diagram. Instead,
Speaker 3: there's this place in between where they're supposed to meet
Speaker 3: at that shouldn't be public because once it's public, now
Speaker 3: you're involving many other individuals, any other entities, who also
Speaker 3: share opinions and beliefs, and then exert pressure on the negotiators,
Speaker 3: which pulls away the power the negotiators are supposed to
Speaker 3: have to clandestinely or secretly discuss the terms outside of
Speaker 3: the public view. It's important for transparency. It's important that
Speaker 3: we all understand like how this agreement gets reached, But
Speaker 3: in the moment that that's happening, it's actually better to
Speaker 3: have it quiet. Just like COVID operations. You don't need
Speaker 3: to tell everyone what every COVID operation is. There are
Speaker 3: transparency mechanisms built in to help make sure there is oversight,
Speaker 3: but it shouldn't be just completely in the open all
Speaker 3: the time, because that that takes away the power of
Speaker 3: doing it that way. Just like negotiations between states.
Speaker 1: Also question for you guys, what happens to those negotiations
Speaker 1: when people show up on Sunday in Switzerland just to
Speaker 1: continue them and like get to the next step, and
Speaker 1: the big boss of one country tweets out or true
Speaker 1: socials out that he's gonna he's gonna wipe everybody out,
Speaker 1: or you know, some.
Speaker 2: Extremely threat three.
Speaker 1: Of course, you know this is a hypoth it's a thought.
Speaker 1: This is a thought exercise. It didn't actually happen last week.
Speaker 1: What what do you think happens in that like whole
Speaker 1: like the Iranians thinking, I mean, I know I've read
Speaker 1: that the Iranians have like psychologists to try and understand
Speaker 1: like how Trump thinks and how he operates and stuff
Speaker 1: like that, which if you can find it as psychologists
Speaker 1: that can figure that out, you know they should be
Speaker 1: you know.
Speaker 2: You know, give them some kind of prize.
Speaker 1: But yeah, what happens to the dynamics of the negotiation when.
Speaker 2: Something like that happens.
Speaker 3: I think very little happens because we are seeing the
Speaker 3: English language things that are said that Trump says, for example,
Speaker 3: in Iranian media they do the exact same thing, They
Speaker 3: say very similar things. And for example, after cost some
Speaker 3: Solomoney was assassinated, there was a lot of this like
Speaker 3: we will punch America in the nose that they would
Speaker 3: say in Farsi, and like they were going to bloody
Speaker 3: America and like a lot of these statements, and it
Speaker 3: wasn't like low level people saying that it was the president,
Speaker 3: it was the foreign minister, it was the IRGC commander.
Speaker 3: And they're still doing it now and you'll see this
Speaker 3: in Farsi. They're talking as if they've defeated the US,
Speaker 3: they've torn the US down. If you look at the
Speaker 3: imagery in Tehran where they had these regime sponsored graffiti artists.
Speaker 3: If you see it like it looks like aircraft carriers destroyed,
Speaker 3: just one that has like a rope tied around an
Speaker 3: aircraft carrier, like pulling it in half. So they have
Speaker 3: their own rhetoric in FARSI going on, but all we're
Speaker 3: seeing is the English side. That doesn't mean we should
Speaker 3: match their rhetoric. In fact, I don't think that's probably helpful.
Speaker 3: But I'm just saying that it might in context. It
Speaker 3: may not be as extreme as we measure, but it's
Speaker 3: also not helpful.
Speaker 4: And I and I mean, it's not helpful. I agree
Speaker 4: with Jonathan. I do think there's so much of it
Speaker 4: now that it's kind of just become background noise. And
Speaker 4: I say that because you know, when you say stuff
Speaker 4: like I'm going to wipe out your civilization, that's that's
Speaker 4: pretty you know, hyperbolic, But when you say that every Tuesday,
Speaker 4: it becomes like right, So even when I'm on, you know,
Speaker 4: I use this as examples because I tend to get
Speaker 4: more feedback, so I'm usually on when I do the
Speaker 4: foreign thing with Iranians. When they start saying, oh, President
Speaker 4: Trump said that, even the host interrupts and says, look,
Speaker 4: if we're going to talk about everything, President Trump says,
Speaker 4: that's all we're going to talk about, like we're not.
Speaker 4: We're not we're not even going to go into like
Speaker 4: that was an appropriate stuff because it's it's it's just
Speaker 4: going to happen again and again and again and again,
Speaker 4: and therefore it's not even we never address these substance
Speaker 4: of it from their perspective, right, you see what I mean,
Speaker 4: Like the host doesn't even wan't talk about anymore because
Speaker 4: then that's all we do on their program is talk
Speaker 4: about that. So I think even the Iranians, they'll use
Speaker 4: it to their benefit, right, but they take it too serious.
Speaker 4: Well maybe, I mean, we did start our decapitation strikes
Speaker 4: between Friday and Monday. We're supposed to be on Monday.
Speaker 4: So but I think, you know, when it comes to
Speaker 4: the rhetoric, even if it's unhelpful, and I'm sure the
Speaker 4: Secretary of State would say it is if you could,
Speaker 4: but I just don't think it's having that big of
Speaker 4: an impact.
Speaker 2: I just don't think.
Speaker 4: We're gonna, you know, if you don't do this, we're gonna,
Speaker 4: you know, start the war over and we're gonna blow
Speaker 4: your country and do Bolivia. I just I just think
Speaker 4: they just just right over it.
Speaker 1: Isn't that doesn't that kind of say something else about
Speaker 1: like how fundamentally broken this reality is that we're living
Speaker 1: in because like back in the day, not even back day,
Speaker 1: like literally you know, last term or during Obama or Bush,
Speaker 1: if a president made a statement like that or any
Speaker 1: kind of statement that the president makes, carries used to
Speaker 1: carry a ton of weight. And now it's just like,
Speaker 1: oh yeah, that's like our crazy granddad, that's like out
Speaker 1: of his mind. But it happens to be the leader
Speaker 1: of the free world, the guy making the actually making
Speaker 1: the decisions.
Speaker 4: Right.
Speaker 1: Like, the fact is this shit went down because bbcme
Speaker 1: for a PowerPoint and then five guys in the situation
Speaker 1: room figured, let's bomb Ran. Let's and not just bomb Ran,
Speaker 1: let's take out the top forty of the entire hierarchy. Hierarchy.
Speaker 1: It's just see where everything lands afterwards, when the smoke settles,
Speaker 1: you know, and here we are.
Speaker 2: So I mean, I don't know.
Speaker 4: There's the actual decision, and then there's a rhetoric. As
Speaker 4: far as a rhetoric, I mean, if you're if somebody
Speaker 4: was asking me, I go with Teddy Roosevelt right walks
Speaker 4: offtly and carry a big stick. But obviously that's not
Speaker 4: the current thought process of the administration and they're not
Speaker 4: asking me, so it is what it is. But the
Speaker 4: decision process I think would be greatly helped to your
Speaker 4: point D by expanding it back to what it always
Speaker 4: has been, which is a process. A National Security Council
Speaker 4: is a process that has input from several different levels expertise, diplomacy, military, intelligence, economic.
Speaker 4: I think we'd be helped by that rather than just
Speaker 4: people who feel like they have to agree and are
Speaker 4: very limited.
Speaker 3: It seems that the process is not working. I mean
Speaker 3: we see that because this kind of whipsaw behavior with
Speaker 3: foreign policy, where it seems like there's one thought that's executed,
Speaker 3: it didn't work out well, they didn't like it, so
Speaker 3: they stopped. They'll try something new, and there's a lot
Speaker 3: of this kind of testing of policy in real time. Normally,
Speaker 3: that testing of policy would happen in discussions in the NSC,
Speaker 3: where someone bring that up and they'd wargame it, they'd
Speaker 3: talk through it, and they'd find out like, oh, there's
Speaker 3: a weakness here in that execution pathway. We need to
Speaker 3: rethink how we're going to get there, and it wouldn't
Speaker 3: happen in the real world normally, but it seems that
Speaker 3: that is actually happening now where they're testing out policy
Speaker 3: decisions by making them by doing them, which is obviously backwards.
Speaker 4: Yeah, just to give a short example of what Jonathan's
Speaker 4: talking about. Okay, we decide to go to war, what's
Speaker 4: likely to happen. The Strait's going to take close. The
Speaker 4: intelligence community is going to say, yes, that's likely to happen,
Speaker 4: So you have to go with that assumption. Okay, so
Speaker 4: the strait is closed. What do we have to do
Speaker 4: to open the straight If they won't open it, well,
Speaker 4: we're gonna have to use ground forces. Are we willing
Speaker 4: to do that? Yes?
Speaker 2: Or no?
Speaker 4: Now, okay, so then we're going to do a blockade.
Speaker 4: What effect will the blockade have on the regime? How
Speaker 4: long will it take to have the actual effect that
Speaker 4: we want? Are we willing to wait that long? Will
Speaker 4: we take the economic pressure? And if the answer is no,
Speaker 4: right it. I know that's not you know, super sophisticated,
Speaker 4: but ultimately that's what is discussed in the National Security Council.
Speaker 4: Are we willing to take that pain? No? Well, then
Speaker 4: we think the whole thing or you know, it's it's
Speaker 4: that kind of scenario, the constituency plans, whether we're willing
Speaker 4: to do it, what is that the enemy's most likely
Speaker 4: course of action, most dangerous course of action. It's basic
Speaker 4: military planning, to be honest. But they do it at
Speaker 4: a at an inner agency level in the NSC, and
Speaker 4: everybody weighs in because there's expertise for the like the
Speaker 4: Energy Department, the Treasury Department. They have a lot of
Speaker 4: input into things that you don't necessarily think of as
Speaker 4: a military person. But then you're like, oh, and then
Speaker 4: other things we can do to amp up pressure that
Speaker 4: could have been an alternative to stress those kind of things.
Speaker 4: And it's not like it's over, you know, as we
Speaker 4: talk about every week, I want the US to come
Speaker 4: out ahead, So it's not over. We still have a
Speaker 4: chance to get a better nuclear agreement, which is good
Speaker 4: for the world, but we're gonna have to probably do
Speaker 4: We're going to have to do something different because it
Speaker 4: doesn't seem to beheading in that direction. They seem to
Speaker 4: be saying I'm not gonna bunch on anything. There's not
Speaker 4: even real discussions about recovering the HU, which you know,
Speaker 4: the Vice President said was in the MoU.
Speaker 3: Yeah. More likely we're gonna have to have an Adams
Speaker 3: for Peace type, you know, Eisenhower outcome where they're allowed
Speaker 3: to continue using what they have under very strict supervision
Speaker 3: and guardrails and different agreements with various countries. China in
Speaker 3: particular is very interested in small modular reactors SMRs that
Speaker 3: they've been building in the Middle East and North Africa
Speaker 3: and things, and I think that probably to get true
Speaker 3: international buy in, you're going to need China or Russia
Speaker 3: Rosatome for example, to come in with the US and
Speaker 3: actually agree to monitor and work with the Iranian program.
Speaker 3: That's probably the most realistic. It might not be ideal
Speaker 3: or what we want, but to actually get it back
Speaker 3: again under scrutiny, that's probably what's going to have to happen.
Speaker 4: Perfect.
Speaker 1: Yeah, So a lot's gonna be happening. We're gonna keep
Speaker 1: an eye on it, and obviously this is probably gonna
Speaker 1: be the leadoff discussion again next week if I had
Speaker 1: a bet. All right, moving on to Ukraine and Russia.
Speaker 1: We've seen over the last you know, several weeks, Russia's
Speaker 1: air defense is either severely depleted or they're moving them
Speaker 1: around because they don't know where Ukraine's gonna hit next.
Speaker 1: You've seen a lot of hits in Moscow, UH, super
Speaker 1: far and super deep.
Speaker 2: UH.
Speaker 1: Crimea is getting pounded as well, So there's a lot
Speaker 1: going on there. Over the last week as well. Our
Speaker 1: last few days, the Russian delegation or you know, Putin
Speaker 1: was in a closed door meeting with Lukashenko talking about
Speaker 1: what I don't know. I mean, Lukashenko is being the
Speaker 1: president of Belarus or the dictator Belarus. I don't know
Speaker 1: if they're asking, they're trying to push him to join
Speaker 1: the fight, get some Belarusian soldiers in on it. I
Speaker 1: don't know, but it obviously seems like I don't know
Speaker 1: if the tide's turning in Ukraine. But Russia does not
Speaker 1: seem like this unstoppable force. They really haven't for four years.
Speaker 1: But you know, to see Moscow get peppered like they did,
Speaker 1: it's pretty incredible, frankly, and it's something we haven't seen before.
Speaker 1: So you know, where you guys at on this? What
Speaker 1: do you guys should like tracking?
Speaker 4: So to start with, and we shared this in our
Speaker 4: group chat, the average life expectancy now for a Russian
Speaker 4: recruit is three weeks from when they walk through they
Speaker 4: stand on their version of the yellow footprints. You've been
Speaker 4: to Paras Island, you know what I'm talking. They're dead.
Speaker 4: It's literally minutes once they get into combat, right, So
Speaker 4: the meat grinder is running out of meat. The meat
Speaker 4: grinder is running out of meat. I think you're muted there, buddy,
Speaker 4: I can't hear you.
Speaker 3: Can you hear them, jentlemen, I can't hear thee I
Speaker 3: see his mouth moving.
Speaker 1: Yeah, we'll you're a little choppy mixed, so I have
Speaker 1: my mic muted. Just repeat what you were saying from
Speaker 1: when they first get in the average life span of
Speaker 1: a new soldier in Russia.
Speaker 4: Yes, so there was a study, I think a well
Speaker 4: sourced one that for when a soldier is taken from
Speaker 4: his village in Russia and enters into training, he has
Speaker 4: three weeks and he'll be dead three weeks. That's the average.
Speaker 4: They have minutes. It's like twenty seven minutes is the
Speaker 4: average soldier's life expectancy once they engage in combat. So
Speaker 4: the meat grinders and running out of me even if
Speaker 4: you don't care, which putin obviously doesn't care about the
Speaker 4: next generation of Russian males. They're still going to run out,
Speaker 4: They're just not going to be and that this is
Speaker 4: at the same time when the capacity, not only the
Speaker 4: actual capabilities of these really sophisticated drones are increasing, but
Speaker 4: they're their quantity is also increasing substantially, like they're producing
Speaker 4: more drones every day than they did the day before.
Speaker 4: So think about it just running out at soldiers. But
Speaker 4: at the same time, Ukraine is and you already mentioned it,
Speaker 4: they're getting they're striking further into Russia, which is where
Speaker 4: all of their significant logistical facilities are on purpose, right
Speaker 4: because they didn't think they could be hit. There's a
Speaker 4: state of emergency in Crimea for the same reasons, and
Speaker 4: that's going to get more and more challenging, and quite frankly,
Speaker 4: if they could take Karsk Bridge out for weeks at
Speaker 4: a time, not just days, and potentially block the ground
Speaker 4: corridor that the Russians have, that's going to seriously challenge
Speaker 4: Russian's ability to stay in Crimea. So talk about a
Speaker 4: shift right now that's going on. We're talking about Iran
Speaker 4: all the time, and maybe it's a good thing because
Speaker 4: it's just happening anyway. Ukraine is shifting the tide. I
Speaker 4: don't want to overstate it and say, like, you know,
Speaker 4: they're going to throw them out tomorrow. Probably not, but
Speaker 4: the tide is shifting. So there's one of two things
Speaker 4: can happen. It can keep shifting and then potentially, hopefully
Speaker 4: Putin's deposed and cooler heads there step in or Putin
Speaker 4: does a crazy ibant and goes, I don't know what
Speaker 4: he can do, but he could seriously escalate start, you know,
Speaker 4: using tactical nukes. I don't know. Hopefully that's not the case.
Speaker 4: The West needs to be very specific now. We are
Speaker 4: going to support Ukraine even more. And by the way,
Speaker 4: the US is doing basically nothing. We're basically just a
Speaker 4: lowing to buy some of our stuff. That's nothing, essentially,
Speaker 4: but we could double down on it. We could increase
Speaker 4: our support. Obviously there's support for that in Congress across
Speaker 4: the Aisle. Double down and say Putin, the only way
Speaker 4: out of this is immediate cease fire negotiations period. If not,
Speaker 4: we're just going to increase our support and we're going
Speaker 4: to increase the economic conquests to you. That's what we
Speaker 4: should be doing. Now. If not, I think Putin's going
Speaker 4: to probably go with the extreme option because he doesn't
Speaker 4: he doesn't see another way out of it. I don't
Speaker 4: know what that extreme option is, but it could drag
Speaker 4: in other countries into war. That's why you're seeing countries
Speaker 4: like Moldova's I think they're talking about joining. Help me out, John,
Speaker 4: there's the country they're talking about. It's right, it's for
Speaker 4: some reason, I can't remember the name of the country,
Speaker 4: but it's the other countries in NATO, all right, So
Speaker 4: that there's other things that are happening right now that
Speaker 4: are prepping for this. It's either going to turn to
Speaker 4: something that's what we want to see, like a negotiated
Speaker 4: into this settlement, probably more in line with what General
Speaker 4: Kellogg was proposing a long time ago, if you remember
Speaker 4: a long time being a couple of years ago, or
Speaker 4: or Putin's going to do a crazy eye than and
Speaker 4: literally do something extreme and that could push this into
Speaker 4: expanded war into the NATO country we don't want.
Speaker 3: Yeah, in particular Poland, if you've seen recently, there's a
Speaker 3: little spat between Zelensky and Tusk, the Polish president, and
Speaker 3: I'm curious if there's some Russian influence operation in there
Speaker 3: to amplify that and make it worse, because I think
Speaker 3: what Russia wants most is for less European countries to
Speaker 3: support Ukraine. They already got their success with the US
Speaker 3: supporting Ukraine less and I'm curious if that is kind
Speaker 3: of a pocket that they're trying to exploit now because
Speaker 3: they are running out of new options and so perhaps
Speaker 3: they're trying to do more of dividing support so that
Speaker 3: there's less for Ukraine to have. The problem is that
Speaker 3: Ukraine now has the largest ground force in Europe. It's
Speaker 3: a seasoned combat force, it has the ability to act autonomously.
Speaker 3: There are needs for support, for sure, but the Ukraine
Speaker 3: today is not the Ukraine four years ago, and so
Speaker 3: it's kind of too late, i think, for Russia to
Speaker 3: try to exert those influence operations, especially on Poland, is Stonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Speaker 3: which is kind of that area that they are targeting
Speaker 3: because it's the near enemy for them, and those countries
Speaker 3: are concerned about what Russia will do next. And even
Speaker 3: a few months ago, before the tables had started turning,
Speaker 3: those three countries, Latvia, Lithuania and Sotnia were very concerned
Speaker 3: about being next, and I think Russia wanted them to
Speaker 3: be next. But since things are changing, Putin has to
Speaker 3: think about how can I still exploit that northern pocket,
Speaker 3: probably through influence operations against Poland. And as you know
Speaker 3: Polish history, Poland has routinely been invaded by the East
Speaker 3: and West over time. It's very difficult for Poland to
Speaker 3: retain its territorial integrity, mostly due to its terrain structure,
Speaker 3: and so that's very hard for Poland, and Poland's acutely
Speaker 3: aware of that, and so Russia's kind of probably pushing
Speaker 3: that button a little bit domestically in Poland to create
Speaker 3: some tension between those erstwhile allies between Ukraine and Poland,
Speaker 3: one being a EU member and one not being a
Speaker 3: EU member. So I think that's a place Putin's trying
Speaker 3: to acutely influence. The problem is there's a lot to
Speaker 3: focus on. As you mentioned, make crimea become a problem
Speaker 3: that was originally an asset and it's now becoming a
Speaker 3: weight that's pulling down attention southeast out of the combat
Speaker 3: area that Putin wanted to have, and that's going to
Speaker 3: be an interesting development. And as you mentioned, with the bridge,
Speaker 3: that's infrastructure. That's a fixed target. So if you're creative,
Speaker 3: you can find new ways to go after it. Even
Speaker 3: if it becomes hardened or defended, well, there will be
Speaker 3: ways to destroy it because it's a fixed target. So
Speaker 3: that's going to be a challenge for them and a
Speaker 3: very expensive challenge for them to defend, and it will
Speaker 3: be a low cost relative low cost thing to attack
Speaker 3: and destroy.
Speaker 4: Romania, that's the country I couldn't well, Dave Dovia, and
Speaker 4: I think there's support from both sides, so from the
Speaker 4: Muldavian opitation and the Romanian to join.
Speaker 3: Mouldiva is that Transnistria is one of those frozen conflict
Speaker 3: zones that Russia invaded and occupied and still occupy as illegal.
Speaker 3: And it's the same concern that Georgia has. If you
Speaker 3: drive down to Belisi, there's all kinds that there's actually
Speaker 3: a NATO office into Blisi because Georgia wants to join NATO,
Speaker 3: and both Georgia and Moldava have this this Russian pocket
Speaker 3: inside their territory that's occupied by Russian forces to this date.
Speaker 4: Because pocket, if they join, you think anything.
Speaker 3: So the problem is they cannot join until that's released. Right.
Speaker 3: So the thing is that you have to have complete
Speaker 3: territorial integrity to join NATO. Now this was a question
Speaker 3: because Cyprus joined even though it's split in half by Turkey,
Speaker 3: but that was kind of put to the side, crazy John. Yeah,
Speaker 3: Otherwise that has been followed. That rule has been followed.
Speaker 3: So countries have to have their territorial integrity, which is
Speaker 3: a reason that that Russia wanted to keep Crimea OCCU
Speaker 3: even if they lost all of Ukraine. They wanted to
Speaker 3: keep Crimea because that would exclude Ukraine from joining NATO
Speaker 3: and joining the EU if Russian forces occupied Crimea. So
Speaker 3: similar with Moldiva, Multavah would have to shake that Russian
Speaker 3: occupation or surrender that territory to Russia, which is not
Speaker 3: going to happen. So there's there's those two options. Otherwise
Speaker 3: they can't join.
Speaker 2: What do you guys?
Speaker 1: And the other thing we didn't mention that's been all
Speaker 1: over like the internet and stuff is showing like all
Speaker 1: the fuel shortages in Russia, you know, people fighting on
Speaker 1: fuel lines and stuff like that, and like like, you know,
Speaker 1: wasn't it John McCain who said, like they're a gas
Speaker 1: station with nuclear weapons or whatever, like you know, Yeah,
Speaker 1: so it's pretty incredible to see. They're also talks of palsy.
Speaker 1: They're gonna have some closed door talks Monday, starting tomorrow
Speaker 1: about stopping the export of diesel from Russia out I
Speaker 1: guess to save it and ration it, which is fucking
Speaker 1: incredible and insane to see. So you're seeing the Ukrainian
Speaker 1: you know, they've been they've been targeting oil infrastructure for
Speaker 1: months now, and uh, you're really seen it kind of
Speaker 1: pay off, and I cannot believe. It's like people are
Speaker 1: probably walking around like it's a fucking funeral in the
Speaker 1: Kremlin or wherever Putin's bunker is, you know, like who's
Speaker 1: gonna tell him the bad news and all, you know,
Speaker 1: things to that nature. So you know, I would lock
Speaker 1: my windows if I'm like a high up fucking Russian
Speaker 1: official or something like that, because who knows if you're
Speaker 1: gonna get tossed out of a window or not in
Speaker 1: the next you know, coming months.
Speaker 2: It's it's a pretty wild scene. What's going on.
Speaker 4: That would be an indicator we start seeing a lot
Speaker 4: of uh, senior people get killed, it's either the coup
Speaker 4: was attempted or yeah, it probably means that to be
Speaker 4: frank because he tried to get ahead of it by
Speaker 4: taking him out. I mean, ultimately they can do it
Speaker 4: right if you got the right people they could putin.
Speaker 4: You know, he has the levers, but if the lever's
Speaker 4: not working for him anymore, they could turn it against it,
Speaker 4: and it's in their own country's interest and quite frankly,
Speaker 4: it would be an absolute gift to this generation. That's
Speaker 4: being Anihlid.
Speaker 1: Yeah in Ukraine too, right, anything else you guys want
Speaker 1: to touch on before we move on about Ukraine and Russia?
Speaker 1: Did I miss anything? I mean that's pretty much general
Speaker 1: what I was saying.
Speaker 3: But okay, well, General Donahue got forced out of Europe,
Speaker 3: most likely because of disagreements on either NATO policy or
Speaker 3: Ukraine policy my opinion.
Speaker 2: That's why you think. Yeah, yeah, a.
Speaker 4: Big, big loss for the US military, well known, super respected,
Speaker 4: and the special operations community, including inside the agencies. I mean,
Speaker 4: the guy did everything. He was a true commander, swider commander,
Speaker 4: the unit commander of the army component of Jaysak. He
Speaker 4: you know, eighty second Airborne commanding General. I mean, the
Speaker 4: guy was just see a great American selfless service and
Speaker 4: the idea that he was just he was going to
Speaker 4: be the next Army Chief of Staff, I think, and
Speaker 4: I know people who would know, and they told me
Speaker 4: he was going to be the next Army chief set
Speaker 4: so big loss, big loss. I don't know how that
Speaker 4: works now. I think he there's an issue of keeping
Speaker 4: his four star because when he retires, this guy needs
Speaker 4: to be able to and I know this is seems
Speaker 4: forever but and he'll probably move on with his life.
Speaker 4: I hope he comes back, and I don't know if
Speaker 4: that's possible. But obviously the current acting or not acting,
Speaker 4: the current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was
Speaker 4: retired before it he became the Chairman of the Joint
Speaker 4: Chiefs of Staff, So maybe CD can do the same thing.
Speaker 1: Yeah, and for everybody else, like you know, who doesn't
Speaker 1: know the insight in a working the Pentagon, who exactly
Speaker 1: General Donahue is uh the famous picture of him walking
Speaker 1: onto the either was c. Seventeen or whatever getting leaving Afghanistan,
Speaker 1: So he was technically the last boots on the ground
Speaker 1: from our twenty year adventure in Afghanistan. Yeah, it's pretty
Speaker 1: incredible on a guy like that get gets pushed out
Speaker 1: and frankly like John, if you if you're thinking that's
Speaker 1: because of you know, strategy in Ukraine, I don't understand.
Speaker 1: I don't see where the downside is of helping Ukraine. Okay,
Speaker 1: if you don't want to give him one hundred billion
Speaker 1: dollars a year, fine, but like more than what we're
Speaker 1: doing right now, I'd understand where the friction is from.
Speaker 1: I mean, I do understand obviously we all know why,
Speaker 1: but I'm saying like it just doesn't make sense.
Speaker 4: At one point, since you brought it up, and rightfully,
Speaker 4: I'd like to say for those that are blaming General Donahue,
Speaker 4: I'm like the exod of Afghanistan. One, the military doesn't
Speaker 4: make policy. Two, he was sent there after the decision
Speaker 4: was made and it was actually he was already going down.
Speaker 4: He made the best that he could of the situation
Speaker 4: he was in period. So blaming him.
Speaker 5: For it is just, in my opinion, nonsense. Not that
Speaker 5: many people are. Yeah, that is an issue. In my opinion,
Speaker 5: it's not. He was simply ordered and he did the best.
Speaker 2: Yeah.
Speaker 1: And if anyone's confused as to what I'm talking about
Speaker 1: in terms of it's because this administration for some reason
Speaker 1: or other cowtows to the Putin regime and does everything
Speaker 1: it can to make it as easy as possible for
Speaker 1: Putin to get what he wants or play Catum at
Speaker 1: the very minimum, play Catom, and it's a fucking disgrace.
Speaker 1: Let's be honest. Just I just want to make sure
Speaker 1: there's nobody confused about how I feel. Yeah, all right, boys, Uh,
Speaker 1: if there's anything else, this is great. We'll do the plugs.
Speaker 1: Look at John's beautiful background too. You can grab his
Speaker 1: two books, Theory of a Regular War and I ran
Speaker 1: Shadow Weapons. So the reason why he did that is
Speaker 1: for me to be able to plug it and remember
Speaker 1: the titles of the books, which I appreciate.
Speaker 2: John, Thank you. Yeah.
Speaker 1: Make the white Fish Security Summing happening in February of
Speaker 1: twenty twenty seven.
Speaker 2: Check that out. That link is in the description.
Speaker 1: Uh mix got a great podcast called The Pub and
Speaker 1: the Porch Applied Stoicism. All those links are in the description.
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Speaker 1: Happy Sunday, go get them punish the enemy. That's why
Speaker 1: me and my friends say in our group chat in
Speaker 1: the morning.
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