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<v Speaker 1>A little behind time here as we start interest its

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<v Speaker 1>Tech pride to a Dave Hatter interest I dot com

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<v Speaker 1>or you get Dave and the crew working on your

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<v Speaker 1>computer related your business computer related issues. Dave, welcome back

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<v Speaker 1>to the program. Struggling with my uh voice this morning. Apologies,

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<v Speaker 1>congratulations on being the Kentucky elected official of the year.

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<v Speaker 1>Just saw that. Notice you are the man. Oh thanks, Let's,

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<v Speaker 1>without further ado dive into if you don't mind jumping

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<v Speaker 1>right into smart TVs which are spying on us.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, I have a little voice problem myself this morning.

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<v Speaker 2>Oh okay, so we can we can commiserate with each other.

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<v Speaker 2>Go now. I guess my first question for you and

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<v Speaker 2>your listeners would be, is anyone surprised to know that

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<v Speaker 2>you're smart TV is spying?

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<v Speaker 1>Not anymore? I just want to know are their options

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<v Speaker 1>to smart TVs if I wanted to buy a new TV,

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<v Speaker 1>are they all smart? Or can you avoid this crap?

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<v Speaker 2>Well, it's really hard to avoid it. I'm not aware

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<v Speaker 2>of any manufacturer that makes TVs that don't at least

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<v Speaker 2>have this capability. But here here's the problem with it,

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<v Speaker 2>and then I'll tell you what you can do to

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<v Speaker 2>try to limit your exposure because at this point, again,

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<v Speaker 2>I'm not aware of any manufacturer that makes a TV

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<v Speaker 2>that isn't smart quote unquote, and you know, people can't

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<v Speaker 2>see my fingers doing the air quote as we say this.

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<v Speaker 2>You know, all of these sort of IoT devices because

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<v Speaker 2>these things, you know, they have a perverse incentive versus

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<v Speaker 2>your incentive is someone that might care about your privacy

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<v Speaker 2>and security. These things are often, if not normally, made

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<v Speaker 2>in China. Their goal is speed to market, market share,

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<v Speaker 2>and ease of use. And anytime you're focused on ease

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<v Speaker 2>of use, you're almost always at the expense of privacy

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<v Speaker 2>and security. So again, whether it's something like an ring

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<v Speaker 2>doorbell or a smart TV or whatever, the smart TVs,

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<v Speaker 2>I think they are particularly insidious in how they work.

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<v Speaker 2>If you have concerns about this. Now, I'm not saying

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<v Speaker 2>that everything this does is some sort of evil plot,

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<v Speaker 2>but I think it's like so many of these other

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<v Speaker 2>smart devices, they play off the fact that people don't

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<v Speaker 2>really understand how any of this works. They don't understand

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<v Speaker 2>how much surveillance can be done on them, and you know,

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<v Speaker 2>they don't really go into it with informed consent. As

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<v Speaker 2>I've said to you, many times over the last ten years.

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<v Speaker 2>If you understand what you're signing up for when you

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<v Speaker 2>use these things, and you understand the potential risks, and

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<v Speaker 2>you choose to move forward, well that's on you. You're

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<v Speaker 2>an adult. Do what you want, right, But I don't

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<v Speaker 2>think most people really get again, just how invasive this

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<v Speaker 2>kind of surveillance can be. Now, most of these new

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<v Speaker 2>smartes TVs, probably all of them. And you may see

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<v Speaker 2>the term CTV for connected TV. That's sort of another

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<v Speaker 2>term you might find if you look into this. You know,

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<v Speaker 2>they have microphones so you can talk to them. So

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<v Speaker 2>there's a potential problem. The thing might be listening to you.

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<v Speaker 2>It could be recording what you're saying. And I would

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<v Speaker 2>remind folks in addition to the fact that recent information

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<v Speaker 2>has come out that a company that people like Facebook

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<v Speaker 2>works with who claim they are listening to you, because

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<v Speaker 2>Facebook has claimed they're not. If you think about it, Brian,

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<v Speaker 2>any so called smart device that you can talk to

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<v Speaker 2>for whatever purpose must be listening to you in order

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<v Speaker 2>to know when you wanted to do something right.

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<v Speaker 1>Always scene makes sense to me along those lines, Dave.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, So, so with that said, you know, if it

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<v Speaker 2>has a microphone. It could be listening to you. Some

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<v Speaker 2>of these things have cameras in them. But the real

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<v Speaker 2>bottom line, and this is going to be a good

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<v Speaker 2>segue into another topic this morning, is these TVs come

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<v Speaker 2>with what's known as an advertising ID, and then that

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<v Speaker 2>advertising ID, when you watch things, is connected back to you,

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<v Speaker 2>and it might be connected to other devices. So you

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<v Speaker 2>know a lot of people will use their phone or

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<v Speaker 2>tablet or PC while they're watching TV. You're coming from

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<v Speaker 2>the same IP address. It's it's possible, through the use

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<v Speaker 2>of cookies and browser fingerprinting and things like that, to

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<v Speaker 2>connect that while you were watching this show, you were

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<v Speaker 2>also doing this on your phone. That must mean that

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<v Speaker 2>you like this, so let's sell you some ads. But

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<v Speaker 2>one of the things they point out specifically in here

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<v Speaker 2>is a lot of these free channels that are streaming based,

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<v Speaker 2>they point out to be and specifically are essentially designed

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<v Speaker 2>for tracking you. And you know, they'll see while you're

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<v Speaker 2>watching a show, how that show is ranked in terms

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<v Speaker 2>of like it's psychographic impact on people, and then they'll

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<v Speaker 2>put ads in there based on that, so you know,

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<v Speaker 2>again it's collecting enormous amounts of information about you. There

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<v Speaker 2>was a lawsuit against Visio at one point, like every

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<v Speaker 2>second they were taking a screenshot of what you were watching.

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<v Speaker 2>So if you think when you're using one of these

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<v Speaker 2>smart TVs you have any privacy whatsoever and out by default,

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<v Speaker 2>you do not. Now to answer your question, what can

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<v Speaker 2>you do about it? Well, it's tough. I mean I

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<v Speaker 2>would remind everyone you could buy a smart TV and

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<v Speaker 2>then just not connect it to the internet, right, you know,

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<v Speaker 2>use it like an old TV. Now, of course, that's

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<v Speaker 2>going to significantly limit how the capabilities of the TV.

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<v Speaker 2>Another thing you could do would be instead of giving

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<v Speaker 2>your data to let's say a Samsung or a Visio

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<v Speaker 2>or whoever makes the TV, you could use a different

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<v Speaker 2>streaming product like a Roku or something. Now, it's it's

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<v Speaker 2>going to track you to it's just a question of

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<v Speaker 2>who's get all that data right.

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<v Speaker 1>Right, your laptop would be getting the TV signal which

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<v Speaker 1>would be transferred to your TV, which is not hooked up.

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<v Speaker 1>Meaning whatever protections you have on your laptop like a

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<v Speaker 1>VPN might offer additional security that a smart TV hooked

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<v Speaker 1>directly up would not.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, or I mean you could There's a lot of

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<v Speaker 2>different ways you could potentially choke off some of this flow.

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<v Speaker 2>But a lot of it boils down to going into

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<v Speaker 2>the settings on the TV itself and seeing what you

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<v Speaker 2>can disable. You know, can you turn off any of

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<v Speaker 2>this sort of tracking? You know, use either some kind

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<v Speaker 2>of privacy settings. Now you get into the privacy washing

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<v Speaker 2>and the dark patterns of the stuff's hidden, and they

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<v Speaker 2>don't really want you to turn it off right. Well,

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<v Speaker 2>but you may be able to, on any given TV

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<v Speaker 2>disable some of this stuff. You might be able to,

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<v Speaker 2>like if something will let me, but if it won't

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<v Speaker 2>let me turn it off, I'll go in and change

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<v Speaker 2>that advertising idea every once in a while, just so

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<v Speaker 2>it's harder to track me.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, and you know me, I never run a call

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<v Speaker 1>for legislation. But the technology to turn this stuff off

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<v Speaker 1>does exist widely in the world. It's not expensive. Everything

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<v Speaker 1>should have the option to let us decide what goes

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<v Speaker 1>out into the world. Period. End of story. Exclamation point

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<v Speaker 1>and I'll reserve my expletives for when the microphone is off, Dave,

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<v Speaker 1>We've got to take a break. We're out of time.

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<v Speaker 1>In six forty fifty five krcit talk station so far

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<v Speaker 1>behind six forty four to fifty five carcity talkshin see

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<v Speaker 1>we try to make some time back up. Dave had

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<v Speaker 1>our interest it dot com. Thank you for you and

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<v Speaker 1>the teams scheduling the segment on Tech Friday, data brokers

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<v Speaker 1>also tracking our phones. I suppose we shouldn't be shocked

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<v Speaker 1>by this either.

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<v Speaker 2>You know, again, Brian Good, segue from the previous topic,

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<v Speaker 2>because this stuff is all related. I just have to

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<v Speaker 2>once again remind people, as we've done so many times,

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<v Speaker 2>that these companies that are making extremely low cost products

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<v Speaker 2>are giving you anything for free, believe it or not,

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<v Speaker 2>are not making it for free. You become their product.

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<v Speaker 2>They capture your data, they monetize that data, and I think,

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<v Speaker 2>as we're finding out slowly in chunks, as I mentioned

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<v Speaker 2>that last segment, we've now seen a company claim that

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<v Speaker 2>they've worked with companies like Facebook, they're listening to you

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<v Speaker 2>all the time. So when people say, how is it

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<v Speaker 2>possible that I'm having a private conversation with my spouse

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<v Speaker 2>and suddenly I get ads for X, Well, it's due

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<v Speaker 2>to all of this sort of thing. You know. Any

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<v Speaker 2>any so called smart device certainly has the capability to

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<v Speaker 2>track you in some way if they want to, and

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<v Speaker 2>most of them do, because again they're either making additional

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<v Speaker 2>money even if you paid for something and you know,

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<v Speaker 2>recurring money, or that's how they're offsetting the cost of

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<v Speaker 2>whatever they're providing to you for free, quote unquote. So

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<v Speaker 2>this story I thought was really interesting because basically it's

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<v Speaker 2>saying that they can track your phone using a variety

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<v Speaker 2>of different techniques, and it comes back to that advertising

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<v Speaker 2>identifier again. You know, Apple and Google both give your

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<v Speaker 2>phone an advertising identifier as well as other types of

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<v Speaker 2>unique identifiers that identify it to the carrier, network and

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<v Speaker 2>so forth. But the point they're making out here is

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<v Speaker 2>that you can use this advertising eye to track where

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<v Speaker 2>the phone is going. They sell this data to various

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<v Speaker 2>data brokers, and that's how, over time, these incredibly detailed

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<v Speaker 2>and grantular dossiers are built up about you. So you know,

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<v Speaker 2>whether it's location tracking, it's the thing you're viewing. Things

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<v Speaker 2>you're viewing on the phone. Some of this gets sold

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<v Speaker 2>to data broker X by application Y, some of it

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<v Speaker 2>gets sold to another data broker. They sell this stuff

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<v Speaker 2>amongst each other, and then over time again you have

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<v Speaker 2>this unbelievably granular and detailed dossier about you. Where you've been,

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<v Speaker 2>what you're doing. And you know, I know some people

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<v Speaker 2>will say, well, I don't care about that. I have

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<v Speaker 2>nothing to hide, and I would just remind folks. Just

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<v Speaker 2>in the past six months, we've seen two massive data breaches,

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<v Speaker 2>the National Public Data Data breach and mc square. Both

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<v Speaker 2>of these are background check companies where they have incredibly

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<v Speaker 2>sensitive information about you. Think about it, Brian, if I

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<v Speaker 2>had all the background check information about you, I'd know

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<v Speaker 2>places you worked, places you lived, your family members, all

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<v Speaker 2>kinds of other information. So whether I wanted to impersonate

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<v Speaker 2>you and commit fraud in your name, or I wanted

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<v Speaker 2>to attack you and have legitimacy because I know information

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<v Speaker 2>that only the legitimate player would know. That kind of

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<v Speaker 2>data provides that. And the more data that gets collected

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<v Speaker 2>about you by these sorts of hidden tracking capabilities, you know,

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<v Speaker 2>that's all feeding into this. Then when it gets breached

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<v Speaker 2>or leaked, it comes back to bite you. And that's

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<v Speaker 2>why you should care about.

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<v Speaker 1>These indeed, and you know judgment Paulaitano has mentioned this before,

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<v Speaker 1>and he's not the only one that's brought it up.

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<v Speaker 1>When you wonder why a politician votes a certain way,

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<v Speaker 1>which seems to fly directly in the face of what

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<v Speaker 1>he or she had campaigned on he or you previously

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<v Speaker 1>stood for. You may have the answer right there, Dave Hatter,

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<v Speaker 1>let's pause. Exactly frightening stuff. Apparently, businesses have lost a

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<v Speaker 1>lot of money in email scans, a huge amount. It's

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<v Speaker 1>six fifty to fifty five of k RC, detalxation, interest

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<v Speaker 1>it dot com. That's where you find Dave Hatter and

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<v Speaker 1>his team. If you have a business, you have computers,

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<v Speaker 1>and he'll keep you from stepping in it, hopefully best

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<v Speaker 1>practices and avoiding all the problems. And we talk about

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<v Speaker 1>speaking and stepping in it, and real quick here we'll

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<v Speaker 1>talk about the email scans and how much it's cost businesses.

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<v Speaker 1>Speaking of that, but real quick here, Rick wanted to know,

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<v Speaker 1>and I think it's a great question because I don't know,

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<v Speaker 1>but it sounds good. Can my router be configured to

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<v Speaker 1>block out going packets from the television?

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<v Speaker 2>Potentially? Yes, it's going to depend on the capabilities of

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<v Speaker 2>your router, how smart it is. You know. One of

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<v Speaker 2>the things you could do too, to protect your other

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<v Speaker 2>devices from any smart device would be to set up

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<v Speaker 2>what's what nerds like you would call a v land

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<v Speaker 2>and basically create a separate network inside your network, so

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<v Speaker 2>these smart devices can't talk to other devices. You could potentially,

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<v Speaker 2>you know, if if the TV is using a main

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<v Speaker 2>name or something to send it back to you know, yeah,

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<v Speaker 2>you could potentially configure your devices to try to block

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<v Speaker 2>that traffic. The problem, Brian is most people wouldn't even

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<v Speaker 2>know how to ask that question. You know, you could

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<v Speaker 2>go online and probably help depending on your specific device.

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<v Speaker 2>It is theoretically possible to do that.

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<v Speaker 1>Well, there's your next business model there. You need to

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<v Speaker 1>set out to help homes secure themselves and keep their

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<v Speaker 1>smart devices from revealing all the information in the world.

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<v Speaker 1>I think the first thing you do is just don't

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<v Speaker 1>get an Alexa type device anyway. Business email scams.

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<v Speaker 2>So this is a huge problem, Brian. We see this

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<v Speaker 2>regularly and it really you know, it's kind of shocking

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<v Speaker 2>to me how bad this problem is and how much

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<v Speaker 2>money is being lost as a results this. The FBI

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<v Speaker 2>says it's fifty five billion dollars from twenty thirteen to

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<v Speaker 2>twenty three. I can tell you that I believe it's

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<v Speaker 2>a lot more than.

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<v Speaker 1>That, and businesses don't report it. You've mentioned that so

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<v Speaker 1>many times.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, in many cases unless there's a regulatory reason to

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<v Speaker 2>report it. They won't, right. I have firsthand knowledge of

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<v Speaker 2>a company here in Cincinnati that was referred to us

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<v Speaker 2>after this an unfortunate situation like this. They lost nine

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<v Speaker 2>hundred and eighty three thousand dollars. Think about that for

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<v Speaker 2>a second. And this often occurs because people do not

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<v Speaker 2>have strong passwords, strong unique passwords, and they don't have

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<v Speaker 2>MFA turned on. If I can get into your email,

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<v Speaker 2>I can look around in there and figure out, like, well,

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<v Speaker 2>who do you communicate with on a regular basis right now?

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<v Speaker 2>For a frontline employee working in a factory, maybe I

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<v Speaker 2>won't ever get access to this kind of information, but

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<v Speaker 2>I might also be able to move latterly within your

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<v Speaker 2>network once I'm in there. But if I can get

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<v Speaker 2>into let's say, like someone that works in your accounting

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<v Speaker 2>department or your finance department because they have a bad

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<v Speaker 2>password and or no MFA, I'm eventually going to figure out,

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<v Speaker 2>if I have enough time, how to get to some money.

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<v Speaker 2>It often involves fraudulent invoicing or request for wire transfers.

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<v Speaker 2>I know we don't have time today, but I think

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<v Speaker 2>I told the story not too long after I became

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<v Speaker 2>mayor and fort Wright, the city clerk got an email

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<v Speaker 2>that looked like it came for me. Wanted to do

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<v Speaker 2>an international wire transfer, and thankfully, you know, she said

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<v Speaker 2>find the world with the city of fort right, Kentucky,

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<v Speaker 2>do an international wire transfer. And yeah, picked up the

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<v Speaker 2>phone and called me, which is always the right answer.

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<v Speaker 2>Anytime there's any question about something, especially if it's financial,

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<v Speaker 2>you should stop what you're doing and either call your

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<v Speaker 2>IT people or your manager or the CEO or whomever

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<v Speaker 2>and say is this legit? Right? But the scope and

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<v Speaker 2>scale of this is insane, And I'm just telling people

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<v Speaker 2>from someone that works in the field. Every day. We

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<v Speaker 2>see this all the time. These are not ridiculously overblown numbers.

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<v Speaker 2>Business email compromise is happening all the time, and I

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<v Speaker 2>just keep to remind people, if you make it easy,

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<v Speaker 2>they will steal your money. Your money has value to them,

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<v Speaker 2>just because often you're on too small I don't any

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<v Speaker 2>think we're stealing, well, your money. It's worth stealing, and

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<v Speaker 2>they will steal your money if you make it easy.

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<v Speaker 2>The good news is well, there's nothing that is bulletproof

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<v Speaker 2>against this. Brian. There's a lot of things you can do,

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<v Speaker 2>including training that will significantly reduce the likelihood of a

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<v Speaker 2>successful attack. But if you don't take it seriously, and

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<v Speaker 2>if you allow people to not have strong unique passwords

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<v Speaker 2>and not use MFA, you are eventually going to fall

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<v Speaker 2>prey to one of these kinds of scams. It's just

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<v Speaker 2>a matter of time until they find you with something

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<v Speaker 2>that's compelling to.

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<v Speaker 1>People well and find you. They will, and it usually

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<v Speaker 1>it doesn't require an individual on the other side, you

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<v Speaker 1>picking up a phone or launching the attack. They do

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<v Speaker 1>this remotely with bots and bot farms, and you know,

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<v Speaker 1>just flip a switch. You got thousands of basically micro

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<v Speaker 1>computers going to work trying to get you to, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>respond to an email. Doesn't cost them much money at all,

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<v Speaker 1>and it's a volume business.

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<v Speaker 2>Right, Yeah, think about it, Brian, if I could, if

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<v Speaker 2>I could send you a phishing email that leads to

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<v Speaker 2>nine hundred and eighty three thousand dollars to me. I

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<v Speaker 2>just really, that's like some Hillary Clinton type return on investment.

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<v Speaker 1>It is cattle futures, and it's a much easier ROI.

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<v Speaker 2>Yes, it is, yes, it is.

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<v Speaker 1>It's you know, I have to joke about this. You know,

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<v Speaker 1>if you don't ask you, you're not going to know.

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<v Speaker 1>This is like go out and ask every woman you

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<v Speaker 1>run into if they want to go out, and eventually

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<v Speaker 1>one of them will. But if you don't ask, they're

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<v Speaker 1>never going to have someone who said yes. If you

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<v Speaker 1>send thousands and tens of thousands and hundreds of thousands

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<v Speaker 1>of phishing emails out in the world, somebody's going to

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<v Speaker 1>respond and you're gonna get nine hundred and eighty thousand dollars.

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<v Speaker 1>Maybe tech Friday, Dave had or intrust it dot coms

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<v Speaker 1>where you find Dave and the crew you need them

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<v Speaker 1>if you have problems along the lines of what we

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<v Speaker 1>talk about each and every week. Thank you Dave for

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<v Speaker 1>spending time with my listeners and me. I always really

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<v Speaker 1>truly look forward to the segment and appreciate the sage,

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<v Speaker 1>wisdoms and advice. Look forward to your next business venture

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<v Speaker 1>helping individuals and homes avoid the snooping and all the

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<v Speaker 1>other things that go along with it. Until next Friday,

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<v Speaker 1>my friend, have a wonderful weekend.

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<v Speaker 2>Always my pleasure, Brian, I look forward to chatting with

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<v Speaker 2>you next week. Thanks