1 00:00:18,760 --> 00:00:21,320 Speaker 1: And we are back with another edition of the Federalist 2 00:00:21,440 --> 00:00:25,000 Radio Hour. I'm Matt Kittle's senior Elections correspondent at the 3 00:00:25,039 --> 00:00:29,800 Federalist and your experience Shirpa on today's quest for Knowledge. 4 00:00:30,239 --> 00:00:33,439 As always, you can email the show at radio at 5 00:00:33,479 --> 00:00:37,560 the Federalist dot com, follow us on x at FDRLST. 6 00:00:38,079 --> 00:00:40,920 Make sure to subscribe wherever you download your podcast, and 7 00:00:41,119 --> 00:00:44,359 of course to the premium version of our website as well. 8 00:00:44,799 --> 00:00:48,479 Our guest today is Mark Moyer, William P. Harris, Professor 9 00:00:48,560 --> 00:00:52,880 of Military History, Hillsdale College. Hard to believe it's been 10 00:00:52,960 --> 00:00:56,280 fifty years since the fall of Saigon. On April thirtieth, 11 00:00:56,399 --> 00:01:00,640 nineteen seventy five. To mark the occasion, Hillsdale Colius Center 12 00:01:00,719 --> 00:01:04,400 for Military History and Strategy, along with Hillsdale in DC, 13 00:01:05,599 --> 00:01:09,560 hosted a conference on the Vietnam War. Professor Moyer joins 14 00:01:09,640 --> 00:01:13,519 us with some perspective on the war that tore America apart, 15 00:01:13,920 --> 00:01:18,519 scars that remain, and the Vietnam of today. Thank you, 16 00:01:18,560 --> 00:01:20,439 sir so much for joining us on this edition at 17 00:01:20,439 --> 00:01:21,480 the Federalist Radio Hour. 18 00:01:22,200 --> 00:01:23,519 Speaker 2: That's great to be with you today. 19 00:01:24,200 --> 00:01:27,599 Speaker 1: Absolutely quite an event last week with some of the 20 00:01:27,599 --> 00:01:31,920 best and brightest minds on history, global affairs getting together. 21 00:01:32,079 --> 00:01:39,079 But I'll begin with the ending. It's amazing, truly to 22 00:01:39,079 --> 00:01:42,040 think that it has been fifty years on the fall 23 00:01:42,040 --> 00:01:46,680 of Saigon, when some nine thousand individuals were airlifted out 24 00:01:46,760 --> 00:01:53,159 of that war torn city. Where have we gone since 25 00:01:54,200 --> 00:01:55,840 the end of that war? 26 00:01:57,959 --> 00:02:01,519 Speaker 2: Yeh, it's been a strange and I think in any 27 00:02:01,560 --> 00:02:05,680 way somber journey. I think one of the things that 28 00:02:06,599 --> 00:02:09,080 we really ought to think about, and we talked a 29 00:02:09,080 --> 00:02:12,199 lot about over the past week, is that there was 30 00:02:12,879 --> 00:02:20,039 a real, extremely damaging, deadly outbreak of further violence after 31 00:02:20,080 --> 00:02:23,319 the war, and I think a lot of Americans were 32 00:02:23,319 --> 00:02:26,000 too ready to simply wipe their hands of it. But 33 00:02:26,680 --> 00:02:29,960 the number of people killed after the war is actually 34 00:02:30,039 --> 00:02:32,719 greater than the number killed during the war. And that's 35 00:02:32,759 --> 00:02:36,719 a combination of re education camps, people fleeing in these 36 00:02:36,800 --> 00:02:40,240 boats and dying at sea, and the Kremer rouge, which 37 00:02:40,280 --> 00:02:44,319 is enabled by the fall of South Vietnam. And that is, 38 00:02:44,639 --> 00:02:47,680 you know, among the most tragic legacies. You know, from 39 00:02:47,719 --> 00:02:51,800 a perspective a US foreign policy, we've done somewhat better, 40 00:02:52,400 --> 00:02:55,599 but the reasons for that it is highly controversial. Some 41 00:02:55,639 --> 00:02:59,639 people say well, we save the rest of Asia because 42 00:03:00,280 --> 00:03:03,039 we made us stand there. Others say, what happened in 43 00:03:03,120 --> 00:03:05,240 Vietnam had nothing to do with it, and that's still 44 00:03:05,240 --> 00:03:08,199 a great point of contention. And I'm of the opinion 45 00:03:08,280 --> 00:03:11,319 that in fact, it's American involvement from sixty five to 46 00:03:11,439 --> 00:03:15,719 seventy five that does save most of Asia from communism, 47 00:03:15,759 --> 00:03:18,599 which is of course hugely important today because we're still 48 00:03:18,639 --> 00:03:20,719 competing with China in that region. 49 00:03:21,680 --> 00:03:24,240 Speaker 1: No doubt about it. And I think if you track 50 00:03:24,319 --> 00:03:27,560 the antecedents of this, you can't talk about the end 51 00:03:27,599 --> 00:03:32,159 of the Fall of Saigon without looking at where all 52 00:03:32,199 --> 00:03:38,319 of this started. And it starts, you know, certainly back 53 00:03:38,360 --> 00:03:42,599 in the nineteenth century French colonialism in control of Indo 54 00:03:42,719 --> 00:03:45,800 China at the time, and then along the way we 55 00:03:46,000 --> 00:03:50,400 have an invasion by Japan and World War Two. We 56 00:03:50,520 --> 00:03:55,199 have this guy named Ho Chi min who take us back, 57 00:03:55,560 --> 00:03:59,879 who is Ho Chi Minh? And is it true that 58 00:04:00,080 --> 00:04:05,319 he appealed originally to the United States, to the Roosevelt administration, 59 00:04:05,400 --> 00:04:09,000 than ultimately to the Truman administration that hey, you know, 60 00:04:09,199 --> 00:04:12,879 you guys, get behind me, and you know, we can 61 00:04:12,960 --> 00:04:16,879 make some deals here. The idea is and maybe it's 62 00:04:16,959 --> 00:04:20,839 revisionist history that Ho Chi Minh was an opportunist. He 63 00:04:20,920 --> 00:04:25,240 wasn't necessarily a premier communist to begin with, but willing 64 00:04:25,279 --> 00:04:27,759 to make a deal for the independence of his country 65 00:04:27,800 --> 00:04:30,199 from French control. 66 00:04:31,560 --> 00:04:35,639 Speaker 2: Yeah, And that's another point of enduring historical controversy. There 67 00:04:35,639 --> 00:04:38,959 were a lot of people and still many historians who 68 00:04:38,959 --> 00:04:41,519 would claim that he was really more of a nationalist, 69 00:04:41,600 --> 00:04:44,959 He wasn't so much a communist, and he would have 70 00:04:45,079 --> 00:04:48,680 been happy to join forces with the United States, and 71 00:04:48,759 --> 00:04:53,240 so we blew massive opportunity to make him our ally. Now, 72 00:04:53,319 --> 00:04:57,959 I and others take a strong issue with that and 73 00:04:58,079 --> 00:05:01,079 point out that, for one thing, if we now know 74 00:05:01,160 --> 00:05:04,319 a great deal about hoach Human's life, there's been several biographies, 75 00:05:04,639 --> 00:05:08,439 he clearly is a true believer in Marxism and Leninism. 76 00:05:08,800 --> 00:05:10,639 And what you see with him, as you saw with 77 00:05:10,720 --> 00:05:14,839 people like Mao and Fidel Castro, is that they pay 78 00:05:14,920 --> 00:05:20,160 lip service to non communist principles as a way of 79 00:05:20,439 --> 00:05:24,040 duping the people that they call useful idiots, so gullible 80 00:05:24,079 --> 00:05:27,800 people in the West who are going to buy their 81 00:05:27,959 --> 00:05:30,519 line for a time so that they can exploit them. 82 00:05:30,519 --> 00:05:34,639 But in hindsight, it's really to me absurd to think 83 00:05:34,680 --> 00:05:38,120 we could have really been an ally. You know, the 84 00:05:38,120 --> 00:05:41,759 only time we've really been able to have a significant 85 00:05:41,800 --> 00:05:44,800 alliance with communist country was during World War Two when 86 00:05:44,839 --> 00:05:48,279 we were fighting for our existence. But other than that, 87 00:05:48,439 --> 00:05:52,399 you know, alliance with murderous communist regimes is just something 88 00:05:53,079 --> 00:05:55,319 the United States do want to do, and we were 89 00:05:55,360 --> 00:05:59,800 at the time competing with communism for control of the 90 00:05:59,800 --> 00:06:02,439 war world. So why would we side with a communist 91 00:06:02,439 --> 00:06:06,680 country when we're trying to support all these non communist groups. 92 00:06:06,800 --> 00:06:09,600 Speaker 1: Yeah, it's an excellent point, you know, Stalin at a time, 93 00:06:09,800 --> 00:06:14,920 as you just noted, you know, seemed to indicate, you know, 94 00:06:15,240 --> 00:06:19,480 an open partnership with the West, and indeed there was 95 00:06:19,519 --> 00:06:22,800 a partnership during World War Two, but it certainly wasn't 96 00:06:22,839 --> 00:06:28,800 a sustainable partnership. They were just just absolutely diametrically opposed 97 00:06:28,959 --> 00:06:33,720 in freedom, free markets, capitalism, in what we know as 98 00:06:33,959 --> 00:06:38,319 you know, the Western experience versus the Soviet what would 99 00:06:38,360 --> 00:06:42,240 become the Soviet Union. Obviously, as for Ho Chi Minh, 100 00:06:42,959 --> 00:06:46,480 no matter how he started or what overtures he made 101 00:06:46,639 --> 00:06:49,680 to the US government and to the West, he was 102 00:06:49,920 --> 00:06:54,720 a tried and true communist throughout his life, and that 103 00:06:54,879 --> 00:06:59,680 included did it not just absolute brutal means to control 104 00:07:00,160 --> 00:07:02,079 his people his country? 105 00:07:03,199 --> 00:07:05,319 Speaker 2: Yes, I mean one of the best pieces of evidence 106 00:07:05,360 --> 00:07:07,639 we have that he was a communist is that he 107 00:07:07,800 --> 00:07:13,720 set up a communist government with police state brutality, everything 108 00:07:13,759 --> 00:07:18,000 you would expect a communist to do. You Another point 109 00:07:18,040 --> 00:07:23,839 that's worth emphasizing is that he very much espouses Marxist 110 00:07:23,920 --> 00:07:28,040 Leninist internationalism. It's one of the other claims that emerges 111 00:07:28,120 --> 00:07:30,560 that Ho Chimen could have been the Teeto of Asia. 112 00:07:30,680 --> 00:07:35,160 That refers to Tito of Yugoslavia, who turns his back 113 00:07:35,240 --> 00:07:38,160 on the Soviets because he thinks they're not giving enough 114 00:07:38,240 --> 00:07:41,199 deference to his national interest. But the problem with that 115 00:07:41,839 --> 00:07:45,519 is that Ho Chi Minh repeatedly time and again made 116 00:07:45,639 --> 00:07:49,680 clear he rejected Tito's idea that this is a world 117 00:07:49,759 --> 00:07:54,480 revolution and so the international revolution comes before your national interest, 118 00:07:54,560 --> 00:08:00,240 and in fact, he and other Vietnamese communists routinely attackedunce 119 00:08:00,519 --> 00:08:03,839 Tito for taking this position. 120 00:08:06,079 --> 00:08:09,240 Speaker 1: And as we see the build up the collapse of 121 00:08:09,519 --> 00:08:15,720 France in Indo China, its exit and rapid exit in 122 00:08:15,800 --> 00:08:19,879 nineteen fifty four, this movement to two states. Of course, 123 00:08:20,000 --> 00:08:25,000 like we saw in Korea, we see Ho Chi Minh 124 00:08:25,399 --> 00:08:30,519 doubling down and then receiving massive amounts of assistance in 125 00:08:30,560 --> 00:08:34,039 the Cold War, and what became part and parcel of 126 00:08:34,080 --> 00:08:36,759 all of that at the domino effect, that's where the 127 00:08:36,840 --> 00:08:40,720 United States gets involved. Eisenhower is convinced in the mid 128 00:08:40,879 --> 00:08:44,399 nineteen fifties that we need a presence there economically, we 129 00:08:44,440 --> 00:08:51,240 need a presence there, at least training wise, militarily. At 130 00:08:51,240 --> 00:08:56,480 that point, was there an opportunity to roll back Ho 131 00:08:56,679 --> 00:09:00,320 Chi Minh or at least have a situation like we 132 00:09:00,399 --> 00:09:03,360 ultimately did in Korea where you have a very prosperous 133 00:09:04,039 --> 00:09:09,279 western linked South Korea versus obviously the absolute reverse in 134 00:09:09,360 --> 00:09:09,960 North Korea. 135 00:09:11,600 --> 00:09:14,320 Speaker 2: Yes, And that's a great question. And that's I think 136 00:09:14,639 --> 00:09:17,879 another of the enduring questions that we continue to grapple 137 00:09:17,919 --> 00:09:21,519 with is could South Vietnam have ended up like South Korea. 138 00:09:21,720 --> 00:09:26,399 I certainly think so. There are some major similarities. They 139 00:09:26,440 --> 00:09:30,639 have a very similar cultural background. The most important difference 140 00:09:31,559 --> 00:09:34,000 that makes it so much harder in Vietnam is that 141 00:09:34,080 --> 00:09:38,879 you have a massive exposed western border. Because the border 142 00:09:38,879 --> 00:09:43,919 between South Korea and North Korea was relatively short and defensible, 143 00:09:43,960 --> 00:09:48,559 but in Vietnam. Once Lyndon Johnson decides he's going to 144 00:09:48,600 --> 00:09:51,279 not go into Laos to cut the Houchuan trail. You 145 00:09:51,440 --> 00:09:55,159 have a thousand mile border on the west that the 146 00:09:55,159 --> 00:09:59,519 North Vietnamese can invade almost anywhere, and it makes it 147 00:09:59,559 --> 00:10:03,480 extremely difficult to try to defend the country. The US 148 00:10:03,639 --> 00:10:06,799 does it for many years, but if you don't want 149 00:10:06,840 --> 00:10:09,600 to spend a lot of money on ammunition and fuel, 150 00:10:10,720 --> 00:10:11,960 you're not gonna be able to do that. And that's 151 00:10:11,960 --> 00:10:15,240 what finally happens, is that the US Congress in nineteen 152 00:10:15,279 --> 00:10:19,440 seventy four decides it's not going to fund expensive war. 153 00:10:19,480 --> 00:10:22,919 And they had a very naive vision. And this is, 154 00:10:23,039 --> 00:10:25,159 you know, a recurring theme we have. I mean, you 155 00:10:25,200 --> 00:10:28,000 saw it going back to the Second World War. We 156 00:10:28,039 --> 00:10:30,120 thought we were going to get along great with Stalin 157 00:10:30,200 --> 00:10:33,720 after World War Two, but then all of a sudden, 158 00:10:33,720 --> 00:10:35,080 we know the Cold War. Then we think we're going 159 00:10:35,159 --> 00:10:38,200 to get along with Mao, and then he turns against us. 160 00:10:38,840 --> 00:10:41,559 We think we're gonna get along with Castro, he turns 161 00:10:41,600 --> 00:10:45,000 against us. And so you have in seventy four seventy 162 00:10:45,039 --> 00:10:48,919 five Democrats saying, well, the North Vietnamese really aren't that bad, 163 00:10:49,000 --> 00:10:51,320 and you know, if we just if we reduce support 164 00:10:51,360 --> 00:10:53,679 to South Vietnam, that means they're going to have to 165 00:10:53,759 --> 00:10:57,519 negotiate with the North Vietnamese and end this war. Well, 166 00:10:57,799 --> 00:11:01,039 of course, the North Vietnamese, we're not actually going to 167 00:11:01,080 --> 00:11:03,240 do that, and so when we reduced aid, they just 168 00:11:03,559 --> 00:11:10,399 exploited that to destroy our allies with enduring bailful consequences. 169 00:11:10,440 --> 00:11:14,919 I mean, you now have capitalism in Vietnam, but it's 170 00:11:14,960 --> 00:11:17,519 still much poorer than South Korea, and you don't have 171 00:11:17,679 --> 00:11:23,159 any freedom, said South Korea samething with Taiwan, which we 172 00:11:23,200 --> 00:11:26,960 bailed out on the Chinese nationalists in nineteen forty nine 173 00:11:27,080 --> 00:11:31,200 in a way similar to Vietnam. But Taiwan and South Korea, 174 00:11:31,240 --> 00:11:33,919 which we helped nurture, are now two of the greatest 175 00:11:33,960 --> 00:11:38,919 countries in the world, whereas North Korea is one of 176 00:11:38,960 --> 00:11:43,600 the world's worth China is quite awful. Who's going to 177 00:11:43,639 --> 00:11:46,080 pick to live in North Korea over South Korean. So 178 00:11:46,159 --> 00:11:48,559 that was one of the great tragedies of the war, 179 00:11:48,960 --> 00:11:51,559 is that all these people in South Vietnam who had 180 00:11:51,559 --> 00:11:55,679 been our allies for over twenty years are essentially abandoned, 181 00:11:56,399 --> 00:11:59,840 and some small number of them are able to escape, 182 00:12:00,080 --> 00:12:03,240 and you know, some of them have become great successes 183 00:12:03,279 --> 00:12:06,159 in the United States, but they had to abandon their 184 00:12:06,240 --> 00:12:08,799 land to this tyrannical government. 185 00:12:09,919 --> 00:12:12,519 Speaker 1: Yeah, chronologically, I want to get to Kennedy, and I'll 186 00:12:12,559 --> 00:12:15,440 do that in just a moment. But you mentioned something 187 00:12:15,480 --> 00:12:20,840 that is both amazing and very frustrating. It's again, we 188 00:12:21,000 --> 00:12:25,240 just never seem to learn. When we think as a country, 189 00:12:25,840 --> 00:12:29,399 the people who are in positions of authority to know 190 00:12:29,519 --> 00:12:32,679 better should learn from history. But as you mentioned, this 191 00:12:33,240 --> 00:12:36,200 long line of dictators, we thought that we could work with, 192 00:12:36,279 --> 00:12:41,120 particularly communist dictators, and it never turned out. In seventy four, 193 00:12:41,159 --> 00:12:43,559 as you mentioned, Congress says, well, we're not going to 194 00:12:43,600 --> 00:12:46,000 pay for this. There are all kinds of reasons. Obviously 195 00:12:46,039 --> 00:12:48,039 the war is very unpopular at this time. But it 196 00:12:48,080 --> 00:12:54,600 just seems like the Jane Fonda approach to dealing with reality, 197 00:12:54,759 --> 00:12:57,679 and that is to say, we just cut ties with 198 00:12:57,799 --> 00:13:01,320 reality when we were dealing with or thinking about dealing 199 00:13:01,320 --> 00:13:05,360 with ho Chi men and Stalin and with you know, 200 00:13:05,480 --> 00:13:09,720 Cruse Chef and Fidel Castro in this long line. Why 201 00:13:09,840 --> 00:13:12,759 is why can we never learn from our history? 202 00:13:14,039 --> 00:13:17,000 Speaker 2: Yeah, it's h it is sad, and it is you know, 203 00:13:17,000 --> 00:13:20,399 I have to say, it's consistently come from one side 204 00:13:20,440 --> 00:13:24,840 of the political spectrum. You have American left, which you know, 205 00:13:24,919 --> 00:13:28,440 for a long time was sympathetic to socialism or some 206 00:13:28,519 --> 00:13:32,039 ex sense still is, and and they thought communism really 207 00:13:32,080 --> 00:13:35,879 wasn't you know, all that bad. And then and you know, 208 00:13:35,919 --> 00:13:38,799 even after Vietnam, we see it continue with Jimmy Carter. 209 00:13:38,879 --> 00:13:42,279 You know, he comes in office in seventy seven saying 210 00:13:42,320 --> 00:13:45,759 that we had this inordinate fear of communism, we really 211 00:13:45,759 --> 00:13:48,600 didn't need it. And then and he starts doing the 212 00:13:48,639 --> 00:13:51,440 same thing, throwing our allies under the bus and then 213 00:13:51,519 --> 00:13:54,840 letting the communists roll over them. And you know, it's 214 00:13:54,840 --> 00:13:57,000 not until near the end of his presidency he himself 215 00:13:57,039 --> 00:13:59,679 admits that this was a catastrophic err and so he 216 00:13:59,720 --> 00:14:04,879 actually she starts rebuilding our military. But it is just 217 00:14:04,919 --> 00:14:10,039 a really tragic view that coused so many people their lives. 218 00:14:10,080 --> 00:14:12,480 I mean, you think about especially China today. I mean, 219 00:14:12,559 --> 00:14:16,480 China is our biggest adversary, the biggest threat to the world, 220 00:14:16,879 --> 00:14:20,799 and we really could have prevented that all from happening 221 00:14:21,000 --> 00:14:25,960 in the forties, and it happens on a smaller scale elsewhere, 222 00:14:26,279 --> 00:14:30,320 and it's you know, Unfortunately, there's just a lot of 223 00:14:30,360 --> 00:14:33,399 wishful thinking, and I think a lot of it also 224 00:14:33,519 --> 00:14:36,919 has to do with people not really understanding human nature 225 00:14:37,519 --> 00:14:42,960 and having naive expectations and somehow believing that these people 226 00:14:42,960 --> 00:14:45,799 aren't going to be lying to us through their teeth. 227 00:14:48,840 --> 00:14:52,000 Speaker 3: Beware of the import tax. The Watched Out on Wall 228 00:14:52,000 --> 00:14:55,279 Street podcast with Chris Markowski. Every day Chris helps unpack 229 00:14:55,320 --> 00:14:57,679 the connection between politics and the economy and how it 230 00:14:57,679 --> 00:15:00,639 affects your wallet. When you're buying stuff online and don't 231 00:15:00,679 --> 00:15:02,720 know where it's coming from, you might want to check 232 00:15:02,759 --> 00:15:05,000 at the end before you check out a sixty three 233 00:15:05,039 --> 00:15:07,720 dollars item on team who has an eighty nine dollars 234 00:15:07,720 --> 00:15:11,320 invore charge by American Whether it's happening in DC or 235 00:15:11,360 --> 00:15:13,279 down on Wall Street, it's affecting you financially. 236 00:15:13,360 --> 00:15:13,879 Speaker 2: Be informed. 237 00:15:13,960 --> 00:15:16,080 Speaker 3: Check out the Watchdot on Wall Street podcast with Chris 238 00:15:16,159 --> 00:15:19,080 Markowski on Apple, Spotify, or wherever you get your podcasts. 239 00:15:22,279 --> 00:15:25,279 Speaker 1: Yeah. I think the fatigue plays a role too, And 240 00:15:25,360 --> 00:15:29,279 I think everything you just said adds to that fatigue. 241 00:15:29,279 --> 00:15:31,919 You know, in World War Two, post World War Two, 242 00:15:32,240 --> 00:15:37,480 the fatigue of that just massacre of humanity, you know, 243 00:15:37,600 --> 00:15:42,919 this catastrophic event for years. I think people were just 244 00:15:43,320 --> 00:15:45,600 tired of it and they wanted to move on. I 245 00:15:45,600 --> 00:15:50,639 think the same thing happened, you know Vietnam. Certainly toward 246 00:15:50,879 --> 00:15:53,960 the end of hostilities, people just wanted to move on. 247 00:15:54,200 --> 00:15:56,440 But the way you move on, how you move on 248 00:15:57,240 --> 00:15:59,960 sets up how you are going to experience the few 249 00:16:00,320 --> 00:16:03,480 and whether you're going to experience the sequel of those events, 250 00:16:03,519 --> 00:16:08,080 and that's unfortunately what we have seen. I want to 251 00:16:08,120 --> 00:16:11,360 take you back to the early nineteen sixties. There's been 252 00:16:11,399 --> 00:16:15,159 a lot of talk over the years that John F. Kennedy, 253 00:16:15,720 --> 00:16:20,120 who certainly listened to his military advisors and got the 254 00:16:20,240 --> 00:16:24,879 United States more involved with training advisory roles I think 255 00:16:25,200 --> 00:16:30,080 somewhere in the vicinity of nine thousand US representatives in 256 00:16:30,200 --> 00:16:33,720 Vietnam in the early nineteen sixties. But there's long been 257 00:16:33,759 --> 00:16:38,759 this debate that Kennedy really soured on Vietnam, and had 258 00:16:38,799 --> 00:16:45,759 he survived, he would have removed United States presence from Vietnam. 259 00:16:46,200 --> 00:16:52,279 Is that true? Is that any record really to confirm 260 00:16:52,360 --> 00:16:56,039 that line of thinking or is that just kind of 261 00:16:56,399 --> 00:16:57,679 counterfactual thought. 262 00:16:58,840 --> 00:17:05,039 Speaker 2: Yeah, that I think is not at all substantiated by 263 00:17:05,720 --> 00:17:07,559 the evidence. And it's just I mean, we have so 264 00:17:07,640 --> 00:17:11,319 many examples of people getting Vietnam wrong, and this is 265 00:17:11,359 --> 00:17:16,799 one of the leading cases, and a lot of it 266 00:17:16,839 --> 00:17:19,400 is inspired by the affect that the analy these admirers 267 00:17:19,400 --> 00:17:22,039 who wanted to think he was a bit further to 268 00:17:22,119 --> 00:17:26,640 the left than he was. But we know clearly he 269 00:17:27,359 --> 00:17:30,839 undertakes a huge increase in the US presence in Vietnam. 270 00:17:31,720 --> 00:17:34,720 And there are a few discussions that people refer to 271 00:17:34,720 --> 00:17:37,079 you to try to say he was thinking about getting out, 272 00:17:37,359 --> 00:17:39,599 where he talks about maybe we take some troops out, 273 00:17:39,640 --> 00:17:42,799 But the reality is those discussions were based on the 274 00:17:42,839 --> 00:17:45,359 idea that things were going to be getting better, and 275 00:17:45,400 --> 00:17:49,880 things were actually getting better in nineteen sixty three until 276 00:17:50,279 --> 00:17:52,640 what is probably the single most important event of the 277 00:17:52,680 --> 00:17:58,079 whole war, which is the overthrow assassination of South Vietnam's president. 278 00:17:58,599 --> 00:18:04,680 And Kennedy had really mismanaged that he is distraught, he's 279 00:18:05,759 --> 00:18:08,720 dumbfounded by the whole thing. And then this is just 280 00:18:09,000 --> 00:18:13,480 weeks before his own assassination. But given everything else, we 281 00:18:13,559 --> 00:18:18,160 know he had already failed in the Bay of Pigs, 282 00:18:18,240 --> 00:18:20,599 and he'd failed in Loss and he specifically said on 283 00:18:20,599 --> 00:18:23,119 a number of occasions, you know, I've already had two 284 00:18:23,119 --> 00:18:26,839 strikes we cannot you have a third strike. We've got 285 00:18:26,880 --> 00:18:30,759 to stand firm in Vietnam. So I think he would 286 00:18:30,799 --> 00:18:34,000 have done just about the same thing as Lyndon Johnson 287 00:18:34,000 --> 00:18:35,240 had he been alive. 288 00:18:36,000 --> 00:18:42,599 Speaker 1: So here comes Lyndon Johnson forced into the role becoming president. 289 00:18:42,880 --> 00:18:50,480 As we've seen over history. Some call these vice presidents 290 00:18:50,559 --> 00:18:57,200 who suddenly ascend to the chief executive role, accidental presidents, 291 00:18:57,240 --> 00:19:00,680 if you will. But he's got some major decisions to make, 292 00:19:00,839 --> 00:19:05,640 and his timetable is quickly set for him in what 293 00:19:05,799 --> 00:19:10,880 becomes the whole Gulf of Tonkin affair that obviously precipitously, 294 00:19:13,039 --> 00:19:16,359 you know, heats up the Cold War, makes it a 295 00:19:16,400 --> 00:19:19,279 hot war in Vietnam for the United States. Take us 296 00:19:19,279 --> 00:19:24,720 through the Gulf of Tonkin, the resolution and where Johnson's 297 00:19:24,839 --> 00:19:28,440 mindset was, and the peoples who surrounded him at that 298 00:19:28,599 --> 00:19:29,920 time giving him advice. 299 00:19:31,559 --> 00:19:36,519 Speaker 2: Yeah, s. Johnson in nineteen sixty four is thinking mainly 300 00:19:36,559 --> 00:19:40,720 about one thing, which is getting re elected. He's also 301 00:19:40,720 --> 00:19:44,759 thinking about his civil rights agenda, and he's advancing civil 302 00:19:44,839 --> 00:19:48,279 rights legislation. He does not want to be a foreign 303 00:19:48,359 --> 00:19:53,559 policy president. He wants to be a domestic legislative guy. 304 00:19:53,599 --> 00:19:57,559 And he does pass a lot of important legislation in 305 00:19:58,400 --> 00:20:01,480 consultation with Congress. But his for nineteen sixty four is 306 00:20:01,559 --> 00:20:05,680 keep Vietnam off of the front page because it's going 307 00:20:05,759 --> 00:20:10,680 to distract from the domestic agenda and people, voters might 308 00:20:10,720 --> 00:20:13,079 get worried that it's not going as well and that 309 00:20:13,160 --> 00:20:16,519 might hurt him. So he is able for the most 310 00:20:16,519 --> 00:20:18,759 part to do that during nineteen sixty four, but the 311 00:20:18,799 --> 00:20:23,400 Gulf of Tonkin incidents in August really throw a wrench 312 00:20:23,440 --> 00:20:29,039 into his plans. You have attacks on American destroyers in 313 00:20:29,079 --> 00:20:32,799 the Tonkin Golf. Now there is later doubts about whether 314 00:20:32,839 --> 00:20:34,720 one of those happen. We know at least the first 315 00:20:34,759 --> 00:20:39,039 of the two happened. Johnson believed they happen, And so 316 00:20:39,240 --> 00:20:44,640 Johnson has to do something to show that he's going 317 00:20:44,680 --> 00:20:47,759 to respond when American ships are attacked on the high seas. 318 00:20:49,400 --> 00:20:54,799 And therefore he consults with his top officials, Robert McNamara 319 00:20:54,880 --> 00:21:00,920 foremost among them, and McNamara is enamored of academic theories, 320 00:21:01,519 --> 00:21:05,759 and the academic theories of the day look at war 321 00:21:05,799 --> 00:21:10,920 as an abstraction between rational actors, and so they hYP outhesize, 322 00:21:10,920 --> 00:21:13,880 what if you do this, take this action, how's the 323 00:21:13,920 --> 00:21:16,200 other side going to respond, and while they're rational, so 324 00:21:16,240 --> 00:21:19,240 we can address that. So the thinking here is that 325 00:21:20,799 --> 00:21:27,359 if we undertake a little, tiny show of force, that's 326 00:21:27,359 --> 00:21:29,880 all we need to do to show the enemy that 327 00:21:30,000 --> 00:21:34,359 we are not going to get pushed around, that we're serious. 328 00:21:34,799 --> 00:21:38,359 So they launch a very small bombing raid against the 329 00:21:38,359 --> 00:21:42,720 North Vietnamese navy and so they think this has worked well. 330 00:21:42,759 --> 00:21:46,720 It turns out the North Vietnamese view this exactly in 331 00:21:46,759 --> 00:21:50,200 the opposite way. They see this as a sign of weakness, 332 00:21:50,599 --> 00:21:52,960 because if you are the world's greatest power, why do 333 00:21:53,000 --> 00:21:56,039 you just rely on this little pinprick strike. So this 334 00:21:56,119 --> 00:22:00,200 actually will encourage North Vietnam to escalate the war, and 335 00:22:00,240 --> 00:22:03,640 then Johnson further pushes them in that direction by stating 336 00:22:03,680 --> 00:22:06,680 repeatedly on the campaign trail that he's not going to 337 00:22:06,680 --> 00:22:10,079 send American boys to Vietnam and that he's a peace candidate. 338 00:22:10,200 --> 00:22:13,519 So this then sets in motion full blown invasion of 339 00:22:13,559 --> 00:22:17,359 South Vietnam, which will come to fruition in early nineteen 340 00:22:17,400 --> 00:22:19,839 sixty five. And that's why ultimately Johnson will have to 341 00:22:19,880 --> 00:22:21,400 send ground troops into the war. 342 00:22:22,240 --> 00:22:26,240 Speaker 1: Yeah, he is not the peace candidate. He got himself 343 00:22:26,279 --> 00:22:29,960 into a lot of problems by saying those things. Other 344 00:22:30,039 --> 00:22:33,519 presidents have said lots of things that have gotten them 345 00:22:33,519 --> 00:22:35,920 into problems. I think of George H. W. Bush and 346 00:22:35,960 --> 00:22:39,680 read my lips. But this obviously ends up with Johnson 347 00:22:39,799 --> 00:22:45,720 sending lots of boys into the jungles of Vietnam. To me, 348 00:22:46,359 --> 00:22:51,200 his handling of Vietnam in many ways was much like 349 00:22:51,240 --> 00:22:54,960 his handling of the Great Society, the War on Poverty 350 00:22:55,279 --> 00:22:59,680 abject failures both. What do you think of Johnson's handling 351 00:22:59,759 --> 00:23:02,960 of the Vietnam Did he approach it in a winnable way? 352 00:23:03,240 --> 00:23:04,559 Is the question for history. 353 00:23:05,960 --> 00:23:09,839 Speaker 2: Now he made a great many errors. Now, one thing 354 00:23:09,880 --> 00:23:13,519 I will say is, you know, I do think in 355 00:23:13,640 --> 00:23:17,759 terms of fighting for venom in itself there was actually 356 00:23:17,880 --> 00:23:20,119 good reason to do that because of the threat of 357 00:23:20,160 --> 00:23:27,119 Asian expansion Asian communist expansionism. But when you get to 358 00:23:27,279 --> 00:23:30,359 how he actually tried to do it, it was a 359 00:23:30,400 --> 00:23:35,319 series of very catastrophic errors. I mean one starting with this, 360 00:23:36,200 --> 00:23:40,160 you know, incorrect messaging about how we're not serious, I 361 00:23:40,200 --> 00:23:44,599 means inviting the enemy to invade, essentially for his own 362 00:23:44,640 --> 00:23:50,319 domestic political benefit. Then he consistently ignores the advice of 363 00:23:50,440 --> 00:23:52,960 his generals, and one of the things they tell him 364 00:23:53,000 --> 00:23:55,960 is we're going to once we start bombing in Earnest 365 00:23:56,039 --> 00:23:58,000 in nineteen sixty five, we have to hit him hard. 366 00:23:58,000 --> 00:24:00,400 And Johnson said, now I'm gonna listen to mak Mara, 367 00:24:00,480 --> 00:24:02,920 who says we should do this thing called gradual escalation, 368 00:24:03,559 --> 00:24:07,000 where we slowly increase. That turns out to be a 369 00:24:07,079 --> 00:24:12,680 terrible idea and ineffective. He refuses to he requests from 370 00:24:12,720 --> 00:24:15,720 the generals to push into North feenomenor laws, which you 371 00:24:15,759 --> 00:24:19,279 also know would have worked out very well. He also 372 00:24:19,960 --> 00:24:24,039 deliberately avoids trying to rouse the nation's spirits, and this 373 00:24:24,079 --> 00:24:26,880 is again because he wants to be the president of 374 00:24:26,880 --> 00:24:30,359 the Great Society and civil rights. And he will admit 375 00:24:30,440 --> 00:24:33,400 later on in his presidency that this was probably not 376 00:24:33,440 --> 00:24:36,039 a good idea, because if the president's not out there 377 00:24:36,079 --> 00:24:38,440 explaining to the people why their war is being fought, 378 00:24:38,440 --> 00:24:42,160 you're going to see the people gradually lose faith in 379 00:24:42,240 --> 00:24:43,599 the war and in the president. 380 00:24:45,200 --> 00:24:50,200 Speaker 1: And indeed they did, they absolutely lost faith in the 381 00:24:50,240 --> 00:24:53,200 war and the president. More on that in just a moment. 382 00:24:53,279 --> 00:24:57,200 Our guest today is Mark Moyer, William P. Harris, Professor 383 00:24:57,240 --> 00:25:01,200 of Military History, Hillsdale College. As we talk about the 384 00:25:01,240 --> 00:25:04,519 fall of Saigon, the effective end of the Vietnam War, 385 00:25:04,559 --> 00:25:09,000 at least for the United States of America. That date 386 00:25:09,359 --> 00:25:14,079 April thirtieth of nineteen seventy five, a day that will 387 00:25:14,680 --> 00:25:22,000 obviously live long in our memories. So macnamara, this is 388 00:25:22,039 --> 00:25:25,400 an interesting fella. And he's got the president's here. I mean, 389 00:25:25,440 --> 00:25:29,880 he absolutely has the president's ear. And as you mentioned before, 390 00:25:30,039 --> 00:25:34,799 he's a theorist. He's a different kind of general. Clearly 391 00:25:34,920 --> 00:25:38,359 history tells us he was not an effective general. Why 392 00:25:38,119 --> 00:25:41,799 what happened with this guy? And why did Johnson listen 393 00:25:41,960 --> 00:25:44,359 so sincerely to him? 394 00:25:44,640 --> 00:25:49,440 Speaker 2: Yes, well, he was somebody with a very impressive demeanor, 395 00:25:49,480 --> 00:25:52,720 the kind of person you listen to. You know, everyone's 396 00:25:52,759 --> 00:25:55,480 come across people. You do something about this person that 397 00:25:55,559 --> 00:25:58,039 instills confidence in him. And so Johnson for a long 398 00:25:58,079 --> 00:26:00,880 time was sort of spellbound. And you know, mcmaarr is 399 00:26:00,880 --> 00:26:05,359 a very smart guy. He was very good at giving presentations. 400 00:26:05,960 --> 00:26:09,440 Now McNamara had come from the business world, he'd been 401 00:26:09,480 --> 00:26:13,920 an executive at the Ford Motor Company, and well rich 402 00:26:14,039 --> 00:26:16,599 religion and Kennedy who brings him in Johnson will inherit him. 403 00:26:16,599 --> 00:26:19,920 But Kennedy and others are of the belief that, well, 404 00:26:19,960 --> 00:26:22,759 we can take things from the business world, which seems 405 00:26:22,799 --> 00:26:25,960 to be more effective, and use them to run this 406 00:26:26,359 --> 00:26:30,839 stodgy pentagon bureaucracy. And now government bureaucracy does tend to 407 00:26:30,839 --> 00:26:36,640 be stodgy and does sometimes need a kick. But when 408 00:26:36,680 --> 00:26:39,599 it comes to war, war is a fundamentally different enterprise 409 00:26:39,720 --> 00:26:42,640 than building cars, because when you're building cars, nobody's there 410 00:26:42,680 --> 00:26:45,279 trying to blow up what you're trying to do. You 411 00:26:45,279 --> 00:26:49,319 don't really have an enemy who's actively getting in your way. 412 00:26:49,319 --> 00:26:52,720 And McNamara really didn't know how to deal with these adversaries. 413 00:26:52,720 --> 00:26:57,720 So that's why he turns to these academic theories. And 414 00:26:57,759 --> 00:27:00,440 you know, this is a part of a broader contentversy 415 00:27:00,599 --> 00:27:03,880 between sort of social science and the humanities and history. 416 00:27:04,640 --> 00:27:08,359 And I'm a historian. I firmly believe that, you know, 417 00:27:08,559 --> 00:27:10,680 as we think about the future, you've got to think 418 00:27:10,680 --> 00:27:15,359 about history. The social sciences like to think in abstract terms, 419 00:27:15,799 --> 00:27:18,440 but if you spend much time looking at the course 420 00:27:18,440 --> 00:27:21,720 of his human history, usually get into trouble if you 421 00:27:21,799 --> 00:27:25,519 simply rely on abstractions, because you take out the human 422 00:27:25,599 --> 00:27:28,799 element and the humans. You know, humans often do things 423 00:27:28,839 --> 00:27:33,519 that are unexpected. They often disappoint us. They are not 424 00:27:33,640 --> 00:27:36,880 always rational, as macnamara is prone to believe, and so 425 00:27:36,960 --> 00:27:43,319 McNamara repeatedly misunderstands his enemy and just makes one bad 426 00:27:43,359 --> 00:27:44,519 decision after the next. 427 00:27:45,160 --> 00:27:51,440 Speaker 1: Yeah, to the detriment of national security and foreign policy 428 00:27:52,200 --> 00:28:00,359 throughout the tet offensive comes along. Is that the the 429 00:28:00,519 --> 00:28:06,599 end for Lyndon Baines Johnson or does he think at 430 00:28:06,599 --> 00:28:09,440 that point we can regroup, because you know, it's not 431 00:28:09,599 --> 00:28:14,359 much longer after that that you get this announcement from 432 00:28:14,400 --> 00:28:19,920 the president on national TV. I will not accept the nomination. 433 00:28:21,519 --> 00:28:26,079 He's done as president of the United States. Did the 434 00:28:26,119 --> 00:28:27,759 tet offensive drive him there? 435 00:28:28,880 --> 00:28:33,039 Speaker 2: It certainly played a large role, and it brings Johnson 436 00:28:33,079 --> 00:28:35,759 to realize that he's been trying to play something of 437 00:28:35,799 --> 00:28:39,039 a middle ground between the liberal wing of his party 438 00:28:39,160 --> 00:28:41,359 and the more considered wing his party and the rest 439 00:28:41,400 --> 00:28:46,240 of the country. And eventually both sides come to conclude 440 00:28:46,279 --> 00:28:48,519 that he's not doing good job, and so he's run 441 00:28:48,559 --> 00:28:52,000 out of support. Now, it's worth noting this is not 442 00:28:52,079 --> 00:28:54,839 the end for the war itself. Public support for the 443 00:28:54,839 --> 00:28:57,960 war actually is quite a bit higher. Still. People still 444 00:28:58,000 --> 00:29:01,640 see this as a significant warrant, and Americans don't want 445 00:29:01,680 --> 00:29:04,359 to lose a war, and what we'll see in the 446 00:29:04,440 --> 00:29:08,680 years ahead is declining American participation. But the hope is 447 00:29:08,720 --> 00:29:14,400 that we can keep South Vietnam alive and not allow 448 00:29:14,480 --> 00:29:15,279 them to collapse. 449 00:29:16,559 --> 00:29:21,240 Speaker 1: Definitely. So and so you have an interesting campaign in 450 00:29:21,400 --> 00:29:27,200 nineteen sixty eight that also includes the Democrats are going 451 00:29:27,240 --> 00:29:30,559 through some very difficult times, to say the least, our 452 00:29:30,599 --> 00:29:34,000 college campuses are on fire, some of our inner cities 453 00:29:34,000 --> 00:29:36,240 are on fire. You have this in the backdrop of 454 00:29:37,400 --> 00:29:41,359 Marxist movement on our college campuses and violence in the 455 00:29:41,359 --> 00:29:46,039 civil rights movement. All of this stuff is going on Vietnam. Obviously, 456 00:29:46,119 --> 00:29:50,079 like everything else, does not happen in a vacuum. But 457 00:29:50,160 --> 00:29:54,759 you have emerging from the nineteen sixty eight presidential contest 458 00:29:54,839 --> 00:29:58,400 a guy that everybody thought was done in politics after 459 00:29:58,759 --> 00:30:03,160 nineteen sixty and certainly after his ill fated run for 460 00:30:03,279 --> 00:30:07,839 governor of California. That's Richard Nixon, and he becomes, in essence, 461 00:30:10,119 --> 00:30:16,000 if not the peace candidate, the win with dignity. It 462 00:30:17,000 --> 00:30:18,599 didn't turn out that way, though, did it. 463 00:30:20,039 --> 00:30:22,599 Speaker 2: Now. I mean, initially Nixon comes in thinking he may 464 00:30:22,599 --> 00:30:27,799 be able to intimidate the North Vietnamese. He has in 465 00:30:27,799 --> 00:30:30,440 mind what Eisenhower did in nineteen fifty three when he 466 00:30:30,480 --> 00:30:32,920 came in and brought an end to the Korean War. 467 00:30:33,559 --> 00:30:37,400 And unfortunately for Nixon, he makes some decisions in nineteen 468 00:30:37,440 --> 00:30:41,359 sixty nine that undercut that. There's a couple of serious 469 00:30:41,599 --> 00:30:45,640 enemy provocations and Nixon doesn't react even though some of 470 00:30:45,680 --> 00:30:48,000 his advisors tell him to do, because he's being told 471 00:30:48,000 --> 00:30:53,160 by Henry Kissinger and others that, well, this could undermine negotiations. 472 00:30:53,519 --> 00:30:55,559 And this is one of the many the fallacies that 473 00:30:55,599 --> 00:30:59,640 comes up over and over again that and it's the 474 00:30:59,680 --> 00:31:02,599 same people usually who are telling us that we really 475 00:31:02,640 --> 00:31:06,200 can we should be more trusting in these communists, but 476 00:31:06,400 --> 00:31:09,240 they keep saying, well, if we only ease off them, 477 00:31:09,240 --> 00:31:12,720 then they will negotiate. And Nixon will eventually learn that 478 00:31:12,839 --> 00:31:14,599 the only way to get the negotiate is actually to 479 00:31:14,680 --> 00:31:16,920 hit them very hard, and that's what will finally happen, 480 00:31:17,000 --> 00:31:19,079 but that will be several years down the road. And 481 00:31:19,119 --> 00:31:23,000 so what Nixon does is go on this strategy of Vietnamization, 482 00:31:23,160 --> 00:31:27,680 of turning things over gradually to the South Vietnamese, and 483 00:31:28,279 --> 00:31:31,200 it actually ends up working pretty well. When you get 484 00:31:31,200 --> 00:31:34,359 to nineteen seventy two, there's a huge North Vietnamese invasion. 485 00:31:34,960 --> 00:31:37,680 American ground troops are gone at that point, and yet 486 00:31:37,680 --> 00:31:42,960 the South Vietnamese hold them off. And so the question 487 00:31:43,000 --> 00:31:47,720 then is how much longer can the US maintain a 488 00:31:47,799 --> 00:31:51,559 high degree of support And Americans will pull out the 489 00:31:51,599 --> 00:31:56,680 early seventy three, but the AID will continue, and another 490 00:31:56,680 --> 00:32:00,200 big conference is how we continue the aid at that level. 491 00:32:00,400 --> 00:32:02,240 Would they have survived? I tend to think they will, 492 00:32:02,279 --> 00:32:05,200 but of course, because of Watergate and Congress, we will 493 00:32:05,200 --> 00:32:07,519 cut the aid in that I think ensure South Vietnam 494 00:32:07,599 --> 00:32:08,160 is going to fall. 495 00:32:08,880 --> 00:32:13,400 Speaker 1: Yeah. Again, so many different events beyond the control of 496 00:32:13,559 --> 00:32:17,960 just this one major war that is going on. I said, 497 00:32:18,000 --> 00:32:23,119 I think I said win with victory or win with dignity. 498 00:32:23,240 --> 00:32:25,920 I think that the term at the time was peace 499 00:32:26,039 --> 00:32:29,359 with dignity, and it's a long road to peace. Obviously, 500 00:32:29,440 --> 00:32:33,599 as we see moving through the Nixon years, when did. 501 00:32:35,400 --> 00:32:36,799 Speaker 2: The pro. 502 00:32:37,960 --> 00:32:45,079 Speaker 1: Vietnam establishment, When did they lose ultimately the support of 503 00:32:45,160 --> 00:32:48,160 America to put it in TV parlance at the time, 504 00:32:48,839 --> 00:32:53,720 when did it go from Americans being archie bunker to 505 00:32:54,720 --> 00:32:56,319 meathead if you will? 506 00:32:57,680 --> 00:33:01,559 Speaker 2: Yeah, well, I do think Watergate play a critical role, 507 00:33:01,920 --> 00:33:06,000 and it's you know, even as the US is pulling out. 508 00:33:06,039 --> 00:33:09,799 There's still a strong sentiment. You know, most Americans want 509 00:33:10,599 --> 00:33:13,319 the country to succeed. They don't like the ally the 510 00:33:13,400 --> 00:33:17,960 idea of one of our allies being overthrown by by communism. 511 00:33:18,839 --> 00:33:21,960 But you know, with Watergate, there's such a souring on Nixon, 512 00:33:22,000 --> 00:33:26,200 and I think that also contributes to the souring on 513 00:33:26,240 --> 00:33:29,640 the war because it was something that Nixon was associated with. 514 00:33:30,240 --> 00:33:32,720 And so you certainly see that in Congress that people 515 00:33:32,799 --> 00:33:36,400 are mad at Nixon, and they they use Vietnam as 516 00:33:36,440 --> 00:33:39,920 a weapon to hit him with. And I said, there's 517 00:33:39,920 --> 00:33:45,799 also in there some naive hope that somehow it's our allies, 518 00:33:48,079 --> 00:33:50,519 you know, racalcitrinds that's in the way of peace. So 519 00:33:50,599 --> 00:33:53,920 if we we remove support to them, that will bring peace. 520 00:33:53,960 --> 00:33:55,640 I mean, it's to some extent a little bit like 521 00:33:55,680 --> 00:33:59,559 we we here in debates today over the Middle East 522 00:33:59,599 --> 00:34:02,480 that well maybe we should just you know, if we 523 00:34:02,599 --> 00:34:05,240 just reduce our support to Israel, that that's going to 524 00:34:06,359 --> 00:34:08,559 bring us peace and happiness. 525 00:34:09,559 --> 00:34:13,519 Speaker 1: I understand, we have lived with a lot of what 526 00:34:13,639 --> 00:34:18,400 feels like never ending wars in this century and the 527 00:34:18,440 --> 00:34:23,239 century past. Americans have dealt with that. Americans have funded 528 00:34:23,280 --> 00:34:29,000 that and whether they wanted to or not. But again, 529 00:34:29,119 --> 00:34:31,360 it is a matter of learning from history. Will delve 530 00:34:31,400 --> 00:34:34,599 into that in just a moment. But I want to 531 00:34:34,639 --> 00:34:37,800 ask you this, because so much came out of Vietnam 532 00:34:37,840 --> 00:34:41,880 and the Vietnam era that has informed and shaped what 533 00:34:42,000 --> 00:34:45,159 this country is today and in many cases the divide 534 00:34:45,159 --> 00:34:49,639 that we experience in this country today. How much did 535 00:34:49,920 --> 00:34:56,360 the fall of Vietnam contribute to this rabid Marxist movement 536 00:34:56,440 --> 00:35:01,079 that is so alive and well, that's that really did 537 00:35:01,199 --> 00:35:05,679 spring up in large part because of Vietnam on college 538 00:35:05,760 --> 00:35:09,159 campuses and in our institutions across the country. How much 539 00:35:09,199 --> 00:35:11,960 of that has to do with Vietnam and the apps 540 00:35:12,039 --> 00:35:16,400 at the actual end, the collapse, the loss in Vietnam. 541 00:35:17,679 --> 00:35:21,239 Speaker 2: Yeah, I think they really went hand in hand. And 542 00:35:21,519 --> 00:35:25,920 the Vietnam campus protests is interesting because that when the 543 00:35:25,960 --> 00:35:29,199 war first gets going in nineteen sixty five, there's really 544 00:35:29,239 --> 00:35:33,639 not much criticism on campus, and it's really not to 545 00:35:33,639 --> 00:35:35,960 you get the baby boomers coming in, combined with the 546 00:35:36,000 --> 00:35:38,880 fact that they get tougher on the draft rules in 547 00:35:38,960 --> 00:35:43,280 nineteen sixty seven, and so you have a generation now 548 00:35:43,760 --> 00:35:46,760 baby boomers really taking control and a lot of them 549 00:35:46,800 --> 00:35:52,199 are not as interested in patriotic sacrifice as their predecessors, 550 00:35:52,360 --> 00:35:56,480 and they latch onto Vietnam. I think partly why it's 551 00:35:56,519 --> 00:35:59,159 still so misunderstood is they really distort the war in 552 00:35:59,239 --> 00:36:05,079 order to serve or their own interests. And then you know, 553 00:36:05,400 --> 00:36:08,079 it's interesting too to see what happens when the Saigon 554 00:36:08,159 --> 00:36:11,199 actually falls. They stop paying a lot of attention to it, 555 00:36:11,800 --> 00:36:14,000 but sort of cling to these notions that it was 556 00:36:14,039 --> 00:36:16,440 a terrible war, but in the meantime kind of forgetting 557 00:36:16,480 --> 00:36:19,639 about what happens next. You know, they're not talking about 558 00:36:19,639 --> 00:36:24,280 re education camps or both people or Khmer Rouge killing 559 00:36:24,480 --> 00:36:26,599 you know, millions of people, and sometimes they'll come up 560 00:36:26,599 --> 00:36:30,599 with crazy excuses as to why, you know, those things 561 00:36:30,599 --> 00:36:35,559 are actually America's fault. But it is an enduring symbol. 562 00:36:35,559 --> 00:36:39,880 And that's why too, you have so much even today, 563 00:36:40,679 --> 00:36:46,320 a strong resistance to anyone who might question through the 564 00:36:46,400 --> 00:36:50,480 conventional wisdom that's been handed down through the anti war movement, 565 00:36:50,480 --> 00:36:54,320 which continues to dominate culture. If you see things like 566 00:36:54,400 --> 00:36:57,760 Ken Burns documentary a few years ago, and there's actually 567 00:36:57,880 --> 00:37:00,880 a new Netflix documentary that just came out out which 568 00:37:01,000 --> 00:37:04,559 I haven't gotten a chance to see yet. But from 569 00:37:05,119 --> 00:37:08,800 well I've heard, it seems to be in the same vein. 570 00:37:09,119 --> 00:37:13,320 This is a fundamentally important event in our history and 571 00:37:13,400 --> 00:37:16,360 especially to them, and so they feel they've got to 572 00:37:16,360 --> 00:37:17,280 control the narrative. 573 00:37:17,760 --> 00:37:20,599 Speaker 1: It's fascinating to me that the history that we talk about, 574 00:37:20,639 --> 00:37:22,440 I mean, as you go back to the founding of 575 00:37:22,440 --> 00:37:27,360 this nation, and you see, you know, a just a genius, 576 00:37:27,840 --> 00:37:30,880 no other way to describe, but Thomas Jefferson, who is 577 00:37:31,159 --> 00:37:35,880 you know, sucked in by the Jacobins, by the you know, 578 00:37:36,159 --> 00:37:41,400 the the appeal of the French Revolution, and then you know, 579 00:37:41,719 --> 00:37:47,920 has to kind of recalibrate is support for what becomes, 580 00:37:48,000 --> 00:37:52,320 you know, just the tyranny of the mob. And that's 581 00:37:52,360 --> 00:37:56,159 where you have the federalist and anti federalist clashing going 582 00:37:56,239 --> 00:37:57,760 on and all of that sort of thing. 583 00:37:57,800 --> 00:37:58,559 Speaker 2: And it just. 584 00:37:58,519 --> 00:38:01,440 Speaker 1: Seems, you know, two hundred years later, two hundred and 585 00:38:01,480 --> 00:38:04,599 fifty years later, we're in the same position again. I 586 00:38:04,679 --> 00:38:06,760 just can't help but think will we ever learn? 587 00:38:08,559 --> 00:38:12,639 Speaker 2: Yeah, that's an excellent point, and that is in fact, 588 00:38:13,440 --> 00:38:16,159 next year will be a much happier anniversary for us, 589 00:38:16,199 --> 00:38:19,559 and we Hillsdale are going to be yes celebrating that 590 00:38:19,599 --> 00:38:21,880 anniversary at the two hund and fiftieth anniversary at the start 591 00:38:21,920 --> 00:38:24,960 of the country. This year's anniversary at the Vietnam is 592 00:38:25,679 --> 00:38:31,719 much more somber. One said, it had so many negative 593 00:38:31,760 --> 00:38:38,000 consequences that it just makes all of us a bit sad. 594 00:38:38,599 --> 00:38:41,320 Speaker 1: Does So let's look at the legacy of Vietnam as 595 00:38:41,360 --> 00:38:45,199 we close out our conversation you mentioned at the beginning, 596 00:38:45,400 --> 00:38:49,400 and we can never forget that the fact that, you know, 597 00:38:49,679 --> 00:38:54,320 things didn't become a nirvana in Vietnam or the rest 598 00:38:54,360 --> 00:38:56,920 of the world, in the United States of America after 599 00:38:57,000 --> 00:39:02,679 the United States left Vietnam in April nineteen seventy five. Altogether, 600 00:39:03,599 --> 00:39:08,199 the devastation that was caused in the wake of our 601 00:39:08,280 --> 00:39:13,440 withdrawal is very clear. And what we have seen, i 602 00:39:13,519 --> 00:39:18,280 think in modern times, the comparisons to what we saw 603 00:39:18,360 --> 00:39:24,519 in the Biden administration and those similar images in Kabul Kable, 604 00:39:26,719 --> 00:39:30,480 it's just once again amazing how its book ended some 605 00:39:30,840 --> 00:39:34,920 fifty years forty five years later. Where do we go 606 00:39:35,079 --> 00:39:40,400 from this point with today's Vietnam. 607 00:39:40,760 --> 00:39:43,880 Speaker 2: Yeah, it's sad. And we saw pretty much the same 608 00:39:43,920 --> 00:39:48,159 thing in Iraq too with Obama and then he also 609 00:39:48,280 --> 00:39:50,440 was trying to get out of afghanistanment you have these 610 00:39:51,280 --> 00:39:54,480 people who think that when the Americans leave, the war 611 00:39:54,599 --> 00:39:56,679 is over. I mean you literally had both Obama and 612 00:39:56,679 --> 00:39:59,480 Biden say that. But you know, the war's not over 613 00:39:59,480 --> 00:40:01,519 as long as people are fighting, and when we had 614 00:40:01,519 --> 00:40:04,159 such a big role in it, to pull out and 615 00:40:04,159 --> 00:40:09,920 then try to pretend that things are over is just horrible. 616 00:40:10,360 --> 00:40:14,480 Hopefully we some people at least will learn something, and 617 00:40:14,559 --> 00:40:18,119 clearly people like Biden didn't learn that from Afghanistan, because 618 00:40:18,119 --> 00:40:20,920 he turns around and does the same thing in Afghanistan. 619 00:40:21,000 --> 00:40:23,599 Of course, we've seen horrible things happen there as well 620 00:40:23,639 --> 00:40:27,199 to the people who had been our allies. And you 621 00:40:27,320 --> 00:40:30,280 also had this naivete that, oh, the Taliban, they've told 622 00:40:30,360 --> 00:40:32,800 us they're going to be nice to women now, so okay, 623 00:40:32,840 --> 00:40:35,440 we can trust them now, which, of course they've totally 624 00:40:36,039 --> 00:40:41,519 renigged on all of that as well. And so I 625 00:40:41,559 --> 00:40:45,559 think it's a reminder we should be very careful in 626 00:40:45,639 --> 00:40:49,320 how we think and avoid this tendency to his naivete 627 00:40:49,320 --> 00:40:53,039 that is unfortunately often common among Americans. I think one 628 00:40:53,079 --> 00:40:55,440 of the best ways to do is actually study history 629 00:40:55,440 --> 00:40:59,440 and see how things actually work in the real world. 630 00:41:00,480 --> 00:41:03,559 Is people, human nature doesn't really change very much so 631 00:41:03,599 --> 00:41:06,199 you're going to find out more about people by looking 632 00:41:06,239 --> 00:41:09,800 at the past than about thinking in abstract terms. 633 00:41:10,360 --> 00:41:14,159 Speaker 1: When I think about Vietnam, America's role in it and 634 00:41:14,400 --> 00:41:17,719 what happened there, and since I cannot help but think 635 00:41:17,760 --> 00:41:22,079 about some family and friends, some men who served in 636 00:41:22,440 --> 00:41:27,320 Vietnam who didn't get lucky by some college deferment, who 637 00:41:27,519 --> 00:41:31,320 lost the lottery, so to speak, and they were in country, 638 00:41:32,159 --> 00:41:35,840 and one in particular comes to mind. Doesn't like to 639 00:41:35,880 --> 00:41:38,800 talk about his experiences because what he experienced would be 640 00:41:38,920 --> 00:41:43,119 unimaginable to most of us, who fortunately haven't had to 641 00:41:43,119 --> 00:41:48,559 deal with that. But despite all of those things that 642 00:41:48,599 --> 00:41:53,400 he witnessed that he experienced, among the worst, if not 643 00:41:53,559 --> 00:41:57,519 the worst, was coming home to be spit on by protesters. 644 00:41:57,880 --> 00:42:03,000 Have we at least got an understanding of what that 645 00:42:03,119 --> 00:42:05,360 meant to those brave people. 646 00:42:07,320 --> 00:42:10,880 Speaker 2: Yes. And you know, that's one area where I will 647 00:42:10,920 --> 00:42:13,760 say the left a little bit got its act together. 648 00:42:13,800 --> 00:42:17,119 They eventually figured out that it's the politicians and not 649 00:42:17,199 --> 00:42:20,000 the troops who decide when we go to war. They 650 00:42:20,000 --> 00:42:21,840 didn't understand at the time of the war, so they 651 00:42:21,840 --> 00:42:27,880 did the sorts of despicable things you talked about, you know, now. 652 00:42:27,920 --> 00:42:31,679 You know, fortunately our veterans don't have to deal with 653 00:42:31,719 --> 00:42:37,320 that same sort of of problem today. But you know, 654 00:42:37,360 --> 00:42:38,760 we are in a period where we now that it 655 00:42:38,800 --> 00:42:43,880 is all volunteer for us. Fortunately we're not heavily engaged now, 656 00:42:43,960 --> 00:42:46,400 but the burden has shifted to a much smaller percent 657 00:42:46,519 --> 00:42:51,079 of the population, which I think is problematic in a 658 00:42:51,159 --> 00:42:54,800 number of ways. It's certainly hard on those families, but 659 00:42:55,559 --> 00:42:57,800 you know, I do think it's worth remembering. A big 660 00:42:57,840 --> 00:43:01,039 reason why I spent so much time writing books about 661 00:43:01,119 --> 00:43:03,920 Vietnam was that I think a lot of the veterans 662 00:43:03,920 --> 00:43:06,960 and their families and the men who never came back, 663 00:43:07,480 --> 00:43:11,000 you know, never really got the full story on what happened, 664 00:43:11,039 --> 00:43:13,840 and they most of them, were subjected to things like 665 00:43:13,920 --> 00:43:18,920 ken Burns and Stanley Carno's book and other gross distortions 666 00:43:18,920 --> 00:43:21,960 of history which made it seem like they had just 667 00:43:22,079 --> 00:43:27,199 been thrown into a complete fools erin it was totally worthless, 668 00:43:27,239 --> 00:43:31,599 and so the real history is much different than In fact, 669 00:43:31,639 --> 00:43:35,519 there were compelling reasons for us to go to Vietnam, 670 00:43:35,679 --> 00:43:40,719 and Americans did many noble things there, and as I think, 671 00:43:40,760 --> 00:43:44,320 as Ronald Reagan said, it was a noble cause it 672 00:43:44,400 --> 00:43:51,559 wasn't be awful and a big nothing, as John Kerry 673 00:43:52,320 --> 00:43:54,280 wants to put it. And it's an important part of 674 00:43:54,320 --> 00:43:55,199 our nation's history. 675 00:43:55,719 --> 00:43:59,679 Speaker 1: Yes, and it definitely has shaped us as Americans and 676 00:43:59,719 --> 00:44:04,199 as a nation. Fascinating conversation. Very much appreciate your time, sir. 677 00:44:05,800 --> 00:44:07,239 Speaker 2: Yeah. Thanks, great to be with you again. 678 00:44:07,719 --> 00:44:10,760 Speaker 1: Thanks to my guest today, Mark Moyer. William P. Harris, 679 00:44:10,760 --> 00:44:14,559 Professor of Military History, Hillsdale College. You've been listening to 680 00:44:14,599 --> 00:44:17,800 another edition of The Federalist Radio Hour. I'm Matt Kittle's 681 00:44:17,800 --> 00:44:21,280 senior elections correspondent at the Federalist. We'll be back soon 682 00:44:21,320 --> 00:44:25,199 with more. Until then, stay lovers of freedom and anxious 683 00:44:25,239 --> 00:44:36,480 for the fray