WEBVTT 1 00:00:00.120 --> 00:00:03.879 Picture this. You're sitting in a dark cockpit, flying, you know, 2 00:00:04.000 --> 00:00:06.480 thousands of feet over the black expanse of the ocean. 3 00:00:06.519 --> 00:00:08.640 It's the middle of the night. You can't see the 4 00:00:08.640 --> 00:00:09.960 horizon at all, right. 5 00:00:09.880 --> 00:00:12.400 Just pitch black outside exactly. 6 00:00:11.960 --> 00:00:13.960 Just the glowing instruments in front of you. And then 7 00:00:14.000 --> 00:00:17.280 suddenly the control column in your hand starts violently shaking, 8 00:00:17.679 --> 00:00:20.559 like literally rattling your bones. The stick shaker, Yeah, the 9 00:00:20.559 --> 00:00:23.519 stick shaker warning. It's designed to startle you screaming at 10 00:00:23.519 --> 00:00:25.839 your nervous system that your plane is stalling, you're losing 11 00:00:25.920 --> 00:00:28.160 lift and about to just fall out of the sky. 12 00:00:29.320 --> 00:00:33.520 And here's the nightmare. At the exact same time, a blaring, 13 00:00:34.359 --> 00:00:38.359 piercing claxon starts going off in the cabin, telling you 14 00:00:38.359 --> 00:00:41.640 that you're flying way too fast, the overspeed alarm. Right, 15 00:00:41.840 --> 00:00:44.119 So if you speed up to fix the stall, you 16 00:00:44.200 --> 00:00:46.799 might literally rip the wings off the plane. But if 17 00:00:46.799 --> 00:00:49.679 you slow down, it's all the overspeed you plummet into 18 00:00:49.719 --> 00:00:51.520 the sea. What do you do? 19 00:00:51.799 --> 00:00:54.520 I mean, it is the ultimate aviation nightmare. It's a 20 00:00:54.520 --> 00:00:58.640 scenario where the absolute most critical data you rely on 21 00:00:58.679 --> 00:01:02.520 to survive has just well, it's turned into a deadly 22 00:01:02.719 --> 00:01:03.679 unsolvable riddle. 23 00:01:03.799 --> 00:01:05.400 It's terrifying, it really is. 24 00:01:05.760 --> 00:01:08.640 And as investigators, you know, when we pull the wreckage 25 00:01:08.640 --> 00:01:11.159 out of the ocean and listen to the cockpit voice 26 00:01:11.159 --> 00:01:13.519 recorders of these events, we aren't just looking at a 27 00:01:13.519 --> 00:01:16.200 broken piece of metal. We are looking at a psychological 28 00:01:16.239 --> 00:01:17.000 pressure cooker. 29 00:01:17.439 --> 00:01:20.280 And that's exactly what we're going to explore in today's 30 00:01:20.319 --> 00:01:23.519 deep dive. We are peeling back the layers on some 31 00:01:23.599 --> 00:01:27.319 of the most harrowing real life aviation disasters in history 32 00:01:27.719 --> 00:01:31.359 to really understand what investigators call the cascade. 33 00:01:30.840 --> 00:01:33.120 Of errors, because it's never just one thing. 34 00:01:33.040 --> 00:01:37.719 No, never, it's how a you know, a microscopic failure 35 00:01:37.799 --> 00:01:40.599 like a tiny insect, or a hidden mechanical flaw, maybe 36 00:01:40.640 --> 00:01:44.040 a math mistake, how that interacts with human panic, our 37 00:01:44.079 --> 00:01:48.000 blind faith, and technology and just the raw will to survive. 38 00:01:48.239 --> 00:01:51.439 Yeah, And to understand how terrifyingly fast that cascade happens, 39 00:01:51.480 --> 00:01:53.239 you just have to look at the Dominican Republic in 40 00:01:53.319 --> 00:01:54.680 February of nineteen ninety six. 41 00:01:54.840 --> 00:01:56.879 Oh right, Burgionnaire Bursionaire. 42 00:01:56.439 --> 00:01:58.640 Flight three oh one. It's a Boeing seven fifty seven, 43 00:01:58.719 --> 00:02:02.200 and it's accelerating down rainslick runway into this pitch black night. 44 00:02:02.319 --> 00:02:05.159 Almost immediately during the takeoff roll, the captain notices his 45 00:02:05.319 --> 00:02:07.719 air speed indicator isn't working. It's just stuck at. 46 00:02:07.719 --> 00:02:10.800 Zero, which is obviously a huge red flag huge. 47 00:02:11.039 --> 00:02:14.039 But as the plane lifts off the tarmac, the gauge 48 00:02:14.080 --> 00:02:18.159 suddenly seems to wake up. It just starts registering speed again. 49 00:02:18.199 --> 00:02:20.439 But it's a phantom reading, right, I mean, the real 50 00:02:20.520 --> 00:02:22.919 crisis kicks in when they hit cruising altitude and they 51 00:02:22.960 --> 00:02:24.680 engage the autopilot exactly. 52 00:02:25.159 --> 00:02:28.280 And here's the fatal flaw in the system's logic. At 53 00:02:28.280 --> 00:02:32.280 the time, the autopilot gets its flight data solely from 54 00:02:32.319 --> 00:02:35.599 the captain's instruments, solely the captain right, and because of 55 00:02:35.639 --> 00:02:38.960 a microscopic blockage on the outside of the plane, that 56 00:02:39.080 --> 00:02:43.199 gauge starts falsely feeding the computer a terrifying narrative. It 57 00:02:43.280 --> 00:02:47.240 tells the autopilot the plane is accelerating wildly, approaching this 58 00:02:47.400 --> 00:02:50.240 catastrophic speed of three hundred and fifty knots. 59 00:02:50.319 --> 00:02:50.759 Oh wow. 60 00:02:51.159 --> 00:02:53.680 So the computer, doing exactly what it's programmed to do 61 00:02:53.800 --> 00:02:57.280 to save the plane, pitches the nose up dangerously high 62 00:02:57.360 --> 00:02:58.800 to act as like a massive air break. 63 00:02:58.879 --> 00:03:01.680 Wait, I'm confused, though, if the captain's gauge was broken, 64 00:03:01.919 --> 00:03:04.280 What about the first officer's gauge? Didn't the plane have 65 00:03:04.400 --> 00:03:05.560 you know, backup sensors? 66 00:03:05.639 --> 00:03:08.919 It did, It absolutely did. The first officer's airspeed indicator 67 00:03:08.960 --> 00:03:11.439 was working perfectly. The actual plane was flying at a 68 00:03:11.439 --> 00:03:12.479 perfectly normal. 69 00:03:12.240 --> 00:03:13.599 Speed, so they were fine. 70 00:03:13.680 --> 00:03:16.520 They were physically fine. But the autopilot wasn't looking at 71 00:03:16.520 --> 00:03:19.280 the first officers side. It only cared about the captain's 72 00:03:19.280 --> 00:03:23.159 corrupted data. So the computer pitches the nose up so 73 00:03:23.280 --> 00:03:26.759 aggressively that the plane physically loses its ability to fly. 74 00:03:27.039 --> 00:03:30.439 It starts stalling, and that leads to the exact nightmare 75 00:03:30.439 --> 00:03:32.879 scenario we started with. Yes, you've got the physical stick 76 00:03:32.919 --> 00:03:36.879 shaker violently vibrating the control columns, warning the pilots of 77 00:03:36.879 --> 00:03:40.680 a stall. Yeah, But simultaneously, the overspeed alarm is just 78 00:03:40.759 --> 00:03:45.120 screaming because the autopilot's corrupted data still thinks they're going too. 79 00:03:45.000 --> 00:03:48.960 Fast, and the human brain simply cannot reconcile two completely 80 00:03:48.960 --> 00:03:51.639 contradictory emergencies in the seconds they have available. 81 00:03:51.680 --> 00:03:54.319 I mean, imagine driving your car down the highway right, 82 00:03:54.560 --> 00:03:56.879 your speedometer says you're doing one hundred fifty miles per hour. 83 00:03:56.919 --> 00:04:01.000 But your engine is actively sputtering, choking and dying. How 84 00:04:01.000 --> 00:04:02.000 do you process that? 85 00:04:02.120 --> 00:04:02.520 You can't. 86 00:04:02.719 --> 00:04:05.919 You have an alarm screening slowdown and a physical vibration 87 00:04:06.039 --> 00:04:06.960 screaming speed up. 88 00:04:07.039 --> 00:04:09.879 And in that moment, overwhelmed by the overspeed alarm, the 89 00:04:09.919 --> 00:04:13.680 captain actually pulled back on the throttles. He reduced engine 90 00:04:13.680 --> 00:04:17.839 power when the stalling plane desperately needed it. Yeah, the 91 00:04:17.839 --> 00:04:21.480 seven fifty seven rolled, dropped its nose and plummeted into 92 00:04:21.560 --> 00:04:23.399 the ocean. There were no survivors. 93 00:04:23.519 --> 00:04:26.600 God, and when the recovery teams finally pulled the wreckage 94 00:04:26.600 --> 00:04:30.480 from the seafloor, they found the culprit. And honestly, this 95 00:04:30.519 --> 00:04:31.480 is the part that haunts me. 96 00:04:31.959 --> 00:04:32.560 The wasp. 97 00:04:32.759 --> 00:04:36.639 Yes, the microscopic assassin that brought down a multi ton 98 00:04:36.839 --> 00:04:41.160 commercial jet was a squatter, a tiny insect called a 99 00:04:41.279 --> 00:04:42.360 mud dauber wasp. 100 00:04:42.560 --> 00:04:46.040 It's unbelievable. The plane had been sitting on the tarmac 101 00:04:46.040 --> 00:04:49.920 for nearly three weeks and the maintenance crew, for whatever reason, 102 00:04:50.040 --> 00:04:52.480 hadn't put the protective covers over the pitto tubes. 103 00:04:52.519 --> 00:04:54.319 Those are the little L shaped pipes on the outside 104 00:04:54.360 --> 00:04:55.600 of the fuselage. 105 00:04:55.120 --> 00:04:57.560 Right right, the ones that take in air to measure speed. 106 00:04:58.000 --> 00:05:00.399 A mud Dauber wasp had flown in and built a 107 00:05:00.439 --> 00:05:04.000 tiny nest inside the captain's pitto tube, completely plugging it. 108 00:05:04.160 --> 00:05:05.920 Just a bug. Yeah, But you know what makes this 109 00:05:06.000 --> 00:05:09.560 tragedy so deeply unsettling. It isn't just the wasp, it's 110 00:05:09.600 --> 00:05:12.600 the culture inside that cockpit, because, like you mentioned, the 111 00:05:12.600 --> 00:05:17.040 first officer's airspeed indicator was working perfectly the entire time, right. 112 00:05:17.199 --> 00:05:18.879 And this is where we hit the human element of 113 00:05:18.879 --> 00:05:22.000 the cascade, because the cockpit voice recorder reveals that the 114 00:05:22.000 --> 00:05:25.199 first officer and a relief pilot in the back actually 115 00:05:25.240 --> 00:05:28.000 recognized the stall. He knew, they knew they were looking 116 00:05:28.040 --> 00:05:31.040 at the correct data. They even gently suggested to the 117 00:05:31.079 --> 00:05:33.560 captain to push the nose down, but they didn't force 118 00:05:33.639 --> 00:05:35.360 the issue, which is wild. 119 00:05:35.560 --> 00:05:37.720 Why. I mean, if you know the plane is falling 120 00:05:37.720 --> 00:05:40.120 out of the sky, once'd you just grab the yoke 121 00:05:40.240 --> 00:05:41.120 and save your own. 122 00:05:40.959 --> 00:05:44.519 Life because of a psychological concept called the authority gradient, 123 00:05:44.639 --> 00:05:48.000 don'kat what is that? So in the mid nineties, aviation 124 00:05:48.160 --> 00:05:50.079 culture in a lot of parts of the world was 125 00:05:50.240 --> 00:05:54.800 incredibly hierarchical. The captain was practically a god in the 126 00:05:54.800 --> 00:05:59.000 cockpit right culturally and procedurally, that junior first officer felt 127 00:05:59.079 --> 00:06:02.000 he couldn't just ripped the controls away from a senior commander, 128 00:06:02.360 --> 00:06:04.800 even as the ocean was literally rushing up to meet them. 129 00:06:05.120 --> 00:06:07.319 He let deference override survival. 130 00:06:07.519 --> 00:06:11.600 That rigid hierarchy is just it's terrifying. It's a tragic 131 00:06:11.639 --> 00:06:15.120 example of how a missing physical safety net, you know, 132 00:06:15.199 --> 00:06:19.199 a simple plastic cover for a tube, paired with human hesitation, 133 00:06:19.519 --> 00:06:22.879 leads to absolute disaster. But at least the missing tube 134 00:06:22.879 --> 00:06:26.240 cover was an accidental emission. What happens when a safety 135 00:06:26.279 --> 00:06:27.839 net is intentionally turned off? 136 00:06:28.040 --> 00:06:31.399 Well, that brings us to August nineteen ninety seven and 137 00:06:31.720 --> 00:06:33.360 Korean air flight eight oh one. 138 00:06:33.800 --> 00:06:35.399 Another really tough one to listen to. 139 00:06:35.639 --> 00:06:37.959 It is so we are looking at a fully loaded 140 00:06:38.000 --> 00:06:41.439 seven forty seven approaching the island of Grom in heavy 141 00:06:41.639 --> 00:06:46.000 erratic rain. It's past midnight. The captain is absolutely exhausted 142 00:06:46.360 --> 00:06:50.120 fighting through what we call a top hat thunderstorm. 143 00:06:49.680 --> 00:06:52.040 Which is a storm cell so dense it can essentially 144 00:06:52.120 --> 00:06:53.439 absorb bradar right. 145 00:06:53.319 --> 00:06:56.439 Right, creating this blind wall of water. Now, normally an 146 00:06:56.480 --> 00:07:00.439 airport has a glide slope beacon. It's an electronic that 147 00:07:00.519 --> 00:07:03.439 acts as like an invisible highway, guiding the plane at 148 00:07:03.439 --> 00:07:06.120 a perfect angle right down to the runway threshold. 149 00:07:06.160 --> 00:07:09.680 But on this night, Guam's glide slope is completely out 150 00:07:09.720 --> 00:07:10.959 of service for maintenance. 151 00:07:11.120 --> 00:07:13.839 Out of service, so the pilot has to perform what's 152 00:07:13.879 --> 00:07:17.759 called a manual step down approach. Without the electronic glide path, 153 00:07:17.839 --> 00:07:20.720 you have to use distance markers. It's honestly like walking 154 00:07:20.759 --> 00:07:22.360 down a staircase in pitch darkness. 155 00:07:22.560 --> 00:07:25.160 Right, you descend to a specific altitude, wait until your 156 00:07:25.160 --> 00:07:27.959 instruments tell you you've traveled a certain distance, and then step 157 00:07:28.000 --> 00:07:29.920 down to the next altitude exactly. 158 00:07:30.199 --> 00:07:34.399 But here's where the psychology of exhaustion kicks in expectation bias, 159 00:07:34.800 --> 00:07:38.040 hallucinating what you want to see. Yes, when a human 160 00:07:38.079 --> 00:07:42.240 brain is desperately tired and under immense stress, it often hallucinates. 161 00:07:42.839 --> 00:07:45.800 The captain, desperate to break through the clouds and just 162 00:07:45.879 --> 00:07:49.839 spot the runway, descends far too early on the final step. 163 00:07:50.040 --> 00:07:51.920 He thinks he sees the glow of the airport. 164 00:07:52.000 --> 00:07:54.759 He does, but what he's actually flying a seven forty 165 00:07:54.800 --> 00:07:58.839 seven into is the rugged, jungle covered terrain of Nimt's 166 00:07:58.879 --> 00:07:59.959 hill miles short of the right. 167 00:08:00.439 --> 00:08:03.560 It's horrific, and the survival. Details from this crash are 168 00:08:03.800 --> 00:08:07.040 just unbelievable. The plane is tearing through the jungle, disintegrating, 169 00:08:07.319 --> 00:08:09.399 and you have a passenger, Berry Small, who was actually 170 00:08:09.439 --> 00:08:10.680 a helicopter pilot himself. 171 00:08:10.759 --> 00:08:11.680 Right, very Small. 172 00:08:11.800 --> 00:08:14.639 His leg was saved from completely shattering against a metal 173 00:08:14.639 --> 00:08:17.879 seat crossbar for one specific reason. He had tucked his 174 00:08:17.959 --> 00:08:20.360 soft carryon bag under the seat in front of him, 175 00:08:20.680 --> 00:08:23.560 and the bag absorbed the impact of his shins flying forward. 176 00:08:23.839 --> 00:08:27.360 It just highlights how microscopic variables decide life or death 177 00:08:27.360 --> 00:08:28.639 in these massive events. 178 00:08:28.800 --> 00:08:31.399 And right near him was an eleven year old girl, 179 00:08:31.879 --> 00:08:32.919 Rika Matsuda. 180 00:08:33.039 --> 00:08:33.440 Ah. 181 00:08:33.480 --> 00:08:36.720 She survived virtually unhurt because her legs were simply too 182 00:08:36.799 --> 00:08:40.120 short to reach that same deadly crossbar that crushed the 183 00:08:40.159 --> 00:08:42.720 limbs of all the adults around her. Wow, and very 184 00:08:42.720 --> 00:08:46.600 Small actually spent years after this crash fighting for safety changes. 185 00:08:47.279 --> 00:08:50.159 He realized that the horrific fire that swept through the cabin, 186 00:08:50.519 --> 00:08:52.679 the fire that actually killed dozens of people who had 187 00:08:52.720 --> 00:08:57.279 survived the initial impact, it was heavily fueled by duty 188 00:08:57.360 --> 00:08:59.919 free alcohol stored in the overhead bin. 189 00:09:00.200 --> 00:09:01.000 Oh that makes sense. 190 00:09:01.120 --> 00:09:04.240 Yeah, the impact broke the bottles, an oxygen from the 191 00:09:04.320 --> 00:09:07.399 damaged ceiling missed with hundreds of liters of high proof flicker. 192 00:09:07.679 --> 00:09:10.440 Just a horrific scenario. But you know, the true shock 193 00:09:10.480 --> 00:09:13.399 of the Korean air investigation wasn't the alcohol or even 194 00:09:13.440 --> 00:09:15.159 the pilot's expectation. 195 00:09:14.679 --> 00:09:16.200 Bias, which is the system on the ground. 196 00:09:16.240 --> 00:09:19.799 Exactly when investigators dug into the systemic failures on the ground, 197 00:09:19.840 --> 00:09:24.159 they found something chilling. Guam's airport was equipped with an MSA, 198 00:09:24.240 --> 00:09:27.960 a Minimum Safe Altitude Warning system. It's a radar system 199 00:09:28.000 --> 00:09:31.879 specifically designed to alert air traffic controllers if a plane 200 00:09:31.960 --> 00:09:36.159 is flying dangerously low, so they can literally radio the 201 00:09:36.240 --> 00:09:37.519 crew and tell them to pull up. 202 00:09:38.120 --> 00:09:41.519 But the FAA had intentionally disabled it for arriving flights. 203 00:09:41.840 --> 00:09:45.399 They had they modified the software. The controllers had complained 204 00:09:45.399 --> 00:09:48.440 that the radar system was giving them too many nuisance readings. 205 00:09:48.919 --> 00:09:51.600 Nuisance readings, Yeah, it was beeping too often because of 206 00:09:51.600 --> 00:09:55.360 the surrounding hills. So to stop the annoying alarms, they 207 00:09:55.480 --> 00:10:00.120 pushed the systems tracking radius eighty kilometers out over the 208 00:10:00.159 --> 00:10:01.279 open ocean. 209 00:10:01.000 --> 00:10:04.080 So they essentially turned off the electronic safety net protecting 210 00:10:04.080 --> 00:10:05.720 the mountains right around the airport. 211 00:10:05.840 --> 00:10:06.720 They turned it off. 212 00:10:07.000 --> 00:10:09.639 That is exactly like taking the batteries out of your 213 00:10:09.679 --> 00:10:12.559 smoke detector because it goes off every time you make toast, 214 00:10:12.960 --> 00:10:15.320 only to end up sleeping through your house burning down. 215 00:10:15.360 --> 00:10:16.480 It's the perfect analogy. 216 00:10:16.679 --> 00:10:20.000 I mean, why do we sacrifice crucial safety for momentary convenience. 217 00:10:20.480 --> 00:10:23.120 If that system had been left on, the controller would 218 00:10:23.120 --> 00:10:25.879 have seen the seven forty seven dropping below the step 219 00:10:25.919 --> 00:10:28.159 down altitude and could have worn them. 220 00:10:28.320 --> 00:10:32.759 It's a really sobering reality about systemic complacency. When we 221 00:10:32.840 --> 00:10:35.919 get annoyed by our own safety systems, we disable the 222 00:10:36.039 --> 00:10:37.639 very thing designed to save us. 223 00:10:38.080 --> 00:10:40.519 It is, but you know, it's one thing to silence 224 00:10:40.559 --> 00:10:44.320 an alarm because it's annoying. It's an entirely different nightmare 225 00:10:44.360 --> 00:10:47.080 when the machine itself is secretly plotting against you. 226 00:10:47.759 --> 00:10:51.159 And that leads us to the longest, most agonizing investigation 227 00:10:51.279 --> 00:10:55.080 in aviation history, the ten year hunt for a mechanical 228 00:10:55.200 --> 00:10:55.960 serial killer. 229 00:10:56.279 --> 00:10:59.039 Ugh, just the phrase aviation serial killer gives me chills. 230 00:10:59.120 --> 00:11:02.120 Well, it chilled the higher industry. In nineteen ninety one, 231 00:11:02.240 --> 00:11:04.679 United Flight five eighty five was on a routine approach 232 00:11:04.759 --> 00:11:09.080 into Colorado Springs, clear day, slightly bumpy winds. Suddenly the 233 00:11:09.120 --> 00:11:12.080 Boeing seven thirty seven violently rolled onto its back, dropped 234 00:11:12.080 --> 00:11:14.080 its nose, and plummeted straight into the ground. 235 00:11:14.120 --> 00:11:15.480 Do survivors none. 236 00:11:15.519 --> 00:11:18.039 Three years later, in nineteen ninety four, USAir flight four 237 00:11:18.080 --> 00:11:21.759 to twenty seven is approaching Pittsburgh, calm, sunny evening. Out 238 00:11:21.759 --> 00:11:24.639 of nowhere, the exact same thing happens. The plane snaps 239 00:11:24.720 --> 00:11:26.679 violently to the left and dives into the earth. 240 00:11:26.720 --> 00:11:29.279 And what made this so terrifying for investigators was the 241 00:11:29.320 --> 00:11:31.879 total lack of evidence. I mean, in both cases, the 242 00:11:31.919 --> 00:11:33.240 planes were perfectly. 243 00:11:32.799 --> 00:11:34.080 Fine, completely fine. 244 00:11:34.159 --> 00:11:37.000 The engines were running at full capacity at the moment 245 00:11:37.039 --> 00:11:41.159 of impact. The pilots were highly experienced. There was no bomb, 246 00:11:41.360 --> 00:11:44.559 no structural failure on the wings. You just have perfectly 247 00:11:44.559 --> 00:11:47.960 good seven thirty seven Dash, which is literally the most 248 00:11:47.960 --> 00:11:51.159 popular passenger jet on Earth, suddenly turning upside down and 249 00:11:51.159 --> 00:11:51.960 falling out of the sky. 250 00:11:52.240 --> 00:11:56.039 Investigators were chasing ghosts. I mean they strongly suspected the rudder, 251 00:11:56.200 --> 00:11:58.679 the huge vertical panel on the tail that steers the 252 00:11:58.720 --> 00:12:01.679 nose left and right, hit some how jammed. But every 253 00:12:01.679 --> 00:12:04.080 time they recovered the parts from the craters and tested 254 00:12:04.080 --> 00:12:07.279 them in the lab, they worked flawlessly. The pressure on 255 00:12:07.320 --> 00:12:10.279 the investigators was immense. If they couldn't find the cause, 256 00:12:10.559 --> 00:12:13.159 they might have had to ground the entire global fleet 257 00:12:13.200 --> 00:12:14.159 of seven thirty seven. 258 00:12:14.320 --> 00:12:17.399 And then in nineteen ninety six they finally get their breakthrough. 259 00:12:18.080 --> 00:12:21.639 East Wind Flight five seventeen is approaching Richmond, Virginia. Suddenly 260 00:12:21.679 --> 00:12:24.679 the plane snaps into that same terrifying role at this time, 261 00:12:24.879 --> 00:12:28.080 right the pilot, Captain Brian Bishop, does what he's trained 262 00:12:28.120 --> 00:12:31.279 to do. He stands on the opposite rudder pedal with 263 00:12:31.399 --> 00:12:34.600 all his weight to counteract the role, but the pedal 264 00:12:34.639 --> 00:12:38.279 won't budge. He is fighting for his life, muscles straining, 265 00:12:39.080 --> 00:12:43.639 but miraculously, after thirty seconds of sheer terror, the rudder 266 00:12:43.759 --> 00:12:45.039 just releases on its own. 267 00:12:45.120 --> 00:12:48.600 He manages to regain control and land exactly and for 268 00:12:48.639 --> 00:12:51.279 the first time in a decade, investigators have a completely 269 00:12:51.320 --> 00:12:55.360 intact plane, an undamaged tail section, and a living pilot 270 00:12:55.399 --> 00:12:55.919 to interview. 271 00:12:56.080 --> 00:12:58.679 So what did they find Because if the parts worked 272 00:12:58.720 --> 00:13:00.039 in the lab, why did they feel. 273 00:13:00.039 --> 00:13:02.600 The sky well, because the lab wasn't the sky. They 274 00:13:02.639 --> 00:13:05.600 realized they had to subject the rudder's power control unit 275 00:13:05.879 --> 00:13:08.879 that's the mechanical muscle that moves the rudder, specifically a 276 00:13:08.919 --> 00:13:12.080 component called a dual servo valve to the most brutal 277 00:13:12.159 --> 00:13:14.320 environmental testing imaginable. 278 00:13:13.799 --> 00:13:15.159 To recreate the flight conditions. 279 00:13:15.279 --> 00:13:17.919 Yes, they had to recreate the extreme conditions of flight. 280 00:13:18.200 --> 00:13:20.639 So they soaked the valve in dry ice to simulate 281 00:13:20.679 --> 00:13:23.799 the sub zero temperatures at thirty thousand feet, then suddenly 282 00:13:23.960 --> 00:13:28.799 blasted it with superheated hydraulic fluid thermal shock, precisely extreme 283 00:13:28.879 --> 00:13:33.639 cold instantly meeting extreme heat. And under that precise thermal shock, 284 00:13:33.679 --> 00:13:38.200 they discovered something horrifying. The valve didn't just jam. It 285 00:13:38.399 --> 00:13:40.360 jammed and then it function in reverse. 286 00:13:40.559 --> 00:13:43.559 Oh my god, here's where it gets absolutely terrifying. I 287 00:13:43.639 --> 00:13:47.759 want you, the listener, to imagine your car starts sliding 288 00:13:47.799 --> 00:13:50.600 on an icy bridge. You do exactly what you've been 289 00:13:50.639 --> 00:13:53.440 trained to do since drivers at beast. You steer into 290 00:13:53.480 --> 00:13:57.480 the skid to regain control. But a microscopic temperature flaw 291 00:13:57.879 --> 00:14:00.840 has secretly wired your steering wheel backwards, so when you 292 00:14:00.919 --> 00:14:02.799 turn right, the wheel snap left. 293 00:14:03.000 --> 00:14:03.639 Exactly. 294 00:14:03.879 --> 00:14:06.320 That is exactly what happened to those pilots in Colorado 295 00:14:06.360 --> 00:14:08.440 and Pittsburgh. The plane started to drift in the wind. 296 00:14:08.600 --> 00:14:10.720 They pushed the rudder pedal to correct it, and the 297 00:14:10.759 --> 00:14:13.919 frozen valve reversed. The command slamming the rudder to the 298 00:14:13.960 --> 00:14:17.919 extreme opposite side. The very action trained to save their 299 00:14:17.960 --> 00:14:20.080 life is what pushed them into a death spiral. 300 00:14:20.200 --> 00:14:24.200 It's tragic. Boeing spent hundreds of millions of dollars redesigning 301 00:14:24.240 --> 00:14:27.480 and replacing those valves worldwide. It was a flaw born 302 00:14:27.519 --> 00:14:33.600 of incredibly complex engineering reacting to extreme unforeseen environmental variables 303 00:14:33.919 --> 00:14:35.000 Bowing didn't know was there. 304 00:14:35.240 --> 00:14:38.120 But what happens when an aerospace giant actually knows about 305 00:14:38.120 --> 00:14:41.720 a fatal flaw and actively chooses to ignore it Because 306 00:14:41.759 --> 00:14:44.279 finding a hidden flaw is one thing, Covering one up 307 00:14:44.440 --> 00:14:45.480 is entirely different. 308 00:14:45.600 --> 00:14:48.679 Yeah, this is where engineering failure crosses into corporate hubris. 309 00:14:49.159 --> 00:14:52.360 In nineteen seventy two, American Airlines Flight ninety six took 310 00:14:52.360 --> 00:14:55.559 off from Detroit. As the DC ten climbed past eleven 311 00:14:55.600 --> 00:14:59.080 thousand feet, the rear cargo door suddenly blew completely off 312 00:14:59.120 --> 00:15:00.399 the side of the plane. 313 00:15:00.159 --> 00:15:03.399 And the pressure difference was so massive that the explosive 314 00:15:03.440 --> 00:15:07.360 decompression actually collapsed the passenger cabin floor down into the 315 00:15:07.360 --> 00:15:10.799 cargo hold, and when the floor caved in, it completely 316 00:15:10.799 --> 00:15:13.679 severed the hydraulic cables that ran through it, the cables 317 00:15:13.679 --> 00:15:17.240 that controlled the tail. Captain Bryce McCormick was left flying 318 00:15:17.320 --> 00:15:18.639 a crippled monster. 319 00:15:18.559 --> 00:15:21.279 But he pulled off one of the most heroic saves 320 00:15:21.279 --> 00:15:22.399 in aviation history. 321 00:15:22.600 --> 00:15:26.159 He really did. He used draw engine thrust. Imagine steering 322 00:15:26.159 --> 00:15:29.720 a massive commercial jet without a steering wheel, unbelievable. He 323 00:15:29.759 --> 00:15:32.080 powered up the left engine to turn right and powered 324 00:15:32.159 --> 00:15:34.600 up the right engine to turn left. Against all odds, 325 00:15:34.679 --> 00:15:37.559 he wrestled that plane back to the runway in Detroit, and. 326 00:15:37.559 --> 00:15:40.600 When investigators looked at the blown off door, they found 327 00:15:40.679 --> 00:15:46.840 a fundamental catastrophic design flaw. Usually, airplane doors are plug doors. 328 00:15:47.159 --> 00:15:50.799 They open inward, meaning the higher air pressure inside the 329 00:15:50.840 --> 00:15:54.360 cabin physically pushes the door tighter into its frame, sort 330 00:15:54.360 --> 00:15:55.960 of like a bathtub stopper. 331 00:15:55.679 --> 00:15:57.240 So it's physically impossible for them to. 332 00:15:57.240 --> 00:16:01.480 Blow out exactly, But to maximize his luggage space, McDonald 333 00:16:01.519 --> 00:16:05.559 Douglas designed the DC ten cargo door to open outward. 334 00:16:05.240 --> 00:16:07.919 Which means the only thing keeping the door from blasting 335 00:16:07.960 --> 00:16:10.639 open in flight are the metal locking pins. 336 00:16:10.960 --> 00:16:14.639 Right, and the locking mechanism was deeply flawed. A baggage 337 00:16:14.639 --> 00:16:18.279 handler could force the external handle closed, and the indicators 338 00:16:18.279 --> 00:16:20.720 in the cockpit which show the door was securely locked, 339 00:16:20.840 --> 00:16:23.879 even if the metal pins hadn't actually engaged around the frame. 340 00:16:23.840 --> 00:16:26.480 So the door was literally a ticking time bomb waiting 341 00:16:26.480 --> 00:16:29.399 for the cabin pressure to pop it open. Yes, and 342 00:16:29.440 --> 00:16:33.320 the Safety Board saw this and demanded the FAA issue 343 00:16:33.360 --> 00:16:37.240 an immediate Airworthiness Directive, an AD that would have legally 344 00:16:37.279 --> 00:16:39.879 forced McDonald douglas to ground the planes and fix the 345 00:16:39.919 --> 00:16:41.200 doors immediately. 346 00:16:40.720 --> 00:16:43.600 But that didn't happen. Unbelievable, the head of the FAA 347 00:16:43.799 --> 00:16:47.000 and the head of McDonald douglas made a private gentleman's agreement. 348 00:16:47.600 --> 00:16:50.919 They agreed the manufacturer would fix the problem voluntarily, just 349 00:16:50.960 --> 00:16:54.720 avoiding the public relations nightmare and the massive financial hit 350 00:16:54.799 --> 00:16:56.799 of an official government grounding. 351 00:16:56.679 --> 00:16:58.919 A gentleman's agreement over passenger lives. 352 00:16:59.200 --> 00:16:59.480 Yeah. 353 00:16:59.840 --> 00:17:04.119 Two years later, a Turkish Airline's DC ten takes off 354 00:17:04.119 --> 00:17:07.759 from Paris. A baggage handler forces the door shut, the 355 00:17:07.759 --> 00:17:11.200 pins don't actually lock, The cockpit says everything is fine, 356 00:17:11.400 --> 00:17:13.960 and at eleven thousand feet the door blows off, just 357 00:17:14.000 --> 00:17:16.880 like before the floor collapses, but this time all the 358 00:17:16.960 --> 00:17:20.440 hydraulic lines are severed. Captain Bryce McCormick's trick with the 359 00:17:20.480 --> 00:17:23.799 engines won't work here because the plane immediately pitches down, 360 00:17:24.240 --> 00:17:27.880 the pilots have absolutely zero control. The plane plows into 361 00:17:27.880 --> 00:17:30.640 a forest outside Paris at five hundred miles an hour. 362 00:17:31.039 --> 00:17:33.160 Three hundred and forty six people die in what was 363 00:17:33.200 --> 00:17:36.000 at the time the worst crash in human history, and. 364 00:17:35.960 --> 00:17:38.640 The tragedy is compounded by what investigators found during the 365 00:17:38.720 --> 00:17:42.400 ensuing lawsuits. They uncovered a document known as the Applegate Memo, 366 00:17:42.519 --> 00:17:45.039 written by a product engineering director at the company the 367 00:17:45.039 --> 00:17:48.680 smoking It the smoking gun. It proved in black and 368 00:17:48.720 --> 00:17:52.519 white that the manufacturer knew about this catastrophic flaw before 369 00:17:52.799 --> 00:17:55.759 the Detroit incident even happened. They had actually had a 370 00:17:55.799 --> 00:17:59.039 cargo door blow out during a ground pressure test years earlier, 371 00:17:59.680 --> 00:18:02.160 but they choose not to change the fundamental design because 372 00:18:02.160 --> 00:18:03.200 it would delay production. 373 00:18:03.759 --> 00:18:06.920 I mean, are we as a society just okay with 374 00:18:07.039 --> 00:18:11.440 the dark concept of tombstone technology, the reality that aviation 375 00:18:11.599 --> 00:18:14.119 safety regulations are almost always written in blood? 376 00:18:14.279 --> 00:18:15.480 It seems that way sometimes. 377 00:18:15.599 --> 00:18:19.119 Is the math of corporate risk assessment fundamentally evil when 378 00:18:19.240 --> 00:18:21.720 human lives are the currency. They knew the door was 379 00:18:21.720 --> 00:18:23.640 a bomb, but fixing it was too expensive. 380 00:18:23.799 --> 00:18:28.119 It reeses really profound questions about accountability when profit motives 381 00:18:28.200 --> 00:18:32.640 intersect with public safety. The rigid systems of corporate self 382 00:18:32.680 --> 00:18:34.240 regulation failed completely. 383 00:18:34.279 --> 00:18:36.720 They really did. So we've spent this entire deep dive 384 00:18:36.839 --> 00:18:42.160 looking at how rigid systems, rigid cockpit hierarchy, rigid corporate greed, 385 00:18:42.319 --> 00:18:47.200 rigid computer programming create these cascades of disaster. So I 386 00:18:47.240 --> 00:18:49.440 want to end by looking at the flip side. What 387 00:18:49.559 --> 00:18:53.440 happens when the system completely dies and fluid rule breaking 388 00:18:53.519 --> 00:18:56.640 human ingenuity is the only backup plan we have. Let's 389 00:18:56.640 --> 00:18:58.039 talk about the miracle at gimli Oh. 390 00:18:58.039 --> 00:19:01.119 It's a perfect counterpoint. July nineteen, teen eighty three, Air 391 00:19:01.200 --> 00:19:03.319 Canada Flight one forty three, a state of the art 392 00:19:03.319 --> 00:19:05.960 Boeing seven to sixty seven, is cruising at twenty six 393 00:19:06.000 --> 00:19:10.440 thousand feet over central Canada. Suddenly, warning alarms flood the tokpit, 394 00:19:10.920 --> 00:19:14.880 fuel pressure drops, the left engine dies. Wow minutes later, 395 00:19:15.000 --> 00:19:18.680 the right engine dies. The cockpit goes totally dark and silent, 396 00:19:18.839 --> 00:19:21.920 save for a few battery powered stand by instruments. They 397 00:19:21.920 --> 00:19:24.799 are in a ninety five ton glider and the cause. 398 00:19:24.519 --> 00:19:27.240 Of this is almost comical in its simplicity. It was 399 00:19:27.279 --> 00:19:31.599 a cascading human error. Based on elementary school math. Canada 400 00:19:31.680 --> 00:19:33.599 was transitioning into the metric system at the time. The 401 00:19:33.599 --> 00:19:35.640