Speaker 1: Hello everybody, ladies and gentlemen, brothers and sisters, comrades and friends.
Speaker 1: We're back with another special episode of History Impossible, another
Speaker 1: audio based adaptation of something that I actually wrote for
Speaker 1: my friend and past guest on History Impossible, the amazing
Speaker 1: journalist David Joseph Walatsko on his publication The Radicalist, where
Speaker 1: I made a debut appearance with my essay that is
Speaker 1: currently titled Trump Isn't Fascist, He's Progressive. This essay ties
Speaker 1: in pretty well to what I'm looking to put out
Speaker 1: for the next couple of special episodes of History Impossible.
Speaker 1: While you guys all patiently wait for the next installment
Speaker 1: in the Muslim Nazi series, which is coming, I'm making
Speaker 1: good progress on it, even in the midst of all
Speaker 1: this work I'm doing for school, and yeah, I will
Speaker 1: keep you guys posted on that for sure. Before we
Speaker 1: get going on this, I want to thank everybody who's
Speaker 1: so ports this show over on Patreon or on substack.
Speaker 1: So if you head to Patreon dot com, slash History
Speaker 1: Impossible Orhistory Impossible dot substack dot com and become a
Speaker 1: supporter today, I would be eternally grateful, like I am
Speaker 1: to my longtime executive producer level supporters John Andre Saither
Speaker 1: and Mike Malebin. I really appreciate all the support that
Speaker 1: you guys can give me, so please consider doing so
Speaker 1: if you have a couple extra books you want to
Speaker 1: throw my way. Anyway, let's get into some impossible history.
Speaker 2: Well, let me to tell you what you would have
Speaker 2: seen and heard. If will not be pleasant listening, if
Speaker 2: you're at lunch, or if you have no appetite, now
Speaker 2: it is a good time to switch off the radio.
Speaker 3: An ancestor of mine maintain that if you eliminate the impossible,
Speaker 3: whatever remains, however improbable. I want to know what that nievespy.
Speaker 2: I wish I could say tonight that a lasting peace
Speaker 2: is inside. I don't feel the alocking dream.
Speaker 1: I feel anting night now.
Speaker 4: I a.
Speaker 2: I we hear for sue to guilt if we share,
Speaker 2: for sued to guill.
Speaker 5: Some say the world will end empire.
Speaker 2: Some say a nie from what I've tasted of desire,
Speaker 2: I hold those of favor fire. But if it had
Speaker 2: to perish twice, I think I know enough of hate
Speaker 2: to say that the destruction ice is also great, and
Speaker 2: what sufficed?
Speaker 4: This is history or possible?
Speaker 1: If there was a moment in which it became clear
Speaker 1: that an apt historical and analogy could be made regarding
Speaker 1: President Trump in his second term. It was at his
Speaker 1: inauguration speech on January twentieth when he said the following quote,
Speaker 1: we are going to be changing the name of the
Speaker 1: Gulf of Mexico to the Gulf of America, and we
Speaker 1: will restore the name of a great president, William McKinley
Speaker 1: to Mount McKinley, where it should be and where it belongs.
Speaker 1: President McKinley made our country very rich through tariffs and
Speaker 1: through talent. He was a natural businessman and gave Teddy
Speaker 1: Roosevelt the money for many of the great things he did,
Speaker 1: including the Panama Canal, which has foolishly been given to
Speaker 1: the country of Panama after the United States, I mean,
Speaker 1: think of this, spent more money than ever spent on
Speaker 1: a project before, and lost thirty eight thousand lives in
Speaker 1: the building of the Panama Canal. We have been treated
Speaker 1: very badly from this foolish gift that should have never
Speaker 1: been made, and Panama's promise to us has been broken unquote.
Speaker 1: There's obviously plenty to respond to in that speech that
Speaker 1: many historians are probably scratching their heads over. But the
Speaker 1: main thing to focus on, at least that I focused
Speaker 1: on the re christening of Mount McKinley, plus the praise
Speaker 1: of its namesake as well as his successor, does not
Speaker 1: align with the usual comparisons made between Trump and certain
Speaker 1: ideological figures. Now, these comparisons, as probably all of you
Speaker 1: listening are aware and remember, ranged from the absurd and
Speaker 1: hyperbolic like Adolph Hitler, Benito Mussolini, Francisco Franco, to the
Speaker 1: more reasonable such as Andrew Jackson. As Eli Lake explained
Speaker 1: on his show Breaking History, I Believe in its first
Speaker 1: episode highly recommend by the way, guys. Back in twenty sixteen,
Speaker 1: the historian Neil Ferguson made a compelling case for defining
Speaker 1: Trump not just in terms of populism, but in terms
Speaker 1: of the populist backlash that was occurring at the time
Speaker 1: of the first selection in which he won, Comparing him,
Speaker 1: as I also did on my very first episode of
Speaker 1: History Impossible, to the Irish American populist firebrand Dennis Kearney
Speaker 1: of the eighteen seventies. You guys might remember that I
Speaker 1: did call it the original Donald Trump, and I won't
Speaker 1: pretend it was just my idea. I did definitely lift
Speaker 1: that from Ferguson, but gave credit where it was due.
Speaker 1: Of course. The thing is, with the handover of power
Speaker 1: from the Biden administration to the new Trump administration and
Speaker 1: this new administration's ever sharpening ideology, things seemed to have
Speaker 1: noticeably changed. We now see in Trump's second term a
Speaker 1: very different shape than the crude populism that has defined
Speaker 1: his political life for the past decade. The populist rhetoric
Speaker 1: is still there, and Elon Musk's antics as the scheming
Speaker 1: foreign born royal advisor, for lack of a better comparison,
Speaker 1: those seemed to be rooted in a quasi libertarian milieu
Speaker 1: loosely borrow from Argentina' Javier Malay, though with less consistency
Speaker 1: or seemingly principle. Now, obviously, these are still early days,
Speaker 1: making it hard to draw firm conclusions as of April
Speaker 1: twenty twenty five when I'm recording this, but Trump's increasingly
Speaker 1: imperialist rhetoric, combined with the manic expansion of executive privilege,
Speaker 1: suggests a clear, if not fully stated or articulated goal, namely,
Speaker 1: having the courts and legislature ultimately sort out these power
Speaker 1: struggles while the executive branch steams on ahead with its plans.
Speaker 1: In short, Trump increasingly resembles a nineteenth century progressive, not
Speaker 1: a fascist. The picture that emerges is not a universally
Speaker 1: rosy one for those who understand the history of American progressivism,
Speaker 1: which is why, as I see it, it's worth examining
Speaker 1: that history through comparative lens, if only to help place
Speaker 1: Trump within the proper context of American history and really
Speaker 1: get into what he is, at least ostensibly hearkening back towards.
Speaker 1: One of the most jarring things about Trump's second term,
Speaker 1: and most important to what we're talking about here, has
Speaker 1: been the interest that he and the people in his
Speaker 1: administration have shown in legit territorial expansion. He's pushed to
Speaker 1: retain American control over the Panama Canal, and he's even
Speaker 1: attempted to insert the US into Greenland's push for independence
Speaker 1: from Denmark, essentially seeking to annex the world's largest island.
Speaker 1: And in addition, there has been a lot of brash
Speaker 1: talk about annexing the entirety of Canada and making it
Speaker 1: into the fifty first state quote unquote. Never mind that
Speaker 1: Canada is more than willing to defend itself, as has
Speaker 1: been made clear in comments made by people in this leadership.
Speaker 1: Perhaps most disturbingly, Trump has floated the idea of essentially
Speaker 1: turning the ruins of the urban micro or state of
Speaker 1: Gaza into a slice of American led commercialism. Gaza el
Speaker 1: Lago is the sort of running joke that people have
Speaker 1: been making. Much of This has all been met with disbelief, laughter,
Speaker 1: and ridicule, including from yours truly, but there is something
Speaker 1: deeply serious behind these plans and threats, at least if
Speaker 1: we look at the historical precedence, with the possible exception
Speaker 1: of Gaza, which is not being treated with the same
Speaker 1: seriousness as the other examples that I just mentioned, these
Speaker 1: strategies are all part of a broader effort to strengthen
Speaker 1: US strategic influence, particularly over the Western Hemisphere. All the
Speaker 1: talk involving the Panama Canal is under the pretext of
Speaker 1: securing it against control by Chinese investments, which are certainly significant,
Speaker 1: with Chinese ports straddling both ends of the canal itself. Now,
Speaker 1: whether or not those ports owned by the Chinese constitute
Speaker 1: a threat to US national security, as Trump has claimed
Speaker 1: it least that's another debate, But what is clear is
Speaker 1: that securing the Panama Canal, perhaps even by force, would
Speaker 1: place one of the most important trade routes in the
Speaker 1: Western Hemisphere firmly under US control. The same goes for Greenland,
Speaker 1: and in the case of Greenland, Trump's from Mark during
Speaker 1: his address to a joint Session of Congress that the
Speaker 1: US would acquire it one way or another quote unquote
Speaker 1: takes on new significance and light of the Independence Gradualist
Speaker 1: Party's recent victory in Greenland, the ones who want to
Speaker 1: separate themselves from Denmark fully this move has essentially made
Speaker 1: it more of a free agent and in theory thus
Speaker 1: ripe for the taking. But the true significance lies in
Speaker 1: Greenland's vital strategic importance for the North Atlantic, like I
Speaker 1: just implied a moment ago, given that eighty percent of
Speaker 1: Greenland lies within the Arctic Circle and acts as a
Speaker 1: defensive hub for vital shipping lanes. Additionally, Greenland is home
Speaker 1: to abundant rare earth mad minerals that are crucial for
Speaker 1: modern technology such as smartphones and green energy batteries. Despite
Speaker 1: the people of Greenland showing little interest in joining the
Speaker 1: US and instead opting for true independence the world's largest island.
Speaker 1: To call it that again is that you can't understate
Speaker 1: the significance of that would be a boon for any
Speaker 1: nation seeking to control it. Finally, when it comes to Canada,
Speaker 1: this plan to annex it, on the face of it
Speaker 1: is probably the most outlandish and nakedly expansionists of them all. However,
Speaker 1: beyond sheer imperialism, there are other justifications being floated. According
Speaker 1: to Trump, one major motivation is to curb the two
Speaker 1: hundred billion dollars that the US pays Canada annually. And Furthermore,
Speaker 1: former Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has acknowledged that the Trump
Speaker 1: administration is very aware his words of Canada's natural resources
Speaker 1: and has expressed interest in controlling them. The talk surrounding
Speaker 1: border security in the context of fentanyl trafficking and illegal
Speaker 1: immigration cannot be discounted either, though tariffs which have taken
Speaker 1: on a new meeting since I started working on this
Speaker 1: recording version, given our so called liberation Day, that's just happened.
Speaker 1: But those tariffs seem to be the methodology that the
Speaker 1: administration is taking in regard to stopping fentanyl trafficking. And
Speaker 1: so forth, at least to incentivize the Canadian government to
Speaker 1: do more to stop it. I guess the point being
Speaker 1: obtaining a vast territory like Canada, with its innumerable resources,
Speaker 1: would essentially cut out the middleman in the thinking of
Speaker 1: the administration. Despite well, the existence of NAFTA until twenty twenty,
Speaker 1: you know, the thing that guaranteed free trade between Mexico,
Speaker 1: the United States and Canada. Now, all this amounts to
Speaker 1: something very familiar to those who have studied American history
Speaker 1: during the progressive era, when the nation was busy developing
Speaker 1: and strengthening the sphere of influence as a matter of policy,
Speaker 1: I want to give a quick note in terminology. I mean,
Speaker 1: we've discussed progressivism in its various forms on this podcast,
Speaker 1: especially with the help of the friend C. J. Kilmer
Speaker 1: of the Dangerous History podcast, but it's worth getting into
Speaker 1: just a little bit here. It may be difficult for
Speaker 1: some to appreciate this similarity between the progressive era and
Speaker 1: today because the word progressivism has long been associated with
Speaker 1: those on the left side of the political ledger. However,
Speaker 1: the progressive vision in the United States has hardly ever
Speaker 1: been unified, except in terms of core principles of so
Speaker 1: called social progress. The differences have largely stemmed from ancillary
Speaker 1: political concerns. For example, the George W. Bush administration was
Speaker 1: defined ostensibly by evangelical Christianity, whereas the Obama administration leaned
Speaker 1: into technocratic expertise. But the ideological split within the progressive
Speaker 1: way worldview has deep historical roots. That first manifested very
Speaker 1: clearly in nineteen twelve between Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt,
Speaker 1: with Poor William Howard Taft and Eugene Debs caught in
Speaker 1: the middle. After that fascinating election that one could legitimately
Speaker 1: call a four person election, the country generally embraced the
Speaker 1: more academic and genteel Wilsonian vision of progressivism, leaving the
Speaker 1: bellicose and nationalist Rooseveltian brand of progressivism behind. That is,
Speaker 1: in my view, until now. The second Trump administration has
Speaker 1: very clearly aligned itself with the legacy of Roosevelt, as
Speaker 1: we heard, but also again as we heard, Trump made
Speaker 1: himself very clear in this in his inauguration speech, with
Speaker 1: that of President William McKinley. Other commentators have made similar observations.
Speaker 1: I'm not pretending to be unique in this regard. For example,
Speaker 1: writing for Unheard, Michael Linde argued that Trump is governing
Speaker 1: quote in a tradition of realist presidents going back to
Speaker 1: Theodore Roosevelt more than a century ago, who have viewed
Speaker 1: world politics as a great power club rather than an
Speaker 1: arena for idealism unquote. Lin's overall point about moral consistency
Speaker 1: is certainly debatable, but he is not alone in recognizing
Speaker 1: this shift. An American conservative Ted Snyder argues that Trump's
Speaker 1: hero worship of McKinley and Roosevelt represents something unpleasant to imagine, because,
Speaker 1: as the article's subheading points out, quote, his heroes were
Speaker 1: war bonkers unquote. So clearly, Trump's attempt to rebrand himself
Speaker 1: within this historical lineage has not been well received by
Speaker 1: those with we could say anti imperialist perspectives, if we
Speaker 1: want to put it as broadly as possible. Now. In
Speaker 1: my view, this concern is for good reason. Very few
Speaker 1: US presidents have been more imperialist than the progressives who
Speaker 1: ruled between eighteen ninety six and nineteen twenty. I mean,
Speaker 1: under McKinley alone, the US acquired the following Hawaii, Guam, Cuba,
Speaker 1: Puerto Rico and the Philippines as part of the famously
Speaker 1: lopsided Spanish American War of eighteen ninety eight. And this
Speaker 1: is to say nothing of US involvement in the Boxer
Speaker 1: Rebellion in China nineteen hundred, what I like to call
Speaker 1: the first global war of the twentieth century. McKinley justified
Speaker 1: these acquisitions under quote the law of belligerent right over
Speaker 1: conquered territory unquote. The conquest of the Philippines then turned
Speaker 1: into what many people have compared to the Vietnam War
Speaker 1: in the nineteen sixties or the Iraq War in the
Speaker 1: two thousands, something known as the Philippine American War of
Speaker 1: eighteen ninety nine to nineteen oh two, and that was
Speaker 1: the most infamous of all the conflicts that occurred. It
Speaker 1: erupted when Spain seeded control of the Philippines and the
Speaker 1: US quickly annexed the islands instead of granted independence. Ultimately,
Speaker 1: over forty two hundred American soldiers and more than twenty
Speaker 1: thousand five Lapino combatants perished. This was something that Dan
Speaker 1: Carlin talked about in my opinion underrated episode in the
Speaker 1: hardcore History catalog called American Peril a number of years ago.
Speaker 1: I think it's actually been over ten years. It's a
Speaker 1: very good one, and I recommend people go back and
Speaker 1: listen to it, or check out my friend Danielle Blelli's
Speaker 1: podcast about Teddy Roosevelt in general to get a good,
Speaker 1: decent idea of the kind of war that was being
Speaker 1: fought over there, and the ideology that spawned it, and
Speaker 1: the personalities and so forth. Anyway, the justifications for the
Speaker 1: annexation of the Philippines were legion at the time, ranging
Speaker 1: from strategic concerns to just outright racism, with some arguing
Speaker 1: that Filipinos were just not frankly fit to govern themselves,
Speaker 1: or that they were not sufficiently Christianized in order to
Speaker 1: do so. But the thing is, ultimately this was all
Speaker 1: about expanding the American sphere of influence. That's it. Because
Speaker 1: at the dawn of the twentieth century that sphere of
Speaker 1: influence paled in comparison to the empires of Europe, and
Speaker 1: the United States had a bit of what Freud called
Speaker 1: penis envy at that point, if you'll pardon the crude analogy. Now,
Speaker 1: this imperial impulse was shared by McKinley's vice president and
Speaker 1: successor Theodore Roosevelt, who further expanded US interventionism after McKinley
Speaker 1: was assassinated when the Polish born anarchist Leon soul Goes
Speaker 1: shot him in the stomach. Roosevelt's Big Stick diplomacy, as
Speaker 1: it has come to be known, and which has clearly
Speaker 1: influenced the forty seventh president, involved creating what became the
Speaker 1: Panama Canal Zone after taking it from Columbia nineteen oh one,
Speaker 1: reasserting control over Cuba despite its nineteen oh two independence,
Speaker 1: and turning the US into a police power quote unquote
Speaker 1: of the Caribbean Sea with the nineteen oh four Roosevelt
Speaker 1: Corollary to what was then simply the Monroe Doctrine. The
Speaker 1: corollary justified US intervention in Latin America by arguing that
Speaker 1: quote chronic wrongdoing may in America as elsewhere, ultimately require
Speaker 1: intervention by some civilized nation unquote. This doctrine laid the
Speaker 1: foundation for further military occupations, such as the US Marine
Speaker 1: intervention in the Dominican Republic in nineteen oh five, and
Speaker 1: it also set the stage for the next major progressive president,
Speaker 1: Woodrow Wilson, to continue to expand American interventionism. One thing
Speaker 1: that's important to remember is that despite the split between
Speaker 1: the visions of progressivism, the genteel academic version of Wilsonianism
Speaker 1: and a more muscular version of Rooseveltianism I guess we
Speaker 1: could call it, does not have one preclude the other
Speaker 1: of acting like imperialists. The impression I have is that
Speaker 1: progressivism of all kinds has an imperialist, expansionist streak. We'll
Speaker 1: be getting into that a little bit more later, but
Speaker 1: it's important to remember that in the modern day versions.
Speaker 2: Of this.
Speaker 1: People were quick to point out and still are, and
Speaker 1: for good reason, that even though President Obama essentially ended
Speaker 1: the Iraq War, it's not like he suddenly pulled back
Speaker 1: American forces from all other conflicts that were ongoing overseas.
Speaker 1: This is just to say that the norms created within
Speaker 1: the capital p progressive context don't really know loyalty to
Speaker 1: particular political parties. This is important to point out because
Speaker 1: you see this already happen with history, Wilson's imperialism specifically
Speaker 1: being downplayed compared to that of McKinley and Roosevelt, and
Speaker 1: that is likely thanks to the progressive split that I
Speaker 1: was talking about as well as Wilson's greater association with
Speaker 1: the First World War breaking out just over a year
Speaker 1: and a half after he took office in nineteen thirteen.
Speaker 1: World War One has to suck the oxygen out of
Speaker 1: the room, and for understandable reasons, but that doesn't make
Speaker 1: the other things that happened under Wilson's watch, or at
Speaker 1: under his orders suddenly not matter. Because Wilson was no
Speaker 1: stranger to foreign intervention in occupation, particularly in Latin America,
Speaker 1: where Roosevelt's corollary provided broad justification for it to just
Speaker 1: keep going. During his presidency, Wilson so called Banana Wars,
Speaker 1: which we will be talking about in a future episode
Speaker 1: if history impossible, coming hopefully pretty soon. They raged south
Speaker 1: of the border, caused by interventions in Mexico, Haiti, Nicaragua,
Speaker 1: and Panama. Justification for American involvement in Latin America and
Speaker 1: in the Caribbean aligned with Wilson's views on the importance
Speaker 1: of what he called pan Americanism, which he believed would
Speaker 1: create a quote unquote progressive order and that would prevent
Speaker 1: a quote unquote state of uncontrollable chaos. In the words
Speaker 1: of historian Lloyd e ambrosious. As with the or Roosevelt's
Speaker 1: own expansionist actions, there were high minded justifications, but it
Speaker 1: is clear that this had to do with securing the
Speaker 1: US sphere of interest. Yet again, as historian Ivan Mussakant
Speaker 1: has written, Roosevelt's motives lay largely in quote cementing America's
Speaker 1: newfound role as quadrispheric constable, in which quote the United
Speaker 1: States could militarily and utilaterally intervene in any regional state
Speaker 1: where the political, economic, or social conditions invited a European
Speaker 1: protective response in force. Or, as Theodore Roosevelt himself said
Speaker 1: in a speech delivered in Cincinnati in the year nineteen
Speaker 1: oh nine, quote expansion is not only the handmade of greatness,
Speaker 1: but above all, it is the handmade of peace. Every
Speaker 1: expansion of a civilized power is a conquest for peace.
Speaker 1: It means not only the extension of American influence and power.
Speaker 1: It means the extension of liberty and order, and the
Speaker 1: bringing nearer by gigantic strides of the day when peace
Speaker 1: shall come to the whole earth. This belief that American
Speaker 1: expansionism was a force for stability and global order provided
Speaker 1: the intellectual foundation for US interventions throughout the early twentieth century,
Speaker 1: driving American foreign policy and reinforcing the Rooseveltian approach to
Speaker 1: empire building, even as Wilson's style himself as a more
Speaker 1: idealistic and principled leader. The parallels between Trump and nineteenth
Speaker 1: century progressive presidents are striking, to say the least. However,
Speaker 1: the closer one looks, the more obvious it becomes that
Speaker 1: not everything aligns perfectly between them. I'll be the first
Speaker 1: to admit that now. This, of course, has more to
Speaker 1: do with the fact that the world, especially the United States,
Speaker 1: has significantly changed in the last one hundred twenty five years.
Speaker 1: While the second Trump administration seems animated by the Rooseveltian
Speaker 1: progressive spirit when it comes to geopolitics, this has not
Speaker 1: always been the case. Trump's first term from twenty seventeen
Speaker 1: to twenty twenty one was more animated by an energy
Speaker 1: of crude nativist populism that largely rejected global expansionism. After all,
Speaker 1: this was the only Republican nominee in twenty fifteen that
Speaker 1: broke ranks and openly denounced the Iraq War, despite also
Speaker 1: falsely claiming that he had always been against it, which
Speaker 1: is just not true. Back in two thousand and two,
Speaker 1: when he was on the Howard Stern Show, Trump had
Speaker 1: literally said that he was in favor of invading Iraq. Regardless,
Speaker 1: the road to this seeming about face reveals not a
Speaker 1: contradiction so much as as I see it at least
Speaker 1: a logical conclusion. Woodrow Wilson, despite resuscitating and maintaining the
Speaker 1: tradition of McKinley and Roosevelt's militarism in Latin America and Caribbean,
Speaker 1: often spoken idealistic terms, especially in nineteen seventeen, when he
Speaker 1: pled for congressional approval to send American men into the
Speaker 1: fray of the First World War under the pretense now
Speaker 1: made famous of quote making the world safe for democracy unquote.
Speaker 1: This was certainly sincere on Wilson's part, driven by his
Speaker 1: legit messionic complex. This is something that the aforementioned friend
Speaker 1: of the Show and of Mind, C. J. Kilmer, has
Speaker 1: talked about on his series about Woodrow Wilson. I think
Speaker 1: most pointedly made clear when Wilson himself said to Democratic
Speaker 1: Party leaders when they approached him after his election, who
Speaker 1: were expecting to get these nice, cushy appointments these jobs
Speaker 1: in his administration for helping put him in the office.
Speaker 1: Wilson looked them dead in the eye and said, and
Speaker 1: I quote, I wish it to be clearly understood that
Speaker 1: I owe you nothing. Remember that God ordained that I
Speaker 1: should be the next president of the United States. Neither
Speaker 1: you or any other mortal could have prevented that, unquote.
Speaker 1: So we clearly have a much different way of looking
Speaker 1: at things, I think than really anyone other than from
Speaker 1: what I can tell George W. Bush and his decree
Speaker 1: that God wanted him to aus Saddam Hussein from power.
Speaker 1: But unlike Wilson, and unlike George W. Bush, the McKinley
Speaker 1: and Roosevelt administrations were more animated by a school of
Speaker 1: thought that today is known as realism, concerning themselves with
Speaker 1: what I see as largely deterministic, supposedly rational interpretations of
Speaker 1: geopolitical forces that must be harnessed rather than defied in
Speaker 1: the name of ideals. Now, similar to McKinley and Roosevelt,
Speaker 1: Trump sees the projection of American power not in terms
Speaker 1: of the Wilsonian notion of spreading American values, as like
Speaker 1: I was hinting at figures like Bush Junior, Obama and
Speaker 1: Biden believed, but rather he and his administration see the
Speaker 1: projection of American power in terms of securing interests and influence.
Speaker 1: This is a function of the worldview that has crystallized,
Speaker 1: particularly but by no means exclusively, on the American right
Speaker 1: during the last fifteen years, neatly aligning with what we
Speaker 1: could call maga populism. In twenty eleven, CNN commentator and
Speaker 1: writer for Read Zakaria released a second edition of his
Speaker 1: landmark two thousand and eight book The Post American World,
Speaker 1: updated to reflect the tumultuous events that were occurring as
Speaker 1: the first edition was being published. At the time of
Speaker 1: its original writing, Barack Obama had yet to be elected
Speaker 1: into office, the war in Iraq had not yet ended,
Speaker 1: and most crucially, the consequences of the Great Financial Crisis
Speaker 1: of two thousand and seven to two thousand and nine
Speaker 1: aka the Great Recession had not yet made themselves apparent.
Speaker 1: By twenty eleven, Zakaria's updated analysis of a world characterized
Speaker 1: by the quote unquote rise of the rest, as he
Speaker 1: put it, was even more prescient. The war on terror
Speaker 1: in the Great Recession made clear to many that the
Speaker 1: American Way had been built on a house of cards,
Speaker 1: and to the less charitable among them, a house of lies.
Speaker 1: But as Zakaria explains in his book, people were starting
Speaker 1: to suspect that quote America had had its day unquote
Speaker 1: years before the financial crisis. As the co founder of
Speaker 1: the company Intel, Andy Grove said in two thousand and five,
Speaker 1: quote America's in danger of following Europe down the tubes.
Speaker 1: And the worst part is that nobody knows it. They're
Speaker 1: all in denial, patting themselves in the back as the
Speaker 1: Titanic heads straight for the Iceberg, full speed ahead unquote.
Speaker 1: For the rest of the world. American decline became apparent
Speaker 1: even earlier than that, As Zakaria notes, US global influence
Speaker 1: quote reached its apogee with Iraq unquote, an unprovoked invasion
Speaker 1: launched despite widespread international opposition. The skepticism of the American
Speaker 1: led end of history quote unquote that supposedly began in
Speaker 1: nineteen eighty nine quickly became global. As Zakaria explains, that
Speaker 1: new world order that George H. W. Bush spoke of
Speaker 1: in nineteen ninety one quickly unwound when the unpopular Iraq
Speaker 1: War became even more unpopular, as it became obvious very
Speaker 1: quickly that despite the understandable ousting of the genocidal Baptist
Speaker 1: regime under Saddam Hussein, the whole enterprise was an unmitigated disaster. America,
Speaker 1: in its brief window of true global dominion, had frankly
Speaker 1: blown its wad. That was the way it looked. However,
Speaker 1: the most striking insight provided by Zakaria is not that
Speaker 1: the Iraq War quote killed American dominance unquote, or the
Speaker 1: uni polar world order itself, but that it that is,
Speaker 1: the Iraq War and the two thousand and eight financial
Speaker 1: crisis accelerated pre existing global trends, mainly the rise of
Speaker 1: the rest, and thus the necessary declension in relative terms
Speaker 1: of the United States. As Zakari writes, quote, the unipolar
Speaker 1: order of the last two decades is waning not because
Speaker 1: of Iraq, but because of the broader diffusion of power
Speaker 1: across the world quote. Chinese strategists had long recognized this transition,
Speaker 1: characterizing the world as made up of quote many powers
Speaker 1: in one superpower unquote. But for these Chinese strategists, this
Speaker 1: was no benign observation. It was a strategic assertion, a
Speaker 1: mission statement. One could even see it as it was
Speaker 1: only a matter of time before Americans themselves would begin
Speaker 1: to experience real and significant self doubt that mirrored the
Speaker 1: doubt being felt by the rest of the world about them.
Speaker 1: But unlike the rising rest, who naturally saw and made
Speaker 1: moves to take an opportunity being presented them, Americans were
Speaker 1: perhaps inevitably going to react with variations of despair, possibly denial.
Speaker 1: The despair and in some cases denial manifested in myriad
Speaker 1: ways into early twenty tens, most dramatically with the now
Speaker 1: infamous Occupied Movement in twenty eleven to twenty twelve, which
Speaker 1: ended up mostly coding left. The right had the Tea
Speaker 1: Party moment starting from twenty ten, but it was not
Speaker 1: clear that the populist backlash was in full swing for
Speaker 1: them until it became embodied by Donald Trump's rise in
Speaker 1: twenty fifteen and the birth of what we can now
Speaker 1: call Maga populism. This first incarnation of Trump was much
Speaker 1: more inwardly focused than the second one appears to be
Speaker 1: as of this recording. This was largely thanks to the
Speaker 1: influence of nativists figures like Steve Bannon, but it was
Speaker 1: of a piece with the current incarnation as well. In
Speaker 1: that maga ideology, what little of it actually can be articulated,
Speaker 1: is firmly rooted in the idea that the US is
Speaker 1: not the unipolar powerhouse that it once was. The only
Speaker 1: seemingly real, serious ideological figure deep in the administration, that is,
Speaker 1: Vice President J. D. Vance has made this clear that
Speaker 1: the US exists and should thus act like it exists
Speaker 1: in a multipolar world. We saw this made very clear
Speaker 1: in his speech given at the Munich Security Conference on
Speaker 1: February fourteenth, twenty twenty five. While notions of a multipolar
Speaker 1: world are interesting for their connections to more esoteric Russian
Speaker 1: figures like Alexander Dugan, who I've spoken to my friend
Speaker 1: Christops and Dreesen's about a lot the reality of a
Speaker 1: multipolar world, and by the way, it is a reality
Speaker 1: we should not be mistaken on. That is what matters
Speaker 1: for understand the second Trump administration's positioning of the US
Speaker 1: in what appear to be nineteenth century progressive terms. This
Speaker 1: is because despite how unpleasant, thuggish and downright means spirited,
Speaker 1: it's all been. To let my bias come through there
Speaker 1: again a little bit. The administration is at least appearing
Speaker 1: to be trying to make the US exist in the
Speaker 1: world as it is, rather than the world as we
Speaker 1: would like it to be. While I would argue there
Speaker 1: are multiple ways to navigate this other than the way
Speaker 1: the administration has been going about it, which I see
Speaker 1: as a deep pessimism masquerading as realism, they are taking
Speaker 1: a supposedly proven approach by mirroring the imperial spheres of
Speaker 1: influenced methodology of the McKinley and Roosevelt administrations one hundred
Speaker 1: and twenty five years ago. The primary difference between the
Speaker 1: two parties in Washington has been revealed, at least as
Speaker 1: they have been manifesting for the last ten to twenty years.
Speaker 1: The Democrats are more than willing to try and appropriate
Speaker 1: the symbols and rhetoric of their populists the one percent
Speaker 1: Black Lives Matter me Too, without ever really changing anything meaningful,
Speaker 1: while the Republicans under Trump seemed to be seeking to
Speaker 1: actually remake the American image. The last time such a
Speaker 1: thing actually happened during relative peacetime was indeed under McKinley
Speaker 1: and Roosevelt. I believe therefore that it is fair, at
Speaker 1: least as of this recording to characterize a second Trump
Speaker 1: administration as the newest incarnation of American progressivism. What that
Speaker 1: actually means is what should concern us. If there was
Speaker 1: one overused bromide of the last eight years that I'm
Speaker 1: sure a lot of you listening know that I got
Speaker 1: very sick of, very quickly, and remain sick of for
Speaker 1: those eight years. It was the invocation of fascism in
Speaker 1: almost any and all negative commentary directed at Donald Trump.
Speaker 1: Everyone from random commenters on Reddit to Rachel Maddow took
Speaker 1: a swing at the reductio ad hit Lerum fallacy. While
Speaker 1: it is now clear that this was almost certainly political
Speaker 1: theater and hardly sincere, especially given the fact that the
Speaker 1: party that saw fit to continually make fascism comparisons was
Speaker 1: apparently more than happy to just hand over power to
Speaker 1: a supposed fascist. Plenty of people took it seriously, and
Speaker 1: you will find no shortage of angry citizens still comparing
Speaker 1: the current administration to fascism or even Nazism. This has
Speaker 1: always read, and usually continues to read, as a textbook
Speaker 1: definition of a moral panic or mass hysteria. And yet
Speaker 1: there does seem to be something a little more apt
Speaker 1: about such a comparison this time around. Now bear with
Speaker 1: me here, guys. There is a bit of cheekiness, of course,
Speaker 1: to be expected when I say something like this. I'm
Speaker 1: being a little provocative here. It is not to say,
Speaker 1: and I am not saying that the second Trump administration
Speaker 1: is absolutely resolutely a fascist administration, because that is not true.
Speaker 1: It is not. I mean, after all, the majority of
Speaker 1: me talking here has been elaborating on how this administration
Speaker 1: resembles nineteenth century progressivism more than anything else. But the
Speaker 1: truth is, nineteenth century progressivism and fascism, along with communism,
Speaker 1: are all quite comfortable bedfellows. These three were the ideologies
Speaker 1: of the future one hundred and fifty years ago or so,
Speaker 1: and while they all had different ideas about the specifics,
Speaker 1: they shared one thing in common, and that is top
Speaker 1: down authoritarianism. Around this time in Western history, notions of
Speaker 1: government by the people for the people were facing a
Speaker 1: lot of skepticism, and there were multiple bold reasons for this,
Speaker 1: and they would take us far too long to chronicle.
Speaker 1: Entire Podcasts have been made dedicated to just parts of
Speaker 1: this story. But the short version, as short as it's
Speaker 1: going to get, is that the early to mid nineteenth
Speaker 1: century saw incredible disruptions to what had long been the
Speaker 1: relative status quo in politics, economics, and war, ranging from
Speaker 1: the French Revolution and the subsequent Napoleonic Wars to the
Speaker 1: Second Industrial Revolution, the Year of Revolutions as in eighteen
Speaker 1: forty eight, and then the American Civil War. In short,
Speaker 1: the will of the people became associated with chaos, and
Speaker 1: generally speaking, those in power abhor chaos unless they can
Speaker 1: make it work for themselves. This is certainly a crude
Speaker 1: and shortened version of nineteenth century history, but it generally
Speaker 1: helps paint the picture. It helps explain why governments, including
Speaker 1: democratic ones, perhaps especially democratic warses ones, would develop warm
Speaker 1: feelings toward authoritarianism as the twentieth century began to loom.
Speaker 1: These warm feelings would manifest in different ways depending on
Speaker 1: the country in question. I mean, as we know, for
Speaker 1: Germany it would become national socialism, though remember communism was
Speaker 1: giving the national socialists to run for their money as well,
Speaker 1: but the point remains. And then in Italy it would
Speaker 1: become fascism, and then ultimately in Russia it would become communism.
Speaker 1: Before the United States some decades even before all that
Speaker 1: happened before the Great War, it would become muscular, technocratic progressivism,
Speaker 1: which endured until the nineteen twenties, before revitalizing itself under
Speaker 1: the auspices of Franklin Dilano Roosevelt in the nineteen thirties
Speaker 1: in the wake of the Great Depression. If one zooms in,
Speaker 1: the different ideologies of these powers cast very different shadows,
Speaker 1: but zoomed out, they all indeed share an authoritarian nature.
Speaker 1: Whether it was the FDR administration forcing the slaughter of
Speaker 1: over thirty thousand pigs to exert control over the livestock economy,
Speaker 1: or one of Stalin's five year plans, or Hitler's autocratic
Speaker 1: drive to make Germany self sufficient, the essence was always
Speaker 1: the same, if not the effect, obviously, considering the latter
Speaker 1: two examples resulted in tens of millions dead. The different
Speaker 1: authoritarian powers, though they often looked at each other admiringly
Speaker 1: for their efforts to protect their people from the horrors
Speaker 1: of the Great Depression, and this included progressives seeing something
Speaker 1: to like across the Atlantic or across the Eurasian land mass.
Speaker 1: The communists, the fascists, the progressives, they all saw each
Speaker 1: other as part of a sort of kindred movement that
Speaker 1: had essentially grown out of the shackles of parliamentary democracies
Speaker 1: or constitutional republics, a movement of pragmatists, a movement to
Speaker 1: get things done, to get action. As Teddy Roosevelt liked
Speaker 1: to say, while the Great Depression had given this worldview
Speaker 1: in the world's democracies a new lease on life, these
Speaker 1: notions of top down, technocratic, authoritarian managers taking hold of
Speaker 1: national or even civilizational destiny long predated those events. The
Speaker 1: writer and the world famous progressive HG. Wells had been
Speaker 1: by his own account, advocating for such a shift for
Speaker 1: three decades. When he spoke on the subject of fascism
Speaker 1: in the early nineteen thirties, indeed, he saw the parallels
Speaker 1: between the fascist movements of Europe and the progressive movement
Speaker 1: of the early twentieth century, which again had seen a
Speaker 1: new lease on life under the auspices of FDR, which
Speaker 1: he saw positively. And he saw all of them in
Speaker 1: a favorable light. He made this clear in nineteen thirty
Speaker 1: two when he addressed to young liberals at Oxford, proclaiming
Speaker 1: the following in his speech quote, I have never been
Speaker 1: able to escape altogether from its relentless logic. We have
Speaker 1: seen the FASCISTI in Italy and a number of Franklin
Speaker 1: Roosevelt's Fascist New Deal clumsy imitations elsewhere, and we have
Speaker 1: seen the Russian Communist Party coming into existence to reinforce
Speaker 1: this idea. I am asking for a liberal FASCISTI for
Speaker 1: enlightened Nazis. And do not let me leave you in
Speaker 1: the slightest doubt as to the scope and ambition of
Speaker 1: what I'm putting before you. These new organizations are not
Speaker 1: merely organizations for the spread of defined opinions. The days
Speaker 1: of that sort of amateurism are over. They are organizations
Speaker 1: to replace a dilatory indecisiveness of democracy. The world is
Speaker 1: sick of parliamentary politics. The Fascist Party, to the best
Speaker 1: of its ability, is Italy. Now the Communist Party, to
Speaker 1: the best of its ability, is Russia. Obviously, the fascists
Speaker 1: of liberalism must carry out a parallel ambition on a
Speaker 1: still vaster scale. They must begin as a disciplined sect,
Speaker 1: but they must end as a sustaining organization of a
Speaker 1: reconstituted mankind. Unquote. H. G. Wells was not a fascist,
Speaker 1: at least in the same way as Hitler. Or even
Speaker 1: Mussolini were. As Philip Coupland explained in his paper on
Speaker 1: the subject, Quote Wells showed how fascist, that is, elitist, authoritarian,
Speaker 1: and violent means could yield liberal ends. Fascism was, in
Speaker 1: essence a tool to be wielded for the common good.
Speaker 1: This notion only changed after it became unfashionable for obvious
Speaker 1: reasons to advocate for such a tool, when world events
Speaker 1: revealed why. As Joonah Goldberg has explained, fascism only really
Speaker 1: started to get a truly bad rap after World War
Speaker 1: II began, and especially after it ended. As Gouldberg emphasizes,
Speaker 1: the real reason fascism got so tarred with a broad
Speaker 1: brush was its association with the Holocaust, and for obviously
Speaker 1: good reason. The Holocaust was, in essence, the end result
Speaker 1: of an authoritarian state was zero checks and balances and
Speaker 1: creative bureaucratic apparatus, all fueled by a singular lethal obsession. Now,
Speaker 1: the important thing here to remember Fascism did not necessarily
Speaker 1: lead to the Holocaust, as seen by the relatively put
Speaker 1: an air quotes here favorable treatment the Jews of Italy
Speaker 1: experienced until the Nazis took over in nineteen forty three
Speaker 1: after Mussolini's fall. But the important thing to remember, though,
Speaker 1: is that the Holocaust could also not have happened without fascism.
Speaker 1: This right here is the seeming chicken and egg problem
Speaker 1: that tends to trip most people up who don't study
Speaker 1: this part of history. Fascism was not at the time
Speaker 1: solely because of the Holocaust. Rather, the Holocaust revealed just
Speaker 1: how bad fascism could be. Now, I depart from Jonah
Speaker 1: Goldberg's analysis pretty sharply in the sense that, unlike him,
Speaker 1: at least when he wrote his book Liberal Fascism back
Speaker 1: in two thousand and seven, I don't personally really care
Speaker 1: whether or not fascism is the domain of the left
Speaker 1: or of the right. It's a top down authoritarian ideology
Speaker 1: that historically tends to result in expansionist violence, and in
Speaker 1: the case of the nazis a obsessive drive for virulent
Speaker 1: race purification, and that in and of itself is bad
Speaker 1: enough for anyone who appreciates individual freedom and agency. Whether
Speaker 1: it's a left or right phenomenon, does it really matter.
Speaker 1: The real problem is that the domains of the left
Speaker 1: and the right both equally believe that if either secures
Speaker 1: power they will lose the freedom and agency that they have.
Speaker 1: Whether or not one side can make a better case
Speaker 1: than the other, it just matters far less than the possibility.
Speaker 1: I personally believe near certainty, but one's mileage may vary.
Speaker 1: That they are both correct but hate each other more
Speaker 1: than they hate any kind of tyranny. I mean, look
Speaker 1: at it this way. If you enjoy seeing tyranny exercised
Speaker 1: on white nationalists or hamas supporting college students, then you
Speaker 1: don't hate tyranny. What you enjoy is a selective application
Speaker 1: of tyranny, and that's just tyranny. It's really that simple.
Speaker 1: This is all to say that fascism itself is not
Speaker 1: what should concern us. What should concern us is top
Speaker 1: down expansionist authoritarianism. However it defines itself progressivism, fascism, communism
Speaker 1: trumpsm it doesn't matter. And if we are to take
Speaker 1: the second Trump administration at face value, with how it
Speaker 1: has been conducting it, particularly with foreign policy, including aggressive
Speaker 1: tariffs that as of this recording, supposedly liberated US two
Speaker 1: days ago, and we haven't really seen much evidence of
Speaker 1: that yet, it is concerning, However, unlike the previously worn
Speaker 1: dangers of Trump and his movement. I don't believe that
Speaker 1: it makes any sense to treat things as existential to
Speaker 1: our government. Bad ideas which are just in my opinion,
Speaker 1: bad ideas. This is just my opinion, after all, are
Speaker 1: not a life or death problem. They don't automatically constitute
Speaker 1: an existential threat to us. All. I have heard it
Speaker 1: said that it would behoove us not to react to
Speaker 1: Trump two point zero like a resistance or hashtag resistance,
Speaker 1: we should say, But rather those of us who don't
Speaker 1: like the policies or the direction things are going in
Speaker 1: to react to it like an opposition, because, to be frank,
Speaker 1: that is what a democracy does. That is what a
Speaker 1: republic does. Despite the resurgence of democratic dominated progressivism in
Speaker 1: the nineteen thirties that arguably continued nearly uninterrupted, if not
Speaker 1: fully uninterrupted, into the Obama era, the Rooseveltian brand, as
Speaker 1: in the Teddy Roosevelt brand, lost its influence outside of
Speaker 1: the mythological context. By the nineteen twenties, more liberty minded
Speaker 1: administrations prevailed, and had it not been for the Great
Speaker 1: Depression providing the incentive for revisiting top down authoritarian measures,
Speaker 1: those more liberty minded administrations and ideas might have continued,
Speaker 1: if only for a time. The world today might be multipolar,
Speaker 1: and the US needs to start acting like it understands
Speaker 1: this fact. But doing so by breathing new life into
Speaker 1: a century old playbook of discredited, nakedly cynical imperialism is
Speaker 1: not the answer. I was thinking about a lot of
Speaker 1: this while reading an essay from Gorvidal actually where he
Speaker 1: talked about Theodore Roosevelt, who he calls an American cissy.
Speaker 1: And I think to close this out, it would be
Speaker 1: appropriate for me to read this passage that just really
Speaker 1: stuck out to me. So, if you'll indulge me, I
Speaker 1: think that this can help illustrate some things in a
Speaker 1: way that my own words can't, especially because it's very
Speaker 1: hard to compete with one of the literary masters of
Speaker 1: the twentieth century. So if you'll indulge me, let's turn
Speaker 1: to what Gorvidal had to say, as follows, there is
Speaker 1: something strangely infantile in this obsession with dice loaded physical courage,
Speaker 1: when the only courage that matters in political or even
Speaker 1: real life is moral. Although Theodore Roosevelt was often reckless
Speaker 1: and always domineering in politics. He never showed much real courage,
Speaker 1: and despite some trust busting, he never took on the
Speaker 1: great ring of corruption that ruled and rules in this republic.
Speaker 1: But then he was born a part of it. At best,
Speaker 1: he was just a dude with the reform play. Fortunately,
Speaker 1: foreign affairs would bring him glory. As Lincoln was the
Speaker 1: Bismarck of the American States, Theodore Roosevelt was the Kaiser
Speaker 1: Wilhelm the Second, a more fortunate and intelligent figure than
Speaker 1: the Kaiser, but every bit as bellicose and conceited. Edith
Speaker 1: Wharton described with what pride tr showed her a photograph
Speaker 1: of himself and the Kaiser, with the Kaiser's inscription. President
Speaker 1: Roosevelt shows the Emperor of Germany how to command an attack.
Speaker 1: I once asked Alice Longworth just why her father was
Speaker 1: such a war lover. She denied that he was. I
Speaker 1: quoted her father's dictum, no triumph of peace is quite
Speaker 1: as great as the supreme triumph of war, A sentiment
Speaker 1: to be echoed by yet another sissy in the next generation.
Speaker 1: Meglio undiorno dalone che cento anni de pecora. Oh well,
Speaker 1: she said, that's the way they all sounded. In those days,
Speaker 1: but they did not all sound that way. Certainly Theodore
Speaker 1: Senior would have been appalled, and I doubt if Eleanor
Speaker 1: really approved of Uncle Teddy's warmongerine. As President, t R
Speaker 1: spoke loudly and carried a fair sized stick when Colombia
Speaker 1: wouldn't give him the land that he needed for a canal.
Speaker 1: He helped invent Panama out of a piece of Colombia
Speaker 1: and God his canal. He also installed the United States
Speaker 1: as the policeman of the Western Hemisphere in order to
Speaker 1: establish an American hegemony in the Pacific. Tr presided over
Speaker 1: the tail end of the slaughter of more than half
Speaker 1: a million Filipinos, who had been under the illusion that
Speaker 1: after the Spanish American War, they would be free to
Speaker 1: set up an independent republic under the leadership of Emilio Guinaldo.
Speaker 1: But TIR had other plans for the Philippines. Nice Mister
Speaker 1: Taft was made the Governor general, and one thousand American
Speaker 1: teachers of English were sent to the islands to teach
Speaker 1: the natives a sovereigns language. Meanwhile, in the aftermath of
Speaker 1: the Boxer rebellion, TR's open door policy in China had
Speaker 1: its ups and downs. In nineteen oh five, the Chinese
Speaker 1: boycotted American goods because of American immigration policies, but the
Speaker 1: United States was still able to establish the sort of
Speaker 1: beachhead on the mainland of Asia that was bound to
Speaker 1: lead to what tr would have regarded as a bully
Speaker 1: fying war with Japan. Those of US who were involved
Speaker 1: in that war did not like it all that much.
Speaker 1: In nineteen oh five, the world famous Henry James came
Speaker 1: in triumph to Washington. He was a friend of Secretary
Speaker 1: of State John Hay and of Henry Adams. Theodore Rex,
Speaker 1: as James called, the President, felt obliged to invite the
Speaker 1: Master to the White House, even though tr had denounced
Speaker 1: James as efete and a miserable little snob. It takes
Speaker 1: one to no one, while James thought of Tr as
Speaker 1: a dangerous and ominous Jingo, but the dinner was a success.
Speaker 1: James described the President as a wonderful little machine. Quite
Speaker 1: exciting to see, but it's really like something behind a
Speaker 1: great plate glass window on Broadway. Tr continued to loathe
Speaker 1: the tone of satirical cynicism of Henry James and Henry Adams,
Speaker 1: while the Master finally dismissed the president as the mere
Speaker 1: monstrous embodiment of unprecedented and resounding noise. Alice Longworth used
Speaker 1: to boast that she and her father's viceroy Taft were
Speaker 1: the last Westerners to be received by the Dowager Empress
Speaker 1: of China. We went to Pee King, to the Forbidden City,
Speaker 1: and there we were taken to see this strange little
Speaker 1: old lady standing at the end of the room. Well,
Speaker 1: there was no bowing or scraping for us, so we
Speaker 1: marched down the room just behind the chamberlain, a eunuch
Speaker 1: like one of those in that book of yours, Justinian,
Speaker 1: who slithered on his belly toward her after he had
Speaker 1: announced us. She gave him a kick, and he rolled
Speaker 1: over like a dog and slithered out. What had they
Speaker 1: talked about? She couldn't recall. I had my impression that
Speaker 1: she rather liked the way the Empress treated her officials.
Speaker 1: Now that war is once more thinkable among the thoughtless,
Speaker 1: Theodore Roosevelt should enjoy a revival. Certainly the new Right
Speaker 1: will find his jingoism appealing, though his trust busting will
Speaker 1: give less pleasure to the honorable society of the invisible hand.
Speaker 1: The figure that emerges is both fascinating and repellent. Theodore
Speaker 1: Roosevelt was a classic American sissy who overcame or appeared
Speaker 1: to overcome his physical fragility through manly activities, of which
Speaker 1: the was exciting and ennobling was well made.
Speaker 4: Every possibly possib with his feature head A rally around him, man, Yes,
Speaker 4: rally once I can a rich and por maybe show
Speaker 4: when he's in the jam that for there might be
Speaker 4: always like be conting on the.
Speaker 5: Square he's comming. I guess he is comming to know
Speaker 5: a boy start to go. I guess not basically pasty fat.
Speaker 3: One small dream say so only shower and just going
Speaker 3: by honey.
Speaker 1: History impossible has been made possible by the kind and
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