WEBVTT 1 00:00:00.520 --> 00:00:02.640 Hey, what's up, guys. This is d Do us a 2 00:00:02.680 --> 00:00:05.360 favorite and check out our Patreon page. It's patreon dot 3 00:00:05.400 --> 00:00:08.960 com Slash the Teamhouse. You get both Teamhouse episodes and 4 00:00:09.039 --> 00:00:13.359 Eyes on Geopolitics episodes completely ad free. You get them 5 00:00:13.359 --> 00:00:15.560 early too. You can ask us questions. You can also 6 00:00:15.599 --> 00:00:19.039 watch the Team House episodes live as we shoot them, 7 00:00:19.079 --> 00:00:21.879 so and you help support the show and support what 8 00:00:21.920 --> 00:00:26.480 we're doing here. It's Patreon dot com Slash the Teamhouse. 9 00:00:26.519 --> 00:00:28.359 Those links are in the description, or if you're listening, 10 00:00:28.399 --> 00:00:30.399 it's in the show notes down below, so you can 11 00:00:30.440 --> 00:00:32.920 click it real quick and easy, and it helps us 12 00:00:33.000 --> 00:00:36.600 keep the lights on. So we appreciate it, and we 13 00:00:36.640 --> 00:00:42.920 appreciate you guys listening. Thanks a bunch. Hey everybody, welcome 14 00:00:42.960 --> 00:00:45.600 to another episode of Eyes on Geopolitics. I'm here with 15 00:00:45.759 --> 00:00:49.560 Mick Moulroy, Mark poly Moreopolis, and Jonathan Hackett. I think 16 00:00:49.600 --> 00:00:54.719 Andy Milburn will be joining us soon soon. A lot happening. Us. 17 00:00:54.920 --> 00:00:57.200 Just beat Canada and the gold medal game and the 18 00:00:57.200 --> 00:01:00.200 Olympics and overtime incredible game. 19 00:01:00.560 --> 00:01:03.799 Yep uh, he is a communist. He was rooting against America. 20 00:01:03.840 --> 00:01:06.400 I wasn't rooting against America. I was more apathetic to 21 00:01:06.439 --> 00:01:10.000 the whole thing. Uh, that's that's the best I'll give 22 00:01:10.000 --> 00:01:11.439 it to you. I mean I gave a little I 23 00:01:11.439 --> 00:01:14.120 didn't really fist pump when Jack you scored. But anyway, 24 00:01:14.760 --> 00:01:16.920 it was a really good game on the street. 25 00:01:16.959 --> 00:01:19.200 Go see AOC and have your little latte with her. 26 00:01:20.640 --> 00:01:23.560 I would love to, to be honest, Uh, happy to 27 00:01:23.599 --> 00:01:28.599 buy her a latte. A lot happening as usual. Uh. 28 00:01:29.159 --> 00:01:31.120 We brought John on, of course, because John is like 29 00:01:31.120 --> 00:01:34.280 our resident expert in Iran and things seem to be 30 00:01:34.319 --> 00:01:37.680 heating up. We have a ton of assets in and 31 00:01:37.719 --> 00:01:43.760 around the area. And that's John. That's beautiful man. Yeah. Yeah, 32 00:01:44.000 --> 00:01:45.000 check out John's book. 33 00:01:45.840 --> 00:01:47.280 I didn't just pull it out from them. 34 00:01:47.519 --> 00:01:52.200 Iran's Shot, Shadow Weapons, Covert Action, Intelligence Operations and unconventional Warfare. 35 00:01:52.200 --> 00:01:56.719 It's out now. That link is in the description. Yeah, 36 00:01:56.760 --> 00:01:58.599 so a lot happened. We have a ton of assets 37 00:01:58.640 --> 00:02:00.439 in the in the Gulf, in and around the area 38 00:02:00.480 --> 00:02:06.120 in and around Iran, as much as we've had in 39 00:02:06.239 --> 00:02:11.120 twenty years outside of the ground forces. So we really 40 00:02:11.159 --> 00:02:13.759 are showing the stick. I don't know. There is a 41 00:02:13.800 --> 00:02:19.000 meeting planned on Thursday with Iranian Foreign Minster and Witkoff 42 00:02:19.080 --> 00:02:21.919 and Jared Kushner. I don't know if that's like for 43 00:02:21.960 --> 00:02:24.759 a new hotel or anything, or actually this Iran deal, 44 00:02:25.280 --> 00:02:28.080 but yeah, that's pretty much what's happening. Obviously everything else 45 00:02:28.080 --> 00:02:30.840 in the world is exploding as well, but that's what's, 46 00:02:31.080 --> 00:02:35.879 you know, dominating the headlines. So guys welcome, and you 47 00:02:35.919 --> 00:02:38.000 guys can mudd wrestle for who wants to go first. 48 00:02:41.319 --> 00:02:45.800 Well, I gotta jump early, unfortunately, so well where to start? 49 00:02:46.400 --> 00:02:49.719 I think you we're right. We have probably as much 50 00:02:49.759 --> 00:02:53.479 air power a raid for this as we did and 51 00:02:53.520 --> 00:02:59.280 maybe even surpassed the two thousand and three invasion of Iraq, 52 00:02:59.319 --> 00:03:02.360 which me and bark Or intimately involved with, not the 53 00:03:02.400 --> 00:03:07.120 airpower and a considered amount of naval force. Right, So 54 00:03:08.039 --> 00:03:11.159 this looks like it's headed either to force or on 55 00:03:11.240 --> 00:03:14.439 into an agreement, although it seems unlikely if we maintain 56 00:03:14.520 --> 00:03:20.520 the maximum position of having to zero enrichment, including significant 57 00:03:20.560 --> 00:03:24.680 restrictions on the ballistic missile program, maybe even proxy for 58 00:03:24.800 --> 00:03:27.840 support if they do not accept that. And they haven't 59 00:03:27.840 --> 00:03:31.319 accept that, and according to some they haven't even acknowledged 60 00:03:31.800 --> 00:03:35.599 the red lines that we have, even though as Mark 61 00:03:35.719 --> 00:03:38.919 just pointed out, the meeting is on Thursday. That might 62 00:03:38.960 --> 00:03:41.759 be to hear if they have come along to our 63 00:03:41.800 --> 00:03:46.759 side and want to avoid what looks like to be 64 00:03:46.800 --> 00:03:51.639 a fairly significant military confrontation between the US and Iran. 65 00:03:51.759 --> 00:03:55.919 If they do not, I do not see the US 66 00:03:56.000 --> 00:03:59.080 just simply turning tail and going home. I just don't 67 00:03:59.080 --> 00:04:02.000 see that happening. So unless they agree with it has 68 00:04:02.039 --> 00:04:05.199 to be way better than the JCPOA politically President Trump 69 00:04:05.199 --> 00:04:09.199 to accept it. It's going to be significant. Now the 70 00:04:09.280 --> 00:04:10.479 question is going to be is it going to be 71 00:04:10.520 --> 00:04:14.240 focused just on the nuclear sites. There's some indication that 72 00:04:14.439 --> 00:04:19.759 they've started rebuilding and reinforcing those sites and the ballistic 73 00:04:19.800 --> 00:04:24.879 missile launch sites and manufacturing centers, or is it also 74 00:04:24.959 --> 00:04:28.279 going to include direct targeting of the regime. And there's 75 00:04:28.319 --> 00:04:30.560 a lot I don't know. It's hard to keep up 76 00:04:30.600 --> 00:04:33.480 with the stuff that's accurate not accurate, but there's a 77 00:04:33.480 --> 00:04:36.319 lot of information. I should say that they have started 78 00:04:36.800 --> 00:04:42.160 basically continuity of regime planning, meaning that they've started dispersing 79 00:04:42.199 --> 00:04:46.639 their leadership. They've started having every key leader pick four 80 00:04:46.680 --> 00:04:51.800 successive leaders. So it's clear that Iran that indicates to 81 00:04:51.879 --> 00:04:53.959 me that they think it's going to happen, which means 82 00:04:54.000 --> 00:04:56.519 they know they're not going to go on Thursday and 83 00:04:56.600 --> 00:04:59.639 agree to what the United States is so I will 84 00:04:59.680 --> 00:05:02.720 stop they're thinking that. Potentially I'd like to see, as 85 00:05:02.759 --> 00:05:05.639 I hope everybody would, a diplomatic resolution of this, but 86 00:05:05.720 --> 00:05:06.399 it doesn't look like it. 87 00:05:06.480 --> 00:05:08.399 Said, Hey, John, can I ask you a question. It's 88 00:05:08.399 --> 00:05:10.519 actually great to have Iran experts here, because you know, 89 00:05:10.560 --> 00:05:13.240 McK and I play them on TV and we're actually 90 00:05:13.279 --> 00:05:15.560 not really are on experts. And one of the things 91 00:05:15.560 --> 00:05:16.839 I think we have to have a little bit of 92 00:05:17.079 --> 00:05:20.839 humility on this, But they're the key question that I'm 93 00:05:20.879 --> 00:05:22.959 kind of really grappling with, and perhaps you can shed 94 00:05:23.000 --> 00:05:26.160 some light has to do with not US decision making, 95 00:05:26.160 --> 00:05:29.319 but Iranian decision making. And I think it's just the notion. 96 00:05:29.360 --> 00:05:32.279 And but that does kind of reflect back to how 97 00:05:32.279 --> 00:05:34.959 does the US kind of grapple with the notion of 98 00:05:35.480 --> 00:05:37.800 if the Supreme Leader, if the Irani leadership actually has 99 00:05:37.839 --> 00:05:41.279 made the calculation that that, you know, a military a 100 00:05:41.319 --> 00:05:44.000 strike on them is actually worth it for regime survival, 101 00:05:44.519 --> 00:05:46.480 how can there actually be an agreement. 102 00:05:46.079 --> 00:05:46.920 At that point? 103 00:05:47.879 --> 00:05:49.639 You know? And I've been kind of mulling this and 104 00:05:49.720 --> 00:05:52.000 kind of contemplating this to see, you know, is there 105 00:05:52.040 --> 00:05:56.040 really a diplomatic opening here. But if because if you 106 00:05:56.079 --> 00:05:57.720 go with that line of thinking that, you know, I 107 00:05:57.759 --> 00:06:00.800 was reading some israel formers really until just official saying 108 00:06:00.839 --> 00:06:03.800 that that's the case, then how do you get out 109 00:06:03.839 --> 00:06:06.560 of this right now? Or is this is a conflict 110 00:06:06.920 --> 00:06:09.600 just inevitable if the Iranians really say, like, hey, we're 111 00:06:09.600 --> 00:06:11.199 not going to back down a pressure, this is two 112 00:06:11.240 --> 00:06:15.360 weeks too much pride for us, and the US kind 113 00:06:15.360 --> 00:06:18.519 of holds that maximalist line. You know, where do we 114 00:06:18.560 --> 00:06:20.519 go from here now other than in a week or 115 00:06:20.519 --> 00:06:23.600 so ago, when you know, in the future when these 116 00:06:23.680 --> 00:06:25.959 things are kind of go round and around again, we 117 00:06:26.040 --> 00:06:28.000 have this enormous force package ready to go. What are 118 00:06:28.000 --> 00:06:28.920 your thoughts, John. 119 00:06:29.560 --> 00:06:31.000 Yeah, So I'm thinking back to I think it was 120 00:06:31.040 --> 00:06:33.120 two thousand and six when the Masad director Married de 121 00:06:33.199 --> 00:06:37.920 Gan said that Mahmud Ahmad Najad is not our rational, 122 00:06:38.199 --> 00:06:40.839 but he's rational like within his own worldview, the things 123 00:06:40.839 --> 00:06:42.759 he's doing makes sense to him. And I think this 124 00:06:42.839 --> 00:06:44.360 is the best way to think about how the regime 125 00:06:44.399 --> 00:06:46.600 is calculating what it's doing. There's two precedents for what's 126 00:06:46.600 --> 00:06:49.360 happening right now. The first is nineteen eighty eight when 127 00:06:49.360 --> 00:06:52.120 the Iran Iraq war was negotiated to end, and the 128 00:06:52.160 --> 00:06:54.800 previous iatolas said that this is a poison chalice that 129 00:06:54.800 --> 00:06:57.839 they have to drink from to end the war after 130 00:06:57.879 --> 00:06:59.800 a million people had just died on both sides. But 131 00:06:59.839 --> 00:07:01.439 they that meant that they had to get to the 132 00:07:01.480 --> 00:07:03.600 point where a million people had died on both sides 133 00:07:03.879 --> 00:07:07.040 before drinking from that poison chalice, according to them. And 134 00:07:07.040 --> 00:07:10.519 then of course the other was the twenty fifteen JCPOA, 135 00:07:10.560 --> 00:07:13.439 which was an imperfect agreement, but to them was a 136 00:07:13.480 --> 00:07:16.240 necessary agreement to get what they wanted after a very 137 00:07:16.279 --> 00:07:18.839 long time of pressure to reach that point, including the 138 00:07:18.920 --> 00:07:21.839 Stuxnet attack on their nuclear facilities and other things that 139 00:07:21.879 --> 00:07:25.600 really cripple the regime, not as publicly as people have seen, 140 00:07:25.639 --> 00:07:28.879 but did have effects on the regime. The point there 141 00:07:28.959 --> 00:07:31.839 is that they don't get there until it seems like 142 00:07:31.920 --> 00:07:34.480 everything else has been exhausted and there's no other choice 143 00:07:34.480 --> 00:07:37.560 for survival. And right now they may not be calculating 144 00:07:37.600 --> 00:07:40.560 that they're at that point. True, they see all these 145 00:07:40.560 --> 00:07:46.079 forces arrayed against them, but there has been restraint. I 146 00:07:46.079 --> 00:07:49.160 guess you could call it shown against Venezuela for example, 147 00:07:49.279 --> 00:07:51.920 and also back in June last year, where the US 148 00:07:52.000 --> 00:07:56.079 didn't push beyond a certain strategic endpoint, similar to nineteen 149 00:07:56.120 --> 00:07:58.720 ninety one when George Bush Senior decided not to push 150 00:07:58.720 --> 00:08:02.120 into Baghdad, Desert Storm, Desert Shield, there was a decision 151 00:08:02.160 --> 00:08:04.160 made to stop. I think the regime may be looking 152 00:08:04.199 --> 00:08:07.959 at those historic precedents and hoping within their own worldview 153 00:08:08.480 --> 00:08:11.279 that there's more to be squeezed out of this. And 154 00:08:11.319 --> 00:08:13.079 if we look at the JCPOA, you know it was 155 00:08:13.120 --> 00:08:15.560 imperfect for one reason. That was because proxies were not 156 00:08:15.560 --> 00:08:19.800 included in that agreement to the West. And perhaps the 157 00:08:19.839 --> 00:08:22.480 West would like that now, but I feel like proxies 158 00:08:22.480 --> 00:08:25.560 are so weakened and so destroyed that it's almost a 159 00:08:25.600 --> 00:08:27.560 throwaway that could be added to it that wouldn't really 160 00:08:27.560 --> 00:08:30.879 have a true effect in reality, because Hesbela is so crippled, Kaiv, 161 00:08:30.920 --> 00:08:34.200 hesbulas crippled, the Iraqi, other PMF groups are so crippled. 162 00:08:35.000 --> 00:08:37.399 So you have to wonder is it just two tracks, 163 00:08:37.480 --> 00:08:42.159 is it nuclear and ICBM or MRBM missile limitations that 164 00:08:42.159 --> 00:08:43.639 are gonna built into this agreement, or is it not 165 00:08:43.679 --> 00:08:45.240 even an agreement at all? That the regime was looking 166 00:08:45.240 --> 00:08:47.440 for perhaps they're looking for a safe exit out of 167 00:08:47.440 --> 00:08:50.440 Iran into maybe Moscow or some country where they could 168 00:08:50.480 --> 00:08:53.000 be safe, and this is a facade where they're just 169 00:08:53.200 --> 00:08:55.759 looking like they're negotiating these things that are familiar to everyone, 170 00:08:55.799 --> 00:08:57.960 but instead it could be actually they're trying to negotiate 171 00:08:57.960 --> 00:08:59.960 for their own survival, whatever that survival might look like. 172 00:09:01.000 --> 00:09:03.039 Do you think the United States though, understands this. I 173 00:09:03.039 --> 00:09:04.440 mean one of the worries and I think, you know 174 00:09:05.399 --> 00:09:07.679 we've talked about this on the show before, is is 175 00:09:08.000 --> 00:09:09.759 you know there has been a hollowing out of iron 176 00:09:09.840 --> 00:09:13.120 expertise in the US government. You know, the National Security 177 00:09:13.120 --> 00:09:16.600 Council staff I don't think operates as it did in 178 00:09:16.639 --> 00:09:18.879 the past, and we have seen both at CIA and 179 00:09:18.919 --> 00:09:20.679 the State Department kind of a you know, a lot 180 00:09:20.679 --> 00:09:23.200 of exodus of really smart folks. Do you think there 181 00:09:23.240 --> 00:09:27.960 are people around, you know, Kushner and Wikoff and the administration, 182 00:09:28.039 --> 00:09:29.360 you know, what they're doing on this. I don't know 183 00:09:29.360 --> 00:09:32.559 the answer to that. I'm curious if you have confidence 184 00:09:33.080 --> 00:09:35.840 that they are being given this kind of analysis and 185 00:09:35.879 --> 00:09:37.600 advice that you just kind of put forward. 186 00:09:38.519 --> 00:09:40.399 I think they're not, and I think it's not necessarily 187 00:09:40.480 --> 00:09:42.360 because they don't want that. I think it's because it's 188 00:09:42.360 --> 00:09:44.480 not organic right now. Like if you look back at 189 00:09:44.480 --> 00:09:47.039 twenty fifteen, in the years leading up to the JCPOA, 190 00:09:47.559 --> 00:09:50.840 you had kind of a concert of things happening together 191 00:09:50.919 --> 00:09:54.600 that it was organic. For example, John Kerry and Jawad 192 00:09:54.639 --> 00:09:58.879 Zarif walking together in Geneva having private conversations. You had 193 00:09:59.000 --> 00:10:02.879 other people like Robert ally and in college in nineteen 194 00:10:02.919 --> 00:10:06.799 seventy nine new members of the Future regime as college 195 00:10:06.840 --> 00:10:09.080 students in the United States. They had these relationships that 196 00:10:09.120 --> 00:10:11.960 had been built over decades and that just doesn't organically 197 00:10:11.960 --> 00:10:14.120 exist in the current group of folks who are in 198 00:10:14.159 --> 00:10:17.360 Switzerland doing these negotiations. 199 00:10:19.320 --> 00:10:26.519 Andy greetings, good to see you guys. Any comments and 200 00:10:26.759 --> 00:10:29.639 kind of current status of where we are. There was 201 00:10:29.679 --> 00:10:32.320 just an announcement on social media that Thursday might be 202 00:10:32.320 --> 00:10:34.480 a day in which Krishner and Wikoff meet the Iranian 203 00:10:34.480 --> 00:10:36.639 foreign minister in Geneva. So it looks like there's one 204 00:10:36.919 --> 00:10:40.480 kind of one last gasp effort to avoid conflict. 205 00:10:42.639 --> 00:10:48.360 Yeah, I mean, we have we started a bet on this. 206 00:10:50.039 --> 00:10:52.159 I think we only market it's a seventy five percent 207 00:10:52.240 --> 00:10:54.399 bet that by December thirty first, will be a new 208 00:10:54.399 --> 00:10:55.120 regime in Iran? 209 00:10:56.080 --> 00:10:57.200 Really well, I. 210 00:10:57.120 --> 00:10:59.000 Mean, isn't the guy isn't that the chances of Guy's 211 00:10:59.080 --> 00:11:03.639 just gonna die is like eighty four? Right, Yeah, so 212 00:11:03.639 --> 00:11:05.919 there'd be a new regime. I don't know why you 213 00:11:06.000 --> 00:11:06.600 take that bit. 214 00:11:08.960 --> 00:11:09.200 Again. 215 00:11:09.320 --> 00:11:11.639 You know, somebody in the NSC probably put some money 216 00:11:11.639 --> 00:11:11.960 on it. 217 00:11:13.480 --> 00:11:14.279 That's a big issue. 218 00:11:14.279 --> 00:11:15.840 Now, people, what are you going now? 219 00:11:20.600 --> 00:11:23.679 So so almost for a moment, I said the last 220 00:11:23.720 --> 00:11:27.759 four words because Mark, I you know, if you if 221 00:11:27.759 --> 00:11:31.240 you're asking me what my prediction is, right, I just 222 00:11:31.679 --> 00:11:35.519 I don't. I don't have one anymore. And and here's why, 223 00:11:35.679 --> 00:11:40.519 I'm not sure if you were to ask senior members 224 00:11:40.559 --> 00:11:44.399 of the administration right now, this isn't necessarily criticism what 225 00:11:44.559 --> 00:11:47.080 is going to happen. I don't think anyone knows. I 226 00:11:47.080 --> 00:11:50.639 think it's I think this could go, This could act 227 00:11:50.679 --> 00:11:52.840 out on a whim. Right up to the last minute. 228 00:11:53.320 --> 00:11:57.000 You know, we talked about the fact that this is 229 00:11:57.279 --> 00:12:00.000 you know, we hate to use the term unprecedented. In fact, 230 00:12:00.159 --> 00:12:02.279 we try and avoid using that term on this show. 231 00:12:02.360 --> 00:12:05.840 But this is, this is a build up in the 232 00:12:05.840 --> 00:12:09.399 Middle East that I think I'm I think I'm correct 233 00:12:09.399 --> 00:12:12.600 in saying hasn't occurred since the earliest part of you know, 234 00:12:12.639 --> 00:12:14.879 the century, right, I mean not the early part of 235 00:12:14.919 --> 00:12:18.360 the century, around the round the beginning of the Iraq War. 236 00:12:20.120 --> 00:12:24.679 So to back down now or to find a compromise 237 00:12:24.799 --> 00:12:29.399 and then have to reposition all of these assets could 238 00:12:29.639 --> 00:12:33.200 could definitely be seen as a as a credibility blow, 239 00:12:33.519 --> 00:12:35.759 you know, whether whether it's painted that way or not. 240 00:12:36.039 --> 00:12:38.200 We you know, you and I and are probably I 241 00:12:38.200 --> 00:12:40.399 think a lot of people who listen to the show 242 00:12:40.519 --> 00:12:43.279 know how things work in the Middle East, and regardless 243 00:12:43.279 --> 00:12:46.120 how it is painted, it does appear. You know, we've 244 00:12:46.159 --> 00:12:48.039 been saying, banging the drun, we're going to do this, 245 00:12:48.080 --> 00:12:50.919 We're going to do this, We're going to strike, yeah, 246 00:12:50.960 --> 00:12:54.639 and then we don't what are the repercussions from that? 247 00:12:55.799 --> 00:12:57.240 Mick, I want to get before you. I know, Mick, 248 00:12:57.240 --> 00:12:58.600 you got to you got to go. But there's something 249 00:12:58.600 --> 00:13:00.080 that's been bugging me. I sent you note the of 250 00:13:00.120 --> 00:13:02.159 the day in our chat on this too, and that's 251 00:13:02.200 --> 00:13:04.639 the idea of it. Seems like the administration, you know, 252 00:13:04.799 --> 00:13:08.559 keeps leaking their their potential strike options. And then John, 253 00:13:08.559 --> 00:13:11.720 I want you're taking this too. But uh uh, Mick, 254 00:13:12.159 --> 00:13:14.000 the strike options. It's like it's like you know, going 255 00:13:14.000 --> 00:13:15.720 to a New Jersey diner. You know, you want to 256 00:13:15.759 --> 00:13:17.799 go to you know, order some some you know Friday 257 00:13:17.799 --> 00:13:20.120 eggs or burger and one of them has to do 258 00:13:20.200 --> 00:13:23.120 with we're going to assassinate the leadership and you know, 259 00:13:23.200 --> 00:13:25.639 and and to me that first of all, there's a 260 00:13:25.639 --> 00:13:27.480 little humility there involved. I don't know if the United 261 00:13:27.519 --> 00:13:30.080 States has that level of granularity in terms of intelligence 262 00:13:30.080 --> 00:13:32.080 collection to do so. We're not the Israelis. But number 263 00:13:32.080 --> 00:13:34.120 two and Mick, this goes to things you and I 264 00:13:34.159 --> 00:13:36.559 did in the past. You know, there are there is 265 00:13:36.639 --> 00:13:39.159 international law on this. I don't know. You know, we 266 00:13:39.200 --> 00:13:41.840 are not at armed conflict with Iran. Under Low Act, 267 00:13:41.919 --> 00:13:44.480 We're not supposed to be able to do this until 268 00:13:44.519 --> 00:13:46.320 we are at conflict with them. And then there's the 269 00:13:46.360 --> 00:13:48.519 Executive Order one two three three three, which bans the 270 00:13:48.519 --> 00:13:51.399 assassination of foreign leaders. And I see nothing in the 271 00:13:51.440 --> 00:13:54.960 press about this, but for you and I, uh and Andy, 272 00:13:55.440 --> 00:13:57.279 I'll throw you in there too, for you know, for practicition, 273 00:13:57.320 --> 00:13:59.519 and Jonathan, I mean, everybody, d We're gonna throw you 274 00:13:59.559 --> 00:14:01.919 in as well. You're coming on the COVID action like 275 00:14:02.000 --> 00:14:04.159 this kind of stuff is what how we don't go 276 00:14:04.279 --> 00:14:06.879 to jail like there is I mean, you you know, 277 00:14:06.919 --> 00:14:08.840 so it's not like a bunch of CIA and Marines 278 00:14:09.080 --> 00:14:11.120 are like, hey, let's go wax and people like there 279 00:14:11.120 --> 00:14:13.919 actually are rules behind this. There are lawyers attached to 280 00:14:13.960 --> 00:14:16.679 your hip everywhere. And so Mick, your your thoughts that 281 00:14:16.679 --> 00:14:18.840 there's no debate on this, I mean to me, I 282 00:14:18.840 --> 00:14:21.600 mean you've sat in that job as the as the daste, 283 00:14:21.840 --> 00:14:25.120 I believe you know. I mean, you don't just go assassin. 284 00:14:25.120 --> 00:14:26.600 And you know, you remember when when Trump said, hey, 285 00:14:26.600 --> 00:14:28.360 I want to go kill prischar Alasade, who was written 286 00:14:28.399 --> 00:14:31.240 about in Bob Woodwards book, and I think the national 287 00:14:31.240 --> 00:14:34.919 security world was like, yeah, we really can't do that. Anyway, 288 00:14:34.919 --> 00:14:38.000 your thoughts on that menu option with the lack of 289 00:14:38.000 --> 00:14:39.960 any kind of legal underpinning, and of course I will 290 00:14:39.960 --> 00:14:42.000 throw out the Mick also went to law school, so 291 00:14:42.080 --> 00:14:42.720 this matters to you. 292 00:14:44.720 --> 00:14:45.279 There is that. 293 00:14:45.799 --> 00:14:47.879 Uh so there's not a lot of debate on any 294 00:14:47.919 --> 00:14:50.440 of it, right, that's kind of surprising. I mean, normally 295 00:14:50.519 --> 00:14:52.759 you'd think that they'd be a lot of discussion, the 296 00:14:52.799 --> 00:14:55.559 President talking about it with the American people of why 297 00:14:55.600 --> 00:14:58.480 this is important because it's you know, the animal gets 298 00:14:58.519 --> 00:15:00.919 a vote on this. This This might not just be 299 00:15:01.399 --> 00:15:04.320 surgical strikes and then it's over. This could be you know, 300 00:15:04.960 --> 00:15:07.200 aircraft carriers that are struck by a messil. It could 301 00:15:07.200 --> 00:15:11.559 be you know soldiers US soldiers that are killed sitting 302 00:15:11.559 --> 00:15:14.600 at a base somewhere. It could be clandestine ops against 303 00:15:15.159 --> 00:15:17.559 you know, soft target targets and diplomats. Right, it could 304 00:15:17.559 --> 00:15:20.720 be all the above. And you know, Jonathan should talk 305 00:15:20.759 --> 00:15:23.360 about all the capabilities that they have that he lays 306 00:15:23.360 --> 00:15:26.399 out in this book. So there should be a discussion 307 00:15:26.639 --> 00:15:29.960 before we even have I think a direct confrontation. And 308 00:15:30.320 --> 00:15:32.399 folks that watch the show know that I supported the 309 00:15:32.519 --> 00:15:35.879 strikes against the nuclear facilities, so I'm not dubbish on this, 310 00:15:37.320 --> 00:15:39.679 but there needs to be buying because this might not 311 00:15:39.799 --> 00:15:44.759 go as smoothly as Venezuela. Right, this could go sideways. 312 00:15:44.759 --> 00:15:47.600 We could have you know, in addition to everything iditioned reference, 313 00:15:47.639 --> 00:15:48.879 we could have pilot shot down. 314 00:15:49.440 --> 00:15:51.879 Is it the competition strike on leadership? Is that legal? 315 00:15:52.080 --> 00:15:54.559 What is your view on that as a kind of 316 00:15:54.600 --> 00:15:58.519 unofficial and lawyer, Yeah, so it is. 317 00:15:58.720 --> 00:16:04.120 It is not legal to take out a leader of 318 00:16:04.120 --> 00:16:06.519 a country that we're not at war with right once 319 00:16:06.639 --> 00:16:09.879 we're at war, which would be the same with us, right, 320 00:16:09.879 --> 00:16:12.600 So they would be essentially legal to try to take 321 00:16:12.600 --> 00:16:14.679 out our commander in chief, but we're not at war 322 00:16:14.759 --> 00:16:18.000 with them. We're doing this because you know, at least 323 00:16:18.120 --> 00:16:20.320 what I think is, we're trying to mitigate the threat 324 00:16:20.320 --> 00:16:24.279 of them acquiring nuclear weapon, which we through multiple administrations 325 00:16:24.279 --> 00:16:28.080 set is unacceptable. But to go after the leadership, even 326 00:16:28.120 --> 00:16:32.200 as despotic as it is, is another step. Right, So 327 00:16:32.519 --> 00:16:35.639 we have no authority we you know, the executive branch 328 00:16:35.679 --> 00:16:39.919 and the DoD to go to war with Oran, and 329 00:16:40.200 --> 00:16:42.720 we're taking that one step further, at least in the press, 330 00:16:42.919 --> 00:16:45.639 with debating whether we're going to take out the leadership. 331 00:16:45.639 --> 00:16:47.559 So there's a legal issue with it, but there's also 332 00:16:48.120 --> 00:16:51.279 a practical like, Okay, so say we do take out 333 00:16:51.320 --> 00:16:53.720 the leadership, who's going to take over? Is it going 334 00:16:53.799 --> 00:16:56.759 to be more amenable to joining an agreement with the 335 00:16:56.840 --> 00:17:02.039 United States? Potentially not. The GC has historically been even 336 00:17:02.120 --> 00:17:05.559 more hawkish when it comes to acquiring nuclear weapon than 337 00:17:05.599 --> 00:17:09.799 the Supreme Leader. So there is the legality, and then 338 00:17:09.839 --> 00:17:12.599 there's the actual practical effect of taking out the leadership, 339 00:17:12.640 --> 00:17:15.400 which might not be putting the United States in a 340 00:17:15.440 --> 00:17:19.039 better position, and if certainly, it could destabilize the entire region, 341 00:17:19.079 --> 00:17:21.359 which is why I think so many countries are really 342 00:17:21.359 --> 00:17:24.920 concerned about what happens next. I would only add one 343 00:17:24.920 --> 00:17:28.400 more thing and then toss it to you, guys. President 344 00:17:28.440 --> 00:17:32.799 Trump keeps saying limited. The way I'm reading that, and 345 00:17:32.839 --> 00:17:35.799 it could be wrong, is normally, as everybody in the 346 00:17:35.839 --> 00:17:39.200 military knows, you present a low, medium, and high threshold. 347 00:17:39.279 --> 00:17:42.200 Same thing in the agency. Right, If you're saying limited, 348 00:17:42.680 --> 00:17:44.480 at least it indicates to me he's talking on the 349 00:17:44.480 --> 00:17:47.400 low end. And I don't think taking out the Supreme 350 00:17:47.480 --> 00:17:50.680 Leader would be considered the low end. So I don't 351 00:17:50.720 --> 00:17:53.759 know if it's legitimate that they're talking about this as 352 00:17:54.000 --> 00:17:56.359 one of the courses of backtion they're considering or not, 353 00:17:56.519 --> 00:17:59.640 because you know, I just wouldn't see that as a 354 00:17:59.680 --> 00:18:01.200 limit did course of action? 355 00:18:01.319 --> 00:18:03.960 Jonathan, What do you think about that? That obviously aspect, 356 00:18:04.039 --> 00:18:08.359 when you know a regimeed decapitation strike as a as 357 00:18:08.400 --> 00:18:12.680 an opening legal isn't as smart as well? 358 00:18:12.759 --> 00:18:13.400 Is it smart? 359 00:18:14.240 --> 00:18:14.440 Yeah? 360 00:18:14.480 --> 00:18:16.880 I mean I'm thinking back to the custom Solomoni assassination 361 00:18:16.960 --> 00:18:20.759 back in twenty twenty January eighth and y're up before 362 00:18:20.839 --> 00:18:23.640 January eighth, and there's what is legal and what is possible. 363 00:18:24.640 --> 00:18:27.920 And with the assassination of Solomoni, they use the authorization 364 00:18:28.000 --> 00:18:30.880 for use of military force that was approved for war 365 00:18:30.960 --> 00:18:32.880 in Iraq. Like back to that two thousand and three 366 00:18:32.880 --> 00:18:34.240 build up, we were just talking about, that's what that 367 00:18:34.359 --> 00:18:37.599 was for nowhere in there doesn't mention Iaron. You know, 368 00:18:37.759 --> 00:18:40.640 there's lots of obviously debate about and discussion about how 369 00:18:40.640 --> 00:18:43.920 that was like patently unlawful according to international law and 370 00:18:43.960 --> 00:18:46.400 according to our own law because of who that person 371 00:18:46.519 --> 00:18:49.480 was and what he represented as far as a political 372 00:18:49.880 --> 00:18:53.759 figure and a military figure from a sovereign country. But 373 00:18:53.880 --> 00:18:56.640 does that matter in terms of US decision making? Because 374 00:18:56.680 --> 00:18:58.960 like the Million dialogue from Thucydides, you know, the strong 375 00:18:59.039 --> 00:19:00.640 do what they can and the week do what they must. 376 00:19:01.000 --> 00:19:04.240 And if the US is the major power, what relevance 377 00:19:04.240 --> 00:19:07.400 does the law have to that power? And that's like 378 00:19:07.559 --> 00:19:11.160 a moral ethical question. But when you have a National 379 00:19:11.160 --> 00:19:13.599 security Council who is making decisions based on a single 380 00:19:13.680 --> 00:19:18.279 individual's direction, sometimes moral and ethical decision making is not 381 00:19:18.279 --> 00:19:22.799 put into there. And so thinking about the attorneys they 382 00:19:22.799 --> 00:19:25.720 have making these things, I don't remember John, you put 383 00:19:25.720 --> 00:19:28.960 out the torture memo back in the early two thousands 384 00:19:29.000 --> 00:19:32.000 for Rumsfeld, I mean, the attorneys that are there are 385 00:19:32.039 --> 00:19:37.440 making opinions that have been kind of predetermined by the 386 00:19:37.559 --> 00:19:40.000 policy setter. So they say, we want a legal opinion 387 00:19:40.000 --> 00:19:42.720 that justifies this action, and that legal opinion will justify 388 00:19:42.759 --> 00:19:44.920 that action, even if it's a very flimsy or tenuous 389 00:19:44.920 --> 00:19:48.640 connection to the moral, ethical and legal things behind it. 390 00:19:48.960 --> 00:19:51.119 And I wouldn't be surprised if a memo was being 391 00:19:51.200 --> 00:19:54.599 drafted in the past few weeks or memos very similar 392 00:19:54.640 --> 00:19:57.240 in structure, where they basically just say, here are A, B, 393 00:19:57.319 --> 00:20:00.279 and C reasons why this is lawful, and now side 394 00:20:00.279 --> 00:20:02.880 observer analyzes that, they would say that's clearly not right. 395 00:20:03.599 --> 00:20:06.960 But the president's not interested in that analysis. He's looking 396 00:20:06.960 --> 00:20:09.359 for a legal justification because that's how international law works. 397 00:20:09.359 --> 00:20:12.519 There isn't, you know, a common law of international law. 398 00:20:12.680 --> 00:20:16.039 There's this thing that we agree to and that we uphold, 399 00:20:16.119 --> 00:20:18.039 and that's why we respond to the pressures of the 400 00:20:18.039 --> 00:20:23.960 international outcry and hide behind our memos regardless of how 401 00:20:24.000 --> 00:20:27.359 lawful they look. With Venezuela, you know, we used we 402 00:20:27.440 --> 00:20:30.920 had a thin justification for that We've had thin justifications 403 00:20:30.920 --> 00:20:34.839 for invading Iraq. Remember holding up the photograph of the 404 00:20:34.880 --> 00:20:38.759 UN Security Council showing the refrigerator trucks of chemical weapons 405 00:20:38.799 --> 00:20:42.519 and all that, despite those things not being true. And 406 00:20:42.680 --> 00:20:45.160 I think that's what the US will produce in this case. 407 00:20:45.200 --> 00:20:47.599 No matter what the option is, whether it's just striking 408 00:20:47.799 --> 00:20:51.440 nuclear facilities again or if it's decapitating the regime, there 409 00:20:51.480 --> 00:20:54.880 will again be some small, thin justification made to hide 410 00:20:54.920 --> 00:20:58.240 behind in the international community despite the US doing it. 411 00:20:58.240 --> 00:20:58.720 No matter what. 412 00:21:01.640 --> 00:21:03.759 Hey, everyone, I want to tell you about my new novel, 413 00:21:04.000 --> 00:21:07.400 The Most Dangerous Man, out in June. It is a 414 00:21:07.440 --> 00:21:11.880 novel about a Regimental Reconnaissance Company soldier who gets kidnapped 415 00:21:11.880 --> 00:21:14.599 while he's on a mission to West Africa, and when 416 00:21:14.640 --> 00:21:17.160 he wakes up, he finds that he is now being 417 00:21:17.240 --> 00:21:20.680 hunted for sport by a group of tech billionaires through 418 00:21:20.680 --> 00:21:24.279 the wilds of West Africa. This book is based on 419 00:21:24.440 --> 00:21:27.880 stories that I heard over the years about safari guides 420 00:21:27.920 --> 00:21:32.160 taking wealthy clients hunting for poachers on game reserves in Africa. 421 00:21:32.960 --> 00:21:36.119 I took that, and I took a century old short story, 422 00:21:36.160 --> 00:21:39.480 The Most Dangerous Game, and modernized it, and the product 423 00:21:39.519 --> 00:21:42.720 is this book which I think will feel contemporary and 424 00:21:43.079 --> 00:21:58.960 resonate with audiences today. Thank you, and please check it out. 425 00:22:01.480 --> 00:22:04.279 All right, let's let's just switch to one topic that 426 00:22:04.319 --> 00:22:06.000 I think again has not been covered a lot. If 427 00:22:06.079 --> 00:22:08.000 Jonathan's going to really help out with this, but I 428 00:22:08.039 --> 00:22:09.720 want to go to Andy just hit for his thoughts 429 00:22:09.720 --> 00:22:11.559 on it, and that has to do with potential kind 430 00:22:11.559 --> 00:22:15.359 of asymmetric or any kind of Iranian response. Again, I 431 00:22:15.400 --> 00:22:18.279 think we've gotten so enamored with the power in the 432 00:22:18.359 --> 00:22:21.160 might of the US military, particularly with successful operations and 433 00:22:21.200 --> 00:22:24.039 the Maduro op being won, you know it always I 434 00:22:24.039 --> 00:22:26.799 think in essence we've gotten lucky in some points that 435 00:22:26.839 --> 00:22:30.400 it hasn't ended in US casualties. But I don't think 436 00:22:30.400 --> 00:22:33.000 we're talking enough about in the cost benefit of this 437 00:22:33.079 --> 00:22:35.519 is what the potential Iranian response. So Andy, and we'll 438 00:22:35.559 --> 00:22:36.960 go to Jonathan in a sect because I think he's 439 00:22:36.960 --> 00:22:39.400 you know, he's written a book and as an expert 440 00:22:39.400 --> 00:22:41.079 on this. But Andy, I want to get your your 441 00:22:41.160 --> 00:22:43.359 sense on this as well as someone who's a veteran 442 00:22:43.519 --> 00:22:46.960 of you know, decades of being in the Middle East 443 00:22:47.000 --> 00:22:49.480 and frankly going up against the Iranians and their proxies, 444 00:22:49.519 --> 00:22:51.240 and so I think those of us who have done 445 00:22:51.240 --> 00:22:53.480 that do have a you know, there's no hubris, there's 446 00:22:53.480 --> 00:22:55.119 no you know, there's a sense of humility that this 447 00:22:55.240 --> 00:22:57.240 is not an adversary that might just fold and we 448 00:22:57.319 --> 00:22:59.799 might you know, take some hits on this. And let 449 00:22:59.799 --> 00:23:03.279 me just let me close this by a conversation, Jonathan 450 00:23:03.319 --> 00:23:06.519 mentioned Mira de Gan when I work with the Israelies 451 00:23:06.519 --> 00:23:08.880 in the past, particularly in the early two thousands, when 452 00:23:08.920 --> 00:23:11.480 when they would be considering operations like this, they would 453 00:23:11.519 --> 00:23:14.880 do a cost benefit analysis and say, and I remember 454 00:23:14.960 --> 00:23:17.400 to Goan saying this to us personally, saying, you know, 455 00:23:17.480 --> 00:23:19.319 if we take this course of action, we might lose 456 00:23:19.319 --> 00:23:21.960 an embassy. Okay, got it, And everyone's kind of shocked. 457 00:23:21.960 --> 00:23:24.319 And they said, but we're willing to take that risk. 458 00:23:24.880 --> 00:23:26.839 And that certainly to me, is not being done in 459 00:23:26.880 --> 00:23:29.000 the United States now. So Andy, what are your thoughts 460 00:23:29.039 --> 00:23:31.640 on that in terms of potential Iranian response and are 461 00:23:31.640 --> 00:23:34.319 we are we not talking about this enough in terms 462 00:23:34.319 --> 00:23:37.359 of what the American people might you know, be seeing 463 00:23:37.440 --> 00:23:38.880 in the next couple of days or weeks. 464 00:23:39.279 --> 00:23:41.640 Yeah, And I'm glad you brought this up because I 465 00:23:41.680 --> 00:23:45.839 think I think it's fair to say that pretty much 466 00:23:46.160 --> 00:23:51.799 everyone in this in our August group of co hosts 467 00:23:51.839 --> 00:23:54.759 for this show now has been involved with this particular 468 00:23:54.799 --> 00:23:57.680 problem said in the past, you know, enough said. But 469 00:23:57.720 --> 00:24:00.119 my point is that we've all been focused on on 470 00:24:00.960 --> 00:24:07.079 Iran's malign influence in the region, right, And I think, again, 471 00:24:07.160 --> 00:24:09.440 I can't speak to you guys, but if we could 472 00:24:09.480 --> 00:24:11.839 go back, you know, the Juju POEA offered a couple 473 00:24:11.839 --> 00:24:15.640 of positive things. It offered access. It offered some level 474 00:24:15.640 --> 00:24:19.759 of transparency. I said, some level, not total transparency, but 475 00:24:19.839 --> 00:24:22.160 it offered a better level than we have now. Right, 476 00:24:22.799 --> 00:24:25.680 we went from scrapping a jig poet to a painis. 477 00:24:25.680 --> 00:24:29.440 But the big, the big problem with the jig poa 478 00:24:29.920 --> 00:24:34.160 was that it didn't even address proxies. And I think 479 00:24:34.200 --> 00:24:36.240 what we're going to look at again, I said, I 480 00:24:36.240 --> 00:24:37.920 wouldn't predict, but I think what we're going to look 481 00:24:37.960 --> 00:24:41.200 at again is a default to the easy button, which 482 00:24:41.279 --> 00:24:44.559 is a focus on nuclear enrichment and kind of a 483 00:24:44.640 --> 00:24:50.000 handwave towards proxies. And I think one of the problems 484 00:24:50.039 --> 00:24:54.319 here that we've all wrestled with is the problem of monitoring. 485 00:24:54.759 --> 00:24:58.559 So if Iran said, okay, hey, we're out of proxy business. Okay, 486 00:24:58.599 --> 00:25:01.680 we would know, hey that Rand's lying because just like 487 00:25:01.759 --> 00:25:05.759 ballistic missiles, they're not going to deinvest. But secondly, how 488 00:25:05.880 --> 00:25:06.759 is that monitored? 489 00:25:07.240 --> 00:25:07.480 You know? 490 00:25:08.160 --> 00:25:12.359 And how do we do we do this by by 491 00:25:12.440 --> 00:25:17.759 conducting meos and taking ships over and trying to prove 492 00:25:17.839 --> 00:25:20.319 the smoking gun connected with ron? I mean, it's not 493 00:25:20.519 --> 00:25:25.240 an easy You can't just say, hey, Iran's not going 494 00:25:25.279 --> 00:25:27.279 to suddenly say hey, I'm going to open up all 495 00:25:27.400 --> 00:25:30.799 shipments from Iranian ports to inspections so you can ensure 496 00:25:30.799 --> 00:25:33.880 we're not transporting lethal aid to our proxies. We know 497 00:25:34.000 --> 00:25:36.480 that's not going to happen, and what but what measure 498 00:25:36.519 --> 00:25:39.039 is short of that? Can that either that problem even 499 00:25:39.039 --> 00:25:43.359 be monitored? That is I think that from from purely 500 00:25:43.359 --> 00:25:44.960 from my point of view, that's the big one of 501 00:25:44.960 --> 00:25:46.720 the biggest problems with the discussions. 502 00:25:46.759 --> 00:25:47.000 Now. 503 00:25:47.359 --> 00:25:50.480 You either make it relatively uncomplex and you focus on 504 00:25:50.559 --> 00:25:53.359 nuclear enrichment, or you get to what is really the 505 00:25:53.440 --> 00:25:56.920 issue for the US. Really is the issue not an 506 00:25:56.960 --> 00:26:00.160 issue that it that that appears existential because it's we're 507 00:26:00.160 --> 00:26:04.400 all convinced it that it is, but that problem of 508 00:26:04.440 --> 00:26:07.759 destabilizing the region, which is I would say the primary 509 00:26:07.799 --> 00:26:11.480 reason and amplistic missiles, but to a lesser extent, I 510 00:26:11.519 --> 00:26:13.599 don't see this conversation going down. And the last thing 511 00:26:13.640 --> 00:26:17.440 I'll say, you know, we've been talking about what will 512 00:26:17.480 --> 00:26:20.240 the strikes? You know what sort of strikes they will be, 513 00:26:20.839 --> 00:26:23.200 and of course we begin with, well what are they 514 00:26:23.240 --> 00:26:25.640 intended to accomplish? I would say one or two things. 515 00:26:25.839 --> 00:26:29.400 One is a mowing the grass type return to nuclear 516 00:26:29.440 --> 00:26:33.359 facilities that perhaps sets the program back six months to 517 00:26:33.400 --> 00:26:37.599 a year. And the other is retribution. Right, I said 518 00:26:37.599 --> 00:26:39.119 I was going to do this, so I'm going to 519 00:26:39.160 --> 00:26:44.680 do it. At least seven thousand people have died, you know, 520 00:26:44.720 --> 00:26:47.920 at least, probably many many more in the in the 521 00:26:47.920 --> 00:26:52.440 Iranian latest Iranian revolution, the president did say that if 522 00:26:52.480 --> 00:26:54.519 the killing went on, he was going to intervene. The 523 00:26:54.599 --> 00:26:57.039 killing did go on after he said that, So we 524 00:26:57.119 --> 00:26:59.480 may be facing a hey, I've got to do this, 525 00:27:00.079 --> 00:27:05.240 and that if we're following that rationale, that leads me 526 00:27:05.400 --> 00:27:08.599 to say, only under those conditions, I think would we 527 00:27:08.680 --> 00:27:16.200 go after leaders of the besiege or the IGC and say, hey, 528 00:27:16.200 --> 00:27:19.319 this was justice for what they did in terms of 529 00:27:19.400 --> 00:27:23.319 meeting out punishment to the protesters. Very last thing I'll 530 00:27:23.319 --> 00:27:25.960 say is I don't think anyone I would hope no 531 00:27:26.000 --> 00:27:32.279 one harbors any real thought that by taking leaders out 532 00:27:32.400 --> 00:27:36.200 of any organization within Iran, we are really enabling a 533 00:27:36.440 --> 00:27:40.440 democratic takeover by any opposition group, because we're not. That's 534 00:27:40.480 --> 00:27:42.799 a that's a huge gap, as we all know. 535 00:27:44.240 --> 00:27:48.240 Jonathan, what's the Iranian response likely to be in your mind? 536 00:27:48.240 --> 00:27:50.759 And I think go in terms of, you know, high, 537 00:27:50.799 --> 00:27:53.400 medium or low confidence on this, you know, so you know, 538 00:27:55.079 --> 00:27:57.359 and also throwing the notion I think in the past 539 00:27:57.400 --> 00:28:00.480 there's been some kind of tacit understandings in order to 540 00:28:00.480 --> 00:28:03.599 avoid escalation between the US and Iran. But the asymmetric 541 00:28:03.640 --> 00:28:07.440 capabilities and what Iran could do in terms of damage 542 00:28:07.480 --> 00:28:11.319 to US interest, US facilities overseas, just to Americans, what 543 00:28:11.359 --> 00:28:13.200 are your thoughts on that, because again I don't think 544 00:28:13.240 --> 00:28:16.720 that's really been discussed enough, particularly in the US national 545 00:28:16.759 --> 00:28:19.960 security media, from Congress or the American people. Everyone thinks 546 00:28:19.960 --> 00:28:21.920 this is so antiseptic, but it might not be. So 547 00:28:21.960 --> 00:28:24.559 what are your thoughts on Iranian capabilities to inflict some 548 00:28:24.599 --> 00:28:25.200 harm on us? 549 00:28:26.119 --> 00:28:27.759 So, a lot of the responses we've seen over the 550 00:28:27.799 --> 00:28:31.640 past twenty five years from Iran against the West are 551 00:28:31.680 --> 00:28:35.200 not the full response option that the regime has, and 552 00:28:35.240 --> 00:28:37.720 I think that that has kind of convinced some observers 553 00:28:37.759 --> 00:28:39.799 that perhaps the regime is so weak that it can't 554 00:28:39.839 --> 00:28:43.319 actually respond. But actually, if you look at Farsi language 555 00:28:43.680 --> 00:28:47.920 discussions from the regime to their own audience, they use 556 00:28:47.960 --> 00:28:51.119 this term heroic restraint all the time when they're talking 557 00:28:51.119 --> 00:28:54.039 about what they've done. Like when COSTM. Solomoney was assassinated, 558 00:28:54.079 --> 00:28:57.200 that was like huge groundbreaking moment where this guy was 559 00:28:57.279 --> 00:28:59.720 untouchable and like the thought was if he dies, the 560 00:28:59.759 --> 00:29:01.759 whole thing is going to like the massive war going 561 00:29:01.839 --> 00:29:05.160 to happen, and there wasn't. And the Iatola himself said 562 00:29:05.160 --> 00:29:08.359 that they're exercising heroic restraint, Like what does that mean? Right? 563 00:29:08.720 --> 00:29:11.119 And if you look at what their actual military doctrine is, 564 00:29:11.160 --> 00:29:13.920 it's called the Mosaic doctrine, where they have this very 565 00:29:14.000 --> 00:29:17.000 high emphasis on dispersal of not just forces, but also 566 00:29:17.039 --> 00:29:20.079 decision making, which is part of the reason why the 567 00:29:20.079 --> 00:29:23.200 airline was shot down in January after Solomani was killed, 568 00:29:23.240 --> 00:29:26.920 because decision making was so decentralized that people that should 569 00:29:26.920 --> 00:29:29.039 have been looking at these missile systems were not looking 570 00:29:29.079 --> 00:29:31.720 at them because of their way that they're doing their 571 00:29:31.720 --> 00:29:34.279 command of control. It's designed so that if leaders get 572 00:29:34.279 --> 00:29:37.640 taken out, the war still happens, right, And that's actually 573 00:29:37.640 --> 00:29:40.359 from the German military World War two called offstrog tactic, 574 00:29:40.359 --> 00:29:43.200 which is mission command, which the US also uses. But 575 00:29:43.319 --> 00:29:45.960 Iran has really pushed it down to the ground force level. 576 00:29:46.640 --> 00:29:48.960 And why I'm saying that when we think about the 577 00:29:49.000 --> 00:29:53.960 negotiations and including proxies into those negotiations, to remove Iran's 578 00:29:53.960 --> 00:29:57.519 connection to proxies, this is an unrealistic request that I 579 00:29:57.559 --> 00:30:01.200 hope that negotiators understand. Why when we look at, for example, 580 00:30:01.279 --> 00:30:03.160 the Marine Corps, we have the Marine Air Ground Task 581 00:30:03.200 --> 00:30:05.759 Force concept where the air and the ground component work 582 00:30:05.799 --> 00:30:08.359 together and they're both necessary components of the success of 583 00:30:08.359 --> 00:30:12.559 those operating forces. The proxies are also like this within 584 00:30:12.599 --> 00:30:15.279 the mosaic doctrine. If you remove the proxies, that doctrine 585 00:30:15.279 --> 00:30:18.759 falls apart because part of that rapidly decentralized command of 586 00:30:18.759 --> 00:30:21.000 control is the fact that the proxies can operate on 587 00:30:21.039 --> 00:30:25.079 their own without regime coordination in the moment. And this 588 00:30:25.119 --> 00:30:28.440 is a huge difference between Arab militaries and Iranians military, 589 00:30:29.359 --> 00:30:32.319 not just the RTESH, which is their regular conventional forces, 590 00:30:32.319 --> 00:30:36.359 but also the IERGC. They're designed to operate independently if 591 00:30:36.359 --> 00:30:39.559 they must, They're designed to operate without any connection back 592 00:30:39.599 --> 00:30:42.480 to some C two node somewhere else. And I think 593 00:30:42.519 --> 00:30:44.680 that when we're thinking about how do they actually respond 594 00:30:44.759 --> 00:30:47.960 without heroic restraint, this is the real scenario we should 595 00:30:47.960 --> 00:30:49.839 be looking at, rather than looking at the past twenty 596 00:30:49.920 --> 00:30:51.480 five years and saying, well, how do they react when 597 00:30:51.480 --> 00:30:54.160 we did X, Y and Z, Because that's likely not 598 00:30:54.200 --> 00:30:55.720 what they're going to do this time. Because I think 599 00:30:55.799 --> 00:30:58.559 they understand this is an existential threat for real, and 600 00:30:58.640 --> 00:31:01.039 you can see that not in their rhetoric but in 601 00:31:01.079 --> 00:31:04.720 their actions. For example, on January thirty first, the IERGC 602 00:31:04.880 --> 00:31:06.920 dispersed a bunch of ground force units to all of 603 00:31:06.960 --> 00:31:10.599 their intercontinental ballistic missile sites and then medium range ballistic 604 00:31:10.599 --> 00:31:12.920 missile sites, which they've never done before. And they did 605 00:31:13.000 --> 00:31:15.599 this to protect those sites from ground force incursions, which 606 00:31:15.640 --> 00:31:17.319 means they expect there could be boots in the ground 607 00:31:17.359 --> 00:31:19.880 that might attack those facilities. They've never done that before 608 00:31:20.079 --> 00:31:23.079 since nineteen eighty eight. Right. Another example is sending out 609 00:31:23.079 --> 00:31:26.440 no tams for live fire over the Persian Gulf. Warning 610 00:31:26.480 --> 00:31:29.480 mariners to stay away and actually firing live munitions across 611 00:31:29.519 --> 00:31:32.400 the water, which they haven't done in a long time. Additionally, 612 00:31:32.640 --> 00:31:35.200 they have Russia there with them doing those maritime exercises, 613 00:31:35.200 --> 00:31:37.839 which is obviously a deterrent effect, which changes the US 614 00:31:37.920 --> 00:31:40.319 decision calculus about what type of attacks they might take 615 00:31:40.519 --> 00:31:42.480 because they don't want to hit Russian forces, or maybe 616 00:31:42.480 --> 00:31:43.920 if they do, they have to change how they think 617 00:31:43.960 --> 00:31:46.599 about that. Eighty percent of their oil goes to China. 618 00:31:47.079 --> 00:31:48.880 That means China has to be part of this decision 619 00:31:48.880 --> 00:31:51.519 making calculus as well, and Iran knows that. So they're 620 00:31:51.559 --> 00:31:54.720 probably thinking about how do we use those assets we have, 621 00:31:54.759 --> 00:31:57.440 which are foreign assets, Chinese and Russian assets, and how 622 00:31:57.440 --> 00:31:59.839 do we disperse decision making as far down as possible 623 00:32:00.039 --> 00:32:02.359 that even if the US does strike us, we'll be 624 00:32:02.400 --> 00:32:05.240 able to do things to not just them, but to Israel, 625 00:32:05.279 --> 00:32:09.039 to UAE, to Bahrain, to Saudi Arabia. I mean, these 626 00:32:09.400 --> 00:32:11.039 these are the things that are in their minds as 627 00:32:11.039 --> 00:32:14.400 they're thinking about what they do. And I would imagine 628 00:32:14.400 --> 00:32:17.160 that these decisions have already been made long ago, right, 629 00:32:17.240 --> 00:32:19.160 So it's not like they're they're deciding it now and 630 00:32:19.200 --> 00:32:21.599 they're disseminating the information now about what to do instead. 631 00:32:21.880 --> 00:32:23.720 This is part of their doctrine, has been built in 632 00:32:23.759 --> 00:32:26.200 since two thousand and two when the mosaic doctrine was 633 00:32:26.240 --> 00:32:29.640 made part of their military doctrine at their basically equivalent 634 00:32:29.640 --> 00:32:31.759 of their War College. All of the officers who have 635 00:32:31.799 --> 00:32:33.880 been trained in the IRGC since two thousand and two 636 00:32:33.880 --> 00:32:36.039 have been trained in this doctrine, just like the Marine 637 00:32:36.119 --> 00:32:38.079 eric around task force concept we have in the Marine 638 00:32:38.119 --> 00:32:41.519 Corps very similar. You know, every echelon of rank, they're 639 00:32:41.559 --> 00:32:44.119 exposed to a higher level of this concept. And that 640 00:32:44.279 --> 00:32:47.279 is their doctrine that we've just never seen it before used, 641 00:32:48.319 --> 00:32:49.319 And that's what I would be concerned. 642 00:32:50.440 --> 00:32:53.079 Do you think the administration has this level of granularity 643 00:32:53.079 --> 00:32:56.440 again that you're describing, whether it's NSC staff or input 644 00:32:56.519 --> 00:32:59.519 from the state or the agency or from DA I mean, 645 00:33:00.079 --> 00:33:02.519 because I would think that this is actually important. Again, 646 00:33:02.599 --> 00:33:05.720 in a normal working administration, you have a course of action, 647 00:33:05.839 --> 00:33:08.599 there'd be National Security Council meetings, it's staffed up and down, 648 00:33:09.079 --> 00:33:10.559 and there would be you know, and you do go 649 00:33:10.599 --> 00:33:13.039 through this cost benefit calculation. But do you think anyone's 650 00:33:13.079 --> 00:33:15.480 actually you know, in an oval office meeting with the 651 00:33:15.519 --> 00:33:17.880 president saying hey, this is what could happen, and this 652 00:33:18.000 --> 00:33:20.720 is why exactly the scenario you laid out. And then 653 00:33:20.759 --> 00:33:23.559 of course it affects the negotiators because if we're putting 654 00:33:23.920 --> 00:33:27.319 proxies on the table, but you're saying this is non negotiable, 655 00:33:27.359 --> 00:33:28.319 then you know, what are we doing? 656 00:33:29.200 --> 00:33:31.319 Right? And I think you're right that probably there is 657 00:33:31.359 --> 00:33:33.680 not the level of granularity that you would hope. And 658 00:33:34.119 --> 00:33:36.640 it's not that it doesn't exist. It does. For example, 659 00:33:36.640 --> 00:33:39.440 the DEA puts out an unclassified report every year called 660 00:33:39.480 --> 00:33:42.359 Iran's Military Power and it's like one hundred and fifty 661 00:33:42.400 --> 00:33:44.599 page document that anyone can download and read, and it 662 00:33:44.599 --> 00:33:46.519 has a lot of this information about how their order 663 00:33:46.559 --> 00:33:48.680 of battle looks and how they disperse forces and et cetera. 664 00:33:49.480 --> 00:33:51.680 Is that information making it to the Oval Office? Probably not. 665 00:33:52.960 --> 00:33:55.039 And I remember even during my time when I was 666 00:33:55.039 --> 00:33:57.640 in the Middle East, most recently at the embassy over there, 667 00:33:58.279 --> 00:34:00.599 we had the President's Daily Brief getting put together all 668 00:34:00.640 --> 00:34:03.839 the time, and it wasn't getting read. So even if 669 00:34:04.000 --> 00:34:05.880 if the President's Daily Brief is not getting read, and 670 00:34:05.920 --> 00:34:08.440 that is the most important piece of material that we 671 00:34:08.559 --> 00:34:11.480 produce as an intelligence community that's not getting read and 672 00:34:11.559 --> 00:34:14.679 that other report's definitely not getting read right, and that 673 00:34:14.719 --> 00:34:16.440 means it's not just not getting read by the president, 674 00:34:16.480 --> 00:34:18.639 it's not being absorbed by the decision makers that are 675 00:34:18.679 --> 00:34:21.760 there that could go tell the President that this is perhaps, 676 00:34:21.920 --> 00:34:24.199 you know, Option A might be preferable to Option B 677 00:34:24.599 --> 00:34:27.280 because of this granularity that we have, and I don't 678 00:34:27.280 --> 00:34:28.559 think that that exists right now. 679 00:34:30.559 --> 00:34:32.760 Andy, quick question for you. You know there's been reports. 680 00:34:32.880 --> 00:34:34.559 I think Wall Street Journal wrote an article and I 681 00:34:34.840 --> 00:34:36.840 find it interesting because you know, we've all been out 682 00:34:36.840 --> 00:34:39.519 there for extended period of times to get cranky, but 683 00:34:39.719 --> 00:34:41.400 that there is some issues with I think it was 684 00:34:41.400 --> 00:34:45.960 the four the carrier battle Group, especially the carrier that's 685 00:34:46.000 --> 00:34:48.719 being extended now, and the deployment. I think it's going 686 00:34:48.760 --> 00:34:51.639 to be the longest deployment of a carrier since Vietnam. 687 00:34:51.719 --> 00:34:54.840 And you know, sailors, you know, aramin pilots or whatever 688 00:34:54.960 --> 00:34:57.440 getting cranky. There's problems with the toilet. I mean, it sounds, 689 00:34:58.159 --> 00:35:00.760 you know, it sounds a little bit kind of into 690 00:35:00.800 --> 00:35:02.760 the weeds. But do you think any of that matters? 691 00:35:03.119 --> 00:35:05.800 And it's not necessarily for morale, but also, you know, 692 00:35:05.880 --> 00:35:09.519 shit starts breaking you, and you and Jonathan certainly know that. 693 00:35:09.519 --> 00:35:11.280 But Andy, what are your thoughts on on kind of 694 00:35:11.280 --> 00:35:13.719 this extended deployment and does that cause you any concern? 695 00:35:13.760 --> 00:35:15.559 You see a lot on social media people are saying, 696 00:35:15.599 --> 00:35:19.000 suck it up. I'm not sure that's really the right response. 697 00:35:19.519 --> 00:35:21.440 Of course, the commander chief calls you to do something, 698 00:35:21.519 --> 00:35:24.559 you do it. But you know, should we be concerned 699 00:35:24.559 --> 00:35:26.880 about this extended deployment? And then you know, and what 700 00:35:27.239 --> 00:35:30.320 really an immense amount of firepower with that carry battle group, 701 00:35:30.360 --> 00:35:32.880 what they can bring yees, So a couple of things. 702 00:35:33.079 --> 00:35:34.840 I think that's a really good point. 703 00:35:35.039 --> 00:35:39.360 And you know, the marine in me is, you know, 704 00:35:39.599 --> 00:35:44.199 shut the fuck up, what are you talking about? But 705 00:35:44.320 --> 00:35:48.840 on the other hand, look, it's a we keep saying this, 706 00:35:48.920 --> 00:35:53.119 and it's progressively true and true. It's a it's an 707 00:35:53.119 --> 00:35:57.000 all volunteer force, and the all volunteer force. The demographics 708 00:35:57.039 --> 00:36:01.599 within that all volunteer force change repeatedly, so you know 709 00:36:01.679 --> 00:36:05.199 you can't And I would order argue that social media 710 00:36:05.280 --> 00:36:11.280 access makes it even worse. Right, people think that, oh, hey, 711 00:36:12.079 --> 00:36:15.400 people can can communicate better with their families. Well they 712 00:36:15.400 --> 00:36:18.320 can to a point, but it also heightens that sense 713 00:36:18.360 --> 00:36:21.079 of proximity and the proximity of all their concerns at 714 00:36:21.119 --> 00:36:23.599 home where I'm heading on this says, yeah, I think 715 00:36:23.639 --> 00:36:29.480 you're definitely seeing cracks. The Navy is notoriously closed mouthed. 716 00:36:29.840 --> 00:36:33.000 I think John will agree with that. When it comes 717 00:36:33.039 --> 00:36:37.360 to releasing information about morale or about leadership, and when 718 00:36:37.360 --> 00:36:40.559 they relieve people, it's always you know, loss of trust 719 00:36:40.599 --> 00:36:43.039 and confidence and racourse not much better. But my point 720 00:36:43.079 --> 00:36:46.480 is there's always kind of this opaque thing. But if 721 00:36:46.480 --> 00:36:49.960 you look between the lines, you've got, you know, you've 722 00:36:50.000 --> 00:36:53.679 got a lot of churn and social media about reduced 723 00:36:54.239 --> 00:36:58.559 readiness of these carrier groups. That's that's a pragmatic reason. 724 00:36:58.679 --> 00:37:01.960 It's not that you you know, giving in too to 725 00:37:02.039 --> 00:37:07.559 feeling overly compassionate to whatever generation this is. You've got 726 00:37:07.599 --> 00:37:13.239 a record of mishaps on the it is on the 727 00:37:13.320 --> 00:37:18.199 Roosevelt right recently, I forget how many aircraft they lost overboard. 728 00:37:18.280 --> 00:37:21.800 They shot one of their own aircraft down. Some of 729 00:37:21.800 --> 00:37:24.679 these mistakes were when you when you watch them on video, 730 00:37:24.719 --> 00:37:27.719 it's just incomprehensible. How does a trained crew do those things? 731 00:37:28.440 --> 00:37:31.320 I don't know what the investigations have revealed. The Navy 732 00:37:31.360 --> 00:37:35.199 haven't released those investigations, but I would maybe fatigue as 733 00:37:35.280 --> 00:37:40.199 part of it. Right, either way, something's going wrong, and 734 00:37:40.239 --> 00:37:42.760 we saw this in the in the Pacific and the 735 00:37:42.800 --> 00:37:48.320 Seventh Fleet, remember back in you know, about ten fifteen 736 00:37:48.400 --> 00:37:52.480 years ago, culminating in a couple of fatal collisions. 737 00:37:53.719 --> 00:37:55.920 Jonathan, what are your thoughts on that too, because and 738 00:37:56.079 --> 00:37:58.079 think about it from a leadership perspective if you want 739 00:37:58.079 --> 00:37:59.760 to address it that way, because I think the idea 740 00:37:59.760 --> 00:38:01.599 of the suck it up is not going to work 741 00:38:02.000 --> 00:38:03.559 if you're the captain of the carrier, I mean you 742 00:38:03.559 --> 00:38:07.199 do care about your crew, yeah, and so, and of 743 00:38:07.239 --> 00:38:11.840 course then there's the notion too of readiness and being 744 00:38:11.840 --> 00:38:14.679 able to carry out critical you know, tasks in combat 745 00:38:14.760 --> 00:38:16.719 in which people are going to be asked to put 746 00:38:16.719 --> 00:38:17.880 in twenty hour days. 747 00:38:18.440 --> 00:38:20.039 Yeah, you've got a real dilemma because of the way 748 00:38:20.079 --> 00:38:22.480 our fleets are designed. You can't just send another aircraft 749 00:38:22.559 --> 00:38:24.679 carrier that hasn't been spun up yet. You know, it 750 00:38:24.719 --> 00:38:26.960 takes so many months to get ready to go. So 751 00:38:27.000 --> 00:38:29.119 your only option is to chop a ship from Seventh 752 00:38:29.119 --> 00:38:31.559 Fleet to Fifth Fleet, for example, and extend its deployment. 753 00:38:32.039 --> 00:38:34.719 And now you're asking for every person participating on that 754 00:38:34.760 --> 00:38:39.280 thing to extend their life and mentioning social media. Actually, 755 00:38:39.400 --> 00:38:42.440 I've seen posts on Facebook and other places where spouses 756 00:38:42.480 --> 00:38:44.679 are complaining about how much time their husbands are out there, 757 00:38:45.320 --> 00:38:49.239 which is a problem from an OPSEC perspective, because we're 758 00:38:49.239 --> 00:38:51.039 not the only ones looking at that, you know. And 759 00:38:51.119 --> 00:38:53.920 when morale gets affected like that, there are leaks like 760 00:38:54.000 --> 00:38:57.719 this that can then be used to exploit the not 761 00:38:57.800 --> 00:39:00.880 just the information environment, but also the actual combat effectiveness 762 00:39:00.880 --> 00:39:03.599 of those individuals because it helps the other side understand things. 763 00:39:03.719 --> 00:39:06.639 And I also mention, actually, the regime is taking advantage 764 00:39:06.639 --> 00:39:08.960 of exactly what you're talking about right now. I just 765 00:39:09.000 --> 00:39:11.440 saw I'm at Yale Law School right now, and we 766 00:39:11.480 --> 00:39:14.679 have a veterans community, and there was a veterans community 767 00:39:14.679 --> 00:39:17.639 message put out requesting a petition to be signed by 768 00:39:17.880 --> 00:39:21.559 combat veterans to protests against the US going to war 769 00:39:21.559 --> 00:39:23.840 against Iran. I looked into where that thing came from, 770 00:39:23.880 --> 00:39:25.599 and it came from the Quincy Institute, which is a 771 00:39:25.639 --> 00:39:29.760 regime connected think tank, because they want veterans to basically 772 00:39:29.800 --> 00:39:31.719 stay this statement, and then the regime can say, look, 773 00:39:31.800 --> 00:39:35.159 American veterans don't support this war, so we cannot forget 774 00:39:35.199 --> 00:39:38.440 that information environment that is attached to an integral to 775 00:39:38.800 --> 00:39:41.239 these combat deployments of actual ships sitting out there at 776 00:39:41.239 --> 00:39:44.559 sea at the same time. Because it's the same world, right, 777 00:39:44.760 --> 00:39:46.920 we can't just think about the naval dimension or the 778 00:39:46.960 --> 00:39:50.639 air dimension. They're all connected together. And I'll also mention 779 00:39:50.719 --> 00:39:53.679 too that the UK just disallowed the US from using 780 00:39:53.679 --> 00:39:57.159 Diego Garcia, which is a massive difference from the past, 781 00:39:57.920 --> 00:40:00.800 and it's extremely important because last year and a when 782 00:40:00.840 --> 00:40:02.880 we were also doing a lot of determent build up 783 00:40:02.880 --> 00:40:06.599 with our Lancers, we use Diego Garcia to preposition those 784 00:40:06.639 --> 00:40:09.199 lancers because we need a certain area in distance to 785 00:40:09.239 --> 00:40:12.199 put those aircraft for them to be effective, not just 786 00:40:12.239 --> 00:40:14.079 to be used once, but to use over and over 787 00:40:14.199 --> 00:40:17.119 in combat, and Diego Garcia is kind of that special 788 00:40:17.159 --> 00:40:20.960 place to do that where we have access basing and overflight. Well, 789 00:40:21.159 --> 00:40:23.440 the UK just disallowed us from doing that, not only 790 00:40:23.480 --> 00:40:27.159 in Diego Garcia but also in mainland UK. So that 791 00:40:27.239 --> 00:40:29.440 changes the calculus, and that pushes a lot of pressure 792 00:40:29.440 --> 00:40:32.000 onto the Navy because that means the Navy is now 793 00:40:32.039 --> 00:40:34.280 the go to place to launch from sea rather than 794 00:40:34.360 --> 00:40:36.519 launching from land. And of course there are a couple 795 00:40:36.559 --> 00:40:39.000 of places we can use like Jordan for example, and 796 00:40:39.079 --> 00:40:42.079 Qatar to launch air assets, but those are so close 797 00:40:42.119 --> 00:40:46.360 and inside the engagement zone that kind of puts them 798 00:40:46.360 --> 00:40:48.039 at risk in a way where we still need further 799 00:40:48.119 --> 00:40:51.079 out rings of aircraft. And the only way to do 800 00:40:51.119 --> 00:40:53.760 that now because the UK is prohibiting us from using 801 00:40:53.800 --> 00:40:58.920 those locations is aircraft carriers, which again puts further pressure 802 00:40:58.960 --> 00:41:00.360 on those forces that are going to be deployed there, 803 00:41:00.400 --> 00:41:02.039 because if we launch a strike and it lasts for 804 00:41:02.119 --> 00:41:05.480 more than a day, those aircraft carriers have to remain 805 00:41:05.599 --> 00:41:09.119 even longer than they have remained now, right, And what 806 00:41:09.159 --> 00:41:11.039 does that mean? I mean do we bring another aircraft 807 00:41:11.039 --> 00:41:14.199 carrier from another fleet? And if we do that, we 808 00:41:14.280 --> 00:41:17.360 lose our force projection in those areas where we remove 809 00:41:17.400 --> 00:41:19.840 those carriers. So these are all things I'm thinking about 810 00:41:19.840 --> 00:41:22.519 when I'm seeing what's going on, especially with the Mediterranean 811 00:41:22.519 --> 00:41:25.960 deployment and then the Fifth Fleet deployment's ramping up. 812 00:41:26.599 --> 00:41:29.119 I would just add that, you know, there's been obviously 813 00:41:29.159 --> 00:41:34.000 a lot of controversy over the UK denial of David Garcia, 814 00:41:34.039 --> 00:41:35.519 but you know, this is what happens when we treat 815 00:41:35.519 --> 00:41:38.559 allies like shit. It was in the UK when the 816 00:41:38.639 --> 00:41:42.559 kind of explosion of anger about President Trump's statements about 817 00:41:42.639 --> 00:41:45.000 NATO forces and their performance in Afghanistan, the whole Green 818 00:41:45.039 --> 00:41:47.199 Line issue, and the anger in the UK this is 819 00:41:47.239 --> 00:41:49.599 not just the general public, but also with current and 820 00:41:49.679 --> 00:41:53.079 former at least intelligence officials that I know was something 821 00:41:53.079 --> 00:41:55.079 I'd never seen before. And so this is the result. 822 00:41:55.079 --> 00:41:58.320 I mean, kure Starmer, the prime minister, who would never, 823 00:41:58.440 --> 00:42:00.760 I mean no British prime minister would do this except 824 00:42:00.840 --> 00:42:03.079 if he had the support of the public, and he does. 825 00:42:03.119 --> 00:42:05.719 There's no the political controversy in the UK is not 826 00:42:06.960 --> 00:42:08.719 It has a lot to do with you know, with 827 00:42:08.800 --> 00:42:10.960 the Epstein files. It has very little to do with 828 00:42:11.400 --> 00:42:15.719 uh Starmer's move here because I think it's popular because 829 00:42:15.719 --> 00:42:19.039 of we've treated our allies like like crap, let me 830 00:42:19.079 --> 00:42:20.679 just flip something. D I'm gonna put you on the 831 00:42:20.719 --> 00:42:24.039 spot here. I was. I was joking before about your 832 00:42:24.079 --> 00:42:26.000 your love of AOC and I'm totally kidding on this. 833 00:42:26.239 --> 00:42:30.400 You you know, this is a a political podcast usually, but 834 00:42:30.480 --> 00:42:33.760 I think but but AOC did make the news because 835 00:42:33.800 --> 00:42:36.079 she started, you know, sending out on social media, you know, 836 00:42:36.159 --> 00:42:38.880 no war and her on and I guess the question 837 00:42:38.920 --> 00:42:41.000 I would have for you, is, you know, what is 838 00:42:41.039 --> 00:42:46.719 a smart strategy from the Democrats presumably they're the ones 839 00:42:46.800 --> 00:42:49.039 or select Republicans as well, who are not in favor 840 00:42:49.079 --> 00:42:51.039 of military action. And would it be just kind of 841 00:42:51.239 --> 00:42:53.880 a statement like that, which which in some ways I 842 00:42:53.920 --> 00:42:56.239 think is not helpful, or would it be better to say, hey, 843 00:42:56.320 --> 00:42:58.679 you know what we do need is congressional authorization. We 844 00:42:58.719 --> 00:43:02.039 need we need another AUMF authorized use of military force. 845 00:43:02.119 --> 00:43:04.880 We need at least a president to address the American people, 846 00:43:05.599 --> 00:43:07.920 congressional hearings. I mean, these are things that are supposed 847 00:43:07.960 --> 00:43:11.000 to happen. So if you're coming from the Democrats side, 848 00:43:11.400 --> 00:43:13.599 you know, is it effective just with these little slogans 849 00:43:13.639 --> 00:43:15.440 know where and Iran? Or would it be smarter to 850 00:43:15.480 --> 00:43:17.440 actually be a little more nuanced, Hey make it, hey, 851 00:43:17.440 --> 00:43:20.360 President Trump, make the case, Let Congress vote if you 852 00:43:20.800 --> 00:43:23.480 go through the War Powers Resolution and things like that, 853 00:43:23.599 --> 00:43:25.880 or even just tell us what the end state, what 854 00:43:25.920 --> 00:43:26.559 the goals are. 855 00:43:27.440 --> 00:43:30.239 I think it depends what your goal is. Right, is 856 00:43:30.280 --> 00:43:34.159 your goal messaging right? Because messaging a ten word statement 857 00:43:35.320 --> 00:43:37.679 goes viral a lot more than you know, we should 858 00:43:37.719 --> 00:43:41.039 really have a sit down, congressional meeting and hearing about 859 00:43:41.039 --> 00:43:43.960 this and like lay out your plan and give us 860 00:43:43.960 --> 00:43:46.760 sex as and o's Also I think the seals kind 861 00:43:46.760 --> 00:43:50.159 of been broken with Venezuela and the drug votes in 862 00:43:50.239 --> 00:43:53.559 terms of international law and like where Congress sits? Does 863 00:43:53.599 --> 00:43:56.280 Congress have any authority? Do they do? They have authority? 864 00:43:56.280 --> 00:43:59.519 But do they want to use their authority? Also, the 865 00:43:59.559 --> 00:44:08.039 other problem is most Democrats are kind of for this, 866 00:44:08.360 --> 00:44:11.840 right They we've hated around Iran for a long time. 867 00:44:12.599 --> 00:44:15.519 We even Democrats. It's not just a republic thing cozy 868 00:44:15.599 --> 00:44:17.679 up with Israel and Apak. I mean, if you want 869 00:44:17.679 --> 00:44:19.320 to talk but nuts and bolts. I think that's why 870 00:44:19.360 --> 00:44:23.320 AOC goes that way where it's like put it on 871 00:44:23.360 --> 00:44:25.559 a fucking poster or a T shirt, because it's like 872 00:44:25.599 --> 00:44:29.039 easy for people to understand, like the majority of American 873 00:44:29.079 --> 00:44:32.239 public doesn't give a fuck about Iran. Well, doesn't want 874 00:44:32.760 --> 00:44:35.400 us spending more and more money on a foreign war, 875 00:44:35.440 --> 00:44:37.880 even if it's three week engagement where we're just blowing 876 00:44:37.880 --> 00:44:40.920 the shit out of them, and frankly, there is no plan, right, 877 00:44:41.000 --> 00:44:43.079 Like I saw a couple of people tweet who are 878 00:44:43.119 --> 00:44:48.519 like experts or national security analysts saying that the move is, oh, 879 00:44:48.519 --> 00:44:51.079 it's good because we don't have a huge ground force there. 880 00:44:51.199 --> 00:44:54.360 It's just a build up of a navy and air 881 00:44:54.400 --> 00:44:57.440 force assets. We'll have a Q three week four week 882 00:44:58.159 --> 00:45:01.880 aerial bombardment and will negotia with the remnants. It's like, 883 00:45:02.280 --> 00:45:06.559 that's the fucking plan here. Like to me as the layman, 884 00:45:06.920 --> 00:45:10.559 that makes absolutely no fucking sense whatsoever. Because we've talked 885 00:45:10.559 --> 00:45:15.079 about it before that more than likely Uron's not gonna 886 00:45:15.079 --> 00:45:17.719 come out of this and bring the show in on 887 00:45:17.760 --> 00:45:21.840 a fucking white horse driving, you know, heading down Main 888 00:45:21.920 --> 00:45:24.239 Street to take control, or they're not going to become 889 00:45:24.280 --> 00:45:29.599 some liberal democracy that's ready for AI and and modernization 890 00:45:29.920 --> 00:45:34.320 and being part of the global economy. Like an IRGC 891 00:45:34.400 --> 00:45:36.559 faction is going to take over and probably be even 892 00:45:36.559 --> 00:45:39.920 more brutal than the Ayatola is, and that's who we're 893 00:45:39.920 --> 00:45:44.320 going to negotiate with. Like, I think it's just wishful thinking, frankly, 894 00:45:44.599 --> 00:45:47.039 and I always heard from other CIA folks that like, 895 00:45:47.119 --> 00:45:50.840 wishful thinking is the worst thing to have. And I 896 00:45:51.000 --> 00:45:53.519 just and I'm just still reeling from the fact that 897 00:45:53.559 --> 00:45:56.440 more than likely there isn't somebody with a granular kind 898 00:45:56.480 --> 00:45:58.880 of look at what's going on in the Oval office 899 00:45:59.000 --> 00:46:01.519 advising the President and his advisors of the Cabinet or 900 00:46:01.960 --> 00:46:06.480 Pete haiksth or whatever. To me, that'sake a complete dereliction 901 00:46:06.559 --> 00:46:08.840 of duty. You don't have some smart guy in there. 902 00:46:09.000 --> 00:46:11.480 I got one on a fucking podcast today on Sunday. 903 00:46:11.800 --> 00:46:13.440 What are we talking about? You can't get one in 904 00:46:13.480 --> 00:46:15.840 the fucking Oval Office. Like, to me, that's a fucking joke. 905 00:46:16.440 --> 00:46:17.920 I'm done, Thank you, Mark. 906 00:46:17.760 --> 00:46:19.440 Well we'll get We'll get Jonathan to walk down to 907 00:46:19.480 --> 00:46:20.719 sixteen hundred Pennsylvania. 908 00:46:21.360 --> 00:46:23.079 Please, a lot of men, guys, let me. 909 00:46:23.159 --> 00:46:25.039 But for Jonathan and Andy, I want to throw something 910 00:46:25.039 --> 00:46:26.880 in into that on a on a personal level. And 911 00:46:27.000 --> 00:46:29.000 so I struggle with this sometimes I'm not a fan 912 00:46:29.039 --> 00:46:32.199 of this administration. That's not a surprise on this podcast. 913 00:46:32.239 --> 00:46:35.480 And Dee gets a lot of hate metil. But where 914 00:46:35.519 --> 00:46:38.239 I agree with kind of the overall premise is you know, 915 00:46:38.960 --> 00:46:40.320 and you know, if you've if you've been at the 916 00:46:40.360 --> 00:46:42.800 tip of the spear, which we have, you know, we 917 00:46:42.840 --> 00:46:45.559 have friends who've been killed by by the Iranians. In essence, 918 00:46:45.599 --> 00:46:49.719 the EFPs in Rock, the running support that SHIA groups there. 919 00:46:50.639 --> 00:46:52.880 I mean, in my entire adult life of twenty six 920 00:46:52.960 --> 00:46:55.360 years at CIA, you know, a lot of it was 921 00:46:55.400 --> 00:46:58.280 folks on Iran or her proxies, and none of it 922 00:46:58.400 --> 00:47:01.280 was just a struggle for ends. It was kinetic, it 923 00:47:01.320 --> 00:47:04.280 was down and dirty. I do not like this regime 924 00:47:04.480 --> 00:47:07.480 and I would love to see regime change. We also 925 00:47:07.480 --> 00:47:09.519 seem to forget that the Iranians were trying to kill 926 00:47:10.199 --> 00:47:13.079 you know, President Trump and John Bolton and Mike Pompeio 927 00:47:13.159 --> 00:47:16.480 and others. And so there's a side of me on 928 00:47:16.519 --> 00:47:18.559 the just the personal side is yeah, you know, I could, 929 00:47:18.599 --> 00:47:20.920 if we could, you know, get this regime out of there. 930 00:47:21.000 --> 00:47:24.000 I'm all for it. Sometimes though I struggle just with 931 00:47:24.039 --> 00:47:26.639 the mechanics of it. And what I think is a 932 00:47:26.639 --> 00:47:29.079 is an administration that doesn't have the competence to do 933 00:47:29.119 --> 00:47:31.440 this right. So with that all in mind, I think 934 00:47:31.440 --> 00:47:33.719 it just from a personal standpoint. You are both former 935 00:47:33.719 --> 00:47:36.559 Marines who both have been, you know, actively in the 936 00:47:36.559 --> 00:47:39.599 fight against the Iranians. What does your gut tell you 937 00:47:39.599 --> 00:47:42.239 on this? I mean, is there something that naws on you? 938 00:47:42.440 --> 00:47:44.239 So right now we're doing we're saying a lot of 939 00:47:44.280 --> 00:47:46.960 things the administration is not doing right on this. But again, 940 00:47:46.960 --> 00:47:48.679 I sometimes i'd sit back and I say, you know what, 941 00:47:48.760 --> 00:47:51.920 but I'm actually for the notion of regime change, and 942 00:47:51.960 --> 00:47:55.199 in particular I am absolutely for supporting the Iranian people 943 00:47:55.199 --> 00:47:59.079 who rose up. Either it's ten thousand or thirty thousand 944 00:47:59.119 --> 00:48:03.000 killed it. It was a debacle. And so Jonathan, let's 945 00:48:03.000 --> 00:48:06.000 start with you from your guest, so you're hones your 946 00:48:06.039 --> 00:48:08.960 personal you know your personal experiences, you. 947 00:48:08.920 --> 00:48:10.840 Know my thought being involved in this stuff over these 948 00:48:11.039 --> 00:48:13.800 past twenty five years, I'm the first one to say, like, 949 00:48:14.039 --> 00:48:16.360 war is not good and we should try to do 950 00:48:16.400 --> 00:48:19.559 everything we can to avoid violence. And I think we 951 00:48:19.679 --> 00:48:22.639 have done almost everything we could to avoid violence in 952 00:48:22.639 --> 00:48:25.480 this case. I mean over years and years. And the 953 00:48:25.519 --> 00:48:28.880 other thing that I think about is there's our strategic 954 00:48:29.000 --> 00:48:31.480 end states, but there's also the strategic end states of 955 00:48:31.480 --> 00:48:35.280 the Iranian people that are suffering under this regime. And 956 00:48:35.320 --> 00:48:37.679 that's ninety percent of the country, maybe more than that, 957 00:48:37.679 --> 00:48:40.000 that want this regime gone, and have wanted this regime 958 00:48:40.039 --> 00:48:42.360 gone more and more over the past forty seven years, right, 959 00:48:42.760 --> 00:48:46.480 and especially in the past two months January eighth and ninth, 960 00:48:46.480 --> 00:48:48.559 If you do the math on it, they were on 961 00:48:48.599 --> 00:48:51.440 the low end, they were killing five human beings per 962 00:48:51.519 --> 00:48:54.760 minute every minute for forty eight hours. On the high end, 963 00:48:55.079 --> 00:48:57.400 you're talking in excess of twenty to thirty people per 964 00:48:57.440 --> 00:49:00.880 minute for forty eight hours. That's insane. And that's and 965 00:49:01.239 --> 00:49:03.719 all the complaints we had about the war in Gaza 966 00:49:04.159 --> 00:49:06.960 that was over two years and Israel killed almost the 967 00:49:07.000 --> 00:49:08.920 same amount of people in two years that the regime 968 00:49:09.000 --> 00:49:12.679 killed in two to three days. Where is the outcry 969 00:49:12.719 --> 00:49:15.239 from the West against that. That's how I'm looking at that, 970 00:49:15.639 --> 00:49:17.679 And especially because you're talking about a country of almost 971 00:49:17.760 --> 00:49:21.239 ninety million people suffering not just violence and death and 972 00:49:21.320 --> 00:49:24.400 rape and destruction, which it's beyond what most people understand. 973 00:49:24.400 --> 00:49:26.280 If you see the videos and what's going on there, 974 00:49:26.280 --> 00:49:30.039 it's utterly disgusting that there are these animals doing this 975 00:49:30.199 --> 00:49:32.519 to people who just want to be free. And with 976 00:49:32.559 --> 00:49:36.800 that in mind, regime change is not it's not great, 977 00:49:37.760 --> 00:49:40.480 But what if that could be freedom for people at 978 00:49:40.480 --> 00:49:43.039 some point and it won't be freedom tomorrow. And that's 979 00:49:43.079 --> 00:49:45.280 the thing to think about. There's a cost if there 980 00:49:45.320 --> 00:49:47.559 is regime change, Just like the French Revolution and even 981 00:49:47.559 --> 00:49:50.480 the American Revolution, when there's regime change, there's a moment 982 00:49:50.719 --> 00:49:55.239 of absolute like violence and it doesn't matter if the 983 00:49:55.440 --> 00:49:57.239 shot comes in on a white horse, well he's got 984 00:49:57.280 --> 00:49:59.559 to get there first. And while he's getting there, there 985 00:49:59.599 --> 00:50:01.639 is law lessness, there is violence. I mean, we remember 986 00:50:01.679 --> 00:50:04.760 in Baghdad when we came in there, there was absolute 987 00:50:04.840 --> 00:50:08.199 unrest because there's no government, there's no sovereignty, there's no police, 988 00:50:08.199 --> 00:50:10.639 there's no trash, there's no sewer like the things that 989 00:50:10.719 --> 00:50:14.760 keep society together. For a moment, it just evaporates. And 990 00:50:15.199 --> 00:50:17.920 that is going to be a really tragic moment. I've 991 00:50:17.960 --> 00:50:21.079 spoken to Iranians who are in Iran right now. They 992 00:50:21.119 --> 00:50:24.280 want that. Yeah, they're willing to pay that cost, and 993 00:50:24.320 --> 00:50:27.039 they're even willing to die for that right now. And 994 00:50:27.079 --> 00:50:29.880 that's that's something to remember that when our interests align 995 00:50:29.920 --> 00:50:32.199 and the interests of those people aligned, that's the moment 996 00:50:32.320 --> 00:50:33.880 to act. And I think that moment is now. 997 00:50:34.519 --> 00:50:36.320 So you know, I was in Europe recently and I 998 00:50:36.920 --> 00:50:39.039 just I was lucky to be involved with the group 999 00:50:39.079 --> 00:50:41.800 who received a briefing from one of the you know, 1000 00:50:41.880 --> 00:50:45.559 the shahs of the Crown Prince's senior advisors. And it 1001 00:50:45.599 --> 00:50:47.480 wasn't a ra ra speech of this has to be done, 1002 00:50:47.519 --> 00:50:49.760 but it was much more of kind of the state 1003 00:50:49.880 --> 00:50:51.760 of where the Iranian people are, and it was it 1004 00:50:51.760 --> 00:50:54.519 was pretty compelling argument that you know, the regime is 1005 00:50:54.559 --> 00:50:56.840 on its last dying days at some point that could mean, 1006 00:50:57.000 --> 00:51:00.400 might mean one year or five years. But I do 1007 00:51:00.440 --> 00:51:02.440 think that what I come back to as well is 1008 00:51:03.559 --> 00:51:05.559 again is I hope we do this right. But it's 1009 00:51:05.559 --> 00:51:08.119 the Iranian people and the idea of a new future. 1010 00:51:08.119 --> 00:51:09.599 And you know, everybody, I mean, I'm going to say this. 1011 00:51:10.039 --> 00:51:11.400 I live in the DC area, so we have a 1012 00:51:11.440 --> 00:51:14.400 zillion Iranian friends, so we're all mesmerized by this and 1013 00:51:14.440 --> 00:51:17.880 certainly want to see change. Andy, what are your thoughts 1014 00:51:17.880 --> 00:51:19.559 on that? Again, as someone who is kind of up 1015 00:51:19.559 --> 00:51:23.599 against the Iranians for some time, and you know, perhaps 1016 00:51:23.639 --> 00:51:27.719 a critic as I am of you know, the mechanics 1017 00:51:27.719 --> 00:51:30.039 of how the Trump administration is doing this, But does 1018 00:51:30.079 --> 00:51:31.880 this not you as well, like, you know, hold on 1019 00:51:31.920 --> 00:51:33.679 a second, Like the right side of history is going 1020 00:51:33.719 --> 00:51:34.599 to be regime change. 1021 00:51:35.800 --> 00:51:41.920 I absolutely agree, and yes we can you know, quite rightfully, 1022 00:51:41.920 --> 00:51:44.679 we talked about, well you can't Russian too, you can't 1023 00:51:44.719 --> 00:51:47.280 force regime change from the air, et cetera, et cetera. 1024 00:51:47.360 --> 00:51:50.159 But there are, as everyone here knows, things that could 1025 00:51:50.239 --> 00:51:53.599 be taking place right now that are focused on practical, 1026 00:51:53.679 --> 00:51:58.159 long term goals. And so one of which, and it 1027 00:51:58.239 --> 00:52:02.320 is kind of the messaging to the US domestic public 1028 00:52:03.159 --> 00:52:06.599 that you know, there's been very little of that, right, 1029 00:52:07.519 --> 00:52:09.599 I mean, this would be a good opportunity for the 1030 00:52:09.599 --> 00:52:14.199 administration to give the case for intervention in Iran based 1031 00:52:14.239 --> 00:52:18.400 on based on what the Iranian regime has done. You no, 1032 00:52:18.559 --> 00:52:25.840 make absolutely open the cruelty, the scale of death on 1033 00:52:26.519 --> 00:52:28.880 you know that has occurred, and all these other things, 1034 00:52:29.000 --> 00:52:32.800 myriad things that they're doing, you know, blinding, using munitions 1035 00:52:32.840 --> 00:52:35.440 deliberately to blind people in the crowd. I mean, all 1036 00:52:35.440 --> 00:52:40.519 of these things that that as far as do I 1037 00:52:40.880 --> 00:52:43.840 in the long term, Do I think American popular opinion 1038 00:52:43.880 --> 00:52:47.599 paid plays a big role in foreign policy? No, absolutely not, 1039 00:52:48.320 --> 00:52:51.480 but it's but it's certainly something the administration. You know, 1040 00:52:51.519 --> 00:52:54.480 if they're looking for reelection and building a case domestically, 1041 00:52:54.719 --> 00:52:57.159 they start on that. And then the second part, as 1042 00:52:57.199 --> 00:53:00.800 everyone here knows, we wouldn't be reading about seeing about 1043 00:53:01.079 --> 00:53:06.320 which are developing covert options, which I'm sure are happening. 1044 00:53:06.440 --> 00:53:08.800 And it's again I mean those of us who work 1045 00:53:08.880 --> 00:53:12.519 with resistance groups and motor for instance. No, it's easier 1046 00:53:12.559 --> 00:53:15.800 said than done, but I'm sure there's two parts of 1047 00:53:15.800 --> 00:53:19.000 that right. There is the assessment piece upfront, which are 1048 00:53:19.000 --> 00:53:21.320 the legitimate groups, which ones are likely to be able 1049 00:53:21.320 --> 00:53:23.920 to bear a burden, and which ones do we want 1050 00:53:23.960 --> 00:53:28.199 to bear a burden in an insurgency, whether it be 1051 00:53:28.239 --> 00:53:31.599 long term or short term. How do we enable them? 1052 00:53:32.079 --> 00:53:34.719 Should we enable them? You know, all these are complex 1053 00:53:34.800 --> 00:53:37.480 questions that takes a while on the ground to be 1054 00:53:37.519 --> 00:53:41.000 able to understand. I would imagine that we're looking at 1055 00:53:41.000 --> 00:53:45.320 those things as well as other non kinetic options focused 1056 00:53:45.639 --> 00:53:50.199 as kind of foreign movement in consonance with our support 1057 00:53:50.239 --> 00:53:54.639 for an insurgent group within Iran, in other words, planning 1058 00:53:54.760 --> 00:53:59.599 a campaign that's focused on perhaps covert operations to parallel 1059 00:53:59.639 --> 00:54:02.440 what is happening out in the open and the last piece, 1060 00:54:03.239 --> 00:54:05.599 and you know, I would say, yeah, I think strikes 1061 00:54:05.599 --> 00:54:07.599 are going to happen. I think they're going to be 1062 00:54:07.679 --> 00:54:13.880 a little bit of a mowing the grass option unless 1063 00:54:13.880 --> 00:54:20.280 we start seeing domestically this case for intervention to support 1064 00:54:20.320 --> 00:54:23.639 the insurgency, Unless we see that openly. I think that 1065 00:54:24.039 --> 00:54:25.960 the follow on the strikes are going to are going 1066 00:54:26.039 --> 00:54:28.840 to be going off the nuclear facilities, which, as we know, 1067 00:54:29.000 --> 00:54:35.639 is an imperfect short term solution. But that is all. Yeah, 1068 00:54:35.719 --> 00:54:40.199 I would, I mean, I would absolutely think that there 1069 00:54:40.239 --> 00:54:43.320 are COVID steps taking place now, as long as we 1070 00:54:43.360 --> 00:54:47.440 don't undermine those covert steps by announcing, Hey, we have 1071 00:54:47.639 --> 00:54:49.360 just taken these covert steps. 1072 00:54:49.480 --> 00:54:53.360 Right wait, yeah, probably these rallies. You know, these rallies 1073 00:54:53.400 --> 00:54:58.199 have done a pretty remarkable job in terms of you know, 1074 00:54:58.239 --> 00:55:01.440 recruiting assets and Prince Blake networks, amongst the kind of 1075 00:55:01.440 --> 00:55:04.119 that the ethnic minorities in Iron So I would imagine 1076 00:55:04.119 --> 00:55:07.039 there's some of that going on. Before we close, I 1077 00:55:07.039 --> 00:55:08.719 want to I want to kind of throw out a subject. 1078 00:55:08.960 --> 00:55:11.440 This just came to me, and it's something that you guys, actually, 1079 00:55:11.480 --> 00:55:14.239 Andy and Jonathan, you are perfect for this. One of 1080 00:55:14.280 --> 00:55:16.159 the things that I found really interesting over the last 1081 00:55:16.199 --> 00:55:17.920 couple of years as I kind of make the rounds 1082 00:55:17.920 --> 00:55:20.519 and give some guest lectures at universities is teaching about 1083 00:55:20.559 --> 00:55:24.760 ethics and morality in conflict. And you know, I've I've 1084 00:55:24.760 --> 00:55:26.360 given this talk. I went down to the Citadel, I 1085 00:55:26.400 --> 00:55:28.159 did it. I did at a Catholic university, and you 1086 00:55:28.199 --> 00:55:30.239 know this this was this with groups that actually think 1087 00:55:30.280 --> 00:55:32.559 about this stuff. And so this is what's what I 1088 00:55:32.559 --> 00:55:34.599 think is is gnawing at me a little bit and 1089 00:55:34.639 --> 00:55:36.239 I want to get your your take on that. If 1090 00:55:36.280 --> 00:55:40.360 there was to be an agreement, uh that that avoids war, 1091 00:55:40.440 --> 00:55:43.360 it's going to be an agreement around the nuclear program. 1092 00:55:43.800 --> 00:55:46.039 But in essence, what that does is it allows the 1093 00:55:46.079 --> 00:55:48.519 regime to survive. And then we go back to the 1094 00:55:48.559 --> 00:55:51.119 ethics and morality of Presidents Trump several weeks ago that 1095 00:55:51.159 --> 00:55:54.639 help was on the way, and again, what the conversation 1096 00:55:54.679 --> 00:55:56.880 we just had was what appeals to me and maybe 1097 00:55:56.880 --> 00:55:59.280 to us, is that you know, that's that's something that 1098 00:55:59.320 --> 00:56:02.519 actually matters. You know that the Iranian people actually stayed 1099 00:56:02.519 --> 00:56:04.800 out in the streets because they thought the US was coming, 1100 00:56:04.800 --> 00:56:07.719 and so on that ethics piece of it, the morality 1101 00:56:07.760 --> 00:56:10.599 piece of it. Actually an agreement, a nuclear agreement that 1102 00:56:10.639 --> 00:56:14.400 would avoid war has a unethical component to that, which 1103 00:56:14.440 --> 00:56:17.559 means the regime survives. And that's what's it's actually keeping me. 1104 00:56:17.719 --> 00:56:19.480 It's keeping me up at night, it's driving me crazy 1105 00:56:19.519 --> 00:56:21.559 a little bit. So, Jonathan, what are your what are 1106 00:56:21.559 --> 00:56:23.239 your thoughts on that? Because look, I mean the one 1107 00:56:23.280 --> 00:56:25.280 thing and I you know, I know Mick certainly much 1108 00:56:25.320 --> 00:56:28.280 better than Andy that I know you do you we've 1109 00:56:28.280 --> 00:56:29.639 known each other for a couple of years. Jonathan we 1110 00:56:29.800 --> 00:56:32.400 just met. But you know Mick who you know US 1111 00:56:32.480 --> 00:56:34.719 Military Marine Corps lawyer is one of the most ethical 1112 00:56:34.760 --> 00:56:37.159 people I've ever met. And I think that's that's not 1113 00:56:37.199 --> 00:56:39.679 based on his training at CIA, it's based on his 1114 00:56:39.760 --> 00:56:42.159 training with the Marine Corps. And again, so Jonathan off 1115 00:56:42.199 --> 00:56:44.320 to you on that ethics piece of this. An agreement 1116 00:56:44.840 --> 00:56:47.800 to stave off war in some ways is unethical because 1117 00:56:47.800 --> 00:56:49.000 of our promises made. 1118 00:56:49.679 --> 00:56:52.719 Yeah, I completely agree. I mean, being a world leader 1119 00:56:52.760 --> 00:56:55.079 has the world word leader in it. That means you 1120 00:56:55.159 --> 00:56:57.760 have to lead, and leading is not easy, right, And 1121 00:56:57.800 --> 00:56:59.440 if you're going to say, if you're the president and 1122 00:56:59.480 --> 00:57:01.400 you're going to say the helps on the way, it 1123 00:57:01.440 --> 00:57:03.719 has to be on the way. And I'm thinking about 1124 00:57:03.719 --> 00:57:05.599 like the Berlin Airlift, when we went and saved all 1125 00:57:05.599 --> 00:57:08.039 those people in Berlin. That was at a great risk 1126 00:57:08.079 --> 00:57:10.000 to us and a great risk to the people in Berlin, 1127 00:57:10.480 --> 00:57:12.079 and we did it because we said we're going to 1128 00:57:12.159 --> 00:57:14.840 do it right. Even things like the lend lease program 1129 00:57:14.840 --> 00:57:16.119 and all these other things in World War Two where 1130 00:57:16.119 --> 00:57:18.039 we like huge risk to do and there was a 1131 00:57:18.039 --> 00:57:19.599 lot of repercussions that could come from it, but we 1132 00:57:19.599 --> 00:57:22.599 didn't negotiate with the others with the enemy to stay 1133 00:57:22.639 --> 00:57:24.760 back and allow things to continue. And the status quo 1134 00:57:24.800 --> 00:57:27.800 in Iran has not worked for anybody, not even for 1135 00:57:28.159 --> 00:57:31.480 the regime, I mean for anybody, since nineteen seventy nine. 1136 00:57:31.960 --> 00:57:33.880 And if we continue to a lot to put it 1137 00:57:33.920 --> 00:57:36.840 on life support, what are we accomplishing just to say 1138 00:57:36.840 --> 00:57:39.679 that we had an agreement. There's really nothing that comes 1139 00:57:39.679 --> 00:57:42.280 this because everybody knows that if the regime comes this agreement, 1140 00:57:42.280 --> 00:57:44.199 they're going to get some concessions for themselves too that 1141 00:57:44.239 --> 00:57:47.320 are positive for the regime beyond the agreement itself. Do 1142 00:57:47.400 --> 00:57:49.239 we really want to be again keeping them on live 1143 00:57:49.280 --> 00:57:51.880 support just so that this will happen again? I mean 1144 00:57:51.880 --> 00:57:54.519 even today and yesterday that this was forty days since 1145 00:57:54.559 --> 00:57:57.840 the actual protest killings, the major Day eight and nine happened. 1146 00:57:58.159 --> 00:58:00.599 People were out there protesting at sharif Is, the beating 1147 00:58:00.679 --> 00:58:04.840 up bus egis, that's again a perfect opportunity to do something. 1148 00:58:04.880 --> 00:58:07.719 And coming to this agreement betrays those people who even 1149 00:58:07.760 --> 00:58:10.320 today are out there protesting because they believe that this 1150 00:58:10.519 --> 00:58:13.159 world power who said they're going to help will come 1151 00:58:13.199 --> 00:58:16.320 to help, you know, And there's a we could have 1152 00:58:16.400 --> 00:58:19.519 chosen to say nothing that's different, but we didn't say nothing. 1153 00:58:19.519 --> 00:58:21.239 We said something, and now we need to do something. 1154 00:58:22.159 --> 00:58:24.480 You know, this reminds me Andya of and you've talked 1155 00:58:24.480 --> 00:58:26.320 about it before, and this this is not a new 1156 00:58:26.360 --> 00:58:28.679 subject that I've raised. But you know, in my career 1157 00:58:28.760 --> 00:58:32.679 working with the Iraqi Kurds, the Syrian opposition, running one 1158 00:58:32.719 --> 00:58:36.320 of our bases in Afghanistan with our Afghan indage, you know, 1159 00:58:36.480 --> 00:58:39.719 we don't have a great track record of keeping our promises. 1160 00:58:39.760 --> 00:58:41.559 And so that's the you know, that's what kind of 1161 00:58:41.639 --> 00:58:45.559 naws at me about this idea of war avoidance might 1162 00:58:45.639 --> 00:58:48.639 mean regime survival and then we betray the actual protesters 1163 00:58:48.679 --> 00:58:51.599 on the streets. What do you think of that? Yeah, 1164 00:58:51.880 --> 00:58:52.559 one hundred percent. 1165 00:58:52.559 --> 00:58:57.280 In fact, off the we withdrew or announced we were 1166 00:58:57.280 --> 00:58:59.599 going to withdrawal, the reality wasn't quite the same on 1167 00:58:59.639 --> 00:59:01.639 the ground from Syria. Do you remember that it was 1168 00:59:02.599 --> 00:59:04.159 in twenty nineteen, right. 1169 00:59:04.280 --> 00:59:07.440 Trump did it after a call with the Turkish That's 1170 00:59:07.599 --> 00:59:08.079 very point. 1171 00:59:08.440 --> 00:59:11.400 And I saw a leader and so I did an 1172 00:59:11.679 --> 00:59:19.039 interview with MSNBC what it was called then, Kendelanian and 1173 00:59:19.119 --> 00:59:23.440 you know, just basically not saying anything controversial except that hey, 1174 00:59:23.480 --> 00:59:26.519 they this is you know, I explained what the SDF 1175 00:59:26.519 --> 00:59:29.360 had done for us, explaining the fact that when we 1176 00:59:29.639 --> 00:59:32.440 just kind of throw our allies to the wolves after 1177 00:59:32.519 --> 00:59:35.920 they have done things where I interest in line is 1178 00:59:35.960 --> 00:59:39.119 not a good precedent because there are pragmatic reasons, right, 1179 00:59:39.719 --> 00:59:44.760 But even so I was beaten up for my emotional argument. 1180 00:59:44.880 --> 00:59:47.239 So I think there's a there's just a lack of 1181 00:59:47.360 --> 00:59:52.800 understanding about this that the solid pragmatic reason that we 1182 00:59:52.840 --> 00:59:57.320 all understand as form of soft or ic practitioners is 1183 00:59:57.360 --> 01:00:01.320 that you can't you can't betray people and then expect 1184 01:00:01.400 --> 01:00:06.199 other people to trust you. It's number one and number two. 1185 01:00:06.760 --> 01:00:10.320 When we're just using the intelligence community and we're just 1186 01:00:10.440 --> 01:00:14.639 using soft our record of using proxies is actually really 1187 01:00:14.639 --> 01:00:17.679 really good, you know. I mean, whether it be the 1188 01:00:17.800 --> 01:00:21.800 SDF for looking back and things like Plant Columbia or 1189 01:00:22.000 --> 01:00:24.960 in our Salvador, when we're not putting massive amounts of 1190 01:00:25.039 --> 01:00:29.000 troops on the ground, when we're just using proxies, we 1191 01:00:29.440 --> 01:00:33.159 have a pretty good success rate. So we don't want 1192 01:00:33.199 --> 01:00:35.159 to violate that, right, We don't want. 1193 01:00:35.079 --> 01:00:36.039 To betray that trust. 1194 01:00:36.119 --> 01:00:38.719 That's a good you know, That's enough reason, I think 1195 01:00:38.760 --> 01:00:41.719 all of us. It goes far deeper than that, and 1196 01:00:42.119 --> 01:00:44.639 I don't think we have to feel apologetic about talking 1197 01:00:44.639 --> 01:00:47.360 about American values and what those really are. And all 1198 01:00:47.360 --> 01:00:50.360 of us understand. I think, I mean, the reason why 1199 01:00:50.400 --> 01:00:54.639 we served our country in different forms wasn't because we 1200 01:00:54.760 --> 01:00:58.800 thought that our country set made the best deals possible, right. 1201 01:00:59.159 --> 01:01:02.159 It was because our country represented certain values that went 1202 01:01:02.239 --> 01:01:10.320 beyond transactional negotiations, and those values were persistent, right, And 1203 01:01:10.440 --> 01:01:13.239 those were things, regardless of administration, that we were willing 1204 01:01:13.320 --> 01:01:16.360 to risk our lives fall. So that is important for 1205 01:01:16.559 --> 01:01:17.519 all of us who wore in the. 1206 01:01:17.559 --> 01:01:21.639 Uniform agreed, and so let's see what happens again. It's uh, 1207 01:01:21.800 --> 01:01:23.719 you know, the irony is that if there's a deal 1208 01:01:23.760 --> 01:01:27.280 that avoids war, it's gonna give your Runnian regime, you know, 1209 01:01:27.480 --> 01:01:30.000 life to fight another day. That's gonna be hard for 1210 01:01:30.039 --> 01:01:31.519 some of us the stomach. D. I'm going to throw 1211 01:01:31.519 --> 01:01:34.400 it back to you. I'm gonna give you one more opportunity, 1212 01:01:34.480 --> 01:01:37.119 D to acknowledge you're happy the US won the gold medal. 1213 01:01:37.920 --> 01:01:39.760 I am happy the US won the gold medal. 1214 01:01:39.920 --> 01:01:41.239 You're a hockey You're a hockey fan. 1215 01:01:41.280 --> 01:01:43.159 I am, yes, I am a hockey fan. 1216 01:01:43.280 --> 01:01:46.320 At Miller Trocheck, Come on, gold medals. This is a 1217 01:01:46.320 --> 01:01:46.679 big deal. 1218 01:01:46.800 --> 01:01:49.639 Ranger fan, the Ranger stink I saw. I'm a little 1219 01:01:49.639 --> 01:01:52.199 bit angry about that, but yeah, no I am. I mean, 1220 01:01:52.239 --> 01:01:55.800 I'm fine with it, honestly, Gotta be honest. You guys 1221 01:01:55.840 --> 01:01:57.719 can call me a comedie all you want. I don't know. 1222 01:01:57.800 --> 01:02:01.960 Blow me. That's for the for the audience. We just 1223 01:02:02.000 --> 01:02:06.039 had an incredible, nuanced conversation about the Iraq possibly Irani 1224 01:02:06.039 --> 01:02:08.199 and war. Now it's like devolved into hockey talk and 1225 01:02:08.199 --> 01:02:10.840 I'm telling everybody to blow me. Sorry, I'm leaving it 1226 01:02:10.880 --> 01:02:14.239 in too. It was a great game, obviously, and I 1227 01:02:14.360 --> 01:02:17.679 enjoyed watching it, and I am happy. I am happy 1228 01:02:17.760 --> 01:02:18.239 the US one. 1229 01:02:18.679 --> 01:02:23.199 All right, So are you happy now? I'm playing there? Okay, 1230 01:02:23.239 --> 01:02:25.239 a little bit, a little bit, a little suaged by 1231 01:02:25.280 --> 01:02:28.199 your non communist leanings at this point, but you can 1232 01:02:28.239 --> 01:02:30.679 go back to get your little coffee shop in Brooklyn, 1233 01:02:30.800 --> 01:02:31.159 thank you. 1234 01:02:31.440 --> 01:02:36.480 Okay, when did when did Russia? When did the Soviet Union? 1235 01:02:36.920 --> 01:02:42.920 NX that Czechoslovakia? I mean really, and it's nineteen sixty eight, right, 1236 01:02:43.480 --> 01:02:48.159 So Hungary was fifty six and I think Czechislavakia was 1237 01:02:48.280 --> 01:02:52.880 sixty eight, and there was a Winter Olympics. I want 1238 01:02:52.880 --> 01:02:58.079 to say. The next Winter Olympics, Czechaslovakia played the Soviet 1239 01:02:58.199 --> 01:03:01.840 Union in ice hockey, and you can still find copies 1240 01:03:01.840 --> 01:03:05.360 of that match. But it was it was blood laden. 1241 01:03:05.400 --> 01:03:08.960 As you can imagine. They pretty much ignored the puck throughout. 1242 01:03:09.519 --> 01:03:13.599 I'm not comparing that to the United States versus Canada. 1243 01:03:14.119 --> 01:03:15.400 It was a pretty pretty rough game. 1244 01:03:15.440 --> 01:03:17.239 It was pretty rough and the only problem with it 1245 01:03:17.280 --> 01:03:19.719 was also like you can't fight. They can't have fights, 1246 01:03:19.800 --> 01:03:21.719 or they kicked out of the game during the Olympics, 1247 01:03:21.760 --> 01:03:25.079 which isn't the same as regular NHL, so there weren't 1248 01:03:25.079 --> 01:03:28.199 any like real, you know, fist fights. There were just 1249 01:03:28.199 --> 01:03:29.400 some scrums. 1250 01:03:29.800 --> 01:03:34.800 Awesome game, incredible game, guys, gotcha. Thanks. 1251 01:03:35.039 --> 01:03:37.039 I want everyone to do me a favor. I want 1252 01:03:37.039 --> 01:03:43.960 everyone to check out John's book I can't remember, Iran Shadows, 1253 01:03:44.239 --> 01:03:49.000 Iran's Shadow Weapons. It's on Amazon right now. The link 1254 01:03:49.079 --> 01:03:51.760 is in the description down below. Andy Milburn's got a 1255 01:03:51.760 --> 01:03:54.159 great book When the Tempest Gathers. Check that out mark 1256 01:03:54.199 --> 01:03:56.960 as well. All the links are down to the description. 1257 01:03:57.119 --> 01:04:01.199 And we have the Whitefish Security Summit in April April 1258 01:04:01.280 --> 01:04:04.119 second to the fourth. Check that out. The links are 1259 01:04:04.159 --> 01:04:08.199 down to the description. The keynote speaker is General Stanley McCrystal, 1260 01:04:09.159 --> 01:04:11.000 so it should be a good one and Mix going 1261 01:04:11.079 --> 01:04:13.599 to be there. Maybe ees On will be there. We're 1262 01:04:13.599 --> 01:04:15.719 trying to figure that out. I have a phone call 1263 01:04:15.760 --> 01:04:19.679 with the organizer later. We'll see if they meet our price. 1264 01:04:20.440 --> 01:04:20.639 Yeah. 1265 01:04:21.599 --> 01:04:24.079 And by the way, business class travel only, I. 1266 01:04:23.960 --> 01:04:27.360 Mean, that's the only way to go. That's the only 1267 01:04:27.360 --> 01:04:30.360 way to go, dude. Check that out. That link is 1268 01:04:30.400 --> 01:04:32.000 into description as well. And of course, if you want 1269 01:04:32.039 --> 01:04:34.880 to help support the showpatreon dot com slash the Teamhouse. 1270 01:04:34.920 --> 01:04:37.880 You get both Teamhouse and eyes On episodes ad free 1271 01:04:37.920 --> 01:04:40.800 early and you can ask us questions. Do all that. 1272 01:04:40.800 --> 01:04:42.440 It's a little bit more access to us. And if 1273 01:04:42.440 --> 01:04:44.199 you have any questions for the guys on eyes On 1274 01:04:45.119 --> 01:04:47.679 hit send them over on Patreon. I'll make sure everyone 1275 01:04:47.719 --> 01:04:51.840 gets them. Jonathan as always a pleasure. We got to 1276 01:04:51.840 --> 01:04:53.519 have you on more and more because I feel like 1277 01:04:53.519 --> 01:04:58.039 you're the smartest guy in the room. And I'm still 1278 01:04:58.079 --> 01:05:01.599 freaking out about the fact that it's fifty to fifty 1279 01:05:01.679 --> 01:05:04.239 that there is a person in not in the Oval 1280 01:05:04.280 --> 01:05:09.960 office talking about these things while they're Uh, that's crazy. 1281 01:05:10.119 --> 01:05:12.599 That freaks me the fuck out because if I can 1282 01:05:12.639 --> 01:05:16.840 get a guy for a podcast, they could definitely get 1283 01:05:16.840 --> 01:05:19.159 somebody in the Oval office to brief the President or 1284 01:05:19.159 --> 01:05:20.679 the Essay or whoever they need to brief. 1285 01:05:21.280 --> 01:05:22.119 It's a choice. 1286 01:05:23.800 --> 01:05:25.000 It's a war on for tease. 1287 01:05:25.320 --> 01:05:28.159 So all right, guys, that's it. 1288 01:05:28.239 --> 01:05:30.320 I love you, Thank you, Thanks guys. 1289 01:05:31.400 --> 01:05:35.039 Hey, guys, I want to tell all of you today 1290 01:05:35.119 --> 01:05:38.320 about a new newsletter that we're launching that encompasses both 1291 01:05:38.400 --> 01:05:42.239 the team House podcast, the eyes On podcast, and the 1292 01:05:42.320 --> 01:05:45.760 high Side news outlet which I run with Sean Naylor. 1293 01:05:46.599 --> 01:05:49.599 The newsletter is going to be once a week. It's 1294 01:05:49.599 --> 01:05:51.880 going to come into your inbox and you're going to 1295 01:05:51.920 --> 01:05:55.679 get the most current podcasts on eyes On, in the Teamhouse, 1296 01:05:56.039 --> 01:05:59.840 and whatever's topical or current on the high Side. So 1297 01:06:00.079 --> 01:06:02.079 it's another way for us to get the information out 1298 01:06:02.079 --> 01:06:05.920 to you as social media algorithms are pretty iffy and 1299 01:06:05.960 --> 01:06:08.480 you never really know what you're gonna get. So this 1300 01:06:08.519 --> 01:06:10.599 is a once a week email. It'll slide into your 1301 01:06:10.599 --> 01:06:13.079 inbox and it will have you know the greatest hits 1302 01:06:13.119 --> 01:06:13.719 of that week. 1303 01:06:13.800 --> 01:06:14.440 It's really good. 1304 01:06:15.559 --> 01:06:19.800 Checking it out. The website for it is Teamhouse Podcast 1305 01:06:20.079 --> 01:06:24.679 dot kit dot com, slash Join Teamhouse Podcast, dot Kit 1306 01:06:24.840 --> 01:06:28.280 dot com slash Join. You go there and you enter 1307 01:06:28.320 --> 01:06:31.320 into your email list, or you enter your email into 1308 01:06:32.199 --> 01:06:34.760 the little thing on the website and you're good to go. 1309 01:06:34.920 --> 01:06:35.599 And that'll be it. 1310 01:06:36.320 --> 01:06:39.000 So we really appreciate your support and I hope you'll 1311 01:06:39.039 --> 01:06:39.960 consider signing up. 1312 01:06:40.159 --> 01:06:40.880 Where's the link? 1313 01:06:41.760 --> 01:06:44.320 The link will also be down the description if you're 1314 01:06:44.320 --> 01:06:48.199 looking for it. There and that's Teamhouse Podcast dot kit 1315 01:06:48.480 --> 01:06:49.320 k I T