WEBVTT 1 00:00:00.520 --> 00:00:02.640 Hey, what's up, guys. This is d Do us a 2 00:00:02.680 --> 00:00:05.360 favorite and check out our Patreon page. It's patreon dot 3 00:00:05.400 --> 00:00:08.919 com slash the Teamhouse. You get both Teamhouse episodes and 4 00:00:09.039 --> 00:00:13.359 Eyes on Geopolitics episodes completely ad free. You get them 5 00:00:13.359 --> 00:00:15.560 early too. You can ask us questions. You can also 6 00:00:15.599 --> 00:00:19.000 watch the Team House episodes live as we shoot them, 7 00:00:19.079 --> 00:00:21.879 so and you help support the show and support what 8 00:00:21.920 --> 00:00:26.480 we're doing here. It's Patreon dot com Slash the Teamhouse. 9 00:00:26.519 --> 00:00:28.359 Those links are in the description, or if you're listening, 10 00:00:28.399 --> 00:00:30.399 it's in the show notes down below, so you can 11 00:00:30.440 --> 00:00:32.920 click it real quick and easy, and it helps us 12 00:00:33.000 --> 00:00:36.600 keep the lights on. So we appreciate it, and we 13 00:00:36.600 --> 00:00:42.159 appreciate you guys listening. Thanks a bunch. Hey everybody, welcome 14 00:00:42.200 --> 00:00:45.759 to another episode of Eyes on Geopolitics, a midweek episode. 15 00:00:46.119 --> 00:00:48.399 It's been busy around here, so might as well do 16 00:00:48.840 --> 00:00:51.840 an extra episode a week. We have Jack Murphy for 17 00:00:51.960 --> 00:00:54.880 our resident Irishman, so happy Saint Patrick's Day to everybody 18 00:00:54.920 --> 00:01:00.679 who celebrates. Jonathan Hackett and Andy Milburn. Lot going on 19 00:01:00.960 --> 00:01:03.880 as usual. We just saw yes just like update like 20 00:01:04.120 --> 00:01:07.400 terms of news, we saw the Defense Ministry get smoked 21 00:01:08.120 --> 00:01:10.920 uh in Iran yesterday or last night, I guess they 22 00:01:11.640 --> 00:01:16.200 they confirmed it. We have a bunch of news actually 23 00:01:16.200 --> 00:01:18.000 that happened, and we didn't talk about this before him, 24 00:01:18.040 --> 00:01:21.040 but we just saw Joe Kent, the he's like head 25 00:01:21.079 --> 00:01:26.200 of CT resign and say because of the Iran war 26 00:01:26.519 --> 00:01:32.840 and that Israel basically dog walked us in. I really 27 00:01:32.840 --> 00:01:34.959 wanted to talk about because I've seen it like popping 28 00:01:35.040 --> 00:01:37.200 up in the press and like actually talking to like 29 00:01:37.280 --> 00:01:39.400 regular people that are like a lot of people are 30 00:01:39.439 --> 00:01:43.040 worried about like a possible like Iranian sleeper cell attack 31 00:01:43.200 --> 00:01:47.439 or or hesbla sleeper cell attack, and I wanted to 32 00:01:47.439 --> 00:01:49.640 talk to the experts to see like what the actual 33 00:01:49.799 --> 00:01:52.760 like is it actually possible? Is there a real threat? 34 00:01:53.439 --> 00:01:57.239 We've seen a couple three actually attacks, one in a 35 00:01:57.239 --> 00:01:59.959 synagogue that was a Lebanese person who's whose family died. 36 00:02:00.719 --> 00:02:03.239 He rammed into the synagogue and killed a few people. 37 00:02:04.319 --> 00:02:08.479 We also saw the tech the Austin shooter and the 38 00:02:08.719 --> 00:02:12.960 uh what was what for? Was he at what? There's 39 00:02:12.960 --> 00:02:14.879 another guy too that shot up a bunch of people 40 00:02:14.879 --> 00:02:16.240 and then the cadets stabbed. 41 00:02:15.919 --> 00:02:18.879 Them and killed them in university and yeah, there you go. 42 00:02:19.599 --> 00:02:21.960 So we've seen like these lone wolfs. As far as 43 00:02:21.960 --> 00:02:23.960 we know, it's a lone wolf attack, not like these 44 00:02:24.080 --> 00:02:26.919 organized where they could trace it back to like a 45 00:02:27.039 --> 00:02:32.199 sleeper cell, you know, Iranian intelligence or hesbola. So I 46 00:02:32.280 --> 00:02:34.280 have the experts here, So you guys tell me how 47 00:02:35.159 --> 00:02:39.759 how much how at risk are we in the United States? 48 00:02:40.039 --> 00:02:41.599 I can go first few on. So I was a 49 00:02:41.639 --> 00:02:43.919 counter intelligence agent. This is exactly the kind of stuff 50 00:02:43.919 --> 00:02:45.840 we looked at both inside the US and against our 51 00:02:45.840 --> 00:02:48.960 allies and partners as well. And counter intelligence always looks 52 00:02:49.000 --> 00:02:51.759 through the eyes of the adversary, which we call red, 53 00:02:51.840 --> 00:02:54.599 to understand the red's perception of blue, which is the 54 00:02:54.599 --> 00:02:56.680 friendly forces. So in this situation, and I'm looking through 55 00:02:56.719 --> 00:02:58.280 the eyes of hesbolla to think about how do they 56 00:02:58.319 --> 00:03:01.479 want to do stuff inside this country? And they have 57 00:03:01.639 --> 00:03:05.560 people here, they have ideas, they have goals that they 58 00:03:05.560 --> 00:03:07.960 want to achieve. But there's a missing ingredient for any threat, 59 00:03:08.080 --> 00:03:12.000 and that is capability. So they could have intent all 60 00:03:12.080 --> 00:03:14.840 day long, they can dream about these big plans, but 61 00:03:14.879 --> 00:03:16.680 if they don't have the capability to do it, it's 62 00:03:16.800 --> 00:03:19.879 very low threat, right. So that's what we're always looking 63 00:03:19.879 --> 00:03:22.199 for from the exploitation side and the neutralization side as 64 00:03:22.199 --> 00:03:24.360 far as counter intelligence is concerned. That's what the FBI 65 00:03:24.479 --> 00:03:26.719 is going to be looking at right now, is Okay, 66 00:03:26.759 --> 00:03:28.479 they have the intent. Not much we can do about that. 67 00:03:28.520 --> 00:03:31.560 You can't kill an idea, but we can reduce capability 68 00:03:31.560 --> 00:03:33.360 on their side, or we can look at the things 69 00:03:33.400 --> 00:03:35.280 they might be interested in and get ahead of them 70 00:03:35.439 --> 00:03:37.280 so that when they go try to use those capabilities 71 00:03:37.280 --> 00:03:38.879 they don't work out the way they expected them to. 72 00:03:39.199 --> 00:03:40.719 This is kind of a basic level to look at 73 00:03:40.719 --> 00:03:44.560 this picture. When we talk about sleeper cells, it's important 74 00:03:44.599 --> 00:03:47.639 to find what does that mean, because, like you mentioned d, 75 00:03:48.400 --> 00:03:51.159 there might be an inspired lone wolf that just doesn't attack. 76 00:03:51.240 --> 00:03:54.479 That's not a sleeper cell. Sleeper cell, but definitily is 77 00:03:54.479 --> 00:03:57.360 a much deeper, long term thing where the person was 78 00:03:57.400 --> 00:03:59.560 sent there way ahead of time with a very simple 79 00:04:00.319 --> 00:04:04.039 mission statement, and they remain quiet and integrated into the community, 80 00:04:04.120 --> 00:04:05.919 working in that community like a normal person for a 81 00:04:05.919 --> 00:04:08.159 long time until they receive some form of activation to 82 00:04:08.159 --> 00:04:09.680 do whatever it is the task was that they were 83 00:04:09.680 --> 00:04:13.360 sent there to do. That means that years, many years 84 00:04:13.360 --> 00:04:15.120 in some cases, that they have to be doing this. 85 00:04:15.639 --> 00:04:18.079 The mission has to be very simple because things will 86 00:04:18.160 --> 00:04:19.879 change over time, and if you give them too detailed 87 00:04:19.879 --> 00:04:22.399 of a mission, that mission might not even exist, that 88 00:04:22.399 --> 00:04:24.560 capability might not exist in the future when they're activated. 89 00:04:24.959 --> 00:04:26.480 And that's important to think about now because this is 90 00:04:26.560 --> 00:04:29.000 kind of a black Swan situation where the way the 91 00:04:29.079 --> 00:04:31.160 US and Israel are attacking Iran, that's very difficult to 92 00:04:31.199 --> 00:04:33.480 predict when and how that would have happened. It could 93 00:04:33.480 --> 00:04:35.160 have just been something like if there is a war 94 00:04:35.199 --> 00:04:38.079 in Iran, do x It might be something this simple, 95 00:04:39.079 --> 00:04:42.120 and the individual that is a sleeper would not be 96 00:04:42.160 --> 00:04:45.199 sent there alone. They wouldn't know the others in the network, 97 00:04:45.240 --> 00:04:48.240 but they would not be alone. And this means there's 98 00:04:48.279 --> 00:04:50.199 compartmentalization that has to happen, and there has to be 99 00:04:50.240 --> 00:04:52.519 a handle or overhead that's actually helping to coordinate the 100 00:04:52.560 --> 00:04:56.680 activities of these individuals. So that introduces another layer of complexity. 101 00:04:56.720 --> 00:04:59.680 And we have seen how Iran has done things in 102 00:04:59.759 --> 00:05:02.279 Unit States in the past, and also compared to other countries, 103 00:05:02.279 --> 00:05:04.360 it's very different than how they operate in the United States. 104 00:05:04.639 --> 00:05:07.319 I can get into official and non official activities they've done, 105 00:05:07.480 --> 00:05:11.399 especially using business cover for commercial activity, cover what they're 106 00:05:11.439 --> 00:05:15.000 doing in the United States, but on the whole They've 107 00:05:15.000 --> 00:05:17.439 been pretty amateur in the United States. And it's not 108 00:05:17.480 --> 00:05:21.560 because they just suck. It's because their capability level, like 109 00:05:21.600 --> 00:05:24.680 I mentioned earlier, is low for a variety of reasons, 110 00:05:25.279 --> 00:05:27.120 not least of which is it's difficult for a handler 111 00:05:27.120 --> 00:05:28.759 to get into the United States, which means they typically 112 00:05:28.800 --> 00:05:32.279 have to communicate over distance through phones or other electronic means, 113 00:05:32.360 --> 00:05:36.160 or through non non personal communications like leaving notes somewhere 114 00:05:36.240 --> 00:05:38.720 or something like this. That's a limitation on their capability. 115 00:05:39.000 --> 00:05:40.959 It's a limitation on what they can actually achieve when 116 00:05:40.959 --> 00:05:43.839 they're here. The other problem is money. They're not part 117 00:05:43.879 --> 00:05:45.399 of the swift banking system they have in Bens in 118 00:05:45.439 --> 00:05:47.120 twenty eighteen, so they either have to use it a 119 00:05:47.199 --> 00:05:50.000 huala or some kind of other activity to conceal the 120 00:05:50.040 --> 00:05:52.279 origin of the money they're using to pay for these activities. 121 00:05:52.560 --> 00:05:54.560 There is an example on in twenty eleven where it 122 00:05:54.600 --> 00:05:56.279 was around two hundred and fifty thousand dollars. They were 123 00:05:56.279 --> 00:05:58.600 trying to pay to a cartel member to give a 124 00:05:58.639 --> 00:06:00.759 weapon to a gentleman in Texas who was supposed to 125 00:06:00.800 --> 00:06:04.360 go assassinate the Saudi ambassador in Washington, d C. The 126 00:06:04.439 --> 00:06:06.920 cartel member said Hey, I'm a cartel guy. I'm going 127 00:06:07.000 --> 00:06:08.519 to go tell the DEA that this is going on 128 00:06:08.560 --> 00:06:09.959 because I don't want to be involved in your own 129 00:06:10.079 --> 00:06:11.879 And that's actually how the US found out about that, 130 00:06:12.240 --> 00:06:15.079 which is kind of interesting, and that was a very 131 00:06:15.079 --> 00:06:18.720 expensive operation that just evaporated because the capability was so low. 132 00:06:19.240 --> 00:06:21.560 I'll stop there at that kind of functional level and 133 00:06:21.600 --> 00:06:22.839 we can talk more about it. But that's how I 134 00:06:22.879 --> 00:06:25.360 would kind of like set the frame around this discussion. 135 00:06:26.040 --> 00:06:28.560 Yeah, I think that's a great frame too, John. The 136 00:06:28.680 --> 00:06:32.600 question of capability is so important. And another example I 137 00:06:32.639 --> 00:06:35.720 would make to people that demonstrates where there was a capability, 138 00:06:35.759 --> 00:06:39.600 a surprising capability even was when the Russians began the 139 00:06:39.600 --> 00:06:43.600 full scale invasion of Ukraine and these sabotage cells suddenly 140 00:06:43.639 --> 00:06:49.120 activated across Russia. You saw military infrastructure, oil infrastructure really 141 00:06:49.720 --> 00:06:51.800 across the breadth of the country. 142 00:06:52.120 --> 00:06:53.199 Going up in flames. 143 00:06:54.120 --> 00:06:58.720 So there was an intelligence or intelligent entity or entities 144 00:06:59.279 --> 00:07:02.279 that absolutely had a capability. I mean they had the 145 00:07:02.360 --> 00:07:05.279 people in place, but they had the capability, meaning there 146 00:07:05.360 --> 00:07:09.199 was pre plane targets, targeting packets were done up, and 147 00:07:09.360 --> 00:07:12.839 there were cachet site locations full of explosives and those 148 00:07:12.839 --> 00:07:16.279 cells were activated through some sort of covert communications method 149 00:07:16.360 --> 00:07:19.720 or cove com. So that's one example of you know, 150 00:07:20.120 --> 00:07:23.839 where where you see a capability doesn't come out of nowhere. 151 00:07:24.120 --> 00:07:26.519 So when you see a bunch of strikes like that happening, 152 00:07:26.959 --> 00:07:31.519 it lends itself to the safe assumption that there is 153 00:07:31.560 --> 00:07:35.160 an intelligent entity behind this. It's not lone wolves, it's 154 00:07:35.199 --> 00:07:39.360 not you know, it's not just dissident groups. I mean, 155 00:07:39.399 --> 00:07:42.160 dissident groups don't come out of nowhere with a capability 156 00:07:42.240 --> 00:07:45.639 like that. It takes them time to evolve and find 157 00:07:45.639 --> 00:07:49.279 their way with those things. So that's one interesting example 158 00:07:49.319 --> 00:07:52.720 to look at. The other I was mentioned into John 159 00:07:52.759 --> 00:07:55.680 before the show was the and we get into a 160 00:07:55.720 --> 00:07:59.920 little bit in detail, but the book Burnbomb Destroy about 161 00:08:00.079 --> 00:08:02.480 the German sleeper cells that were here during World War 162 00:08:02.560 --> 00:08:08.040 One conducting acts of sabotage, also quite amateurish, but it 163 00:08:08.120 --> 00:08:13.040 evolved over time, and they used incendiary devices, probably not 164 00:08:13.160 --> 00:08:16.160 that different than the stuff that the cells in Russia used, 165 00:08:16.600 --> 00:08:21.120 you know, one hundred years later to destroy ships, you know, 166 00:08:21.160 --> 00:08:24.600 ships that were on their way to Europe. And when 167 00:08:24.639 --> 00:08:29.720 it really got effective again this question of capability was 168 00:08:29.759 --> 00:08:32.679 when you're using sleepers, you're using a surrogate force or 169 00:08:32.759 --> 00:08:35.879 something of this nature. I've had a CIA officer describe 170 00:08:35.879 --> 00:08:37.519 it to me because he tried to he did do 171 00:08:37.600 --> 00:08:40.960 this in Afghanistan. He's like, imagine trying to play pool 172 00:08:41.120 --> 00:08:44.679 and you're sitting on top of overturned trash can ten 173 00:08:44.720 --> 00:08:46.960 feet away from the pool table, and you got like 174 00:08:47.039 --> 00:08:49.799 three queues that are like duct taped together, and you're 175 00:08:49.840 --> 00:08:52.200 like trying to like hit the hit the ball and 176 00:08:52.279 --> 00:08:54.679 knock the eight ball in the corner pocket. He's like, 177 00:08:54.720 --> 00:08:56.639 that's kind of what you're trying to do. The further 178 00:08:56.720 --> 00:08:58.919 away from it you are, the harder it becomes to 179 00:08:58.960 --> 00:09:04.679 control those operations. With the German case, you know, they 180 00:09:04.720 --> 00:09:07.840 became effective once they got a no shit German intelligence 181 00:09:07.840 --> 00:09:10.519 officer into the country to start coordinating and running some 182 00:09:10.600 --> 00:09:15.120 of that stuff. And then that brings us to more 183 00:09:15.200 --> 00:09:19.279 current situation with Iran and are their sleeper cells in 184 00:09:19.320 --> 00:09:22.480 the United States Just a couple of things to tag 185 00:09:22.559 --> 00:09:27.200 on to what John already illuminated there. There's one case 186 00:09:28.240 --> 00:09:31.399 back in the nineteen nineties. I just had to look 187 00:09:31.399 --> 00:09:33.360 it up to get the name right. It was Captain 188 00:09:33.399 --> 00:09:38.600 Will Rogers three. The skipper of the USS Vincennes in 189 00:09:38.679 --> 00:09:41.799 San Diego, there was a bomb found in his van, 190 00:09:42.240 --> 00:09:44.480 and to this day, I don't think it's ever been 191 00:09:44.519 --> 00:09:49.240 fully explained what that was about. There's thoughts in the 192 00:09:49.279 --> 00:09:51.639 intelligence community or there has been over the years that 193 00:09:51.639 --> 00:09:55.759 that was an Iranian plot. But the Iranians also whack 194 00:09:55.840 --> 00:09:59.320 people globally. I mean, they're not like cautious about that 195 00:09:59.360 --> 00:10:02.360 there is an Iran and op And I'm just saying 196 00:10:02.360 --> 00:10:05.320 in Europe that the bomb didn't go off, but when 197 00:10:06.159 --> 00:10:10.519 they deconstructed it, it was a very advanced bomb. It 198 00:10:10.639 --> 00:10:14.799 shocked a lot of people in the security community in Europe. 199 00:10:15.360 --> 00:10:17.360 So the Iranians don't have a lot of hesitation with 200 00:10:17.399 --> 00:10:21.000 this sort of stuff. But now, you know, are these 201 00:10:21.039 --> 00:10:24.399 cells in the United States? And I think I think 202 00:10:24.399 --> 00:10:27.399 we have some pretty good proof that they aren't, that 203 00:10:27.440 --> 00:10:31.120 those cells just don't exist. After the Solemani strike, you 204 00:10:31.159 --> 00:10:35.440 would have expected something to have cooked off, And now we're, 205 00:10:35.600 --> 00:10:39.000 you know, bombing the hell out of Iran and fixing 206 00:10:39.039 --> 00:10:41.879 the due potentially a ground invasion. I mean, if the 207 00:10:41.919 --> 00:10:45.559 Iranians are not activating those cells now, then explain to 208 00:10:45.600 --> 00:10:48.480 me what the trigger is, because they're already in an 209 00:10:48.480 --> 00:10:51.159 existential crisis right now. I mean, they're not going to 210 00:10:51.159 --> 00:10:54.519 topple easily. But if not now, then when that's that 211 00:10:54.519 --> 00:10:57.159 would be my question, And I think that's sort of 212 00:10:57.159 --> 00:11:00.320 the counterfactual. You could look at this to try to 213 00:11:00.320 --> 00:11:02.840 determine if these cells even exist. I would say they 214 00:11:02.879 --> 00:11:07.960 probably don't. However, there are people in this country. They 215 00:11:07.960 --> 00:11:10.840 could be lone wolves, they could be you know, support agents, 216 00:11:11.159 --> 00:11:14.679 people who are sympathetic towards the Iranian regime who take 217 00:11:14.759 --> 00:11:18.799 action on their own or maybe at direction from you know, 218 00:11:18.919 --> 00:11:22.480 back back in Iran. One thing that I was told 219 00:11:22.519 --> 00:11:25.799 about just yesterday is a bunch of suspicious packages have 220 00:11:25.879 --> 00:11:29.840 been showing up at McDill Air Force Base, directed towards 221 00:11:30.360 --> 00:11:35.480 Sentcom Central Command. The FBI is investigating this, they're involved. 222 00:11:35.519 --> 00:11:37.720 I have not heard that an actual bomb has turned 223 00:11:37.799 --> 00:11:39.799 up yet, but I mean this could even just be 224 00:11:40.240 --> 00:11:44.080 a psychological operation to send packages that look like bombs 225 00:11:44.120 --> 00:11:47.480 to just you know, get people on the base, you know, 226 00:11:47.799 --> 00:11:51.759 cautious or afraid. So we'll see what happens with that. 227 00:11:53.720 --> 00:11:56.799 I don't know what's uh, John, is anything I'm missing 228 00:11:56.799 --> 00:11:58.639 here that you'd like to elaborate on. 229 00:11:59.399 --> 00:12:01.120 I just want to kind of pull on a thread 230 00:12:01.120 --> 00:12:03.159 that you mentioned. You mentioned sabotage and a couple of 231 00:12:03.159 --> 00:12:06.600 things like this, and again from that counterintelligence framework, So 232 00:12:06.679 --> 00:12:09.120 there are four types of attacks we'd be looking for 233 00:12:09.240 --> 00:12:12.759 from a potential sleeper element like you're mentioning, and those 234 00:12:12.799 --> 00:12:15.120 attacks would be against certain types of targets, right because 235 00:12:15.120 --> 00:12:17.279 you're trying to achieve some objective by doing this thing. 236 00:12:17.720 --> 00:12:21.679 The four types of targets are persons, organizations, installations, and 237 00:12:21.720 --> 00:12:24.759 then people generally, and there's a specific type of attack 238 00:12:24.840 --> 00:12:27.399 that targets each one of these. So, for example, attacks 239 00:12:27.440 --> 00:12:31.559 against persons are typically espionage related, attacks against organizations are 240 00:12:31.600 --> 00:12:36.480 subversion related. Then against installations it's sabotage. Then against people 241 00:12:36.519 --> 00:12:38.159 or other things to get terrorism as that kind of 242 00:12:38.200 --> 00:12:40.440 catch all at the end. But when we're trying to 243 00:12:40.480 --> 00:12:42.919 protect against these things to produce that capability I was 244 00:12:42.960 --> 00:12:44.879 talking about, you know, like you mentioned, there might be 245 00:12:44.879 --> 00:12:46.639 a low moul or even a person in contact with 246 00:12:46.679 --> 00:12:49.360 some goods forced guy overseas. They could have that intent 247 00:12:49.399 --> 00:12:51.159 all day long. But if we can actually go after 248 00:12:51.200 --> 00:12:54.759 the persons, organizations, and installations to defend those those categories, 249 00:12:55.039 --> 00:12:58.120 we can more precisely protect them. So even if the 250 00:12:58.679 --> 00:13:01.559 adversary had some really good intent and maybe even a 251 00:13:01.600 --> 00:13:04.080 little bit of capability, the target suddenly becomes too hard 252 00:13:04.159 --> 00:13:05.679 to strike and they're going to have to flow around 253 00:13:05.720 --> 00:13:07.480 it and go somewhere else. So this is kind of 254 00:13:07.480 --> 00:13:09.799 the thing we look at when we're trying to preemptively 255 00:13:09.840 --> 00:13:13.559 neutralize these activities is evaluating our own installations, like McDill 256 00:13:13.600 --> 00:13:16.000 Air Force Base, for example. We'd be thinking about how 257 00:13:16.000 --> 00:13:18.159 the vehicles get in on the base, how to packages 258 00:13:18.480 --> 00:13:19.960 go around here, like where are the cameras? All these 259 00:13:20.000 --> 00:13:22.440 things to get these things already ahead of time. So 260 00:13:22.519 --> 00:13:24.759 if something like this comes up, the person approaching their 261 00:13:24.840 --> 00:13:27.519 vehicle already understands how to evaluate their vehicle before getting 262 00:13:27.559 --> 00:13:31.200 into it due to heightened threat environment situations for example. 263 00:13:31.960 --> 00:13:33.840 So these are the things to keep in the back 264 00:13:33.879 --> 00:13:35.960 of the mind as a person evaluating what are these 265 00:13:36.000 --> 00:13:38.879 actual threats and what is the actual capability. And I'll 266 00:13:38.919 --> 00:13:42.360 mention the Bojinka plot, which was a pre al Qaeda 267 00:13:42.440 --> 00:13:45.080 type plot in the nineteen nineties that college Sai Muhammad 268 00:13:45.320 --> 00:13:47.320 and some others were planning to bring a bunch of 269 00:13:47.360 --> 00:13:49.399 aircraft and crash them into buildings, which sounds a lot 270 00:13:49.440 --> 00:13:52.759 like September eleventh, but this was before September eleventh. The 271 00:13:52.799 --> 00:13:54.840 reason they weren't able to do that they had a 272 00:13:54.879 --> 00:13:57.879 really good plan, excellent ideas, and a lot of intent, 273 00:13:58.200 --> 00:14:00.679 that they had almost no capability to do it. It 274 00:14:00.720 --> 00:14:03.320 wasn't until later on that they actually shifted their operations 275 00:14:03.320 --> 00:14:05.519 to be able to have the capability years later in 276 00:14:05.559 --> 00:14:07.679 two thousand and one, to actually execute such a threat 277 00:14:07.879 --> 00:14:10.240 with the capability required to do it. And I only 278 00:14:10.320 --> 00:14:13.399 highlight that because the intent didn't change the entire time. 279 00:14:13.679 --> 00:14:16.799 What did change was their ability and the opportunity to 280 00:14:16.840 --> 00:14:17.480 do that attack. 281 00:14:19.279 --> 00:14:22.399 Just one more thing I'd like to touch upon here 282 00:14:22.440 --> 00:14:27.000 with the nature of sleeper cells, potentially especially sleeper cells 283 00:14:27.039 --> 00:14:29.840 from an authoritarian regime that are placed under cover in 284 00:14:29.879 --> 00:14:31.759 a country like the United States. 285 00:14:32.440 --> 00:14:33.360 There were a few. 286 00:14:33.720 --> 00:14:35.960 The Soviets didn't have as many as we probably thought 287 00:14:35.960 --> 00:14:37.559 they did, but at the end of the Cold War 288 00:14:37.600 --> 00:14:40.000 it was revealed that they did have some sleeper agents. 289 00:14:41.200 --> 00:14:43.799 In the Milt Bearden's book The Main Enemy, he talks 290 00:14:43.799 --> 00:14:46.919 about one of them, a check guy, who they had 291 00:14:46.960 --> 00:14:50.679 placed in the United States, and after the Wall came down, 292 00:14:50.960 --> 00:14:53.919 I think I believe he came forward. If I remember correctly, 293 00:14:54.559 --> 00:14:58.279 and he had just integrated into the community, like he 294 00:14:58.360 --> 00:15:01.039 had a family, he had like kid playing in Little 295 00:15:01.120 --> 00:15:04.559 League baseball and this sort of stuff. And he was like, yeah, 296 00:15:04.600 --> 00:15:07.600 I have like this trunk of like rusty military gear 297 00:15:07.639 --> 00:15:10.120 in my basement if you guys want to come get it, Like, 298 00:15:10.240 --> 00:15:13.360 I don't give a fuck. And I think this is 299 00:15:13.399 --> 00:15:15.600 a problem too with that a country like a Ran 300 00:15:15.679 --> 00:15:19.720 would have you send sleepers to the United States when 301 00:15:19.720 --> 00:15:22.840 they're here for a prolonged period of time building their 302 00:15:22.879 --> 00:15:26.080 cover and building their capabilities, unless they are the most 303 00:15:26.279 --> 00:15:31.279 hardcore ideological dude, they are going to start finding a woman, 304 00:15:31.840 --> 00:15:34.759 They're gonna get a job, they're gonna have kids, the 305 00:15:34.840 --> 00:15:37.159 kids are gonna get into school, and then when that 306 00:15:37.240 --> 00:15:41.240 activation code finally comes thirty years later, they're like, do 307 00:15:41.320 --> 00:15:43.639 I really want to like screw up my whole life 308 00:15:43.639 --> 00:15:45.919 here and end up in a supermax for the rest 309 00:15:45.960 --> 00:15:50.039 of my rest of my days because this authoritarian regime 310 00:15:50.320 --> 00:15:52.960 that doesn't give a shit about me wants me to 311 00:15:53.000 --> 00:15:56.360 go and kill a bunch of innocent people. So I 312 00:15:56.399 --> 00:15:59.120 think that's another dynamic that comes into play when you're 313 00:15:59.120 --> 00:16:01.080 trying to use sleeper agents. 314 00:16:02.120 --> 00:16:04.360 Actually jack on that. So even not just sleep agents, 315 00:16:04.399 --> 00:16:07.320 but embassy personnel from these countries. I was doing a 316 00:16:07.320 --> 00:16:09.440 lot of work in North Africa to the US embassies there, 317 00:16:09.480 --> 00:16:12.679 and there were a few North Korean diplomats that in 318 00:16:12.759 --> 00:16:15.720 the countries that have North Korean embassies there in Northwest Africa. 319 00:16:16.039 --> 00:16:19.279 Those diplomats are not allowed to return back to Pyongyang ever, 320 00:16:19.840 --> 00:16:22.600 they have to rotate around the embassies in Northwest Africa 321 00:16:22.679 --> 00:16:25.759 because the government au oritarian government is worried about the 322 00:16:25.799 --> 00:16:28.919 exposure they've had to things like alcohol and parties and 323 00:16:28.960 --> 00:16:32.759 restaurants and freedom even in Northwest Africa, to the extent 324 00:16:32.799 --> 00:16:35.039 that they will not allow them to return back to 325 00:16:35.519 --> 00:16:36.960 rotate back to the mainland. 326 00:16:38.159 --> 00:16:39.000 That's crazy. 327 00:16:39.639 --> 00:16:43.000 What I'd heard is that the embassy personnel from North 328 00:16:43.039 --> 00:16:46.360 Korea have to travel around in threes. It would make 329 00:16:46.399 --> 00:16:50.039 Detroit play, yeah, to make it impossible for the agency 330 00:16:50.039 --> 00:16:51.080 for CIA. 331 00:16:50.679 --> 00:16:51.360 To recruit them. 332 00:16:51.799 --> 00:16:53.399 We have the same thing with the Chinese as well. 333 00:16:53.440 --> 00:16:56.120 When I was in the Defense Attache staff, the Russians 334 00:16:56.159 --> 00:16:58.399 would always come in a group of three the Troika. 335 00:16:58.720 --> 00:17:00.320 The Chinese would always be in a group of three, 336 00:17:00.399 --> 00:17:02.159 and we wouldn't interact with the North Koreans. But they 337 00:17:02.200 --> 00:17:05.119 also would, and so would the Iranians because they know themselves, 338 00:17:05.160 --> 00:17:07.319 the government knows that this is going to happen. 339 00:17:08.160 --> 00:17:11.680 Right, Is this like mutually assured destruction. Everyone's spying on 340 00:17:11.720 --> 00:17:12.319 everyone else. 341 00:17:14.079 --> 00:17:15.759 They had to go to the bathroom in three's at 342 00:17:15.759 --> 00:17:17.359 any events that we were at. 343 00:17:19.000 --> 00:17:19.839 It's wild. 344 00:17:20.359 --> 00:17:21.799 Thanks to me and you guys. 345 00:17:21.680 --> 00:17:24.640 And restart what you were saying. I apologize you were muted? 346 00:17:25.759 --> 00:17:26.359 Am I muted in? 347 00:17:26.440 --> 00:17:29.119 Now you're good? Now you're good? 348 00:17:29.200 --> 00:17:29.400 Now? 349 00:17:29.839 --> 00:17:31.680 Do you customarily mute meet during these. 350 00:17:31.640 --> 00:17:33.079 Up are yelling at Richie? 351 00:17:33.720 --> 00:17:38.480 Oh okay, all right, yeah, so you know, going getting 352 00:17:38.519 --> 00:17:42.440 back to to Iran though, I mean, I think and 353 00:17:42.440 --> 00:17:44.400 and John you know way more about this than I do. 354 00:17:44.519 --> 00:17:49.079 But you know, this term sleeper cells sounds sexy. It's 355 00:17:49.200 --> 00:17:53.039 it evokes Hollywood. It evokes that mini series, you know, 356 00:17:53.079 --> 00:17:55.319 the Netflix. I think it's a Netflix mini series about 357 00:17:55.359 --> 00:17:59.000 Russian sleeper cells, but I think it's fed a salmon. 358 00:17:59.039 --> 00:18:01.240 That's not the way that the Ranians operate. They can't 359 00:18:01.240 --> 00:18:03.400 afford to operate that way, as you know, as Jack 360 00:18:03.440 --> 00:18:06.880 pointed out, what put a cell into the United States 361 00:18:07.440 --> 00:18:11.799 and with the instructions to act if a war comes, 362 00:18:12.480 --> 00:18:15.599 you know, if war occurs. I mean, neither cou'sforce nor 363 00:18:15.680 --> 00:18:20.279 has BOLLA has that kind of resources. Although and that's 364 00:18:20.359 --> 00:18:23.400 just not that modus operati, right, I mean, they plan 365 00:18:23.559 --> 00:18:27.359 for specific operations, and they insert people for those operations, 366 00:18:27.680 --> 00:18:30.680 but they don't send people to the United States for 367 00:18:31.039 --> 00:18:33.559 two or three decades and have them integrate in the 368 00:18:33.559 --> 00:18:37.079 American society, apply for green cards and residents. All of 369 00:18:37.119 --> 00:18:41.079 this just on the contingency that something might happen. And 370 00:18:41.519 --> 00:18:45.920 I think, you know, although it's say it, there's another 371 00:18:46.000 --> 00:18:49.079 factor to this, right or the gain. I mean, although 372 00:18:49.079 --> 00:18:51.920 this is a super sexy topic that's likely to get 373 00:18:51.960 --> 00:18:56.559 everyone's attention, if you are planning this from an Iranian perspective, 374 00:18:56.920 --> 00:19:00.240 domestic attacks within the United States are actually a relatively 375 00:19:00.319 --> 00:19:04.000 hard target. You've got plenty of softer targets spread out 376 00:19:04.319 --> 00:19:09.599 across not just Middle East, but globally. US interests, overseas, 377 00:19:09.759 --> 00:19:14.480 diplomatic missions, military bases as we've seen. You know, even 378 00:19:14.480 --> 00:19:18.039 military bases that should be hardened in the Middle East 379 00:19:18.319 --> 00:19:21.079 are still subject to attack from from the Uranians, where 380 00:19:21.079 --> 00:19:24.440 they can cause casualties without all the planning and everything 381 00:19:24.440 --> 00:19:28.920 else involved in putting action cells within within the US. 382 00:19:29.000 --> 00:19:32.519 So you know, i'd say that there's there's just no chart, 383 00:19:32.599 --> 00:19:34.880 I mean, very little chance of a Hollywood sleeper cell 384 00:19:35.000 --> 00:19:39.000 type scenario. And what we've seen historically a small targeted 385 00:19:39.079 --> 00:19:43.880 networks you know, that are that are that are put 386 00:19:43.960 --> 00:19:48.640 in for a specific mission, and we've kind of the 387 00:19:48.640 --> 00:19:50.839 other thing is I think we kind of conflated. And 388 00:19:50.839 --> 00:19:54.160 I like to give your thoughts on this, John Iranian 389 00:19:54.440 --> 00:19:57.200 direct Granian action, which would be Kup's force, right, which 390 00:19:57.240 --> 00:20:01.039 is the Forron six Stone operations, arm I gcs except 391 00:20:01.240 --> 00:20:07.519 and and proxies like Hesbala Hosbala does have and overseas 392 00:20:08.640 --> 00:20:11.480 you know, a section that's focused on overseas operations, and 393 00:20:11.519 --> 00:20:14.480 I forget what it's called. It's like the i JO 394 00:20:14.799 --> 00:20:19.640 or something. John, You'll probably probably know that Islamic organization. Yeah, 395 00:20:20.599 --> 00:20:24.039 but they but as far as I mean, there was 396 00:20:24.079 --> 00:20:27.720 an attempt to attack on the Saudi ambassador right back 397 00:20:27.720 --> 00:20:30.039 in twenty eleven. But aside from that, we've seen mainly 398 00:20:30.400 --> 00:20:34.759 you know, fundraising, logistics, procurement, that's kind of things that 399 00:20:34.799 --> 00:20:39.400 they focus on mostly, and and and integration with criminal 400 00:20:39.440 --> 00:20:43.279 networks in the Western hemisphere. That's a great point, actually 401 00:20:43.319 --> 00:20:46.759