Speaker 1: I want you to picture something you do probably every
Speaker 1: single day, maybe twenty thirty even one hundred times.
Speaker 2: A day, Yeah, easily one hundred times.
Speaker 1: Right, You open your browser, you type in a URL.
Speaker 1: Maybe it's your bank, maybe it's your email, maybe it's
Speaker 1: I don't know, that embarrassing medical question you don't really
Speaker 1: want to ask a doctor in person.
Speaker 2: We've all been there, exactly.
Speaker 1: And you look up and you see that little padlock
Speaker 1: icon in the corner, you see the letters HTTPS, and
Speaker 1: you just kind of relax.
Speaker 2: You feel safe.
Speaker 1: You feel safe. You type in your credit card number,
Speaker 1: your social Security number, you know your darkest secrets. You
Speaker 1: just trust it implicitly. But here's the question that really
Speaker 1: kept nagging me while reading our source material for today's
Speaker 1: deep dive. Why do we trust it? Like? What is
Speaker 1: actually happening behind that little icon to justify all that trust?
Speaker 2: It is arguably the single most important click we make
Speaker 2: in the modern world, and for most people, I mean,
Speaker 2: it's just magic. It's a binary state, right, it's locked
Speaker 2: or it's unlocked. Yeah, But as we're going to find
Speaker 2: out today exploring this, it is definitely not magic. It's
Speaker 2: basically a war zone.
Speaker 1: A war zone is an incredibly vivid way to put it.
Speaker 2: Welcome back to the Deep Dive Today we are tackling
Speaker 2: an absolute beast of a topic. We're engaging with TLS
Speaker 2: Cryptography in Depth by doctor Paul Dupless and doctor Roland Schmidz. Now,
Speaker 2: I have to be honest with you. When I first
Speaker 2: saw the title, I thought, Okay, this is going to
Speaker 2: be dry.
Speaker 1: It sounds a bit heavy.
Speaker 2: It does transport layer security doesn't exactly screen betreat. I
Speaker 2: was fully expecting pages and pages of just impossible math. Right.
Speaker 1: It sounds incredibly dense, and look, the math inside the
Speaker 1: protocol is dense. It kind of has to be. But
Speaker 1: if you peel back the layers as we're going to do,
Speaker 1: this isn't really a math book. It's a book about
Speaker 1: high stake strategy. It is the story of the invisible
Speaker 1: armor that keeps the global economy from effectively collapsing overnight
Speaker 1: because without TLS, the Internet as we know it simply
Speaker 1: stops functioning. That's totally the vibe I got once I
Speaker 1: actually started reading. The mission for this deep dive is
Speaker 1: to try and move past the complex equations. Will leave
Speaker 1: the capulus to the computers and get at the core
Speaker 1: question the authors are posing, how do two people who
Speaker 1: have literally never met share a secret in a crowded
Speaker 1: room without anyone else hearing.
Speaker 2: That's the golden question because looking at.
Speaker 1: The source material, the answer involves everything from Cold War
Speaker 1: spies to well, actual lava lamps.
Speaker 2: The lava answer honestly my favorite part of the whole infrastructure.
Speaker 1: We will definitely get to those.
Speaker 2: Yeah, it really covers the full spectrum. It spans the
Speaker 2: history of the Internet, from the early days where everyone
Speaker 2: just trusted everyone to the modern zero trust environment we
Speaker 2: have to live in right now.
Speaker 1: So let's unpack this. The book starts by setting the
Speaker 1: stage with a bit of history. We usually think of
Speaker 1: cryptography as this military thing, right Enigma machines, guys in
Speaker 1: trench coats, meeting on foggy bridges, submarines exchanging coded messages.
Speaker 2: Historically, that's exactly what it was. For thousands of years.
Speaker 2: Cryptography was exclusively for generals, diplomats, and spies. Right. If
Speaker 2: you were just a regular person in say nineteen fifty,
Speaker 2: you didn't need to encrypt your grocery list or your
Speaker 2: letter to Gramma. No one cared exactly. But the source
Speaker 2: material makes a crucial point here the shifts wasn't just
Speaker 2: about technology improving, It was about necessity. Two massive forces
Speaker 2: collided to make cryptography essential for every single person on Earth,
Speaker 2: and those are connectivity and complexity.
Speaker 1: Let's start with connectivity. Because on the surface, connecting everything
Speaker 1: seems great. My toaster talks to my phone, my car
Speaker 1: talks to the traffic lights. I can see who is
Speaker 1: at my front door while I'm on vacation. It all
Speaker 1: feels like progress. But the authors argue this created a
Speaker 1: massive problem.
Speaker 2: It created the problem of the attack surface. Think about
Speaker 2: it this way. When you connect to toothbrush or a
Speaker 2: cart to the Internet, you are opening a door. You
Speaker 2: were creating an entry point.
Speaker 1: Yeah.
Speaker 2: And the scary part, which the authors highlight beautifully is
Speaker 2: the concept of zero marginal cost. This is an economic
Speaker 2: term that has terrifying implications for cybersecurity.
Speaker 1: Zero marginal cost. I actually circled that phrase in my notes.
Speaker 1: It sounds a bit like business school jargon. But break
Speaker 1: that down for us. How does that apply to hacking?
Speaker 2: Okay, so imagine you want to break into houses in
Speaker 2: a physical neighborhood. To break into one house takes time,
Speaker 2: it takes effort and risk. I have to pick the lock,
Speaker 2: check for dogs, avoid the police, maybe jump a fence.
Speaker 1: Sounds exhausting right now.
Speaker 2: To break into six hundred thousand houses that would take lifetimes.
Speaker 2: It is physically impossible for one person to.
Speaker 1: Do that because the physics of the real world slow
Speaker 1: you down. You can only be in one place at
Speaker 1: one time exactly.
Speaker 2: But in the digital world, physics doesn't apply in the
Speaker 2: same way. Once an attacker writes a script to hack
Speaker 2: one specific device, say a specific model of webcam with
Speaker 2: a known security flaw, the cost to hack one hundred
Speaker 2: thousand of those webcams is essentially zero. Wow, it costs
Speaker 2: them nothing to scale up. You just press enter and
Speaker 2: the script runs against the entire Internet.
Speaker 1: That is a terrifying thought, scaling a crime instantly, and
Speaker 1: the source gives a really concrete, really just diructive example
Speaker 1: of this the Mirri botnet from twenty sixteen.
Speaker 2: This is a classic case study in the book. Mira
Speaker 2: was a piece of malware that honestly wasn't even that
Speaker 2: sophisticated code wise. It was actually quite simple. Really yeah.
Speaker 2: It just scanned the Internet for IoT devices, cameras, routers,
Speaker 2: baby monitors that were still using factory default passwords. Because
Speaker 2: let's be honest, how often do users plug these things
Speaker 2: in and actually change the admin settings?
Speaker 1: Almost never. I'm guilty of it. You get the new gadget,
Speaker 1: you just want it to work, you plug it in,
Speaker 1: and you completely forget about it.
Speaker 2: We all are, Yeah, And the speed of this infection
Speaker 2: was insane. The source notes that at its peak, Mira
Speaker 2: was infecting devices within minutes of them going online. Metz
Speaker 2: it amassed an army of six hundred thousand bots, and
Speaker 2: it did this because of that connectivity. You couldn't physically
Speaker 2: recruit six hundred thousand soldiers that fast, but digitally it
Speaker 2: took moments. And then they used those six hundred thousand
Speaker 2: devices to launch attacks that took down major parts of
Speaker 2: the Internet.
Speaker 1: So that's connectivity. We've connected every thing, so everything is
Speaker 1: vulnerable to these mass scale attacks. But then we have
Speaker 1: the second driver, which is complexity. The authors have this
Speaker 1: quote that I underline three times complexity is the worst
Speaker 1: enemy of security.
Speaker 2: It's a bold statement, but it holds up under scrutiny.
Speaker 2: The logic is simple. The more complex a system is,
Speaker 2: the more moving parts it has, and more moving parts
Speaker 2: means more mistakes. Software is written by humans, and humans
Speaker 2: make mistakes.
Speaker 1: They use the Linux kernel as an example here to
Speaker 1: illustrate just how big these systems have gotten.
Speaker 2: Right, The Linux kernel is the core of so many
Speaker 2: operating systems, including Android, and a huge chunk of the
Speaker 2: web's infrastructure is something like thirty million lines.
Speaker 1: Of code thirty millionar.
Speaker 2: Now, think about human error. Even if you are the
Speaker 2: absolute best programmer in the world, you are going to
Speaker 2: make typos. You're going to make logic errors. Even if
Speaker 2: you only have one bug for every ten thousand lines
Speaker 2: of code, which would be an incredibly low air rate.
Speaker 2: A system that size is satistically guaranteed to have thousands
Speaker 2: of vulnerabilities.
Speaker 1: So we are essentially building systems that are just too
Speaker 1: big to ever be fully bug free. We're building skyscrapers
Speaker 1: knowing there are cracks in the foundation simply because the
Speaker 1: skyscraper is too big to inspect every single inch of
Speaker 1: concrete precisely.
Speaker 2: And that is the fundamental argument for why we need
Speaker 2: cryptography and protocols like TLS. We can't fix every bug
Speaker 2: in the software. It's impossible, So we wrap the communication
Speaker 2: in this invisible armor to protect it, even when the
Speaker 2: system itself might be vulnerable. We assume the network is
Speaker 2: hostile and we armor the data.
Speaker 1: Okay, so that's the why we're living in a glasshouse
Speaker 1: of complexity and connectivity. Now, let's talk about the how
Speaker 1: the book introduces us to a cast of characters to
Speaker 1: explain how this armour works. If you've ever read anything
Speaker 1: about crypto, you know these names. We've got Alice and Bob,
Speaker 1: the famous duo.
Speaker 2: Alice is usually the center, Bob is the receiver. They
Speaker 2: are just placeholders for point A and point B. But
Speaker 2: in a security context, we have to introduce the villains
Speaker 2: to really understand the stakes. You have Eve Eve the evesdropper. Correct,
Speaker 2: she just listens, She sits on the wire. She wants
Speaker 2: to steal your credit card number or read your emails,
Speaker 2: but she doesn't actually touch the data. She's passive. She's
Speaker 2: the spy in the corner booth with the newspaper cutout.
Speaker 1: And then there's the nastier one, Mallorie.
Speaker 2: Mallory is the active attacker. She's malicious. She doesn't just listen.
Speaker 2: She intercepts the message and changes it. She takes a
Speaker 2: message like paid Bob ten dollars and changes it to
Speaker 2: pay Mallory ten thousand, dollars before passing.
Speaker 1: It along to stop even Mallory. The book introduces this
Speaker 1: framework called the CIA triad, and I have to clarify
Speaker 1: for everyone listening, this is not the Spy Agency, no.
Speaker 2: Although I'm sure the agency cares deeply about this concept too.
Speaker 2: CIA in this context stands for confidentiality, integrity, and authentication.
Speaker 2: These are the three pillars of a secure channel. If
Speaker 2: you are missing even one, you aren't safe. You need
Speaker 2: all three to actually trust the connection.
Speaker 1: Let's take them one by one to see how they
Speaker 1: actually work in the wild. Starting confidentiality, this is what
Speaker 1: most of us think of when we hear the word encryption,
Speaker 1: Keeping secret secret right.
Speaker 2: This is the primary defense against EVE. Only Alice Babob
Speaker 2: should be able to read the message. If EVE intercepts it,
Speaker 2: it should just look like garbage data, pure static. But
Speaker 2: the source gives a great example of what happens when
Speaker 2: confidentiality fails.
Speaker 1: The we hack oh early Wi Fi security. I remember
Speaker 1: this being notoriously bad, but I never actually understood why.
Speaker 1: I just knew I was supposed to switch my router
Speaker 1: to WPA.
Speaker 2: It was awful. WEP stands for wired equivalent privacy. The
Speaker 2: goal was to make Wi Fi as safe as plugging
Speaker 2: in a physical cable, but the math was fundamentally flawed.
Speaker 2: The source explains that WEP reused its keys way too often,
Speaker 2: so it.
Speaker 1: Was repetitive, like using the same password.
Speaker 2: Over and over in a way. Yeah, imagine a codebook
Speaker 2: where you eventually have to start back at page one.
Speaker 2: An attacker could just sit outside your house in a car,
Speaker 2: listen to the noise of your network traffic, and because
Speaker 2: the patterns eventually repeated, they could mathematically recover the password
Speaker 2: without ever knocking on your door.
Speaker 1: How long are we talking hours?
Speaker 2: Days with it? About one minute?
Speaker 1: One minute. That's not even enough time to make a
Speaker 1: cup of coffee.
Speaker 2: Nope, you just drive by and steal the network. So
Speaker 2: confidentiality is eve can't read my stuff. But that's only
Speaker 2: step one. Next up is integrity. This is the one
Speaker 2: I think people overlook the most.
Speaker 1: I definitely did before reading this. Integrity means knowing that
Speaker 1: the message wasn't changed in transit. It's the defense against Mallory.
Speaker 2: It is because secrecy isn't enough. If I send an
Speaker 2: encrypted message to the bank saying Paybob, and Mallory scrambles
Speaker 2: the encrypted bits so that when the bank decrypts it,
Speaker 2: it says pay Mallory. It doesn't matter that it was encrypted.
Speaker 2: The instruction got changed. The system failed.
Speaker 1: And the scariest, most Hollywood style example of an integrity
Speaker 1: attack and the source material has to be stucksnet.
Speaker 2: The famous worm that hit the Iranian nuclear facilities. That
Speaker 2: is the ultimate integrity case study.
Speaker 1: This story always blows my mind. Walk us through the
Speaker 1: integrity failure there. How did it actually trick them? So?
Speaker 2: Stucksnent was sophisticated for many reasons, but the integrity aspect
Speaker 2: is fascinating. It attacked the centrifuges, the machinery used to
Speaker 2: enrich uranium. It didn't just shut them down, It manipulated
Speaker 2: the commands to make the centrifuges spin too fast and
Speaker 2: literally destroy themselves.
Speaker 1: But the operators were sitting in a control room monitoring this.
Speaker 1: Why didn't they see the machines spinning out of control
Speaker 1: on their screens.
Speaker 2: That's the genius and the horror of the attack. While
Speaker 2: it was destroying the machines, stucksnet was sending fake data
Speaker 2: back to the control room. It had recorded normal operations
Speaker 2: prior to the attack and was playing that loop back
Speaker 2: to the screens, So.
Speaker 1: The operators are looking at their monitors seeing system normal,
Speaker 1: sipping their tee, while the reality in the next room
Speaker 1: is system critical and centrifuges are tearing themselves apart.
Speaker 2: That is the integrity breach. The data they were receiving
Speaker 2: was a lie. It had lost its integrity, and that
Speaker 2: failure caused physical destruction. It shows that digital security is
Speaker 2: just about data. It's about the physical world too.
Speaker 1: That really drives it home. It's not just about stealing data,
Speaker 1: it's about trusting what you see, which leads us to
Speaker 1: the third pillar, authentication.
Speaker 2: The A and the triad, proving you are who you
Speaker 2: say you are. This is arguably the most critical one
Speaker 2: because you can have a perfectly encrypted, integrity protected connection
Speaker 2: straight to a hacker exactly if you don't know who
Speaker 2: is on the other end of the line, the encryption
Speaker 2: doesn't matter. And this brings us to the g Pack
Speaker 2: of twenty fifteen, a huge moment, a watershed moment in
Speaker 2: IoT security. This changed how the auto industry thought about
Speaker 2: software entirely.
Speaker 1: Two researchers, Charlie Miller and Chris Baalisek, managed to remotely
Speaker 1: take control of a jeep Cherokee. And we aren't talking
Speaker 1: about changing the radio station or rolling down the windows.
Speaker 1: We were talking steering, brakes, transmission right.
Speaker 2: And the scary part was where they were doing it from.
Speaker 2: They weren't in the back seat with the laptop plugged
Speaker 2: into the dashboard. They were sitting on a couch miles away.
Speaker 2: They exploited the car's infotainment system. You connect via the
Speaker 2: cellular network, but.
Speaker 1: How does the radio let you cut the brakes? That
Speaker 1: seems like a massive design flaw.
Speaker 2: It is. Once they got into the infotainment system, they
Speaker 2: found a component called the d bus. This is like
Speaker 2: the internal nervous system of the car. It connects the
Speaker 2: radio to the engine, the brakes, the steering. Yeah, and
Speaker 2: here is where authentication failed. The d bus didn't ask
Speaker 2: for ID.
Speaker 1: It just trusted the commands completely.
Speaker 2: It assumed that if you were connected to the internal network,
Speaker 2: you must be safe. It didn't authenticate the commands at all.
Speaker 2: So the researchers could send a command like engage brakes,
Speaker 2: and the car just obeyed. It didn't ask are you
Speaker 2: the driver or are you a mechanic? It just said okay.
Speaker 1: That is terrifying. It's like walking into a bank vault
Speaker 1: just because the front door was unlocked, and the vault
Speaker 1: just opens because you're standing there.
Speaker 2: Another great example of authentication failure in the book is
Speaker 2: the false base station or stingray attack.
Speaker 1: This is with mobile phones, right, I've heard about these
Speaker 1: being used in cities.
Speaker 2: Yes, your phone constantly looks for a cell tower, but
Speaker 2: in early two G networks and even some setups today,
Speaker 2: the phone didn't require the tower to prove its identity.
Speaker 2: It just connected to the strongest signal.
Speaker 1: It's just looking for the loudest voice in the room exactly.
Speaker 2: So police or attackers could set up a fake tower,
Speaker 2: a stingray that blasts a really strong signal. Your phone says, oh,
Speaker 2: a great signal, and connects to it instead of the real.
Speaker 1: Tower, and now all your calls and data are going
Speaker 1: through them because.
Speaker 2: The network failed to authenticate itself to the phone. The
Speaker 2: two way street, you need to know the bank is
Speaker 2: the bank, and the bank needs to know you Are
Speaker 2: you okay?
Speaker 1: So we have the triad confidentiality, integrity, authentication. But here
Speaker 1: is the million dollar question that the book raises. If
Speaker 1: the bad guys know all this, if they know the math,
Speaker 1: they know the protocols, they know the triad. How do
Speaker 1: we keep anything safe? Doesn't the enemy knowing the system
Speaker 1: make it weak? If I tell a Burgling exactly what
Speaker 1: brand of lock I have on my front door, isn't
Speaker 1: that a bad idea?
Speaker 2: That is the paradox, but in cryptography it's actually the
Speaker 2: exact opposite. This is known as Kirkos principle.
Speaker 1: The enemy knows the system or.
Speaker 2: Gus Kirkhofs back in the nineteenth century argued that you
Speaker 2: should never rely on security by obscurity. You shouldn't rely
Speaker 2: on hiding how your system works, because eventually a manual
Speaker 2: gets lost, or a disgruntled employee leaks the blueprints, or
Speaker 2: someone reverse engineers it.
Speaker 1: So if the blueprints are public, where is the secret
Speaker 1: the key?
Speaker 2: The only thing that should be secret is the key.
Speaker 2: The lock design can be totally public. In fact, it
Speaker 2: should be public so that thousands of experts can try
Speaker 2: to piket and find flaws, but the key, that specific
Speaker 2: string of data, must remain entirely private.
Speaker 1: It's like the lock on your front door. Everyone knows
Speaker 1: how a pin tumbler lock works. You can look it
Speaker 1: up on Wikipedia right now. But knowing how the lock
Speaker 1: works doesn't help you get into my house unless you
Speaker 1: have my specific key precisely.
Speaker 2: Open design leads to stronger security because it gets tested
Speaker 2: by the community and the source material goes deep into
Speaker 2: key management, because if the key is the only secret,
Speaker 2: you better protect it with your life. One major concept
Speaker 2: here is forward secrecy.
Speaker 1: Which sounds like time travel, but it's actually about damage control.
Speaker 2: It is imagine you use the same key for every
Speaker 2: email you sent for ten ms. If I steal that
Speaker 2: key today, I can go back and read everything you
Speaker 2: wrote in twenty fifteen total disaster.
Speaker 1: My entire history is exposed.
Speaker 2: Forward secrecy means we change the keys constantly. We use
Speaker 2: session keys. We generate a key, use it for one conversation,
Speaker 2: and then destroy it.
Speaker 1: Like burning the diary after you write the entry.
Speaker 2: Exactly if I hack you today, I can't read the
Speaker 2: messages you sent yesterday because that key is gone. It
Speaker 2: doesn't exist anymore.
Speaker 1: It effectively locks the pass. I love that, but this
Speaker 1: brings up a technical problem that I found really interesting
Speaker 1: while reading. To generate all these keys, we need randomness.
Speaker 1: We need to pick numbers that no one can guess,
Speaker 1: and as the book points out, computers are actually terrible
Speaker 1: at being random.
Speaker 2: They are. Computers are logical machines. They follow strict instructions.
Speaker 2: If you tell a computer to pick a random number,
Speaker 2: it uses an algorithm. It's like flipping a coin. But
Speaker 2: if you knew the exact wind speed, the force of
Speaker 2: the thumb, and the weight of the coin, you could
Speaker 2: predict the outcome every single time.
Speaker 1: And if a hacker knows the algorithm and the starting
Speaker 1: point the seed, they can predict the number the computer
Speaker 1: will pick.
Speaker 2: Which defeats the whole purpose. If I can predict your key,
Speaker 2: I can unlock your door. This is where we get
Speaker 2: into entropy. In crypto, entropy basically means surprise or uncertainty.
Speaker 2: We need a source of data that is completely unpredictable.
Speaker 1: And this is where the lava lamps come in. I
Speaker 1: tease this at the very beginning. The source mentions cloud Flare,
Speaker 1: a massive web security company, tell us about the wall
Speaker 1: of entropy.
Speaker 2: It's brilliant. At their headquarters, they have a wall of
Speaker 2: actual physical lava lamps. They have a camera pointed right
Speaker 2: at them. The blobs of lax moving around are governed
Speaker 2: by fluid dynamics, heat chaos. It is fithysically impossible to
Speaker 2: predict exactly what shape those blobs will take next.
Speaker 1: So they use the video feed of the lava.
Speaker 2: Lamps as a source of randomness.
Speaker 1: Yes, wild.
Speaker 2: They digitize the visual noise of the lava lamps to
Speaker 2: generate true randomness. They mix that with the computer's mathematical
Speaker 2: randomness to create keys that are effectively impossible to predict.
Speaker 1: That is just so cool. You're securing the banking data
Speaker 1: of the world using groovy nineteen seventies room decre.
Speaker 2: It highlights the lengths we have to go to. We
Speaker 2: have to reach out into the physical world, into the
Speaker 2: chaos of reality to find true unpredictability because the digital
Speaker 2: world is just too orderly.
Speaker 1: So bringing it all together, we live in this world
Speaker 1: of infinite connectivity and zero cost attacks. To survive, we
Speaker 1: build these secure channels. We use the CIA triad to
Speaker 1: ensure no one is listening, nothing is changed, and we
Speaker 1: know who we're talking to.
Speaker 2: And we do it by adhering to Kirkhoff's principal open standards,
Speaker 2: secret keys, and fueling it all with high entropy randomness.
Speaker 1: And all of this is bundled up in TLS transport
Speaker 1: layer security. That's the invisible armor. It's what happens when
Speaker 1: you click that padlock.
Speaker 2: It is. It's a protocol that negotiates all of this
Speaker 2: for you in milliseconds. It picks the cipher, it exchanges
Speaker 2: the keys, It authenticates the server, all before your webpage
Speaker 2: even lugs. It handles the complexity so you don't have to.
Speaker 1: It really is a marvel of engineering. But before we
Speaker 1: wrap up this deep dive, the book leaves us with
Speaker 1: a bit of a provocative thought. We talked earlier about
Speaker 1: complexity being the enemy of security.
Speaker 2: We did, and looking at the trends in the source material,
Speaker 2: software is only getting more complex.
Speaker 1: The Linux kernel grows larger every year. We are adding
Speaker 1: features faster than we can secure them. We want our
Speaker 1: fridges to tweet and our cars to drive themselves. We
Speaker 1: aren't slowing down.
Speaker 2: That is the big question the author's pose. If complexity
Speaker 2: is the enemy and we demand more complexity, more features,
Speaker 2: more connectivity, are we fighting a losing battle?
Speaker 1: Can cryptography keep up with an attack surface that is
Speaker 1: expanding infinitely?
Speaker 2: The math is solid. The encryption works, as we saw
Speaker 2: with the jeep haag or stucksnet. The implementation is where
Speaker 2: we fail. We can build the perfect lock, but if
Speaker 2: we put it on a door made of tissue paper,
Speaker 2: or if we forget to check who is knocking the
Speaker 2: lock doesn't matter. The challenge isn't the math anymore. It's
Speaker 2: the messiness of the real world.
Speaker 1: A sobering thought to leave you with. Next time you
Speaker 1: see that padlock, maybe give a little nod to the math,
Speaker 1: the lava lamps and the invisible armor keeping the chaos
Speaker 1: at bay. Thanks for joining us on this deep dive.
Speaker 2: Stay secure, everyone,