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Speaker 1: You're listening to the Mind Over Murder podcast.

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Speaker 2: My name is Bill Thomas. I'm a writer, consulting, producer,

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and now podcaster. I am now trying to use my

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experience as the brother of a murder victim to help

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other victims of violent crime. I'm working on a book

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on the unsolved Colonial Parkway murders, and I'm the co

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administrator of the Colonial Parkway Murders Facebook group together with

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Kristin Dilly.

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Speaker 1: My name is Kristin Dilly.

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Speaker 3: I'm a writer, a researcher, a teacher, and a victim's advocate,

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as well as the social media manager and co administrator

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for the Colonial Parkway Murders Facebook page with my partner

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in crime, Bill Thomas.

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Speaker 2: It's important to note that this podcast was recorded a

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couple of weeks ago, just before we got the latest

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solved in the Colonial Parkway murders, that of my sister

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Kathy Thomas and Rebecca Dowski. So when I'm referencing Alan

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Wade wilmer Se being linked to four homicides, that number

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is now six. Now on with the show, Welcome to

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mind Over Murder. I'm Bill Thomas. My podcast partner, Kristin

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Dilly is not here this week. She is away on assignment,

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but should be back next time. Here on Mind over Murder. Today,

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we have a very special guest, and I'm going to

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struggle pronouncing her last name. It's okay, Jennifer Boocholts. Is

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that closed?

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Speaker 4: I got a prompt?

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Speaker 2: Oh, okay, I practiced, Jennifer. Welcome.

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Speaker 4: Thank you so much for having me. Bill.

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Speaker 2: Tell us a little bit about yourself, and don't be modest.

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Speaker 4: I'll try to keep it short. I'm an Army veteran.

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I served in the US Army as a counter intelligence agent,

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and I've done tours in Iraq and Afghanistan, and I've

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done enforced Protection Operation Lizard called all around the world

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as a contractor for different agencies. Several years back, I

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went and got my master's in forensic science and started

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teaching forensics and criminal justice at American Military University, and

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I'm still there as a part time instructor. Now. I'm

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currently a cold case investigator for the Opatha County Sheriff's

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office in Colorado, not Texas, but that's fair to mix

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them up that they get half in Bolotin. I'm actually

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a civilian criminal investigator, so I'm not badged. But I

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can do pretty much everything the detectives can do except

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arrest somebody or swear under oath before a judge for

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something like a search one. But I do interviews, interrogations,

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my foot bunsard warms all the time, write rewards, whatever,

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work alongside the detectives. And like I said, I teach

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part time. And then my civilian non work investigative partner

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George Jared and I host a podcast called Break the Cakes,

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and we also co founded a nonprofit by the same name.

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So we're dedicated to trying to help families and law

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enforcement with unsolved home side cases around the country.

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Speaker 2: And the work that you do with Break the Case

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that's volunteer work, is it not.

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Speaker 4: Yes, and completely separate from my position to the Sheriff's office.

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I keep the two separate.

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Speaker 2: Like you didn't have enough on your plate, then you

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had to start a podcast where among your distinguished guests,

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and I'll put myself in a less distinguished category.

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Speaker 4: No.

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Speaker 2: No, I've suggested with you and George several years ago,

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and then we've seen each other at Crime con and

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other conferences, and I always feel like we have these

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fantastic conversations which are not long enough.

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Speaker 4: It's really hard though, when you're standing on your table

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and you've got tons of people commide one and speak

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to you and Kristen.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, one of the great things about crime Con is

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you see so many people that you know and respect

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and can learn from. In addition to meeting friends and

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fans and all that stuff. I love the networking that

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can take place. And I can't count how many people

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I've met at crime Con and other true crime conferences

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that have proven to be incredibly helpful in terms of

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educating christ an enemy about various aspects in terms of

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their own areas of expertise. That has great value too.

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Speaker 4: Oh for sure. And I'm always looking for outside resources

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that I call a lot of particular case for assistance

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or something. So networking the most valuable part.

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Speaker 2: Do you feel like there's a through line here with

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your army experience and counterintelligence and then moving into more

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of a law enforcement and an investigative role. I do so.

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Speaker 4: Counter intelligence is an investigative role. We were badged in

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the army and on investigative status in most of the

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places I was assigned. It's just a different type of investigation.

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The cycle of investigation is pretty much the same no

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matter what type of case you're working on. But in

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addition to that, I think the most valuable things that

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bridge those gaps between the two career lines is my

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interview and interrogation experience from the Army. He was in Afghanistan.

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I interviewed over five hundred local Afghan nationals. Got some

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amazing experience there in interviewing and interrogation, and it's some

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in Iraq. Know as much, I was doing some different

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stuff when I was in Iraq, but have you worked

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in South Korea with different human sources, lots of interviewing there.

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It's just very interview heavy, and of course that really

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teaches you like about human behavior in general and nonverbal behavior, right,

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and all those little things that you see on the

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via that you're supposed to pick up on Carring is

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across in the cold case investigations a lot, because we're

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always going back and reinterviewing people or finding new people

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to interview. So I think my skill set is directly

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applicable there in the patience level that you're taught when

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you work in color intelligence. You know, the ultimate goal

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of counterintelligence is to recruit human sources to give you

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information about your adversary, and so if you're at wartime,

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that's going to be whatever country you're fighting. But you

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learn in ait the very beginning of your training in

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the army that you're just going to be one part

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of that process and you may never get to see

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the end result of what happens with that source. But

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your work, no matter what it is very important. But

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you have to have so much patience. And so patience

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is definitely a virtue, and that definitely carries over into

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cold case investigations because you've got to be patients not

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going to happen right away like with a brand new case.

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But I enjoy that because it gives me so much

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more time to become a subject matter expert on a case,

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really evaluate it. It makes freadsheets Lambily's notes, and I

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could take my time of me methodical and I love

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that software cuttings, but I love it.

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Speaker 2: Would there be a lot of work with translators because

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here I am listening to you talk about being in Iraq, Afghanistan, Korea,

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you weren't necessarily always conducting those investigations or those interrogations

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in the person's native language. Where you would you be

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working in a partnership with a translator. Yep.

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Speaker 4: In Korea, we had a Korean, a lincol guy who's

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grown up in South Korea. He was assigned to us

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as a full time translator, so we had him wherever

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we need to go or whatever, because, Yeah, most of

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the kre instance speak English. With innovating and interrogating, if

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you can conduct it in that person's native language, it's

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better than trying to get them to think through the

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wording to translate themselves. Yeah, and iraqis Afghanistan the same things.

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A few Iraqis I worked with did speak decent English.

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Usually I'd still take an interpreter with me. And Afghanistan,

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nearly every interview I conducted was in their local language

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with an interpreter. Right, I just don't speak their language.

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Speaker 2: And I suppose in all of those examples, you're looking

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for thoughtful answers from this individual, and most of us

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are going to think in our native language. So it

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actually was simpler to ask someone in their native language

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so they could think about their answer and provide you, yeah,

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a good in depth answer. But I suppose the trust

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of your translator partner is absolutely critical to hear too.

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Because say that you need like details, you.

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Speaker 4: Have to have an excellent working relationship with your interpreter,

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and we would do a lot of training with them

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on We would have to train them to pick up

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on things we couldn't.

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Speaker 2: Yes, I would.

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Speaker 4: Don't you think they're lying or you know they're lying.

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You've got to convey that to me.

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Speaker 2: Don't just think I'm going to get it.

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Speaker 4: Correct and we can take a break and walk out

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of the room and talk about whatever's going on. But

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you've got to convey your thoughts that are in your

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head to me because I can interpret their body language

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and stuff. But still different because with a different culture.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, culturally, but you're literally on the other side of

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the world. Culturally, you want you didn't grow up there,

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and here's this five foot ten blonde woman asking all

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these questions. I know we were talking off air about

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the fact that in certain places in the world, like

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in Germany and Norway you mentioned you fit right in.

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And then, knowing that you'd worked in Iraq and Afghanistan,

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I thought to myself, and in Iraq and Afghanistan, I'll

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bet a five to ten blond woman really stood out.

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Speaker 4: In some way. But a lot of the people I

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worked with or talked with were intrigued.

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Speaker 2: Oh they were.

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Speaker 4: Yeah, they would ask me questions too, And I don't

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mind that in an interrogation, right, most of the stuff

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I was doing was interviewing the difference. I don't mind

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answering questions. What's it like in there? Sim uh huh dog.

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Then then after getting sant Obama is an outre So

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what do you think about Obama compared to Oh, yeah,

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we have to go down this road.

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Speaker 2: But it's interesting because people from another country would be

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asking you about US presidents and things like that. But

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I find even in my working with people from around

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the world, they're very interested in what goes on in

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the United States politically, socially, even entertainment wise. Yes, movies

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and television shows and all that stuff. They have a

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great deal of interest.

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Speaker 4: Yes, it's so different to them to what they're used to.

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Speaker 2: So what brought you to Colorado?

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Speaker 4: Colorado is my first thirty station in the Army. I

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was stationed at Fort Carson. I really enjoyed it when

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I was stationed here. The mountains are really close by,

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tons of hiking and wreck climbing, and I liked to

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skie so it has all the outdoor stuff and four seasons.

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And ironically, my husband, who was Air Force, we were

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stationed here at the same time, but we didn't meet here.

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Speaker 2: Oh that's interesting.

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Speaker 4: You actually met in Korea. And then I got out

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of the Army. We were in Florida because he was

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stationed at Florida and we really didn't like Florida. Yeah,

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so he got out, We're like, where do you want

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to go? So we both kind of like Colorado situated

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halfway between our families. And then he got accepted to

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the University of Colorado for engineering, and so we just

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ended up moving back and we've been here ever since.

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Speaker 2: Oh got it. I wasn't sure if it was a

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work thing, but it was really one of those where

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where do we go from here? Question?

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Speaker 4: Out in a way we can go where we want.

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When I was working back then, I was traveling, so

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if I was hold, you could live wherever you want

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in the US and the flight to where you needed to.

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So it was a fun decision.

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Speaker 2: And then what kind of cases have kept you busiest with?

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Break the Case both the podcast and your nonprofit organization.

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You and George Jarrett have been working together for how

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long now.

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Speaker 4: It willed begs years this month. Sorry, I had to

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think it was January thirtieth of twenty nineteen that we

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met over the phone, that we got connected at the

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hip on the Rebecca Gold case. It had a positive

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outcome on that one her killers now serving forty years.

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Speaker 2: Wow, fantastic work.

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Speaker 4: For those who don't know the case. I'll just be

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real short.

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Speaker 2: Were they Oh sure?

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Speaker 4: Unting out there and all over our website too. You

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can go look at all the content. But ultimately her

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killer joined a Facebook group that George and I were

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admins of and he was making comments and then he

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started direct messaging me in twenty twenty and we had.

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Speaker 2: A and this is under his name, his real name,

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And was this a name that was already known to

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you as a potential suspect, not as a suspect.

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Speaker 4: So when he joined the group, one of our crowdsourcing

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team members that gets picked a caller Miranda. She's amazing,

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she's great in genealogy. She had mapped the whole family

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tree of Rebecca's boyfriend, and that was important because Rebecca

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was killed inside her boyfriend's house and then her body

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was moved to a secondary location when someone tried to

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clean the scene, so I just know from experience, like

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with someone then't that much effort. They got a known

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connection to the victim, right of course, were eyeballing the

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boyfriend and like, how did he get cleared and does

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he actually have an alibi? And if it's not him,

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then somebody connected to.

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Speaker 2: Him to him.

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Speaker 4: Yeah, So this guy named Larry Miller joined our Facebook

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group and Miranda says, hey, by the way, that's Casey's

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first cousin. Okay, that's interesting, and you see there's real name,

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all right, But we did a bunch of research and

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at the tire Rebecca's murder, William was living in Texas

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with a wife and a small child, and we didn't

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no reason to believe he was anywhere near the state

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of Arkansas with like twelve hours the way. So that's

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why he was never a suspect to us. But we

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weren't curious why he was in the group, and then

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he definitely lied to me when we were d mding

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each other, I found roundabout ways to ask how did

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you find out about this murder? Living overseas working in

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the oil industry, And so he went to great lengths

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to keep his relationship to the family private, but it

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knew so I played don't but I was like, that's interesting,

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but we still don't have a reason. I think he'd

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been in the state of Arkansas within about six weeks

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before his arrest. Swinney, we got the magic tip.

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Speaker 2: From somebody that put him there.

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Speaker 4: Found out he had come to visit that weekend because

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his mom and brother were living in the area, and

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that was another piece of the puzzle we did not know.

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Speaker 2: Wow, something went to.

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Speaker 4: Huge lengths to cover up the fact that these three

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were in the area at the time for murder.

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Speaker 2: By the time it was confirmed that he was in

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Arkansas at the time of Rebecca Goulds murder, were you

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suspicious of him by that point.

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Speaker 4: No. It was that piece of information that changed our

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whole focus right then, where we're like, okay, okay, there's

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these two brothers that nobody ever admitted were in the

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state at the time. One of them has got to

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be involved in this at a minimum, but we didn't

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know which brother. We were looking at both the brothers,

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like doing as much ancestry and back hoomb research as

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we could have to figure out everything we could about them.

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What's really disheartening about this case is that William Miller's

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name had been in the case file since the first week.

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Speaker 2: Of course, police had known he'd.

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Speaker 4: Been in the state, and they didn't think it was

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weird that he fled with state the day after, and

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that his mom packed up her entire house and moved

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to Texas the week of the murder.

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Speaker 2: How is that even possible that someone that blows town

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right after this Brital murder doesn't move on to law

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enforcement's radar.

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Speaker 4: I don't know, because obviously as soon as we found out,

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we were alarmed.

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Speaker 2: Oh no, all yeah, so without question.

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Speaker 4: So in November of twenty twenty, and part of the

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problem with this case is that they'd had the same

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detective onage for fourteen years who believed that this was

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a drug deal gone wrong.

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Speaker 2: And he was locked into that theory.

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Speaker 4: And it was completely false. We know that now he

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completely publicly accused this guy with no evidence, oh boy,

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and basically ruined his wife. But anyways, outside in twenty twenty,

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they also got a new detective on it. Finally he

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let an open mind, so she went back to the beginning,

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and he started looking at William Miller unbeknown to us,

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moved out to Oregon where William was in November and

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interviewed them, and William.

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Speaker 2: Confessed, so really that part of it was a new detective,

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fresh eyes, not being locked into past theories.

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Speaker 4: Yes, correct?

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Speaker 2: Was your relationship with the new detective? Was it able

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to be a cooperative one?

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Speaker 4: It was okay. It was falsely a one way road

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where if we found information that seemed important, we would

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pass it to him. He did call me in Georgia

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a couple times with questions. He was in our Facebook

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group under fake name, he told us then he was

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I don't know which fake person he was.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, maybe better for you not to know just exactly. Yeah,

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John Smith was a member of the Facebook group.

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Speaker 4: I was just happy he was watching working around. So

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there was some collaboration, But honestly, after the conviction, we

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asked if we could meet with him because we wanted

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to better understand what did we do that helped, What

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could we have done better? Did we overstep? And he

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refused to meet with us.

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Speaker 2: Oh my, because we're.

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Speaker 4: So basically talked to us ever since, and the story

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is actually not over because the way I am confessor

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Rebecca's murder, he confessed to five other murders, but with

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the other five he claimed they were sex workers, so

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he didn't know their names, so he couldn't tell and

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best meters exactly through and he did get some details.

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He did give some locations Arkansas. They pleased didn't do

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anything about those extra confessions, those additional confessions.

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Speaker 2: Excuse me, wow, how disappointing.

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Speaker 4: Been trying to work on that on our own ver and.

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Speaker 2: You've worked on other cases as well. For again, this

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is all at no charge. This is out of the

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goodness of your heart.

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Speaker 4: Really ever take money from a victim's family. Never.

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Speaker 2: And you mentioned something which is I think our reason

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for this conversation today. You mentioned in the Rebecca Gould case,

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which had a tremendous outcome, will you identify a suspect?

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And if Arkansas law enforcement doesn't want to acknowledge your role,

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I guess we'll just have to live with that. But

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it sounds like you played a pretty major role in

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helping build this case against this suspect. You mentioned using

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ancestry to help you build out family trees, and I

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know you've done this successfully in other cases. You and

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I were talking about this a week or so back

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and we thought we should get together and talk about

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it on the podcast. What's going on with the changes

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in what they call the terms of service for ancestry

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dot com, which I know many of us, myself included

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use for family DNA research. My understanding is that mid

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last year ancestry dot com made change to their terms

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of service. What does that mean for investigators like yourself?

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Speaker 4: I mean the giant mess It was actually a lean November,

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I believe, but they change their terms of service. So previously,

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as me working for somebody in law enforcement, we were

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not allowed to upload a DNA profile and Ancestry we

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understood that right weren't supposed to use it to try

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and identify suspects. But we could use it and I

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have done this extensively at work. We could use it

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to build chandy trees of missing persons or to help

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us an attempt to identify the owner of unidentified human remains.

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So I did this on at least a half dozen

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of our cases at work. Part of my purpose with

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a couple of the missing persons cases is because I

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discovered that we didn't have a relative's DNA of the

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missing person and coded so built these family truths to

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identify which relatives of the missing person were still alive,

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and then figure out which is the one that's going

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to share the most DNA with the person, And then

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I would use my law enforcement out of bases to

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find that person's phone number, usually because they might not

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live here and won't explain what I'm doing. And you

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never had any problem with anybody giving me the DNA.

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And again, we wanted to make sure that for each

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missing person case we had a relative's DNA and CODUS

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and then a name US which is another database for

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missing and unidentified persons. So now with the updated terms

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of service, and this is the direct quote from their website,

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but we are not chusing services in connection with any

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law enforcement investigation or judicial perceiving, which means I can't

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even use it like in the examples they just gave

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to try to locate the missing person's relative. Can't begin

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to understand who wouldn't want that done?

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Speaker 2: Yeah, this whole thing seems in it just completely insane.

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I don't want to move too quickly past something, which

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is that for those situations where law enforcement is uploading

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a profile, a DNA profile of either a missing person

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or a suspect in an investigation, and they're uploading those

395
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two Jedmatch and Family Treat DNA because those two databases

396
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permit law enforcement to upload an unknown person or a

397
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suspect into their databases. But no one's trying to upload

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into Ancestry or there's there's my Heritage, and so many

399
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other popular sites, but the only two that allow uploads

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are jed match and family Tree DNA. Am I correct?

401
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Speaker 4: That's correct, and an author has one they've started well, DNA.

402
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Speaker 2: Solves, which I know is a bit smaller, but every

403
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DNA database could potentially offer a lead to law enforcement

404
00:20:44,359 --> 00:20:47,079
in those situations. But there are no violations of terms

405
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of service when someone does that.

406
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Speaker 4: That's correct. So another quote from they're updated terms of

407
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service is that users are not to use information obtained

408
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from Ancestry DNA services, whether they're in whole or art

409
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in combination with any other database or service for law

410
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enforcement like so basically acting only half a law enforcement

411
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or helping law enforcement or any judicial proceeding. So it's

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not only that I, as a Sheriff's office employee, can't

413
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use it. I can't ask a failing member of my

414
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missing person, say to go to their Ancestry account and

415
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could you look in your tree for me and tell

416
00:21:21,920 --> 00:21:24,640
me this, that or the other. Technically not allowed to

417
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do that. The other thing we've done in the past

418
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is ordered at home Leona kids from Ancestry for victims'

419
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family members to take and upload into Ancestry so that

420
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they can see if they number one get a mash

421
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to their missing person, there is an off chance that

422
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the missing person is out there alive.

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Speaker 2: Absolutely yeah.

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Speaker 4: Or also to help us find relatives. And again we've

425
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never had anybody have an issue doing that for us,

426
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but now that's we're not allowed to do that either.

427
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Speaker 2: I'm outraged. I think what Ancestry is trying to do

428
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is so overstepping their bounds. First of all, well, where

429
00:22:00,480 --> 00:22:04,519
do they get off telling the family member of a

430
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missing person, for example, that they can't upload their DNA

431
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as part of a quest. Look, my family found a

432
00:22:12,480 --> 00:22:15,119
half sister we knew nothing about, which has been an

433
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exciting journey in and out of itself. I'm sure conversation

434
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for another day, but we have a new sister and

435
00:22:21,839 --> 00:22:25,559
we're thrilled to have her. I don't see how Ancestry

436
00:22:25,839 --> 00:22:28,640
has a leg to stand on in terms of you

437
00:22:28,759 --> 00:22:31,880
telling a family member, here's a home kit, spit in

438
00:22:31,880 --> 00:22:35,119
this tomb like we've all done, and upload your DNA.

439
00:22:35,200 --> 00:22:38,480
This might help in the search for your lost loved

440
00:22:38,519 --> 00:22:42,720
one or your murdered sibling, like in my example, a

441
00:22:42,759 --> 00:22:44,720
sister Kathy is a murder victim as part of the

442
00:22:44,759 --> 00:22:48,000
Colonial Parkway murders. I don't even think they're standing on

443
00:22:48,160 --> 00:22:51,640
very firm ground here. They have no right to tell

444
00:22:51,680 --> 00:22:54,039
you what you can do. We all pay for our

445
00:22:54,079 --> 00:22:59,119
subscriptions to ancestry where you were doing genealogical research. I'm

446
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looking into the promises and the mcneces, which is my

447
00:23:02,119 --> 00:23:04,480
mom's maiden name, which is one of the ways we

448
00:23:04,599 --> 00:23:08,200
ended up finding my new half sister. This is crazy.

449
00:23:08,279 --> 00:23:11,440
I don't even think they're standing on very firm ground here.

450
00:23:11,920 --> 00:23:15,039
Speaker 4: And not only is applying to ancestry dot com, but

451
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the other databases that I guess they control, well, I

452
00:23:18,319 --> 00:23:21,319
don't know if they own, but that includes find a grank,

453
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which I thought was a totally public website that any civilian.

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Speaker 2: User companion inform each and we infuse that in our

455
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case too.

456
00:23:28,920 --> 00:23:33,559
Speaker 4: Yeah, so I have a homicide victim from nineteen eighty eight. Oh,

457
00:23:33,599 --> 00:23:35,599
she has a daughter who was one year old when

458
00:23:35,640 --> 00:23:38,079
she was killed. I knew the daughter had been in

459
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the military. I'm using all my law enforcing databases like

460
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she and not find this girl. None of the information's correct.

461
00:23:44,839 --> 00:23:46,720
I'm like stretching my head. How am I going to

462
00:23:46,759 --> 00:23:48,960
find this girl? I need her DNA. I don't have

463
00:23:49,039 --> 00:23:53,440
any relatives DNA for this homicide victim. I'm just googling

464
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my victim's name one day, let's see if there's anything new.

465
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And up comes a link to find a grave And

466
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there's no obituary, but there is a list with a

467
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photo of her headstone. And I noticed there's one comment

468
00:24:03,839 --> 00:24:08,039
from her daughter, made ten years prior. But I noticed

469
00:24:08,039 --> 00:24:10,359
the daughter actually made to find a grave account. I

470
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made an account and find a grave, messaged the daughter

471
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to find a grave, and that's how we connected. What

472
00:24:16,680 --> 00:24:17,359
is wrong with that?

473
00:24:17,680 --> 00:24:18,480
Speaker 2: Who? What? Nothing?

474
00:24:18,960 --> 00:24:20,599
Speaker 4: Once? The problem?

475
00:24:20,799 --> 00:24:23,000
Speaker 2: This daughter, who would have been one at the time

476
00:24:23,200 --> 00:24:26,720
of her mother's death, would now be a grown woman.

477
00:24:27,359 --> 00:24:30,799
Yes she is and has every right to hear from you.

478
00:24:31,119 --> 00:24:33,920
Was she aware of the fact that you were looking

479
00:24:34,000 --> 00:24:34,480
for her?

480
00:24:35,160 --> 00:24:38,400
Speaker 4: No, the like all the other information I had found

481
00:24:38,440 --> 00:24:41,079
on her, was not valid. I had found her ex

482
00:24:41,200 --> 00:24:43,359
mother in law and spoke to the ex mother in law,

483
00:24:43,400 --> 00:24:45,400
but she'd been divorced for a while, so the X

484
00:24:45,440 --> 00:24:46,920
mother in law didn't know where she was living.

485
00:24:47,039 --> 00:24:49,039
Speaker 2: It weren't in touch anymore, that kind of thing.

486
00:24:49,559 --> 00:24:53,119
Speaker 4: Didn't have any more contact information for her. And when

487
00:24:53,119 --> 00:24:55,279
I finally got a hold of her, she goes, this

488
00:24:55,359 --> 00:24:58,079
is the first phone call I've ever gotten about my mom.

489
00:24:58,720 --> 00:25:01,359
It was so critical, it was so important, and she

490
00:25:01,480 --> 00:25:04,720
was so thankful. So, like you said, how dare you

491
00:25:04,920 --> 00:25:07,960
prevent me from trying to find somebody through an open

492
00:25:07,960 --> 00:25:08,920
source database.

493
00:25:10,279 --> 00:25:13,480
Speaker 2: You're listening to mindover Murder. We'll be right back after

494
00:25:13,559 --> 00:25:21,440
this word from our sponsors. We're back here at mindover Murder.

495
00:25:22,960 --> 00:25:25,640
Speaker 4: And then they're also saying we can't use newspapers dot

496
00:25:25,640 --> 00:25:27,440
com anymore. So you're telling me you can't go look

497
00:25:27,519 --> 00:25:28,880
up my person's obituary.

498
00:25:29,440 --> 00:25:33,279
Speaker 2: This is crazy. I use newspapers dot com probably at

499
00:25:33,319 --> 00:25:38,039
least once a week. They Ancestry also own newspapers dot com.

500
00:25:38,440 --> 00:25:38,680
Speaker 4: I guess.

501
00:25:39,079 --> 00:25:43,799
Speaker 2: So I find myself looking up things regarding our family history,

502
00:25:43,960 --> 00:25:47,039
and it's incredibly helpful to be able to look up

503
00:25:47,079 --> 00:25:50,640
an article. I'm very disturbed by something which is that

504
00:25:50,880 --> 00:25:54,960
many of the sources of information in the ancestry kind

505
00:25:55,000 --> 00:25:58,640
of array of tools that are used by genealogists, our

506
00:25:58,680 --> 00:26:03,640
public information to start with, like local and state records

507
00:26:03,640 --> 00:26:08,279
of births, deaths, marriages. Yeah, and I'm willing to pay

508
00:26:08,319 --> 00:26:10,799
for my subscription. I don't have a problem with it.

509
00:26:10,880 --> 00:26:14,240
I recognize the providing a valuable service. But for them

510
00:26:14,279 --> 00:26:18,160
to say that you can then not look for this. Now,

511
00:26:18,359 --> 00:26:21,920
woman the daughter and it sounds like very happy to

512
00:26:21,960 --> 00:26:25,880
hear from you with information about her late mother. How

513
00:26:25,920 --> 00:26:29,400
can they say, oh, we're not going to allow you

514
00:26:29,799 --> 00:26:33,359
to use this information, and if you pay for it,

515
00:26:33,480 --> 00:26:38,519
you're not doing anything that's untoward or illegal done at all.

516
00:26:38,680 --> 00:26:41,680
Speaker 4: We're just helping the groups and their families. And I

517
00:26:41,680 --> 00:26:43,640
would love, I would actually love to talk to somebody

518
00:26:43,640 --> 00:26:47,480
in Ancestry who did all this, because they actually contradict themselves.

519
00:26:47,680 --> 00:26:50,559
Is also in the terms of service, it says, quote

520
00:26:50,599 --> 00:26:54,079
Ancestry does not claim any ownership rights to your content,

521
00:26:54,480 --> 00:26:57,960
control how you choose to share your content within the services,

522
00:26:58,079 --> 00:27:01,039
or limit how you share it outside of Ancestry. I'm like,

523
00:27:01,200 --> 00:27:03,319
wait a minute, so which is it?

524
00:27:03,359 --> 00:27:05,720
Speaker 2: So which is it? Are you going to try to

525
00:27:05,759 --> 00:27:10,039
prevent me from using this information to move an investigation

526
00:27:10,279 --> 00:27:11,200
forward or not.

527
00:27:12,039 --> 00:27:14,279
Speaker 4: So they have someome they really need to make some

528
00:27:14,400 --> 00:27:16,200
check sits to their wording if you asked me, but

529
00:27:16,240 --> 00:27:18,000
if you want to get minitty gritty, I was just

530
00:27:18,039 --> 00:27:19,960
reading it a line for line. I'm like, wait, this

531
00:27:20,200 --> 00:27:21,240
contradicts what they.

532
00:27:21,279 --> 00:27:24,759
Speaker 2: What it says two paragraphs before this whole thing. It

533
00:27:25,039 --> 00:27:28,119
just I'm disgusted, And like I said, I have no

534
00:27:28,160 --> 00:27:30,799
problem whatsoever paying for the service. I pay for the

535
00:27:30,839 --> 00:27:33,599
service of a year. I use the service. As I

536
00:27:33,680 --> 00:27:36,200
was mentioning to you, I think I probably looked something

537
00:27:36,279 --> 00:27:39,279
up no less than once a week. We have friends

538
00:27:39,319 --> 00:27:42,720
of ours that are helping us research the Colonial Parkway murders,

539
00:27:42,759 --> 00:27:45,359
which is a case. Now we're finally, after all these years,

540
00:27:45,400 --> 00:27:48,519
starting to see some significant movement forward thanks to the

541
00:27:48,640 --> 00:27:52,240
Virginia State Police and SAKE grants at a Sexual Assault

542
00:27:52,279 --> 00:27:55,240
Kit initiative grants that they've been applying for. And now

543
00:27:55,240 --> 00:28:00,240
they've linked this suspector's deceased Alan Wade Wilmer Sr. To

544
00:28:00,400 --> 00:28:03,680
four murders, one pair of which are part of the

545
00:28:03,680 --> 00:28:07,960
Colonial Parkway murders directly, and one Loriente. Powell has a

546
00:28:08,039 --> 00:28:12,640
newly identified victim of Wilmers. She had been considered what

547
00:28:12,720 --> 00:28:17,079
Kristin Dilley often calls Colonial Parkway Murders adjacent. It was

548
00:28:17,119 --> 00:28:19,680
a murder that took place right around the same time

549
00:28:19,720 --> 00:28:22,319
and in the same geographic area of Virginia, and we

550
00:28:22,400 --> 00:28:25,720
had always thought that Lorient Powell might be related to

551
00:28:25,759 --> 00:28:29,000
the Colonial Parkway murders. Again, thanks to the Virginia State Police,

552
00:28:29,160 --> 00:28:34,319
DNA Labs International and their team, Yes, the Department of

553
00:28:34,359 --> 00:28:37,400
Forensic Sciences for the Commonwealth of Virginia, and a whole

554
00:28:37,400 --> 00:28:39,839
bunch of people I'm probably forgetting they all worked together.

555
00:28:40,160 --> 00:28:44,119
Blied Versaki Grant sent the evidence down to DNA Labs

556
00:28:44,160 --> 00:28:47,880
International and lo and behold we got another hit. Amazing,

557
00:28:47,960 --> 00:28:52,519
but it's so exciting when you see this moving forward. Now.

558
00:28:52,559 --> 00:28:56,359
Did they use ancestry in any of their searches? I

559
00:28:56,400 --> 00:28:58,160
don't know. I've never even asked them.

560
00:28:58,519 --> 00:28:59,839
Speaker 4: Who cares right?

561
00:29:00,079 --> 00:29:01,480
Speaker 2: Who cares well?

562
00:29:02,160 --> 00:29:04,839
Speaker 4: You solved a murder? Who doesn't want that?

563
00:29:05,200 --> 00:29:10,519
Speaker 2: Yeah, her family's been waiting for answers for over thirty years.

564
00:29:10,960 --> 00:29:13,039
Speaker 4: I was randing with George about this the other day

565
00:29:13,079 --> 00:29:15,400
and I'm like, who know what he goes? There's one

566
00:29:15,440 --> 00:29:18,039
group Jen and I'm like, who, And he's the criminals themselves.

567
00:29:18,039 --> 00:29:20,839
Speaker 2: I was gonna say, is Joy's talking about the bad guy?

568
00:29:21,640 --> 00:29:23,359
Who else would not want this?

569
00:29:23,759 --> 00:29:26,160
Speaker 4: Yeah, and so Ancestry, let's just help the rapists and

570
00:29:26,240 --> 00:29:27,680
murderers stay out there longer.

571
00:29:27,839 --> 00:29:30,960
Speaker 2: Yeah exactly. They'll be your biggest fans. But the rest

572
00:29:31,000 --> 00:29:33,640
of us are standing here scratching our heads.

573
00:29:33,880 --> 00:29:38,240
Speaker 4: Yeah, it's point not Also, it's taxpayer dollars that paid

574
00:29:38,240 --> 00:29:42,240
to digitize all those public records. Yeah, in story didn't

575
00:29:42,279 --> 00:29:46,920
pay for that. This is unbelievable to me. I'd love

576
00:29:47,079 --> 00:29:50,599
to get somebody from Ancestry on the podcast to explain

577
00:29:50,880 --> 00:29:54,559
just how this benefits anyone. The one thing it did

578
00:29:54,559 --> 00:29:58,880
occur to me reading articles preparing for today's conversation, this

579
00:29:59,000 --> 00:30:02,559
feels like they're trying to protect their terf because they

580
00:30:02,680 --> 00:30:06,039
have and are probably, without questioning, the market leader in

581
00:30:06,119 --> 00:30:08,640
terms of genealogy. I know there are lots of other

582
00:30:08,720 --> 00:30:11,720
sites that provide similar services, but I've found it in

583
00:30:11,759 --> 00:30:16,599
my limited experience that ancestries array of tools are very helpful,

584
00:30:16,759 --> 00:30:18,640
which is why I use.

585
00:30:18,519 --> 00:30:21,240
Speaker 2: It and am happy to pay for it. This almost

586
00:30:21,240 --> 00:30:24,400
feels like a defensive move, like they're trying to prevent

587
00:30:24,599 --> 00:30:28,680
other companies or competitors from getting any kind of leg up.

588
00:30:28,920 --> 00:30:33,480
The whole thing just feels so counter productive. Where would

589
00:30:33,480 --> 00:30:36,920
it leave investigators like yourself in terms of the work

590
00:30:36,920 --> 00:30:39,920
that you do both for your volunteer not for profit

591
00:30:40,240 --> 00:30:43,119
organization and for the work you do during the day.

592
00:30:43,720 --> 00:30:47,000
Speaker 4: Technically there are rules apply to both roles, because in

593
00:30:47,079 --> 00:30:51,240
both roles, I'm working on unsolved cases, whether it's directly

594
00:30:51,440 --> 00:30:55,039
short my law enforcement or indirectly through the nonprofit, but

595
00:30:55,160 --> 00:31:00,000
ultimately for law enforcement use. I'm stuck. I'm literally payicking

596
00:31:00,079 --> 00:31:03,119
because my subscription's gotta run out soon and I'm not

597
00:31:03,200 --> 00:31:06,319
going to have anything, and I will find a replacement,

598
00:31:06,400 --> 00:31:09,039
But what I've found is there's nothing comparable right now

599
00:31:09,079 --> 00:31:12,160
on the market. My understanding is there's a couple of places,

600
00:31:12,200 --> 00:31:14,960
a couple companies that have something that they're working on

601
00:31:15,319 --> 00:31:17,960
that will be allowed to be used by law enforcement.

602
00:31:18,599 --> 00:31:20,920
Is not going to be next month, six months, a year.

603
00:31:21,160 --> 00:31:23,519
Like I got cases that work on. I have massive

604
00:31:23,519 --> 00:31:26,480
family trees I've built in ancestry and now what Yeah,

605
00:31:26,519 --> 00:31:29,319
I can download the jed com file. There are other

606
00:31:29,440 --> 00:31:32,599
programs where you can upload a jed com file. Right,

607
00:31:32,759 --> 00:31:35,559
don't look anything like your tree did on ancestry, and

608
00:31:35,599 --> 00:31:39,039
it's not nearly as usual friendly. It's also not connected

609
00:31:39,039 --> 00:31:43,039
to all those historical records, so there's major limitations, and

610
00:31:43,079 --> 00:31:46,160
it's gonna stall cases. There's absolutely no doubt if we

611
00:31:46,200 --> 00:31:49,200
abide by their terms of service, which my ethical guidelines

612
00:31:49,240 --> 00:31:53,400
say I have to, it's going to stall progress in cases,

613
00:31:53,799 --> 00:31:58,359
especially unidentified human remains cases. Who doesn't want their missing

614
00:31:58,599 --> 00:32:01,839
launched one identified? Oh, there's nobody who wouldn't want Maybe

615
00:32:01,839 --> 00:32:04,480
even a criminal would want that if they're missing their brothers.

616
00:32:04,519 --> 00:32:06,039
Has nothing to do with a crime being.

617
00:32:07,279 --> 00:32:10,000
Speaker 2: I also think the people in those communities when you

618
00:32:10,039 --> 00:32:13,759
hear about someone when they say remains were discovered somewhere.

619
00:32:13,759 --> 00:32:17,279
A lot of times it's in isolated locations, or it's

620
00:32:17,359 --> 00:32:20,599
on a farm or in a barn or places like

621
00:32:20,720 --> 00:32:23,440
that where there really had a complete loss as to

622
00:32:23,519 --> 00:32:27,119
who this person might be. The members of the community

623
00:32:27,240 --> 00:32:29,599
often pull together and they say, we really want to

624
00:32:29,640 --> 00:32:32,720
find out who this person is. There's the humanity of

625
00:32:32,759 --> 00:32:35,559
it all. How tragic it is for someone to die

626
00:32:35,920 --> 00:32:40,359
apparently alone, to not even be known by their families.

627
00:32:40,880 --> 00:32:43,880
People always have these legends, Oh, my uncle moved to

628
00:32:43,920 --> 00:32:47,880
California and we never heard from him again. Maybe that happened,

629
00:32:47,960 --> 00:32:51,599
But what if it didn't. What if exactly your uncle

630
00:32:51,799 --> 00:32:55,559
is the person that was found in this isolated location

631
00:32:55,920 --> 00:32:58,839
with no clue as to who he is.

632
00:32:59,720 --> 00:33:04,160
Speaker 4: I may give a real case scenario there just hopen Nework.

633
00:33:04,920 --> 00:33:07,720
So in nineteen eighty six, here in Colora Springs, the

634
00:33:07,799 --> 00:33:10,720
skeletal remains of a man were found in a field.

635
00:33:11,000 --> 00:33:13,720
I say, there's no walidarid or anything. You give any

636
00:33:13,720 --> 00:33:16,200
indication who he is. He was shot in the head.

637
00:33:16,279 --> 00:33:20,079
It's a homicide. Forty years twenty twenty six, forty years.

638
00:33:20,680 --> 00:33:23,519
Just last week we met with Ramdville College and if

639
00:33:23,680 --> 00:33:26,799
law enforcement out there is listening and you have unidentified remains,

640
00:33:26,920 --> 00:33:30,240
we use contact Ramobow because they had this amazing program

641
00:33:30,519 --> 00:33:34,799
where they will hey for the development of the SNIP profile,

642
00:33:34,839 --> 00:33:37,000
which is a type of DNA profile you need to

643
00:33:37,039 --> 00:33:40,440
do genealogy, and they're students who are genealogists in training,

644
00:33:40,720 --> 00:33:44,000
put together the family tree based on those connections and

645
00:33:44,039 --> 00:33:47,039
figure out who your person probably is. Just had a

646
00:33:47,079 --> 00:33:49,680
meeting Thursday. They put it We're on a zoom just

647
00:33:49,680 --> 00:33:51,200
like you and I are right now. They put up

648
00:33:51,200 --> 00:33:54,119
a PowerPoint its side too. It says, here's your league

649
00:33:54,160 --> 00:33:56,720
candidate with a name and a lack of wow because

650
00:33:56,960 --> 00:33:59,519
love it so one hundred percent confirmed.

651
00:33:59,160 --> 00:34:01,880
Speaker 2: Not confirmed yet but not even part of the less.

652
00:34:01,880 --> 00:34:07,400
Speaker 4: Right so emotionally and positively overwhelming. Forty years and we've

653
00:34:07,440 --> 00:34:10,039
been trying to figure out who this guy is. Yeah,

654
00:34:10,159 --> 00:34:12,800
this poor man MO homicide investigation. If you don't know

655
00:34:12,800 --> 00:34:14,079
who the victim is, because.

656
00:34:13,840 --> 00:34:17,280
Speaker 2: It's right, Yeah, you can't ever tell who killed someone

657
00:34:17,320 --> 00:34:19,480
if you don't even know who the poor victim is

658
00:34:19,840 --> 00:34:22,360
to start with. You have a name, Now I.

659
00:34:22,440 --> 00:34:25,199
Speaker 4: Have a name, and everything so far in our research

660
00:34:25,599 --> 00:34:29,119
is falling into place, thankfully. He has a brother and

661
00:34:29,159 --> 00:34:32,320
Hassan who were alive. Huh I did both of them?

662
00:34:32,800 --> 00:34:35,760
Speaker 2: Did they know what ever happened to them? To their

663
00:34:36,280 --> 00:34:37,800
no idea brother.

664
00:34:37,679 --> 00:34:40,559
Speaker 4: And he was an infant when his dad went missing.

665
00:34:40,599 --> 00:34:42,760
It was killed. He had no memory of his dad,

666
00:34:43,000 --> 00:34:45,719
and he'd heard stories through the years like maybe he

667
00:34:45,760 --> 00:34:47,840
was in witness protection and stuff like that.

668
00:34:48,039 --> 00:34:51,519
Speaker 2: Yeah. Boy, some of these start to sound like urban legends.

669
00:34:51,559 --> 00:34:55,320
Speaker 4: After a while, Draling was a little more reliable, but

670
00:34:55,400 --> 00:34:57,159
not much. He's like, I think the last tie my

671
00:34:57,239 --> 00:34:59,519
son was in the late seventies, and I remember he's

672
00:34:59,559 --> 00:35:02,039
out my mom and then he took off, and but

673
00:35:02,159 --> 00:35:04,079
he moved around a lot. He was in and out

674
00:35:04,119 --> 00:35:07,119
of jail, and we just lost track of it. And

675
00:35:07,239 --> 00:35:11,000
so without genealogy, we never ever would have figured out

676
00:35:11,039 --> 00:35:13,320
who this is because he was never reported as missing.

677
00:35:13,760 --> 00:35:16,440
None of his relatives are felons, so they're not in codis,

678
00:35:16,440 --> 00:35:18,760
so there's no DNA hit and there was nothing else

679
00:35:18,800 --> 00:35:22,079
to go on. So without genealogy, he would still be unnamed.

680
00:35:22,480 --> 00:35:25,000
This will be the first case at my Sheriff's office

681
00:35:25,039 --> 00:35:27,559
that I can't co exult because it's still.

682
00:35:27,440 --> 00:35:30,519
Speaker 2: An open homes Did you've identified the victim?

683
00:35:30,559 --> 00:35:32,920
Speaker 4: You've identified, We've solved part of it, and be the

684
00:35:32,960 --> 00:35:35,760
first one where we used genealogy to do again. I

685
00:35:35,840 --> 00:35:38,199
keep saying, who wouldn't want that for their family member?

686
00:35:38,360 --> 00:35:42,159
His brother was just overwhelmed naturally emotions, But who wouldn't

687
00:35:42,159 --> 00:35:45,440
want their loved one found and identified? And so now

688
00:35:45,599 --> 00:35:47,920
we can give him his name back, Now we can

689
00:35:47,920 --> 00:35:49,960
give his remains to his family, so he can have

690
00:35:50,000 --> 00:35:53,119
a proper burial. Those things are so important.

691
00:35:53,039 --> 00:35:55,760
Speaker 2: They are, and this is the kind of thing where

692
00:35:55,800 --> 00:35:59,360
you think to yourself, why would ancestry want to stand

693
00:35:59,400 --> 00:36:03,440
in the way of giving that family answers. They have

694
00:36:03,599 --> 00:36:08,760
every right to use the ancestry system to find their

695
00:36:09,159 --> 00:36:13,159
lost brother and father. I recognize that it would be

696
00:36:13,199 --> 00:36:15,599
a significant challenge. I'm not saying it can't be done,

697
00:36:15,840 --> 00:36:18,760
and your team might be able to actually solve the

698
00:36:18,800 --> 00:36:22,360
homicide part of this equation. But at least we've solved

699
00:36:22,400 --> 00:36:25,880
the missing person's side of the equation. And with all

700
00:36:25,960 --> 00:36:28,719
due respect, no, he didn't go into witness protection or

701
00:36:28,719 --> 00:36:31,719
anything like that. He was a homicide victim. They have

702
00:36:31,800 --> 00:36:33,880
to live with that sadness, but at least they know

703
00:36:34,000 --> 00:36:37,119
what happened to him, and as you said, if they

704
00:36:37,320 --> 00:36:40,639
choose to, they'll know where his remains are. They can

705
00:36:41,039 --> 00:36:44,199
if there's a family plot or whatever. I just think

706
00:36:44,360 --> 00:36:47,639
this is a human being. He deserved to be treated

707
00:36:47,679 --> 00:36:51,920
with respect. And it took forty years the science caught

708
00:36:52,000 --> 00:36:55,519
up here, and this is a great use of genealogy.

709
00:36:56,119 --> 00:36:58,239
Speaker 4: Yeah, I don't know why they want to forbid that.

710
00:36:58,800 --> 00:37:00,440
What the ultimately they do is I have more of

711
00:37:00,480 --> 00:37:02,880
law enforcement off their site. Of course, so they're gonna

712
00:37:02,920 --> 00:37:04,880
lose a bunch of money. I'm sure one of these

713
00:37:04,920 --> 00:37:08,000
other companies is going to develop something very similar and

714
00:37:08,039 --> 00:37:09,719
then all the business will go there.

715
00:37:10,000 --> 00:37:12,400
Speaker 2: Yeah, so it doesn't have to be that way.

716
00:37:12,519 --> 00:37:15,199
Speaker 4: So I got a lot of people say just keep

717
00:37:15,320 --> 00:37:18,400
using it and they're never gonna know. But there's problems

718
00:37:18,400 --> 00:37:21,199
with that when you're law enforcement, because you have ethical guidelines, right,

719
00:37:21,679 --> 00:37:26,360
and you've built of follow those morally. Personally, I want

720
00:37:26,360 --> 00:37:28,280
to say, yeah, I'm just gonna keep using it, but

721
00:37:28,559 --> 00:37:31,679
I can't and my agency won't let me. So I

722
00:37:31,840 --> 00:37:35,079
have to find an alternate, and we will. It's just

723
00:37:35,119 --> 00:37:36,920
gonna be a challenge, and I know I'm not the

724
00:37:36,960 --> 00:37:38,719
only one in this country going through it. I'm sure

725
00:37:38,719 --> 00:37:41,519
there's tons of others panicking and trying to figure out

726
00:37:41,639 --> 00:37:42,159
what to do.

727
00:37:42,199 --> 00:37:46,679
Speaker 2: Also, in the example you just used from Colorado Springs,

728
00:37:47,039 --> 00:37:50,920
will there be an announcement that his remains have been found?

729
00:37:51,559 --> 00:37:52,480
What's the next step?

730
00:37:53,119 --> 00:37:56,320
Speaker 4: So we got the brother and son's cheek swaps, and

731
00:37:56,360 --> 00:37:58,599
then those will go to the lab and they'll do

732
00:37:58,639 --> 00:38:01,559
a one to one comparison between the DNA profile from

733
00:38:01,559 --> 00:38:04,960
the skeleton to those two relatives, and then they'll pretty

734
00:38:04,960 --> 00:38:07,800
confidently be able to say, yeah, this is the guy,

735
00:38:08,159 --> 00:38:11,039
especially since we have his son. That's really good and

736
00:38:11,079 --> 00:38:13,199
then we'll then me and my partner will write on

737
00:38:13,280 --> 00:38:15,800
the press release and there will be an announcement. But

738
00:38:15,840 --> 00:38:18,000
we don't want to be premature because there is still

739
00:38:18,039 --> 00:38:20,400
a chance that it's not him, we think, so we

740
00:38:20,480 --> 00:38:23,159
have to be sure DNA wise. But yes, but it'll

741
00:38:23,159 --> 00:38:25,360
probably be a couple of months because lab work takes

742
00:38:25,400 --> 00:38:29,719
a while. Super exciting, it's just you can't describe the feeling.

743
00:38:29,840 --> 00:38:32,039
You can identify, I think with what I'm feeling in

744
00:38:32,039 --> 00:38:35,559
a way like when they start getting the DANI results

745
00:38:35,800 --> 00:38:39,000
around the murders that are possibly connected to your sister,

746
00:38:39,360 --> 00:38:43,079
I'm sure you get that same elation, Okay, And.

747
00:38:43,000 --> 00:38:46,960
Speaker 2: We're thrilled for the other family where eight visions and

748
00:38:47,599 --> 00:38:49,519
what they call the core of what they call the

749
00:38:49,519 --> 00:38:53,800
Colonial Parkway murders, four couples. We've always said for years,

750
00:38:54,280 --> 00:38:59,079
decades even that we would be happy with any movement whatsoever,

751
00:38:59,320 --> 00:39:01,519
and so for us to find out and we all

752
00:39:01,559 --> 00:39:04,719
know each other that the killer of Robin Edwards and

753
00:39:04,840 --> 00:39:06,719
David Nobling, who were one of the couples in the

754
00:39:06,719 --> 00:39:10,199
Colonial Parkway murders, I know those people. I have spent

755
00:39:10,400 --> 00:39:13,400
a lot of time with the Edwards and Nobling families,

756
00:39:14,159 --> 00:39:18,000
I'm beyond thrilled that they finally have answers. I'm not

757
00:39:18,039 --> 00:39:21,079
saying it makes their lives perfect from here on out.

758
00:39:21,320 --> 00:39:25,280
We all have the usual struggles in real life. It

759
00:39:25,440 --> 00:39:29,599
makes me happy that they have answers. Our suspect Wilmer

760
00:39:29,920 --> 00:39:32,960
is dead. But we're grown ups here. We know that

761
00:39:33,079 --> 00:39:36,119
it's been thirty nine years since the start of this case.

762
00:39:36,559 --> 00:39:38,880
We knew there was a real good chance that with

763
00:39:39,000 --> 00:39:42,000
so many years going by, there's a very good chance

764
00:39:42,199 --> 00:39:46,400
that the offender would be deceased by the time we

765
00:39:46,400 --> 00:39:48,880
were able to identify him, and that would probably be

766
00:39:49,559 --> 00:39:52,840
a good chance, good chance in the case you're describing too,

767
00:39:52,880 --> 00:39:57,039
it's been forty years. Answers are very meaningful, and I've

768
00:39:57,079 --> 00:40:01,079
been trying to convey this to particularly the FBI, who

769
00:40:01,159 --> 00:40:04,480
are handling my sister and Rebekadowski's case. Two of the

770
00:40:04,599 --> 00:40:07,280
double homicides in our case are FBI cases because they

771
00:40:07,280 --> 00:40:10,199
happen inside in National Park, and then two of them

772
00:40:10,400 --> 00:40:13,159
are handled by the Virginia State Police because they happen

773
00:40:13,320 --> 00:40:17,360
outside the National Park. But I've been trying to explain

774
00:40:17,639 --> 00:40:21,719
to the investigators over the years, answers are very meaningful.

775
00:40:22,280 --> 00:40:26,000
If we have three hundred thousand cold case homicides here

776
00:40:26,039 --> 00:40:28,000
in the United States. First of all, I believe that

777
00:40:28,039 --> 00:40:29,440
should be a national scandal.

778
00:40:30,360 --> 00:40:33,000
Speaker 4: It is in crisis and many other words.

779
00:40:33,119 --> 00:40:35,880
Speaker 2: Yeah. At the same time, if you think about it,

780
00:40:36,159 --> 00:40:39,239
let's just say each one of those three hundred thousand

781
00:40:39,320 --> 00:40:42,039
people has a mom and dad and a couple siblings.

782
00:40:42,559 --> 00:40:45,639
At a minimum, they're probably related to four people. I'm

783
00:40:45,679 --> 00:40:47,840
just making this up. That means that right here in

784
00:40:47,880 --> 00:40:52,199
America tonight, there are over a million people struggling to

785
00:40:52,239 --> 00:40:55,000
get to sleep every single night for the rest of

786
00:40:55,079 --> 00:41:00,199
their lives, wondering what happened to their loved one. I

787
00:41:00,239 --> 00:41:04,599
think answers it's not always about punishment. Yes, of course,

788
00:41:04,679 --> 00:41:07,320
if they identify an offender, and we do have some

789
00:41:07,440 --> 00:41:11,000
living potential offenders in our case, would I like to

790
00:41:11,039 --> 00:41:13,920
see them in jail for the rest of their lives. Absolutely,

791
00:41:14,519 --> 00:41:19,880
Even answers are very meaningful and important. Like you say,

792
00:41:19,960 --> 00:41:22,519
for this young woman who was one year old when

793
00:41:22,559 --> 00:41:25,800
her mom died, it was very meaningful for her to

794
00:41:26,039 --> 00:41:29,000
be provided with this information, just like the brother and

795
00:41:29,119 --> 00:41:32,000
the son of this man that was a homicide victim.

796
00:41:32,079 --> 00:41:35,239
Because even as you describe the situation, I thought to myself. Man,

797
00:41:35,320 --> 00:41:37,400
that's going to be a long shot to solve that

798
00:41:37,519 --> 00:41:40,880
homicide forty years later. It isn't like you got a

799
00:41:40,960 --> 00:41:45,360
running start way back in eighty six. At the same time,

800
00:41:45,719 --> 00:41:49,159
to know what happened to him, what happened to her,

801
00:41:49,559 --> 00:41:56,159
that's incredibly important. Absolutely, I'm shocked that ancestry feels that

802
00:41:56,440 --> 00:42:00,719
throwing up roadblocks in the path of hardworking and investigators

803
00:42:00,840 --> 00:42:06,119
and forensic genealogists, law enforcement and other well meaning people

804
00:42:06,400 --> 00:42:08,079
around the country. I think it's shocking.

805
00:42:08,800 --> 00:42:12,280
Speaker 4: Yeah, and why could we at least get an explanation.

806
00:42:11,960 --> 00:42:14,639
Speaker 2: Because yeah, I still I haven't I haven't heard one.

807
00:42:15,159 --> 00:42:18,000
Speaker 4: Very unclear as to what happened that led them to

808
00:42:18,039 --> 00:42:20,920
make this decision. But obviously the higher up's ancestry don't

809
00:42:20,960 --> 00:42:23,559
have any missing persons or homeside victims in their families,

810
00:42:23,599 --> 00:42:26,960
because yeah, can ie making this decision that they did.

811
00:42:27,159 --> 00:42:29,239
Speaker 2: Welcome to my world. I'd be happy to sit down

812
00:42:29,280 --> 00:42:30,320
with them, and I'll be polite.

813
00:42:30,440 --> 00:42:32,480
Speaker 4: That's same year.

814
00:42:33,000 --> 00:42:35,440
Speaker 2: I can't thank you enough for coming on Mind over

815
00:42:35,559 --> 00:42:39,320
Murder and explaining a little bit about what's happened, perhaps

816
00:42:39,360 --> 00:42:42,039
just as importantly, how this is going to impact cold

817
00:42:42,119 --> 00:42:45,280
case investigations in Colorado and across the country.

818
00:42:45,599 --> 00:42:48,199
Speaker 4: Everywhere it's going to stow. Some will into a cross

819
00:42:48,199 --> 00:42:50,760
for a while, So I hope. I guess they can

820
00:42:50,800 --> 00:42:53,119
sleep fine with that at night. But I can't. And

821
00:42:53,280 --> 00:42:55,639
I will say, if you don't mind me addressing the

822
00:42:55,639 --> 00:42:59,719
privacy concerns that often come up. Sure, I'm still in

823
00:42:59,800 --> 00:43:03,239
your from so many people. I'm not letting law enforcement

824
00:43:03,239 --> 00:43:05,639
out of access to my DNA. Listen to me, Your

825
00:43:05,760 --> 00:43:09,599
DNA is not actually in any of these databases. Yes,

826
00:43:09,760 --> 00:43:12,280
new spit in a tube and they developed a profile,

827
00:43:12,360 --> 00:43:15,239
but that is not welling into the database. They turned

828
00:43:15,239 --> 00:43:17,440
it into a code, which if he wrote it out

829
00:43:17,480 --> 00:43:18,920
on a piece of paper and found all the street

830
00:43:18,920 --> 00:43:22,639
would mean absolutely nothing. It's a code inversion that goes

831
00:43:22,679 --> 00:43:25,519
in the database and your actual DNA is destroyed. So

832
00:43:25,760 --> 00:43:29,159
I can't go in ancestry and take your DNA and

833
00:43:29,239 --> 00:43:31,519
plant it out a crime scene, or give it to

834
00:43:31,599 --> 00:43:35,480
a health insurance company, or any of that. Moment that

835
00:43:35,559 --> 00:43:39,880
I'm still hearing, it's not true. Even in ancestry, you

836
00:43:39,880 --> 00:43:43,199
can make your family tree one hundred percent completely private

837
00:43:43,280 --> 00:43:45,559
so nobody can see it. I know this because this

838
00:43:45,639 --> 00:43:47,960
is how I this is the settings I use for

839
00:43:48,039 --> 00:43:51,280
my victims family trees. If you have privacy concerns, just

840
00:43:51,320 --> 00:43:53,199
make your tree completely private. And if you want to

841
00:43:53,239 --> 00:43:55,039
know how to shoot me email, I'll tell you how.

842
00:43:55,519 --> 00:43:56,960
Not part it's two settings.

843
00:43:57,440 --> 00:44:00,159
Speaker 2: But jen that they're going to clone me. You know

844
00:44:00,159 --> 00:44:00,960
they're going to clone me?

845
00:44:01,159 --> 00:44:04,400
Speaker 4: No, so I only join and address up privacy concerned

846
00:44:04,639 --> 00:44:07,119
like even have a couple family members on not why

847
00:44:07,159 --> 00:44:08,519
law enforcement see why DNA?

848
00:44:08,920 --> 00:44:09,840
Speaker 2: You don't have to.

849
00:44:10,320 --> 00:44:11,880
Speaker 4: Yeah, I'm not seeing your DNA.

850
00:44:12,039 --> 00:44:14,079
Speaker 2: If you want to say no, just say no.

851
00:44:14,519 --> 00:44:16,760
Speaker 4: Yeah. So I don't know why Ancestry couldn't just do

852
00:44:16,800 --> 00:44:17,480
an opt in.

853
00:44:17,480 --> 00:44:21,280
Speaker 2: Opt out type saying Heaven forbid is due?

854
00:44:21,599 --> 00:44:23,639
Speaker 4: Yeah, or people just learn how to make their treat

855
00:44:23,719 --> 00:44:26,239
private if you don't want law enforcement to see you treat.

856
00:44:26,320 --> 00:44:29,599
Speaker 2: But it's as simple as checking and unchecking boxes. And

857
00:44:29,639 --> 00:44:32,519
if you feel strongly about it, I understand, then just

858
00:44:32,719 --> 00:44:35,440
check the box or unchecked the box that says this

859
00:44:35,480 --> 00:44:37,840
can be used by law enforcement. And I want to

860
00:44:37,880 --> 00:44:41,480
be clear heer. This is not currently an applicable use

861
00:44:41,840 --> 00:44:46,320
on the Ancestry database. It's only jedmatch and family Tree

862
00:44:46,440 --> 00:44:50,199
DNA and the off RAM database that allow this kind

863
00:44:50,199 --> 00:44:53,960
of use by law enforcement. I don't get the paranoia.

864
00:44:54,079 --> 00:44:58,199
I understand there are people that distrust law enforcement. Look,

865
00:44:58,239 --> 00:45:00,639
I've had my issues with law enforcement over the issue.

866
00:45:01,360 --> 00:45:04,480
Any final thoughts before we wrap, How.

867
00:45:04,280 --> 00:45:06,960
Speaker 4: Is this going to play out in sport someday? And

868
00:45:07,480 --> 00:45:11,199
I can already hear my ideas office saying, oh, you

869
00:45:11,280 --> 00:45:13,599
went against the term of service of a company, but

870
00:45:13,760 --> 00:45:16,280
means we can't use anything that you collected, like fruit

871
00:45:16,280 --> 00:45:18,800
to the poisonous tree. But the thing is a term

872
00:45:18,840 --> 00:45:22,079
of service is not a law. So Ancestrys hasn't created

873
00:45:22,119 --> 00:45:24,519
a law. I don't know what does light lead to,

874
00:45:24,599 --> 00:45:26,760
and I don't even want to speculate, but I will

875
00:45:26,800 --> 00:45:29,280
just say there's no court precedence yet that I know

876
00:45:29,400 --> 00:45:32,239
about where an agency did go against the terms of

877
00:45:32,239 --> 00:45:35,159
service and then what happened the judge? What a judge

878
00:45:35,199 --> 00:45:38,239
showed out. I would hope not I identify somebody or whatever.

879
00:45:38,280 --> 00:45:40,119
But it will be interesting to see how this plays

880
00:45:40,119 --> 00:45:42,119
out in court in the future. But it could cause

881
00:45:42,480 --> 00:45:45,079
really a ton of problems in court cases too, depending

882
00:45:45,119 --> 00:45:45,840
on the judge.

883
00:45:46,199 --> 00:45:49,079
Speaker 2: We'll be following this as we go along, and we'll

884
00:45:49,119 --> 00:45:52,239
definitely have you back for further conversations about what you're

885
00:45:52,239 --> 00:45:56,199
doing solving cold cases and helping families get answers.

886
00:45:56,639 --> 00:45:58,840
Speaker 4: Well, I very much appreciate it. Thank you.

887
00:46:00,000 --> 00:46:02,119
Speaker 2: We'll do it for this episode of mind Over Murder.

888
00:46:02,400 --> 00:46:03,480
We'll see you next time.

889
00:46:13,280 --> 00:46:16,800
Speaker 1: Mind Over Murder is a production of Absolute Zero and

890
00:46:16,880 --> 00:46:18,320
Another Dog Productions.

891
00:46:18,880 --> 00:46:22,199
Speaker 2: Our executive producers are Bill Thomas and Kristin Dilley.

892
00:46:22,559 --> 00:46:25,000
Speaker 1: Our logo art is by Pamela Arnois.

893
00:46:25,639 --> 00:46:27,679
Speaker 2: Our theme music is by Kevin McLoud.

894
00:46:28,239 --> 00:46:32,119
Speaker 1: Mind Over Murder is distributed in partnership with crawl Space Media.

895
00:46:32,920 --> 00:46:36,079
Speaker 2: You can follow us on Facebook, Twitter, or Instagram.

896
00:46:36,280 --> 00:46:38,840
Speaker 1: You can also follow our page on the Colonial Parkway

897
00:46:38,920 --> 00:46:40,760
Murders on Facebook.

898
00:46:40,519 --> 00:46:43,559
Speaker 2: And finally, you can follow Bill Thomas on Twitter at

899
00:46:43,599 --> 00:46:45,199
Bill Thomas five six.

900
00:46:45,679 --> 00:47:01,119
Speaker 1: Thank you for listening to mind Over murdero

