WEBVTT 1 00:00:01.000 --> 00:00:06.000 It's nights with Dan Ray. I'm telling you easy Boston video. 2 00:00:07.799 --> 00:00:10.759 Dan Walkin's like very much as we head into our 3 00:00:10.880 --> 00:00:13.279 tenth hour here on this Tuesday night. And wasn't it 4 00:00:13.400 --> 00:00:16.640 cold out there today? Imagine? Must not have been a 5 00:00:16.640 --> 00:00:18.800 fun night at Fenway Park. It wasn't a fun night 6 00:00:18.800 --> 00:00:21.239 at Fenway Park because the Red Sox lost for the 7 00:00:21.280 --> 00:00:23.359 second night in a row to the Toronto Blue Jays. 8 00:00:23.399 --> 00:00:27.440 But the weather, they must have not had too many 9 00:00:27.519 --> 00:00:31.320 too much in beer sales. I would guess hot chocolate 10 00:00:31.399 --> 00:00:34.520 was the hot commodity tonight at the old Ballpark, that's 11 00:00:34.520 --> 00:00:36.679 for sure. So the Red Sox just six and six 12 00:00:37.439 --> 00:00:41.240 back to five hundred and hey, season is still young. 13 00:00:41.679 --> 00:00:46.000 They haven't even hit the ten mark of the season. Okay, 14 00:00:46.920 --> 00:00:51.799 many of you, I think know about a couple of 15 00:00:51.799 --> 00:00:55.840 those websites there. One is called ancestry dot com and 16 00:00:55.880 --> 00:00:59.119 the other is twenty three and me uh. And those 17 00:00:59.240 --> 00:01:03.240 websites that used to heavily advertise on television. I don't 18 00:01:03.280 --> 00:01:06.280 know that they are still well. One is in bankruptcy. 19 00:01:06.959 --> 00:01:09.680 But they would tell you a lot, or they would 20 00:01:10.040 --> 00:01:12.319 tell you that they had the ability to tell you 21 00:01:12.400 --> 00:01:17.120 a lot about your ancestry. About your heritage, about whether 22 00:01:17.239 --> 00:01:22.400 or not you were, you know, all from one part 23 00:01:22.400 --> 00:01:26.239 of the world, or if you uh, your your heritage 24 00:01:26.319 --> 00:01:30.000 came from many different countries. And they did that with 25 00:01:30.799 --> 00:01:35.519 generally a DNA sample that you would send voluntarily, and 26 00:01:35.840 --> 00:01:37.640 it was fun. A lot of people learned a lot 27 00:01:37.680 --> 00:01:42.599 about their background. I never did it. I never had 28 00:01:42.599 --> 00:01:45.680 the curiosity because I feel I know where my people 29 00:01:45.719 --> 00:01:49.799 came from, you know, the old sod And I didn't 30 00:01:49.799 --> 00:01:51.879 think that, although I guess I was a little bit 31 00:01:51.920 --> 00:01:55.359 intrigued by it, because look, there could be all of 32 00:01:55.439 --> 00:01:58.079 us if you go back five, six, eight, ten generations, 33 00:01:58.120 --> 00:02:03.920 maybe there's somebody from a different part of the world 34 00:02:04.560 --> 00:02:08.599 in your background, in your family's background. Well, twenty three 35 00:02:08.599 --> 00:02:11.800 of me is now file for bankruptcy. Ancestry dot Com, 36 00:02:11.840 --> 00:02:14.080 I think is still in business. But a guy that 37 00:02:14.199 --> 00:02:16.680 knows a lot more about all of this stuff is 38 00:02:16.759 --> 00:02:21.120 Jason Kelly. Jason is what's called an activism director at 39 00:02:21.120 --> 00:02:25.400 the Electronic Frontier Foundation. So first of all, Jason, tell 40 00:02:25.479 --> 00:02:29.360 us what the Electronic Frontier Foundation is, and then what 41 00:02:29.520 --> 00:02:33.240 is an activism director. I'm sure that when you were 42 00:02:33.280 --> 00:02:36.039 ten years old and they asked you in school, Jason 43 00:02:36.120 --> 00:02:37.560 what do you want to be when you grow up? 44 00:02:37.680 --> 00:02:39.919 I want to be an activism director. 45 00:02:40.080 --> 00:02:43.159 Missus Smith, I'm sure that was not what you just said. 46 00:02:44.800 --> 00:02:46.520 How are you? 47 00:02:46.520 --> 00:02:48.639 You're right about that? Thanks for having me on, Dan. 48 00:02:49.840 --> 00:02:51.960 Yeah, I wanted to be a writer when I was 49 00:02:52.000 --> 00:02:55.759 a kid, and you know, I do a little writing now. 50 00:02:55.800 --> 00:02:58.879 As an activism director, I somewhat get to fulfill that. 51 00:03:00.080 --> 00:03:05.120 The The Electronic Frontier Foundation is a impact litigation law 52 00:03:05.159 --> 00:03:08.879 firm that's been around for over thirty years, not with 53 00:03:09.000 --> 00:03:11.520 me the whole time. I've only been there about a decade, 54 00:03:11.520 --> 00:03:16.639 but we started in the nineties and you can think 55 00:03:16.639 --> 00:03:18.199 of us kind of like the ASLU. 56 00:03:18.400 --> 00:03:19.240 It's a it's. 57 00:03:19.080 --> 00:03:24.080 An organization that pushes for laws to be more privacy protective, 58 00:03:24.960 --> 00:03:29.039 more free speech protective. But our focus is primarily around 59 00:03:29.919 --> 00:03:33.680 digital technology around you know, the growth of technology and 60 00:03:33.879 --> 00:03:37.919 laws that impact what you do online. You know what 61 00:03:37.960 --> 00:03:41.280 computers know about you, you know what companies collect, that 62 00:03:41.439 --> 00:03:47.319 sort of thing, and you know, the activism team focuses 63 00:03:47.360 --> 00:03:50.000 on a lot of different stuff, but we think of 64 00:03:50.000 --> 00:03:53.039 ourselves as one of the three prongs in the in 65 00:03:53.080 --> 00:03:56.439 the fight that e FF is engaged in. So we've 66 00:03:56.439 --> 00:04:00.800 got the legal team, which does impact litigations. So you know, 67 00:04:00.879 --> 00:04:03.319 a law comes out or a company is you know, 68 00:04:03.360 --> 00:04:07.680 taking advantage of someone, we go to court and file 69 00:04:07.719 --> 00:04:10.680 a lot of briefs and things like that you can imagine, 70 00:04:10.719 --> 00:04:12.560 just like the ACLU, and they join us in a 71 00:04:12.599 --> 00:04:14.599 lot of cases as well. And then we've got a 72 00:04:14.639 --> 00:04:20.160 technologist department that's like the smarty Pants that really understand 73 00:04:20.160 --> 00:04:23.720 how computers work, and they help us understand new technology. 74 00:04:24.839 --> 00:04:27.120 You know, we talk with people in the Senate and 75 00:04:27.439 --> 00:04:30.800 they help everyone who needs to know how these kinds 76 00:04:30.800 --> 00:04:33.920 of things work understand them. And then the Activism team 77 00:04:34.560 --> 00:04:37.519 is sort of like the Comms department, you know. We 78 00:04:37.519 --> 00:04:42.199 we make sure that that people can understand the confusing laws, 79 00:04:42.639 --> 00:04:46.560 the confusing technology, and we overall try to get people 80 00:04:46.600 --> 00:04:49.839 to take action. When there's let's say a law that 81 00:04:50.000 --> 00:04:53.839 Congress is debating or a state is you know, putting forward, 82 00:04:54.360 --> 00:04:57.000 we try to tell people, hey, here's what this law does. 83 00:04:57.160 --> 00:04:59.199 If you care about it, you know, reach out to 84 00:04:59.240 --> 00:05:02.560 your representa and let them know either way, which whichever 85 00:05:02.639 --> 00:05:07.199 way it is. And you know, we were very very occasionally, 86 00:05:07.920 --> 00:05:10.560 once every few years we may put on a protest 87 00:05:10.639 --> 00:05:12.839 or something like that. A few years ago, I flew 88 00:05:12.920 --> 00:05:15.279 well I didn't fly it, but we flew a plane 89 00:05:15.319 --> 00:05:19.800 over Apple's headquarters because they were getting ready to make 90 00:05:19.879 --> 00:05:22.959 some changes to how they encrypt their their devices that 91 00:05:23.199 --> 00:05:25.480 we didn't like and a bunch of people were worried 92 00:05:25.480 --> 00:05:28.160 about and we won that fight. So they didn't do that, 93 00:05:28.319 --> 00:05:30.560 and that was that was one of those little stunts 94 00:05:30.560 --> 00:05:33.560 that you know, only an activism director can pull off. 95 00:05:34.040 --> 00:05:36.399 So that's that's the basis of it. 96 00:05:36.879 --> 00:05:40.439 Okay, well, real quickly, we're going to talk about twenty 97 00:05:40.439 --> 00:05:42.319 three and Me and the filing for bankruptcy and the 98 00:05:42.360 --> 00:05:46.360 implications thereof. And I know that there's probably a bunch 99 00:05:46.360 --> 00:05:48.199 of these companies out there, but the only ones that 100 00:05:48.279 --> 00:05:51.639 I really saw advertised on TV to an extent was 101 00:05:51.879 --> 00:05:55.399 twenty three in me in Ancestry dot Com. Am I 102 00:05:55.439 --> 00:05:58.600 missing anything? I'd be other than those? As the two 103 00:05:58.680 --> 00:06:00.480 big companies that are in this are. 104 00:06:01.439 --> 00:06:03.639 Those are the big ones. You're correct about that. 105 00:06:03.680 --> 00:06:07.000 There are a few that I don't exactly understand, you know, 106 00:06:07.040 --> 00:06:10.759 what their business model is. But for example, there's ged Match, 107 00:06:11.360 --> 00:06:14.519 is a company that has you know, let's say, ten 108 00:06:14.600 --> 00:06:17.959 percent of the customer base of ancestry dot Com. 109 00:06:18.240 --> 00:06:18.680 There are a. 110 00:06:18.639 --> 00:06:23.040 Couple that are you know, that size, and they don't 111 00:06:23.040 --> 00:06:25.279 have as you know, I think that everyone. 112 00:06:25.000 --> 00:06:27.079 Understands they don't have quite as much information. 113 00:06:27.240 --> 00:06:31.040 They might be a little cheaper, but yeah, basically there 114 00:06:31.040 --> 00:06:33.120 are those two in the in the field. 115 00:06:33.439 --> 00:06:39.720 Okay. So now one of the big, the big companies, 116 00:06:39.759 --> 00:06:43.639 twenty three in ME his file for bankruptcy, and the 117 00:06:43.759 --> 00:06:45.839 article that I read said that a lot of people 118 00:06:45.920 --> 00:06:49.240 are a little freaked out about this because obviously, when 119 00:06:49.600 --> 00:06:53.199 twenty three and ME files for bankruptcy, there are some 120 00:06:53.360 --> 00:06:58.839 elements of that country that have some value and they 121 00:06:58.879 --> 00:07:03.040 have to dispose of that the material, whether it's you know, 122 00:07:03.199 --> 00:07:07.800 desks and chairs or whether it's information panels that might 123 00:07:08.040 --> 00:07:11.720 be of some value to companies. So it's theoretical that 124 00:07:11.720 --> 00:07:15.439 that people could have this information which they confided into 125 00:07:15.720 --> 00:07:18.279 twenty three and meters, which now is going to be 126 00:07:18.920 --> 00:07:22.560 be bartered or you know, was sold to another country, 127 00:07:22.560 --> 00:07:24.759 and that's kind of freaking people out rightfully. 128 00:07:24.800 --> 00:07:30.079 So yeah, I think so, you know, I think of 129 00:07:30.120 --> 00:07:34.439 this a little bit like if you you know, gave 130 00:07:34.480 --> 00:07:38.600 your credit card information to a company and that company 131 00:07:38.639 --> 00:07:42.000 got bought by another company, and now you know, you're 132 00:07:42.000 --> 00:07:45.160 not necessarily worried that they're going to run your credit card, 133 00:07:45.199 --> 00:07:49.519 but you never really know. And in this case, instead 134 00:07:49.560 --> 00:07:51.600 of a credit card which you can cancel, which you 135 00:07:51.600 --> 00:07:54.160 can change the number and you know, block and everything, 136 00:07:54.800 --> 00:07:58.600 your DNA is not going to change. And so anybody 137 00:07:58.600 --> 00:08:05.480 who has that it forever, and they can't necessarily just 138 00:08:06.600 --> 00:08:09.399 you know, do a scan and learn everything in the 139 00:08:09.399 --> 00:08:12.560 world about you. It's it's more complicated than that. But 140 00:08:13.480 --> 00:08:16.120 they do have a lot of information that they can 141 00:08:16.199 --> 00:08:18.439 use in you know, a couple of different ways that 142 00:08:18.480 --> 00:08:21.639 I think people should know about, and people I think 143 00:08:21.639 --> 00:08:25.639 are rightfully concerned that they're not going to know what 144 00:08:25.759 --> 00:08:28.079 happens with that information. I mean, I think that's really 145 00:08:28.120 --> 00:08:30.759 what freaks people out, is is that uncertainty. 146 00:08:30.839 --> 00:08:33.360 Yeah, I want to talk about process, what people have 147 00:08:33.519 --> 00:08:37.720 done and if they have Anyone who asks questions, by 148 00:08:37.720 --> 00:08:40.480 the way, can join the conversation. But I'm going to 149 00:08:40.559 --> 00:08:43.480 ask you a few questions, so don't assume I'm going 150 00:08:43.559 --> 00:08:45.679 to ask the right questions. Ladies and gentlemen. Many of 151 00:08:45.679 --> 00:08:48.000 you out there know more about this than I do, 152 00:08:49.000 --> 00:08:51.320 but probably none of you know as much about it 153 00:08:51.360 --> 00:08:53.559 as my guest does. So feel free to line up, 154 00:08:53.639 --> 00:08:56.080 get some questions in and I have some questions when 155 00:08:56.080 --> 00:08:58.840 we come back as well. Six one seven, two, five, 156 00:08:58.879 --> 00:09:02.759 four ten thirty, six nine three, one ten thirty. Those 157 00:09:02.759 --> 00:09:05.279 are that you brought. Those are the two on air lines. 158 00:09:05.360 --> 00:09:08.600 We'll get you on night side, and I'm not sure 159 00:09:08.639 --> 00:09:11.120 what we're gonna do later on tonight. So if this 160 00:09:11.279 --> 00:09:14.399 interest you, feel free, whatevers you ask. As I say, 161 00:09:14.440 --> 00:09:16.679 I told you many times, there's no such thing as 162 00:09:16.679 --> 00:09:19.000 a dumb question. I learned that in law school because 163 00:09:19.000 --> 00:09:21.480 that's the question you don't have the courage to ask 164 00:09:21.519 --> 00:09:25.159 the professor. And that's the question that comes up on 165 00:09:25.200 --> 00:09:28.320 the midterm or on the final exam. So with that 166 00:09:29.240 --> 00:09:32.960 admonission six one seven, two, four thirty, six one seven, 167 00:09:33.000 --> 00:09:35.039 nine three, one tenth thirty, we'll be right back on 168 00:09:35.279 --> 00:09:38.879 night Side with Dan Ray here on Boston's WBZ. And 169 00:09:38.919 --> 00:09:42.679 it's more than Boston's WBZ. We have listeners right now 170 00:09:42.720 --> 00:09:46.000 with this hour all Oliver Eastern, the eastern half of 171 00:09:46.080 --> 00:09:48.600 Canada and the eastern half of the United States. Back 172 00:09:48.600 --> 00:09:49.919 on night Side right after this. 173 00:09:51.159 --> 00:09:56.559 Night Side with Dan Ray, I'm delling YOUBZ Boston's News Radio. 174 00:09:58.360 --> 00:10:01.000 With me. It is Jason Kelly he's the activism director 175 00:10:01.039 --> 00:10:06.519 for the Electronic Frontier Foundation. Now, now don't don't get 176 00:10:07.039 --> 00:10:10.960 you know, concerned about this, but if you've ever been 177 00:10:11.000 --> 00:10:13.600 a patient, if you've ever been a client twenty three 178 00:10:13.720 --> 00:10:17.639 in me, I think you've got to listen real carefully. 179 00:10:18.879 --> 00:10:23.480 What advice, Jason, would you give to anyone who was 180 00:10:25.000 --> 00:10:28.159 a client of twenty three and me submitted their DNA 181 00:10:28.320 --> 00:10:31.480 sample And this might be five years ago, ten years ago, 182 00:10:31.480 --> 00:10:35.159 there around for a long time. What do they what 183 00:10:35.200 --> 00:10:37.759 should they be concerned about, and what can they do? 184 00:10:37.919 --> 00:10:41.080 At this point, the companies in bankruptcy, it's eventually going 185 00:10:41.159 --> 00:10:46.000 to disappear. What can be done? What can be done? 186 00:10:46.279 --> 00:10:46.559 Well? 187 00:10:46.639 --> 00:10:49.559 I think the biggest thing people need to know is 188 00:10:49.639 --> 00:10:54.240 that they can ask the company pretty quickly to delete 189 00:10:54.360 --> 00:10:58.679 the data that they've collected. It's not a super long process. 190 00:10:58.720 --> 00:11:00.879 It's not something that's going to take more than you know, 191 00:11:01.000 --> 00:11:04.799 ten twenty minutes. And that really, I think, for a 192 00:11:04.799 --> 00:11:06.759 lot of people is going to give them peace of mind. 193 00:11:07.200 --> 00:11:08.720 It's just going to make them feel a little bit 194 00:11:08.720 --> 00:11:11.600 better about the fact that this company could sell that 195 00:11:11.720 --> 00:11:14.440 data to pretty much anybody, and we don't have a 196 00:11:14.519 --> 00:11:19.600 choice in where it goes. And that process is fairly simple. 197 00:11:19.720 --> 00:11:22.440 You can log into the site, you go to the settings, 198 00:11:22.519 --> 00:11:26.159 you go to your data, and you basically just say 199 00:11:26.200 --> 00:11:29.360 can you delete the data there? There's an option for it. 200 00:11:29.360 --> 00:11:32.200 It might be a little complicated. They have to email 201 00:11:32.320 --> 00:11:34.360 you and you have to email them back. You know, 202 00:11:34.399 --> 00:11:37.200 if you're like me, you might have lost the password, 203 00:11:37.240 --> 00:11:39.279 maybe you haven't logged into it since you did it, 204 00:11:39.360 --> 00:11:42.360 so you know, it's not going to necessarily be the 205 00:11:42.399 --> 00:11:43.279 easiest thing in the world. 206 00:11:43.320 --> 00:11:45.159 But they do allow. 207 00:11:44.840 --> 00:11:47.840 You to do that, and that can delete both of 208 00:11:47.879 --> 00:11:50.559 the data that they have that's on their let's say 209 00:11:50.559 --> 00:11:53.679 they're back end in their system. And then you can 210 00:11:53.759 --> 00:11:57.960 also request that they destroy the genetic data if they've 211 00:11:58.000 --> 00:12:00.919 got that on hand as well, so you can. 212 00:12:00.799 --> 00:12:01.879 Make those requests. 213 00:12:01.960 --> 00:12:05.600 And I would recommend it for most people who are 214 00:12:06.080 --> 00:12:09.120 concerned at all about this, because otherwise it's just going 215 00:12:09.200 --> 00:12:10.960 to sort of eat away at. 216 00:12:10.840 --> 00:12:12.440 You, and I think it should. 217 00:12:13.279 --> 00:12:17.000 You know, a company buying this data can more or 218 00:12:17.120 --> 00:12:20.919 less know whether you have certain diseases. They could put 219 00:12:20.960 --> 00:12:24.519 together a list of connections with your relatives. And I 220 00:12:24.559 --> 00:12:27.600 don't know exactly what they're going to do with that information, 221 00:12:27.679 --> 00:12:30.840 but I don't like someone having it when I didn't 222 00:12:31.240 --> 00:12:36.039 intend them to, and there's just sort of an unease 223 00:12:36.120 --> 00:12:38.120 that comes with that. And I think most people are 224 00:12:38.159 --> 00:12:40.960 going to feel better if they go online, go to 225 00:12:41.000 --> 00:12:44.639 the account, log in, go to the settings, and just 226 00:12:44.799 --> 00:12:47.600 choose to delete my data, and you can download the data 227 00:12:47.679 --> 00:12:50.200 before you do that. That'll give you a little bit 228 00:12:50.240 --> 00:12:52.720 of information. You won't be able to use the site 229 00:12:52.720 --> 00:12:55.759 anymore after you request that they delete it, but you 230 00:12:55.840 --> 00:12:58.000 will have a little bit of that information. And some 231 00:12:58.120 --> 00:12:59.399 of it you can download is going. 232 00:12:59.360 --> 00:12:59.960 To be gibberish. 233 00:13:00.080 --> 00:13:03.919 It's the DNA data results that are going to look 234 00:13:03.960 --> 00:13:07.679 like computer code to most people, including me. But in 235 00:13:07.720 --> 00:13:10.799 the case of another service popping up that can use 236 00:13:10.799 --> 00:13:13.519 that information in the future that you feel comfortable giving 237 00:13:13.559 --> 00:13:16.360 it to, you could reuse it if you need to. 238 00:13:16.840 --> 00:13:20.840 That is all really great advice. One of the things 239 00:13:21.039 --> 00:13:24.600 that has been controversial, and we can get into this 240 00:13:24.679 --> 00:13:29.759 a little bit more in depth, is that police agencies 241 00:13:30.480 --> 00:13:35.360 on occasion have been able to use this type of 242 00:13:35.480 --> 00:13:43.360 data to sort of almost triangulate someone within your family 243 00:13:43.879 --> 00:13:48.960 who might have been guilty of a crime. And explain 244 00:13:49.039 --> 00:13:51.879 how that works, because if you can explain in a 245 00:13:51.879 --> 00:13:54.720 way that people will understand well and appreciate it. Give 246 00:13:54.720 --> 00:13:56.360 me an idea how that works. 247 00:13:57.559 --> 00:14:01.000 So let's say you've got a crime scene with a 248 00:14:01.080 --> 00:14:04.480 coffee cup on it, and that coffee cup has you know, 249 00:14:04.720 --> 00:14:08.120 somebody's DNA because they took a drink. Yep, the police 250 00:14:08.120 --> 00:14:10.639 can swab that. They can run it through basically the 251 00:14:10.759 --> 00:14:13.559 same kinds of systems that twenty three and me used 252 00:14:14.240 --> 00:14:17.759 and it you know, the way it looks when they 253 00:14:17.799 --> 00:14:19.879 get out the data on the other end is that 254 00:14:19.960 --> 00:14:23.000 it's it's basically a series of letters and numbers. And 255 00:14:23.759 --> 00:14:26.440 if they do everything right, and the software is not 256 00:14:26.519 --> 00:14:30.720 always perfect, but if they do everything right, they can 257 00:14:30.919 --> 00:14:35.480 ask twenty three and meter for them to run a 258 00:14:35.559 --> 00:14:39.039 DNA sample through their database. They could do that with 259 00:14:39.080 --> 00:14:41.639 any of these companies, and some of them require warrants 260 00:14:41.639 --> 00:14:42.480 and some of them don't. 261 00:14:42.840 --> 00:14:46.240 And the DNA data sample, and the DNA data sample 262 00:14:46.320 --> 00:14:50.279 they would be running through would be the DNA sample 263 00:14:50.399 --> 00:14:53.919 that in this hypothetical they lifted from a coffee cup 264 00:14:53.960 --> 00:14:58.519 at a crime scene under the belief that perhaps the 265 00:14:58.559 --> 00:15:01.679 person who committed the crime that could be their DNA. 266 00:15:02.000 --> 00:15:04.080 That could be their DNA that's on the coffee cup 267 00:15:04.200 --> 00:15:06.559 and what happens next? What happens next? 268 00:15:07.240 --> 00:15:10.639 So they get a match, and that match isn't necessarily 269 00:15:10.720 --> 00:15:16.480 the exact person that was responsible for leaving the DNA behind. 270 00:15:16.519 --> 00:15:20.480 But if you're related to someone who was at that 271 00:15:20.559 --> 00:15:23.960 crime scene and put that DNA on that coffee cup 272 00:15:24.559 --> 00:15:27.799 and you put your your information into twenty three and meters, 273 00:15:28.480 --> 00:15:30.960 you will come up as the match. So they will 274 00:15:31.000 --> 00:15:33.559 look at these two comparisons and say, well, this person 275 00:15:33.679 --> 00:15:39.679 isn't the exact person, but they have a basically a 276 00:15:39.919 --> 00:15:43.960 you know, one in four connection to that person, which 277 00:15:44.000 --> 00:15:47.000 means that it's probably their cousin or probably their you know, 278 00:15:47.639 --> 00:15:50.039 sibling or something like that. And if more than one 279 00:15:50.080 --> 00:15:53.960 person has put that data into the database, they, like 280 00:15:54.000 --> 00:15:57.799 you said, triangulate it and they can pretty quickly, you know, 281 00:15:57.960 --> 00:15:59.679 using all the other police skills. 282 00:15:59.360 --> 00:16:00.559 That they have, and you're out. 283 00:16:00.960 --> 00:16:02.679 Okay, well who lived there at. 284 00:16:02.559 --> 00:16:03.879 The time exactly? 285 00:16:03.960 --> 00:16:05.919 They can get more information to figure out we think 286 00:16:05.919 --> 00:16:10.720 it's this person, not necessarily you, but someone you're related to. 287 00:16:11.000 --> 00:16:13.679 Well they could the police can show up at your 288 00:16:13.759 --> 00:16:18.200 house with or without a warrned and they can say, gee, 289 00:16:18.200 --> 00:16:22.200 would like to have a conversation with you. That's most people. 290 00:16:22.480 --> 00:16:25.200 Most people are going to say, oh, sure, how can 291 00:16:25.240 --> 00:16:26.879 I help you? Now? Some are going to say, do 292 00:16:26.879 --> 00:16:29.039 you have a war, I don't have to talk to you, 293 00:16:29.159 --> 00:16:32.159 or whatever. But that's only going to raise the suspicion 294 00:16:32.200 --> 00:16:32.919 of the police. 295 00:16:34.399 --> 00:16:37.679 Maybe you know too much about the cousin and yeah. 296 00:16:37.559 --> 00:16:40.159 So in other words, so now they're going to say, gee, 297 00:16:40.200 --> 00:16:44.759 do you have any relatives, you know, cousins or uncles 298 00:16:44.879 --> 00:16:48.080 or aunts or whatever, who happen to live in pick 299 00:16:48.120 --> 00:16:53.600 At City, Phoenix, Arizona. Uh, well, yeah, my cousin, Herbie 300 00:16:53.600 --> 00:16:58.000 lives in Phoenix area. Really, how long has Herbie been there? Oh, 301 00:16:58.080 --> 00:17:01.960 he moved out there and now ninety and we haven't 302 00:17:01.960 --> 00:17:07.599 seen him since. Oh really, Okay, Now they may be saying, hmmm, 303 00:17:07.839 --> 00:17:11.119 this is the where this crime occurred. They may not 304 00:17:11.200 --> 00:17:13.960 even tell you that. Okay. They just might at that 305 00:17:14.000 --> 00:17:16.920 point say thank you very much, And they might then 306 00:17:17.000 --> 00:17:21.319 be able to solve that case by spotting Herbie walking 307 00:17:21.359 --> 00:17:23.640 down the street with another cup of coffee, and when 308 00:17:23.680 --> 00:17:26.720 Herbie throws that cup of coffee away, they recover and 309 00:17:26.759 --> 00:17:29.519 they have a DNA match. Or they may put you 310 00:17:29.559 --> 00:17:33.400 in the impossibly very uncomfortable position of saying, hey, we 311 00:17:33.519 --> 00:17:36.599 believe that you know a relative of yours may have 312 00:17:36.599 --> 00:17:39.960 committed this horrific crime and would like to ask you 313 00:17:40.000 --> 00:17:44.160 some questions about your family tree. I mean think about it. 314 00:17:44.240 --> 00:17:48.200 Yeah, yeah, yeah, any anybody could be in this situation, 315 00:17:48.279 --> 00:17:51.319 if you've never even committed a crime, It's very possible. 316 00:17:51.759 --> 00:17:57.200 The data from research has shown that there I mentioned 317 00:17:57.200 --> 00:18:01.000 one of the smaller services, ged match service has about 318 00:18:01.000 --> 00:18:05.319 one million users. And just because of how similar you 319 00:18:05.359 --> 00:18:08.640 know people are and how related people are, if. 320 00:18:08.519 --> 00:18:12.039 You go back a little ways. 321 00:18:11.119 --> 00:18:14.359 If somebody found your DNA and a coffee cup and 322 00:18:15.359 --> 00:18:19.640 researchers had access to ged match's service, they could pretty 323 00:18:19.720 --> 00:18:23.319 quickly find who you were even on one on out 324 00:18:23.319 --> 00:18:26.759 of one million. Now twenty three and meters has fifteen million, 325 00:18:27.359 --> 00:18:31.799 so everybody probably has a relative in this database. That's 326 00:18:31.839 --> 00:18:33.440 one of the things to worry about is that even 327 00:18:33.799 --> 00:18:35.640 even if you've never used it, you know, you might 328 00:18:35.680 --> 00:18:38.119 want to check around with your with your relatives and 329 00:18:38.160 --> 00:18:41.480 see who has because even if you are not in it, 330 00:18:41.559 --> 00:18:44.279 you you kind of are, you know, I mean most 331 00:18:44.279 --> 00:18:47.759 of us probably are at some level based on a relative. 332 00:18:47.880 --> 00:18:51.200 So yeah, it's it affects everybody, even if you know 333 00:18:51.240 --> 00:18:53.519 you've never used it, and even if you've never committed 334 00:18:53.519 --> 00:18:56.559 a crime, because they might still come to your door. 335 00:18:56.599 --> 00:18:59.279 And also they might get it wrong. You know, just 336 00:18:59.319 --> 00:19:01.640 because you're d is on that coffee cup where someone 337 00:19:01.640 --> 00:19:04.319 else's is doesn't necessarily mean that that's the person who 338 00:19:04.359 --> 00:19:05.000 committed the crime. 339 00:19:05.480 --> 00:19:08.359 My guest is Jason Kelly. Jason's an activisim director for 340 00:19:08.440 --> 00:19:12.240 the Electronic Frontier Foundation, and we're talking about if your 341 00:19:12.359 --> 00:19:16.880 DNA has been voluntarily submitted to twenty three and meters 342 00:19:16.920 --> 00:19:21.200 that company has filed for bankruptcy. UH. Feel free to 343 00:19:21.319 --> 00:19:24.640 join the conversation. Any questions you like. My name's Dan Ray. 344 00:19:24.640 --> 00:19:26.640 This is Nightside. We'll get some callers coming up on 345 00:19:26.680 --> 00:19:29.240 the other side. Six one, seven, two, five, four, ten 346 00:19:29.319 --> 00:19:33.240 thirty six one seven, nine, three, one, ten thirty. We'll 347 00:19:33.240 --> 00:19:36.240 get to phone calls, more questions for my guest, Jason Kelly. 348 00:19:36.319 --> 00:19:41.720 Right after this, you're on Night Side with Dan Ray. 349 00:19:42.119 --> 00:19:44.880 I'm Easy Boston's News Radio. 350 00:19:45.839 --> 00:19:48.359 All right, Thank you very much, Dan Watkins. My guest 351 00:19:48.480 --> 00:19:51.799 is Jason Kelly. He's an activism director with the Electronic 352 00:19:51.839 --> 00:19:56.920 Frontier Foundation. The point of this hour tonight is to 353 00:19:57.039 --> 00:20:03.119 make you aware that when you submit information about yourself 354 00:20:03.240 --> 00:20:08.480 DNA information to private companies. I'm sure you sign a 355 00:20:08.519 --> 00:20:10.880 lot of documents and I'm sure that you give them 356 00:20:10.920 --> 00:20:15.200 permission to maintain the file, and you don't read the 357 00:20:15.279 --> 00:20:18.519 fine print, and you're interested in finding out. Gee, am 358 00:20:18.519 --> 00:20:22.480 I twenty percent German? And my fifteen percent? Kenyon? What 359 00:20:22.640 --> 00:20:26.799 is my background? Do I have Spanish? You know, that's 360 00:20:26.839 --> 00:20:28.279 the way that they get you to do. And of 361 00:20:28.319 --> 00:20:31.240 course you pay money to have this service provided. And 362 00:20:31.319 --> 00:20:38.720 now with this company in bankruptcy, it's possible. Now Jason 363 00:20:38.759 --> 00:20:42.359 has been kind enough to explain what you might be 364 00:20:42.440 --> 00:20:45.920 able to do to eliminate or to get rid of 365 00:20:46.559 --> 00:20:52.799 some of the information that you have voluntarily provided. However, 366 00:20:52.920 --> 00:20:55.319 you may have some questions, and so what we're going 367 00:20:55.400 --> 00:20:56.799 to do is we're going to go to phone calls. 368 00:20:58.079 --> 00:21:01.359 We've laid it out for you as clearly as we can. 369 00:21:03.400 --> 00:21:06.799 You know, we live in an age where all of 370 00:21:06.880 --> 00:21:11.920 us give out information and all of us get bombarded 371 00:21:12.440 --> 00:21:18.480 with phone calls, get bombarded with spam emails, the more ways. 372 00:21:18.599 --> 00:21:23.079 And I'm guilty. I'm I'm on Facebook, I'm on Twitter, 373 00:21:23.440 --> 00:21:27.599 I'm on Instagram. I'm because that's my business to communicate 374 00:21:27.640 --> 00:21:31.279 with people. But I probably would be doing most of 375 00:21:31.319 --> 00:21:36.559 those anyway, but it puts us we have you have 376 00:21:36.680 --> 00:21:40.680 basically walked out into the middle of the town square 377 00:21:40.720 --> 00:21:43.799 and stripped yourself naked and said here I am, here's 378 00:21:44.000 --> 00:21:47.720 everything you need to know about me. Jason. How far 379 00:21:47.920 --> 00:21:49.240 off is that analogy? 380 00:21:51.200 --> 00:21:54.759 I think that's about one hundred percent correct. Unless someone 381 00:21:54.839 --> 00:21:57.119 lives in the woods and doesn't have a phone or 382 00:21:57.160 --> 00:21:59.480 a computer, I think that's pretty much where most of 383 00:21:59.519 --> 00:22:03.160 us are at. And and it's you know, whether it's 384 00:22:03.279 --> 00:22:08.000 DNA or your location because you carry your phone around, 385 00:22:08.319 --> 00:22:11.720 or the websites you visit, you know, all this information 386 00:22:12.000 --> 00:22:16.000 can be collected and and what's worrisome for most people, 387 00:22:16.039 --> 00:22:19.960 I think is it's not just that one company knows 388 00:22:20.079 --> 00:22:23.440 you know, Google knows where your phone was, or Apple 389 00:22:23.519 --> 00:22:26.000 knows where your phone was, and then another company knows 390 00:22:26.039 --> 00:22:28.440 where you know, where you went online, what kind of 391 00:22:28.440 --> 00:22:31.279 Facebook pages you like, and then another company has your 392 00:22:31.359 --> 00:22:34.559 DNA information and might know what kind of diseases you 393 00:22:34.599 --> 00:22:38.160 are predisposed to. What worries people and should is that 394 00:22:38.160 --> 00:22:43.039 that information often gets collected by data brokers and put 395 00:22:43.079 --> 00:22:48.039 into a big profile and so that you know, not 396 00:22:48.160 --> 00:22:50.799 everyone has access to that, but but that's how it 397 00:22:50.880 --> 00:22:54.119 all happened, so that they can then do what you said. 398 00:22:54.160 --> 00:22:56.720 They can send you ads, they can you know, make 399 00:22:56.759 --> 00:22:58.920 phone calls things like that to try to get you 400 00:22:59.000 --> 00:23:03.279 to buy things, and in worse cases, you know, depending 401 00:23:03.319 --> 00:23:06.559