WEBVTT

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<v Speaker 1>Welcome back to the deep dive. Today we are taking

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<v Speaker 1>aim at something pretty central to modern life but often

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<v Speaker 1>really misunderstood, computer hacking. Yeah, definitely forget the cliches, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>the dark rooms, green tech's flashing. We want to get

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<v Speaker 1>into the real mindset, the methods, and maybe most importantly,

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<v Speaker 1>what you can actually do to protect yourself exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>And I think our mission here for you listening is

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<v Speaker 2>to move past this idea that hacking is always some

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<v Speaker 2>super complex code breaking thing. Okay, Often hacking just means

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<v Speaker 2>well using skills cleverly to find weak spots, and overwhelmingly

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<v Speaker 2>those weak spots they're.

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<v Speaker 1>Human human vulnerabilities.

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<v Speaker 2>That's it. Technology is moving so fast, but the biggest

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<v Speaker 2>threats to your privacy they're often exploiting basic trust, not

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<v Speaker 2>some futuristic AI.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, let's unpack that. Because hacker itself is such a

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<v Speaker 1>loaded term, we probably need to define who we're actually

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<v Speaker 1>talking about first, maybe based on like their intention the

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<v Speaker 1>old hat analogy.

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<v Speaker 2>Vercise, it's a good shorthand basically, have three relationships to

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<v Speaker 2>the system you're interacting with. First, the black hats the

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<v Speaker 2>bad guys. Yeah, pretty much, they're looking for malicious unauthorized entry.

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<v Speaker 2>Their goal is you know, theft, damage, messing with data.

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<v Speaker 2>They're criminals, plain and simple, no permission involved.

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<v Speaker 1>Right. Then you've got the opposite, the white hats, ethical

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<v Speaker 1>hackers exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>They're the defenders, often hired by big companies think Facebook, Microsoft, Google,

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<v Speaker 2>places like that. They're authorized to attack the system, but

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<v Speaker 2>their job is purely to find those weaknesses and help

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<v Speaker 2>fix them before the black hats can get there. Essential

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<v Speaker 2>security work.

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<v Speaker 1>So protectors basically, right. And the third type, the gray hats.

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<v Speaker 1>They sound a bit ambiguous, they really are. They operate

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<v Speaker 1>in this murky middle ground. They might exploit a system,

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<v Speaker 1>find a vulnerability without permission, okay, but maybe not with

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<v Speaker 1>purely evil intent. Often they'll tell the owner, hey, you've

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<v Speaker 1>got a hole here, But sometimes sometimes they might ask

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<v Speaker 1>for a small fee like a bug bounty. They set

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<v Speaker 1>themselves to fix it, which puts them in a tricky

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<v Speaker 1>ethical spot. Yeah, definitely a gray area. Okay, So we

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<v Speaker 1>have these different players. But here's what blew my mind

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<v Speaker 1>from the sources. When you look at how attacks actually

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<v Speaker 1>happened today, it's rarely the super technical stuff. It's mostly

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<v Speaker 1>about people. Social engineering that is.

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<v Speaker 2>The absolute key takeaway here, it's staggering, really technical flaws.

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<v Speaker 2>They account for maybe what three percent of successful attacks?

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<v Speaker 1>Only three percent?

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, the other ninety seven percent purely based on social

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<v Speaker 2>engineer ninety seven.

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<v Speaker 1>Wow, So the whole game has shifted. It's not about

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<v Speaker 1>breaking the code, it's about breaking the person exploiting our psychology,

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<v Speaker 1>you got it, our instinct to help, maybe our fear

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<v Speaker 1>of authority or just getting rushed into doing something without thinking.

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<v Speaker 2>That's the target now, much more than the software itself.

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<v Speaker 1>And within that huge ninety seven percent, there's one technique

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<v Speaker 1>that stands out.

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<v Speaker 2>Oh yeah, the undisputed king is fishing. The stats suggests

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<v Speaker 2>something like ninety one percent, nine out of ten data

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<v Speaker 2>breaches start with a phishing attempt.

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<v Speaker 1>Hishing. This is the classic email scam, right, trying to

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<v Speaker 1>lure you into clicking a bad link or giving up

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<v Speaker 1>your log in details.

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<v Speaker 2>That's the basics of it. Yeah, but what makes them

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<v Speaker 2>work isn't just the email itself, it's the psychology. How

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<v Speaker 2>So they deliberately create this sense of urgency or maybe

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<v Speaker 2>a threat or fear. Yeah, they want to trigger an

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<v Speaker 2>emotional reaction, so you act fast before your logical brain

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<v Speaker 2>cakes in. Ah, think about that US Tax Day scam

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<v Speaker 2>back in twenty eighteen, emails claiming to be from the

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<v Speaker 2>IRS demanding tax details immediately. They used fear of the IRS,

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<v Speaker 2>the deadline pressure.

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<v Speaker 1>To make people panic and handover info exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>And they often use those weird shortened links or links

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<v Speaker 2>that look legit but actually redirect you to a fake

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<v Speaker 2>site built just to steal your credentials.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, so that's manipulating fear. What about impersonation? How does

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<v Speaker 1>that work psychologically?

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<v Speaker 2>Impersonation plays on our respect for authority really, or maybe

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<v Speaker 2>just our tendency to do what we're told by someone

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<v Speaker 2>who sounds like they're.

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<v Speaker 1>In charge, boss or IT support.

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<v Speaker 2>Precisely, criminals pose as an IT executive, a manager and auditor,

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<v Speaker 2>someone whose request you probably wouldn't question immediately. It takes

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<v Speaker 2>more setup for the attacker, sure, but the success rate

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<v Speaker 2>can be really high. We saw attacks like this jump

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<v Speaker 2>almost four hundred percent of one year because people just comply.

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<v Speaker 1>Wow, that's a huge increase. And it's not just email, right,

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<v Speaker 1>We also need to think about vishing and smashing voice

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<v Speaker 1>and text.

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<v Speaker 2>Absolutely, these often fly under the radar of traditional email filters. Phishing,

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<v Speaker 2>that's voice fishing happens over the phone. The attacker calls up,

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<v Speaker 2>tries to get credentials, or sometimes they're more aggressive. They

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<v Speaker 2>might try to talk you into running a script on

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<v Speaker 2>your computer or visiting a compromise website while you're on

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<v Speaker 2>the call, and they're harder to a tract, much harder,

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<v Speaker 2>no obvious digital trail like an email header. Remember that

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<v Speaker 2>massive IRS fishing scam ran for years twenty twelve to

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<v Speaker 2>twenty sixteen.

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<v Speaker 1>I do remember hearing about that.

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<v Speaker 2>Costs victims hundreds of millions, all because people believe they

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<v Speaker 2>were talking to a real IRS agent demanding immediate payment.

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<v Speaker 2>That fear factor.

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<v Speaker 1>Again, and smishing is the text message version.

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<v Speaker 2>Correct SMS fishing. They get numbers from breaches, web crawling,

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<v Speaker 2>sometimes just random generators.

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<v Speaker 1>And what kind of tricks do they use in texts?

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<v Speaker 2>All sorts my promise, fake coupons or discounts, playing on greed,

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<v Speaker 2>or they'll poses your bank, you know, urgent click here

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<v Speaker 2>to reactivate your card, or your online account expires today,

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<v Speaker 2>log in here to renew. Texts feel immediate personal, so

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<v Speaker 2>people react quickly.

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<v Speaker 1>It all comes back to that psychological manipulation. Okay, so

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<v Speaker 1>let's say they see they trick us that ninety seven

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<v Speaker 1>percent chance? What tools are they actually using them? What's

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<v Speaker 1>in their like digital toolkit? Once they have that initial access.

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<v Speaker 2>Right the toolkit, it can get specialized, but the concepts

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<v Speaker 2>are often quite straightforward. Take keyloggers, for.

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<v Speaker 1>Instance, teloggers the blog your keys.

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<v Speaker 2>Exactly that They record every single key stor it you make,

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<v Speaker 2>user names, passwords, credit card numbers, private messages, everything.

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<v Speaker 1>How do they work?

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<v Speaker 2>Well? Think of your operating system having this thing called

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<v Speaker 2>an API. It's like a messenger carrying instructions. A keylogger

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<v Speaker 2>basically attaches itself to that messenger and copies down everything

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<v Speaker 2>you type before it even gets processed properly, usually arrives

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<v Speaker 2>hidden inside some malware.

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<v Speaker 1>Nasty. And what about root kits? That sounds even worse.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, the name is pretty menacing, isn't it. A rootkit

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<v Speaker 2>is basically a collection of software tools designed to give

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<v Speaker 2>an attacker deep remote access and control over your system.

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<v Speaker 2>And crucially, it hides itself really well from detection.

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<v Speaker 1>So it's like a hidden back.

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<v Speaker 2>Door kind of. Yeah. If the key lagger is spying

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<v Speaker 2>on your typing, the root kit is like a secret

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<v Speaker 2>agent living in your computer, giving the hacker full control

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<v Speaker 2>to steel files, install more bad stuff, or even crash

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<v Speaker 2>the whole system. And again they almost always get installed

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<v Speaker 2>through those initial social engineering tricks.

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<v Speaker 1>It's interesting that one tool you mentioned, the vulnerability scanner,

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<v Speaker 1>is used by both sides, black hats and white hats.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, it's purely a tool like a hammer. White hats

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<v Speaker 2>use scanners to find security holes so they can fix

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<v Speaker 2>them quickly. Black hats use the exact same scanners to

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<v Speaker 2>look for those same weaknesses, but obviously they want to

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<v Speaker 2>exploit them. It's like checking the doors and windows before breakin.

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<v Speaker 1>Right. Okay, let's talk passwords. We hear password cracking all

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<v Speaker 1>the time. Can we break down the main ways they

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<v Speaker 1>actually do. Yeah?

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<v Speaker 2>Sure. Think of them mostly as automated guessing games. The

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<v Speaker 2>most famous is probably the brute force attack.

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<v Speaker 1>That's just trying everything.

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<v Speaker 2>Pretty much. Automated software just systematically tries every possible combination

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<v Speaker 2>of letters, numbers, symbols abcaaab AC one two three one

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<v Speaker 2>A one B, just keeps going until it hits the

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<v Speaker 2>right one.

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<v Speaker 1>Must take ages for complex passwords.

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<v Speaker 2>They can, Yeah, that's why password complexity helps. Then you've

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<v Speaker 2>got a variation called the dictionary attack.

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<v Speaker 1>Using dictionary words exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>Uses huge lists of common words, phrases, names, maybe common

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<v Speaker 2>modifications like adding what twenty three at the end shockingly

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<v Speaker 2>effective because well, so many people use simple words or

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<v Speaker 2>perle patterns.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, that makes sense. And the third one reverse brute force.

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<v Speaker 1>How's that different?

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<v Speaker 2>So instead of trying many passwords against one username, reverse

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<v Speaker 2>brute force takes one really common, leaked or weak password

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<v Speaker 2>like password one, two three or maybe spring twenty twenty

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<v Speaker 2>four and tries it against thousands or millions of different usernames.

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<v Speaker 1>Ah, playing the odds that someone used that specific weak

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<v Speaker 1>password exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>They know a certain percentage of people will always use

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<v Speaker 2>the easiest option. The defense against all three really is

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<v Speaker 2>a strong unique password, ideally long random, maybe multi word

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<v Speaker 2>makes sense.

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<v Speaker 1>Let's shift two attacks specifically targeting websites. What's in SQL

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<v Speaker 1>injection sounds technical?

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<v Speaker 2>It is a bit technical, but the concept isn't too bad.

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<v Speaker 2>Imagine a website search box or the lug in form.

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<v Speaker 2>Those boxes need to talk to the website's database behind

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<v Speaker 2>the scenes using a language called SQL. Okay, if the

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<v Speaker 2>website code isn't careful about checking what you type into

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<v Speaker 2>that box, an attacker could actually type in malicious sequel

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<v Speaker 2>commands instead us a.

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<v Speaker 1>Search term and trick the database.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, basically trick the database into doing something it shouldn't,

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<v Speaker 2>like revealing all the usernames and passwords stored inside or

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<v Speaker 2>customer data. It's exploiting a loophole in how the website

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<v Speaker 2>handles user input.

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<v Speaker 1>Gotcha and the other big web attach DIDO distributed denial of.

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<v Speaker 2>Service that one's maybe easier to picture. It's basically just

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<v Speaker 2>a massive overwhelming traffic jam created on purpose.

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<v Speaker 1>Traffic jam.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah. The attacker uses a network of compromised computers, sometimes

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<v Speaker 2>thousands or millions of them, called a botnet, to flood

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<v Speaker 2>the target website or network with so much junk traffic

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<v Speaker 2>that legitimate users can't get through. The whole service is

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<v Speaker 2>grind to a halt, becomes unusable.

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<v Speaker 1>Overwhelmed by noise. Okay, let's move to some specific case studies.

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<v Speaker 1>The sources talk about something called session hijacking using cross

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<v Speaker 1>site scripting or EXSS. Can you break that down simply?

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<v Speaker 2>Okay?

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<v Speaker 1>Sure?

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<v Speaker 2>Think about when you log into your bank account online,

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<v Speaker 2>you navigate around check balances, make transfers. You don't want

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<v Speaker 2>to type your password on every single page.

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<v Speaker 1>Right right, there would be annoying.

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<v Speaker 2>Exactly. That convenience comes from something called a session ID.

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<v Speaker 2>Once you log in, the website gives your browser a

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<v Speaker 2>temporary token, like a digital hall pass. This little piece

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<v Speaker 2>of data, often stored in something called a cookie, proves

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<v Speaker 2>to the website that you're already logged in for that session.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, so the hacker wants my hall.

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<v Speaker 2>Pass precisely now. XSS. Cross site scripting happens when a

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<v Speaker 2>website doesn't properly clean up the input fields, maybe a

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<v Speaker 2>comment section, a user profile, somewhere users can type stuff.

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<v Speaker 2>An attacker injects a small piece of malicious code, usually JavaScript,

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<v Speaker 2>into that field, and then what then? An unsuspecting user,

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<v Speaker 2>maybe even someone with high privileges like a site administrator,

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<v Speaker 2>visits that page. The malicious script runs silently in their

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<v Speaker 2>browser and steals their session id that hall pass.

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<v Speaker 1>Oh wow.

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<v Speaker 2>The hacker then takes that stolen session ID and uses

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<v Speaker 2>a tool to basically stick it into their own browsers

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<v Speaker 2>request to the website. The website sees the valid hall

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<v Speaker 2>pass and things the hackers the administrator to get logged in,

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<v Speaker 2>effectively impersonating the victim without ever needing the password.

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<v Speaker 1>So they're logged in without actually logging in. That's sneaky,

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<v Speaker 1>very and.

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<v Speaker 2>That's why website security involves constantly checking and cleaning user input,

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<v Speaker 2>encrypting those section cookies, setting them to expire quickly, all

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<v Speaker 2>that stuff.

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<v Speaker 1>Right. There was also that incredible story about Instagram. A

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<v Speaker 1>researcher found a way to potentially hijack any account and

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<v Speaker 1>got paid for it.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, that was Laxman Maia. He got a thirty thousand

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<v Speaker 2>dollars bug bounty from Facebook for finding and responsibly reporting it.

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<v Speaker 1>It was clever.

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<v Speaker 2>He targeted the password reset.

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<v Speaker 1>Feature, the one that sends a code to your phone exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>You get a six digit code via SMS or email. Right,

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<v Speaker 2>But the trick is that code usually expires pretty quickly,

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<v Speaker 2>maybe ten minutes, and Instagram, like most services, has rate

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<v Speaker 2>limiting in place.

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<v Speaker 1>Meaning you can't just guess codes endlessly.

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<v Speaker 2>Right. They block you after a certain number of failed

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<v Speaker 2>attempts from the same place, the same IP address. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 2>but Mathia figured out a way around the rate limit.

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<v Speaker 2>He realized he could send a huge number of simultaneous guesses,

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<v Speaker 2>but crucially, he sent them from many, many different IP addresses,

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<v Speaker 2>all at once, constantly rotating them. The system's rate limiting

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<v Speaker 2>wasn't sophisticated enough to catch that distributed attack.

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<v Speaker 1>So he could just flood it with guesses from everywhere

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<v Speaker 1>pretty much.

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<v Speaker 2>He calculated he'd need about five thousand different IP addresses

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<v Speaker 2>to have enough guesses to reliably crack the six digit

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<v Speaker 2>code within that ten minute window.

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<v Speaker 1>Five thousand ips.

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<v Speaker 2>That sounds expensive, you'd think so, but here's the kicker.

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<v Speaker 2>He estimated he could rent those five thousand ips from

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<v Speaker 2>cloud computing providers for only about one hundred and fifty

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<v Speaker 2>US dollars.

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<v Speaker 1>Wow, only one hundred and fifty bucks to potentially take

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<v Speaker 1>over any Instagram account. That's sobering.

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<v Speaker 2>It really shows the economics of these things and why

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<v Speaker 2>finding and fixing these flaws is so critical and why

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<v Speaker 2>responsible disclosure like he did is so important.

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<v Speaker 1>Absolutely, And speaking of mobile, let's touch on smartphones Pacific attacks.

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<v Speaker 1>The sources mentioned they have a high success rate.

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<v Speaker 2>They do. Yeah, the mobile threat landscape is a bit different.

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<v Speaker 2>You know. For regular computers, hackers might use rit's remote

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<v Speaker 2>administration tools things like nanocore or dark comet to get

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<v Speaker 2>a control. Okay, for smartphones, especially Android, you have similar

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<v Speaker 2>tools like androad or droi jack. They can be really effective.

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<v Speaker 2>But phones also have that unique SMS channel that computers don't.

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<v Speaker 1>Right. You mentioned vishing and smishing, But are there other SMS.

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<v Speaker 2>Attacks, Yes, some quite alarming ones. There's something called the

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<v Speaker 2>midnight rate. A simple SMS can be crafted to silently

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<v Speaker 2>trigger actions on the phone, like opening the browser to

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<v Speaker 2>a malicious site, retrieving devised info like its unique ID number,

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<v Speaker 2>or even pushing malware onto the.

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<v Speaker 1>Device, all from one text message.

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<v Speaker 2>Potentially, Yes, and then there's the control message attack. This

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<v Speaker 2>is even scarier. Certain types of control messages, if exploited,

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<v Speaker 2>could potentially change core phone settings without you knowing, things

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<v Speaker 2>like disablings security features, maybe unchecking SSL so your encrypted

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<v Speaker 2>connections aren't actually encrypted anymore, or, in a worst case scenario,

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<v Speaker 2>pushing a remote wipe command to erase everything on the phone.

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<v Speaker 2>Erase everything, Yes, and imagine if that wipe command could

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<v Speaker 2>then be forwarded to everyone in the hacked phone's contact list.

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<v Speaker 2>The potential for damage spreads rapidly.

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<v Speaker 1>That's terrifying. Okay, let's shift to our final section. This

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<v Speaker 1>is something a lot of people worry about IP addresses.

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<v Speaker 1>If someone online gets your IP address, should you panic?

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<v Speaker 1>Are they in your system, right.

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<v Speaker 2>This causes a lot of anxiety. Let's be really clear.

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<v Speaker 2>An IP address by itself is just a number. It's

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<v Speaker 2>like your house's street address, but for.

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<v Speaker 1>The Internet, your Internet provider gives it to you exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>It's assigned by your ISP, and it's necessary for your

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<v Speaker 2>computer or phone to send and receive data online. Just

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<v Speaker 2>knowing someone's ipaddress is generally normal. It happens constantly during

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<v Speaker 2>web browsing, gaming, emailing. It's not inherently illegal or dangerous.

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<v Speaker 1>So the danger isn't the IP itself.

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<v Speaker 2>No, the danger only comes if someone uses that IP

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<v Speaker 2>address to actually try and attack or violate your device

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<v Speaker 2>or network. That act is illegal, But simply knowing the

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<v Speaker 2>number doesn't grant them automatic access. Think of it like

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<v Speaker 2>knowing someone's home address doesn't mean you can walk through

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<v Speaker 2>their locked front door.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, that helps clarify, But how do hackers actually track

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<v Speaker 1>an IP address if they want to target someone specifically?

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<v Speaker 2>Well, the most reliable way to silently get someone's IP

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<v Speaker 2>is to trick them into sending traffic directly to you

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<v Speaker 2>or to something you control. A common method involves setting

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<v Speaker 2>up a simple, free website. You upload a small script,

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<v Speaker 2>often called an IP finder or logger. Then you give

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<v Speaker 2>the target a specific link to that website, maybe disguised

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<v Speaker 2>as a link to an image or an interesting article.

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<v Speaker 1>And when they click it.

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<v Speaker 2>When they click the link, their browser connects to your

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<v Speaker 2>website to load the content. Your script then automatically logs

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<v Speaker 2>their IP address, often along with their browser type and

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<v Speaker 2>operating system details, all silently in the background.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, so now the hacker has my IP knows I

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<v Speaker 1>use Firefox on Windows for example. What can they realistically

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<v Speaker 1>do with just that information? What's the actual threat level?

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<v Speaker 2>This is important for many, let's say, less skilled or

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<v Speaker 2>amateur hackers getting that info the IP the browser is

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<v Speaker 2>often just used for.

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<v Speaker 1>Scare tactics, just to frighten people.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, they'll message you saying I have your IP, I

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<v Speaker 2>know you're using Chrome, I'm hacking you, hoping you'll panic,

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<v Speaker 2>maybe even try to extort money from you. In reality,

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<v Speaker 2>they might not have any deeper access at.

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<v Speaker 1>All, so it can be a bluff. What about finding

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<v Speaker 1>my location?

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<v Speaker 2>Geolocation from an IP address is not precise. It gives

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<v Speaker 2>an approximate location, usually narrowed down to your city or region,

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<v Speaker 2>maybe a few square kilometers in urban areas, maybe dozens

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<v Speaker 2>in rural areas. It points to the general areas served

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<v Speaker 2>by your ISP's equipment, not your specific house. Only your

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<v Speaker 2>ISP or law enforcement with a warrant can link that

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<v Speaker 2>IP to your exact physical address.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, so they don't instantly know where I live. A

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<v Speaker 1>skilled hacker use the IP to actually get in.

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<v Speaker 2>That's where the complexity comes in. A skilled attacker could

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<v Speaker 2>use your IP address as a starting point. They would

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<v Speaker 2>likely try to scan your internet router, the box connecting

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<v Speaker 2>your home network to the Internet, looking for open ports

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<v Speaker 2>or known vulnerabilities.

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<v Speaker 1>How would they do that.

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<v Speaker 2>They try to figure out the make and model of

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<v Speaker 2>your router, the software version it's running, and then check

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<v Speaker 2>databases of known exploits for that specific hardware or software.

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<v Speaker 2>Or if they find an administrative login page for the

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<v Speaker 2>router exposed to the Internet, they might try a brute

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<v Speaker 2>force or dictionary attack against the router's password itself.

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<v Speaker 1>But that sounds difficult and time consuming.

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<v Speaker 2>It absolutely is. It's a long, complex process, not instant

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<v Speaker 2>access by any means. Most home routers have basic security features.

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<v Speaker 2>Default passwords should always be changed, and keeping firmware updated

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<v Speaker 2>helps close known vulnerabilities.

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<v Speaker 1>So what's the simplest defense If I'm worried someone has

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<v Speaker 1>my IP?

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<v Speaker 2>Often the easiest thing is just to reboot your router.

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<v Speaker 2>For most home Internet connections, this will cause your ISP

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<v Speaker 2>to assign you a new public IP address. The old

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<v Speaker 2>one becomes useless to the attacker.

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<v Speaker 1>A simple reboot, okay. And for more robust protection.

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<v Speaker 2>For genuine anonymity and security against IP tracking and some

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<v Speaker 2>types of scanning, using a reputable VPN virtual private network

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<v Speaker 2>is a good step, or for higher security using something

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<v Speaker 2>like the TR network. These services mask your real IP

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<v Speaker 2>address by routing your traffic through their servers.

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<v Speaker 1>First makes sense VPNs and TR for masking.

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<v Speaker 2>Okay. So if we kind of pull all these threads together,

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<v Speaker 2>what does it all mean? I think the big picture

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<v Speaker 2>is that no single piece of software, no machine, can

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<v Speaker 2>give you one hundred percent guaranteed security, especially in a

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<v Speaker 2>world where technology keeps changing so fast. Awareness, being diligent,

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<v Speaker 2>staying informed, these are just essential now, particularly when as

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<v Speaker 2>we saw, ninety seven percent of attacks are aimed squarely

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<v Speaker 2>at our basic human instincts and reflexes.

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<v Speaker 1>That really is the most critical takeaway, isn't It's less

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<v Speaker 1>about fighting off some super genius coder in a basement. Often, Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>and more about recognizing and resisting that social exploitation using strong,

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<v Speaker 1>unique passwords, not falling for those urgent fear based requests,

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<v Speaker 1>being skeptical, that's your first and best line of defense.

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<v Speaker 2>Absolutely, and supporting things like responsible disclosure like the Instagram

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<v Speaker 2>researcher did is vital too. That helps everyone become safer

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<v Speaker 2>by getting flaws fixed before they're widely abused.

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<v Speaker 1>Definitely. Okay, let's wrap up with a final thought for you,

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<v Speaker 1>our listener, to take away and maybe mull over. Given

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<v Speaker 1>that the overwhelming majority of successful attacks, that huge ninety

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<v Speaker 1>seven percent statistic rely not on technical wizardry, but on

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<v Speaker 1>exploiting basic human psychology, our instinct to help our deference

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<v Speaker 1>to authority. What's one small daily habit you could change,

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<v Speaker 1>starting right now, to make yourself less exploitable. Think about

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<v Speaker 1>that immediate reaction you have when you get an urgent

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<v Speaker 1>email or call from someone claimed to be your boss

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<v Speaker 1>or the bank or IT support. Could you build in

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<v Speaker 1>just a tiny pause, maybe a five second verification delay,

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<v Speaker 1>before you automatically click or comply? How might that change

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<v Speaker 1>things
