1 00:00:00,480 --> 00:00:07,759 Speaker 1: Remember November mysterious drones operating with impunity over America and worldwide. 2 00:00:08,279 --> 00:00:11,080 Speaker 2: Now, a senior British official confirm to Fox that the 3 00:00:11,160 --> 00:00:15,800 UK has deployed about sixty troops, including counter drone specialists, 4 00:00:15,960 --> 00:00:17,960 to help determine who is behind this and to help 5 00:00:18,039 --> 00:00:22,000 defend the airbases, and it fears its potential coordinated operation. 6 00:00:22,359 --> 00:00:26,239 Speaker 1: The Biden administration plays it down. It's entirely possible that 7 00:00:26,280 --> 00:00:28,920 it could be hobbyists or something else. 8 00:00:28,960 --> 00:00:30,679 Speaker 3: We just got to look into it. 9 00:00:30,879 --> 00:00:34,079 Speaker 1: Twenty twenty five brings in a new president and a 10 00:00:34,159 --> 00:00:35,679 response to the drones. 11 00:00:35,799 --> 00:00:38,200 Speaker 4: The drones that were flying over New Jersey in large 12 00:00:38,280 --> 00:00:42,359 numbers were authorized to be flown by the FAA for 13 00:00:42,560 --> 00:00:46,880 research and various other reasons. Many of these drones were 14 00:00:46,880 --> 00:00:52,079 also hobbyists, recreational and private individuals that enjoy flying Jones. 15 00:00:52,520 --> 00:00:56,119 Speaker 1: Is the White House being transparent? And what about next time? 16 00:00:56,280 --> 00:01:00,560 The UAP Disclosure Fund Public Safety Working Group ways in. 17 00:01:01,159 --> 00:01:10,519 Let's get to it everyone. Welcome to the Good Trouble Show. 18 00:01:10,560 --> 00:01:13,519 I'm Matt Ford. The end of twenty twenty four was 19 00:01:13,599 --> 00:01:18,280 marked by seemingly unending reports of drones worldwide that did 20 00:01:18,280 --> 00:01:21,319 not seem to be well, sort of acting or operating 21 00:01:21,439 --> 00:01:26,719 like regular drones. The year prior, these mystery drones were 22 00:01:26,760 --> 00:01:30,799 operating with impunity over Langley Air Force Base in Virginia, 23 00:01:31,159 --> 00:01:34,079 forcing the United States Air Force to move an entire 24 00:01:34,200 --> 00:01:38,760 wing of F twenty two fighters to another location. While 25 00:01:38,799 --> 00:01:42,040 public reports of the mystery drones have virtually disappeared, a 26 00:01:42,120 --> 00:01:45,680 former Pentagon official told The Good Trouble Show off the 27 00:01:45,719 --> 00:01:51,000 record that mysterious drone incursions are continuing to occur over 28 00:01:51,359 --> 00:01:55,200 the United States military bases, albeit at a lower rate 29 00:01:55,480 --> 00:01:59,040 and without anywhere near the operational impact the twenty twenty 30 00:01:59,040 --> 00:02:03,120 three Langley insie had. Today an expert panel joins us 31 00:02:03,159 --> 00:02:06,480 to discuss these incidents, what we can possibly expect in 32 00:02:06,519 --> 00:02:10,879 the near future, and how public safety officials should prepare. 33 00:02:11,000 --> 00:02:14,479 But first, please hit the subscribe and thumbs up buttons 34 00:02:14,520 --> 00:02:17,439 on YouTube do his favor ly to comment and let 35 00:02:17,520 --> 00:02:20,639 us know what you think about this episode. We always 36 00:02:20,680 --> 00:02:23,280 love reading the comments. You can also find us on 37 00:02:23,719 --> 00:02:26,560 x at Good Trouble Show, Let's See We're there, yep, 38 00:02:26,639 --> 00:02:30,719 and everywhere else at The Good Trouble Show, and you 39 00:02:30,759 --> 00:02:33,840 can always find us wherever you enjoy your podcasts. Search 40 00:02:33,960 --> 00:02:37,800 for the Good Trouble Show with Matt Ford and if 41 00:02:37,879 --> 00:02:39,840 you want to chip in to keep the lights on, 42 00:02:40,039 --> 00:02:43,199 we always appreciate that you can become a Patreon member 43 00:02:43,479 --> 00:02:47,319 of The Good Trouble Show by going to www dot 44 00:02:47,479 --> 00:02:52,439 patreon dot com forward slash the Good Trouble Show sign 45 00:02:52,520 --> 00:02:55,560 up and you can support support this work. Also. Super 46 00:02:55,639 --> 00:02:59,000 chats are also open today since we are live, and 47 00:02:59,039 --> 00:03:02,039 they are a great way to lend your financial support 48 00:03:02,599 --> 00:03:05,400 that allows us to bring you excellent guests like we 49 00:03:05,560 --> 00:03:08,560 have today. Now with that out of the way, we 50 00:03:08,800 --> 00:03:12,639 are live, so please post your questions for our panelists 51 00:03:12,680 --> 00:03:16,280 in all caps and the chat, and speaking of the chat, 52 00:03:16,319 --> 00:03:20,639 a big shout out to our team of Good Troubleshow 53 00:03:20,680 --> 00:03:24,919 moderators who are keeping the trolls away. Without the moderators, 54 00:03:24,960 --> 00:03:27,840 we would not we would not have chat. So before 55 00:03:27,879 --> 00:03:30,039 we bring in our speakers, I want to kind of 56 00:03:30,080 --> 00:03:32,919 set up set up the show today as I nearly 57 00:03:33,000 --> 00:03:35,560 knock my mouse off the table at the table here, 58 00:03:36,039 --> 00:03:39,800 today's format will be a little bit different and the thing, 59 00:03:40,199 --> 00:03:42,199 the thing I want to say is that we are 60 00:03:42,240 --> 00:03:46,759 not here today to talk about uh hobbyist drones operated 61 00:03:46,800 --> 00:03:52,400 by individuals or companies or the FAA if they're operating drones, 62 00:03:52,439 --> 00:03:55,319 which I don't think they are. We are talking about 63 00:03:55,439 --> 00:04:00,599 vehicles that are often reported as spheres or owns the 64 00:04:00,639 --> 00:04:04,560 size of an suv, demonstrating behavior that our state of 65 00:04:04,599 --> 00:04:08,319 the art just just does not have have. And we're 66 00:04:08,360 --> 00:04:12,280 also going to talk about the need for better transparency 67 00:04:12,319 --> 00:04:15,280 from the federal government. I mean, not only you know, 68 00:04:15,599 --> 00:04:17,639 for the public, because you know, we all of course 69 00:04:17,800 --> 00:04:20,720 deserve to know what is going on above our skies, 70 00:04:21,000 --> 00:04:26,040 but especially for local and state authorities. This gas lighting 71 00:04:26,079 --> 00:04:30,600 that we've seen, certainly from the previous administration and possibly 72 00:04:30,639 --> 00:04:32,759 from this one as well, in terms of gas lighting 73 00:04:33,040 --> 00:04:36,800 local and state officials, it's it's it's just not cool. 74 00:04:37,240 --> 00:04:40,120 And and then the final thing I want to note 75 00:04:40,160 --> 00:04:44,079 is that this has been going on for a very 76 00:04:44,199 --> 00:04:48,920 very long time. The Pentagon, the folks and the Pentagon 77 00:04:49,160 --> 00:04:53,079 and previous administrations. Hopefully again we'll see a change with 78 00:04:53,120 --> 00:04:56,720 the with the Trump administration, but they always the Pentagon, 79 00:04:56,759 --> 00:05:00,160 the CIA, the intelligence community, they always want you to 80 00:05:00,199 --> 00:05:03,759 think that this is something new, that it's like, oh, 81 00:05:03,879 --> 00:05:06,720 you know, we're gonna figure out what these drones are. 82 00:05:06,800 --> 00:05:09,519 We're going to deploy some sensors and we'll get to 83 00:05:09,600 --> 00:05:12,480 the get to the bottom of it. You saw, you saw, 84 00:05:12,519 --> 00:05:16,519 and you heard that multiple times from it was at 85 00:05:16,519 --> 00:05:20,000 a John Kirby who worked for the Biden administration, a 86 00:05:20,120 --> 00:05:23,879 sort of the Pentagon spokesperson. But it was all all 87 00:05:23,920 --> 00:05:28,439 that same sort of bs that they continue to shovel, 88 00:05:28,560 --> 00:05:31,000 which is they want all of you at home to 89 00:05:31,079 --> 00:05:34,639 think this is something new, they've never seen it before. 90 00:05:34,879 --> 00:05:38,000 They you know, they're there is as confused by it 91 00:05:38,040 --> 00:05:41,560 as you. They're going to get to the bottom of it. Well, folks, 92 00:05:42,000 --> 00:05:47,639 that is just a load of horseshit, quite frankly, Uh, 93 00:05:47,720 --> 00:05:51,439 this has been going on literally for decades. On our 94 00:05:51,480 --> 00:05:54,160 program today we have the former chief of Police Chris 95 00:05:54,399 --> 00:05:59,680 Chris Grooms who him and many other law enforcement officers 96 00:06:00,199 --> 00:06:04,120 or Nebraska in twenty nineteen, twenty twenty had hordes of 97 00:06:04,160 --> 00:06:10,920 these drones flying around. So it's it's definitely just a 98 00:06:10,959 --> 00:06:16,079 line of horse manure that the government is trying to 99 00:06:16,199 --> 00:06:20,000 sell you when they know when they act like this 100 00:06:20,079 --> 00:06:23,120 as some kind of surprise, and we don't know where 101 00:06:23,120 --> 00:06:27,000 it's from, but it's probably FAA drones as you know anyway, 102 00:06:27,079 --> 00:06:30,199 So as many of you know, when I'm not hosting 103 00:06:30,240 --> 00:06:33,519 the Good Trouble Show. I volunteer as the Director of 104 00:06:33,560 --> 00:06:38,240 Strategy for the UAP Disclosure Fund. Our organization is a 105 00:06:38,279 --> 00:06:44,319 non partisan nonprofit supporting UAP legislation, protecting whistleblowers, and raising 106 00:06:44,360 --> 00:06:48,759 public awareness for greater transparency. Our amazing team that we 107 00:06:48,800 --> 00:06:52,079 have at UAPDF has some familiar names everyone at home 108 00:06:52,160 --> 00:06:55,279 might know. Yuan Fung are our executive director. We have 109 00:06:55,360 --> 00:07:00,439 doctor Gary Nolan, Loue Elizondo, Colonel Carl Nell, Jordan Fla Hours, 110 00:07:00,560 --> 00:07:06,360 a former Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence, Christopher Mellen, retired 111 00:07:06,480 --> 00:07:10,639 Navy Rear Admiral Tim Galladett, and Kirk McConnell, who was 112 00:07:10,680 --> 00:07:15,879 a worked for Senate Armed Services Committee, and attorney Dylan Guthrie. 113 00:07:16,199 --> 00:07:19,839 Last month, you APDF sponsored a town hall led by 114 00:07:19,920 --> 00:07:25,759 the UAPDF Public Safety Working Group to discuss the drone issue. 115 00:07:25,800 --> 00:07:29,879 And it is my pleasure today to welcome this group 116 00:07:30,279 --> 00:07:33,639 back to the show. So let's see here make sure 117 00:07:33,639 --> 00:07:35,800 we got all the audio on. So below me we 118 00:07:35,879 --> 00:07:40,600 have Sean Grovener who will serve as my co host Forday, 119 00:07:40,920 --> 00:07:42,800 we'll talk about that in a second. Sean is a 120 00:07:42,920 --> 00:07:46,920 forensic consultant who spent twenty five years at the Illinois 121 00:07:47,000 --> 00:07:50,040 State Police. On the top right there your top right, 122 00:07:50,399 --> 00:07:54,480 we have investigator and author Richard Lang who's book, A 123 00:07:54,639 --> 00:07:58,759 First Responder's Guide to UFO Encounters offers a guide for 124 00:07:59,040 --> 00:08:02,519 handling UAP incidents. On the middle right, we are joined 125 00:08:02,560 --> 00:08:06,160 by more friends of the show, Jerry and John Todesco. 126 00:08:06,199 --> 00:08:10,360 They are founders of Nightcrawler Research. They these these two 127 00:08:10,439 --> 00:08:13,720 researchers are just doing amazing work. And we have some 128 00:08:13,839 --> 00:08:18,000 exclusive footage of what kind of some drone stuff u 129 00:08:18,079 --> 00:08:20,839 e P that they that they encountered off the coast 130 00:08:20,879 --> 00:08:22,560 of Long Island. Will show a little bit later in 131 00:08:22,600 --> 00:08:25,560 the show. And uh see, finally, who do we have 132 00:08:25,680 --> 00:08:28,560 we have returning to the show the former chief of 133 00:08:28,560 --> 00:08:35,799 Police of or Nebraska, chief former chief of Nebraska. Well, 134 00:08:35,799 --> 00:08:38,080 I can't talk today. I'm all all time tied. The 135 00:08:38,080 --> 00:08:44,159 former chief of Police of Ord, Nebraska, Chris Chris Groom. So, guys, thanks, 136 00:08:44,679 --> 00:08:51,320 thanks for joining us. How how is everyone excellent? Okay? Great? So, 137 00:08:51,679 --> 00:08:53,480 as I said this, this is a little bit of 138 00:08:53,480 --> 00:08:57,600 a different format. I saw the town hall, uh and said, 139 00:08:57,799 --> 00:08:59,360 you know what, we got to get all these experts 140 00:08:59,399 --> 00:09:02,000 on the town hall that you guys appeared on the 141 00:09:02,080 --> 00:09:06,480 UAPDF channel on YouTube. Was just fantastic and Sean, Now, 142 00:09:06,480 --> 00:09:09,320 of course I'd met everyone else, but I had never 143 00:09:09,559 --> 00:09:12,840 come across you before, and I thought, this guy's incredible 144 00:09:13,080 --> 00:09:17,200 at hosting these things. You are asking just incredible questions. 145 00:09:17,200 --> 00:09:19,519 So I thought to myself, you know what, this is 146 00:09:19,559 --> 00:09:22,759 a Sunday. I'm gonna kind of relax a bit. And 147 00:09:22,919 --> 00:09:26,159 since we have have you on and we know that 148 00:09:26,240 --> 00:09:30,720 you're you're a great host from watching the watching the 149 00:09:30,759 --> 00:09:32,879 town hall last time, I thought, hey, let's have let's 150 00:09:32,919 --> 00:09:35,360 co host this thing. So I'm going to hand it 151 00:09:35,399 --> 00:09:37,480 over to you and then I'll sort of pop in 152 00:09:37,840 --> 00:09:42,840 here and there with questions, hopefully some questions from the audience. 153 00:09:42,879 --> 00:09:45,360 And again, folks in the audience, if you if you 154 00:09:45,399 --> 00:09:48,039 have any questions, we encourage you to put them in 155 00:09:48,080 --> 00:09:51,720 the chat. Please put them in all caps so so 156 00:09:51,759 --> 00:09:55,720 we don't miss him there. And before we actually kick 157 00:09:55,759 --> 00:09:57,480 this off and I hand this off to you, Sean, 158 00:09:57,559 --> 00:10:01,120 what better way to set up today's discus then a 159 00:10:01,240 --> 00:10:06,600 clip from our friend Ross Coltart on News Nation, Let's watch. 160 00:10:06,559 --> 00:10:11,240 Speaker 5: Not consistent with normal drone technology and the government's very 161 00:10:11,360 --> 00:10:15,000 quick attempt to try and ludicrously explain away the drones 162 00:10:15,440 --> 00:10:18,480 by saying they were part of some government research project 163 00:10:18,799 --> 00:10:22,559 has only added fuel to the fire of conspiracy theories 164 00:10:23,120 --> 00:10:25,519 because a lot of people are still seeing these drones, 165 00:10:25,639 --> 00:10:28,080 a lot of these drones are still showing themselves over 166 00:10:28,200 --> 00:10:32,759 government facilities, particularly military bases, and all it's doing. You know, 167 00:10:33,039 --> 00:10:37,759 there's a lot said about conspiracy theories that they may 168 00:10:37,799 --> 00:10:41,879 not be true, but often the attempt to dismiss those 169 00:10:41,879 --> 00:10:45,559 conspiracy theories by either ignoring them, playing them down, or 170 00:10:45,639 --> 00:10:50,159 disinforming about them, plays up to those conspiracy theories. And 171 00:10:50,200 --> 00:10:52,879 that's certainly what the government's doing at the moment. The 172 00:10:53,080 --> 00:10:58,240 absolutely ludicrous, laughable government response made by a White House 173 00:10:58,240 --> 00:11:02,279 press commentator who said that the drone's flap that's occurred 174 00:11:02,279 --> 00:11:05,279 for the last few months was simply a government research 175 00:11:05,360 --> 00:11:12,159 project and also other reasons unspecified reasons is ridiculous and 176 00:11:12,279 --> 00:11:15,679 all it's done, I think is fuel public speculation of 177 00:11:15,759 --> 00:11:19,759 conspiracies like Project Blue Beam. Frankly, I don't think Project 178 00:11:19,799 --> 00:11:22,600 Blue Beam is true. I don't see any evidence at all, 179 00:11:22,639 --> 00:11:24,360 and I talk to a lot of people in NASA 180 00:11:24,440 --> 00:11:27,240 that NASA could even possibly be involved in such a 181 00:11:27,279 --> 00:11:31,799 conspiracy but I do think that it's not outside the 182 00:11:31,840 --> 00:11:34,840 realm of possibility. I suppose that there are some forces 183 00:11:34,879 --> 00:11:37,919 in the dark State, the deep state, that might take 184 00:11:37,919 --> 00:11:41,799 it upon themselves to essentially do something with technology that 185 00:11:41,799 --> 00:11:45,000 they've been concealing from the American public, but I don't 186 00:11:45,039 --> 00:11:46,559 see any evidence of that at the moment. 187 00:11:47,559 --> 00:11:51,000 Speaker 1: All right, Well, there you go, our good friend Ross Koltart, 188 00:11:51,000 --> 00:11:55,120 who does amazing work on News Nation and is just 189 00:11:55,240 --> 00:11:59,600 fantastic show on Reality Check. So Sean let me, I'm 190 00:11:59,639 --> 00:12:03,399 going to have this off to you. And yeah, and again, 191 00:12:03,559 --> 00:12:06,639 folks of watching at home, please post your questions in 192 00:12:06,679 --> 00:12:09,360 all caps and everyone, welcome to the show. 193 00:12:10,679 --> 00:12:14,320 Speaker 6: All right, thanks Matt on the show. This was a 194 00:12:14,320 --> 00:12:17,320 great team to work with. We're going to have a 195 00:12:17,320 --> 00:12:20,240 little bit of additional information for you today, which is 196 00:12:20,279 --> 00:12:23,600 why we are joining with the same team. So today 197 00:12:23,639 --> 00:12:26,519 we're going to discuss some important things. The importance of 198 00:12:26,759 --> 00:12:32,000 coordinating a response between first responders, technical specialists, investigators in 199 00:12:32,039 --> 00:12:37,240 support of resolving unidentified threats to public infrastructure and private property. 200 00:12:38,200 --> 00:12:42,840 Developing standard procedures, training and equipment is essential for effective 201 00:12:42,879 --> 00:12:45,440 public safety response to unidentified threat incidents. 202 00:12:46,600 --> 00:12:48,120 Speaker 7: What is you the public? 203 00:12:48,240 --> 00:12:51,080 Speaker 6: What can you do to assist public safety when observing 204 00:12:51,159 --> 00:12:53,679 unknown drones, and of course we need to focus on 205 00:12:53,720 --> 00:12:56,840 the importance of evidence. So as we watch today, I'm 206 00:12:56,840 --> 00:13:00,000 going to ask you to really consider how you would 207 00:13:00,080 --> 00:13:04,600 handle an incident where you went outside and saw one 208 00:13:04,639 --> 00:13:08,879 of the in the sky. So at this time, I 209 00:13:08,879 --> 00:13:11,200 would like to introduce Chris Grooms, who is a former 210 00:13:11,279 --> 00:13:15,919 chief of ORDPD, Nebraska. At the time of these unknown 211 00:13:16,120 --> 00:13:19,240 drone incursions in twenty nineteen and twenty twenty, he was 212 00:13:19,279 --> 00:13:24,879 a deputy with the Valley County Sheriff's Office. Chris, Thank 213 00:13:24,919 --> 00:13:27,600 you for your service. We appreciate you being with us 214 00:13:27,600 --> 00:13:34,120 again today a quick rundown of your specific encounters that 215 00:13:34,159 --> 00:13:37,759 you had with these unidentified drones, your response and what 216 00:13:37,840 --> 00:13:38,519 the outcome was. 217 00:13:40,039 --> 00:13:46,399 Speaker 3: Thanks for having me, so if you can give us. 218 00:13:47,840 --> 00:13:52,600 Speaker 6: A breakdown of how you became incursions and what did 219 00:13:52,600 --> 00:13:53,440 you actually experience. 220 00:13:53,519 --> 00:13:54,279 Speaker 1: Did give us. 221 00:13:55,759 --> 00:13:57,679 Speaker 7: A view of what you saw that day? 222 00:13:59,279 --> 00:14:03,720 Speaker 3: Yeah, So, we obviously had seen that there was some 223 00:14:03,879 --> 00:14:08,080 drone activity that was going on in Colorado. We didn't 224 00:14:08,080 --> 00:14:10,679 think much of it at the time, but then they 225 00:14:10,679 --> 00:14:13,639 started showing up around here around the Valley County area, 226 00:14:15,879 --> 00:14:18,279 and Valley County is about a five hundred and sixty 227 00:14:18,279 --> 00:14:24,279 eight square mile county, but we have less population than 228 00:14:24,360 --> 00:14:27,320 we do you know, cattle and horses. We have a 229 00:14:27,360 --> 00:14:30,639 population of about forty five hundred people. So there's not 230 00:14:30,720 --> 00:14:34,879 a lot of activity out here that would involve airplanes, helicopters, 231 00:14:35,240 --> 00:14:38,799 even drones. We don't have a drone, you know, hobbyist 232 00:14:38,879 --> 00:14:43,200 group out here doing stuff. It's just very rare and 233 00:14:43,320 --> 00:14:46,600 random that we have activity like that around here. And 234 00:14:46,759 --> 00:14:51,080 in twenty nineteen of December twenty nineteen, they started these 235 00:14:51,080 --> 00:14:54,039 things started moving into our area and when they showed up, 236 00:14:54,639 --> 00:14:57,080 we started getting nine to one one calls to the 237 00:14:57,120 --> 00:15:01,799 sheriff's office, to the local PD, and in that time 238 00:15:03,279 --> 00:15:06,720 it lasted about fourteen to seventeen days, a little bit 239 00:15:06,759 --> 00:15:11,399 longer if you look at other counties incidents that happened 240 00:15:11,440 --> 00:15:13,879 as well, because it wasn't just isolated to us. It 241 00:15:14,000 --> 00:15:18,600 was numerous counties in both directions east, north, southwest, even 242 00:15:18,639 --> 00:15:21,200 up to one hundred miles from us. They were seeing 243 00:15:21,200 --> 00:15:23,399 the same stuff as we were at the same time 244 00:15:23,440 --> 00:15:28,399 on the same nights, so it was very coordinated, not hobbyists, 245 00:15:28,639 --> 00:15:33,600 not government activity. We looked into all that stuff, but 246 00:15:33,720 --> 00:15:38,919 as far as what I saw at the individual level. 247 00:15:39,240 --> 00:15:41,679 The first night would have been around the twenty fourth 248 00:15:41,720 --> 00:15:45,639 of December of twenty nineteen. My sheriff, who actually received 249 00:15:45,679 --> 00:15:48,320 the call, called me and asked me to come support 250 00:15:48,440 --> 00:15:51,080 him so we could figure out what this thing was 251 00:15:51,159 --> 00:15:54,440 and what it was doing. Well, I headed south down 252 00:15:54,559 --> 00:15:58,960 Highway eleven to go link up with him near Davis 253 00:15:58,960 --> 00:16:01,360 Creek Reservoir, which is where this thing was close to. 254 00:16:02,200 --> 00:16:05,399 It was about a mile west of the Davis Creek Reservoir. 255 00:16:06,799 --> 00:16:09,320 So as I was heading towards the sheriff, I noticed 256 00:16:09,440 --> 00:16:12,799 some reddish green lights in the sky, you know, and 257 00:16:12,840 --> 00:16:16,200 they were i'd say six to eight feet apart, but 258 00:16:16,279 --> 00:16:18,159 it was a reddish green light and they were kind 259 00:16:18,159 --> 00:16:20,759 of blinking, and it was just out there, hovering all 260 00:16:20,799 --> 00:16:24,080 by itself in the middle of nowhere. And the sheriff 261 00:16:24,120 --> 00:16:27,759 had tried to make contact with it initially, and that's 262 00:16:27,799 --> 00:16:30,600 why he called me to come help him. So as 263 00:16:30,600 --> 00:16:33,759 we started to pursue it, we were in our vehicles, 264 00:16:33,960 --> 00:16:35,000 our patrol vehicles. 265 00:16:35,840 --> 00:16:36,279 Speaker 1: This thing. 266 00:16:36,639 --> 00:16:38,960 Speaker 3: Every time that we would try and move closer to it, 267 00:16:38,960 --> 00:16:42,679 it would move away from us, but it always paralleled 268 00:16:42,720 --> 00:16:45,480 the roads. It always moved in a way that we 269 00:16:45,519 --> 00:16:48,000 couldn't get to it or get better eyes on it, 270 00:16:48,399 --> 00:16:51,039 But it never got away from us to where we 271 00:16:51,080 --> 00:16:54,559 could couldn't see it. It obviously knew we were there, 272 00:16:55,320 --> 00:16:58,840 and as we would pursue it down the gravel roads, 273 00:16:59,240 --> 00:17:01,440 it would move in a direction that we couldn't get 274 00:17:01,480 --> 00:17:04,200 close enough to it, but it would stay near the roads. 275 00:17:06,279 --> 00:17:08,920 Speaker 6: So I got a question, So, given that you were 276 00:17:08,920 --> 00:17:12,440 within the proximity to have eyes on this, were you 277 00:17:12,480 --> 00:17:17,480 able to get any information regarding the size, the shape, 278 00:17:17,680 --> 00:17:21,319 any distinguishing features. You know, we've talked a lot about, uh, 279 00:17:21,480 --> 00:17:24,759 you know, the the these drone incursions happening over the 280 00:17:24,799 --> 00:17:28,240 last several years, and now we have a response from 281 00:17:28,240 --> 00:17:33,920 our you know, these are approved flights by hobbyists. So 282 00:17:34,400 --> 00:17:37,880 what can you tell us about distinguishing features of these 283 00:17:37,920 --> 00:17:40,200 objects that you saw that don't conform to that. 284 00:17:41,880 --> 00:17:46,920 Speaker 3: Well, the first the first night that I witnessed one personally, 285 00:17:47,480 --> 00:17:49,640 I couldn't get close enough to it to tell if 286 00:17:49,640 --> 00:17:53,039 there was a fixed wing or if it was some 287 00:17:53,079 --> 00:17:55,960 form of a quad copp or anything like that. It 288 00:17:56,039 --> 00:17:58,880 was just the two reddish green lights. But I can 289 00:17:59,240 --> 00:18:01,680 tell you that as close as we could get to it, 290 00:18:01,720 --> 00:18:08,039 which was maybe within oh four hundred feet somewhere around there. 291 00:18:08,920 --> 00:18:11,599 There was no noise. There was no noise that would 292 00:18:11,599 --> 00:18:15,599 tell us that it was a drone or anything like that. 293 00:18:17,319 --> 00:18:19,240 The other night that I witnessed, which would have been 294 00:18:19,240 --> 00:18:23,759 about a week later, there was absolutely no signs to 295 00:18:23,799 --> 00:18:28,119 it whatsoever that it was a drone due to it 296 00:18:28,200 --> 00:18:31,799 was just a big ball, bright light in the sky 297 00:18:31,880 --> 00:18:36,839 and the distance that it covered from the north to 298 00:18:36,920 --> 00:18:39,680 my location to the south was about three quarters of 299 00:18:39,720 --> 00:18:43,160 a mile and it covered that distance in about two 300 00:18:43,240 --> 00:18:47,720 to four seconds. And it wasn't very high in the sky. 301 00:18:47,759 --> 00:18:49,400 It was one hundred hundred and fifty feet And the 302 00:18:49,440 --> 00:18:51,559 reason I knew that was because I referenced off the 303 00:18:51,599 --> 00:18:55,519 co op tower where it was coming from, So I 304 00:18:55,559 --> 00:18:59,559 knew roughly the height of the object, and then as 305 00:18:59,599 --> 00:19:02,319 far as the size when it passed in front of me, 306 00:19:02,880 --> 00:19:07,839 right in front of my windshield, from one side of 307 00:19:07,880 --> 00:19:09,640 the light to the other side of the light, I 308 00:19:09,759 --> 00:19:11,880 estimated to be about the size of my pickup truck, 309 00:19:11,960 --> 00:19:14,680 and at that time I was driving a RAM fifteen 310 00:19:14,759 --> 00:19:19,079 hundred crew grab pickup, so it was fairly large, at 311 00:19:19,160 --> 00:19:24,400 least the light was anyways, but the amount of you know, 312 00:19:24,480 --> 00:19:26,720 the two to four seconds that it took to cover 313 00:19:26,839 --> 00:19:31,160 that distance. I'm not familiar with drones that can cover 314 00:19:31,240 --> 00:19:34,599 that distance that quickly. And that there was no noise. Again, 315 00:19:35,640 --> 00:19:38,559 the only thing that I saw that maybe gave it 316 00:19:39,079 --> 00:19:43,240 some type of fixed object was it had contrails behind it, 317 00:19:44,000 --> 00:19:48,160 and those contrails stayed as it passed by me. The 318 00:19:48,200 --> 00:19:52,279 contrails stayed there when it finally disappeared away from me 319 00:19:52,759 --> 00:19:55,759 to where I could no longer see it. When I 320 00:19:55,799 --> 00:19:58,480 looked back to see if there was those contrails were 321 00:19:58,519 --> 00:20:03,200 still there. They were gone. But I just that night, 322 00:20:03,240 --> 00:20:05,599 I don't I don't feel like it was a drone, 323 00:20:05,960 --> 00:20:10,720 just by the bright light that it was. It was 324 00:20:10,759 --> 00:20:14,720 a reddish orange light. How fast it went. The no noise, 325 00:20:17,000 --> 00:20:18,839 yeah it was. It was just it was so odd 326 00:20:18,880 --> 00:20:22,079 and it was it still boggles my mind to this day. 327 00:20:22,839 --> 00:20:23,640 Speaker 1: So kind. 328 00:20:24,160 --> 00:20:27,599 Speaker 6: And what you describe is pretty sensational. How many drones 329 00:20:27,640 --> 00:20:29,400 did you see at any given time, you know, did 330 00:20:29,440 --> 00:20:33,680 they appear the same or were they different in some way? 331 00:20:34,640 --> 00:20:39,119 Speaker 3: Well, some nights in our county we would see upwards 332 00:20:39,119 --> 00:20:43,079 of fifty and they would move in formations, whether they 333 00:20:43,079 --> 00:20:46,440 were in a huge you know, diamond shaped formation or 334 00:20:46,480 --> 00:20:53,039 flying in a wedge. A deputy, the sheriff, and a 335 00:20:53,240 --> 00:20:56,759 off duty state trooper all counted anywhere between forty and 336 00:20:56,839 --> 00:21:00,559 fifty and they the forty to fIF the of them 337 00:21:00,599 --> 00:21:04,319 were basically surrounding a small town in my county called Arcadia, 338 00:21:04,640 --> 00:21:08,400 which is a town of about six hundred people, and 339 00:21:09,359 --> 00:21:11,440 they just they were just there. They were just hovering 340 00:21:11,480 --> 00:21:14,240 over the town doing whatever it was that they were doing, 341 00:21:14,799 --> 00:21:18,759 and eventually they just flew off. And you know, I'll 342 00:21:18,799 --> 00:21:21,759 go back and just say that every night that these 343 00:21:21,799 --> 00:21:24,920 things showed up for that fourteen to seventeen days, we 344 00:21:25,000 --> 00:21:27,480 never tracked where they could, where they were coming from, 345 00:21:28,039 --> 00:21:30,440 We never tracked where they went. And that wasn't just 346 00:21:30,559 --> 00:21:34,359 our county. It was multiple counties coordinating together at the 347 00:21:34,400 --> 00:21:37,240 local law enforcement level to try and get a fix 348 00:21:37,279 --> 00:21:38,519 on these things. 349 00:21:39,240 --> 00:21:42,519 Speaker 6: And so and I want to I want to go 350 00:21:42,559 --> 00:21:44,400 into a little bit more of that as as we 351 00:21:44,440 --> 00:21:47,880 talk about the tracking. This is very important because you know, 352 00:21:47,920 --> 00:21:50,920 as taxpayers, we pay for a lot of resources to 353 00:21:50,960 --> 00:21:55,920 maintain the security of our nation and globally, Actually, what 354 00:21:56,119 --> 00:22:00,880 steps were taken to gather the evidence that would demonstrate 355 00:22:00,920 --> 00:22:05,200 to our government agencies and the public. 356 00:22:05,839 --> 00:22:06,519 Speaker 7: What this was. 357 00:22:06,559 --> 00:22:10,960 Speaker 6: As far as any photo, video evidence, anything that you 358 00:22:10,960 --> 00:22:13,680 know that might have been deposited. 359 00:22:15,000 --> 00:22:17,880 Speaker 3: Well, I mean we did have We did have videos 360 00:22:18,640 --> 00:22:22,400 from people, uh, and it was this, you know, it 361 00:22:22,440 --> 00:22:24,920 was just a big bright light in the sky. And 362 00:22:25,759 --> 00:22:30,680 we we had witness testimony, sworn statements. You know, I 363 00:22:31,000 --> 00:22:34,640 could have had more sworn statements from people, but there 364 00:22:34,720 --> 00:22:37,839 was just so many people that were unwilling to put 365 00:22:37,920 --> 00:22:40,720 their name out there, you know, in the sworn statements. 366 00:22:40,759 --> 00:22:45,519 They just would refuse to fill them out. But we uh, 367 00:22:46,079 --> 00:22:48,440 you know, we coordinated with all the other law enforcement 368 00:22:48,480 --> 00:22:52,480 agencies in the local area, calls to service, the nine 369 00:22:52,480 --> 00:22:57,559 to one one locks, reaching out to federal agencies, the FBI, 370 00:22:58,400 --> 00:23:02,440 the state patrol. Just there was just all sorts of 371 00:23:02,440 --> 00:23:04,720 different ways that we tried to figure out what it was, 372 00:23:04,759 --> 00:23:07,240 and it was always the same thing of well, that's 373 00:23:07,240 --> 00:23:10,880 not us, We're not doing that. You know, we don't 374 00:23:10,920 --> 00:23:15,240 know what it is. We reached out to survey companies 375 00:23:15,279 --> 00:23:18,200 that maybe you were doing something with GPS, it's we 376 00:23:18,559 --> 00:23:21,039 did our due diligence. I mean, we even reached out 377 00:23:21,119 --> 00:23:25,319 to Facebook to see if they were doing something, and 378 00:23:25,400 --> 00:23:27,599 it was all the same Nope, that's not us. Nope, 379 00:23:27,599 --> 00:23:28,480 we're not doing that. 380 00:23:29,480 --> 00:23:34,799 Speaker 6: So during your response, did you experience what other observations 381 00:23:34,799 --> 00:23:37,119 did you have as far as any effects on the environment, 382 00:23:37,559 --> 00:23:40,680 did you you know, was there any heat signatures any 383 00:23:40,839 --> 00:23:43,799 did you feel any heat from the object. Was there 384 00:23:43,839 --> 00:23:48,279 any sort of disruption to any electronic devices, anything that 385 00:23:48,839 --> 00:23:50,000 beyond what you could see. 386 00:23:51,319 --> 00:23:55,440 Speaker 3: No, we never I never experienced anything that was hot 387 00:23:55,559 --> 00:23:58,759 or earned. None of my electronics ever shut off. 388 00:23:58,960 --> 00:23:59,920 Speaker 7: Radio is always work. 389 00:24:00,039 --> 00:24:04,039 Speaker 3: We could communicate through our cell phones, and none of 390 00:24:04,039 --> 00:24:07,400 the other local populace ever, you know, reached out to 391 00:24:07,480 --> 00:24:11,319 us to say, hey, this thing burned me or I 392 00:24:11,359 --> 00:24:13,440 could feel heat or anything like that. We never had 393 00:24:13,720 --> 00:24:17,240 any of that. We did have some other weird stuff though, 394 00:24:17,920 --> 00:24:22,839 h ranchers calling in saying that these things are hovering 395 00:24:22,880 --> 00:24:25,880 in and their pastures, shining big bright lights down on 396 00:24:26,000 --> 00:24:29,079 their cattle or their horses and disturbing their cattle or 397 00:24:29,079 --> 00:24:33,400 their horses. We never had any calls about cattle mutilations 398 00:24:33,480 --> 00:24:36,839 or anything like that. But at some at one point, 399 00:24:36,880 --> 00:24:39,720 there was a few days they weren't all together, they 400 00:24:39,720 --> 00:24:41,839 were kind of broken up, but there was all There 401 00:24:41,880 --> 00:24:44,960 was a few days where we had different ranchers that 402 00:24:45,039 --> 00:24:49,359 had called either me personally or the office to say, hey, 403 00:24:50,440 --> 00:24:54,400 this this white light, bright light, and the sky was 404 00:24:54,440 --> 00:24:57,839 shining something down on my cattle that scared them. I 405 00:24:57,880 --> 00:24:59,240 had to go out at four in the morning to 406 00:24:59,279 --> 00:25:02,960 get accountabilit any of them. It just irritated them. They 407 00:25:02,960 --> 00:25:04,000 wanted to know what it was. 408 00:25:05,279 --> 00:25:08,799 Speaker 6: So to your knowledge, was was there any property damage 409 00:25:08,920 --> 00:25:11,400 or injury to anyone or any of the cattle. 410 00:25:11,160 --> 00:25:15,200 Speaker 3: Or Nope, nope, never had any reports of that. 411 00:25:16,519 --> 00:25:22,119 Speaker 6: What about the demand on government resources to your local jurisdiction. 412 00:25:23,039 --> 00:25:25,720 You know, you describe your community as a you know, 413 00:25:25,720 --> 00:25:29,279 a ranching community. It sounds like a very peaceful, quiet community. 414 00:25:29,759 --> 00:25:34,440 Something that would be uncare a high level known technology 415 00:25:34,480 --> 00:25:36,759 to dedicate resources to. 416 00:25:38,279 --> 00:25:40,359 Speaker 7: What demand did this. 417 00:25:40,480 --> 00:25:44,200 Speaker 6: Place on your community in terms of response, how many 418 00:25:44,279 --> 00:25:48,279 officers approximately responded? You know, what was the nature of 419 00:25:48,279 --> 00:25:50,839 this response in terms of resources? 420 00:25:51,519 --> 00:25:54,839 Speaker 3: Well, from my county alone, there was at the time 421 00:25:55,680 --> 00:25:59,480 five full time deputies and sheriff, and then there was 422 00:25:59,599 --> 00:26:04,200 three either three or four or police department officers, including 423 00:26:04,240 --> 00:26:10,119 the chief. And we obviously work different shifts than other guys, 424 00:26:10,160 --> 00:26:13,559 but typically on a night where this would be going on, 425 00:26:14,119 --> 00:26:16,359 I would say about two to three of us would respond, 426 00:26:16,519 --> 00:26:19,599 just in my county, but some of the other counties 427 00:26:19,599 --> 00:26:22,440 were having one or two guys or gals out at 428 00:26:22,440 --> 00:26:25,319 the same time dealing with their stuff and their county. 429 00:26:26,240 --> 00:26:29,240 So there was a few of us. For as small 430 00:26:29,279 --> 00:26:32,200 of a population as we are, there was a few 431 00:26:32,200 --> 00:26:35,160 of us out every night trying to observe these things 432 00:26:35,279 --> 00:26:38,160 or collect data or anything like that. 433 00:26:40,240 --> 00:26:43,640 Speaker 6: At any time where you notified of any specific exercises 434 00:26:43,960 --> 00:26:50,240 or additional activities that would would be expected to be 435 00:26:50,319 --> 00:26:53,839 notified to your agency that hey, you know, don't get 436 00:26:53,880 --> 00:26:56,000 all up in arms about is there these exercise going 437 00:26:56,039 --> 00:26:59,279 on or tests, any any sort of notification that might 438 00:26:59,279 --> 00:27:02,599 have aligned with these observations. 439 00:27:02,640 --> 00:27:05,680 Speaker 3: Nope, nope. Off at Air Force Base, which is out 440 00:27:05,680 --> 00:27:10,119 of Omaha. They're they're fairly large base, you know. They 441 00:27:10,240 --> 00:27:14,160 they have jets and C one thirty's and stuff like 442 00:27:14,200 --> 00:27:16,720 that flying and out of there all the time. But 443 00:27:16,759 --> 00:27:19,920 when we reached out to them, it was nope, that's 444 00:27:19,960 --> 00:27:22,400 not us, we're not doing that. We don't know what 445 00:27:22,480 --> 00:27:26,880 it is that So we kind of wouled them out. 446 00:27:28,279 --> 00:27:31,599 The FBI told us, Nope, that's not us, We're not 447 00:27:31,680 --> 00:27:34,279 doing that. Even the State Patrol. We reached out to 448 00:27:34,319 --> 00:27:37,319 them and they we do have state troopers in this area, 449 00:27:38,119 --> 00:27:40,680 but we reached out to the command and they said, no, 450 00:27:40,799 --> 00:27:42,920 we don't have that capability. We're not doing that. 451 00:27:43,799 --> 00:27:44,839 Speaker 1: Ah. 452 00:27:44,960 --> 00:27:46,480 Speaker 3: I think at one point you talked to the f 453 00:27:46,519 --> 00:27:49,240 A and they said, no, that's not us, We're not 454 00:27:49,319 --> 00:27:52,920 doing that. So we we we reached out through a 455 00:27:52,920 --> 00:27:54,079 lot of different agencies. 456 00:27:55,119 --> 00:27:58,160 Speaker 6: So as as you're responding to this, uh, this series 457 00:27:58,200 --> 00:28:00,920 of incidents, and you're you're reaching out of these agencies, 458 00:28:00,960 --> 00:28:04,079 you have, uh, you know what seems to be you know, 459 00:28:04,920 --> 00:28:09,319 ill equipped to address uh an area an incident like this. 460 00:28:09,480 --> 00:28:15,079 I mean, uh, the the police agencies respond to incidents 461 00:28:15,119 --> 00:28:17,240 on the ground, and here you have an air incident. 462 00:28:17,559 --> 00:28:19,920 So what what kind of challenges did you face when 463 00:28:20,000 --> 00:28:23,000 trying to interface with other agencies as far as communication, 464 00:28:23,759 --> 00:28:27,480 uh information sharing resources. What are some of the challenges 465 00:28:27,519 --> 00:28:28,519 that you faced. 466 00:28:29,839 --> 00:28:32,279 Speaker 3: Well, A lot of it was just you know, the 467 00:28:32,400 --> 00:28:35,119 lack of what we were receiving from the federal government. 468 00:28:36,839 --> 00:28:40,519 You know, they're the agencies around here. We we have 469 00:28:41,039 --> 00:28:45,319 fairly sophisticated technology to do our job, but as far 470 00:28:45,400 --> 00:28:49,519 as anything that's aerial, we you know, we don't have 471 00:28:49,640 --> 00:28:54,200 the typical thermals or night vision or anything like that. 472 00:28:54,920 --> 00:28:57,359 Every officer doesn't have that. We'd have to go to 473 00:28:57,400 --> 00:29:01,119 our swat team guys to get that stuff. So that 474 00:29:01,720 --> 00:29:04,799 definitely was a problem, was being able to use any 475 00:29:04,799 --> 00:29:08,240 type of thermals or die vision at any given time 476 00:29:08,279 --> 00:29:11,000 to try and get eyes on these things to figure 477 00:29:11,000 --> 00:29:12,799 out what type of structure there. 478 00:29:12,759 --> 00:29:13,160 Speaker 1: Was to it. 479 00:29:14,400 --> 00:29:16,640 Speaker 3: As far as the communication side of it goes, we 480 00:29:16,720 --> 00:29:21,119 did communicate a lot with other surrounding agencies, either by 481 00:29:21,200 --> 00:29:26,920 cell phone or radio. But anytime that we would communicate 482 00:29:27,519 --> 00:29:30,079 and say, hey, can you go sit up on this hill, 483 00:29:30,599 --> 00:29:32,839 this thing is kind of moving in that direction towards 484 00:29:32,920 --> 00:29:35,759 you guys over in your county. They would go set 485 00:29:35,839 --> 00:29:38,839 up over there, and you know, they'd have ten power 486 00:29:38,920 --> 00:29:42,119 binos or whatever to try and see lights in the 487 00:29:42,119 --> 00:29:45,480 sky or whatever, and they would disappear. I don't know 488 00:29:45,519 --> 00:29:49,240 if that meant they shut the lights off or some 489 00:29:49,359 --> 00:29:53,160 other crazy technology. I don't know, but we just could 490 00:29:53,200 --> 00:29:57,079 never triangulate where they were going or where they came from. 491 00:29:57,480 --> 00:29:59,119 It was just so random. 492 00:29:59,440 --> 00:30:03,119 Speaker 6: So so going back on your response here, I know 493 00:30:03,119 --> 00:30:04,039 it's spent some time. 494 00:30:04,720 --> 00:30:06,039 Speaker 7: If this were to happen again. 495 00:30:07,000 --> 00:30:09,519 Speaker 6: What additional resources would you ask for if you were 496 00:30:09,559 --> 00:30:12,279 in charge of responding to this incident, what would you say, Hey, 497 00:30:12,759 --> 00:30:17,440 we absolutely need these resources, these personnel, this equipment we 498 00:30:17,480 --> 00:30:21,319 need to set up, you know, in these locations to 499 00:30:21,440 --> 00:30:22,200 get a beat on this. 500 00:30:22,240 --> 00:30:23,240 Speaker 7: What would you ask for? 501 00:30:24,599 --> 00:30:28,519 Speaker 3: I would definitely ask the federal government to help us 502 00:30:28,599 --> 00:30:31,680 give us some answers. But as far as equipment, we 503 00:30:31,720 --> 00:30:34,240 could use some thermals, we could use some night vision. 504 00:30:35,160 --> 00:30:39,480 Communication wise, we got great radios, we have a good 505 00:30:39,559 --> 00:30:44,680 radio system, we have a great regional dispatch center. Cell 506 00:30:44,680 --> 00:30:48,119 Phones obviously they worked, so that was a quick way 507 00:30:48,160 --> 00:30:50,559 for us to talk. But I would definitely say just 508 00:30:50,599 --> 00:30:53,759 being able to get eyes on these things with those 509 00:30:53,799 --> 00:30:57,160 thermals or their night visions, so if they did go 510 00:30:57,359 --> 00:31:00,519 dark or shut their lights off, at least hopefully we 511 00:31:00,519 --> 00:31:02,839 could pick them up with some type of thermal imaging 512 00:31:03,440 --> 00:31:05,400 and that might help us track them a little bit better. 513 00:31:06,559 --> 00:31:08,839 Speaker 1: I'd actually liked to I was going through while you 514 00:31:08,880 --> 00:31:13,480 guys were chatting here. Chris a while back sent something like, 515 00:31:13,799 --> 00:31:16,599 I think it's almost close to like forty or more 516 00:31:17,400 --> 00:31:20,440 calls to service. Now, these are the kind of nine 517 00:31:20,440 --> 00:31:22,319 to one to one call records, and I thought that 518 00:31:22,559 --> 00:31:25,160 I would read some here because I think it really 519 00:31:25,400 --> 00:31:33,359 illustrates how prolific this particular drone event was. And so yeah, 520 00:31:33,359 --> 00:31:35,319 I'm just going to go through some of them here. 521 00:31:36,440 --> 00:31:43,440 Let's see. So this this was from let's see, sorry, 522 00:31:43,559 --> 00:31:47,920 January thirteenth of twenty twenty, called details, and I'm going 523 00:31:47,960 --> 00:31:50,960 to leave the officers' names out, and of course the 524 00:31:51,000 --> 00:31:56,079 person who made the made the call. But this officer said, 525 00:31:56,079 --> 00:32:00,720 about ten minutes ago eight drones flew over his property west, 526 00:32:01,519 --> 00:32:05,400 so that's one. Another one here saw cluster of bright 527 00:32:05,559 --> 00:32:08,799 lights to the southwest of her house. This was on 528 00:32:09,079 --> 00:32:16,440 January seventh, twenty twenty. Let's see west of Dodge and 529 00:32:16,680 --> 00:32:24,000 sixteenth cluster of fifteen drones on let's see January seventh. 530 00:32:24,000 --> 00:32:28,640 A drone hovering over house and lists the caller saw 531 00:32:28,640 --> 00:32:34,079 about four to five hours ago when she complained. Let's 532 00:32:34,079 --> 00:32:40,599 see Ashley Furniture. See Ashley Furniture stores. See drones three 533 00:32:40,599 --> 00:32:46,559 to southeast three to four miles. Another person called says 534 00:32:46,599 --> 00:32:50,119 he is seeing three small and one large drone over 535 00:32:50,480 --> 00:32:56,279 Maxwell if that's a street. Another person on again on 536 00:32:56,440 --> 00:33:01,920 January seventh, six drones. Caller and his girlfriend said they 537 00:33:01,960 --> 00:33:07,039 saw them yellow in different colored lights. Northwest of airport 538 00:33:07,119 --> 00:33:12,400 near Highway is another call drones over house. Twenty of 539 00:33:12,440 --> 00:33:16,799 them happened forty five minutes ago. Majority went east, others 540 00:33:16,839 --> 00:33:22,039 went north. Another one here on January second, twenty twenty 541 00:33:22,240 --> 00:33:27,279 Hershey two drones near the canal. Saw drones one west 542 00:33:27,279 --> 00:33:31,839 of Sutherland, one west of north Platte. Let's see here 543 00:33:31,880 --> 00:33:34,400 looking for some other ones. Looks like one is north 544 00:33:34,400 --> 00:33:40,200 of Miller Road. This was again on January seventh. Solid 545 00:33:40,200 --> 00:33:43,680 white light that's been there for five minutes west of Highway, 546 00:33:43,799 --> 00:33:47,960 maybe moving east. And again, folks, these are actual. These 547 00:33:48,000 --> 00:33:50,759 are the calls to service, and maybe after I go 548 00:33:50,799 --> 00:33:53,920 through some of these will have Chris tell us exactly 549 00:33:53,960 --> 00:33:57,880 what calls to service are, But I mean these are. 550 00:33:59,319 --> 00:34:04,880 It's the number of them is insane. One drone approximately 551 00:34:04,960 --> 00:34:08,719 forty feet in the air called in by by a 552 00:34:08,760 --> 00:34:15,119 police officer. That's pretty low. Another call ten to twenty 553 00:34:15,199 --> 00:34:18,280 drones flying one thousand feet in the air around Highway 554 00:34:18,320 --> 00:34:24,480 eighty three complaint loops as a complaintant. There Another call 555 00:34:24,599 --> 00:34:27,840 six to seven drones overhead between well Fleet and Dickens 556 00:34:29,360 --> 00:34:34,719 Drone siding about twenty minutes ago. It's just it's unreal 557 00:34:35,440 --> 00:34:37,239 the number of them. I'm just going to kind of 558 00:34:37,320 --> 00:34:40,639 quick skim through some of these others. Here's another one. 559 00:34:42,320 --> 00:34:44,679 A caller saw high in the sky and said it 560 00:34:44,679 --> 00:34:47,559 looked like a satellite going west to east, and then 561 00:34:47,679 --> 00:34:51,760 saw fifteen separate lights following each other in a straight line, 562 00:34:51,760 --> 00:34:55,400 evenly spaced. The lights were not blinking, they were steady lights. 563 00:34:57,239 --> 00:34:59,519 Drone not too far up in the air, flashing lights 564 00:34:59,519 --> 00:35:04,079 on either side. It has two lights hovering in one spot. Uh. 565 00:35:04,400 --> 00:35:07,679 Followed a drone. Another call followed drone from town along 566 00:35:07,800 --> 00:35:11,199 South Buffalo and then around the lake by the dumpedon 567 00:35:11,719 --> 00:35:16,519 end of their house. Drone siding. Drone siding seen several 568 00:35:16,599 --> 00:35:19,360 drones flying together. Some have flew off and then turned 569 00:35:19,400 --> 00:35:23,480 back around. They are flying towards Hershey, right now, I 570 00:35:23,599 --> 00:35:26,480 made contact with a large Okay, so this is uh, 571 00:35:26,800 --> 00:35:29,840 this is a called call to service from you, Chris. 572 00:35:30,599 --> 00:35:34,519 Where you state, uh, let's see, attempted to make contact 573 00:35:34,519 --> 00:35:40,039 with large drone that was flying west and let's see 574 00:35:40,519 --> 00:35:43,039 I delete that one just kind of and and finally 575 00:35:43,119 --> 00:35:46,639 I want to read this statement that that you that 576 00:35:46,719 --> 00:35:51,079 you provided. Again, this is ORed police department. This is 577 00:35:51,280 --> 00:35:53,320 back when you were you were a chief of police. 578 00:35:54,360 --> 00:35:57,400 The legal statement, the statement that was provided to you 579 00:35:57,639 --> 00:36:00,159 when you were chief of police. There, my daughter and 580 00:36:00,199 --> 00:36:04,480 I noticed the drones hovering over Ord along with a 581 00:36:04,519 --> 00:36:08,559 redacted name. We watched them for about fifteen to thirty minutes, 582 00:36:08,599 --> 00:36:12,480 hovering over the Valley County Courthouse. There maybe was three 583 00:36:12,559 --> 00:36:15,559 to four drones in a row. This was all during daylight. 584 00:36:15,960 --> 00:36:18,480 The next night we started seeing them out at our 585 00:36:18,519 --> 00:36:21,440 place one point five miles from ORD. I tried to 586 00:36:21,519 --> 00:36:24,440 video some of them. However, some of the videos didn't 587 00:36:24,440 --> 00:36:27,480 come out clear. The drones had red, green, blue, and 588 00:36:27,599 --> 00:36:31,079 white lights. Blue is not a standard color for aircraft. 589 00:36:31,400 --> 00:36:33,880 We would see them alone or in multiples in a 590 00:36:33,960 --> 00:36:37,480 straight line or circle. They would hover in one spot 591 00:36:37,519 --> 00:36:40,239 for a while and then go lower towards the ground. 592 00:36:40,599 --> 00:36:45,039 They would also circle around an area and then move online. 593 00:36:45,400 --> 00:36:47,599 They would hover until they would see us watching them, 594 00:36:47,639 --> 00:36:51,320 and then they would take off fast. Exclamation point. We 595 00:36:51,400 --> 00:36:55,320 started noticing them in more numbers, hovering in squares or grids. 596 00:36:55,360 --> 00:36:59,920 One night there was one flying west and one flying 597 00:37:00,079 --> 00:37:02,920 east at the same time. One flew right by a plane. 598 00:37:03,480 --> 00:37:05,440 It got to the point where we could. We could 599 00:37:05,519 --> 00:37:08,559 be inside our house and hear them flying around all 600 00:37:08,599 --> 00:37:12,039 over our place. One video, I was able to rush outside. 601 00:37:12,079 --> 00:37:15,199 In one second of video, you could hear the engine, 602 00:37:15,280 --> 00:37:18,000 We could see all of their lights, the shadow of 603 00:37:18,039 --> 00:37:20,840 the shape of the drone, and it flew right over us. 604 00:37:21,199 --> 00:37:23,760 Then it was back up in the sky. I mean, 605 00:37:24,639 --> 00:37:28,960 really really pretty pretty amazing accounts there, Chris, What what 606 00:37:29,079 --> 00:37:32,880 are calls to service? What have I been reading to 607 00:37:33,000 --> 00:37:33,719 our viewers here? 608 00:37:34,719 --> 00:37:36,920 Speaker 3: Yeah, So calls to service can be a lot of 609 00:37:36,960 --> 00:37:39,000 different things. It can be an actual nine to one 610 00:37:39,039 --> 00:37:43,079 one call, or it could be somebody calling our dispatch 611 00:37:43,119 --> 00:37:46,719 center to just file a complaint or to let us 612 00:37:46,760 --> 00:37:51,199 know something is suspicious. But the calls to service themselves 613 00:37:51,440 --> 00:37:56,280 come either directly to the dispatch center and they dispatch us, 614 00:37:56,800 --> 00:37:59,119 or say I get a personal phone call from, uh, 615 00:37:59,559 --> 00:38:02,400 you know, a citizen in the county, and I call 616 00:38:02,519 --> 00:38:05,000 my dispatch and say, hey, so and so just called 617 00:38:05,039 --> 00:38:08,920 me about a suspicious person near Dollar General. And then 618 00:38:08,960 --> 00:38:10,760 I tell dispatch I'm going to be out at Dollar 619 00:38:10,800 --> 00:38:13,280 General reference a suspicious person. Can you make me a 620 00:38:13,320 --> 00:38:16,159 call to service for that? And then dispatch makes the 621 00:38:16,199 --> 00:38:18,679 call to service Later in the day, if I need 622 00:38:18,679 --> 00:38:21,800 to go do documentation because I made an arrest or 623 00:38:21,840 --> 00:38:25,719 I witnessed something that was odd, I would do my report. 624 00:38:26,760 --> 00:38:29,039 So a call to service is essentially anything that we 625 00:38:29,079 --> 00:38:32,320 as law enforcement officers are able to track as well 626 00:38:32,360 --> 00:38:35,039 as if it goes to a court case or a trial, 627 00:38:35,440 --> 00:38:38,400 we would use those calls to service and reports to 628 00:38:39,239 --> 00:38:39,920 use them in trial. 629 00:38:40,480 --> 00:38:42,960 Speaker 1: Got it, Okay, Sean, back back to you. I feel 630 00:38:42,960 --> 00:38:43,920 like a news anchor here. 631 00:38:44,519 --> 00:38:45,480 Speaker 7: Oh no, this is great. 632 00:38:45,559 --> 00:38:50,400 Speaker 6: Yeah, And Matt, it's because what that conveys to the 633 00:38:50,400 --> 00:38:53,639 public is that there were there was significant concern in 634 00:38:53,679 --> 00:38:57,280 the community. It was documented in the computer aided dispatch 635 00:38:57,360 --> 00:39:01,599 system for the police department, and that is way to 636 00:39:01,679 --> 00:39:04,920 catalog all of the witnesses that are saying that they 637 00:39:04,960 --> 00:39:07,280 saw what they said that they saw, and this is 638 00:39:07,320 --> 00:39:11,320 important to corroborate the information to determine whether or not 639 00:39:11,400 --> 00:39:13,280 this is something we need to be concerned with or 640 00:39:13,360 --> 00:39:17,880 something that is clearly by the number of reports and 641 00:39:17,920 --> 00:39:22,320 the fact that the reports were saying that these drones 642 00:39:22,360 --> 00:39:25,440 were hovering over private property, hovering in the vicinity of 643 00:39:26,000 --> 00:39:29,519 an airport, and then now you know, years later, we're 644 00:39:29,519 --> 00:39:32,440 being told that these were approved by the FAA. So 645 00:39:33,920 --> 00:39:37,960 hopefully what we're going to get out of really parse 646 00:39:38,039 --> 00:39:42,679 out what is reasonable in terms responces, what our preparedness 647 00:39:42,719 --> 00:39:45,599 level is, and as it compares to the information that 648 00:39:45,639 --> 00:39:49,320 we do have. So, Chris, based on all of this 649 00:39:49,480 --> 00:39:53,679 information and given the time that has gone by, let 650 00:39:53,679 --> 00:39:57,079 me ask you to date, has there been any accountability 651 00:39:57,119 --> 00:40:00,159 as to who was responsible for the in your communit? 652 00:40:01,440 --> 00:40:01,760 Speaker 1: Nope. 653 00:40:02,840 --> 00:40:07,760 Speaker 3: We never received any any answers from any agency, the 654 00:40:07,920 --> 00:40:11,599 local you know, the state patrol obviously if it wasn't theirs, 655 00:40:11,679 --> 00:40:15,400 they they never gave us answers. FBI never gave us answers. 656 00:40:17,800 --> 00:40:22,559 It's it's just kind of been a a whatever situation. 657 00:40:22,920 --> 00:40:26,880 Seems like nobody wants to tell us or they don't know. 658 00:40:27,719 --> 00:40:29,199 Speaker 1: But what what what has. 659 00:40:29,039 --> 00:40:29,840 Speaker 7: That done with? 660 00:40:30,239 --> 00:40:34,559 Speaker 6: You know, in terms of the confidence in public safety efforts? 661 00:40:34,559 --> 00:40:39,000 And I know we're talking about have you, as a 662 00:40:39,000 --> 00:40:42,880 as a local county UH officer or the state or 663 00:40:42,920 --> 00:40:46,199 state partners, have they experienced any any flak from the 664 00:40:46,199 --> 00:40:49,480 public because of you know, the lack of accountability UH 665 00:40:49,639 --> 00:40:50,679 for these drones. 666 00:40:52,559 --> 00:40:54,960 Speaker 3: Not that I not that I'm aware of that they've 667 00:40:55,000 --> 00:40:58,480 ever received any flack, but I still to this day 668 00:40:59,079 --> 00:41:03,280 have people in community coming up to me and saying, so, 669 00:41:03,320 --> 00:41:06,119 what's going on with this? Why are we still being 670 00:41:06,159 --> 00:41:09,320 told that it's FAA approved. You know, they laugh at that. 671 00:41:10,079 --> 00:41:13,360 They're they're just fed up with why nothing is being 672 00:41:13,360 --> 00:41:17,280 told to us. Truthfully, they never give us black but 673 00:41:17,320 --> 00:41:20,440 they they definitely don't like and appreciate being lied to 674 00:41:20,480 --> 00:41:21,599 you by the threaderal government. 675 00:41:24,039 --> 00:41:26,559 Speaker 7: Matt, did you have a question, No, I was just. 676 00:41:26,519 --> 00:41:29,760 Speaker 1: I wanted to jump in so so so we are 677 00:41:29,840 --> 00:41:32,920 getting uh let's see here, yeah, so yues so Sean, 678 00:41:33,000 --> 00:41:35,480 we're occasionally getting a little some audio hits on you. 679 00:41:35,639 --> 00:41:37,920 So uh so we're having a little bit of drop out, 680 00:41:37,960 --> 00:41:40,679 but we'll keep on We'll keep on going. But yeah, 681 00:41:40,679 --> 00:41:44,199 the thing I would would note is, like I said 682 00:41:44,239 --> 00:41:48,119 earlier in the program, the government wants you to think 683 00:41:48,199 --> 00:41:51,519 that this is all new, that they've never run into 684 00:41:51,559 --> 00:41:54,480 this before. It's a mystery. They want to get to 685 00:41:54,519 --> 00:41:57,320 the bottom of it, just like everyone else. And when 686 00:41:57,360 --> 00:42:02,679 you when you listen to Chris Grooms talk about this 687 00:42:02,920 --> 00:42:06,840 incident from twenty nineteen twenty twenty and the federal response, 688 00:42:06,960 --> 00:42:10,440 or sort of the lack of federal response, how the 689 00:42:10,480 --> 00:42:15,320 government reacted in twenty nineteen twenty twenty is literally identical 690 00:42:15,559 --> 00:42:22,880 to what you saw just this past November, December, January. 691 00:42:23,000 --> 00:42:27,119 Speaker 6: So, Chris, I want to ask it, after your response 692 00:42:27,800 --> 00:42:30,159 to these incidents and the lack of accountability, has this 693 00:42:30,559 --> 00:42:34,079 resulted in any changes to your agency's protocols? What changes 694 00:42:34,519 --> 00:42:39,519 for improvement you know has has your made as a 695 00:42:39,519 --> 00:42:40,119 result of this. 696 00:42:42,920 --> 00:42:46,960 Speaker 3: When I was with the Sheriff's office, we obviously we 697 00:42:47,000 --> 00:42:49,880 tried to figure out what the situation was and what 698 00:42:49,920 --> 00:42:52,840 these things were, who they belonged to, But as far 699 00:42:52,880 --> 00:42:56,920 as us being able to figure out a better approach, 700 00:42:57,159 --> 00:43:00,639 we never really did that at the at the sheriff's 701 00:43:00,679 --> 00:43:05,400 office level. We did put meetings on at the regional 702 00:43:05,440 --> 00:43:09,679 dispatch Center where all surrounding agencies could come together and 703 00:43:09,760 --> 00:43:14,920 discuss better ways to communicate, better detail and reports on 704 00:43:14,960 --> 00:43:18,079 what these things possibly could have looked like, that type 705 00:43:18,079 --> 00:43:20,840 of stuff, But as far as at the Sheriff's office 706 00:43:20,840 --> 00:43:23,559 where I was at, we never got around to coming 707 00:43:23,639 --> 00:43:26,639 up with anything better that we could do, just because 708 00:43:26,880 --> 00:43:30,480 I would assume the lack of information that we were 709 00:43:30,519 --> 00:43:34,039 being given. I think that's the biggest problem, is the 710 00:43:34,159 --> 00:43:38,400 lack of information that has passed down to your local 711 00:43:38,440 --> 00:43:42,159 and state law enforcement. If we had better information or 712 00:43:42,199 --> 00:43:46,480 better intelligence, we could act on that and make the 713 00:43:46,559 --> 00:43:48,360 area safer. But we're just not getting that. 714 00:43:50,519 --> 00:43:55,760 Speaker 6: So we've spent some time talking about the public safety response, 715 00:43:55,920 --> 00:43:58,119 and I know a lot of attention is being placed 716 00:43:58,159 --> 00:44:03,719 on the federal go to all of our public safety professionals. 717 00:44:03,199 --> 00:44:05,440 Speaker 7: As well as the public that this is a collective effort. 718 00:44:05,880 --> 00:44:10,760 Speaker 6: Uh, you know, espe with the vacation of uh federal 719 00:44:10,920 --> 00:44:15,159 several federal positions. Uh you know, in many ways, our 720 00:44:15,199 --> 00:44:19,840 federal response, you know, maybe compromised. So it is imperative, 721 00:44:19,920 --> 00:44:24,239 imperative that the public remain informed as to what you 722 00:44:24,360 --> 00:44:30,480 can do. Uh uh our public safety professionals with gathering informations. 723 00:44:30,480 --> 00:44:32,039 Speaker 7: There's a lot of cell phones out there. 724 00:44:32,280 --> 00:44:34,800 Speaker 6: We need to make sure that we're collecting the information 725 00:44:34,920 --> 00:44:38,000 that we're willing to uh go on record with what 726 00:44:38,039 --> 00:44:47,639 we sawation for the public. Uh with these ongoing incursions. 727 00:44:46,679 --> 00:44:49,559 Speaker 3: Are you asking me to bring up what the what 728 00:44:49,599 --> 00:44:51,480 the public can do? You cut nowt. 729 00:44:53,000 --> 00:44:53,239 Speaker 7: Well? 730 00:44:53,400 --> 00:44:56,719 Speaker 3: Like like you said, they need to be uh, you know, 731 00:44:57,400 --> 00:45:00,840 contacting us with with any any in the sky that 732 00:45:00,920 --> 00:45:04,679 they may find to be odd. We haven't seen that 733 00:45:04,719 --> 00:45:10,519 stuff around here. That I'm aware of lately. There was 734 00:45:10,559 --> 00:45:14,519 a deputy that had been seeing some stuff recently, but 735 00:45:14,599 --> 00:45:17,920 as far as I know, the public hadn't been calling 736 00:45:17,920 --> 00:45:21,880 in on it. But as far as the public, you know, 737 00:45:22,159 --> 00:45:25,199 don't be afraid to call your local law enforcement even 738 00:45:25,239 --> 00:45:29,760 if you think that it's you know, oh, I don't 739 00:45:29,760 --> 00:45:31,400 think it was this, or I don't think it was that. 740 00:45:32,360 --> 00:45:35,480 Call law enforcement and let them know, give them details, 741 00:45:35,920 --> 00:45:40,320 because something that you may be seeing right now may 742 00:45:40,400 --> 00:45:44,800 corroborate to something from three years ago. And that's how 743 00:45:44,840 --> 00:45:47,400 you can build a case or build evidence to what 744 00:45:47,440 --> 00:45:50,199 you need to do based off of just the information 745 00:45:50,320 --> 00:45:53,320 that a law enforcement officer can can receive and go 746 00:45:53,440 --> 00:45:56,159 back and look into the what it was three years ago. 747 00:45:57,800 --> 00:46:00,679 So yeah, I just I feel like a around here, 748 00:46:00,719 --> 00:46:02,719 we don't have a lot of problems with the public 749 00:46:02,800 --> 00:46:06,320 being scared to call law enforcement. You know, we get 750 00:46:07,119 --> 00:46:10,280 we get some pretty odd calls just from people you know, 751 00:46:10,400 --> 00:46:15,760 fighting over you know, a catchup model. We get those 752 00:46:15,760 --> 00:46:19,360 phone calls, so and we have to respond to it. 753 00:46:19,719 --> 00:46:20,280 Speaker 1: We just do. 754 00:46:20,960 --> 00:46:24,320 Speaker 3: Uh Yeah, So around here, we don't have a lot 755 00:46:24,320 --> 00:46:26,960 of problems with you know, the locals reaching out the 756 00:46:27,000 --> 00:46:29,840 law enforcement because for the most part, they trust, they 757 00:46:29,840 --> 00:46:33,679 trust us. But I feel like that is the biggest 758 00:46:33,719 --> 00:46:36,440 thing that the public can do is just continue to 759 00:46:36,559 --> 00:46:37,960 report it to your law enforcement. 760 00:46:39,000 --> 00:46:41,480 Speaker 1: Hey, hey, Sean, I'm gonna interrupt here because your your 761 00:46:41,480 --> 00:46:44,400 audio drops aren't happening more more often, and ask you 762 00:46:44,480 --> 00:46:48,719 to disconnect from Zoom and reboot the program and then 763 00:46:48,760 --> 00:46:51,639 I'll put you back, put you back in there, because 764 00:46:51,679 --> 00:46:54,400 I think we're we're losing some of your your excellent 765 00:46:54,719 --> 00:46:56,119 your excellent questions there. 766 00:46:56,880 --> 00:46:57,159 Speaker 8: Thanks. 767 00:46:57,639 --> 00:47:00,679 Speaker 1: Yeah, no, no problem at all. So, So, Chris, are 768 00:47:00,719 --> 00:47:05,159 you are you surprised judging from your experience and dealing 769 00:47:05,199 --> 00:47:08,239 with the federal government back in twenty nineteen, twenty twenty 770 00:47:08,239 --> 00:47:11,639 and the kind of lack of a response, are you 771 00:47:11,760 --> 00:47:16,119 surprised by the response this go around? All of this started, 772 00:47:16,159 --> 00:47:19,760 I think it was like November of last year in 773 00:47:19,800 --> 00:47:22,599 the UK and then it started happening in New Jersey. 774 00:47:23,159 --> 00:47:27,280 Was their response? Did it surprise you at all? Quite? 775 00:47:27,280 --> 00:47:34,000 Speaker 3: Frankly, Uh, not really, because it's been it's been that 776 00:47:34,039 --> 00:47:37,760 way for two different administrations. Now. You know, if you 777 00:47:37,760 --> 00:47:40,480 think about twenty nineteen, twenty twenty, when it was going 778 00:47:40,519 --> 00:47:44,480 on around us, you know, President Trump was the president 779 00:47:44,519 --> 00:47:47,679 his administration was in power and we were getting nothing, 780 00:47:48,199 --> 00:47:51,079 you know, and then President Biden came in. Now New 781 00:47:51,159 --> 00:47:54,239 Jersey's experiencing that stuff and among other places, and they're 782 00:47:54,280 --> 00:47:59,559 getting the same runner out. I was optimistic at first, 783 00:48:00,079 --> 00:48:02,800 and President Trump made the comment that I'll get to 784 00:48:02,800 --> 00:48:04,719 the bottom of it and let the American people know 785 00:48:05,159 --> 00:48:07,559 as soon as I get in office. I took that 786 00:48:07,639 --> 00:48:10,159 as cool, maybe we're going to finally get something. But 787 00:48:10,239 --> 00:48:14,159 when we were told what the Press secretary said, I 788 00:48:14,280 --> 00:48:16,639 just kind of shook my head, like, Okay, we're back 789 00:48:16,639 --> 00:48:18,480 to where we were four years ago. 790 00:48:19,800 --> 00:48:22,039 Speaker 1: I shook my I shook my head as well. Sean, 791 00:48:22,119 --> 00:48:22,639 I see your. 792 00:48:22,559 --> 00:48:28,119 Speaker 6: Back, I am, and I actually have to uh. 793 00:48:31,039 --> 00:48:31,960 Speaker 7: Make an adjustment. 794 00:48:32,559 --> 00:48:40,760 Speaker 6: Okay, the thrill of doing live streams all right, how's 795 00:48:40,800 --> 00:48:41,559 how's my audio? 796 00:48:41,800 --> 00:48:43,480 Speaker 1: Oh yeah, no, it's it's fine. I haven't heard you 797 00:48:43,559 --> 00:48:45,800 drop out, so I think we're hopefully we're good. Knock 798 00:48:45,840 --> 00:48:48,000 on wood, all right, Chris. 799 00:48:48,480 --> 00:48:50,480 Speaker 6: I want to thank you for your time and for 800 00:48:50,599 --> 00:48:52,480 being once again a part of this panel. 801 00:48:53,000 --> 00:48:53,679 Speaker 7: We thank you for. 802 00:48:53,679 --> 00:48:57,760 Speaker 6: Your service both with the various facets of law enforcement 803 00:48:57,800 --> 00:49:02,760 and your service as military officer for our nation. You 804 00:49:02,840 --> 00:49:07,360 are a proxy for public safety in terms of first 805 00:49:07,400 --> 00:49:11,400 response to this incident. As a direct witness, I want 806 00:49:11,400 --> 00:49:16,920 to turn to Richard Lang, former mutual UFO Network and 807 00:49:17,840 --> 00:49:23,440 Advanced Aerospace Weapons Systems Applications Programs Investigations Coordinator otherwise known 808 00:49:23,440 --> 00:49:28,079 as afsapp rich thanks for joining us. 809 00:49:28,199 --> 00:49:30,360 Speaker 9: Thank you, good to be here. 810 00:49:30,400 --> 00:49:33,719 Speaker 6: Thanks Sean, thank you, and so as we as we 811 00:49:33,800 --> 00:49:36,280 hand off the baton. You know, when we have an incident, 812 00:49:36,360 --> 00:49:39,360 we have a first responder that responds to the scene, 813 00:49:39,400 --> 00:49:42,719 collects as much evidence as they can, gather the information, 814 00:49:42,840 --> 00:49:45,639 and then the investigators responsible for conducting the follow up. 815 00:49:46,360 --> 00:49:50,400 Can you give us a little bit of a background 816 00:49:50,400 --> 00:49:56,480 in terms of training for public safety professionals and specifically 817 00:49:56,519 --> 00:50:00,079 the gaps what is public safety not getting in in 818 00:50:00,159 --> 00:50:03,000 terms of responding to anomalist drone encounters. 819 00:50:03,320 --> 00:50:05,639 Speaker 9: Sure, I'd be happy to One of the things that 820 00:50:05,679 --> 00:50:07,320 I think you know just as we were talking here 821 00:50:07,360 --> 00:50:11,679 today that there's definitely a disconnect as far as reporting goes. 822 00:50:11,719 --> 00:50:13,280 And by that I mean if you were to go 823 00:50:13,320 --> 00:50:16,880 on Google right now and say how to report a 824 00:50:17,000 --> 00:50:20,239 UFO incident or how to report a UAP incident, It's 825 00:50:20,280 --> 00:50:22,719 going to take you to sites like move on the 826 00:50:22,800 --> 00:50:27,280 Mutual UFOE Network or the National UFO Reporting Center. It 827 00:50:27,320 --> 00:50:30,480 doesn't tell you to call the local police. And that's 828 00:50:30,559 --> 00:50:32,440 kind of the way it's always been in the past. 829 00:50:32,559 --> 00:50:35,559 You know, having worked in the Star team at MOFON, 830 00:50:35,719 --> 00:50:39,320 we've got at least eight hundred reports coming in every month, 831 00:50:39,880 --> 00:50:44,719 but people typically haven't been conditioned to get the police involved. 832 00:50:44,719 --> 00:50:46,400 And I think that that's one of the things I'm 833 00:50:46,440 --> 00:50:49,280 seeing now is that you know, with the incursion of 834 00:50:49,320 --> 00:50:52,480 all this activity, the so called drones, if you will, 835 00:50:53,440 --> 00:50:56,960 for the police are suddenly being pulled into this, where 836 00:50:56,960 --> 00:51:00,440 in the past they really weren't. So now you're dealing 837 00:51:00,480 --> 00:51:03,599 with a lot of police officers like Chris and a 838 00:51:03,639 --> 00:51:05,599 lot of other guys that are out there, and women 839 00:51:05,679 --> 00:51:09,320 that are responded to these things and for probably for 840 00:51:09,360 --> 00:51:13,559 the first time. And you know, one of the reasons 841 00:51:13,599 --> 00:51:15,559 that I wrote my book, which is a guide for 842 00:51:15,599 --> 00:51:20,599 first responders, I have a really good friend, doctor Keith Taylor, Professor, 843 00:51:21,360 --> 00:51:25,280 and he had conducted a survey and basically sent out 844 00:51:25,880 --> 00:51:29,320 emails to three hundred of the biggest law enforcements and 845 00:51:29,440 --> 00:51:33,159 agencies in the country asking them questions like what type 846 00:51:33,159 --> 00:51:36,039 of training do you have to handle UAP events. Do 847 00:51:36,119 --> 00:51:39,599 you have any SOPs for dealing with this kind of thing? 848 00:51:39,920 --> 00:51:42,119 And also do you have any kind of equipment that 849 00:51:42,159 --> 00:51:48,000 you supply your personnel with. Unfortunately, the answer came back 850 00:51:48,039 --> 00:51:51,199 and it was totally negative. No one responded. None of 851 00:51:51,239 --> 00:51:55,960 those agencies responded with any kind of applicable training. And 852 00:51:56,039 --> 00:51:58,199 so that was kind of what motivated me more than 853 00:51:58,239 --> 00:52:01,559 anything else to write my book. And when I did it, 854 00:52:02,800 --> 00:52:04,320 I try to give them a little bit of the 855 00:52:04,360 --> 00:52:06,440 history of how this is all developed back and from 856 00:52:06,480 --> 00:52:09,960 the Truman administration to the current the current day, and 857 00:52:09,719 --> 00:52:12,679 and and how the defense contractors have been involved in 858 00:52:12,960 --> 00:52:16,519 developing this technology and the secrecy that's been involved in that, 859 00:52:16,920 --> 00:52:18,159 just so they can get a little bit of an 860 00:52:18,239 --> 00:52:20,519 understanding of it, because a lot of people really don't 861 00:52:21,000 --> 00:52:23,840 have a good handle on it. And then I put 862 00:52:23,920 --> 00:52:26,599 in there a list of all the terms and acronyms 863 00:52:26,599 --> 00:52:28,840 that are used to define this stuff, just to help 864 00:52:29,320 --> 00:52:33,920 enhance understanding. And then I put a chapter in there 865 00:52:34,360 --> 00:52:39,119 about the reconnaissance activity. And essentially, if you have a 866 00:52:39,199 --> 00:52:44,480 craft that crashes, uh, the government has teams what we 867 00:52:44,559 --> 00:52:47,159 call them recon units, and they're they're you know, they 868 00:52:47,559 --> 00:52:51,760 they deploy out of different bases around the country, and 869 00:52:51,760 --> 00:52:55,400 and they're there to come in and secure this stuff 870 00:52:55,800 --> 00:52:58,440 and and and gather it up. And not to say 871 00:52:58,440 --> 00:53:04,159 that they're exclusively dealing with you know, uh UAP or 872 00:53:04,239 --> 00:53:07,039 anomalous phenomena, but also if you have an aircraft with 873 00:53:07,079 --> 00:53:10,760 a nuclear missile on it, or uh some type of 874 00:53:10,760 --> 00:53:13,840 a craft that crashes, or a piece of a satellite 875 00:53:13,880 --> 00:53:16,280 comes down, these are the guys that go out and 876 00:53:16,320 --> 00:53:18,159 it's their job to go and get it cleaned, it 877 00:53:18,239 --> 00:53:20,840 up and secure it. And so I put a chapter 878 00:53:20,880 --> 00:53:23,920 in my book how they would react with the local police. 879 00:53:24,519 --> 00:53:26,679 And that typically might mean if they're really what there 880 00:53:26,800 --> 00:53:28,519 was a crash somewhere, they're going to put a cover 881 00:53:28,599 --> 00:53:32,679 story out, quarantine the area, probably use local police officers 882 00:53:32,679 --> 00:53:36,280 to maintain the perimeter, but typically local police don't get 883 00:53:36,320 --> 00:53:39,159 inside the perimeter to see what they're they're they're actually 884 00:53:39,239 --> 00:53:43,559 doing or or recovering. And then and then the most 885 00:53:43,559 --> 00:53:47,079 important chapter in the book, again the the whole context 886 00:53:47,159 --> 00:53:50,559 of my book was for officers safety, because when you 887 00:53:50,559 --> 00:53:56,280 look at investigative you know, the investigations, there's there's in responses. 888 00:53:56,320 --> 00:53:58,519 There's really two things that we're dealing with one is 889 00:53:58,559 --> 00:54:02,880 that you know, you go and investigate something to collect 890 00:54:03,000 --> 00:54:06,559 data and you know, photographs, videos and all that kind 891 00:54:06,559 --> 00:54:10,320 of stuff for the research. The other side of it 892 00:54:10,400 --> 00:54:13,199 is just to make sure that the officers are trained 893 00:54:13,320 --> 00:54:16,679 so that they can respond safely to this stuff without 894 00:54:16,679 --> 00:54:19,559 any personal injury. And so I had to put a 895 00:54:19,599 --> 00:54:22,559 list together of things that we kind of wanted them 896 00:54:22,599 --> 00:54:25,280 to understand, and we can talk a little bit. There's 897 00:54:25,320 --> 00:54:28,320 some very simple equipment that I recommend they have the 898 00:54:28,360 --> 00:54:31,559 police cars that would really help protect them. But basically, 899 00:54:32,639 --> 00:54:35,400 you're dealing with somebody that gets a call. You're on 900 00:54:35,480 --> 00:54:39,880 patrol two thirty in the morning, and and and some 901 00:54:40,039 --> 00:54:43,840 lady calls up and she's all upset that because something's 902 00:54:43,920 --> 00:54:46,280 landed or crashed in or pasture and she's afraid it's 903 00:54:46,280 --> 00:54:48,920 going to hurt her horses. So you roll up on 904 00:54:48,960 --> 00:54:51,519 the scene, and there's some things that you need to 905 00:54:51,599 --> 00:54:55,320 understand and know as you as you get close to that. 906 00:54:55,760 --> 00:54:57,960 And part of what I'm trying to what I'm saying here, 907 00:54:58,239 --> 00:55:00,719 a lot of it is the information that I've developed 908 00:55:00,719 --> 00:55:04,119 over doing years of research and working with with witnesses 909 00:55:04,159 --> 00:55:07,719 and you know, looking at reports and some of the 910 00:55:07,719 --> 00:55:11,480 things that have happened to individuals that that cause them 911 00:55:11,559 --> 00:55:13,360 to have health health. 912 00:55:15,079 --> 00:55:15,599 Speaker 7: Effects. 913 00:55:16,159 --> 00:55:19,960 Speaker 9: And by that I mean, like you have a typical scenario. 914 00:55:20,280 --> 00:55:21,880 You know, over the years, there's been a number of 915 00:55:21,920 --> 00:55:25,480 these cases where there's some people that are out in 916 00:55:25,519 --> 00:55:28,679 the remote area somewhere and for whatever reason, they're confronted 917 00:55:28,719 --> 00:55:32,119 with with phenomena, whether it's a craft or whatever, and 918 00:55:32,159 --> 00:55:34,800 so the next thing, you know, the car stopped and 919 00:55:35,159 --> 00:55:37,280 they're they're trying to figure out what's going on. So, 920 00:55:37,679 --> 00:55:39,559 you know, the two people in the front seat jump 921 00:55:39,559 --> 00:55:41,880 out of the car and they're wandering around looking and 922 00:55:41,920 --> 00:55:44,400 trying to figure out what's happening. And then the third 923 00:55:44,440 --> 00:55:46,519 person is like scared to death and curled up on 924 00:55:46,519 --> 00:55:49,719 the floor in the back seat. And then a month later, 925 00:55:49,840 --> 00:55:52,400 the two individuals that were out out of the car 926 00:55:52,880 --> 00:55:58,679 are developing all kinds of adverse health effects, tumors, you know, POSP, 927 00:55:59,239 --> 00:56:02,199 pop pop, cancer, that kind of thing, and the guy 928 00:56:02,199 --> 00:56:04,280 that was scared and hiding in the back seat has 929 00:56:04,360 --> 00:56:08,039 no health health effects to deal with. So the bottom 930 00:56:08,079 --> 00:56:11,199 line is that you can you can deduce that the 931 00:56:11,320 --> 00:56:15,199 car protects you from some of the hazards that that 932 00:56:15,320 --> 00:56:18,000 might be encountered, it's the metal in the car that 933 00:56:18,079 --> 00:56:22,000 will protect you. And so we talk about these the 934 00:56:22,039 --> 00:56:25,079 hazards that these crashes they could be. You can have 935 00:56:25,639 --> 00:56:33,159 nuclear radiation, electromagnetic fields, high electrostatic energy, and there could 936 00:56:33,159 --> 00:56:36,199 be toxic substances or even some bio hazards. 937 00:56:37,239 --> 00:56:39,079 Speaker 6: Richard, So let me let me just jump in real 938 00:56:39,119 --> 00:56:42,320 quick here, because you gave a great summary of what 939 00:56:42,320 --> 00:56:44,480 you would do in an investigation. But I want to 940 00:56:44,559 --> 00:56:46,440 kind of break this into pieces. So if we have 941 00:56:46,519 --> 00:56:49,000 the scene response, where we're collecting the data, we're we're 942 00:56:49,000 --> 00:56:52,440 identifying witnesses, we're collecting evidence, and then we follow up 943 00:56:52,480 --> 00:56:55,239 and then we identify certain hazards that may have been 944 00:56:55,280 --> 00:56:57,519 present at the scene. I want to make a distinction 945 00:56:57,679 --> 00:57:01,639 between what your duties were as the Muffon coordinator and 946 00:57:01,679 --> 00:57:04,639 what we're seeing on the East Coast and what Chris 947 00:57:04,719 --> 00:57:07,519 is describing out in Nebraska, and then we have other 948 00:57:07,599 --> 00:57:09,320 reports on the West Coast. 949 00:57:09,119 --> 00:57:10,079 Speaker 7: And around the world. 950 00:57:10,559 --> 00:57:13,079 Speaker 6: It's important to make a distinction between the incidents that 951 00:57:13,679 --> 00:57:17,159 reportedly involve these types of health incidents and these types 952 00:57:17,199 --> 00:57:20,719 of distinguishing features that that we would characterize as anomalous 953 00:57:21,079 --> 00:57:24,599 and incidents that are being heavily covered in the news, 954 00:57:24,920 --> 00:57:27,639 and that the FAA and federal government are saying, hey, 955 00:57:27,679 --> 00:57:31,320 these are hobbyists, these are approved FA flights, and this 956 00:57:31,360 --> 00:57:35,679 is these are just normal drones or advanced drones. When 957 00:57:35,880 --> 00:57:41,280 when when you conduct your investigations, what important pieces of 958 00:57:41,280 --> 00:57:45,039 information are you collecting to say, hey, this is not 959 00:57:45,960 --> 00:57:50,679 a conventional piece of equipment or uh or a conventional 960 00:57:50,800 --> 00:57:53,960 description of anything. What what exactly are you pinning down 961 00:57:54,320 --> 00:57:55,880 to separate the wheat from the chafe. 962 00:57:56,760 --> 00:57:59,119 Speaker 9: Well, Sean, I think that the thing that we have 963 00:57:59,199 --> 00:58:02,719 to distinguish here is there's a difference between me deploying 964 00:58:02,719 --> 00:58:06,239 an investigator to go out and work on a case 965 00:58:06,320 --> 00:58:10,679 where someone's reported an incident, and that you know, the 966 00:58:10,719 --> 00:58:16,559 whole context of my book was really not about investigating 967 00:58:16,679 --> 00:58:20,159 UFO cases. It was about officer safety and the kind 968 00:58:20,199 --> 00:58:22,599 of things that need to be done to protect them personally, 969 00:58:22,679 --> 00:58:26,880 if you will, I think that, you know, as we're 970 00:58:26,920 --> 00:58:29,440 looking at all these cases that are coming in, and 971 00:58:29,480 --> 00:58:33,559 I've looked at hundreds of them over the years, the thing, 972 00:58:33,719 --> 00:58:37,960 the whole concept of the drone. I mean, a lot 973 00:58:37,960 --> 00:58:39,800 of us that have been around a while we kind 974 00:58:39,800 --> 00:58:43,559 of jokingly say that the concept of drones is like 975 00:58:43,639 --> 00:58:46,280 the old the new word for swamp gas. And the 976 00:58:46,360 --> 00:58:49,159 reason that they we think that is because if you 977 00:58:49,519 --> 00:58:53,039 say the word drone, most people find it pretty disarming. 978 00:58:53,199 --> 00:58:54,760 You know, someone will say, oh, yeah, we bought our 979 00:58:54,840 --> 00:58:57,360 kids a drone for Christmas last year. We were just 980 00:58:57,559 --> 00:59:00,360 playing with it out in the backyard last summer, and 981 00:59:00,440 --> 00:59:03,360 so the concept of a drone is very disarming, and 982 00:59:03,400 --> 00:59:07,599 whoever came up with that, it was really a brilliant deception, 983 00:59:07,719 --> 00:59:10,920 if you will, as far as what's going on with 984 00:59:10,960 --> 00:59:15,599 this phenomena. And again, I think John and Jerry probably 985 00:59:15,599 --> 00:59:18,039 could could could define this a lot better than me. 986 00:59:18,159 --> 00:59:20,039 But what they're seeing out there is that there are 987 00:59:20,159 --> 00:59:22,960 multiple types of these things, and some of them are 988 00:59:23,000 --> 00:59:27,440 occurring simultaneously, and so it's very difficult to sort of 989 00:59:27,920 --> 00:59:31,719 sort it all out, if you will. I had recently 990 00:59:32,039 --> 00:59:33,880 one of my guys that work with me during the 991 00:59:33,920 --> 00:59:36,480 asset program was and that he lives in New Jersey 992 00:59:36,559 --> 00:59:39,320 and he was him and his friend hiked into an 993 00:59:39,360 --> 00:59:42,840 area where they were known to be seeing these drones, 994 00:59:43,440 --> 00:59:47,800 and you know, he gave me a pretty pretty comprehensive 995 00:59:47,840 --> 00:59:52,880 description of of what it was looked like and they ultimately, 996 00:59:52,920 --> 00:59:55,119 there were three of them that came in that came 997 00:59:55,159 --> 00:59:57,800 pretty close to them, and the kind of things that 998 00:59:57,920 --> 00:59:59,960 you know, they're talking about something that's hovering a treat 999 01:00:00,039 --> 01:00:03,159 top level, and these things are three of them. They 1000 01:00:03,199 --> 01:00:05,840 were synchronized so if one of them would turn, they 1001 01:00:05,840 --> 01:00:08,920 would all turn the same way, exactly the same the 1002 01:00:08,960 --> 01:00:13,199 same time. And one of them got within about seventy 1003 01:00:13,280 --> 01:00:15,960 yards of him. And again these are a tree level, 1004 01:00:16,440 --> 01:00:19,840 so they're low. And he had he had one of 1005 01:00:19,880 --> 01:00:23,039 his you know, he had a trifield meter with them 1006 01:00:23,400 --> 01:00:26,159 set in the magnetic range, and it just pegged the meter. 1007 01:00:26,239 --> 01:00:29,000 It started, yeah, you know, it went off really hard. 1008 01:00:29,360 --> 01:00:32,599 And he also noticed that he was feeling the tingling 1009 01:00:32,639 --> 01:00:37,159 sensation on his skin, on his face, and he said 1010 01:00:37,159 --> 01:00:39,760 that he thought that, you know, like the next day 1011 01:00:39,760 --> 01:00:42,119 he kind of had a sunburn from it, which would 1012 01:00:42,159 --> 01:00:45,320 be typical of a magnetic radiation that it would it 1013 01:00:45,320 --> 01:00:49,280 would cause that kind of kind of damage. And he 1014 01:00:49,360 --> 01:00:51,760 also said that it had a kind of a humming 1015 01:00:51,840 --> 01:00:54,960 sound and uh, it had no propellers or wings or 1016 01:00:55,000 --> 01:00:57,039 anything like that on it. He described it as like 1017 01:00:57,079 --> 01:01:02,320 an elongated rectangle shaped like a shoe box if you will, 1018 01:01:02,360 --> 01:01:04,039 and it was about the size of a mini van 1019 01:01:04,760 --> 01:01:06,840 and and it got that close to him. So we 1020 01:01:06,840 --> 01:01:09,679 we kind of thought that was interesting. And then I 1021 01:01:09,800 --> 01:01:14,960 had John and Jerry uh look at uh Joe did 1022 01:01:15,000 --> 01:01:18,480 Wardow's testimony in the video that that we did with him, 1023 01:01:19,000 --> 01:01:20,800 and you know, I think they can tell you that 1024 01:01:20,840 --> 01:01:23,599 they were seeing objects that were pretty much you know, 1025 01:01:23,639 --> 01:01:26,800 they've identified the same kind of phenomena up in New York. 1026 01:01:28,960 --> 01:01:30,599 So is that does that kind of answer your question? 1027 01:01:31,440 --> 01:01:34,719 Speaker 6: Yeah, so so as we again it answers the question. 1028 01:01:34,800 --> 01:01:39,039 But I want to reemphasize, uh, one of the problems 1029 01:01:39,039 --> 01:01:41,360 that we have in addressing this issue is that we 1030 01:01:41,440 --> 01:01:43,719 have people on the on the far and the spectrum 1031 01:01:43,719 --> 01:01:46,360 that uh, you know, have put a label that this is, 1032 01:01:46,480 --> 01:01:48,960 you know, something you know, otherworldly, and then we have 1033 01:01:49,360 --> 01:01:53,320 the opposite perspective with it, which is this is just conventional, prosaic, 1034 01:01:53,519 --> 01:01:57,760 you know, tech. So the importance of of you know, 1035 01:01:57,880 --> 01:02:02,760 a response preparedness preparedness plan for public safety professionals is 1036 01:02:02,800 --> 01:02:06,519 to be able to accurately identify all of the steps 1037 01:02:06,519 --> 01:02:08,840 that need to be taken in an investigation so that 1038 01:02:08,920 --> 01:02:12,239 we can uh, you know, establish you know, the credibility 1039 01:02:12,280 --> 01:02:17,400 and veracity of witnesses, to secure digital evidence and data. Uh, 1040 01:02:17,559 --> 01:02:19,639 and to make sure that any anything that may have 1041 01:02:19,679 --> 01:02:25,800 been deposited by the drone is identified for examination. Uh. 1042 01:02:26,119 --> 01:02:29,199 You know, without those steps, then you know, we we're 1043 01:02:29,280 --> 01:02:31,079 kind of running in circles as to what this is 1044 01:02:31,199 --> 01:02:33,679 or what it isn't And then you know, we're dealing 1045 01:02:33,719 --> 01:02:37,880 with issues like in Chris's community where people are frustrated 1046 01:02:38,320 --> 01:02:40,679 and not just in that community but throughout our nation 1047 01:02:41,239 --> 01:02:44,199 as to the lack of knowledge as to what this is. 1048 01:02:44,960 --> 01:02:46,480 Speaker 7: So I want to ask. 1049 01:02:46,320 --> 01:02:52,320 Speaker 6: You what what resources, uh do you recommend for today's 1050 01:02:52,360 --> 01:02:56,320 response given that the government position is that these are 1051 01:02:56,320 --> 01:03:00,119 all approved FAA flights or hobbyists and there's you know 1052 01:03:00,239 --> 01:03:02,280 this is there's no evidence to indicate that it's a 1053 01:03:02,280 --> 01:03:03,239 public safety hazard. 1054 01:03:03,519 --> 01:03:03,719 Speaker 5: Cool. 1055 01:03:03,760 --> 01:03:05,719 Speaker 9: Yeah, let me let me go that I actually where 1056 01:03:05,719 --> 01:03:09,280 you went. Okay, that you know some of the research 1057 01:03:09,360 --> 01:03:12,880 that's been done, and Jim Sigala has recently done some 1058 01:03:13,000 --> 01:03:16,280 interviews talking about the research that they did on the 1059 01:03:16,280 --> 01:03:19,679 Skinwalker Ranch when they were dealing with anomalous phenomena. So 1060 01:03:20,039 --> 01:03:23,119 I would say that there's probably about five or six 1061 01:03:23,199 --> 01:03:26,559 things that occur during an anomalous event that would help 1062 01:03:26,599 --> 01:03:29,599 you identify whether it's a star space station or whether 1063 01:03:29,599 --> 01:03:33,639 it's really something that's that's happening. First of all, if 1064 01:03:33,679 --> 01:03:37,639 you have an anomalous event, some type of UAP, it 1065 01:03:37,679 --> 01:03:42,519 gets in close proximity, there's typically a gamma radiation spike. 1066 01:03:43,079 --> 01:03:46,639 So so when you have them, you know, like on 1067 01:03:46,679 --> 01:03:49,480 our field teams were recommending them, you know, to use 1068 01:03:49,519 --> 01:03:53,719 these little radiation detectors which are pretty accurate and reliable. 1069 01:03:53,760 --> 01:03:56,360 And and so if you're out in the field and 1070 01:03:56,440 --> 01:03:59,840 something happens where something you know gets close, if you 1071 01:04:00,079 --> 01:04:03,960 start seeing gamma spikes, it's not enough to like harm you. 1072 01:04:04,119 --> 01:04:06,320 It's like turned on and turned off real quick, but 1073 01:04:06,360 --> 01:04:10,679 it's definitely definable with the meter. Also, same thing, you'll 1074 01:04:10,719 --> 01:04:15,440 get spikes with electromagnetic energy, usually in the magnetic range. 1075 01:04:15,800 --> 01:04:18,679 Another thing that you'll notice is that if you have 1076 01:04:19,000 --> 01:04:21,559 a GPS. I have a GPS, and when you turn 1077 01:04:21,599 --> 01:04:25,320 it on, it it'll maybe identify twelve satellites. Well, if 1078 01:04:25,360 --> 01:04:27,000 you're watching that thing and all of a sudden it's 1079 01:04:27,039 --> 01:04:30,159 down to one satellite or two satellites, there's usually something 1080 01:04:30,159 --> 01:04:34,079 anomalous involved in that. And obviously interruptions and cell phones 1081 01:04:34,599 --> 01:04:37,800 and you know. So what I'm trying to say is, 1082 01:04:37,800 --> 01:04:39,239 you know, like when we have these guys that are 1083 01:04:39,239 --> 01:04:41,519 going out and doing night watches or responded and made 1084 01:04:41,559 --> 01:04:44,119 our real arms or something like that. If you have 1085 01:04:44,280 --> 01:04:47,000 the radiation detector, if you have the magnetic you know, 1086 01:04:47,039 --> 01:04:51,679 the Trifield type meters, those will give you some and 1087 01:04:51,760 --> 01:04:54,000 the ones that we recommend have alarms in them, so 1088 01:04:54,079 --> 01:04:56,519 you're basically when the alarms start going off, you know 1089 01:04:56,599 --> 01:04:59,039 something's going on. And that's a good way to sort 1090 01:04:59,079 --> 01:05:02,159 of identify them because a lot of times, you know, 1091 01:05:02,199 --> 01:05:04,320 in the in the you know, the in my experience 1092 01:05:04,599 --> 01:05:08,159 in years past, you know, people will report something that 1093 01:05:08,159 --> 01:05:10,000 that you know, flew over their house and landed in 1094 01:05:10,039 --> 01:05:13,159 the woods behind the house. And sometimes things happen that 1095 01:05:13,199 --> 01:05:16,320 looked like that. I had an investigator went out one night. 1096 01:05:16,639 --> 01:05:19,639 Guy was a physician, and he basically made a report 1097 01:05:19,679 --> 01:05:21,760 that said this thing came over his house and then 1098 01:05:21,840 --> 01:05:24,039 it went down in the field way beyond in the 1099 01:05:24,079 --> 01:05:27,400 woods behind his house. So, you know, the investigator goes out, 1100 01:05:27,480 --> 01:05:29,320 sits down on the back porch where the guy was, 1101 01:05:29,559 --> 01:05:32,400 and he's got his computer and it's got up basically 1102 01:05:32,440 --> 01:05:34,639 a star map in there, and what you do is 1103 01:05:34,679 --> 01:05:37,079 you put the coordinates of where you are in the 1104 01:05:37,159 --> 01:05:39,840 date and time, and it'll give you a picture of 1105 01:05:39,840 --> 01:05:42,679 what that night sky looked like that night. And it's 1106 01:05:43,159 --> 01:05:45,719 they're quite useful. So he's with this guy and the 1107 01:05:45,719 --> 01:05:47,480 guy says, yeah, it was nine thirty. So he takes 1108 01:05:47,480 --> 01:05:50,239 his mouth and rolls the time in at nine thirty there, 1109 01:05:50,360 --> 01:05:52,639 and there is this really bright light right up in 1110 01:05:52,639 --> 01:05:55,639 the sky and he's moving at ten ten thirty and 1111 01:05:55,719 --> 01:05:58,280 you can see the the light just appears to come 1112 01:05:58,360 --> 01:06:02,239 over and go down in the horiz and the guys like, yeah, yeah, 1113 01:06:02,519 --> 01:06:05,400 that's exactly what I saw. And the investory goes, that 1114 01:06:05,559 --> 01:06:09,800 was Jupiter, you know. So so that that happens, and 1115 01:06:09,800 --> 01:06:12,119 and there are things out there in the night sky 1116 01:06:12,159 --> 01:06:15,559 that look anomalous and they're not, but uh, you know 1117 01:06:15,679 --> 01:06:16,039 one of them. 1118 01:06:16,079 --> 01:06:17,920 Speaker 6: I'm glad that you addressed the you know, the issue 1119 01:06:17,920 --> 01:06:20,800 of misidentification because it's you know, it's a real issue. 1120 01:06:20,800 --> 01:06:23,039 It's something that happens. You know, people are not lying 1121 01:06:23,480 --> 01:06:25,239 when they say that they saw something and it was 1122 01:06:25,239 --> 01:06:25,840 a mistake. 1123 01:06:26,039 --> 01:06:26,400 Speaker 7: Okay. 1124 01:06:26,880 --> 01:06:30,719 Speaker 6: Uh, you went through quite a bit of equipment that 1125 01:06:30,719 --> 01:06:35,679 that will help our investigators and first responders conduct the investigation. 1126 01:06:36,719 --> 01:06:40,679 One of the challenges with you know, getting that type 1127 01:06:40,679 --> 01:06:43,320 of equipment is procurement. UH So it's a it's a 1128 01:06:43,400 --> 01:06:47,519 challenge to have agencies by equipment for which they don't 1129 01:06:47,559 --> 01:06:52,039 have a demonstrated uh purpose that is going to be 1130 01:06:52,119 --> 01:06:55,760 used to justify the cost. What what do you say 1131 01:06:55,800 --> 01:07:00,400 to our public safety agencies or even our you know, 1132 01:07:00,440 --> 01:07:03,599 the public who want to invest in these items, what 1133 01:07:03,639 --> 01:07:08,320 do you recommend as far as immediate purchases to address these. 1134 01:07:08,360 --> 01:07:11,599 Speaker 9: Yeah, I think in going back to the original concept 1135 01:07:11,760 --> 01:07:14,199 is the training is the most critical part. Because you 1136 01:07:14,239 --> 01:07:15,920 can have the greatest equipment of the world. If you 1137 01:07:15,920 --> 01:07:19,440 don't know how to use it, then it's pretty useless. 1138 01:07:19,639 --> 01:07:21,440 But I would say as a very minimum, and again, 1139 01:07:21,480 --> 01:07:24,519 I just produced a video for our field team and 1140 01:07:24,599 --> 01:07:27,760 it's just basically a thing that helps them to put 1141 01:07:27,800 --> 01:07:30,239 together a kit what you need to have in the field. 1142 01:07:30,519 --> 01:07:33,000 One of the things that I start out with is 1143 01:07:33,400 --> 01:07:38,079 these little radiation detectors. This particular one, it's the best 1144 01:07:38,079 --> 01:07:42,400 selling one on Amazon right now. I read a report 1145 01:07:42,440 --> 01:07:44,440 that was done by a very technical company and they 1146 01:07:44,440 --> 01:07:47,880 gave it like a four point eight. It's accurate, it's reliable, 1147 01:07:48,239 --> 01:07:50,400 you can charge it up, it'll stay for ten hours. 1148 01:07:50,400 --> 01:07:54,400 It's got alarms in it, and they cost maybe sixty 1149 01:07:54,440 --> 01:07:57,440 eighty bucks. They're not that expensive anymore. The other thing 1150 01:07:57,519 --> 01:08:01,280 is there's different types of them, but these called trifield meters. 1151 01:08:01,320 --> 01:08:06,519 They basically pick up electric energy, magnetic energy and RF 1152 01:08:06,719 --> 01:08:09,840 like from cell phone towers and things like that. And 1153 01:08:10,199 --> 01:08:12,679 I'd recommend that you set it on the magnetic setting. 1154 01:08:12,719 --> 01:08:15,679 And you know, I think anything over five mg is 1155 01:08:15,679 --> 01:08:17,359 where you've got to start worrying, where it could cause 1156 01:08:17,399 --> 01:08:21,439 a health problem. And so that is those are the 1157 01:08:21,439 --> 01:08:25,239 probably the two. Then there's also another thing that I 1158 01:08:25,279 --> 01:08:28,640 was showing you guys earlier tonight. These little this is 1159 01:08:28,720 --> 01:08:30,960 like a little credit card. It's a little plastic car. 1160 01:08:31,279 --> 01:08:34,079 And this was developed for homeland security and there's a 1161 01:08:34,079 --> 01:08:37,079 whole bunch of different government agencies that use these now. 1162 01:08:37,279 --> 01:08:39,880 That cost twenty bucks. And when they come there in 1163 01:08:39,880 --> 01:08:43,239 a little plastic bag and when you open it up, 1164 01:08:43,319 --> 01:08:47,159 it'll lasts for almost three years. Basically you can carry 1165 01:08:47,159 --> 01:08:50,479 this in your in your wallet or hanging on your credentials. 1166 01:08:50,880 --> 01:08:54,479 And if you've ever been exposed to anything radioactive, you 1167 01:08:54,520 --> 01:08:55,960 can see these little. 1168 01:08:55,720 --> 01:08:56,720 Speaker 7: Bar charts here. 1169 01:08:56,920 --> 01:08:59,439 Speaker 9: They'll there's a chuck and it tells you they'll change 1170 01:08:59,479 --> 01:09:03,760 color and indicate the level of exposure that you've had 1171 01:09:04,159 --> 01:09:08,039 to radiation. So everybody on our team, we're trying to 1172 01:09:08,039 --> 01:09:09,720 get them all to carry these around with them at 1173 01:09:09,760 --> 01:09:12,800 least when they're deployed for sure. So that's kind of 1174 01:09:13,479 --> 01:09:15,399 that's kind of it. And just a couple of other 1175 01:09:15,479 --> 01:09:19,680 quick things. Is anyone that's in the field, particularly an officer, 1176 01:09:19,960 --> 01:09:21,760 one of the things that you don't want to do 1177 01:09:21,960 --> 01:09:25,199 is you don't want to walk under a craft that's 1178 01:09:25,239 --> 01:09:30,600 hovering because most of the what we call electro gravitic propulsion, 1179 01:09:32,319 --> 01:09:35,039 it affects human skin tissue the same way it would 1180 01:09:35,039 --> 01:09:37,479 as you stuck your micro arm in a microwave oven. 1181 01:09:37,560 --> 01:09:41,159 It'll it'll it'll cause skin tissue damage. And so we 1182 01:09:41,239 --> 01:09:44,319 always tell them that, you know, if you're on patrol 1183 01:09:44,640 --> 01:09:46,520 or if you're an investigator and you get in close 1184 01:09:46,560 --> 01:09:49,880 proximity to an event that's occurring, you want to make 1185 01:09:49,920 --> 01:09:53,039 sure if you can stay in the car, because the 1186 01:09:53,079 --> 01:09:56,159 car really will protect you and also the pretended windshield 1187 01:09:56,199 --> 01:09:59,479 to protect your eyes a little bit too. If you 1188 01:09:59,520 --> 01:10:01,800 get close to something that's on the ground and it's 1189 01:10:01,800 --> 01:10:05,319 still powered up there can be different types of radiation 1190 01:10:05,439 --> 01:10:07,960 coming off that. There can be electro, there can be 1191 01:10:08,039 --> 01:10:12,079 ultra violet radiation that will give you skin, it'll burn 1192 01:10:12,079 --> 01:10:16,079 you like sunburn. But there's also in some cases there's 1193 01:10:16,199 --> 01:10:19,359 there's X radiation and gamma radiation that's strong enough to 1194 01:10:19,359 --> 01:10:23,880 cause radiation sickness. And what I tell you know, law 1195 01:10:23,960 --> 01:10:26,920 enforcement people, is when you get in close proximity to 1196 01:10:26,960 --> 01:10:31,720 this phenomena, you may see that dash cams will quit working, 1197 01:10:31,880 --> 01:10:35,960 body cams will quit working, radio equipment will fail. And 1198 01:10:36,279 --> 01:10:38,800 that's very typical, and that's the same thing that happens 1199 01:10:38,840 --> 01:10:42,720 with the investigators. Our guy out there in New Jersey 1200 01:10:43,199 --> 01:10:46,720 was trying to he had an iPhone thirteen and when 1201 01:10:46,720 --> 01:10:49,840 he tried to take a picture of it, the focus 1202 01:10:49,880 --> 01:10:52,159 would just keep going in and out. It wouldn't lock in. 1203 01:10:52,199 --> 01:10:54,920 And there's kind of like he described, the lightest kind 1204 01:10:54,920 --> 01:11:00,680 of slightly stroboscopic, so it would it confuses the the 1205 01:11:00,880 --> 01:11:03,199 auto focused systems in the cameras. It makes it more 1206 01:11:03,239 --> 01:11:06,920 difficult to photograph, and we recommend using up more like 1207 01:11:07,760 --> 01:11:11,840 a DLSR and then manually focusing it. 1208 01:11:12,399 --> 01:11:16,520 Speaker 6: All right, Richard, thank you for providing that breakdown of 1209 01:11:16,560 --> 01:11:19,760 the safety considerations, and obviously we want to remind our 1210 01:11:19,760 --> 01:11:22,920 public safety professionals as well as the public that you know, 1211 01:11:23,000 --> 01:11:26,119 procedures for managing hazardous materials are provided in the United 1212 01:11:26,119 --> 01:11:30,680 States Department of Transportation and Emergency Response Guidebook. This provides 1213 01:11:30,720 --> 01:11:33,920 the relative distance when it should be to avoid exposures. 1214 01:11:33,920 --> 01:11:35,800 So basically, if you can smell it or you can 1215 01:11:35,840 --> 01:11:38,760 feel it, you're in it. And what you've described is, 1216 01:11:39,079 --> 01:11:41,960 you know the effects of radiation that may not be 1217 01:11:42,359 --> 01:11:43,359 immediately apparent. 1218 01:11:43,479 --> 01:11:44,920 Speaker 7: You know, I asked Chris, you. 1219 01:11:44,920 --> 01:11:47,880 Speaker 6: Know, hey, did you feel any heat or any type 1220 01:11:47,880 --> 01:11:51,000 of unusual effects from the environment. He said no, But 1221 01:11:51,159 --> 01:11:53,680 we as we know with radiation, and we still don't know, 1222 01:11:54,239 --> 01:11:57,239 you know, when cancer manifests, how you know, when did 1223 01:11:57,279 --> 01:11:57,600 it start? 1224 01:11:57,640 --> 01:11:59,159 Speaker 7: We haven't been able to pinpoint that. 1225 01:11:59,359 --> 01:12:04,359 Speaker 6: So these items that you've mentioned are important for public 1226 01:12:04,439 --> 01:12:08,039 safety agencies to consider, you know, doing some research and 1227 01:12:08,119 --> 01:12:11,760 purchasing and hopefully we'll you know, in the event that 1228 01:12:11,800 --> 01:12:15,720 these drone incursions continue they are apparently continuing, as we 1229 01:12:15,760 --> 01:12:19,640 heard from Rosscoltart earlier. It is important to have a plan. 1230 01:12:20,560 --> 01:12:24,800 So Richard, thank you for being on our panel today 1231 01:12:25,079 --> 01:12:28,239 and part of this discussion. At this time, I would 1232 01:12:28,279 --> 01:12:33,199 like to turn to Jerry and John Todsco electrical engineers 1233 01:12:33,199 --> 01:12:36,119 who have taken it upon themselves to apply some very 1234 01:12:36,119 --> 01:12:41,199 innovative techniques with technologies to detect these drones. And what 1235 01:12:41,239 --> 01:12:46,479 they've done is been able to use hyperspectral photography to 1236 01:12:47,119 --> 01:12:50,439 visualize things that they can see only in certain spectrums 1237 01:12:50,479 --> 01:12:53,000 but not with the naked eye. So Jerry and John, 1238 01:12:53,039 --> 01:12:55,800 thank you for joining us again once today and if 1239 01:12:55,840 --> 01:13:01,000 you could please tell us what technology or behavior have 1240 01:13:01,119 --> 01:13:04,439 you been able to detect using UH your methods. 1241 01:13:05,039 --> 01:13:08,199 Speaker 8: Sure, thank you, Sean, also, Matt, thank you, thank you 1242 01:13:08,279 --> 01:13:13,119 very much for having us back. The the comments, the 1243 01:13:13,119 --> 01:13:18,880 the observations that both Chris and uh rich I presented 1244 01:13:19,159 --> 01:13:22,119 is uh pretty much in line with what we've been 1245 01:13:22,520 --> 01:13:25,479 observing on the east coast of of the the US 1246 01:13:26,520 --> 01:13:29,239 on the Long Out off the Long Island coast. UH, 1247 01:13:29,359 --> 01:13:33,399 we're seeing objects out there that are they're not micro drones, 1248 01:13:33,439 --> 01:13:37,199 they're not many drones. They you know, they're they seem 1249 01:13:37,239 --> 01:13:43,319 to be much larger. They're presenting with certain lighting systems 1250 01:13:43,319 --> 01:13:46,680 that look like navigation lights. We're not exactly sure if 1251 01:13:46,680 --> 01:13:49,319 they're in the right the proper sequence or there the 1252 01:13:49,439 --> 01:13:52,560 flash rates are the same because they seem to change. 1253 01:13:53,000 --> 01:13:56,399 You'll see you'll see these lights they'll go from from 1254 01:13:56,520 --> 01:14:01,039 red and green, uh to to white and there's there's 1255 01:14:01,479 --> 01:14:03,760 at times it seems to be no real pattern to it. 1256 01:14:04,279 --> 01:14:07,520 You know, they'll the the flesh rates will change. Uh, 1257 01:14:07,560 --> 01:14:09,840 the objects will take on they seem to take on 1258 01:14:09,920 --> 01:14:13,359 a different type of appearance at times. So uh, you know, 1259 01:14:14,039 --> 01:14:16,039 we we want to we kind of want to keep 1260 01:14:16,560 --> 01:14:19,960 a group of items together, a group of observations together, 1261 01:14:21,000 --> 01:14:23,000 because they're they're they're I think they're all one and 1262 01:14:23,039 --> 01:14:26,000 the same. You know, you're talking u a p uh. 1263 01:14:26,439 --> 01:14:30,159 Whether they're drones or drone like objects, they they have 1264 01:14:30,479 --> 01:14:35,680 uh uh an anonymous characteristic about them that they're they're 1265 01:14:35,720 --> 01:14:40,119 they're presenting in certain ways that they don't are not typical. 1266 01:14:40,159 --> 01:14:42,439 They're not typical of what we see with with drones. 1267 01:14:44,159 --> 01:14:46,399 We've heard heard a number of reports out in the 1268 01:14:46,399 --> 01:14:50,479 field about these objects suddenly going dark is as Chris mentioned, 1269 01:14:51,399 --> 01:14:54,520 or suddenly taking off at a very rapid rate of speed. 1270 01:14:56,119 --> 01:14:59,960 And this is not typical of of of most drone 1271 01:15:00,359 --> 01:15:02,840 type objects that you're that that you're seeing out there. 1272 01:15:03,039 --> 01:15:05,319 Whether or not there's a combination of them. You know, 1273 01:15:05,359 --> 01:15:08,479 I'm possibly a military component to it, that that is 1274 01:15:08,520 --> 01:15:12,439 actually flying the drones out there, which are you know, 1275 01:15:12,880 --> 01:15:17,199 a high tech version of it, which is not which 1276 01:15:17,239 --> 01:15:20,479 is not typical of commercial drones that we're seeing. So 1277 01:15:20,560 --> 01:15:22,720 I think that's what people are getting right, you know, 1278 01:15:22,760 --> 01:15:25,039 they're they're getting right that they are seeing stuff out 1279 01:15:25,039 --> 01:15:28,600 there that is not typical, you know, and and so 1280 01:15:28,760 --> 01:15:31,880 and the reason for so many records that that we're 1281 01:15:31,880 --> 01:15:35,800 hearing about. You know, there is a fair share of 1282 01:15:36,399 --> 01:15:40,199 typical commercial traffic and we've we've made mistakes ourselves as 1283 01:15:40,199 --> 01:15:42,880 far as identifying it. But you need certain types of 1284 01:15:42,920 --> 01:15:47,920 equipment to to you know, uh, dive into those characteristics 1285 01:15:48,039 --> 01:15:52,039 and understand what they are. You know, there's certain camera 1286 01:15:52,119 --> 01:15:56,479 systems we use hyperspectral cameras. There's also, uh, there's a 1287 01:15:57,720 --> 01:16:01,319 radiation you know, background monitoring equipment, environmental monitoring equipment that 1288 01:16:01,960 --> 01:16:05,359 I think is required, especially for first responders that that 1289 01:16:05,399 --> 01:16:08,439 are up against something that they really don't know what 1290 01:16:08,479 --> 01:16:13,640 they're up against, especially what what Rich has mentioned. You know, 1291 01:16:13,680 --> 01:16:16,720 those are concerns, those are those are real concerns. And uh, 1292 01:16:17,159 --> 01:16:19,720 you know, as far as having the the the proper 1293 01:16:19,760 --> 01:16:22,279 equipment it's it's you know, of course it's safe, better 1294 01:16:22,359 --> 01:16:25,199 safe than sorry. Uh, but there were there's a uh, 1295 01:16:25,479 --> 01:16:29,079 you know, quite a few pieces of equipment that the 1296 01:16:29,079 --> 01:16:32,159 the law enforcement already has and that can be utilized 1297 01:16:32,239 --> 01:16:36,039 right away. This is their speed guns. There were there 1298 01:16:36,159 --> 01:16:39,840 radar guns. There, there's light ar guns that then give 1299 01:16:39,880 --> 01:16:43,479 you range and velocity of an object. 1300 01:16:44,000 --> 01:16:44,239 Speaker 1: Uh. 1301 01:16:44,279 --> 01:16:46,119 Speaker 8: These are the kind of things that we really need 1302 01:16:46,159 --> 01:16:49,079 to know from folks that are on the on the 1303 01:16:49,119 --> 01:16:54,079 front lines, like like Chris. You know, it's uh, you know, 1304 01:16:54,279 --> 01:16:57,000 we don't always get an ideal situation. It's not you know, 1305 01:16:57,039 --> 01:16:59,199 it's not always ideal when we're out there. We're making 1306 01:16:59,199 --> 01:17:03,079 these observations and you know, for somebody to see something 1307 01:17:03,119 --> 01:17:07,399 that's that's literally sixty feet away, you know though, that's 1308 01:17:07,439 --> 01:17:09,560 the kind of data points we need. That's the kind 1309 01:17:09,600 --> 01:17:12,600 of data that we need to look at and and 1310 01:17:12,880 --> 01:17:16,159 understand and analyze to come up with a characterization of 1311 01:17:16,199 --> 01:17:18,880 what these things are and the methodology for detecting them. 1312 01:17:20,000 --> 01:17:21,720 And this is what we've tried to do over the 1313 01:17:21,760 --> 01:17:24,680 last few years that we've been out at rob Moses 1314 01:17:24,760 --> 01:17:27,199 Day Punk. Now, we do have a number of equipment 1315 01:17:27,199 --> 01:17:31,479 that we use on a regular basis. We have made suggestions, 1316 01:17:31,760 --> 01:17:35,119 and some of those suggestions are very much what Rich 1317 01:17:35,159 --> 01:17:39,600 had already pointed out. But again it's it's using the 1318 01:17:39,760 --> 01:17:42,600 speed guns, the radar guns that the the law enforcement 1319 01:17:42,640 --> 01:17:45,640 has on most of the time, light our systems, light 1320 01:17:45,640 --> 01:17:50,760 our guns, the flashlights. You know, there are times and 1321 01:17:50,880 --> 01:17:54,159 you know, if they are going dark, you know, you know, 1322 01:17:54,319 --> 01:17:57,520 I don't you know, I would cautiously advise people to 1323 01:17:58,560 --> 01:18:01,239 use those lights to to light them up to find 1324 01:18:01,239 --> 01:18:04,199 out what is up there. And of course that's I'm 1325 01:18:04,239 --> 01:18:06,840 speaking from from a researcher's point of view with right 1326 01:18:06,920 --> 01:18:09,640 right now, and it's uh, you know, of course, you know, 1327 01:18:10,079 --> 01:18:14,720 take those precautions, you know, and stride and you know, 1328 01:18:14,720 --> 01:18:18,319 if you feel uncomfortable, if folks feel uncomfortable about doing that, 1329 01:18:18,840 --> 01:18:22,800 then I certainly would recommend it. But but for us personally, 1330 01:18:22,840 --> 01:18:24,640 you know, we're trying to understand what they are. 1331 01:18:25,399 --> 01:18:26,960 Speaker 5: Yeah, and let me. 1332 01:18:27,000 --> 01:18:29,560 Speaker 6: Let me just jump in here because you said some 1333 01:18:29,640 --> 01:18:31,960 things that are very important in terms of you know, 1334 01:18:32,199 --> 01:18:35,439 identifying some things that are concerned. You know, again, we 1335 01:18:35,560 --> 01:18:38,159 keep getting this message that you know, there's no evidence 1336 01:18:38,199 --> 01:18:41,720 that this is a public safety hazard. Can you you know, 1337 01:18:41,800 --> 01:18:44,680 I you know share with us any specific markers that 1338 01:18:45,119 --> 01:18:48,920 indicate advanced capabilities that could be a public safety hazard. 1339 01:18:50,399 --> 01:18:54,000 Speaker 8: So, you know, we had a we have a situation 1340 01:18:54,199 --> 01:19:00,520 back in August of twenty two a physical, uh side 1341 01:19:00,520 --> 01:19:03,119 of it, you know, where we had observed an object 1342 01:19:03,159 --> 01:19:05,000 that was just off the coast. It was it was 1343 01:19:05,039 --> 01:19:10,399 on the water shore and uh, we were subjected to 1344 01:19:10,640 --> 01:19:13,880 some kind of a lack of a better word, a 1345 01:19:13,920 --> 01:19:18,800 flaccid paralysis was it was very short lived. It was 1346 01:19:18,840 --> 01:19:22,159 from an observation we were making down there of of 1347 01:19:22,159 --> 01:19:25,000 of an invisible set of a triangle of invisible set 1348 01:19:25,000 --> 01:19:28,760 of lights that was in the form of an Isosceles triangle. 1349 01:19:29,319 --> 01:19:33,840 And these lights would they would synchronize rotation as as 1350 01:19:34,079 --> 01:19:37,239 Richard pointed out with somebody that he had spoken to, 1351 01:19:37,640 --> 01:19:42,279 UH that made an observation with this, and we had 1352 01:19:42,399 --> 01:19:45,239 observed this in night vision equipment, so we weren't able 1353 01:19:45,239 --> 01:19:49,680 to see it, you know, physically visibly with the naked 1354 01:19:49,680 --> 01:19:54,560 eye and under the night vision equipment. We had something 1355 01:19:54,600 --> 01:19:58,560 that you know, had had approached us, you know, right 1356 01:19:58,600 --> 01:20:02,159 on the shore and and we had a physical we 1357 01:20:02,199 --> 01:20:05,880 had a physical reaction from it. It's not something we 1358 01:20:05,880 --> 01:20:08,239 can wrap our heads around. I really don't know how 1359 01:20:08,239 --> 01:20:12,159 to advise anybody as far as you know, what we 1360 01:20:12,159 --> 01:20:14,239 we even believe it might might have been. You know, 1361 01:20:14,279 --> 01:20:17,560 it's a it was. It was a surprise, tough to 1362 01:20:17,560 --> 01:20:19,760 wrap your head around, but uh, it did have an 1363 01:20:19,760 --> 01:20:24,079 effect on us. And you know, if if that that 1364 01:20:24,239 --> 01:20:26,640 is the case, you know, you certainly want to avoid 1365 01:20:26,640 --> 01:20:29,600 that as much as you can. And uh, you know. 1366 01:20:29,560 --> 01:20:33,199 Speaker 6: Did you see any any sort of medical evaluation or 1367 01:20:33,720 --> 01:20:36,399 support uh following this exposure. 1368 01:20:37,039 --> 01:20:39,479 Speaker 8: No, we did not, We did not. We had we 1369 01:20:39,600 --> 01:20:42,800 had followed it up with u the u AP Medical 1370 01:20:42,920 --> 01:20:44,840 u AP Medical Group, and we had spoken to the 1371 01:20:44,920 --> 01:20:48,399 medical team. We had met with a team of neuroscientists 1372 01:20:48,439 --> 01:20:51,840 and including I think a neurologist, and we had spoken 1373 01:20:51,880 --> 01:20:54,279 about it. We also had spoken with an emergencym position. 1374 01:20:54,800 --> 01:20:57,680 I got it later on, but at this point in time, 1375 01:20:58,119 --> 01:21:01,520 it was too far removed the event that you probably 1376 01:21:01,560 --> 01:21:03,760 wouldn't show anything. And it's such a stigma or a 1377 01:21:03,800 --> 01:21:06,800 stigma around it that it wasn't something that we wanted 1378 01:21:06,840 --> 01:21:12,119 to openly, you know, advertise out there with without research. 1379 01:21:12,239 --> 01:21:14,600 You know, we just didn't know, didn't know, you know, 1380 01:21:14,880 --> 01:21:17,000 uh what to make of it. You just had no 1381 01:21:17,039 --> 01:21:18,640 idea what to make of it at that time. 1382 01:21:19,319 --> 01:21:21,159 Speaker 6: And so and so that's part of the problem. And 1383 01:21:21,159 --> 01:21:23,720 and and again hats off to you, h to you 1384 01:21:23,800 --> 01:21:26,520 both for coming forward and sharing this. It's it's a 1385 01:21:26,600 --> 01:21:29,319 challenge when you're trying to when you're engaging in research 1386 01:21:29,359 --> 01:21:32,000 and you're you know, you're again you're like the fireman, right, 1387 01:21:32,079 --> 01:21:35,800 the firefighter who's going into the fire, and you're exposed 1388 01:21:35,840 --> 01:21:36,560 to the hazards. 1389 01:21:36,640 --> 01:21:37,720 Speaker 7: So you're you're. 1390 01:21:37,600 --> 01:21:40,199 Speaker 6: Running toward the hazard, you're not running away from it, 1391 01:21:40,279 --> 01:21:43,720 and therefore you're subject to these exposures. But at the 1392 01:21:43,760 --> 01:21:47,720 same time, because this, uh, these types of exposures are 1393 01:21:47,720 --> 01:21:51,319 not readily understood, Uh, you have some resist you know, 1394 01:21:51,439 --> 01:21:54,680 reservations about making a formal report. So I just want 1395 01:21:54,680 --> 01:21:57,279 to confirm did you make a formal report or or 1396 01:21:57,279 --> 01:22:01,760 did you not? We did not, Okay, So so again 1397 01:22:02,039 --> 01:22:03,840 to our public, we want to make sure that we 1398 01:22:04,000 --> 01:22:07,279 encourage you to, uh, if something like this does happen, 1399 01:22:07,399 --> 01:22:11,239 to make a formal report. Uh. You know, Jerry and John, 1400 01:22:11,359 --> 01:22:14,720 you're you're in the thick of it, and we appreciate, uh, 1401 01:22:14,800 --> 01:22:19,359 you know, the the technical expertise that you're lending to this. Uh, 1402 01:22:19,640 --> 01:22:24,279 as far as the the technical limitations uh that you 1403 01:22:24,319 --> 01:22:28,159 know that relate to electronic jamming and identification. Have you 1404 01:22:28,199 --> 01:22:32,199 come across anything that would indicate uh, you know, some 1405 01:22:32,239 --> 01:22:38,239 sort of electronic jamming or communication by uh this technology 1406 01:22:38,239 --> 01:22:39,359 towards your devices. 1407 01:22:40,840 --> 01:22:43,279 Speaker 8: Yeah, yeah, so it was this was uh we we 1408 01:22:43,600 --> 01:22:46,760 did go out in December of between Christmas and New 1409 01:22:46,840 --> 01:22:50,239 Year's when this this New Jersey drone drone flat was 1410 01:22:50,319 --> 01:22:53,279 uh was occurring, and it was just occurring in New Jerseys. 1411 01:22:53,600 --> 01:22:55,800 The reality of it was covering all throughout the Northeast. 1412 01:22:55,840 --> 01:22:58,560 These numbers, the amount of reports were growing throughout the Northeast. 1413 01:22:58,600 --> 01:23:00,359 It wasn't just New Jersey, it was connected. It was 1414 01:23:00,439 --> 01:23:02,960 Long Island, New York, Staten Island Race. And this is 1415 01:23:02,960 --> 01:23:06,319 a statistic that closely looked up in Enigma lapse. They 1416 01:23:06,359 --> 01:23:09,600 actually have a piece of software that they're documenting these cases. 1417 01:23:10,600 --> 01:23:14,359 But yeah, in December and early January when we went 1418 01:23:14,399 --> 01:23:16,880 out there, there's more of the December incident. 1419 01:23:17,119 --> 01:23:17,359 Speaker 1: Uh. 1420 01:23:17,920 --> 01:23:20,319 Speaker 8: We had seen objects out there. Some of them were 1421 01:23:20,359 --> 01:23:23,000 drone like, some of them were looked like orbs what 1422 01:23:23,039 --> 01:23:26,439 we were seeing before. But we when we were tracking 1423 01:23:26,479 --> 01:23:29,960 these objects, but both of them out there, we did 1424 01:23:30,000 --> 01:23:33,960 get these odd radar reflections that appeared to be it 1425 01:23:33,960 --> 01:23:36,439 looks similar to what you would see with jamming radar jamming. 1426 01:23:36,880 --> 01:23:41,000 You get these these radial reflections along appearance pattered on 1427 01:23:41,039 --> 01:23:44,039 the on the display of the radar. Yeah. Interference patterns, yeah, 1428 01:23:44,119 --> 01:23:48,159 long long delay echoes, you know, some some unusual, very 1429 01:23:48,199 --> 01:23:53,960 unusual interference patterns. And uh, this is something that you know, 1430 01:23:54,520 --> 01:23:57,159 we're not exactly sure you know, what is occurring around 1431 01:23:57,199 --> 01:24:00,760 these objects that's producing this effect, you know. I know 1432 01:24:00,840 --> 01:24:04,079 some people see this the chromatic changes of light that 1433 01:24:04,119 --> 01:24:07,479 they seem to have a kaleidoscope appearance to them when 1434 01:24:07,520 --> 01:24:10,600 they see them when they were when they're visible. Other 1435 01:24:10,680 --> 01:24:14,239 times they'll see, uh, what looks like a poly rotating polyhedron, 1436 01:24:14,840 --> 01:24:18,319 you know. And most of the time it can't be 1437 01:24:18,800 --> 01:24:21,359 visualized in the visible light. It has to be you 1438 01:24:21,399 --> 01:24:24,159 have to use some kind of MVG, some kind of 1439 01:24:24,239 --> 01:24:27,479 night vision goggles and night vision camera or night vision 1440 01:24:27,600 --> 01:24:31,319 system that you know, you can actually make these things out. 1441 01:24:31,840 --> 01:24:35,720 They do seem to be accompanying the drones, you know, 1442 01:24:35,760 --> 01:24:38,600 and this is what we had observed back in November 1443 01:24:38,600 --> 01:24:42,239 of twenty twenty two. It looked like drones swarm out 1444 01:24:42,279 --> 01:24:44,760 there and it all lasted for three weeks. That was it. 1445 01:24:45,800 --> 01:24:49,039 After that three week period, the drud, the the the 1446 01:24:49,079 --> 01:24:53,239 objects that look like drones, they just suddenly disappeared. They 1447 01:24:53,239 --> 01:24:56,239 weren't there. We were just looking at these other objects 1448 01:24:56,239 --> 01:24:58,600 that were characteristic of what we've been seeing over the 1449 01:24:58,640 --> 01:25:00,520 last three years. And that's a thing I wanted to 1450 01:25:00,560 --> 01:25:03,279 clarify as we were putting everything on basket. But there 1451 01:25:03,359 --> 01:25:05,439 is what we were seeing. The two types of objects. 1452 01:25:05,439 --> 01:25:09,000 There was these drone like objects that would flash, that 1453 01:25:09,039 --> 01:25:11,319 would they would you would see more than one a 1454 01:25:11,359 --> 01:25:13,640 single light. And then it was these orb like objects 1455 01:25:13,720 --> 01:25:16,439 or orbs that were just a single light. And then 1456 01:25:16,479 --> 01:25:19,760 the or these orb like objects would have more bizarre 1457 01:25:19,880 --> 01:25:24,640 characteristics and behaviors. And the drone like objects. We're talking 1458 01:25:24,640 --> 01:25:28,239 about these things that we were a little as look 1459 01:25:28,239 --> 01:25:30,199 at behavior. I want to go back on. The equipment 1460 01:25:30,880 --> 01:25:33,720 is to tract these objects. We were using active radar. 1461 01:25:33,760 --> 01:25:36,600 We're using two types of radar x M y axis 1462 01:25:36,640 --> 01:25:39,720 radar on two different geometries so we can get a 1463 01:25:39,720 --> 01:25:42,840 better profile of these We were also using uh million 1464 01:25:42,840 --> 01:25:46,920 meter wave radar portable radars to detect them. Anything diskies 1465 01:25:46,960 --> 01:25:50,039 that you want to use radar besides the hyph perspectual 1466 01:25:50,039 --> 01:25:52,680 cameras to see them with you know, whether it were 1467 01:25:52,760 --> 01:25:55,439 visible or they win the infrared range or in the ultraviolet. 1468 01:25:55,479 --> 01:25:58,720 You know, we were using hyperspectual cameras to attract the 1469 01:25:58,800 --> 01:26:01,079 to to detect them and try act them. And that's 1470 01:26:01,079 --> 01:26:03,560 how we arrived at the objects. We're talking about the 1471 01:26:03,640 --> 01:26:04,680 two types of objects. 1472 01:26:05,399 --> 01:26:09,479 Speaker 6: So so you know, Richard earlier uh gate went through 1473 01:26:10,039 --> 01:26:13,000 a mini inventory of equipment and supplies that he would 1474 01:26:13,119 --> 01:26:16,039 use for his investigations. And and and you two are 1475 01:26:16,439 --> 01:26:21,439 using innovative technologies to detect these objects where people with 1476 01:26:21,960 --> 01:26:26,039 plane vision can't detect them. And you you are sharing 1477 01:26:26,039 --> 01:26:29,880 with us additional effects uh what you described as uh 1478 01:26:30,000 --> 01:26:36,439 neuromuscular effects as well as electronic jamming. What what we 1479 01:26:36,520 --> 01:26:40,680 haven't talked about, are you know, drone surveillance to your 1480 01:26:40,760 --> 01:26:44,520 to your knowledge, have you observed any drone activity that 1481 01:26:44,640 --> 01:26:48,039 seems to be ours trying to make an identification of 1482 01:26:48,079 --> 01:26:50,159 what this is or have you sent up a drone yourself. 1483 01:26:50,680 --> 01:26:52,880 Speaker 8: Yeah, so that's the interesting part. I mean, we haven't. 1484 01:26:53,199 --> 01:26:56,039 We haven't sent up our own drone. We've had plenty 1485 01:26:56,039 --> 01:26:59,279 of suggestions to do that, which we haven't done yet, 1486 01:26:59,279 --> 01:27:03,479 but uh, we are detecting with the spectrum analyzes a 1487 01:27:03,520 --> 01:27:07,800 certain carrier frequency which is not it's not really indicative 1488 01:27:07,840 --> 01:27:12,359 of of of the drone remote access drone remote controls. 1489 01:27:13,479 --> 01:27:17,479 You know, the frequencies typically you know, it's with smaller drones, microdrones, 1490 01:27:17,560 --> 01:27:20,399 mini drones that you know, you're talking anything like nine 1491 01:27:20,479 --> 01:27:23,720 hundred megaherts on up. You know, so these frequencies can 1492 01:27:23,760 --> 01:27:26,880 be in they can be in bundles of three to 1493 01:27:26,960 --> 01:27:30,520 four gigaherts. They can be one to two gigaherts. They 1494 01:27:30,560 --> 01:27:32,960 can also be as high up as as one hundred 1495 01:27:32,960 --> 01:27:35,720 and thirty gig arts up the chain. So it's said, 1496 01:27:35,800 --> 01:27:39,640 you know, the frequencies can be extremely high, but nothing 1497 01:27:39,680 --> 01:27:43,880 that we've observed so far, especially with the with the 1498 01:27:43,880 --> 01:27:48,000 the the high counts that were seeing out there at 1499 01:27:48,000 --> 01:27:53,399 that time. You know, we couldn't correlate any specific, uh 1500 01:27:53,520 --> 01:27:56,880 spectrums of frequencies that could have been used for control. 1501 01:27:57,560 --> 01:28:01,039 You know, it's they're very difficult to see and these 1502 01:28:01,039 --> 01:28:04,760 particular frequencies are they're high in amplitude, but they're they're 1503 01:28:04,840 --> 01:28:08,520 almost like transience. They're almost like pilot signals and there's 1504 01:28:08,560 --> 01:28:11,279 there doesn't seem to be any intelligence around it that 1505 01:28:11,760 --> 01:28:16,880 is doing any real control unless they're they're they're putting 1506 01:28:17,079 --> 01:28:19,319 putting a pilot signal out there when they're in close 1507 01:28:19,319 --> 01:28:22,880 proximity to each other or or or an aircraft. You know, 1508 01:28:22,960 --> 01:28:25,079 I don't know, and I want to clarify what John's 1509 01:28:25,119 --> 01:28:28,239 talking about. These talking about transmitting signals to get these 1510 01:28:28,319 --> 01:28:31,000 these side bands, so frequencies that that are there that 1511 01:28:31,079 --> 01:28:34,159 are uh that's carrying data, they're they're they're intelligence. It's 1512 01:28:34,159 --> 01:28:37,399 called intelligence. But you get these side band frequencies weeketings, 1513 01:28:37,399 --> 01:28:40,520 these now pulses, when these when these when he's drawn 1514 01:28:40,640 --> 01:28:43,560 like objects are out and they're they usually pop in 1515 01:28:43,600 --> 01:28:47,520 at about one point seven gig yards and one gi guards. 1516 01:28:47,560 --> 01:28:52,119 They usually they're they're dual signals that pop up when 1517 01:28:52,119 --> 01:28:54,279 these things are out. They're always a company one one 1518 01:28:54,319 --> 01:28:57,439 accompanies the other. The largest signals at one point seventy 1519 01:28:57,560 --> 01:29:00,079 nine and one point seventy five gig ards and and 1520 01:29:00,119 --> 01:29:01,960 you have a one point eighty one which is at 1521 01:29:02,000 --> 01:29:05,079 a much lower amplitude, but they seem to occur together. 1522 01:29:05,640 --> 01:29:08,119 That's the only thing that we're picking up out in 1523 01:29:08,159 --> 01:29:11,399 the field. You know, when we're seeing high traffic areas 1524 01:29:11,920 --> 01:29:14,359 and in our typical and normal r F transmitting fre 1525 01:29:14,640 --> 01:29:18,199 you know, right right regular frequencies are drug typical drones. 1526 01:29:18,239 --> 01:29:20,880 And it seems to be patterns with you know, with 1527 01:29:20,880 --> 01:29:24,560 with magnetominis as well. It's not just not just the 1528 01:29:24,720 --> 01:29:27,840 r F frequencies that we're seeing. We're seeing a specific 1529 01:29:27,920 --> 01:29:33,279 pattern with the magnetomitis as well as the ultrasonic detection 1530 01:29:33,439 --> 01:29:35,760 systems that we have as well. So there seems to 1531 01:29:35,760 --> 01:29:39,960 be some correlation which we're still trying to figure out 1532 01:29:39,960 --> 01:29:43,279 what's still working on at this point. But getting back 1533 01:29:43,319 --> 01:29:46,600 as far as you know, uh, you know, uh, the 1534 01:29:46,680 --> 01:29:50,399 tactle equipment that that we know we're trying to to 1535 01:29:50,840 --> 01:29:55,159 you know, to basically rally for is the is for 1536 01:29:55,199 --> 01:29:58,239 the police departments to have, you know, emergency management, to 1537 01:29:58,319 --> 01:30:02,920 have some kind of systems that they may eliminate some 1538 01:30:02,960 --> 01:30:05,399 of those those wild guesses as far as you know, 1539 01:30:05,439 --> 01:30:07,920 what it is that they're encountering and that sort of thing. 1540 01:30:08,199 --> 01:30:12,039 You know, we highly recommend night vision cameras, which are 1541 01:30:12,079 --> 01:30:15,800 a near infrared or a short wave of infrared, the 1542 01:30:17,359 --> 01:30:20,560 type of stuff that the law enforcementory has. Speed guns 1543 01:30:20,560 --> 01:30:23,880 are very important. The radars themselves and no meter wave 1544 01:30:24,000 --> 01:30:27,119 radar between twenty four gigahertz and thirty six or two 1545 01:30:27,159 --> 01:30:31,239 different types. I think they use stalker and they have 1546 01:30:31,239 --> 01:30:33,960 a range of about a mile and a half to 1547 01:30:34,039 --> 01:30:37,520 two miles, something the size of an suv and something 1548 01:30:37,560 --> 01:30:39,720 the size of an airliner or something aside of a 1549 01:30:39,880 --> 01:30:42,800 tractor trailer. You can go out almost three miles for 1550 01:30:42,920 --> 01:30:47,039 detection capability. Now, it doesn't matter whether these objects are 1551 01:30:47,079 --> 01:30:49,760 moving very quickly, you know, the only thing that we're 1552 01:30:49,800 --> 01:30:53,079 concerned about, and the thing that we're interested in is 1553 01:30:53,479 --> 01:30:57,920 whether or not they're producing Adoptler effect, the reflection from 1554 01:30:57,960 --> 01:31:00,720 the radar. It's just something tangible. It is something that 1555 01:31:00,760 --> 01:31:04,079 has masks any whether you hear a chirp, well, you 1556 01:31:04,119 --> 01:31:07,800 hear a Doppler changing sounds of frequency changing. Those are 1557 01:31:07,840 --> 01:31:11,319 the kind of things that are important to us because 1558 01:31:11,359 --> 01:31:13,840 it's it's more than just a plasma. It's more than 1559 01:31:13,920 --> 01:31:19,079 just a you know, uh, you know, swamp gas. You know. 1560 01:31:19,399 --> 01:31:23,359 And I want to back up with something here. Many 1561 01:31:23,399 --> 01:31:25,239 of the police forces, like in Orange County, I know 1562 01:31:25,279 --> 01:31:27,640 they were doing it. I think they're doing Monmouth County, 1563 01:31:27,720 --> 01:31:30,760 New Jersey, the sheriff's departments, they were using the They 1564 01:31:30,760 --> 01:31:35,279 did have a mobile command unit drone unit that they 1565 01:31:35,279 --> 01:31:38,159 were deploying. I know they were looking at ADSB data 1566 01:31:38,319 --> 01:31:44,199 to track planes manned aircraft. They were launching their own 1567 01:31:44,279 --> 01:31:48,520 drone six foot industrial drones with both flear and and 1568 01:31:48,920 --> 01:31:52,159 a standard camera system on it. And they were getting 1569 01:31:52,720 --> 01:31:55,920 and they were giving some unusual things. They actually have 1570 01:31:55,920 --> 01:31:58,439 a video of an object that was oval shaped. It 1571 01:31:58,560 --> 01:32:02,239 was a greenish color, greenish shoe to it. It had 1572 01:32:02,279 --> 01:32:06,600 a yellow red beacon in the front head and it 1573 01:32:06,680 --> 01:32:08,560 had one on the bottom which weren't always on. They 1574 01:32:08,560 --> 01:32:11,680 would would occasionally flash in the direction of travel of 1575 01:32:11,720 --> 01:32:12,600 the object. 1576 01:32:13,359 --> 01:32:13,520 Speaker 1: Uh. 1577 01:32:13,600 --> 01:32:17,359 Speaker 8: They also talked about these objects having no thermal signature, 1578 01:32:18,880 --> 01:32:23,199 odd flight behaviors such as speeding towards their drone they 1579 01:32:23,279 --> 01:32:27,199 launched and and stopping, making a one eighty degrees turn 1580 01:32:27,279 --> 01:32:31,239 around it back, shooting back off in the distance that 1581 01:32:31,359 --> 01:32:34,479 shooting back towards the drone again and making you turn 1582 01:32:34,520 --> 01:32:38,239 around it. So it's it's distant fit normal and no 1583 01:32:38,479 --> 01:32:41,199 and no sounds and no sound yet. So they were 1584 01:32:41,239 --> 01:32:43,399 detecting with Chris and they were were doing their due 1585 01:32:43,399 --> 01:32:47,720 diligence detect and detecting. You know these you know you know, 1586 01:32:48,000 --> 01:32:50,000 going out and investigating and trying to So they're doing 1587 01:32:50,039 --> 01:32:52,279 a pretty good job with what they have as far 1588 01:32:52,319 --> 01:32:54,640 as Yeah, and they've reported this, and they've reported this, 1589 01:32:54,680 --> 01:32:57,279 but it seems to I've gone, you know, kind of ignored. 1590 01:32:57,479 --> 01:32:58,039 I guess. 1591 01:32:58,560 --> 01:33:01,319 Speaker 6: So, so, Jerry and John, if you can give us 1592 01:33:01,359 --> 01:33:06,880 a kind of a scenario, an actual situation. You just 1593 01:33:06,920 --> 01:33:09,600 gave us a good description. But at some point we're 1594 01:33:09,600 --> 01:33:13,479 going to show some video of an experience that you had. 1595 01:33:13,720 --> 01:33:17,520 Can you tell us about a significant experience that we 1596 01:33:17,600 --> 01:33:20,960 might be able to see on video or photo that 1597 01:33:21,039 --> 01:33:22,920 would provide us some visual context? 1598 01:33:23,800 --> 01:33:24,159 Speaker 8: Sure? 1599 01:33:24,359 --> 01:33:26,560 Speaker 1: Do we want to play the play the video that 1600 01:33:26,640 --> 01:33:29,720 you guys send? Yes, yes, Okay, Yeah, we'll do that 1601 01:33:29,840 --> 01:33:31,800 and then yeah, I mean you can I kind of 1602 01:33:31,880 --> 01:33:34,600 over it. Here here we go and the recent wrong one. 1603 01:33:36,199 --> 01:33:38,960 Speaker 8: Okay, so this was back in November twenty twenty two, 1604 01:33:39,000 --> 01:33:42,439 I think it's November twelfth. What we're seeing is we're 1605 01:33:42,439 --> 01:33:45,479 seeing these objects that that we were off on the 1606 01:33:45,560 --> 01:33:48,399 Fire Island Notional Seashore. It's a barrier island off of 1607 01:33:48,439 --> 01:33:51,359 Long Island, and you're seeing these clusters of objects there 1608 01:33:51,399 --> 01:33:54,079 were some of them are very loaded the water. Here's 1609 01:33:54,079 --> 01:33:58,439 something that we're drone was drone like, and what it's 1610 01:33:58,439 --> 01:34:01,119 doing is it's shining some kind of us There's there's 1611 01:34:01,159 --> 01:34:03,720 another light object flashing off to the side of it, 1612 01:34:03,960 --> 01:34:06,199 and it looks like it's trying to observe this object 1613 01:34:06,199 --> 01:34:08,279 by using these search beams. And you see it lighting 1614 01:34:08,319 --> 01:34:10,840 up a cloud down here, you know, whether an anti 1615 01:34:10,880 --> 01:34:13,920 collision lights or something else. But they're extremely bright. It's 1616 01:34:13,960 --> 01:34:16,920 a but there's a dude. Actually, they were actually shining 1617 01:34:16,920 --> 01:34:19,920 search beams flatterally and these and these drones, you know, 1618 01:34:20,399 --> 01:34:23,520 drones typically of five hundred loomings as far as their 1619 01:34:23,560 --> 01:34:25,479 lighting system. And here's what here's a lot this is 1620 01:34:25,479 --> 01:34:28,439 a drone like object. Again, it's pulsing. There's a little 1621 01:34:28,520 --> 01:34:31,600 object that's very low low over the water. There's no 1622 01:34:31,720 --> 01:34:34,359 one that's flashing. It's sitting on the water. Yeah, so 1623 01:34:34,399 --> 01:34:37,279 you'll see that the object just below it is an 1624 01:34:37,479 --> 01:34:40,159 orb and the object above that we believe to be 1625 01:34:40,199 --> 01:34:43,000 this that's throne like objects that appeared to be they're 1626 01:34:43,000 --> 01:34:45,600 flashing there. And the same can be said with these 1627 01:34:45,600 --> 01:34:48,880 two objects here you have one. 1628 01:34:49,000 --> 01:34:51,920 Speaker 6: Was there any indication that the any of these drones 1629 01:34:52,000 --> 01:34:55,720 were operated by you know, any of our government or 1630 01:34:55,840 --> 01:34:57,800 or you know, any known entity or. 1631 01:34:59,000 --> 01:35:02,199 Speaker 8: Non that's that was the issue with the with the 1632 01:35:02,239 --> 01:35:06,079 spectrum analyzes. We we couldn't get you know, we would 1633 01:35:06,159 --> 01:35:09,239 we expected to see some kind of a remote transmission 1634 01:35:09,239 --> 01:35:12,079 around it, you know, that would give its commands and 1635 01:35:12,079 --> 01:35:15,239 that sort of thing, some intelligence of you know, directionality 1636 01:35:15,319 --> 01:35:18,399 and so forth, some control signals. But we saw nothing. 1637 01:35:18,800 --> 01:35:21,720 And so the other thing what looked like pilot signals. 1638 01:35:21,880 --> 01:35:24,319 The other thing I wanted to talk about, we did 1639 01:35:24,319 --> 01:35:26,359 do a deep dive on that. We had an investigator 1640 01:35:26,399 --> 01:35:28,760 with us, Donald lie Ardo. She once worked as a 1641 01:35:28,760 --> 01:35:32,079 private investigator. She actually checked in with the DHS, She 1642 01:35:32,239 --> 01:35:36,319 checked in with with with the WAAR Enforcement Marine Bureau. 1643 01:35:36,359 --> 01:35:39,119 She checked in with a Coastguard. She checked in with 1644 01:35:39,520 --> 01:35:44,439 many of the other agencies. Nobody would would respond take 1645 01:35:44,479 --> 01:35:45,880 responsibility for these objects. 1646 01:35:46,840 --> 01:35:49,239 Speaker 6: I see, and I noticed that there was a light 1647 01:35:49,319 --> 01:35:52,600 flashing what seemed to be from whoever's taking this footage. 1648 01:35:53,159 --> 01:35:55,079 Speaker 7: What was the objective of shining the light? 1649 01:35:56,039 --> 01:35:57,880 Speaker 8: All right? So what we're trying to do is we're 1650 01:35:58,359 --> 01:36:00,239 we're trying to hit back. We've we've seen in the 1651 01:36:00,279 --> 01:36:02,640 past where if we've hit it with a torch, a 1652 01:36:02,720 --> 01:36:07,800 visible torch or an infrared torch, you know, move that 1653 01:36:07,880 --> 01:36:10,800 light that emitter in front of the objects or or 1654 01:36:10,840 --> 01:36:13,600 against the objects to see if they're reflecting light back. Yeah, 1655 01:36:13,600 --> 01:36:15,680 we also want to we also want to see the structure. 1656 01:36:16,000 --> 01:36:17,439 We want to see if the structure. We also want 1657 01:36:17,439 --> 01:36:20,479 to determine the range, because we know what the range 1658 01:36:20,520 --> 01:36:23,119 of the of the of the torches, We know what 1659 01:36:23,159 --> 01:36:26,119 the range of the the I R emitterus, you know, 1660 01:36:26,119 --> 01:36:28,239 and they're like there was one in thirteen hundred meters, 1661 01:36:28,279 --> 01:36:30,319 the other one was a little bit more. So we know, 1662 01:36:30,479 --> 01:36:32,720 you know how far they can penetrate output before you 1663 01:36:32,760 --> 01:36:34,920 get a reflection. So we were looking for that, and 1664 01:36:34,960 --> 01:36:37,279 of course we got it. We were we were reflecting 1665 01:36:37,359 --> 01:36:41,880 light back from these objects, the objects that didn't give 1666 01:36:41,960 --> 01:36:44,520 us any visible signature when it was when we hit 1667 01:36:44,560 --> 01:36:47,359 it with a visible torch, we could see a reflection 1668 01:36:47,520 --> 01:36:50,600 coming back from that object, you know, So if the 1669 01:36:50,640 --> 01:36:53,000 object went dark, we were able to illuminate it to 1670 01:36:53,039 --> 01:36:56,239 some extent and see it. And if you if you, 1671 01:36:56,479 --> 01:36:58,399 like I said, if you take enough time to look 1672 01:36:58,399 --> 01:37:00,800 at this video, this is to what we were seeing. 1673 01:37:00,920 --> 01:37:03,079 There looks like two types of objects out there, two 1674 01:37:03,079 --> 01:37:05,960 distinct patterns two distinct objects. There's a drone like objects. 1675 01:37:06,079 --> 01:37:08,439 We see the flash patterns and you see this looks 1676 01:37:08,439 --> 01:37:10,920 like search slights, toll look like the surveiling or looking 1677 01:37:11,479 --> 01:37:13,920 looking at these orbs. But these these objects appear to 1678 01:37:13,920 --> 01:37:16,239 be orbs, are a single source of light and the 1679 01:37:16,399 --> 01:37:17,880 sphericle is herrable, right. 1680 01:37:17,920 --> 01:37:18,399 Speaker 1: And we'd be. 1681 01:37:18,399 --> 01:37:22,319 Speaker 8: Tracking these these orbs with night vision, night vision cameras, 1682 01:37:22,399 --> 01:37:25,479 night vision goggles, so we could see them, and we 1683 01:37:25,520 --> 01:37:27,720 could see with the motion of the orbs if they 1684 01:37:27,720 --> 01:37:30,399 would move in a certain direction. It seemed like these 1685 01:37:31,119 --> 01:37:36,119 these these drone like objects would basically follow the same 1686 01:37:36,199 --> 01:37:40,159 course almost in a pursuit or surveillance operation. 1687 01:37:41,399 --> 01:37:43,600 Speaker 6: And what did what did the drones look like when 1688 01:37:43,640 --> 01:37:46,800 you were not using the night vision camera or the 1689 01:37:46,880 --> 01:37:47,960 I our camera. 1690 01:37:48,680 --> 01:37:51,560 Speaker 8: So the thing is we we couldn't identify anything other 1691 01:37:51,600 --> 01:37:53,520 than the bright light. There was just bright light that 1692 01:37:53,560 --> 01:37:56,359 were on the object itself. Never saw structure, We never 1693 01:37:56,399 --> 01:37:59,560 heard them those sounds, sounds. We could never see the structure. 1694 01:38:00,039 --> 01:38:03,199 Even with the now, even with the Fleer camera, the 1695 01:38:03,279 --> 01:38:06,119 long wave thermal camera. You know, we would expect to 1696 01:38:06,159 --> 01:38:08,399 see a thermal signature. Well we didn't get that. We 1697 01:38:08,439 --> 01:38:11,359 didn't get that. Yeah, you know so, and it's got long. 1698 01:38:11,399 --> 01:38:14,159 Speaker 6: But how long did this observation. 1699 01:38:13,800 --> 01:38:18,039 Speaker 8: Last we're seeing both types of objects, it was it 1700 01:38:18,079 --> 01:38:21,079 was about two weeks in November of twenty twenty two, 1701 01:38:21,600 --> 01:38:24,600 and it was another uh I think it was a 1702 01:38:24,640 --> 01:38:27,199 week in October, the end of ox. Yeah, and at 1703 01:38:27,239 --> 01:38:29,560 the end of October and in the drone like objects 1704 01:38:29,560 --> 01:38:32,199 couldn't see again, but we continued to see these orbs. 1705 01:38:32,640 --> 01:38:34,119 Speaker 7: For the video that we just saw. 1706 01:38:34,560 --> 01:38:37,079 Speaker 6: For the video that we just saw, how long were 1707 01:38:37,119 --> 01:38:40,399 those drones and that was all over the water? 1708 01:38:40,600 --> 01:38:41,000 Speaker 7: Correct? 1709 01:38:41,199 --> 01:38:41,720 Speaker 8: Right? Yes? 1710 01:38:41,920 --> 01:38:43,399 Speaker 3: Okay, how long. 1711 01:38:43,159 --> 01:38:45,640 Speaker 7: Were those drones hovering over the water. 1712 01:38:46,079 --> 01:38:48,439 Speaker 8: They were out there, They were out there from seven 1713 01:38:48,560 --> 01:38:52,640 to probably uh eleven o'clock, eleven thirty eleven eleven thirty. 1714 01:38:52,680 --> 01:38:54,880 Speaker 6: Yeah, and were you out there the entire time to 1715 01:38:54,880 --> 01:38:58,000 have visual that they did not go to another place 1716 01:38:58,039 --> 01:38:58,960 and redeploy. 1717 01:38:59,600 --> 01:39:02,119 Speaker 8: Yeah, we be out there all night and eventually they 1718 01:39:02,239 --> 01:39:06,359 just they just kind of they kind of disappeared, Okay, 1719 01:39:06,399 --> 01:39:09,279 and because they we don't and it maybe because they 1720 01:39:09,319 --> 01:39:12,439 shut their you know, they're lighting down, or or they 1721 01:39:12,520 --> 01:39:15,520 changed their spectral signatures, but they weren't there right, right, 1722 01:39:15,600 --> 01:39:19,439 And and there's a Like I said, these these times 1723 01:39:19,439 --> 01:39:23,279 are pretty well defined. I mean it's seven o'clock, you know, 1724 01:39:23,399 --> 01:39:26,199 seven o'clock at night till almost twelve o'clock at night. 1725 01:39:26,319 --> 01:39:28,399 You know, it's well, this is this is just for 1726 01:39:28,439 --> 01:39:30,720 the drone like ops, just for the drone. We could 1727 01:39:30,720 --> 01:39:33,600 see that could go all night long. We'd see case. 1728 01:39:33,840 --> 01:39:36,960 They'd be sporad occasionally spak, pomp in and out, appear 1729 01:39:37,039 --> 01:39:37,640 and disappear. 1730 01:39:38,199 --> 01:39:40,359 Speaker 6: All right, so five hours or more over the water, 1731 01:39:40,640 --> 01:39:45,039 no appearance signs of uh redeployment and uh and to 1732 01:39:45,119 --> 01:39:48,039 your knowledge, have you ever seen anything uh like that 1733 01:39:48,119 --> 01:39:51,760 before that we can uh account for in our inventory. 1734 01:39:52,359 --> 01:39:55,359 Speaker 8: No, No, nothing like that. It's uh, there's the sheer 1735 01:39:55,479 --> 01:39:57,800 number of them out there. I mean, I mean that 1736 01:39:57,920 --> 01:40:00,319 night we were seeing anywhere between you know, fish fifteen 1737 01:40:00,319 --> 01:40:03,600 to thirty and they could loiter for long periods of time, 1738 01:40:03,640 --> 01:40:07,199 for hours, you know, and very bright lights that would 1739 01:40:07,239 --> 01:40:09,279 running I mean you were running down a battery sauce 1740 01:40:09,840 --> 01:40:12,920 right bright. The lights are extremely bright. Yeah, yeah, that's uh. 1741 01:40:13,159 --> 01:40:15,399 That's the other thing. It's not typical drones. Yeah, I 1742 01:40:15,439 --> 01:40:18,800 mean so certainly not commercial drones. If anything. These are 1743 01:40:18,840 --> 01:40:22,239 large drones and obviously to have the capacity to run 1744 01:40:22,279 --> 01:40:24,760 those bright lights, which is not to be better than 1745 01:40:24,760 --> 01:40:25,720 five hundred womens. 1746 01:40:25,760 --> 01:40:27,760 Speaker 6: You know, it has to do, all right, And Jerry 1747 01:40:27,760 --> 01:40:30,800 and John, this is this is fantastic work. Uh. It 1748 01:40:30,840 --> 01:40:34,520 would be great to see similar footage capture captured by 1749 01:40:34,520 --> 01:40:37,359 other investigators in other parts of the country, other parts 1750 01:40:37,359 --> 01:40:37,920 of the world. 1751 01:40:38,359 --> 01:40:38,520 Speaker 9: Uh. 1752 01:40:38,560 --> 01:40:41,159 Speaker 6: So we appreciate the work that you're doing. What's next 1753 01:40:41,159 --> 01:40:44,399 in your investigations? What what do you have plan next? 1754 01:40:44,520 --> 01:40:47,359 Speaker 8: So you know we're trying to work with of course, uh, 1755 01:40:47,479 --> 01:40:51,960 you know, law enforcement and uh, you know, other agencies 1756 01:40:52,000 --> 01:40:54,640 as well as far as you know, putting together some 1757 01:40:54,760 --> 01:40:59,680 kind of a means of of of testing this stuff, 1758 01:40:59,800 --> 01:41:02,359 of measuring it. You know, it's uh, well detecting it, 1759 01:41:02,560 --> 01:41:04,239 you know, something coming up with some kind of a 1760 01:41:04,279 --> 01:41:08,840 methodology and uh you know there's a couple of things 1761 01:41:08,840 --> 01:41:11,680 that you know, we'd like to suggest right away. And 1762 01:41:11,720 --> 01:41:15,680 that's you know, with the possibility of uv C burns, 1763 01:41:15,760 --> 01:41:19,359 you know, which is uh, we've actually had detections out 1764 01:41:19,359 --> 01:41:23,279 there with the UVC detector. Now, our detector is very sensitive. 1765 01:41:23,279 --> 01:41:26,479 It's i mean it can see it can see the 1766 01:41:26,560 --> 01:41:29,000 fire the size of a of a campfire from from 1767 01:41:29,000 --> 01:41:32,479 almost twenty five thousand feet, you know, So it's it's 1768 01:41:32,520 --> 01:41:37,880 it's very very sensitive in that regard. UVC detection is 1769 01:41:38,079 --> 01:41:43,840 primary for plasmas, coronal discharges, arcs, something that's giving off. 1770 01:41:43,880 --> 01:41:47,279 I know, there's been some observations and then you know 1771 01:41:47,319 --> 01:41:50,439 in the past where they were reported as having a 1772 01:41:50,439 --> 01:41:55,119 buzzing sound and a bluish glow around them, which you 1773 01:41:55,119 --> 01:41:58,079 know could be very much indicative of of of UVC 1774 01:41:58,600 --> 01:42:02,520 and VC pattern And I want to mention something of 1775 01:42:02,560 --> 01:42:05,479 that that we we actually had our own observation. We 1776 01:42:05,479 --> 01:42:08,039 have a video of an object had a bluist hue 1777 01:42:08,079 --> 01:42:11,239 to it. It was it was flickering and it was rotating, 1778 01:42:11,600 --> 01:42:14,960 it was it was traveling along the shoreline, and we 1779 01:42:15,039 --> 01:42:17,680 have had a the UVC detector out there and it 1780 01:42:17,720 --> 01:42:21,159 actually triggered the UVC detector three times, which indicated this 1781 01:42:21,319 --> 01:42:23,800 was either giving up some kind of corona discharge, a 1782 01:42:24,000 --> 01:42:26,600 high voltage electrical discharge, or it was some kind of 1783 01:42:26,600 --> 01:42:28,800 plasma sheath around the object. But it was it was 1784 01:42:28,840 --> 01:42:33,960 an orb but spherical, bluish spherical objects, right and and 1785 01:42:33,960 --> 01:42:37,000 and so that's that's you know, not a not a 1786 01:42:37,039 --> 01:42:39,880 hazard apparently, so we have it. 1787 01:42:40,000 --> 01:42:42,079 Speaker 6: We have a ton of questions. Uh, And I just 1788 01:42:42,119 --> 01:42:45,479 want to point something out. You guys have done some 1789 01:42:45,560 --> 01:42:48,640 amazing work you did. You were very articulate, uh in 1790 01:42:48,720 --> 01:42:51,880 explaining your process for anyone who woke up halfway through 1791 01:42:51,960 --> 01:42:54,359 or at the end of physics class. Uh, it probably 1792 01:42:54,359 --> 01:42:57,039 went way over the head. But this is the importance 1793 01:42:57,039 --> 01:43:00,840 of having our best and brightest conduct these investigations. So 1794 01:43:00,960 --> 01:43:04,039 I want to turn to back to Matt. We have 1795 01:43:04,319 --> 01:43:07,359 quite a few questions, and we apologize in advance if 1796 01:43:07,359 --> 01:43:09,600 we don't answer every question in full. 1797 01:43:09,720 --> 01:43:12,920 Speaker 7: But Matt, please give us the questions that you have. 1798 01:43:13,119 --> 01:43:15,880 Speaker 1: All right, yeah, great, yeah, so yeah, folks, thanks thanks 1799 01:43:16,479 --> 01:43:18,720 for all the questions. Quite a few of them here. 1800 01:43:19,000 --> 01:43:23,399 Some are just comments. Jackson, matt Ford, you're a patriot 1801 01:43:23,439 --> 01:43:27,760 everyone as a guest on the show Our Patriots Metrospect, 1802 01:43:28,000 --> 01:43:33,239 thank you very much for that. Sylvie Goathier. Drones are 1803 01:43:33,319 --> 01:43:35,920 showing up all over the world. How come this is 1804 01:43:35,960 --> 01:43:42,800 not a worldwide concern? Who wants to take that? 1805 01:43:42,800 --> 01:43:45,680 Speaker 8: That's what we'd like to know. That's really good. That's 1806 01:43:45,720 --> 01:43:46,520 a really good question. 1807 01:43:46,960 --> 01:43:51,199 Speaker 9: I think it probably is a worldwide concern, you know, Okay, I. 1808 01:43:51,199 --> 01:43:54,079 Speaker 6: Think the consensus is that it should be a worldwide concern. 1809 01:43:54,119 --> 01:43:57,960 That's why we're holding this panel discussion to advocate for 1810 01:43:58,720 --> 01:44:03,840 clarity on what reports are being made to the frequency 1811 01:44:03,920 --> 01:44:07,720 and type of activity that is being reported. And you 1812 01:44:07,760 --> 01:44:13,239 know the importance of having a preparedness, a response preparedness 1813 01:44:13,279 --> 01:44:15,960 plan for these ongoing encourages. 1814 01:44:16,600 --> 01:44:21,560 Speaker 1: Absolutely have a question here for all when will when? 1815 01:44:21,800 --> 01:44:24,760 When will you podcasters begin to push people like put 1816 01:44:24,800 --> 01:44:28,680 Off and other people who clearly have some hard answers 1817 01:44:28,880 --> 01:44:32,600 for evidence. That's good, but we I don't quite understand it. 1818 01:44:32,680 --> 01:44:35,520 But yes, hey, I get help put Off on the show. Absolutely, 1819 01:44:36,000 --> 01:44:39,159 friend of the show, David Smith? Smiths or Smith? Or 1820 01:44:40,560 --> 01:44:44,199 does the panel think we are seeing human made drones 1821 01:44:44,600 --> 01:44:49,640 using some reverse engineered exotic tech from adversaries or from 1822 01:44:49,840 --> 01:44:50,960 US or both? 1823 01:44:53,239 --> 01:44:55,720 Speaker 6: Richard, I'm one asked that you respond to that game. 1824 01:44:55,840 --> 01:44:58,239 Speaker 9: Well, I think that it's a culmination of all the above. 1825 01:44:58,439 --> 01:45:03,439 There's clearly some you know, man made vehicles, if you will, 1826 01:45:03,560 --> 01:45:06,680 And I think that you know, the real you know, 1827 01:45:06,720 --> 01:45:09,880 what you guys are seeing in your instruments is there's 1828 01:45:10,000 --> 01:45:15,000 like more than one, uh, there's more than one phenomena 1829 01:45:15,039 --> 01:45:18,239 occurring at the same time, you know. And so yeah, 1830 01:45:18,239 --> 01:45:21,439 I think it's probably a combination of the above and 1831 01:45:21,560 --> 01:45:24,319 just the other point with you know, when somebody said 1832 01:45:24,319 --> 01:45:27,199 about the worldwide phenomena, one of the things I thought 1833 01:45:27,239 --> 01:45:29,239 was kind of ludicrous is the fact that they're saying 1834 01:45:29,279 --> 01:45:33,239 the FAA approved it. But you know, a logistical standpoint, 1835 01:45:33,279 --> 01:45:36,399 they don't have much to do with the other parts 1836 01:45:36,399 --> 01:45:36,960 of the world. 1837 01:45:37,680 --> 01:45:43,880 Speaker 1: That's that's for sure. Richard Chaffee. Any electronic interference. 1838 01:45:43,560 --> 01:45:47,439 Speaker 9: At all, are you asking me? 1839 01:45:48,239 --> 01:45:51,399 Speaker 1: Yeah, i'd say yeah, probably for Jerry and John. 1840 01:45:52,680 --> 01:45:56,840 Speaker 8: Yes, we've we've had instances of electromagan interference on the 1841 01:45:56,880 --> 01:46:01,039 hyperspectual equipment. In one case, it caused one of our 1842 01:46:01,239 --> 01:46:02,560 pieces of going to actually fail. 1843 01:46:03,680 --> 01:46:05,560 Speaker 1: Do you think do you think it was intentional or 1844 01:46:05,640 --> 01:46:08,199 just a byproduct? Like did it did it feel like 1845 01:46:08,239 --> 01:46:09,079 it was targeted? 1846 01:46:10,159 --> 01:46:12,359 Speaker 8: We're not really sure. In that case, it could have 1847 01:46:12,359 --> 01:46:14,880 been a by product, but we're not sure. Yeah, I mean, 1848 01:46:14,880 --> 01:46:18,279 it's a you know, the you know, the field itself. 1849 01:46:18,279 --> 01:46:20,520 It's when we you know, we had one of the 1850 01:46:20,520 --> 01:46:23,479 cameras down by the water. It had a plastic enclosure. 1851 01:46:24,560 --> 01:46:26,960 Most of the cameras that we you know, use it. 1852 01:46:26,960 --> 01:46:28,880 We try to go with the metal enclosure. We try 1853 01:46:28,920 --> 01:46:32,119 to wrap into some kind of a Faraday cage, if 1854 01:46:32,159 --> 01:46:37,680 you will, some kind of a E M P shield, 1855 01:46:38,800 --> 01:46:43,000 because we have had camera batteries that were failing when 1856 01:46:43,039 --> 01:46:45,920 they should have you know, uh, if it should have 1857 01:46:46,000 --> 01:46:48,159 lasted four hours and we got maybe an hour out 1858 01:46:48,159 --> 01:46:50,319 of it or less, and then all of a sudden, 1859 01:46:50,319 --> 01:46:52,560 as if you leave the battery on a shelf somewhere 1860 01:46:52,600 --> 01:46:55,399 for a while, it would basically seemed to almost like 1861 01:46:55,520 --> 01:47:00,680 repolarize and and operate normally, which is unusual, you know. 1862 01:47:01,199 --> 01:47:03,319 Speaker 9: And I could also add that, I'm sorry, I could 1863 01:47:03,319 --> 01:47:05,359 add that the car. There's been cases where we've had 1864 01:47:05,399 --> 01:47:07,920 cars that are disabled where it literally just shoves the whole. 1865 01:47:07,720 --> 01:47:11,079 Speaker 8: Car right right, So it's uh so these are the 1866 01:47:11,159 --> 01:47:13,520 kind of things, and especially with our radar systems, we've 1867 01:47:13,520 --> 01:47:18,159 had some very unusual interference patterns, uh which look like 1868 01:47:18,199 --> 01:47:23,319 they look like radial streaks, uh from the center where 1869 01:47:23,399 --> 01:47:26,079 the where the the the r V would be the 1870 01:47:26,399 --> 01:47:29,520 mobile lab and outward in the distance, you'd you'd see 1871 01:47:29,560 --> 01:47:35,359 these these uh linear linear patterns of lines that were 1872 01:47:36,279 --> 01:47:39,960 generated by you know, multiple reflections. 1873 01:47:41,279 --> 01:47:44,560 Speaker 1: All right, let's see here again another one. Jordan Lee 1874 01:47:44,680 --> 01:47:48,039 A fantastic show, guys, Thank thank you so much pairs 1875 01:47:48,039 --> 01:47:52,239 of diamonds? Uh? Have any men men in black come 1876 01:47:52,279 --> 01:47:56,199 to town at that occurrence? Not sure which occurrence, but 1877 01:47:56,640 --> 01:47:57,800 any men in black? 1878 01:47:59,079 --> 01:48:02,000 Speaker 8: In our case, we were out a couple of times. 1879 01:48:02,039 --> 01:48:05,159 We were out there. There was we have a permit 1880 01:48:05,199 --> 01:48:10,000 to be out there, so they actually bar the public 1881 01:48:10,039 --> 01:48:14,159 from staying being out there past six o'clock. Seven o'clock 1882 01:48:14,159 --> 01:48:16,279 they actually told to leave. They made the lete by 1883 01:48:16,319 --> 01:48:20,640 the the park police. We actually had some vehicles out 1884 01:48:20,680 --> 01:48:24,920 there about mid others midnight one night. Then they were 1885 01:48:24,960 --> 01:48:27,680 out there. They actually formed an arc around our vehicle. 1886 01:48:28,279 --> 01:48:30,680 They had had attended windows, They had their high beams 1887 01:48:30,720 --> 01:48:33,279 on so they could see us, but we couldn't see them. 1888 01:48:33,800 --> 01:48:36,399 There were people moving out of the vehicles looking over 1889 01:48:37,199 --> 01:48:39,399 but we we had turned the lights on on a 1890 01:48:39,479 --> 01:48:43,560 canusil let them know that we were filming, so which 1891 01:48:43,760 --> 01:48:45,880 maybe keep us kept us safe. They were out there 1892 01:48:45,880 --> 01:48:48,199 for maybe an hour. Then they left and it happened 1893 01:48:48,239 --> 01:48:50,880 I think twice unusual activity, you know, so I don't 1894 01:48:50,920 --> 01:48:52,039 know who did. 1895 01:48:52,119 --> 01:48:56,079 Speaker 9: They have government license plates on the cars g plates We. 1896 01:48:56,000 --> 01:48:58,560 Speaker 8: Could see was there was black. There were black suburbans 1897 01:48:58,760 --> 01:49:01,720 as black. You have black saburn you couldn't see the plates, 1898 01:49:01,760 --> 01:49:04,760 you know. Yeah, I'm not sure why you couldn't see it. 1899 01:49:05,439 --> 01:49:07,359 And they were curious about what we were doing out there. 1900 01:49:08,359 --> 01:49:10,720 Speaker 1: And I take it you guys didn't go up and 1901 01:49:11,239 --> 01:49:13,880 offer them, offer them a diet coke or anything like that. 1902 01:49:14,479 --> 01:49:16,720 Speaker 8: No, we we show us our phone, cell phones and 1903 01:49:16,800 --> 01:49:18,720 our cameras on our vehicle. Make sure they sort of 1904 01:49:18,760 --> 01:49:21,039 lighting on it, that everything was being filmed to. 1905 01:49:23,159 --> 01:49:28,199 Speaker 1: Gotcha. Okay, let's see here, uh that Okay, hold on 1906 01:49:28,239 --> 01:49:38,319 a second, all right, let's see tim, any any spectrum 1907 01:49:38,399 --> 01:49:44,520 data on the on the lighting uh itself? Any? Uh? Yeah, 1908 01:49:44,560 --> 01:49:47,039 I mean that's actually a really good question. Any any 1909 01:49:47,600 --> 01:49:51,399 any anything on the spectrum wise that would tell you, 1910 01:49:51,479 --> 01:49:54,439 like how pure the light is, Was it always the 1911 01:49:54,479 --> 01:49:56,119 same frequency, et cetera. 1912 01:49:56,319 --> 01:49:59,319 Speaker 8: Yes, Yeah. So the the interesting thing is that we're 1913 01:49:59,359 --> 01:50:03,520 actually we're in a in a process of submitting another 1914 01:50:03,560 --> 01:50:11,279 paper with using uh uh spectrographs or radio spectroscopy, doing 1915 01:50:11,359 --> 01:50:14,880 radio spectroscopy on on these on these the the the 1916 01:50:15,199 --> 01:50:19,640 lights themselves, and of course with the you know, we're 1917 01:50:19,720 --> 01:50:22,399 using a certain kind of spectrometer that can go from 1918 01:50:23,239 --> 01:50:25,760 the u v C down to one hundred and ninety 1919 01:50:25,760 --> 01:50:29,079 four nanometers on up to almost twelve hundred nanometers up 1920 01:50:29,119 --> 01:50:31,399 in the I R I R range. So so it 1921 01:50:31,479 --> 01:50:35,359 covers a large swath of frequencies from visible light to 1922 01:50:35,560 --> 01:50:38,000 U V to I R and it takes the I 1923 01:50:38,239 --> 01:50:42,840 R into the into the shortwave infrared. So what we're 1924 01:50:42,840 --> 01:50:46,000 trying to do is put together a system of UH 1925 01:50:46,039 --> 01:50:52,439 determining signatures of planes of u of drones. Because those 1926 01:50:52,560 --> 01:50:57,039 lighting metal Halie lighting systems or or lead lighting systems, 1927 01:50:57,039 --> 01:51:02,239 they all have unique spectral signatures spectral footprints. We should 1928 01:51:02,239 --> 01:51:05,079 be able to tell right away whether it's a typical 1929 01:51:05,159 --> 01:51:08,039 halagen light that's being used on a on a plane 1930 01:51:08,079 --> 01:51:10,000 or if it's something else, or if it's a plasma 1931 01:51:10,880 --> 01:51:14,640 specific frequency very can detect. We're in a proceslect The 1932 01:51:14,760 --> 01:51:17,279 radio spectroscopy came later because it was based on funding, 1933 01:51:17,800 --> 01:51:20,279 which you know wasn't always available to us. We had 1934 01:51:20,520 --> 01:51:22,720 actually had a funded and helped us with that, and 1935 01:51:22,720 --> 01:51:24,159 that was the last piece of equipment we bough up. 1936 01:51:24,199 --> 01:51:27,319 And right now we're actually you're running the tests to 1937 01:51:27,800 --> 01:51:32,119 put together a pattern of signatures so we can identify 1938 01:51:32,239 --> 01:51:35,960 MANDA air craft from drones from to possibly if something 1939 01:51:35,960 --> 01:51:39,760 else that maybe run maybe it's a plasma powered electrical power, 1940 01:51:39,760 --> 01:51:43,199 you know, So they're every every light, every lighting system 1941 01:51:43,199 --> 01:51:47,239 that is out there has its own unique signature, and 1942 01:51:47,279 --> 01:51:49,760 that's what we're trying to determine, you know, what those 1943 01:51:49,760 --> 01:51:50,520 signatures are. 1944 01:51:50,920 --> 01:51:54,399 Speaker 1: Got it? Okay, Sarah? Why are most reporters not pushing 1945 01:51:54,479 --> 01:51:58,119 when the answer for what the drones are is clearly 1946 01:51:58,159 --> 01:52:01,359 be as? So they being intimidated or are they just 1947 01:52:02,199 --> 01:52:05,600 rolling over Chris? Why don't why don't you take that one? 1948 01:52:07,760 --> 01:52:12,279 Speaker 3: Yeah, I don't know. I mean, obviously it's very infuriating. 1949 01:52:12,399 --> 01:52:16,479 It's frustrating that, you know, a lot of these journalists 1950 01:52:16,520 --> 01:52:19,720 aren't taking it very serious or they're not pursuing in 1951 01:52:19,960 --> 01:52:22,800 any way. But there are a few out there out 1952 01:52:22,800 --> 01:52:26,399 there that are doing a good job, and obviously hopefully 1953 01:52:26,439 --> 01:52:29,399 they can help us get to the bottom of it. 1954 01:52:30,199 --> 01:52:36,039 You know, obviously you Matt Ross and just just people 1955 01:52:36,079 --> 01:52:38,159 like that or need to continue to pursue it. But 1956 01:52:39,479 --> 01:52:42,000 I think the lady, I think the mainstream media is 1957 01:52:42,039 --> 01:52:45,199 just kind of a it's a dead horse. You just 1958 01:52:45,239 --> 01:52:48,199 don't know what to think anymore when they when they 1959 01:52:49,039 --> 01:52:51,319 put out their information, you don't know if it's gonna 1960 01:52:51,319 --> 01:52:55,560 be fake or wrong or if there's a bias agenda 1961 01:52:55,680 --> 01:52:58,840 to it, you just you just don't know. And for 1962 01:52:58,880 --> 01:53:03,319 the most part, I don't watch mainstream media anymore. I 1963 01:53:03,319 --> 01:53:05,079 I come to I come to you guys. I come 1964 01:53:05,079 --> 01:53:07,720 to the that third party because you guys are telling 1965 01:53:07,760 --> 01:53:09,520 the truth, or at least trying to get to the 1966 01:53:09,560 --> 01:53:10,359 bottom of the truth. 1967 01:53:11,319 --> 01:53:13,840 Speaker 1: Richard, what are your what are your thoughts on that? Well? 1968 01:53:13,920 --> 01:53:17,279 Speaker 9: I was thinking a couple of things. One was last 1969 01:53:17,359 --> 01:53:20,039 year at the SCU conference, I got to meet Ross 1970 01:53:20,239 --> 01:53:25,199 Colhart and he did a really nice presentation and people 1971 01:53:25,199 --> 01:53:27,560 were asking that question, you know, what's going on? Why 1972 01:53:27,600 --> 01:53:31,159 is the media doing this? And basically he said that 1973 01:53:31,640 --> 01:53:34,920 he did an interview with Gary Nolan and on his 1974 01:53:35,000 --> 01:53:39,880 show and it got three point two million views, you know, 1975 01:53:39,920 --> 01:53:42,319 And I was thinking, the last time that happened was like, 1976 01:53:42,479 --> 01:53:45,520 you know, when during nine to eleven or when Cronkite 1977 01:53:45,600 --> 01:53:49,319 told everybody that President Kennedy had been assassinated. So I 1978 01:53:49,359 --> 01:53:51,960 think that what you know, what you're saying, I personally 1979 01:53:51,960 --> 01:53:54,279 don't watch the news anymore, and most people I talked 1980 01:53:54,279 --> 01:53:57,760 to are basically they don't believe them. I had to, 1981 01:53:57,880 --> 01:53:59,079 you know, and I'm not going to say who it 1982 01:53:59,159 --> 01:54:01,520 was but but but recently I had an occasion to 1983 01:54:01,560 --> 01:54:04,399 be with one of the individuals who's one of the 1984 01:54:04,399 --> 01:54:09,479 primetime you know, news network guys on six o'clock news, 1985 01:54:10,279 --> 01:54:12,600 and I was with him for a couple hours and 1986 01:54:12,640 --> 01:54:15,760 I was talking to him about my books and he 1987 01:54:15,880 --> 01:54:18,960 seemed he seemed quite interested in it. But he told 1988 01:54:18,960 --> 01:54:21,359 me pretty blatantly, because Richard, this none of this stuff 1989 01:54:21,359 --> 01:54:24,159 ever comes across my desk. And I think what you're 1990 01:54:24,199 --> 01:54:26,399 dealing with is a lot of these network people, you know, 1991 01:54:26,439 --> 01:54:29,000 they come in the morning and they've got an agenda, 1992 01:54:29,119 --> 01:54:33,159 you know somebody, you know, they've got researchers, and they go, Okay, 1993 01:54:33,199 --> 01:54:34,840 today we're going to go here and we're going to 1994 01:54:34,920 --> 01:54:37,399 talk at these people about this and that, and you know, 1995 01:54:37,560 --> 01:54:41,319 their days pretty well planned out. And I think those 1996 01:54:41,359 --> 01:54:46,079 individuals probably you know, they're they probably much do whatever 1997 01:54:46,199 --> 01:54:50,079 their feed is, and so I if there's something going on, 1998 01:54:50,119 --> 01:54:52,880 it's probably more on the network level where they're just saying, hey, 1999 01:54:52,880 --> 01:54:55,079 you know, don't talk about this or don't talk about that. 2000 01:54:55,239 --> 01:54:59,680 But some of the he was quite interested and surprised 2001 01:55:00,000 --> 01:55:02,079 because I was really you know, going on about the 2002 01:55:02,119 --> 01:55:04,119 history of it and all the research that i'd done 2003 01:55:04,159 --> 01:55:07,520 and the UFO cases I worked on, and and I 2004 01:55:07,520 --> 01:55:10,640 mean he just didn't seem to know very much about it, 2005 01:55:10,680 --> 01:55:11,560 which surprised me. 2006 01:55:12,159 --> 01:55:16,560 Speaker 1: Got it, okay, ras mataz Hi. Do you think that 2007 01:55:17,039 --> 01:55:20,479 the only way we'll have real disclosure is if a 2008 01:55:20,479 --> 01:55:25,880 adversary is if one of our adversary goes first? Who 2009 01:55:25,880 --> 01:55:27,640 wants to take that or has thoughts? 2010 01:55:27,680 --> 01:55:30,640 Speaker 9: I know that's one of the concerns that you know, 2011 01:55:32,119 --> 01:55:36,279 is that with disclosure, there's always the possibility if they 2012 01:55:36,319 --> 01:55:38,159 don't at some point step up to the plate and 2013 01:55:38,199 --> 01:55:40,840 deal with it, one of our foreign adversaries, the Russians 2014 01:55:40,920 --> 01:55:43,279 or the Chinese, are going to jump in front of 2015 01:55:43,359 --> 01:55:46,119 us and get in the spotlight and and and and 2016 01:55:46,600 --> 01:55:49,000 basically pull the trigger on it. And then it's going 2017 01:55:49,079 --> 01:55:52,159 to make the rest make us look like we weren't, 2018 01:55:52,319 --> 01:55:55,000 you know, we weren't on target or paying attention. 2019 01:55:55,800 --> 01:56:00,800 Speaker 1: Absolutely, Lisa McNally, here's a question for the the Di 2020 01:56:00,920 --> 01:56:04,399 Deesco d d s El. I can't spell very well 2021 01:56:04,520 --> 01:56:08,239 the to Deesco brothers. Do they think that they are 2022 01:56:08,279 --> 01:56:10,680 looking at UAP or drones? 2023 01:56:12,119 --> 01:56:14,920 Speaker 8: Well, to us, it's all it's all UAP because it's 2024 01:56:15,000 --> 01:56:19,920 unidentified anomalist phenomena. So whether it's drones or it's something else, 2025 01:56:19,960 --> 01:56:22,760 non human intelligence or or whatever, I mean, it's the 2026 01:56:22,760 --> 01:56:25,840 same thing to us. We're just kind of trying to 2027 01:56:25,880 --> 01:56:31,560 figure out what's the source and and and it's properties right, right, 2028 01:56:31,720 --> 01:56:34,279 and and and nobody at this point it seems to 2029 01:56:34,319 --> 01:56:37,600 have much of a clue other than you know, I 2030 01:56:37,640 --> 01:56:39,399 mean some of the stuff that they're saying that the 2031 01:56:39,439 --> 01:56:42,920 typical commercial traffic and that sort of thing. Yeah, it 2032 01:56:43,079 --> 01:56:45,760 probably is a fair amount of commercial traffic out there, 2033 01:56:45,760 --> 01:56:48,600 but you know, there's also some observations that have been 2034 01:56:48,640 --> 01:56:52,680 made by you know, pretty incredibly credible people that that 2035 01:56:52,800 --> 01:56:55,479 you just can't simply dismiss. Yeah, I mean it's it's 2036 01:56:55,560 --> 01:56:58,399 it's not just reports from the public, which are thousands. 2037 01:56:58,399 --> 01:57:00,920 Was well over five thousand reports just in the Northeast, 2038 01:57:01,000 --> 01:57:02,960 and it's I know it was high than that, But 2039 01:57:03,000 --> 01:57:06,560 there was also just the very sheriff's departments who coordinated. 2040 01:57:07,079 --> 01:57:08,720 They like I said, they had they had their own 2041 01:57:08,760 --> 01:57:10,760 drone units. They were doing it. They were doing the 2042 01:57:10,840 --> 01:57:14,119 due diligence. There was a state police that were doing it. 2043 01:57:14,159 --> 01:57:18,239 They were actually going up in helicopters and making uh, 2044 01:57:18,479 --> 01:57:22,880 you know, close proximity observations, these things, uh, and these 2045 01:57:22,920 --> 01:57:27,800 other agencies involved. You know, it's uh, you can't just 2046 01:57:27,920 --> 01:57:30,119 you can't just you know, just score it off on 2047 01:57:30,159 --> 01:57:31,520 the scrappaple. 2048 01:57:32,199 --> 01:57:35,159 Speaker 1: Understood, Okay, Andy, two dogs always a great show, Matt, 2049 01:57:35,399 --> 01:57:38,680 thank you for that compliment. Lisa McNally, do you think 2050 01:57:38,840 --> 01:57:42,920 they are far too advanced to be man made? What? 2051 01:57:43,239 --> 01:57:43,439 Speaker 6: Uh? 2052 01:57:43,680 --> 01:57:46,760 Speaker 1: You know what's being observed? Chris, what are your thoughts 2053 01:57:46,760 --> 01:57:49,319 with what you saw firsthand in Nebraska? 2054 01:57:51,760 --> 01:57:54,279 Speaker 3: Well, the one night that I saw the the big 2055 01:57:54,720 --> 01:57:59,359 light in the sky just going super super fast. I'm 2056 01:57:59,399 --> 01:58:03,680 pretty familiar with drones just from my military backgrounds. I'm 2057 01:58:03,720 --> 01:58:10,399 not an expert on it, but the no noise, the 2058 01:58:10,399 --> 01:58:16,079 the size of the light, it just doesn't seem like 2059 01:58:16,640 --> 01:58:20,279 we as a human species are at that level of technology. 2060 01:58:21,760 --> 01:58:23,720 And some of the other things that were reported by 2061 01:58:23,760 --> 01:58:27,920 other deputies in different counties, what they seen or what 2062 01:58:28,319 --> 01:58:32,960 they took down, witness statements, that technology just doesn't seem 2063 01:58:33,000 --> 01:58:37,600 like you're your man made stuff, you know, like John 2064 01:58:37,640 --> 01:58:39,760 and Jerry said, it's probably a mixture of stuff. It's 2065 01:58:39,800 --> 01:58:45,560 probably drones and something of Nhi. I just I just 2066 01:58:45,600 --> 01:58:48,479 don't know, but I would I would like to figure 2067 01:58:48,479 --> 01:58:49,119 out what it is. 2068 01:58:49,479 --> 01:58:53,000 Speaker 1: Yeah. Actually, and then while I'm switching the show here, 2069 01:58:53,000 --> 01:58:56,359 of course I hit hit the wrong button. But we 2070 01:58:56,600 --> 01:58:59,680 had a couple of skills from you and John and Jerry. 2071 01:59:00,239 --> 01:59:02,720 What is that I forgot to show earlier? What are 2072 01:59:02,760 --> 01:59:03,640 we looking at here? 2073 01:59:04,319 --> 01:59:07,159 Speaker 8: Okay? So here's We were actually heading towards Robin Mose 2074 01:59:07,199 --> 01:59:09,319 the State Park. It was on the fire on Nationals 2075 01:59:09,439 --> 01:59:11,920 Shore and on the way we were seeing these objects 2076 01:59:11,920 --> 01:59:14,800 these if you look to the left, one at the 2077 01:59:14,800 --> 01:59:17,720 tree line and one above the tree line. These two lights, 2078 01:59:18,520 --> 01:59:20,840 they're kind of bright. They were hovering in the air 2079 01:59:20,920 --> 01:59:22,960 for for a long period of time, at least a 2080 01:59:23,000 --> 01:59:27,319 half hour wow, before fading out disappearing right, and the 2081 01:59:27,399 --> 01:59:29,960 note star is nothing like that. You know. We used 2082 01:59:30,520 --> 01:59:33,359 hilariot area mapping and and and of course there was 2083 01:59:33,720 --> 01:59:37,439 these things remained stationary. Why the rest of the constellations 2084 01:59:37,479 --> 01:59:40,520 would do that thing, you know, and the movement so 2085 01:59:40,640 --> 01:59:44,159 you know, it was just and this was actually at 2086 01:59:44,199 --> 01:59:46,960 Robert Moses State Park, which is seeing to the left. 2087 01:59:47,000 --> 01:59:51,119 To the to the left is an aircraft is an 2088 01:59:51,119 --> 01:59:54,479 airliner which we were tracking on radar. And of course 2089 01:59:54,520 --> 01:59:58,760 there's this some video, uh, compression issues because there's a 2090 01:59:58,800 --> 02:00:01,159 cell phone cameras to the right of it, you'll see it, 2091 02:00:01,279 --> 02:00:03,279 or a black object that we couldn't track on radar. 2092 02:00:03,640 --> 02:00:06,560 It was invisible to our radar. Yeah, no thermals, no 2093 02:00:06,640 --> 02:00:11,119 thermal signature. You know, this is an object that was 2094 02:00:11,159 --> 02:00:13,640 a we cinema drone like there was. It was three 2095 02:00:13,760 --> 02:00:17,800 lights that descended that something appeared diskyd descended towards the water. 2096 02:00:18,960 --> 02:00:22,399 They didn't flashy, they just kind of it was three 2097 02:00:22,880 --> 02:00:26,880 three old Eddy, steady steady stay lights. Yeah. 2098 02:00:26,880 --> 02:00:31,880 Speaker 1: Wow, Okay, great health plan, uh health plan. Fantastic channel. 2099 02:00:32,000 --> 02:00:35,199 Very much appreciate all who honestly add to the space. 2100 02:00:35,439 --> 02:00:40,479 Really appreciate that compliment. Reality Check Vip Todasco Brothers. What 2101 02:00:40,640 --> 02:00:45,399 were your thoughts about the red blue gravity shifts? 2102 02:00:46,039 --> 02:00:49,760 Speaker 8: So, you know, we had recently wrote that paper and 2103 02:00:49,800 --> 02:00:53,279 it's uh, we had noticed over the period of three 2104 02:00:53,359 --> 02:00:56,000 years that we were doing this research, is that there 2105 02:00:56,079 --> 02:01:00,760 was an interesting phenomenon around the lights themselves, these orbs, 2106 02:01:00,800 --> 02:01:03,720 and they seem to have a kaleidoscope appearance to them. 2107 02:01:04,920 --> 02:01:08,279 When we looked at it, you know, frame by frame 2108 02:01:08,760 --> 02:01:12,319 you could see that these objects it wasn't just changing color, 2109 02:01:12,720 --> 02:01:16,560 but there was specific colors. They were changing red and blue. 2110 02:01:17,079 --> 02:01:19,079 You know, when the object would move away from you, 2111 02:01:20,199 --> 02:01:23,239 it would red shift, and as the object moved towards you, 2112 02:01:23,800 --> 02:01:26,800 whether it was rotating or just moving in your direction, 2113 02:01:27,199 --> 02:01:31,960 it would blue shift. Then we started to see also 2114 02:01:32,479 --> 02:01:37,000 some unusual activity with the propagation of our radar signals, 2115 02:01:37,720 --> 02:01:41,239 the marine based radar, which is three centimeters beam they 2116 02:01:41,279 --> 02:01:45,079 call it X band, which is a small beam that 2117 02:01:45,079 --> 02:01:49,520 they use on ships to determine weather conditions and biomass 2118 02:01:49,600 --> 02:01:52,079 and all that other stuff. You know, So you know, 2119 02:01:52,199 --> 02:01:54,560 this is the kind of thing that you know, we 2120 02:01:54,560 --> 02:01:58,560 were getting some odd returns. And these odd returns were 2121 02:01:59,439 --> 02:02:03,600 a signal that would come back late, and the signal 2122 02:02:03,640 --> 02:02:08,359 would come back late, but didn't lose any any gain. 2123 02:02:08,479 --> 02:02:11,399 It was the signal would come back at at an 2124 02:02:11,399 --> 02:02:14,199 amplitude that was very much in line with what was 2125 02:02:14,239 --> 02:02:16,880 being transmitted. There was the same energy level. Yeah, that 2126 02:02:17,079 --> 02:02:20,159 energy level didn't dissipate at all, which we would expect 2127 02:02:20,279 --> 02:02:23,359 that to happen if it was coming back several seconds late. 2128 02:02:23,600 --> 02:02:26,279 And this is a phenomenon that's been called it's called 2129 02:02:26,279 --> 02:02:29,600 long delay echoes. It's a delay in the return of 2130 02:02:29,640 --> 02:02:32,439 the radar signal, which is something's causing that delay, and 2131 02:02:32,479 --> 02:02:35,520 it usually occurred when one of these warblike objects would 2132 02:02:35,520 --> 02:02:37,119 be within the line of it was in the line 2133 02:02:37,119 --> 02:02:39,439 of sight. Yeah, so we use it. We use a 2134 02:02:39,560 --> 02:02:42,520 ship as a reference, a large ship out there. We'd 2135 02:02:42,520 --> 02:02:45,399 bounce a radar signal off the ship, and if we 2136 02:02:45,439 --> 02:02:48,600 saw these objects in the line of sight between the 2137 02:02:48,680 --> 02:02:52,399 ship and the radar mantana the scanner, we would look 2138 02:02:52,439 --> 02:02:58,159 for these effects. And it was statistically significant because I 2139 02:02:58,159 --> 02:03:00,960 would say seven out of ten times we get we 2140 02:03:01,039 --> 02:03:03,760 get an interference pattern when these objects were in the 2141 02:03:03,800 --> 02:03:07,840 line of sight of of of the ship, which is uh, 2142 02:03:07,960 --> 02:03:10,279 which is bizarre. And it's not just the radar, it's 2143 02:03:10,359 --> 02:03:13,319 uh it seems to be occurring with GPS signals as well, 2144 02:03:13,520 --> 02:03:17,159 and light ruh and light r you know. So putting 2145 02:03:17,159 --> 02:03:20,039 this all together, you know, we're we're you know, we're 2146 02:03:20,119 --> 02:03:23,600 kind of surmising that this this this may have more 2147 02:03:23,640 --> 02:03:27,560 to do with gravitational lensing, well, gravidity type you know, 2148 02:03:27,800 --> 02:03:31,079 drive systems that these things are being uh that user 2149 02:03:31,119 --> 02:03:34,039 its propulsion systems, and we're using these four data points 2150 02:03:34,079 --> 02:03:36,960 to to put to you know, to uh make that 2151 02:03:36,960 --> 02:03:37,680 that hypothesis. 2152 02:03:37,680 --> 02:03:41,600 Speaker 1: Connect that case, reality check v I P. For the 2153 02:03:41,600 --> 02:03:46,119 Tedesco Brothers again, Uh, you ever use s d R 2154 02:03:46,239 --> 02:03:50,199 software to try and listen to the r S signals? 2155 02:03:50,680 --> 02:03:53,239 Speaker 8: Yes. So the problem with the s d R and 2156 02:03:53,239 --> 02:03:57,079 and and we've talked to other other engineers too that 2157 02:03:57,119 --> 02:04:00,640 are out in the field using these SDR radios. The 2158 02:04:00,720 --> 02:04:04,880 problem is the software to flying radio is that it 2159 02:04:04,880 --> 02:04:09,319 doesn't seem to to pick up these peak responses very well. 2160 02:04:10,000 --> 02:04:13,880 The ditch they they they cur they're almost like transients, 2161 02:04:14,479 --> 02:04:16,880 and these transient pulses have to be picked up with 2162 02:04:17,039 --> 02:04:22,039 a something spectrum analyzer that is expensive enough to have 2163 02:04:22,119 --> 02:04:24,960 a good what they call a sample rate. So in 2164 02:04:25,079 --> 02:04:28,880 order for it to see these very narrow occurring pulses 2165 02:04:28,960 --> 02:04:32,159 or transients, so spikes, you have to have something that 2166 02:04:32,199 --> 02:04:35,880 has the resolution they called bandwidth resolution in order to 2167 02:04:35,920 --> 02:04:38,199 determine that they're there. Well, I haven't seen him on 2168 02:04:38,239 --> 02:04:41,399 an SDR radio. Yeah, we're using what the twenty six gig, 2169 02:04:41,880 --> 02:04:44,319 the twenty six I think it's a twenty six gig 2170 02:04:44,479 --> 02:04:46,479 spectro analyze. It's a high inspects analytic. 2171 02:04:47,680 --> 02:04:50,680 Speaker 1: Greg how asks again for the Tedesco Brothers, are you 2172 02:04:50,840 --> 02:04:55,239 going to work with SkyWatch h Q headquarters to analyze 2173 02:04:55,279 --> 02:04:59,560 their data that they that they've asked for on X Well. 2174 02:05:00,000 --> 02:05:07,600 Speaker 8: Actually, Russ Coulthard had expressed Jake Barber had expressed an 2175 02:05:07,640 --> 02:05:11,840 interest in talking with us, so Ross Cold had had 2176 02:05:12,399 --> 02:05:15,439 actually gave our information to Jake. So never afraid to talk, 2177 02:05:15,479 --> 02:05:17,399 and we're we're open awesome. 2178 02:05:17,600 --> 02:05:22,359 Speaker 1: Dave Smethers asks does the panel think craft have different functions? 2179 02:05:22,760 --> 02:05:26,439 I ese, small surveillance drones and master craft, et cetera. 2180 02:05:26,800 --> 02:05:31,279 The signal frequencies reminded me of Skinwalker Ranch that I 2181 02:05:30,840 --> 02:05:33,680 noticed that as well, Dave, you know close to that 2182 02:05:33,680 --> 02:05:37,920 one point six gigahertz. The signal frequencies remind me of 2183 02:05:38,000 --> 02:05:42,960 Skinwalker Ranch and imply communications between the craft. 2184 02:05:43,560 --> 02:05:45,079 Speaker 8: Jerry and John will give that to you as well, 2185 02:05:46,239 --> 02:05:49,720 so that we couldn't suspect the same thing. We suspect 2186 02:05:49,760 --> 02:05:54,840 that there's there are pilot signals out there and they're generating, well, 2187 02:05:54,880 --> 02:05:59,119 we believe they may be generating these signals in order 2188 02:05:59,199 --> 02:06:03,479 to keep communication I guess between these objects or even 2189 02:06:04,079 --> 02:06:08,159 as a as a almost like a sense a maintenance 2190 02:06:08,199 --> 02:06:10,920 signal that lets them know if there's an aircraft in 2191 02:06:10,920 --> 02:06:13,920 the area or something like that. That can avoid you know, 2192 02:06:14,000 --> 02:06:17,079 something along those lines. There's nothing that we see that 2193 02:06:17,079 --> 02:06:21,199 that actually has a intelligence to it that looks like 2194 02:06:21,239 --> 02:06:24,000 it's a's doing any kind of controls. It looks more 2195 02:06:24,000 --> 02:06:26,359 and more or less like a like a like a pilot, 2196 02:06:26,479 --> 02:06:30,840 like like something that's just sending out a signal, and uh, 2197 02:06:30,880 --> 02:06:35,800 the signals is sufficient in amplitude too to uh, you know, 2198 02:06:35,920 --> 02:06:39,399 to give some kind of an indication, whether it's it's 2199 02:06:39,199 --> 02:06:42,520 it's it's receiving it from other objects, or it's bouncing 2200 02:06:42,560 --> 02:06:45,840 it in some way, which is it's using for some 2201 02:06:45,920 --> 02:06:49,000 kind of maybe you know, uh, some kind of detection 2202 02:06:49,239 --> 02:06:51,800 property to detection some sort and some kind of clock 2203 02:06:51,880 --> 02:06:54,560 pulse and to net maybe the network these are maybe 2204 02:06:54,840 --> 02:06:57,760 maybe the network, possibly the network the eticts together who 2205 02:06:57,800 --> 02:06:58,960 knows understand? 2206 02:06:59,520 --> 02:07:02,720 Speaker 1: Dominic also asks you guys to John and Jerry, are 2207 02:07:02,760 --> 02:07:07,920 they aware that our research from University on Ukraine regarding 2208 02:07:07,960 --> 02:07:11,479 fast objects flying in the sky they use very fast cameras. 2209 02:07:11,479 --> 02:07:13,159 I don't know that. Does that make sense? Yes? 2210 02:07:13,640 --> 02:07:15,960 Speaker 8: Yes, yes, a matter of fact, Abvi Lobin looked into 2211 02:07:16,000 --> 02:07:21,479 that and he kind of challenged it. He challenged their observations. 2212 02:07:22,760 --> 02:07:27,279 You know, after experiencing what we've experienced out there. I'm 2213 02:07:27,319 --> 02:07:31,159 not about to challenge their observations, you know, I think 2214 02:07:31,239 --> 02:07:33,159 there's something to it. Yeah, we're got to talk to 2215 02:07:33,159 --> 02:07:36,520 them directly, and that's something that you know, it seems 2216 02:07:36,560 --> 02:07:39,159 to agree with what we're seeing. As far as dark objects. 2217 02:07:40,520 --> 02:07:42,800 You know these there are objects that are dark. You know, 2218 02:07:42,920 --> 02:07:45,560 you just don't see them. Yeah, we'll be more satisfied 2219 02:07:45,560 --> 02:07:46,439 we talked them directly. 2220 02:07:47,279 --> 02:07:51,680 Speaker 1: Understood, Okay, great, Yeah, So that's that's it for the questions. Sean, 2221 02:07:51,720 --> 02:07:53,439 I'll hand it back over to you, but kind of 2222 02:07:53,439 --> 02:07:55,560 wrap all of this up all right. 2223 02:07:55,680 --> 02:08:00,000 Speaker 6: Well, gentlemen, I want to thank you for your participate 2224 02:08:00,279 --> 02:08:05,000 on this panel today. Just to summarize, Chris is proxy 2225 02:08:05,119 --> 02:08:09,600 for our public safety. You're a direct witness to the 2226 02:08:09,640 --> 02:08:13,039 incursions in twenty nineteen twenty twenty. You have some very 2227 02:08:13,039 --> 02:08:17,520 sensational and anomaloust descriptions that you've provided, not information that 2228 02:08:17,520 --> 02:08:19,479 you've gotten from anyone else but you yourself. 2229 02:08:19,520 --> 02:08:20,119 Speaker 7: You were there. 2230 02:08:20,560 --> 02:08:22,840 Speaker 6: You are also part of the investigation to gather up 2231 02:08:22,880 --> 02:08:27,960 witnesses and to work with our local, county, state, and 2232 02:08:28,000 --> 02:08:31,600 federal partners to get an idea of what this is, 2233 02:08:31,800 --> 02:08:34,399 and to date, we still don't have the answers that 2234 02:08:34,439 --> 02:08:37,560 we're looking for, but we do appreciate the effort that 2235 02:08:37,600 --> 02:08:41,560 you've put into this. Richard, your long history of investigations 2236 02:08:41,800 --> 02:08:45,039 with the federal government and your participation on this panel 2237 02:08:45,079 --> 02:08:49,439 to help educate the public as to the history of 2238 02:08:49,479 --> 02:08:54,079 reports as it relates to UAP and separating UAP from drones, 2239 02:08:54,520 --> 02:08:57,119 and what we need to do strategically to protect anyone 2240 02:08:57,159 --> 02:09:00,159 that is conducting these investigations. We appreciate your support or 2241 02:09:01,119 --> 02:09:06,680 and your knowledge as we engage in future endeavors to 2242 02:09:06,920 --> 02:09:12,520 understand and respond appropriately to this. John and Jerry, your 2243 02:09:12,800 --> 02:09:17,760 technical expertise is priceless. We need to replicate what you're doing. 2244 02:09:18,720 --> 02:09:20,960 We will support you in every way that we can, 2245 02:09:21,039 --> 02:09:24,720 and we ask for the public support in reaching out 2246 02:09:24,760 --> 02:09:28,680 to our elected officials to allocate funding for all facets 2247 02:09:28,760 --> 02:09:33,720 of investigators and other personnel that we would call on 2248 02:09:34,159 --> 02:09:38,159 to really get an understanding of this. It is a 2249 02:09:38,199 --> 02:09:42,560 concern that a statement is being made that this is 2250 02:09:42,680 --> 02:09:46,880 not a public safety hazard u and there's no there are. 2251 02:09:46,920 --> 02:09:51,199 All of these incursions or drone operations have been approved, 2252 02:09:51,279 --> 02:09:54,079 yet we have people that are reporting some level of 2253 02:09:54,479 --> 02:09:59,439 disability or disablement. We have vehicles that have not been 2254 02:09:59,479 --> 02:10:03,600 working proper really, and we have concerns from our public 2255 02:10:03,640 --> 02:10:08,680 citizens as to what is happening and the lack of accountability. 2256 02:10:09,199 --> 02:10:14,119 So if you want to continue this discussion, please go 2257 02:10:14,199 --> 02:10:20,119 to UAP Disclosurefund dot org slash forward slash public Safety. 2258 02:10:20,439 --> 02:10:23,239 We will continue this discussion and we will continue to 2259 02:10:23,239 --> 02:10:27,600 add resources so that if you'd like to contribute. We 2260 02:10:28,039 --> 02:10:31,239 need all hands in our nation and around the world 2261 02:10:31,239 --> 02:10:34,520 to understand this. So Matt, thank you again for having 2262 02:10:34,560 --> 02:10:37,760 me as your co host on the show, and I 2263 02:10:37,840 --> 02:10:38,760 will turn it back to you. 2264 02:10:39,239 --> 02:10:42,319 Speaker 1: Awesome. Yeah, well, thanks, thanks everyone. This has really been 2265 02:10:42,800 --> 02:10:46,079 a great, great show. I've got some thoughts I'll share 2266 02:10:46,359 --> 02:10:49,479 here in a minute after after we sign off here 2267 02:10:49,760 --> 02:10:52,479 with you guys, But yeah, sean really great job. I 2268 02:10:52,520 --> 02:10:56,560 thought the questions were really on point. Richard again, thank 2269 02:10:56,640 --> 02:11:00,479 you for coming on. And are there any any plans 2270 02:11:00,479 --> 02:11:04,760 for future books in along this same thing as far 2271 02:11:04,760 --> 02:11:06,760 as UAP and first responders. 2272 02:11:07,119 --> 02:11:11,079 Speaker 9: Well, right now, I'm working on a book that's basically 2273 02:11:11,119 --> 02:11:14,800 a culmination of cases. Every all these times when I 2274 02:11:14,840 --> 02:11:19,199 go out and speak and sell my books, everybody's like, well, 2275 02:11:19,319 --> 02:11:22,319 what about cases? Can you give us some information on cases? 2276 02:11:22,399 --> 02:11:25,000 So I'm working on a book right now, about halfway 2277 02:11:25,000 --> 02:11:28,119 through it, and it's a culmination of maybe twenty five 2278 02:11:28,600 --> 02:11:31,520 short stories, and they're all about cases I've worked on, 2279 02:11:31,640 --> 02:11:35,520 but they're told from the perspective of the person and 2280 02:11:35,600 --> 02:11:37,680 what they experienced and what they were feeling, and not 2281 02:11:37,800 --> 02:11:41,359 like investigation reports, the kind of thing where somebody tell 2282 02:11:41,399 --> 02:11:43,920 you why you're sitting across the dinner table. I was 2283 02:11:43,960 --> 02:11:45,840 on my way home and this happened, and da da 2284 02:11:45,880 --> 02:11:48,319 da da. But that's the next that's the next thing 2285 02:11:48,359 --> 02:11:49,000 in my world. 2286 02:11:50,279 --> 02:11:54,960 Speaker 1: Jerry and John Dedesco, sorry to disco. What's what's what's 2287 02:11:55,039 --> 02:11:58,840 next for the Nightcrawler research efforts? 2288 02:11:59,680 --> 02:12:03,359 Speaker 8: Will Well, we're working on a third paper, as we mentioned, 2289 02:12:03,359 --> 02:12:07,079 the radio spectroscopy paper, so we can specifically identify the 2290 02:12:07,279 --> 02:12:11,279 based on lighting systems these objects because use the spectral signatures. 2291 02:12:11,840 --> 02:12:15,000 The other thing is, uh, if we get funding, I mean, 2292 02:12:15,039 --> 02:12:18,960 we can take this another another direction and actually uh 2293 02:12:19,479 --> 02:12:25,199 investigating USOS. We would retrofit a probably a miniacht with 2294 02:12:25,760 --> 02:12:28,239 the same kinds of equipment, with a three hundred and 2295 02:12:28,239 --> 02:12:33,239 sixty degree sonar and using an r V underw're RV 2296 02:12:33,680 --> 02:12:36,960 we're a big dingy. Otherwise we'll stuck with a dingy 2297 02:12:37,039 --> 02:12:39,800 with what we can manage on there. 2298 02:12:40,720 --> 02:12:42,640 Speaker 9: So we're gonna call this from the water crawler or 2299 02:12:42,640 --> 02:12:49,479 something like that, right, Yeah, I don't Yeah. 2300 02:12:48,279 --> 02:12:51,319 Speaker 1: I love that. Yeah. And Chris, what's next for you? 2301 02:12:51,439 --> 02:12:53,439 Or do you expect to see any more drones out 2302 02:12:53,479 --> 02:12:54,640 in the Nebraska area. 2303 02:12:56,600 --> 02:13:02,399 Speaker 3: Anything's possible, But I left law Enforce in December to 2304 02:13:02,560 --> 02:13:07,960 do a private contracting job overceive, so probably believing the 2305 02:13:07,960 --> 02:13:09,560 country in the next couple months. 2306 02:13:09,840 --> 02:13:14,239 Speaker 1: Well, absolutely, absolutely stay safe. And then finally, Sean, what's 2307 02:13:14,319 --> 02:13:14,840 next for you? 2308 02:13:16,439 --> 02:13:20,319 Speaker 6: I also retired in December and am ramping up my 2309 02:13:20,399 --> 02:13:24,000 work with the Scientific Coalition for UAP Studies. The Intention 2310 02:13:24,119 --> 02:13:30,520 Studied team has done some great work studying similar incursions 2311 02:13:31,039 --> 02:13:36,319 at military atomic warfare facilities dating back from nineteen forty 2312 02:13:36,319 --> 02:13:38,960 five to nineteen seventy five, and we're continuing that work 2313 02:13:39,239 --> 02:13:44,680 to identify patterns that relate to the current incursions that 2314 02:13:44,680 --> 02:13:47,680 we're seeing today. What we're trying to do is understand 2315 02:13:48,319 --> 02:13:53,479 the signatures that are being documented by our best scientists 2316 02:13:54,319 --> 02:13:57,159 to develop an understanding as to what kind of control 2317 02:13:57,239 --> 02:14:00,000 system that is being used, whether it's a chemical control 2318 02:14:00,199 --> 02:14:06,159 system of some sort of gravity manipulation or something else. 2319 02:14:07,079 --> 02:14:11,199 So these are very novel ideas, at least to us, 2320 02:14:11,279 --> 02:14:12,920 but there's a lot of research that is going to 2321 02:14:12,920 --> 02:14:14,960 be required, and so that's what I'm going to be 2322 02:14:15,000 --> 02:14:16,800 spending my time doing in the near future. 2323 02:14:17,199 --> 02:14:20,359 Speaker 1: Fantastic and again, uh, we'll put the put the link 2324 02:14:20,439 --> 02:14:25,560 up for the for the UAP Disclosure Fund, folks. Yeah, 2325 02:14:25,600 --> 02:14:29,279 definitely definitely check out uh check that out. This this 2326 02:14:29,640 --> 02:14:33,920 Public Safety Task Force Group whatever it's you guys are 2327 02:14:33,960 --> 02:14:37,600 really really added a lot to the conversation and we 2328 02:14:37,720 --> 02:14:41,439 definitely appreciate you coming on spending your Sunday here and 2329 02:14:41,560 --> 02:14:44,760 sharing your thoughts on on this drone thing, which I 2330 02:14:45,600 --> 02:14:49,920 can tell you are definitely not FAA approved approved to drone. 2331 02:14:49,960 --> 02:14:53,319 So everyone, thanks, thanks for joining us, and have a 2332 02:14:53,520 --> 02:15:00,279 fantastic Sunday. Thanks Matte, Thanks awesome, good night. Okay, all right, great, 2333 02:15:00,560 --> 02:15:04,680 let's see here. Yeah it's uh, well, I turned everybody's 2334 02:15:04,680 --> 02:15:08,680 audio off here so we don't don't hear anything. Yeah, 2335 02:15:08,720 --> 02:15:14,479 you know, it's it's it blows me away that this 2336 02:15:14,560 --> 02:15:21,479 sort of gas lighting from multiple administrations is continuing. I'm 2337 02:15:21,479 --> 02:15:24,560 trying to give the Trump administration the benefit of the doubt. 2338 02:15:25,119 --> 02:15:29,880 Perhaps some bad information was fed up the chain to 2339 02:15:29,880 --> 02:15:32,800 to the White House, to the President. We know that 2340 02:15:32,880 --> 02:15:37,439 there is a long history of the Pentagon, of the 2341 02:15:37,720 --> 02:15:43,680 of the National Security Council lying or hiding things from 2342 02:15:43,960 --> 02:15:47,279 former or from current presidents. We know that there are 2343 02:15:47,359 --> 02:15:51,119 presidents that were never read into this, or we're maybe 2344 02:15:51,159 --> 02:15:55,199 possibly only partially read into the program. You know, we 2345 02:15:55,239 --> 02:15:59,159 had heard very early on that National Security Advisor Jake 2346 02:15:59,239 --> 02:16:02,800 Sullivan and members of the National Security Council decided not 2347 02:16:02,960 --> 02:16:06,880 to brief President Biden back when he was in power. 2348 02:16:07,560 --> 02:16:10,239 You know, we had heard this about i'd say, probably 2349 02:16:10,279 --> 02:16:13,560 about a year before the election, that that kind of 2350 02:16:13,800 --> 02:16:17,279 mentally he was not doing well and that this whole 2351 02:16:17,359 --> 02:16:19,960 knowledge would be maybe a bridge too far. Now. I 2352 02:16:20,000 --> 02:16:25,199 don't know if that changed following all the the Chinese balloons, 2353 02:16:25,640 --> 02:16:28,159 balloon Gate, all that kind of stuff. But but you know, 2354 02:16:28,239 --> 02:16:32,799 there is a very long history of the deep state, 2355 02:16:32,879 --> 02:16:35,639 if you want to call it, that these these deputy 2356 02:16:35,719 --> 02:16:40,280 level folks that are spread all throughout government, these these 2357 02:16:40,520 --> 02:16:44,680 career career folks, these senior executive service folks, and and 2358 02:16:45,280 --> 02:16:49,319 certain members of military leadership that that just want to 2359 02:16:49,360 --> 02:16:54,360 keep everybody in the dark. And it just I cannot 2360 02:16:54,440 --> 02:17:02,920 think really of a you know, a more American thing. Uh, 2361 02:17:03,159 --> 02:17:09,440 then to have the federal government gas light law enforcement 2362 02:17:10,040 --> 02:17:16,399 to gaslight are our first responders. It's it's really just, 2363 02:17:17,959 --> 02:17:22,920 you know, it's it's unconscionable. We're we're not idiots, and 2364 02:17:23,200 --> 02:17:25,319 I you know, I dare say. The folks are first 2365 02:17:25,360 --> 02:17:28,639 responders that have worked in government or for city governments 2366 02:17:28,680 --> 02:17:30,680 for a long time. You know, they know when they're 2367 02:17:30,680 --> 02:17:35,879 being lied to. And it has been crystal clear that 2368 02:17:36,280 --> 02:17:41,360 the federal government has been lying to our first responders. 2369 02:17:41,639 --> 02:17:44,799 It is crystal clear that the federal government has been 2370 02:17:44,920 --> 02:17:50,479 lying to uh, you know, to local and state officials 2371 02:17:50,479 --> 02:17:54,000 when it comes to all of this, to to the U, A, U, A, P, 2372 02:17:54,239 --> 02:17:58,520 s U, the gas lighting, with the drones, all of 2373 02:17:58,559 --> 02:18:04,360 that stuff. It's none of us are that idiotic, that 2374 02:18:05,239 --> 02:18:10,719 ill informed to think that all of these hundreds upon 2375 02:18:10,879 --> 02:18:16,360 hundreds of reports we're all just FAA approved drones. Now, 2376 02:18:16,399 --> 02:18:18,920 certainly there were a lot of things that I'm quite 2377 02:18:18,920 --> 02:18:25,920 certain were misidentifications, either planets or prosaic drones or whatnot. 2378 02:18:26,040 --> 02:18:30,360 But there is a large subset of this stuff that 2379 02:18:31,200 --> 02:18:35,600 these are not from here. I guarant Dan Tiat. The 2380 02:18:35,799 --> 02:18:40,600 fact that drones in what was it twenty twenty three, 2381 02:18:41,520 --> 02:18:44,840 twenty twenty three, December twenty twenty three, going into twenty 2382 02:18:44,879 --> 02:18:50,399 twenty four, we're operating with impunity over Langley Air Force 2383 02:18:50,479 --> 02:18:53,520 Base in Virginia. And I want to remind everybody that 2384 02:18:53,639 --> 02:18:57,000 Langley Air Force Base, that is the Air Force BACE 2385 02:18:57,479 --> 02:19:03,079 that is part of US Northcom that is responsible for 2386 02:19:03,159 --> 02:19:07,040 the defense, the air defense of the Capital region. So 2387 02:19:07,879 --> 02:19:14,479 you're telling me that hobbyist drones, I guess the hobbyists 2388 02:19:14,479 --> 02:19:18,760 were just coming out in just you know, in full force, 2389 02:19:18,840 --> 02:19:23,360 flying their drones over one of our nation's most important 2390 02:19:23,399 --> 02:19:27,079 air bases, so much so that the United States Air 2391 02:19:27,120 --> 02:19:30,760 Force had to relocate an entire wing of F twenty 2392 02:19:30,840 --> 02:19:34,760 two fighters, an entire wing of F twenty two fighters 2393 02:19:34,959 --> 02:19:42,680 that are responsible for protecting the restricted airspace over Washington. 2394 02:19:43,840 --> 02:19:47,760 These hobbyist drones, boyd these hobbyists shown up in force 2395 02:19:48,120 --> 02:19:53,159 flying drones for over a month over Langley Air Force Bace, 2396 02:19:53,879 --> 02:19:58,319 these hobbyist drones that the military police at Langley Air 2397 02:19:58,399 --> 02:20:05,079 Force Base had absolutely no luck in downing any of 2398 02:20:05,120 --> 02:20:09,559 these things with their electronic warfare weapons. You know, the 2399 02:20:09,799 --> 02:20:13,959 White House wants you to think that all of that 2400 02:20:14,280 --> 02:20:18,840 were nothing. But you know, Joe Blow with his with 2401 02:20:18,920 --> 02:20:23,399 his DGI drone, running them, running them above our nation's 2402 02:20:23,520 --> 02:20:27,639 most important, one of our nation's most important air force bases. It, folks, 2403 02:20:27,639 --> 02:20:33,079 it absolutely makes zero sense. It in many ways, if 2404 02:20:33,559 --> 02:20:36,600 this thing weren't such a serious national security issue. It's 2405 02:20:36,680 --> 02:20:40,959 almost it's almost comical that you have a White House, 2406 02:20:41,479 --> 02:20:46,319 this Trump administration and the previous administration that is gas 2407 02:20:46,479 --> 02:20:51,200 lighting Americans, that is gas lighting state officials, that is 2408 02:20:51,319 --> 02:20:56,840 gaslighting local officials, that is gas lighting first responders about 2409 02:20:57,040 --> 02:21:02,040 these drones. It is it's just absolutely ridiculous. And we 2410 02:21:02,200 --> 02:21:07,680 know that there is a history of these things, these uh, 2411 02:21:07,920 --> 02:21:12,920 these airborne vehicles of unknown origin from physically hurting people, 2412 02:21:13,559 --> 02:21:17,520 either through some kind of radiation exposure or both, you 2413 02:21:17,559 --> 02:21:20,000 know both. Richard, I think it was Richard spoke about 2414 02:21:20,440 --> 02:21:23,440 some of the some of the the health effects from 2415 02:21:23,760 --> 02:21:27,959 people getting too close to these things. Doctor Gary Nolan 2416 02:21:28,239 --> 02:21:34,040 of Stanford University has spoken extensively on damage that has 2417 02:21:34,079 --> 02:21:38,959 been observed to people's brains through MRI studies. People from 2418 02:21:39,200 --> 02:21:42,639 the intelligence community or other government agencies that have gotten 2419 02:21:42,680 --> 02:21:48,319 close to UAP and sustained physical injury. So you have 2420 02:21:48,360 --> 02:21:51,639 to ask yourself, well, who is who is this? Who 2421 02:21:51,719 --> 02:21:55,159 is our federal government really working for? Are they working 2422 02:21:55,879 --> 02:21:59,719 for the American people? Are they working for to protect? 2423 02:22:00,040 --> 02:22:04,079 Are our first responders? Are they Are they working for 2424 02:22:04,120 --> 02:22:08,559 the American people to to be truthful about the dangers 2425 02:22:08,639 --> 02:22:12,239 of these things, because if you ask me, it sure 2426 02:22:12,360 --> 02:22:15,920 seems that they are not. It sure seems, and I 2427 02:22:15,920 --> 02:22:20,120 think it's it's just blatantly obvious that they are gas 2428 02:22:20,200 --> 02:22:25,760 lighting all of us. They are not being truthful with 2429 02:22:26,120 --> 02:22:30,000 the American public. They are not being truthful with h 2430 02:22:30,200 --> 02:22:33,840 with local and state officials and you and frankly it's 2431 02:22:33,920 --> 02:22:38,360 it's I can sort of see where maybe the federal 2432 02:22:38,399 --> 02:22:42,040 government would uh you know, kind of you know, say 2433 02:22:42,280 --> 02:22:47,079 on the down low or or some classification levels as 2434 02:22:47,520 --> 02:22:52,120 confidential conversations with local and state officials saying, hey, folks, 2435 02:22:52,239 --> 02:22:54,920 this is what's really going on. We don't want, we 2436 02:22:55,000 --> 02:22:58,079 don't want to cause any sort of uh panic within 2437 02:22:58,120 --> 02:23:01,399 the public. But I can tell you that, uh, you know, 2438 02:23:01,440 --> 02:23:04,639 the folks that we've spoke to local and state government officials, 2439 02:23:05,319 --> 02:23:10,479 they weren't being told any lock of truth. And the 2440 02:23:10,479 --> 02:23:16,280 the frustration from these local and state officials, you could 2441 02:23:16,479 --> 02:23:20,639 just tell was palpable because they knew the federal government 2442 02:23:20,879 --> 02:23:26,040 was lying to their faces and in treating them like like, uh, 2443 02:23:26,159 --> 02:23:28,639 I don't know, you know, like I don't know what 2444 02:23:28,639 --> 02:23:32,559 what the what the issue is there, but uh, treating 2445 02:23:32,600 --> 02:23:35,040 them like they they don't need to know this information. 2446 02:23:36,399 --> 02:23:38,520 And I think that's really kind of one of the 2447 02:23:38,799 --> 02:23:42,879 biggest tragedies of of all of this. There is such 2448 02:23:42,959 --> 02:23:45,879 mistrust in the government that's been that way for quite 2449 02:23:45,920 --> 02:23:51,399 some time. There is, uh, you know, such skepticism towards 2450 02:23:51,559 --> 02:23:54,639 the mainstream media in terms of being truthful. I mean, 2451 02:23:54,680 --> 02:23:58,000 we've we have seen time and time again articles by 2452 02:23:58,360 --> 02:24:01,079 one particular reporter in the New York in the New 2453 02:24:01,159 --> 02:24:05,719 York Times that is clearly this guy is just parroting 2454 02:24:05,799 --> 02:24:10,959 propaganda that is being given given to him from the Pentagon. 2455 02:24:12,239 --> 02:24:17,000 There's one well known reporter that guess what, he's on 2456 02:24:17,120 --> 02:24:20,440 CIA payroll. I know this guy's I know exactly who 2457 02:24:20,479 --> 02:24:24,920 this guy is and when when a uh, one of 2458 02:24:24,959 --> 02:24:28,639 the sources in the intelligent in the intelligence community told 2459 02:24:28,680 --> 02:24:32,200 me about this individual and that he's on he's on 2460 02:24:32,239 --> 02:24:34,920 the payroll, and then I went and went and looked 2461 02:24:34,920 --> 02:24:38,319 at all of these this individual's uh uh sort of 2462 02:24:38,399 --> 02:24:42,319 appearances on places like CNN and others and articles this 2463 02:24:42,360 --> 02:24:46,079 individual has has printed, this guy that is getting paid 2464 02:24:46,159 --> 02:24:51,200 by the CIA. It all made sense. It's like, that's 2465 02:24:51,239 --> 02:24:55,000 why you're shoveling all of this bs, because you're lining 2466 02:24:55,079 --> 02:25:01,840 your pocket. You don't have a democracy when you know, 2467 02:25:01,879 --> 02:25:05,399 when you have this sort of free press that is 2468 02:25:05,440 --> 02:25:10,079 supposed to be free and independent doing the bidding of 2469 02:25:10,399 --> 02:25:13,879 their handlers in the intelligence community or in the Pentagon. 2470 02:25:15,000 --> 02:25:18,639 We saw this time and time again with the Pentagon 2471 02:25:18,680 --> 02:25:22,799 Public Affairs Officer Susan Go who would in the previous 2472 02:25:22,840 --> 02:25:28,680 administration hold press conferences, select press, private press conferences with 2473 02:25:28,840 --> 02:25:32,239 select members of the media. Guess who was frozen out? 2474 02:25:32,559 --> 02:25:35,520 Chris Sharp of the Liberation Times. Guess who else was 2475 02:25:35,520 --> 02:25:39,719 frozen out? Ross Colthart of News Nation. Guess who was 2476 02:25:39,760 --> 02:25:43,840 not frozen out? The New York The New York Times, 2477 02:25:44,079 --> 02:25:47,719 Julian Barnes, and some folks I think another guy from 2478 02:25:47,799 --> 02:25:51,879 Wall Street, the Wall Street Journal. It is It is 2479 02:25:51,959 --> 02:25:55,680 obvious because you'll see these guys like Julian Barnes put 2480 02:25:55,719 --> 02:26:02,000 out just absolute journalistic garbage that wouldn't even be worth 2481 02:26:02,040 --> 02:26:06,360 putting in the National Enquirer. I mean just it is. 2482 02:26:06,719 --> 02:26:08,479 It is I don't even know how this guy looks 2483 02:26:08,479 --> 02:26:11,879 at himself and looks at himself in the mirror when 2484 02:26:13,000 --> 02:26:16,200 what you read coming from Julian Barnes out of the 2485 02:26:16,200 --> 02:26:20,040 New York Times is I mean, it's clear it's propaganda. 2486 02:26:20,760 --> 02:26:24,200 It is clear that this guy is towing the line 2487 02:26:24,760 --> 02:26:30,079 for the Pentagon. And you know, so these these folks 2488 02:26:30,159 --> 02:26:36,879 from the mainstream media that continue to really just parent 2489 02:26:36,959 --> 02:26:43,600 propaganda by the Pentagon, by the intelligence community. It erodes, 2490 02:26:44,079 --> 02:26:49,239 It erodes trust in our free press. And when all 2491 02:26:49,280 --> 02:26:51,559 of this comes out, and it is going to come out, 2492 02:26:51,959 --> 02:26:54,520 you know, we know that it nearly came out during 2493 02:26:54,559 --> 02:26:57,639 the Church Committee back in the early nineteen seventies when 2494 02:26:57,639 --> 02:27:00,799 they discovered that, oh guess what, the CIA had been 2495 02:27:01,159 --> 02:27:08,239 paying or compensating hundreds of reporters in the American media, 2496 02:27:08,559 --> 02:27:13,360 including editors, heads of networks. The CIA was either paying 2497 02:27:13,360 --> 02:27:16,639 them directly, paying them through a cutout, or it was 2498 02:27:16,680 --> 02:27:20,120 a quid pro quote. In other words, if you're Julian 2499 02:27:20,159 --> 02:27:21,879 Barnes at the New York Times, if you want to 2500 02:27:21,920 --> 02:27:24,479 get if you want to get this exclusive interview with 2501 02:27:24,520 --> 02:27:27,040 the Secretary of Defense, I guess what we need you 2502 02:27:27,079 --> 02:27:29,399 to write an article for the New York Times about UAP. 2503 02:27:29,879 --> 02:27:32,719 Here are the talking points we would love for you 2504 02:27:33,399 --> 02:27:36,159 to write about in the New York Times. Wink, wink, 2505 02:27:36,239 --> 02:27:38,959 and lo and behold, you played ball, so you're going 2506 02:27:39,000 --> 02:27:41,520 to get that nice interview with the Secretary of Defense. 2507 02:27:42,280 --> 02:27:46,079 This is the kind of deal making that happens, and 2508 02:27:46,120 --> 02:27:50,760 this is the kind of cancer that is present in 2509 02:27:50,959 --> 02:27:57,079 our mainstream media. It is no wonder that mainstream media 2510 02:27:57,399 --> 02:28:01,200 is falling on its face. It is no wonder that 2511 02:28:01,680 --> 02:28:05,719 people are turning to our show and others and Ross 2512 02:28:05,760 --> 02:28:10,159 coltart and and Christopher Sharp of The Liberation Times and 2513 02:28:10,239 --> 02:28:14,479 George Knapp and others to tell them the truth because 2514 02:28:14,639 --> 02:28:19,639 the mainstream media is not all of us that are 2515 02:28:19,799 --> 02:28:21,959 for the truth. You know, we have no idea where 2516 02:28:21,959 --> 02:28:24,719 this stuff is from. I couldn't tell you. I wish 2517 02:28:24,959 --> 02:28:27,680 I wish I knew. But we're gonna be honest about it. 2518 02:28:27,719 --> 02:28:32,319 We're gonna tell you when we don't know something versus uh, 2519 02:28:32,440 --> 02:28:36,719 this current administration which is gas lighting or perhaps hopefully 2520 02:28:36,799 --> 02:28:39,559 just has bad information that was given to them about 2521 02:28:39,680 --> 02:28:44,280 about the drones. But you have to you have to 2522 02:28:44,360 --> 02:28:47,559 really take it with a grain of salt. What the 2523 02:28:47,559 --> 02:28:52,280 mainstream media is is telling you, and then also what 2524 02:28:52,319 --> 02:28:55,559 they are failing to tell you and what they are ignoring. 2525 02:28:57,879 --> 02:29:02,520 It is, it is. It doesn't matter what administration, if 2526 02:29:02,520 --> 02:29:06,799 it's Republican or Democrat. This it's it's beyond party. This 2527 02:29:06,840 --> 02:29:09,840 stuff is going on all the time. It has gone 2528 02:29:09,920 --> 02:29:14,079 on for a very long time. And you know, and 2529 02:29:14,120 --> 02:29:18,680 again you have to ask yourself, do they think these 2530 02:29:18,680 --> 02:29:23,280 folks in government that are part of this deep state? 2531 02:29:23,360 --> 02:29:25,280 I used to make fun of Trump and his deep 2532 02:29:25,319 --> 02:29:28,079 state stuff all the time. I'm a Democrat, but lo 2533 02:29:28,200 --> 02:29:32,000 and behold, he was right about it. It is. It 2534 02:29:32,079 --> 02:29:35,079 is true, and you have these folks that are doing 2535 02:29:35,319 --> 02:29:38,120 everything to kind of undermine all of us in terms 2536 02:29:38,159 --> 02:29:44,600 of learning what is truly going on. It's it is. 2537 02:29:44,399 --> 02:29:44,760 Speaker 8: It is. 2538 02:29:45,040 --> 02:29:49,440 Speaker 1: It transcends politics. It is. It is the the the 2539 02:29:49,479 --> 02:29:54,840 deputy level folks in DoD and IC and elsewhere, in 2540 02:29:54,879 --> 02:29:58,159 these different nodes of the government that are hiding this, 2541 02:29:58,280 --> 02:30:01,040 that are propagating this. And I want to be specific, 2542 02:30:01,159 --> 02:30:05,920 not everyone in the government is is guilty of this. 2543 02:30:06,079 --> 02:30:09,079 There are good people in the Pentagon, there are good 2544 02:30:09,159 --> 02:30:13,879 people in the intelligence community, in the CIA, in the UH, 2545 02:30:13,959 --> 02:30:19,280 in the NSSA, in the in the Department of Energy 2546 02:30:19,319 --> 02:30:21,520 that do want to do the right thing. They know 2547 02:30:22,239 --> 02:30:25,399 that this lie that has been going on for you know, 2548 02:30:25,719 --> 02:30:28,760 for seventy eighty years or longer, it's time that it 2549 02:30:28,840 --> 02:30:31,920 comes to an end. So I know that often on 2550 02:30:31,959 --> 02:30:34,920 this show when I when I'm sort of speaking extemporaneously, 2551 02:30:34,959 --> 02:30:37,719 not off of notes or anything, I sometimes make that 2552 02:30:37,799 --> 02:30:41,079 mistake of kind of throwing everybody into that bucket. But 2553 02:30:41,159 --> 02:30:44,719 there are people in government that are trying to do 2554 02:30:45,159 --> 02:30:47,719 the right thing, and they know that that this uh, 2555 02:30:48,360 --> 02:30:51,520 you know that that it's time to level with the 2556 02:30:51,520 --> 02:30:57,680 American people and in the world. And my message to 2557 02:30:58,159 --> 02:31:03,879 the Trump administration, to President Trump or Donald don Junior, 2558 02:31:04,000 --> 02:31:07,559 or whoever is hopefully watching this show, is you have 2559 02:31:07,760 --> 02:31:14,959 a unique opportunity to do what no former president has done, 2560 02:31:15,159 --> 02:31:19,680 which is to declassify the stuff that sits under Presidential 2561 02:31:19,680 --> 02:31:23,840 Emergency Action directives under the NSC. President Trump, you have 2562 02:31:24,040 --> 02:31:29,040 the unilateral authority to declassify anything that is in the 2563 02:31:29,120 --> 02:31:33,959 National Security Council that is under Presidential Emergency Action Directives 2564 02:31:33,959 --> 02:31:39,000 that are not anything that's classed in DOE, anything that 2565 02:31:39,159 --> 02:31:43,520 is under National Security Council, which half of this stuff 2566 02:31:43,559 --> 02:31:49,760 is classified. The UAP drone stuff, the Havana syndrome stuff, 2567 02:31:49,879 --> 02:31:52,600 all of that stuff sits under NSC. They're the ones 2568 02:31:52,879 --> 02:31:57,239 that are the classification authority. They are the ones. Anything 2569 02:31:57,280 --> 02:32:00,920 that is classified by that is a White House SAP, 2570 02:32:01,239 --> 02:32:04,559 that is a White House Special Access program that sits 2571 02:32:04,639 --> 02:32:07,719 in the National Security Council. No one in Congress has 2572 02:32:07,760 --> 02:32:11,200 the legal authority to view it, absolutely non That is 2573 02:32:11,280 --> 02:32:15,280 why they take things like UAP and they stuff it 2574 02:32:15,319 --> 02:32:19,920 in the NSC. The NSC has the legal authority to 2575 02:32:20,079 --> 02:32:24,879 lock it down and keep it away from Congress. So 2576 02:32:25,000 --> 02:32:29,040 all of this stuff that's going on, these billions upon 2577 02:32:29,200 --> 02:32:35,319 billions of dollars that the Pentagon is kind of squirrelling away, 2578 02:32:35,520 --> 02:32:39,399 hiding it, hiding what they are spending and where they 2579 02:32:39,399 --> 02:32:42,719 are spending it. That's how they do it. All this 2580 02:32:42,840 --> 02:32:46,840 stuff stuffed in the NSC or under the Department of 2581 02:32:46,959 --> 02:32:51,200 Energy under transclassified Foreign Nuclear information. That's how they hide 2582 02:32:51,200 --> 02:32:57,360 this stuff from Congress. Congress cannot do its job of oversight, 2583 02:32:57,840 --> 02:33:00,879 of a fiscal oversight of what is going on with 2584 02:33:00,920 --> 02:33:05,120 this government when all of this stuff billions of dollars, 2585 02:33:06,000 --> 02:33:11,280 is being squirreled away under waved special access programs or 2586 02:33:11,360 --> 02:33:15,399 waived and acknowledged special access programs that's stuffed into the 2587 02:33:15,479 --> 02:33:19,559 National Security Council. That's how they hide this stuff. That's 2588 02:33:19,600 --> 02:33:24,159 how they are taking your tax dollars, your hard earned 2589 02:33:24,200 --> 02:33:28,639 tax dollars. All of you, who, like most Americans, are 2590 02:33:28,680 --> 02:33:32,280 having a hell of a hard time making ends meet, 2591 02:33:32,559 --> 02:33:35,239 having a hell of a hard time putting food on 2592 02:33:35,319 --> 02:33:42,000 the table, all of this pork spending. That is, you know, 2593 02:33:42,040 --> 02:33:46,719 you have this fifty thousand dollars hammer or whatever it 2594 02:33:46,799 --> 02:33:52,799 is from a Boeing aircraft company, or ten thousand dollars bolt. 2595 02:33:53,479 --> 02:33:57,319 I guarantee you ninety five percent of the cost of 2596 02:33:57,399 --> 02:34:02,440 those parts ghost to some special access program that is 2597 02:34:02,479 --> 02:34:08,120 off the books. So that fifty thousand dollars hammer, will 2598 02:34:08,159 --> 02:34:11,200 just say forty nine thousand dollars is going into the 2599 02:34:11,639 --> 02:34:15,680 into the back pocket of some special access program that 2600 02:34:15,799 --> 02:34:19,280 the Pentagon does not want Congress or the American public 2601 02:34:19,319 --> 02:34:22,559 to know about. So you want to you want to 2602 02:34:22,639 --> 02:34:29,440 know why the Pentagon continues to fail every audit. You 2603 02:34:29,479 --> 02:34:31,840 want to you want to know why the Pentagon can 2604 02:34:31,879 --> 02:34:36,479 apparently not account. I think it's either fifty or sixty percent. 2605 02:34:37,600 --> 02:34:41,200 It's somewhere right at the halfway mark. The Pentagon cannot 2606 02:34:41,440 --> 02:34:46,319 account for physical assets. They don't know where stuff is. 2607 02:34:47,600 --> 02:34:51,479 You got to be kidding me. Fifty to sixty percent 2608 02:34:52,520 --> 02:34:57,479 they cannot figure out where it's at. And which makes 2609 02:34:57,520 --> 02:35:00,600 you wonder if the if the Pentagon, the I see 2610 02:35:00,760 --> 02:35:03,719 has been lying to all of us about the UAP issue, 2611 02:35:03,719 --> 02:35:06,680 about the drone issue, and and uh, you know who knows, 2612 02:35:06,760 --> 02:35:12,200 who knows what else that would explain, you know, stuff doesn't. 2613 02:35:12,280 --> 02:35:16,680 Stuff doesn't. Money doesn't grow on trees. Money comes from you, 2614 02:35:16,879 --> 02:35:20,200 the taxpayer, and it gets funneled into areas that you 2615 02:35:20,319 --> 02:35:26,520 don't know about. And Congress doesn't either. I certainly hope 2616 02:35:26,760 --> 02:35:32,559 this this new commission or task force by Representative Anna 2617 02:35:32,600 --> 02:35:36,600 Polina Luna, who are we are very very supportive of this. 2618 02:35:36,639 --> 02:35:40,760 We think this is a good move. But I am 2619 02:35:41,319 --> 02:35:45,799 hopeful that the Chair of the House Oversight Committee, James Comer, 2620 02:35:46,120 --> 02:35:52,440 will be very generous in issuing subpoenas. Two folks that 2621 02:35:52,639 --> 02:35:58,920 have worked this topic, people that have maybe supervised the 2622 02:35:58,959 --> 02:36:01,600 Office of Global Acts US and the CIA and other 2623 02:36:02,319 --> 02:36:06,159 other other programs that are run under the CIA Directorate 2624 02:36:06,159 --> 02:36:10,719 of Science and Technology. I certainly hope that Congressman Comer 2625 02:36:11,079 --> 02:36:16,040 will at the encouragement by Annapolina Luna a subpoena a 2626 02:36:16,159 --> 02:36:19,000 bunch of folks and bring them in and put them 2627 02:36:19,000 --> 02:36:21,120 on uh, put them in front of the committee and 2628 02:36:21,280 --> 02:36:25,360 ask them under oath very very specific questions. Because the 2629 02:36:25,399 --> 02:36:27,840 minute you bring these folks and you don't ask them 2630 02:36:28,000 --> 02:36:31,360 under oath uh, and you don't bring the right people in? 2631 02:36:31,600 --> 02:36:37,079 Who who you bring in someone that does have plausible deniability? Uh? 2632 02:36:37,239 --> 02:36:39,840 You know there, you know they can they can claim 2633 02:36:39,920 --> 02:36:44,000 that they don't know anything. UH. And it is it 2634 02:36:44,079 --> 02:36:47,719 is important. You can't bring these people in and trust 2635 02:36:47,799 --> 02:36:49,959 that they are going to tell you the truth. There 2636 02:36:50,280 --> 02:36:54,399 has to be a legal mechanism, under the threat of 2637 02:36:54,799 --> 02:37:00,799 perjury to to sort of what words, you know, just 2638 02:37:01,600 --> 02:37:03,799 to really force them to speak the truth. 2639 02:37:04,440 --> 02:37:04,600 Speaker 9: Uh. 2640 02:37:05,040 --> 02:37:08,040 Speaker 1: They you can't just bring them in and expect them 2641 02:37:08,040 --> 02:37:11,719 to be honest. Uh. I've been told that in the 2642 02:37:11,719 --> 02:37:16,239 security classification guides of of uh you know, most special 2643 02:37:16,280 --> 02:37:20,719 access programs, it it tells them specifically, if you are 2644 02:37:20,799 --> 02:37:24,360 caught uh or something happens, this is the lie that 2645 02:37:24,399 --> 02:37:27,000 you are to say. It's in the it's in a playbook, 2646 02:37:27,040 --> 02:37:30,600 it's in a freak combinder of if you get called 2647 02:37:30,799 --> 02:37:33,479 to testify in front of Congress and you're not under oath. 2648 02:37:33,719 --> 02:37:36,760 This is how you explain away this special access program. 2649 02:37:37,399 --> 02:37:40,799 This is the gamesmanship that they have to make sure 2650 02:37:40,879 --> 02:37:44,559 that members of Congress do not find uh find out 2651 02:37:44,600 --> 02:37:48,920 what the truth is. So Congress, you cannot do your 2652 02:37:49,000 --> 02:37:55,440 job unless your legislation has enforcement mechanisms, unless your legislation 2653 02:37:55,879 --> 02:38:00,559 has teeth, unless your legislation has uh has they to 2654 02:38:00,639 --> 02:38:05,799 hold these people to account because guess what, for eighty years, 2655 02:38:06,639 --> 02:38:09,840 they have had all this time to perfect their game. 2656 02:38:09,920 --> 02:38:13,239 They have had all of these years to perfect this 2657 02:38:13,680 --> 02:38:17,440 show game that they are playing with with Congress and 2658 02:38:17,520 --> 02:38:23,040 the American public. And until we demand answers, it's going 2659 02:38:23,120 --> 02:38:26,559 to be more of the same. And my message to 2660 02:38:27,079 --> 02:38:30,840 all of the Republicans out there, especially the Maga Republicans, 2661 02:38:32,399 --> 02:38:35,159 you have a seat at the table with this administration. 2662 02:38:36,040 --> 02:38:40,559 You are the ones that got Trump elected. You have 2663 02:38:40,600 --> 02:38:46,639 a voice and you can say to this administration President Trump, 2664 02:38:46,719 --> 02:38:49,719 we love you, we voted for you, but you promised 2665 02:38:49,799 --> 02:38:52,920 us the truth, and we know that you are not 2666 02:38:53,200 --> 02:38:58,319 being straight with us about this whole drone thing. All 2667 02:38:58,360 --> 02:39:03,440 of the Maga folks, you have unique opportunity to have 2668 02:39:03,520 --> 02:39:07,600 a conversation with a president who is frankly seems a 2669 02:39:07,639 --> 02:39:11,040 little more open to listening to uh uh to his 2670 02:39:11,079 --> 02:39:14,920 supporters than than some of the folks in previous administras. 2671 02:39:14,920 --> 02:39:18,200 Some of the presidents and previous administrations take advantage of that. 2672 02:39:18,799 --> 02:39:23,280 Tell this administration that you want the truth. I know 2673 02:39:23,360 --> 02:39:26,239 for a fact, Don Junior is very much for this. 2674 02:39:26,479 --> 02:39:31,399 Don Junior, r fk uh. These folks are our proponents 2675 02:39:31,399 --> 02:39:34,959 of getting this stuff out. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, 2676 02:39:35,040 --> 02:39:38,399 he was fully read into this, into the uh into 2677 02:39:38,479 --> 02:39:43,239 the deep legacy program during during the last Trump administration. 2678 02:39:43,399 --> 02:39:49,319 He knows everything. He knows everything. Marco Rubio knows everything. 2679 02:39:50,440 --> 02:39:54,639 So the other folks that are in the Trump administration, uh, 2680 02:39:54,719 --> 02:39:57,639 John Ratcliffe and others, they all know, they were all 2681 02:39:57,680 --> 02:40:02,600 read in. So President Trump, you have a unique opportunity. 2682 02:40:03,319 --> 02:40:08,440 You have people that are your your your main proponents, 2683 02:40:08,479 --> 02:40:12,200 that are the main folks on your on your team 2684 02:40:12,600 --> 02:40:18,479 that feel that this needs needs to come out. And again, 2685 02:40:18,520 --> 02:40:21,120 President Trump, I used to think your stuff about the 2686 02:40:21,159 --> 02:40:24,319 deep State was a load of bs, but it's not. 2687 02:40:25,920 --> 02:40:31,120 And there is no better demonstration, there is no better 2688 02:40:31,479 --> 02:40:34,920 way of proving your whole thing about the deep State 2689 02:40:35,159 --> 02:40:40,520 than the uap drone issue. You declassify that stuff that's 2690 02:40:40,600 --> 02:40:43,000 in uh, that's in the n SC that you have 2691 02:40:43,200 --> 02:40:46,719 the legal authority, do you latterly, do you will prove 2692 02:40:46,840 --> 02:40:49,840 to the world, into the American public, that what you 2693 02:40:49,920 --> 02:40:55,479 have been saying about this deep state stuff is actually true. 2694 02:40:56,159 --> 02:40:59,079 It is It is your political get out of jail 2695 02:40:59,159 --> 02:41:01,639 card for you if well, I'm not going to elaborate 2696 02:41:01,680 --> 02:41:04,879 anymore on that, but but you have this opportunity to 2697 02:41:06,760 --> 02:41:09,799 make your case and show that there is proof in 2698 02:41:09,840 --> 02:41:13,239 the pudding. So there you go. So again, folks, if 2699 02:41:13,280 --> 02:41:16,799 you are you know, if you are a MAGA person 2700 02:41:16,920 --> 02:41:22,479 and been active in this president's re election campaign, let 2701 02:41:22,520 --> 02:41:25,319 these folks know, Let the administration know that you deserve 2702 02:41:25,399 --> 02:41:28,239 to know the truth. The American people deserve to know 2703 02:41:28,280 --> 02:41:32,399 the truth. This transcends, This transcends party. Doesn't matter if 2704 02:41:32,440 --> 02:41:36,280 you're Democrat, Republican, or anything in between. We are all Americans. 2705 02:41:36,319 --> 02:41:39,600 We all love our country. We all deserve the truth. 2706 02:41:39,920 --> 02:41:43,639 We all deserve to know what information we need to 2707 02:41:43,719 --> 02:41:46,799 know to protect our families, to protect the health and 2708 02:41:46,879 --> 02:41:52,799 safety of our first responders. We all deserve Our elected 2709 02:41:53,799 --> 02:41:57,680 elected government officials in state and city deserve to know 2710 02:41:57,760 --> 02:42:02,840 the truth. Let them know that. Let them know that 2711 02:42:03,600 --> 02:42:06,879 because we, as Loue El Azondo I believe said, we 2712 02:42:06,959 --> 02:42:10,760 can handle the truth. We are ready for it. So 2713 02:42:10,799 --> 02:42:14,440 folks really appreciate everyone hanging out for the show. If 2714 02:42:14,440 --> 02:42:17,639 you like this show, we always do appreciate a thumbs 2715 02:42:17,680 --> 02:42:20,799 up and a subscribe and then also leave a comment. 2716 02:42:21,120 --> 02:42:23,879 And right after this video, one of our other shows 2717 02:42:23,920 --> 02:42:26,079 is going to play. We would love for you to 2718 02:42:26,079 --> 02:42:28,760 sit around or stick around and watch it. That is 2719 02:42:28,760 --> 02:42:31,280 actually one of the biggest things that YouTube looks for 2720 02:42:31,399 --> 02:42:33,719 is after this show ends, if you stick around to 2721 02:42:33,760 --> 02:42:37,200 watch the next show from the Good Trouble Show. They 2722 02:42:37,239 --> 02:42:41,319 love that and that helps promote our channel organically to 2723 02:42:42,040 --> 02:42:46,200 other folks. So thanks again for joining us. And right 2724 02:42:46,239 --> 02:42:48,040 over here is going to be the next video that 2725 02:42:48,120 --> 02:42:50,680 we'll show up from the Good Trouble Show. Tell your 2726 02:42:50,680 --> 02:42:51,559 friends about. 2727 02:42:51,360 --> 02:42:51,719 Speaker 3: Us and. 2728 02:42:53,639 --> 02:42:58,440 Speaker 1: Tell your elected officials that it is time for the truth. 2729 02:42:58,559 --> 02:43:01,719 Thanks for joining us, and we will see you very 2730 02:43:01,760 --> 02:43:04,399 soon with some more great interviews from the Good to 2731 02:43:04,440 --> 02:43:04,959 Trouble Show.