WEBVTT 1 00:00:01.720 --> 00:00:05.320 More people are flying than ever, and cameras and phones 2 00:00:05.360 --> 00:00:11.919 are all part of the trip, capturing unbelievable moments of danger. 3 00:00:14.599 --> 00:00:15.000 The plane. 4 00:00:15.919 --> 00:00:19.239 For the first time, we unpacked the science of what's 5 00:00:19.320 --> 00:00:22.920 really going on in these caught on camera crises. 6 00:00:23.679 --> 00:00:25.079 Grace for Impact, Grace for. 7 00:00:25.079 --> 00:00:30.160 Impact, revealing in forensic detail how and why flights turned deadly. 8 00:00:30.719 --> 00:00:34.240 He was literally clinging to the air to stay ab. 9 00:00:36.640 --> 00:00:40.640 Unraveling secret stories from cockpit error to engine failure. 10 00:00:40.880 --> 00:00:43.520 We just had an announcements We've got on emergency landing. 11 00:00:43.600 --> 00:00:54.240 From freak weather to meltdown on the runwaysh discover the 12 00:00:54.320 --> 00:01:02.880 surprising truth behind planes gone viral. With more aircraft in 13 00:01:02.960 --> 00:01:07.079 the sky than ever before, pressure on pilots has never 14 00:01:07.159 --> 00:01:09.760 been higher. Do you want to dispatch the emergency vehicles? 15 00:01:10.000 --> 00:01:13.040 They need to get us safely where we want to go, 16 00:01:13.560 --> 00:01:16.680 when we want to get there. But every time we 17 00:01:16.840 --> 00:01:19.760 take to the air, there's a risk that the pilot 18 00:01:20.120 --> 00:01:21.159 may make an error. 19 00:01:21.239 --> 00:01:26.439 Oh my god, it's gonna stand Come on, buddy. 20 00:01:27.680 --> 00:01:30.400 A sudden lack of concentration. 21 00:01:29.920 --> 00:01:31.280 It's like time slowed down. 22 00:01:31.760 --> 00:01:36.719 A miscalculation or a wrong command at thirty five thousand 23 00:01:36.760 --> 00:01:38.719 feet can end in disaster. 24 00:01:40.719 --> 00:01:44.200 He was literally clinging to the air to stay airborn. 25 00:01:45.120 --> 00:01:48.400 But sometimes a cool head can be all a pilot 26 00:01:48.519 --> 00:01:50.000 needs to save the day. 27 00:01:51.560 --> 00:01:53.640 I wouldn't be sitting here today if it wasn't for 28 00:01:53.760 --> 00:01:54.640 his ringers. 29 00:01:55.879 --> 00:02:05.000 And turn a potential tragedy into triumph. November one, twenty eleven, 30 00:02:06.920 --> 00:02:11.599 lot for Like to zero sixteen approaches Warsaw, Poland after 31 00:02:11.599 --> 00:02:15.280 an eight hour flight from Newark, New Jersey, on board 32 00:02:15.439 --> 00:02:17.360 two hundred and thirty one people. 33 00:02:20.439 --> 00:02:28.479 This flight was the same as any other flight. 34 00:02:27.240 --> 00:02:32.240 For the passengers. The initial descent seems normal, but pilot 35 00:02:32.560 --> 00:02:37.000 Captain Varona and Polish air traffic Control realize they have 36 00:02:37.039 --> 00:02:42.319 a problem. 37 00:02:42.439 --> 00:02:47.240 Things started getting a little unusual and there was a 38 00:02:47.240 --> 00:02:51.479 lot of activity with the flight attendants going back and 39 00:02:51.599 --> 00:02:55.599 forth to the cockpit area, you know, stopping against sam ray. 40 00:02:57.759 --> 00:03:02.039 The Polish Air Force scrambles to F sixteen fighters to 41 00:03:02.199 --> 00:03:09.680 shadow the flight, but they can only confirm what the 42 00:03:09.800 --> 00:03:17.680 crew already know. This Boeing seven sixty seven is coming 43 00:03:17.719 --> 00:03:20.000 in with no landing gear. 44 00:03:21.000 --> 00:03:24.759 I looked out the window and I saw F sixteen 45 00:03:24.960 --> 00:03:26.039 circling our plane. 46 00:03:26.159 --> 00:03:28.360 Yeah, this just is not a normal occurrence. 47 00:03:28.680 --> 00:03:31.960 There were people who were screaming at certain areas of 48 00:03:32.000 --> 00:03:35.360 the plane and just you know, wanting answers, while't even 49 00:03:35.400 --> 00:03:36.319 know what was happening. 50 00:03:37.080 --> 00:03:40.400 What's happening is the seven sixty seven is circling Warsaw 51 00:03:40.759 --> 00:03:44.520 to burn off excess fuel ready for an emergency landing. 52 00:03:45.319 --> 00:03:48.199 And as we were circling around, they didn't tell us. 53 00:03:48.919 --> 00:03:51.280 We didn't know why we were making this emergency in 54 00:03:51.319 --> 00:03:54.919 the landing. We didn't know what the actual reason was. 55 00:03:55.719 --> 00:03:59.479 To minimize the risk of an explosion. Captain Rohner wants 56 00:03:59.479 --> 00:04:06.840 his fuel tanks running on empty wheels or no wheels. 57 00:04:07.400 --> 00:04:08.840 This plane's coming down. 58 00:04:10.080 --> 00:04:19.879 We're getting closer and closer to the runway. I see 59 00:04:19.920 --> 00:04:27.199 the plane lowering, lowering, lowering. 60 00:04:27.639 --> 00:04:30.160 No one has ever tried to land a seven sixty 61 00:04:30.199 --> 00:04:31.839 seven without wheels. 62 00:04:33.160 --> 00:04:39.120 Grace for impact, Grace for impact. I was never so 63 00:04:39.240 --> 00:04:42.399 fearful in my life. 64 00:04:47.439 --> 00:04:52.439 The prospect of death being moments away is a darting prospect. 65 00:05:25.560 --> 00:05:29.439 The aircraft finally screeches to a halt, but the danger 66 00:05:29.560 --> 00:05:30.560 is far from over. 67 00:05:31.160 --> 00:05:35.519 Of course, everybody roared with the applause, you know, everybody 68 00:05:35.560 --> 00:05:40.279 was celebrating, and literally we had the flight attendant scream. 69 00:05:40.040 --> 00:05:44.480 Get off this plane now, and made everybody get up 70 00:05:44.480 --> 00:05:47.920 and we're hysterical and in fear that this plane was 71 00:05:47.959 --> 00:05:54.600 going to blow up. There was smoke. 72 00:05:54.800 --> 00:05:59.120 Coming into the plane from the engine that was on fire. 73 00:06:01.720 --> 00:06:04.839 It smelled the smoke and it smelled like burning fuel. 74 00:06:08.160 --> 00:06:12.560 Those slide rafts came out and everybody is literally in 75 00:06:12.920 --> 00:06:17.439 a mad dish to get off the plane. 76 00:06:21.839 --> 00:06:29.519 The evacuation takes just ninety seconds. Amazingly, not one of 77 00:06:29.560 --> 00:06:33.639 the two hundred and twenty passengers or eleven crew are injured. 78 00:06:46.680 --> 00:06:55.639 The problem begins as the plane leaves Newark. Just after takeoff. 79 00:06:56.040 --> 00:07:02.839 Captain Varner pulls up the wheels. Immediately, cockpit alarms indicate 80 00:07:02.879 --> 00:07:09.600 a fault with the hydraulic system powering the undercarriage. 81 00:07:11.079 --> 00:07:18.480 This lot Polish Airlines aircraft had a hydraulic problem. It 82 00:07:18.600 --> 00:07:22.600 wasn't affecting the flight, but it affected the way in 83 00:07:22.720 --> 00:07:27.600 which the undercarriage of the aeroplane the airplane's wheels could 84 00:07:27.639 --> 00:07:28.199 be lowered. 85 00:07:29.560 --> 00:07:33.600 Fortunately, modern aircraft have an electrical backup if the undercarriage 86 00:07:33.680 --> 00:07:38.600 hydraulics fail. Captain Varner flies on to Poland, assuming he 87 00:07:38.639 --> 00:07:41.360 can use the standby system. When he comes into land 88 00:07:41.399 --> 00:07:45.920 in Warsaw after a flight of almost eight hours, he's 89 00:07:45.959 --> 00:07:49.839 making his final approach to Warsaw Airport, knowing full well 90 00:07:49.920 --> 00:07:52.959 he has no hydraulic system to lower the landing gear. 91 00:07:54.560 --> 00:08:00.360 It's time to employ the electrical failsafe backup. The only 92 00:08:00.399 --> 00:08:03.160 problem with the backup is that you can't test it 93 00:08:03.199 --> 00:08:06.560 in flight. You can only use it once, and then 94 00:08:06.800 --> 00:08:08.360 only when you really need it. 95 00:08:09.800 --> 00:08:13.720 As the aircraft approached Warsaw, then the flight crew obviously 96 00:08:13.800 --> 00:08:16.639 needed to lower the undercarriage before landing. 97 00:08:16.879 --> 00:08:20.920 As he nears the airport, Captain Vrohner engages the backup 98 00:08:20.959 --> 00:08:25.079 system and nothing happens. 99 00:08:26.439 --> 00:08:29.279 They tried lowering it with the standard system and that 100 00:08:29.319 --> 00:08:32.159 didn't work. They tried to lower with what's called the 101 00:08:32.200 --> 00:08:34.919 alternate system. That didn't work as well. 102 00:08:35.840 --> 00:08:40.000 Vrona is high and dry over Warsaw with no hydraulics, 103 00:08:40.360 --> 00:08:45.360 no electrical backup, and no wheels. Flight zero sixteen is 104 00:08:45.399 --> 00:08:47.480 in trouble, deep trouble. 105 00:08:48.279 --> 00:08:52.480 So the crew told the air traffic control and circled. 106 00:08:53.279 --> 00:08:56.080 The fail safe system has failed. 107 00:08:57.600 --> 00:08:59.559 It's one of those days where it's a hard day 108 00:08:59.600 --> 00:09:01.240 at the office, but you're trained for it. 109 00:09:03.799 --> 00:09:06.519 With no undercarriage and the lives of two hundred and 110 00:09:06.600 --> 00:09:10.159 thirty one people at stake, Vroner has no option but 111 00:09:10.240 --> 00:09:17.000 to land the plane with no wheels. In a normal landing, 112 00:09:17.440 --> 00:09:20.480 he'd lift the nose slightly to reduce the rate of descent, 113 00:09:21.120 --> 00:09:25.360 landing on the back wheels first before engaging reverse thrust 114 00:09:25.720 --> 00:09:33.480 and applying the wheel brakes. With no wheels and no brakes, 115 00:09:34.080 --> 00:09:37.080 Broner's best chance is to touch down resting on the 116 00:09:37.159 --> 00:09:41.000 two engines and the rear part of the fuselage as 117 00:09:41.039 --> 00:09:44.960 delicately as possible. It's what pilots call a gear up 118 00:09:45.480 --> 00:09:46.399 or belly landing. 119 00:09:47.000 --> 00:09:49.240 Eventually, they had decided that they had to do a 120 00:09:49.279 --> 00:09:52.679 gear up landing, so no undercarriage legs coming down. 121 00:09:53.320 --> 00:09:56.879 This will hopefully ensure it lands relatively smoothly on the 122 00:09:56.919 --> 00:10:00.559 engine casings instead of slamming down on the nose or tail, 123 00:10:01.000 --> 00:10:03.519 causing the plane to cartwheel and explode. 124 00:10:04.039 --> 00:10:06.440 For a pilot, it's not really something you want to do. 125 00:10:06.639 --> 00:10:08.480 I wouldn't like to have to do a bonny landing. 126 00:10:08.519 --> 00:10:08.919 I wouldn't. 127 00:10:08.960 --> 00:10:12.080 I'd very much not like to be a passenger. During one. 128 00:10:13.559 --> 00:10:16.519 One hundred and seventy nine tons of Boeing seven sixty 129 00:10:16.559 --> 00:10:19.039 seven is about to hit the runway at one hundred 130 00:10:19.039 --> 00:10:23.960 and eighty miles an hour with minimal directional control and 131 00:10:24.000 --> 00:10:29.840 no brakes. Emergency services spray foam on the runway in 132 00:10:29.879 --> 00:10:34.919 a desperate attempt to stop Flight zero sixteen turning into 133 00:10:34.919 --> 00:10:35.720 a fireball. 134 00:10:38.399 --> 00:10:45.559 It would feel dreadful, The noise would be frightening. The 135 00:10:45.759 --> 00:10:49.919 mere fact that you know exactly what's happening that's going 136 00:10:50.000 --> 00:10:55.320 to be absolutely awful. 137 00:10:55.399 --> 00:10:59.120 So why didn't this aircraft catch fire when it's smashed 138 00:10:59.120 --> 00:11:04.840 down on its enngine? Up to eighty percent of the 139 00:11:04.879 --> 00:11:08.559 material used in a modern aircraft is aluminium. It's both 140 00:11:08.679 --> 00:11:18.000 light and strong. Crucially, unlike steel, aluminium doesn't produce many 141 00:11:18.039 --> 00:11:23.720 sparks during friction, and the remaining fuel on this boeing 142 00:11:23.799 --> 00:11:27.840 is in sealed tanks well away from the engines. So 143 00:11:27.919 --> 00:11:31.159 if the landing is controlled and smooth, the hope is 144 00:11:31.240 --> 00:11:35.879 the aircraft is less likely to catch fire, which means, 145 00:11:35.960 --> 00:11:39.320 thanks to Varna and the emergency services at Warsaw Airport, 146 00:11:39.720 --> 00:11:42.960 this was one belly landing that didn't go belly up? 147 00:11:45.960 --> 00:11:48.720 But how had the failsafe system failed? 148 00:11:49.679 --> 00:11:52.559 Essentially, the undercarriage didn't come down when they were required 149 00:11:52.559 --> 00:11:55.960 to on approach. What they hadn't detected was the fact 150 00:11:56.000 --> 00:11:58.480 that a circuit breaker, which is like a fuse that 151 00:11:58.559 --> 00:12:01.000 had popped now wider pop nobody knows. 152 00:12:01.679 --> 00:12:06.200 Accident investigators discovered that the supply of electricity powering the 153 00:12:06.240 --> 00:12:08.440 backup landing gear had cut out. 154 00:12:09.240 --> 00:12:11.720 That had been switched off, and they didn't know that, 155 00:12:12.000 --> 00:12:16.480 and that's why the standby system for lowering the wheels 156 00:12:16.720 --> 00:12:18.879 wasn't working. There was nothing wrong with it, it was 157 00:12:18.919 --> 00:12:19.679 just switched off. 158 00:12:22.399 --> 00:12:26.759 Someone had accidentally knocked the switch and this went unnoticed. 159 00:12:27.919 --> 00:12:30.919 A simple incident, but one that nearly led to a 160 00:12:30.960 --> 00:12:40.120 fatal disaster. Six days after pulling off his spectacular landing, 161 00:12:40.679 --> 00:12:45.159 Captain Varner was awarded the Order of Polonia Restitutor, one 162 00:12:45.159 --> 00:12:49.480 of Poland's highest decorations, and acclaimed a national hero. 163 00:12:51.159 --> 00:12:52.320 He knocked it out of the park. 164 00:12:52.840 --> 00:12:58.600 Captain Rona is a hero and I will be forever 165 00:12:58.720 --> 00:13:01.440 indebted to him because I wouldn't be sitting here today 166 00:13:01.519 --> 00:13:06.039 talking to you if it wasn't for his greatness. 167 00:13:11.440 --> 00:13:16.679 Despite increasing levels of aircraft reliability, pilots still require a 168 00:13:16.720 --> 00:13:21.120 great deal of training, skill, and crucially calmness under pressure 169 00:13:24.279 --> 00:13:27.600 to captain a commercial aircraft. In the US, the Federal 170 00:13:27.639 --> 00:13:31.919 Aviation Authority stipulates you must clock up at least fifteen 171 00:13:32.039 --> 00:13:36.519 hundred hours in the air. But the man at the 172 00:13:36.559 --> 00:13:39.919 controls of this light aircraft still has a long way 173 00:13:39.960 --> 00:13:49.480 to go. Twelve thousand feet above Wisconsin, three skydivers are 174 00:13:49.519 --> 00:14:05.759 seconds away from their sixth and final jump of the day. 175 00:14:10.840 --> 00:14:16.080 Two Cessna's are flying in close formation, and just as 176 00:14:16.120 --> 00:14:18.240 the sky divers they're about to jump. 177 00:14:34.120 --> 00:14:36.799 They're flying and they're getting ready to go ahead and 178 00:14:36.840 --> 00:14:38.879 get out. So I was actually the first one out 179 00:14:38.919 --> 00:14:40.440 the door, and I climbed all the way out to 180 00:14:40.480 --> 00:14:43.480 the outside of the strut, and I hang on out 181 00:14:43.480 --> 00:14:46.080 there while everybody else is climbing out of the airplane 182 00:14:46.200 --> 00:14:47.120 getting ready to jump. 183 00:14:48.200 --> 00:14:49.879 I felt just jold, and. 184 00:14:49.840 --> 00:14:54.159 I knew that the airplanes had collided, so I. 185 00:14:53.440 --> 00:14:54.000 Just let go. 186 00:15:02.600 --> 00:15:05.559 This is one jump the skydivers will never forget. 187 00:15:23.559 --> 00:15:25.919 I was getting ready to climb out of a plan 188 00:15:26.480 --> 00:15:27.919 to get to the Native. 189 00:15:27.879 --> 00:15:29.360 And then it just exploded. 190 00:15:30.519 --> 00:15:35.600 The w seared off our pilot, and the cheese queens yelled. 191 00:15:35.200 --> 00:15:36.399 For us to go. 192 00:15:36.840 --> 00:15:39.919 So I jumped out and trying to get as far 193 00:15:40.000 --> 00:15:44.639 away from the debree as possible. Dorm was exploded in 194 00:15:44.720 --> 00:15:46.960 and it was really really hot, and there were cleans 195 00:15:47.000 --> 00:15:47.960 and three everywhere. 196 00:15:49.759 --> 00:15:53.360 Incredibly, all eleven people on board the planes lived to 197 00:15:53.440 --> 00:15:54.240 tell the tale. 198 00:15:56.559 --> 00:15:58.799 I just watched this on fold in front of my face, 199 00:15:58.879 --> 00:16:00.799 and it was like slowed down. 200 00:16:06.080 --> 00:16:09.879 Ten bodies skydiving through the air, all going in different directions. 201 00:16:10.840 --> 00:16:12.639 It's absolutely a miracle. 202 00:16:14.080 --> 00:16:15.360 That no one was hurt for kills. 203 00:16:27.639 --> 00:16:30.919 So what caused this spectacular mid air collision. 204 00:16:40.960 --> 00:16:45.080 Well, the two aircraft were information because the jumpers wanted 205 00:16:45.120 --> 00:16:48.840 to jump simultaneously and close together and probably link up 206 00:16:49.159 --> 00:16:51.240 in the air before they deployed the shoots. 207 00:16:55.240 --> 00:16:58.559 When flying in formation, the lead plane should maintain a 208 00:16:58.600 --> 00:17:03.919 constant speed to keep the formation tight. The trail plane 209 00:17:04.000 --> 00:17:07.400 must hold its position relative to the lead plane, remaining 210 00:17:07.440 --> 00:17:09.720 within one hundred feet of the plane up front at 211 00:17:09.759 --> 00:17:16.880 all times. It's vital good visibility is maintained. The trail 212 00:17:16.920 --> 00:17:20.359 pilot must react to even the slightest adjustments in speed 213 00:17:20.440 --> 00:17:22.599 or altitude of the plane in front. 214 00:17:24.720 --> 00:17:27.359 As soon as they see us lead, they leave. So 215 00:17:27.480 --> 00:17:28.839 that's generally how it works. 216 00:17:29.119 --> 00:17:29.400 Does not. 217 00:17:32.400 --> 00:17:36.319 As the skydivers ready to jump, suddenly they find themselves 218 00:17:36.319 --> 00:17:42.440 pinned between the two aircraft. It's only sixteen seconds since 219 00:17:42.480 --> 00:17:44.160 the first jumpers climbed out. 220 00:17:46.559 --> 00:17:49.799 When you fly in formation, then you generally have the 221 00:17:49.880 --> 00:17:53.200 least experienced pilot as the lead, and the more experienced 222 00:17:53.240 --> 00:17:57.240 pilot will follow you off to one side and slightly below. 223 00:17:57.519 --> 00:18:00.200 The lead aircraft is responsible for lookout, to make sure 224 00:18:00.240 --> 00:18:03.519 they don't bump into other aeroplanes, for navigation all the rest. 225 00:18:03.839 --> 00:18:07.160 And this guy, he has no other responsibility except to 226 00:18:07.240 --> 00:18:11.279 keep the other guy in sight to stay with him. 227 00:18:11.359 --> 00:18:12.200 That didn't happen. 228 00:18:13.480 --> 00:18:16.079 What did happen was that the trail plane got in 229 00:18:16.119 --> 00:18:19.519 front of the lead plane, which was now above and behind. 230 00:18:20.519 --> 00:18:24.759 The pilots lost sight of each other, with dramatic consequences. 231 00:18:25.799 --> 00:18:30.119 Inexperience led the two planes onto a catastrophic collision. 232 00:18:30.200 --> 00:18:43.400 Cause our pilot in the chase plane it was his 233 00:18:43.640 --> 00:18:48.559 first time whind that position in a formation. 234 00:18:53.720 --> 00:18:56.960 In this particular situation, everything is reversed. We end up 235 00:18:56.960 --> 00:19:00.519 with the more experienced pilot flying in front, and he 236 00:19:00.599 --> 00:19:02.880 ends up on top of the other airplane rather than 237 00:19:03.160 --> 00:19:05.400 behind to the side and below. 238 00:19:08.480 --> 00:19:12.480 In the Cessna one eighty series aeroplanes, these both were 239 00:19:12.759 --> 00:19:15.480 they've got high wings. When you're like that, you can't 240 00:19:15.680 --> 00:19:16.720 neither can see the other. 241 00:19:17.079 --> 00:19:21.559 See and avoid is the rule in this situation. If 242 00:19:21.599 --> 00:19:24.880 you don't see, you can't avoid. And I think it's 243 00:19:24.880 --> 00:19:25.799 as simple as that. 244 00:19:26.160 --> 00:19:30.200 This guy, who should have been following and keeping inside 245 00:19:29.759 --> 00:19:34.240 the lead aircraft at all times, lost sight of him, 246 00:19:34.359 --> 00:19:36.759 didn't know where he was. And the drill at that 247 00:19:36.880 --> 00:19:41.000 point is to break off and get clear and then 248 00:19:41.440 --> 00:19:44.960 established level flight, look around and then find out where 249 00:19:44.960 --> 00:19:47.759 he is and then rejoined safely. Okay, that's the drill. 250 00:19:48.440 --> 00:19:51.680 But no, he lost sight of him and thinks, oh, 251 00:19:51.720 --> 00:19:52.680 what's going on here? 252 00:19:53.839 --> 00:19:57.160 So on top of having the most inexperienced pilot leading 253 00:19:57.160 --> 00:20:01.680 the formation, the Cessna design with the overwing restricting vision 254 00:20:02.119 --> 00:20:05.039 caused the trail pilot to lose sight of the lead 255 00:20:06.119 --> 00:20:09.799 But why in this catalog of errors wasn't either pilot 256 00:20:09.880 --> 00:20:12.079 able to take evasive action sooner. 257 00:20:12.960 --> 00:20:15.599 One of the problems with amid air collision is the 258 00:20:15.640 --> 00:20:18.279 fact that there's no relative movement to the aeroplane. The 259 00:20:18.319 --> 00:20:21.920 airplane looks the same angle out of the window as 260 00:20:22.440 --> 00:20:23.599 you approach the collision. 261 00:20:25.119 --> 00:20:28.359 According to the FAA, while looking for other planes in 262 00:20:28.359 --> 00:20:32.480 a largely featureless sky, pilots may suffer from a phenomenon 263 00:20:32.559 --> 00:20:37.759 called eyemiopia. When our eyes scan blank sky, there is 264 00:20:37.839 --> 00:20:42.279 little to focus on. Our focal length remains short. We're 265 00:20:42.319 --> 00:20:45.680 not likely to see another airplane closing in, even if 266 00:20:45.720 --> 00:20:49.799 it's in plane sight, and by then it's often too late. 267 00:20:50.440 --> 00:20:52.680 So all you have is a dot that gets bigger 268 00:20:52.720 --> 00:20:56.319 and bigger and bigger. And our eyes are built to 269 00:20:56.440 --> 00:21:00.359 detect movement, but there's no relative movement in this case. Actually, 270 00:21:00.359 --> 00:21:02.920 it can be very difficult to see an aeroplane that 271 00:21:02.960 --> 00:21:03.839 you're going to collide with. 272 00:21:04.880 --> 00:21:08.079 Well, I never saw the other airplane comings cordus. What 273 00:21:08.160 --> 00:21:10.599 I felt was I felt the other airplane hit us, 274 00:21:11.799 --> 00:21:13.000 and I just decided time to go. 275 00:21:13.160 --> 00:21:13.799 So I let go. 276 00:21:16.160 --> 00:21:19.480 We skydive because we want action, we want things to happen. 277 00:21:19.519 --> 00:21:20.400 Well, that was about of action. 278 00:21:22.759 --> 00:21:29.079 Miraculously, everyone survives and without serious injury. Almost as incredibly, 279 00:21:29.160 --> 00:21:32.759 no one is struck by falling debris from the exploding planes. 280 00:21:33.160 --> 00:21:37.559 They were damned lucky that somebody didn't either directly get 281 00:21:37.640 --> 00:21:43.440 hit by wreckage or didn't get their parachutes snagged in 282 00:21:43.599 --> 00:21:45.599 some way while they were trying to get clear of 283 00:21:45.640 --> 00:21:52.799 the damaged aeroplanes. The wing that detached, and then the 284 00:21:52.880 --> 00:21:55.640 aeroplane tumbling through the sky, the remainder of the airplane 285 00:21:55.720 --> 00:21:58.720 to through the sky. 286 00:21:59.319 --> 00:22:02.519 We're falling than the debris, but once the opener, parachute 287 00:22:02.559 --> 00:22:05.119 is actually going to be quite opposite, and the degree 288 00:22:05.200 --> 00:22:06.960 is going to be calling faster than us. So I 289 00:22:07.000 --> 00:22:08.680 wanted to make sure I had it as a pair 290 00:22:08.720 --> 00:22:12.640 of airspace as possible to pull my parents deeply and 291 00:22:12.720 --> 00:22:13.799 make it back to the ground. 292 00:22:14.079 --> 00:22:18.960 The potential for having your parachute wrecked or your parachute 293 00:22:19.039 --> 00:22:24.279 rigging snagged in something. And the pilot of the terminally 294 00:22:24.359 --> 00:22:28.599 damaged aeroplane managed to extricate himself and use his emergency 295 00:22:28.680 --> 00:22:35.000 chute and he landed safely. Ah, that's a nightmarish to have. 296 00:22:35.039 --> 00:22:37.160 Both feet on the ground and to know that I'm 297 00:22:37.200 --> 00:22:39.039 going to see my son, and I'm going to see 298 00:22:39.039 --> 00:22:44.319 my family, and I get to continue to live, not 299 00:22:44.400 --> 00:22:49.039 to survive life, but live life. That was a very 300 00:22:49.200 --> 00:22:54.039 powerful experience that absolutely changed my life and changed my 301 00:22:54.079 --> 00:22:54.759 life for the better. 302 00:23:08.880 --> 00:23:12.920 Mid Air collisions are extremely rare, and accidents at altitude 303 00:23:12.960 --> 00:23:21.359 account for only about ten percent of all aircraft disasters. 304 00:23:22.359 --> 00:23:26.000 Over two thirds of all airplane incidents occur during takeoff 305 00:23:26.079 --> 00:23:31.079 or landing, which makes these by far the most dangerous 306 00:23:31.119 --> 00:23:38.599 phases of flying. Twenty third July twenty sixteen, a Royal 307 00:23:38.640 --> 00:23:42.839 Air Moroc Boeing seven three seven is preparing for takeoff 308 00:23:42.839 --> 00:23:54.720 at Frankfurt Airport, Runway eighteen, destination Casablanca. It seems like 309 00:23:54.759 --> 00:23:58.240 a standard takeoff, but the plane has barely left the 310 00:23:58.279 --> 00:24:04.839 ground when it quickly touched down again. The pilot attempts 311 00:24:04.839 --> 00:24:08.440 a second takeoff, but again it can't get off the ground. 312 00:24:09.119 --> 00:24:14.200 Something is clearly wrong. This time, the aircraft's tail is 313 00:24:14.279 --> 00:24:18.920 perilously close to the tarmac. This plane is running out 314 00:24:18.920 --> 00:24:24.519 of runway and the pilot is running out of options. Finally, 315 00:24:24.880 --> 00:24:28.319 on the third attempt, the seven three seven lifts off, 316 00:24:28.799 --> 00:24:32.319 its passengers, unaware of how close they came to disaster. 317 00:24:38.240 --> 00:24:45.200 So what caused this near catastrophe. 318 00:24:45.240 --> 00:24:47.799 In the case of the Air Moroc it looks as 319 00:24:47.880 --> 00:24:52.480 though the pilots were trying to get the aircraft into 320 00:24:52.480 --> 00:24:55.200 the air before it was ready to go. 321 00:24:56.160 --> 00:24:57.960 As you take off down a runway, you set the 322 00:24:57.960 --> 00:25:01.519 engine power steal the aeroplane straight down the runway, and 323 00:25:01.559 --> 00:25:04.079 as the speed builds up, you need to lift the nose. 324 00:25:04.160 --> 00:25:07.359 This is called rotation. So one of the pilots will 325 00:25:07.400 --> 00:25:10.000 say this is the speed to rotate the aeroplane out 326 00:25:10.240 --> 00:25:12.440 and then you start to pull the control column or 327 00:25:12.440 --> 00:25:15.160 the stick towards the back. The nose lifts up and 328 00:25:15.200 --> 00:25:16.960 then the aeroplane should climb away. 329 00:25:18.200 --> 00:25:21.960 At take off speed. The pilot pulls back the control column, 330 00:25:22.000 --> 00:25:25.720 lifting the aircraft's nose until it rises to an angle 331 00:25:25.759 --> 00:25:29.119 of about twelve degrees and the plane lifts up. 332 00:25:29.559 --> 00:25:33.119 If you observe an aircraft taking off, it's almost seamless, 333 00:25:33.119 --> 00:25:37.000 so as the pilot rotates, the aircraft starts to lift 334 00:25:37.039 --> 00:25:43.599 off almost immediately. What happens in the case of that 335 00:25:43.680 --> 00:25:46.920 clip is that the aircraft rotates into the flying attitude, 336 00:25:47.400 --> 00:25:51.519 but it's sort of almost bouncing along very light, but 337 00:25:51.640 --> 00:25:52.880 it's not climbing away. 338 00:25:53.880 --> 00:25:56.359 So it appears the crew on the Royal air Morock 339 00:25:56.480 --> 00:26:00.799 flight a rotating at too low a speed, lifting the 340 00:26:00.839 --> 00:26:03.799 nose of the plane too early, which could have caused 341 00:26:03.799 --> 00:26:12.039 the tail to hit the runway. Fortunately, they managed to 342 00:26:12.079 --> 00:26:15.359 control the pitch of the aircraft enough to avoid a 343 00:26:15.400 --> 00:26:20.759 tail strike before increasing their speed to achieve a successful takeoff. 344 00:26:21.960 --> 00:26:26.920 The other possibility is that the correct thrust was not set. 345 00:26:29.480 --> 00:26:32.880 The aircraft does appear to be reluctant to fly, but 346 00:26:33.000 --> 00:26:36.519 eventually it does and after that it seemed to climb 347 00:26:36.519 --> 00:26:40.480 away quite normally, which might be an indication that they 348 00:26:40.799 --> 00:26:45.599 suddenly went oh, not enough power more and the aircraft 349 00:26:45.680 --> 00:26:47.559 accelerated and climbs away normally. 350 00:26:48.400 --> 00:26:51.319 So, although it seems like pilot error is to blame, 351 00:26:52.039 --> 00:26:55.519 a Raal Airmerock statement claims the landing of a Turkish 352 00:26:55.599 --> 00:27:00.559 air flight just moments earlier caused the problem. They point 353 00:27:00.559 --> 00:27:04.200 out that the Frankfort tower advised the Morocc captain of 354 00:27:04.240 --> 00:27:09.960 the presence of wake turbulence over the runway. Wake turbulence 355 00:27:10.039 --> 00:27:13.240 is a disturbance in the atmosphere that forms behind an 356 00:27:13.279 --> 00:27:17.319 aircraft as it passes through the air. A wing tip 357 00:27:17.480 --> 00:27:21.039 vortex is the most dangerous component of this churning air. 358 00:27:22.000 --> 00:27:25.880 It occurs when a wing is generating lift, thereby causing 359 00:27:25.880 --> 00:27:28.039 a vortex to trail from each tip. 360 00:27:30.160 --> 00:27:33.559 So you've got high pressure air underneath, you've got low 361 00:27:33.640 --> 00:27:36.400 pressure air, which is the lift sucking, or two of 362 00:27:36.400 --> 00:27:39.759 them will act together to produce what we call lift. 363 00:27:40.640 --> 00:27:43.880 What happens to the wingtip when those the high pressure 364 00:27:43.960 --> 00:27:48.480 underneath meets the low pressure up dear starts to spin 365 00:27:49.119 --> 00:27:50.279 what's know as a vortex. 366 00:27:53.759 --> 00:27:58.200 Wingtip vortices spread laterally away from the plane. Their strength 367 00:27:58.279 --> 00:28:01.960 determined primarily by the and air speed of the aircraft. 368 00:28:08.240 --> 00:28:11.799 During takeoff and landing, aircraft operate at a high angle 369 00:28:11.839 --> 00:28:18.759 of attack, which maximizes the formation of strong vortices. This 370 00:28:18.880 --> 00:28:23.200 makes wake turbulence most dangerous during takeoff and landing, when 371 00:28:23.240 --> 00:28:28.640 there's little altitude for recovery. If the onset of wake 372 00:28:28.759 --> 00:28:32.440 is occurring, immediate invasive action is vital. 373 00:28:34.240 --> 00:28:38.519 And that's why there are minimum separation distances for times 374 00:28:38.799 --> 00:28:43.079 between aircraft arriving on the same flight path. 375 00:28:49.559 --> 00:28:53.079 As a result of the alleged wake turbulence, air Morocs 376 00:28:53.160 --> 00:28:56.480 said that their captain performed a maneuver to accelerate in 377 00:28:56.559 --> 00:29:03.119 order to achieve speeds permitting a safe takeoff. However, an 378 00:29:03.160 --> 00:29:07.359 accident investigation said it wasn't possible to establish whether this 379 00:29:07.599 --> 00:29:12.000 was the cause and decided to refrain from initiating an investigation. 380 00:29:13.599 --> 00:29:16.480 Certainly, the way that the aeroplane was flying doesn't necessarily 381 00:29:16.559 --> 00:29:19.720 look as if it was encountering awake turbance. 382 00:29:21.160 --> 00:29:24.799 There was some explanation proffered about wake turbulence from the 383 00:29:24.880 --> 00:29:27.599 flight bef ire. No, I don't give that much credence 384 00:29:27.680 --> 00:29:29.200 at all. 385 00:29:29.400 --> 00:29:33.039 Whatever the reason, and despite a very shaky start, the 386 00:29:33.119 --> 00:29:44.480 aircraft continued safely on to Casablanca. Although flying is safer 387 00:29:44.559 --> 00:29:48.200 than ever, flight deck confusion is by far the leading 388 00:29:48.319 --> 00:29:52.680 cause of commercial airline accidents, with close to eighty percent 389 00:29:52.759 --> 00:29:57.720 of all incidents caused by pilot error, and when it 390 00:29:57.759 --> 00:30:04.200 comes to light aircraft, the skill the limit. June thirtieth, 391 00:30:04.240 --> 00:30:08.279 twenty twelve, a group of family and friends are returning 392 00:30:08.319 --> 00:30:12.359 from a hiking trip in the aptly named frank Church 393 00:30:12.720 --> 00:30:19.039 River of No Return wilderness in Idaho. The aircraft, an 394 00:30:19.079 --> 00:30:22.440 aged Stinson one oh eight, is at Bruce Meadow's High 395 00:30:22.440 --> 00:30:27.319 Altitude Airfield, taxiing down the five thousand foot dirt airstrip 396 00:30:37.440 --> 00:30:40.559 with full fuel tanks and four people on board. The 397 00:30:40.640 --> 00:30:43.160 plane is close to its maximum takeoff weight. 398 00:30:47.759 --> 00:30:51.839 It's a four seater with four people in it. A 399 00:30:51.880 --> 00:30:56.640 lot of light aircraft, you can't have full passenger load 400 00:30:56.920 --> 00:30:57.759 and full fuel. 401 00:31:04.519 --> 00:31:08.400