1 00:00:01,720 --> 00:00:05,320 Speaker 1: More people are flying than ever, and cameras and phones 2 00:00:05,360 --> 00:00:11,919 are all part of the trip, capturing unbelievable moments of danger. 3 00:00:14,599 --> 00:00:15,000 Speaker 2: The plane. 4 00:00:15,919 --> 00:00:19,239 Speaker 1: For the first time, we unpacked the science of what's 5 00:00:19,320 --> 00:00:22,920 really going on in these caught on camera crises. 6 00:00:23,679 --> 00:00:25,079 Speaker 3: Grace for Impact, Grace for. 7 00:00:25,079 --> 00:00:30,160 Speaker 1: Impact, revealing in forensic detail how and why flights turned deadly. 8 00:00:30,719 --> 00:00:34,240 Speaker 4: He was literally clinging to the air to stay ab. 9 00:00:36,640 --> 00:00:40,640 Speaker 1: Unraveling secret stories from cockpit error to engine failure. 10 00:00:40,880 --> 00:00:43,520 Speaker 5: We just had an announcements We've got on emergency landing. 11 00:00:43,600 --> 00:00:54,240 Speaker 1: From freak weather to meltdown on the runwaysh discover the 12 00:00:54,320 --> 00:01:02,880 surprising truth behind planes gone viral. With more aircraft in 13 00:01:02,960 --> 00:01:07,079 the sky than ever before, pressure on pilots has never 14 00:01:07,159 --> 00:01:09,760 been higher. Do you want to dispatch the emergency vehicles? 15 00:01:10,000 --> 00:01:13,040 They need to get us safely where we want to go, 16 00:01:13,560 --> 00:01:16,680 when we want to get there. But every time we 17 00:01:16,840 --> 00:01:19,760 take to the air, there's a risk that the pilot 18 00:01:20,120 --> 00:01:21,159 may make an error. 19 00:01:21,239 --> 00:01:26,439 Speaker 6: Oh my god, it's gonna stand Come on, buddy. 20 00:01:27,680 --> 00:01:30,400 Speaker 1: A sudden lack of concentration. 21 00:01:29,920 --> 00:01:31,280 Speaker 7: It's like time slowed down. 22 00:01:31,760 --> 00:01:36,719 Speaker 1: A miscalculation or a wrong command at thirty five thousand 23 00:01:36,760 --> 00:01:38,719 feet can end in disaster. 24 00:01:40,719 --> 00:01:44,200 Speaker 4: He was literally clinging to the air to stay airborn. 25 00:01:45,120 --> 00:01:48,400 Speaker 1: But sometimes a cool head can be all a pilot 26 00:01:48,519 --> 00:01:50,000 needs to save the day. 27 00:01:51,560 --> 00:01:53,640 Speaker 3: I wouldn't be sitting here today if it wasn't for 28 00:01:53,760 --> 00:01:54,640 his ringers. 29 00:01:55,879 --> 00:02:05,000 Speaker 1: And turn a potential tragedy into triumph. November one, twenty eleven, 30 00:02:06,920 --> 00:02:11,599 lot for Like to zero sixteen approaches Warsaw, Poland after 31 00:02:11,599 --> 00:02:15,280 an eight hour flight from Newark, New Jersey, on board 32 00:02:15,439 --> 00:02:17,360 two hundred and thirty one people. 33 00:02:20,439 --> 00:02:28,479 Speaker 8: This flight was the same as any other flight. 34 00:02:27,240 --> 00:02:32,240 Speaker 1: For the passengers. The initial descent seems normal, but pilot 35 00:02:32,560 --> 00:02:37,000 Captain Varona and Polish air traffic Control realize they have 36 00:02:37,039 --> 00:02:42,319 a problem. 37 00:02:42,439 --> 00:02:47,240 Speaker 8: Things started getting a little unusual and there was a 38 00:02:47,240 --> 00:02:51,479 lot of activity with the flight attendants going back and 39 00:02:51,599 --> 00:02:55,599 forth to the cockpit area, you know, stopping against sam ray. 40 00:02:57,759 --> 00:03:02,039 Speaker 1: The Polish Air Force scrambles to F sixteen fighters to 41 00:03:02,199 --> 00:03:09,680 shadow the flight, but they can only confirm what the 42 00:03:09,800 --> 00:03:17,680 crew already know. This Boeing seven sixty seven is coming 43 00:03:17,719 --> 00:03:20,000 in with no landing gear. 44 00:03:21,000 --> 00:03:24,759 Speaker 9: I looked out the window and I saw F sixteen 45 00:03:24,960 --> 00:03:26,039 circling our plane. 46 00:03:26,159 --> 00:03:28,360 Speaker 3: Yeah, this just is not a normal occurrence. 47 00:03:28,680 --> 00:03:31,960 Speaker 9: There were people who were screaming at certain areas of 48 00:03:32,000 --> 00:03:35,360 the plane and just you know, wanting answers, while't even 49 00:03:35,400 --> 00:03:36,319 know what was happening. 50 00:03:37,080 --> 00:03:40,400 Speaker 1: What's happening is the seven sixty seven is circling Warsaw 51 00:03:40,759 --> 00:03:44,520 to burn off excess fuel ready for an emergency landing. 52 00:03:45,319 --> 00:03:48,199 Speaker 9: And as we were circling around, they didn't tell us. 53 00:03:48,919 --> 00:03:51,280 Speaker 3: We didn't know why we were making this emergency in 54 00:03:51,319 --> 00:03:54,919 the landing. We didn't know what the actual reason was. 55 00:03:55,719 --> 00:03:59,479 Speaker 1: To minimize the risk of an explosion. Captain Rohner wants 56 00:03:59,479 --> 00:04:06,840 his fuel tanks running on empty wheels or no wheels. 57 00:04:07,400 --> 00:04:08,840 This plane's coming down. 58 00:04:10,080 --> 00:04:19,879 Speaker 9: We're getting closer and closer to the runway. I see 59 00:04:19,920 --> 00:04:27,199 the plane lowering, lowering, lowering. 60 00:04:27,639 --> 00:04:30,160 Speaker 1: No one has ever tried to land a seven sixty 61 00:04:30,199 --> 00:04:31,839 seven without wheels. 62 00:04:33,160 --> 00:04:39,120 Speaker 3: Grace for impact, Grace for impact. I was never so 63 00:04:39,240 --> 00:04:42,399 fearful in my life. 64 00:04:47,439 --> 00:04:52,439 Speaker 9: The prospect of death being moments away is a darting prospect. 65 00:05:25,560 --> 00:05:29,439 Speaker 1: The aircraft finally screeches to a halt, but the danger 66 00:05:29,560 --> 00:05:30,560 is far from over. 67 00:05:31,160 --> 00:05:35,519 Speaker 9: Of course, everybody roared with the applause, you know, everybody 68 00:05:35,560 --> 00:05:40,279 was celebrating, and literally we had the flight attendant scream. 69 00:05:40,040 --> 00:05:44,480 Speaker 3: Get off this plane now, and made everybody get up 70 00:05:44,480 --> 00:05:47,920 and we're hysterical and in fear that this plane was 71 00:05:47,959 --> 00:05:54,600 going to blow up. There was smoke. 72 00:05:54,800 --> 00:05:59,120 Speaker 8: Coming into the plane from the engine that was on fire. 73 00:06:01,720 --> 00:06:04,839 Speaker 3: It smelled the smoke and it smelled like burning fuel. 74 00:06:08,160 --> 00:06:12,560 Speaker 9: Those slide rafts came out and everybody is literally in 75 00:06:12,920 --> 00:06:17,439 a mad dish to get off the plane. 76 00:06:21,839 --> 00:06:29,519 Speaker 1: The evacuation takes just ninety seconds. Amazingly, not one of 77 00:06:29,560 --> 00:06:33,639 the two hundred and twenty passengers or eleven crew are injured. 78 00:06:46,680 --> 00:06:55,639 The problem begins as the plane leaves Newark. Just after takeoff. 79 00:06:56,040 --> 00:07:02,839 Captain Varner pulls up the wheels. Immediately, cockpit alarms indicate 80 00:07:02,879 --> 00:07:09,600 a fault with the hydraulic system powering the undercarriage. 81 00:07:11,079 --> 00:07:18,480 Speaker 4: This lot Polish Airlines aircraft had a hydraulic problem. It 82 00:07:18,600 --> 00:07:22,600 wasn't affecting the flight, but it affected the way in 83 00:07:22,720 --> 00:07:27,600 which the undercarriage of the aeroplane the airplane's wheels could 84 00:07:27,639 --> 00:07:28,199 be lowered. 85 00:07:29,560 --> 00:07:33,600 Speaker 1: Fortunately, modern aircraft have an electrical backup if the undercarriage 86 00:07:33,680 --> 00:07:38,600 hydraulics fail. Captain Varner flies on to Poland, assuming he 87 00:07:38,639 --> 00:07:41,360 can use the standby system. When he comes into land 88 00:07:41,399 --> 00:07:45,920 in Warsaw after a flight of almost eight hours, he's 89 00:07:45,959 --> 00:07:49,839 making his final approach to Warsaw Airport, knowing full well 90 00:07:49,920 --> 00:07:52,959 he has no hydraulic system to lower the landing gear. 91 00:07:54,560 --> 00:08:00,360 It's time to employ the electrical failsafe backup. The only 92 00:08:00,399 --> 00:08:03,160 problem with the backup is that you can't test it 93 00:08:03,199 --> 00:08:06,560 in flight. You can only use it once, and then 94 00:08:06,800 --> 00:08:08,360 only when you really need it. 95 00:08:09,800 --> 00:08:13,720 Speaker 5: As the aircraft approached Warsaw, then the flight crew obviously 96 00:08:13,800 --> 00:08:16,639 needed to lower the undercarriage before landing. 97 00:08:16,879 --> 00:08:20,920 Speaker 1: As he nears the airport, Captain Vrohner engages the backup 98 00:08:20,959 --> 00:08:25,079 system and nothing happens. 99 00:08:26,439 --> 00:08:29,279 Speaker 5: They tried lowering it with the standard system and that 100 00:08:29,319 --> 00:08:32,159 didn't work. They tried to lower with what's called the 101 00:08:32,200 --> 00:08:34,919 alternate system. That didn't work as well. 102 00:08:35,840 --> 00:08:40,000 Speaker 1: Vrona is high and dry over Warsaw with no hydraulics, 103 00:08:40,360 --> 00:08:45,360 no electrical backup, and no wheels. Flight zero sixteen is 104 00:08:45,399 --> 00:08:47,480 in trouble, deep trouble. 105 00:08:48,279 --> 00:08:52,480 Speaker 4: So the crew told the air traffic control and circled. 106 00:08:53,279 --> 00:08:56,080 Speaker 1: The fail safe system has failed. 107 00:08:57,600 --> 00:08:59,559 Speaker 5: It's one of those days where it's a hard day 108 00:08:59,600 --> 00:09:01,240 at the office, but you're trained for it. 109 00:09:03,799 --> 00:09:06,519 Speaker 1: With no undercarriage and the lives of two hundred and 110 00:09:06,600 --> 00:09:10,159 thirty one people at stake, Vroner has no option but 111 00:09:10,240 --> 00:09:17,000 to land the plane with no wheels. In a normal landing, 112 00:09:17,440 --> 00:09:20,480 he'd lift the nose slightly to reduce the rate of descent, 113 00:09:21,120 --> 00:09:25,360 landing on the back wheels first before engaging reverse thrust 114 00:09:25,720 --> 00:09:33,480 and applying the wheel brakes. With no wheels and no brakes, 115 00:09:34,080 --> 00:09:37,080 Broner's best chance is to touch down resting on the 116 00:09:37,159 --> 00:09:41,000 two engines and the rear part of the fuselage as 117 00:09:41,039 --> 00:09:44,960 delicately as possible. It's what pilots call a gear up 118 00:09:45,480 --> 00:09:46,399 or belly landing. 119 00:09:47,000 --> 00:09:49,240 Speaker 5: Eventually, they had decided that they had to do a 120 00:09:49,279 --> 00:09:52,679 gear up landing, so no undercarriage legs coming down. 121 00:09:53,320 --> 00:09:56,879 Speaker 1: This will hopefully ensure it lands relatively smoothly on the 122 00:09:56,919 --> 00:10:00,559 engine casings instead of slamming down on the nose or tail, 123 00:10:01,000 --> 00:10:03,519 causing the plane to cartwheel and explode. 124 00:10:04,039 --> 00:10:06,440 Speaker 5: For a pilot, it's not really something you want to do. 125 00:10:06,639 --> 00:10:08,480 Speaker 4: I wouldn't like to have to do a bonny landing. 126 00:10:08,519 --> 00:10:08,919 Speaker 10: I wouldn't. 127 00:10:08,960 --> 00:10:12,080 Speaker 4: I'd very much not like to be a passenger. During one. 128 00:10:13,559 --> 00:10:16,519 Speaker 1: One hundred and seventy nine tons of Boeing seven sixty 129 00:10:16,559 --> 00:10:19,039 seven is about to hit the runway at one hundred 130 00:10:19,039 --> 00:10:23,960 and eighty miles an hour with minimal directional control and 131 00:10:24,000 --> 00:10:29,840 no brakes. Emergency services spray foam on the runway in 132 00:10:29,879 --> 00:10:34,919 a desperate attempt to stop Flight zero sixteen turning into 133 00:10:34,919 --> 00:10:35,720 a fireball. 134 00:10:38,399 --> 00:10:45,559 Speaker 4: It would feel dreadful, The noise would be frightening. The 135 00:10:45,759 --> 00:10:49,919 mere fact that you know exactly what's happening that's going 136 00:10:50,000 --> 00:10:55,320 to be absolutely awful. 137 00:10:55,399 --> 00:10:59,120 Speaker 1: So why didn't this aircraft catch fire when it's smashed 138 00:10:59,120 --> 00:11:04,840 down on its enngine? Up to eighty percent of the 139 00:11:04,879 --> 00:11:08,559 material used in a modern aircraft is aluminium. It's both 140 00:11:08,679 --> 00:11:18,000 light and strong. Crucially, unlike steel, aluminium doesn't produce many 141 00:11:18,039 --> 00:11:23,720 sparks during friction, and the remaining fuel on this boeing 142 00:11:23,799 --> 00:11:27,840 is in sealed tanks well away from the engines. So 143 00:11:27,919 --> 00:11:31,159 if the landing is controlled and smooth, the hope is 144 00:11:31,240 --> 00:11:35,879 the aircraft is less likely to catch fire, which means, 145 00:11:35,960 --> 00:11:39,320 thanks to Varna and the emergency services at Warsaw Airport, 146 00:11:39,720 --> 00:11:42,960 this was one belly landing that didn't go belly up? 147 00:11:45,960 --> 00:11:48,720 But how had the failsafe system failed? 148 00:11:49,679 --> 00:11:52,559 Speaker 5: Essentially, the undercarriage didn't come down when they were required 149 00:11:52,559 --> 00:11:55,960 to on approach. What they hadn't detected was the fact 150 00:11:56,000 --> 00:11:58,480 that a circuit breaker, which is like a fuse that 151 00:11:58,559 --> 00:12:01,000 had popped now wider pop nobody knows. 152 00:12:01,679 --> 00:12:06,200 Speaker 1: Accident investigators discovered that the supply of electricity powering the 153 00:12:06,240 --> 00:12:08,440 backup landing gear had cut out. 154 00:12:09,240 --> 00:12:11,720 Speaker 4: That had been switched off, and they didn't know that, 155 00:12:12,000 --> 00:12:16,480 and that's why the standby system for lowering the wheels 156 00:12:16,720 --> 00:12:18,879 wasn't working. There was nothing wrong with it, it was 157 00:12:18,919 --> 00:12:19,679 just switched off. 158 00:12:22,399 --> 00:12:26,759 Speaker 1: Someone had accidentally knocked the switch and this went unnoticed. 159 00:12:27,919 --> 00:12:30,919 A simple incident, but one that nearly led to a 160 00:12:30,960 --> 00:12:40,120 fatal disaster. Six days after pulling off his spectacular landing, 161 00:12:40,679 --> 00:12:45,159 Captain Varner was awarded the Order of Polonia Restitutor, one 162 00:12:45,159 --> 00:12:49,480 of Poland's highest decorations, and acclaimed a national hero. 163 00:12:51,159 --> 00:12:52,320 Speaker 3: He knocked it out of the park. 164 00:12:52,840 --> 00:12:58,600 Speaker 8: Captain Rona is a hero and I will be forever 165 00:12:58,720 --> 00:13:01,440 indebted to him because I wouldn't be sitting here today 166 00:13:01,519 --> 00:13:06,039 talking to you if it wasn't for his greatness. 167 00:13:11,440 --> 00:13:16,679 Speaker 1: Despite increasing levels of aircraft reliability, pilots still require a 168 00:13:16,720 --> 00:13:21,120 great deal of training, skill, and crucially calmness under pressure 169 00:13:24,279 --> 00:13:27,600 to captain a commercial aircraft. In the US, the Federal 170 00:13:27,639 --> 00:13:31,919 Aviation Authority stipulates you must clock up at least fifteen 171 00:13:32,039 --> 00:13:36,519 hundred hours in the air. But the man at the 172 00:13:36,559 --> 00:13:39,919 controls of this light aircraft still has a long way 173 00:13:39,960 --> 00:13:49,480 to go. Twelve thousand feet above Wisconsin, three skydivers are 174 00:13:49,519 --> 00:14:05,759 seconds away from their sixth and final jump of the day. 175 00:14:10,840 --> 00:14:16,080 Two Cessna's are flying in close formation, and just as 176 00:14:16,120 --> 00:14:18,240 the sky divers they're about to jump. 177 00:14:34,120 --> 00:14:36,799 Speaker 7: They're flying and they're getting ready to go ahead and 178 00:14:36,840 --> 00:14:38,879 get out. So I was actually the first one out 179 00:14:38,919 --> 00:14:40,440 the door, and I climbed all the way out to 180 00:14:40,480 --> 00:14:43,480 the outside of the strut, and I hang on out 181 00:14:43,480 --> 00:14:46,080 there while everybody else is climbing out of the airplane 182 00:14:46,200 --> 00:14:47,120 getting ready to jump. 183 00:14:48,200 --> 00:14:49,879 Speaker 10: I felt just jold, and. 184 00:14:49,840 --> 00:14:54,159 Speaker 7: I knew that the airplanes had collided, so I. 185 00:14:53,440 --> 00:14:54,000 Speaker 3: Just let go. 186 00:15:02,600 --> 00:15:05,559 Speaker 1: This is one jump the skydivers will never forget. 187 00:15:23,559 --> 00:15:25,919 Speaker 11: I was getting ready to climb out of a plan 188 00:15:26,480 --> 00:15:27,919 to get to the Native. 189 00:15:27,879 --> 00:15:29,360 Speaker 9: And then it just exploded. 190 00:15:30,519 --> 00:15:35,600 Speaker 11: The w seared off our pilot, and the cheese queens yelled. 191 00:15:35,200 --> 00:15:36,399 Speaker 3: For us to go. 192 00:15:36,840 --> 00:15:39,919 Speaker 11: So I jumped out and trying to get as far 193 00:15:40,000 --> 00:15:44,639 away from the debree as possible. Dorm was exploded in 194 00:15:44,720 --> 00:15:46,960 and it was really really hot, and there were cleans 195 00:15:47,000 --> 00:15:47,960 and three everywhere. 196 00:15:49,759 --> 00:15:53,360 Speaker 1: Incredibly, all eleven people on board the planes lived to 197 00:15:53,440 --> 00:15:54,240 tell the tale. 198 00:15:56,559 --> 00:15:58,799 Speaker 7: I just watched this on fold in front of my face, 199 00:15:58,879 --> 00:16:00,799 and it was like slowed down. 200 00:16:06,080 --> 00:16:09,879 Speaker 11: Ten bodies skydiving through the air, all going in different directions. 201 00:16:10,840 --> 00:16:12,639 It's absolutely a miracle. 202 00:16:14,080 --> 00:16:15,360 Speaker 3: That no one was hurt for kills. 203 00:16:27,639 --> 00:16:30,919 Speaker 1: So what caused this spectacular mid air collision. 204 00:16:40,960 --> 00:16:45,080 Speaker 10: Well, the two aircraft were information because the jumpers wanted 205 00:16:45,120 --> 00:16:48,840 to jump simultaneously and close together and probably link up 206 00:16:49,159 --> 00:16:51,240 in the air before they deployed the shoots. 207 00:16:55,240 --> 00:16:58,559 Speaker 1: When flying in formation, the lead plane should maintain a 208 00:16:58,600 --> 00:17:03,919 constant speed to keep the formation tight. The trail plane 209 00:17:04,000 --> 00:17:07,400 must hold its position relative to the lead plane, remaining 210 00:17:07,440 --> 00:17:09,720 within one hundred feet of the plane up front at 211 00:17:09,759 --> 00:17:16,880 all times. It's vital good visibility is maintained. The trail 212 00:17:16,920 --> 00:17:20,359 pilot must react to even the slightest adjustments in speed 213 00:17:20,440 --> 00:17:22,599 or altitude of the plane in front. 214 00:17:24,720 --> 00:17:27,359 Speaker 7: As soon as they see us lead, they leave. So 215 00:17:27,480 --> 00:17:28,839 that's generally how it works. 216 00:17:29,119 --> 00:17:29,400 Speaker 9: Does not. 217 00:17:32,400 --> 00:17:36,319 Speaker 1: As the skydivers ready to jump, suddenly they find themselves 218 00:17:36,319 --> 00:17:42,440 pinned between the two aircraft. It's only sixteen seconds since 219 00:17:42,480 --> 00:17:44,160 the first jumpers climbed out. 220 00:17:46,559 --> 00:17:49,799 Speaker 5: When you fly in formation, then you generally have the 221 00:17:49,880 --> 00:17:53,200 least experienced pilot as the lead, and the more experienced 222 00:17:53,240 --> 00:17:57,240 pilot will follow you off to one side and slightly below. 223 00:17:57,519 --> 00:18:00,200 Speaker 4: The lead aircraft is responsible for lookout, to make sure 224 00:18:00,240 --> 00:18:03,519 they don't bump into other aeroplanes, for navigation all the rest. 225 00:18:03,839 --> 00:18:07,160 And this guy, he has no other responsibility except to 226 00:18:07,240 --> 00:18:11,279 keep the other guy in sight to stay with him. 227 00:18:11,359 --> 00:18:12,200 That didn't happen. 228 00:18:13,480 --> 00:18:16,079 Speaker 1: What did happen was that the trail plane got in 229 00:18:16,119 --> 00:18:19,519 front of the lead plane, which was now above and behind. 230 00:18:20,519 --> 00:18:24,759 The pilots lost sight of each other, with dramatic consequences. 231 00:18:25,799 --> 00:18:30,119 Inexperience led the two planes onto a catastrophic collision. 232 00:18:30,200 --> 00:18:43,400 Speaker 11: Cause our pilot in the chase plane it was his 233 00:18:43,640 --> 00:18:48,559 first time whind that position in a formation. 234 00:18:53,720 --> 00:18:56,960 Speaker 5: In this particular situation, everything is reversed. We end up 235 00:18:56,960 --> 00:19:00,519 with the more experienced pilot flying in front, and he 236 00:19:00,599 --> 00:19:02,880 ends up on top of the other airplane rather than 237 00:19:03,160 --> 00:19:05,400 behind to the side and below. 238 00:19:08,480 --> 00:19:12,480 Speaker 4: In the Cessna one eighty series aeroplanes, these both were 239 00:19:12,759 --> 00:19:15,480 they've got high wings. When you're like that, you can't 240 00:19:15,680 --> 00:19:16,720 neither can see the other. 241 00:19:17,079 --> 00:19:21,559 Speaker 10: See and avoid is the rule in this situation. If 242 00:19:21,599 --> 00:19:24,880 you don't see, you can't avoid. And I think it's 243 00:19:24,880 --> 00:19:25,799 as simple as that. 244 00:19:26,160 --> 00:19:30,200 Speaker 4: This guy, who should have been following and keeping inside 245 00:19:29,759 --> 00:19:34,240 the lead aircraft at all times, lost sight of him, 246 00:19:34,359 --> 00:19:36,759 didn't know where he was. And the drill at that 247 00:19:36,880 --> 00:19:41,000 point is to break off and get clear and then 248 00:19:41,440 --> 00:19:44,960 established level flight, look around and then find out where 249 00:19:44,960 --> 00:19:47,759 he is and then rejoined safely. Okay, that's the drill. 250 00:19:48,440 --> 00:19:51,680 But no, he lost sight of him and thinks, oh, 251 00:19:51,720 --> 00:19:52,680 what's going on here? 252 00:19:53,839 --> 00:19:57,160 Speaker 1: So on top of having the most inexperienced pilot leading 253 00:19:57,160 --> 00:20:01,680 the formation, the Cessna design with the overwing restricting vision 254 00:20:02,119 --> 00:20:05,039 caused the trail pilot to lose sight of the lead 255 00:20:06,119 --> 00:20:09,799 But why in this catalog of errors wasn't either pilot 256 00:20:09,880 --> 00:20:12,079 able to take evasive action sooner. 257 00:20:12,960 --> 00:20:15,599 Speaker 5: One of the problems with amid air collision is the 258 00:20:15,640 --> 00:20:18,279 fact that there's no relative movement to the aeroplane. The 259 00:20:18,319 --> 00:20:21,920 airplane looks the same angle out of the window as 260 00:20:22,440 --> 00:20:23,599 you approach the collision. 261 00:20:25,119 --> 00:20:28,359 Speaker 1: According to the FAA, while looking for other planes in 262 00:20:28,359 --> 00:20:32,480 a largely featureless sky, pilots may suffer from a phenomenon 263 00:20:32,559 --> 00:20:37,759 called eyemiopia. When our eyes scan blank sky, there is 264 00:20:37,839 --> 00:20:42,279 little to focus on. Our focal length remains short. We're 265 00:20:42,319 --> 00:20:45,680 not likely to see another airplane closing in, even if 266 00:20:45,720 --> 00:20:49,799 it's in plane sight, and by then it's often too late. 267 00:20:50,440 --> 00:20:52,680 Speaker 5: So all you have is a dot that gets bigger 268 00:20:52,720 --> 00:20:56,319 and bigger and bigger. And our eyes are built to 269 00:20:56,440 --> 00:21:00,359 detect movement, but there's no relative movement in this case. Actually, 270 00:21:00,359 --> 00:21:02,920 it can be very difficult to see an aeroplane that 271 00:21:02,960 --> 00:21:03,839 you're going to collide with. 272 00:21:04,880 --> 00:21:08,079 Speaker 7: Well, I never saw the other airplane comings cordus. What 273 00:21:08,160 --> 00:21:10,599 I felt was I felt the other airplane hit us, 274 00:21:11,799 --> 00:21:13,000 and I just decided time to go. 275 00:21:13,160 --> 00:21:13,799 Speaker 10: So I let go. 276 00:21:16,160 --> 00:21:19,480 Speaker 7: We skydive because we want action, we want things to happen. 277 00:21:19,519 --> 00:21:20,400 Speaker 3: Well, that was about of action. 278 00:21:22,759 --> 00:21:29,079 Speaker 1: Miraculously, everyone survives and without serious injury. Almost as incredibly, 279 00:21:29,160 --> 00:21:32,759 no one is struck by falling debris from the exploding planes. 280 00:21:33,160 --> 00:21:37,559 Speaker 4: They were damned lucky that somebody didn't either directly get 281 00:21:37,640 --> 00:21:43,440 hit by wreckage or didn't get their parachutes snagged in 282 00:21:43,599 --> 00:21:45,599 some way while they were trying to get clear of 283 00:21:45,640 --> 00:21:52,799 the damaged aeroplanes. The wing that detached, and then the 284 00:21:52,880 --> 00:21:55,640 aeroplane tumbling through the sky, the remainder of the airplane 285 00:21:55,720 --> 00:21:58,720 to through the sky. 286 00:21:59,319 --> 00:22:02,519 Speaker 11: We're falling than the debris, but once the opener, parachute 287 00:22:02,559 --> 00:22:05,119 is actually going to be quite opposite, and the degree 288 00:22:05,200 --> 00:22:06,960 is going to be calling faster than us. So I 289 00:22:07,000 --> 00:22:08,680 wanted to make sure I had it as a pair 290 00:22:08,720 --> 00:22:12,640 of airspace as possible to pull my parents deeply and 291 00:22:12,720 --> 00:22:13,799 make it back to the ground. 292 00:22:14,079 --> 00:22:18,960 Speaker 4: The potential for having your parachute wrecked or your parachute 293 00:22:19,039 --> 00:22:24,279 rigging snagged in something. And the pilot of the terminally 294 00:22:24,359 --> 00:22:28,599 damaged aeroplane managed to extricate himself and use his emergency 295 00:22:28,680 --> 00:22:35,000 chute and he landed safely. Ah, that's a nightmarish to have. 296 00:22:35,039 --> 00:22:37,160 Speaker 11: Both feet on the ground and to know that I'm 297 00:22:37,200 --> 00:22:39,039 going to see my son, and I'm going to see 298 00:22:39,039 --> 00:22:44,319 my family, and I get to continue to live, not 299 00:22:44,400 --> 00:22:49,039 to survive life, but live life. That was a very 300 00:22:49,200 --> 00:22:54,039 powerful experience that absolutely changed my life and changed my 301 00:22:54,079 --> 00:22:54,759 life for the better. 302 00:23:08,880 --> 00:23:12,920 Speaker 1: Mid Air collisions are extremely rare, and accidents at altitude 303 00:23:12,960 --> 00:23:21,359 account for only about ten percent of all aircraft disasters. 304 00:23:22,359 --> 00:23:26,000 Over two thirds of all airplane incidents occur during takeoff 305 00:23:26,079 --> 00:23:31,079 or landing, which makes these by far the most dangerous 306 00:23:31,119 --> 00:23:38,599 phases of flying. Twenty third July twenty sixteen, a Royal 307 00:23:38,640 --> 00:23:42,839 Air Moroc Boeing seven three seven is preparing for takeoff 308 00:23:42,839 --> 00:23:54,720 at Frankfurt Airport, Runway eighteen, destination Casablanca. It seems like 309 00:23:54,759 --> 00:23:58,240 a standard takeoff, but the plane has barely left the 310 00:23:58,279 --> 00:24:04,839 ground when it quickly touched down again. The pilot attempts 311 00:24:04,839 --> 00:24:08,440 a second takeoff, but again it can't get off the ground. 312 00:24:09,119 --> 00:24:14,200 Something is clearly wrong. This time, the aircraft's tail is 313 00:24:14,279 --> 00:24:18,920 perilously close to the tarmac. This plane is running out 314 00:24:18,920 --> 00:24:24,519 of runway and the pilot is running out of options. Finally, 315 00:24:24,880 --> 00:24:28,319 on the third attempt, the seven three seven lifts off, 316 00:24:28,799 --> 00:24:32,319 its passengers, unaware of how close they came to disaster. 317 00:24:38,240 --> 00:24:45,200 So what caused this near catastrophe. 318 00:24:45,240 --> 00:24:47,799 Speaker 10: In the case of the Air Moroc it looks as 319 00:24:47,880 --> 00:24:52,480 though the pilots were trying to get the aircraft into 320 00:24:52,480 --> 00:24:55,200 the air before it was ready to go. 321 00:24:56,160 --> 00:24:57,960 Speaker 5: As you take off down a runway, you set the 322 00:24:57,960 --> 00:25:01,519 engine power steal the aeroplane straight down the runway, and 323 00:25:01,559 --> 00:25:04,079 as the speed builds up, you need to lift the nose. 324 00:25:04,160 --> 00:25:07,359 This is called rotation. So one of the pilots will 325 00:25:07,400 --> 00:25:10,000 say this is the speed to rotate the aeroplane out 326 00:25:10,240 --> 00:25:12,440 and then you start to pull the control column or 327 00:25:12,440 --> 00:25:15,160 the stick towards the back. The nose lifts up and 328 00:25:15,200 --> 00:25:16,960 then the aeroplane should climb away. 329 00:25:18,200 --> 00:25:21,960 Speaker 1: At take off speed. The pilot pulls back the control column, 330 00:25:22,000 --> 00:25:25,720 lifting the aircraft's nose until it rises to an angle 331 00:25:25,759 --> 00:25:29,119 of about twelve degrees and the plane lifts up. 332 00:25:29,559 --> 00:25:33,119 Speaker 10: If you observe an aircraft taking off, it's almost seamless, 333 00:25:33,119 --> 00:25:37,000 so as the pilot rotates, the aircraft starts to lift 334 00:25:37,039 --> 00:25:43,599 off almost immediately. What happens in the case of that 335 00:25:43,680 --> 00:25:46,920 clip is that the aircraft rotates into the flying attitude, 336 00:25:47,400 --> 00:25:51,519 but it's sort of almost bouncing along very light, but 337 00:25:51,640 --> 00:25:52,880 it's not climbing away. 338 00:25:53,880 --> 00:25:56,359 Speaker 1: So it appears the crew on the Royal air Morock 339 00:25:56,480 --> 00:26:00,799 flight a rotating at too low a speed, lifting the 340 00:26:00,839 --> 00:26:03,799 nose of the plane too early, which could have caused 341 00:26:03,799 --> 00:26:12,039 the tail to hit the runway. Fortunately, they managed to 342 00:26:12,079 --> 00:26:15,359 control the pitch of the aircraft enough to avoid a 343 00:26:15,400 --> 00:26:20,759 tail strike before increasing their speed to achieve a successful takeoff. 344 00:26:21,960 --> 00:26:26,920 Speaker 10: The other possibility is that the correct thrust was not set. 345 00:26:29,480 --> 00:26:32,880 The aircraft does appear to be reluctant to fly, but 346 00:26:33,000 --> 00:26:36,519 eventually it does and after that it seemed to climb 347 00:26:36,519 --> 00:26:40,480 away quite normally, which might be an indication that they 348 00:26:40,799 --> 00:26:45,599 suddenly went oh, not enough power more and the aircraft 349 00:26:45,680 --> 00:26:47,559 accelerated and climbs away normally. 350 00:26:48,400 --> 00:26:51,319 Speaker 1: So, although it seems like pilot error is to blame, 351 00:26:52,039 --> 00:26:55,519 a Raal Airmerock statement claims the landing of a Turkish 352 00:26:55,599 --> 00:27:00,559 air flight just moments earlier caused the problem. They point 353 00:27:00,559 --> 00:27:04,200 out that the Frankfort tower advised the Morocc captain of 354 00:27:04,240 --> 00:27:09,960 the presence of wake turbulence over the runway. Wake turbulence 355 00:27:10,039 --> 00:27:13,240 is a disturbance in the atmosphere that forms behind an 356 00:27:13,279 --> 00:27:17,319 aircraft as it passes through the air. A wing tip 357 00:27:17,480 --> 00:27:21,039 vortex is the most dangerous component of this churning air. 358 00:27:22,000 --> 00:27:25,880 It occurs when a wing is generating lift, thereby causing 359 00:27:25,880 --> 00:27:28,039 a vortex to trail from each tip. 360 00:27:30,160 --> 00:27:33,559 Speaker 10: So you've got high pressure air underneath, you've got low 361 00:27:33,640 --> 00:27:36,400 pressure air, which is the lift sucking, or two of 362 00:27:36,400 --> 00:27:39,759 them will act together to produce what we call lift. 363 00:27:40,640 --> 00:27:43,880 What happens to the wingtip when those the high pressure 364 00:27:43,960 --> 00:27:48,480 underneath meets the low pressure up dear starts to spin 365 00:27:49,119 --> 00:27:50,279 what's know as a vortex. 366 00:27:53,759 --> 00:27:58,200 Speaker 1: Wingtip vortices spread laterally away from the plane. Their strength 367 00:27:58,279 --> 00:28:01,960 determined primarily by the and air speed of the aircraft. 368 00:28:08,240 --> 00:28:11,799 During takeoff and landing, aircraft operate at a high angle 369 00:28:11,839 --> 00:28:18,759 of attack, which maximizes the formation of strong vortices. This 370 00:28:18,880 --> 00:28:23,200 makes wake turbulence most dangerous during takeoff and landing, when 371 00:28:23,240 --> 00:28:28,640 there's little altitude for recovery. If the onset of wake 372 00:28:28,759 --> 00:28:32,440 is occurring, immediate invasive action is vital. 373 00:28:34,240 --> 00:28:38,519 Speaker 10: And that's why there are minimum separation distances for times 374 00:28:38,799 --> 00:28:43,079 between aircraft arriving on the same flight path. 375 00:28:49,559 --> 00:28:53,079 Speaker 1: As a result of the alleged wake turbulence, air Morocs 376 00:28:53,160 --> 00:28:56,480 said that their captain performed a maneuver to accelerate in 377 00:28:56,559 --> 00:29:03,119 order to achieve speeds permitting a safe takeoff. However, an 378 00:29:03,160 --> 00:29:07,359 accident investigation said it wasn't possible to establish whether this 379 00:29:07,599 --> 00:29:12,000 was the cause and decided to refrain from initiating an investigation. 380 00:29:13,599 --> 00:29:16,480 Speaker 5: Certainly, the way that the aeroplane was flying doesn't necessarily 381 00:29:16,559 --> 00:29:19,720 look as if it was encountering awake turbance. 382 00:29:21,160 --> 00:29:24,799 Speaker 10: There was some explanation proffered about wake turbulence from the 383 00:29:24,880 --> 00:29:27,599 flight bef ire. No, I don't give that much credence 384 00:29:27,680 --> 00:29:29,200 at all. 385 00:29:29,400 --> 00:29:33,039 Speaker 1: Whatever the reason, and despite a very shaky start, the 386 00:29:33,119 --> 00:29:44,480 aircraft continued safely on to Casablanca. Although flying is safer 387 00:29:44,559 --> 00:29:48,200 than ever, flight deck confusion is by far the leading 388 00:29:48,319 --> 00:29:52,680 cause of commercial airline accidents, with close to eighty percent 389 00:29:52,759 --> 00:29:57,720 of all incidents caused by pilot error, and when it 390 00:29:57,759 --> 00:30:04,200 comes to light aircraft, the skill the limit. June thirtieth, 391 00:30:04,240 --> 00:30:08,279 twenty twelve, a group of family and friends are returning 392 00:30:08,319 --> 00:30:12,359 from a hiking trip in the aptly named frank Church 393 00:30:12,720 --> 00:30:19,039 River of No Return wilderness in Idaho. The aircraft, an 394 00:30:19,079 --> 00:30:22,440 aged Stinson one oh eight, is at Bruce Meadow's High 395 00:30:22,440 --> 00:30:27,319 Altitude Airfield, taxiing down the five thousand foot dirt airstrip 396 00:30:37,440 --> 00:30:40,559 with full fuel tanks and four people on board. The 397 00:30:40,640 --> 00:30:43,160 plane is close to its maximum takeoff weight. 398 00:30:47,759 --> 00:30:51,839 Speaker 10: It's a four seater with four people in it. A 399 00:30:51,880 --> 00:30:56,640 lot of light aircraft, you can't have full passenger load 400 00:30:56,920 --> 00:30:57,759 and full fuel. 401 00:31:04,519 --> 00:31:08,400 Speaker 1: The plane struggles to get lift and about three quarters 402 00:31:08,400 --> 00:31:18,319 of the way down the strip it's still not airborne. 403 00:31:19,880 --> 00:31:23,039 Rapidly running out of runway, the pilot is about to 404 00:31:23,079 --> 00:31:26,440 abort the takeoff when a gust of wind lifts the 405 00:31:26,480 --> 00:31:27,480 plane into the air. 406 00:31:30,440 --> 00:31:32,440 Speaker 5: This is the time where you just land the aeroplane 407 00:31:32,480 --> 00:31:34,200 back again, or you get a taxi home. 408 00:31:42,319 --> 00:31:45,200 Speaker 1: The plane may be airborne, but the pilot still can't 409 00:31:45,240 --> 00:31:47,519 get the Stinson to climb as expected. 410 00:31:54,559 --> 00:31:57,160 Speaker 10: He seemed to have a minute or two where he 411 00:31:57,160 --> 00:32:00,240 could have just landed it on the grass, But to. 412 00:32:00,359 --> 00:32:15,119 Speaker 1: Do that, the Stinson is now getting perilously close to 413 00:32:15,200 --> 00:32:49,279 the trees. But how did this seemingly simple take off 414 00:32:49,599 --> 00:33:00,599 end in disaster. To minimize the risk at high altitude, 415 00:33:00,640 --> 00:33:04,799 all pilots are required to use charts to calculate their 416 00:33:05,079 --> 00:33:10,000 density altitude before takeoff. 417 00:33:09,160 --> 00:33:13,559 Speaker 4: To work out what the engine performance will do. Aviators 418 00:33:13,640 --> 00:33:17,440 use a system known as density altitude. It's an equation 419 00:33:17,559 --> 00:33:21,519 where you bring together two factors, the temperature and the 420 00:33:21,599 --> 00:33:23,759 thickness of the air, or the thinness of the air 421 00:33:23,799 --> 00:33:26,119 at altitude. 422 00:33:25,119 --> 00:33:29,000 Speaker 1: Bruce Meadows Airfield is six three hundred and seventy feet 423 00:33:29,240 --> 00:33:32,880 above sea level and the outside air temperature is twenty 424 00:33:32,920 --> 00:33:34,359 seven degrees centigrade. 425 00:33:35,559 --> 00:33:38,799 Speaker 4: It was not only at high altitude that day the 426 00:33:38,880 --> 00:33:41,079 temperature was higher than it normally was. 427 00:33:43,680 --> 00:33:48,400 Speaker 1: Before takeoff, the pilot checked his performance charts and calculated 428 00:33:48,440 --> 00:33:54,119 that the density altitude was approximately nine two hundred feet. 429 00:33:53,960 --> 00:33:56,519 Speaker 5: And the certification of the aeroplane only allows it to 430 00:33:56,559 --> 00:33:59,279 take off from airports up to six thousand feet. 431 00:34:00,119 --> 00:34:02,920 Speaker 1: So even though the air strip is above the maximum 432 00:34:02,960 --> 00:34:06,720 takeoff height for this plane, the high temperature and much 433 00:34:06,759 --> 00:34:09,400 thinner air make it feel even higher. 434 00:34:12,199 --> 00:34:14,960 Speaker 5: As you go up in terms of altitude, then the 435 00:34:15,000 --> 00:34:18,480 air gets thinner. This has two separate effects. Firstly, the 436 00:34:18,519 --> 00:34:21,280 amount of lift that you can generate reduces for a 437 00:34:21,320 --> 00:34:25,280 fixed forward speed across the ground. And secondly, the engine 438 00:34:25,639 --> 00:34:29,239 actually takes less oxygen into the cylinder each time is 439 00:34:29,280 --> 00:34:33,039 cycled through, and that gives you less power, so you 440 00:34:33,159 --> 00:34:34,880 end up in a nasty situation where you have to 441 00:34:34,880 --> 00:34:38,199 fly faster and faster in order to generate enough lift 442 00:34:38,599 --> 00:34:40,440 and the engine power is reduced. 443 00:34:41,440 --> 00:34:44,519 Speaker 1: Lift is the force that holds an aircraft in the air. 444 00:34:45,159 --> 00:34:48,039 Most lift on an aircraft is generated by the wings. 445 00:34:48,960 --> 00:34:51,719 Airplane wings are shaped to make the air move faster 446 00:34:51,840 --> 00:34:54,840 over the top of the wing. When air moves faster, 447 00:34:55,239 --> 00:34:58,440 the pressure of the air decreases, so the pressure on 448 00:34:58,519 --> 00:35:01,679 the top is less than the pressure on the bottom. 449 00:35:01,920 --> 00:35:04,679 The difference in pressure creates a force on the wing 450 00:35:05,119 --> 00:35:09,320 that lifts the plane into the air despite a lack 451 00:35:09,360 --> 00:35:12,559 of lift. And engine power. The plane still manages to 452 00:35:12,559 --> 00:35:15,760 get airborne, but why does it struggle to gain height? 453 00:35:16,280 --> 00:35:19,840 Speaker 5: As the aircraft takes off and flies at very low altitude, 454 00:35:20,320 --> 00:35:24,360 it flies in something called ground effect. This is like 455 00:35:24,400 --> 00:35:27,719 a cushion of air underneath from the wings being there, 456 00:35:28,239 --> 00:35:31,840 so the aircraft isn't really flying in free air. It's 457 00:35:31,880 --> 00:35:34,599 dependent on this cushion of air that it's flying along with. 458 00:35:35,360 --> 00:35:39,159 Speaker 1: At high altitude, ground effect can fall a pilot into 459 00:35:39,159 --> 00:35:43,199 believing his aircraft can fly, but although airborne, he can 460 00:35:43,239 --> 00:35:47,760 find himself without enough lift to climb to escape potential obstacles. 461 00:35:49,079 --> 00:35:52,719 Speaker 4: He was literally clinging to the air to stay airborne. 462 00:35:54,000 --> 00:35:56,440 Speaker 5: And then as it enters the air around the trees, 463 00:35:56,920 --> 00:35:58,840 then it doesn't have any of this ground effect and 464 00:35:58,920 --> 00:36:02,480 starts to sink back again. The pilot's obviously trying to 465 00:36:02,480 --> 00:36:05,199 steer around the trees, but the problem being that every 466 00:36:05,199 --> 00:36:08,039 time you steer the aeroplane, you're actually reducing the amount 467 00:36:08,079 --> 00:36:10,519 of lift that's available to keep the aeroplane up, and 468 00:36:10,559 --> 00:36:14,519 you're using some of the lift to turn you. So 469 00:36:14,719 --> 00:36:18,679 it was pretty much a one way course to the forest. 470 00:36:23,440 --> 00:36:26,559 Speaker 1: For all his bad planning, this pilot had one piece 471 00:36:26,559 --> 00:36:33,280 of luck coming down in the forest. Each impact slows 472 00:36:33,360 --> 00:36:37,239 the plane and reduces its energy, softening the final crash 473 00:36:37,239 --> 00:36:43,559 as it hits the ground. If they'd cleared the trees, 474 00:36:43,679 --> 00:36:48,280 there was little he could have done. Faced with low 475 00:36:48,320 --> 00:36:51,360 air speed and a rising terrain, A turn was out 476 00:36:51,440 --> 00:36:54,519 of the question, and the impact would probably have been 477 00:36:54,639 --> 00:37:00,519 far more severe. 478 00:37:03,119 --> 00:37:07,039 Speaker 5: It's a fairly typical light aircraft accident in terms of 479 00:37:07,079 --> 00:37:10,400 the pilot pressing on. Rather than rejecting the takeoff. 480 00:37:11,480 --> 00:37:14,920 Speaker 4: He should have realized that the aircraft's performance was simply 481 00:37:15,000 --> 00:37:18,360 not good enough to fly safely. He should have abandoned 482 00:37:18,400 --> 00:37:19,000 his takeoff. 483 00:37:27,679 --> 00:37:30,880 Speaker 1: Despite some injuries to the pilot, all four men were 484 00:37:30,960 --> 00:37:33,400 lucky to be able to walk away from this wreckage 485 00:37:33,800 --> 00:37:40,920 with their lives. One of the basics for pilots is 486 00:37:41,000 --> 00:37:44,280 knowing what your plane is capable of, whatever the weather. 487 00:37:45,960 --> 00:37:50,880 High tech cockpit equipment assists flight crews like never before, 488 00:37:51,639 --> 00:37:57,599 but there are still many things computers can't do. Over 489 00:37:57,719 --> 00:38:01,119 ninety nine percent of all landings a manual, and as 490 00:38:01,199 --> 00:38:06,480 yet there's no such thing as an automated takeoff. One 491 00:38:06,559 --> 00:38:09,559 hundred percent of all takeoffs must be carried out by 492 00:38:09,599 --> 00:38:14,199 the pilot, and sometimes they have to trust their instincts. 493 00:38:15,280 --> 00:38:23,159 Speaker 4: Oh my god, my god, Oh my god, my plane, 494 00:38:23,519 --> 00:38:24,440 my point is crushed. 495 00:38:26,039 --> 00:38:31,960 Speaker 1: Thirteenth of March twenty fourteen, eighteen year old Hannah Udran 496 00:38:32,280 --> 00:38:34,559 is one of one hundred and forty nine passengers on 497 00:38:34,599 --> 00:38:38,880 a US air flight from Philadelphia to Fort Lauderdale. 498 00:38:39,760 --> 00:38:43,760 Speaker 3: Oh my god, the plane is on. Oh my gosh. 499 00:38:44,400 --> 00:38:50,079 Speaker 1: Using CCTV footage taken from Philadelphia International Airport in the distance, 500 00:38:50,119 --> 00:38:54,159 we can see Hannah's plane US Airways flight seventeen oh 501 00:38:54,239 --> 00:39:10,920 two preparing for takeoff. Hannah's plane has crashed on takeoff. 502 00:39:10,920 --> 00:39:12,199 Speaker 3: You're evacuating the plane. 503 00:39:12,559 --> 00:39:16,119 Speaker 1: Oh my god, seventeen We're going to dispatch the emergency vehicles. 504 00:39:17,119 --> 00:39:20,199 Speaker 4: Okay, all right, it seems to be everything's okay. 505 00:39:20,519 --> 00:39:23,360 Speaker 2: This is the first time I was ever flying alone. 506 00:39:24,000 --> 00:39:27,079 And we take off the runway and then all of 507 00:39:27,119 --> 00:39:29,960 a sudden, the plane skidd it and hit the ground 508 00:39:30,920 --> 00:39:36,599 very very roughly. We were all jerked in our seats. 509 00:39:36,760 --> 00:39:40,440 Of course, everyone on the plane is screaming and yelling 510 00:39:40,559 --> 00:39:44,000 and evacuate. No one's really sure what just happened. What's 511 00:39:44,079 --> 00:39:44,519 going on. 512 00:39:48,559 --> 00:39:52,559 Speaker 1: When the pilot aboarts take off, the front wheel gear crumples, 513 00:39:52,719 --> 00:39:56,320 causing the plane to crash. 514 00:39:56,480 --> 00:39:59,480 Speaker 2: Once we went in the air, it sort of sounded 515 00:39:59,559 --> 00:40:02,079 like like a tired path doing. 516 00:40:01,960 --> 00:40:04,360 Speaker 3: Some like loud noise had happened. 517 00:40:04,960 --> 00:40:09,079 Speaker 2: There's just screaming happening, and the pilots and consay things. 518 00:40:09,119 --> 00:40:10,719 Speaker 3: Everything happened, so fairst. 519 00:40:12,000 --> 00:40:17,519 Speaker 1: But wide does Hannah's plane nosedive on the tarmac mechanical 520 00:40:17,559 --> 00:40:27,000 failure or pilot error. Before leaving the gate, the copilot 521 00:40:27,119 --> 00:40:30,679 enters the data into the flight computer, which then calculates 522 00:40:30,719 --> 00:40:37,639 the speed and thrust needed for takeoff. But there's a problem. 523 00:40:38,000 --> 00:40:41,119 Flight seventeen oh two is cleared for takeoff on runway 524 00:40:41,159 --> 00:40:45,960 twenty seven L. The co pilot enters twenty seven R 525 00:40:46,039 --> 00:40:50,159 into the flight computer, and that runway is one thousand 526 00:40:50,159 --> 00:40:57,280 feet shorter. After backing away from the gate, the captain 527 00:40:57,360 --> 00:41:00,840 spots the error, but the co pilot fail to update 528 00:41:00,880 --> 00:41:08,320 the information. The pilot speeds down the correct runway twenty 529 00:41:08,360 --> 00:41:11,159 seven L, but at ninety two miles an hour, a 530 00:41:11,239 --> 00:41:17,320 cockpit alert Triggersdane. The computer is warning the pilots to 531 00:41:17,360 --> 00:41:21,039 slow down as far as it's concerned, they're rapidly approaching 532 00:41:21,079 --> 00:41:27,440 the end of the shorter runway twenty seven RAN. Neither 533 00:41:27,519 --> 00:41:31,880 pilot understands what the retard alarm means during a takeoff situation, 534 00:41:32,480 --> 00:41:35,000 as they more often hear it on landing, but the 535 00:41:35,039 --> 00:41:39,320 pilot suddenly decides the plane is unsafe to fly and 536 00:41:39,360 --> 00:41:43,519 aborts the takeoff, smashing the aircraft down on the nose gear. 537 00:41:44,360 --> 00:41:48,400 The plane could have taken off safely, but the pilots 538 00:41:48,480 --> 00:41:51,679 didn't understand what the computer was telling them. 539 00:41:51,920 --> 00:41:54,559 Speaker 2: My family is a bit of a jokester family. We 540 00:41:54,679 --> 00:41:57,159 kind of joke about everything. So the first thing I 541 00:41:57,239 --> 00:42:00,360 did was just send a video of me running from 542 00:42:00,360 --> 00:42:04,360 the plane, because I knew if I didn't have video proof, 543 00:42:05,079 --> 00:42:06,760 my parents wouldn't even believe me. 544 00:42:08,719 --> 00:42:09,480 Speaker 3: I got no queen. 545 00:42:14,719 --> 00:42:19,679 Speaker 1: Analysis from the National Transportation Safety Board shows that statistically, 546 00:42:20,199 --> 00:42:24,400 most airline accidents have survival rates of over eighty percent. 547 00:42:26,760 --> 00:42:31,320 Constant improvements in safety an aircraft. Technology plays a massive role, 548 00:42:31,960 --> 00:42:42,119 but sometimes luck has a part too. Amelia, Virginia, this 549 00:42:42,280 --> 00:42:48,159 aircraft is being flown by no ordinary pilot. In fact, 550 00:42:48,760 --> 00:42:51,920 this is no pilot. The man in this plane has 551 00:42:52,000 --> 00:42:57,719 never flown before in his life. 552 00:42:57,760 --> 00:43:02,159 Speaker 6: This dude's gonna, oh my god, come on, buddy, get 553 00:43:02,199 --> 00:43:02,679 it together. 554 00:43:12,599 --> 00:43:15,880 Speaker 1: After persuading the airport manager to let him taxi his 555 00:43:16,000 --> 00:43:20,199 new plane down the runway. He soon finds himself airborne 556 00:43:20,599 --> 00:43:22,400 with zero hours flight time. 557 00:43:24,239 --> 00:43:26,360 Speaker 12: So this poor guy who thought he was going to 558 00:43:26,360 --> 00:43:29,559 have a drive along the runway now realizes he's flying 559 00:43:29,559 --> 00:43:31,800 an aeroplane and wonders what to do about it. 560 00:43:33,760 --> 00:43:35,559 Speaker 6: There you go, there you go. 561 00:43:36,840 --> 00:43:39,599 Speaker 1: He may have managed somehow to get it off the ground, 562 00:43:40,079 --> 00:43:43,360 but it's becoming clear that he has absolutely no idea 563 00:43:43,440 --> 00:44:01,599 how to land it. Miraculously, this first time flyer manages 564 00:44:01,639 --> 00:44:04,639 to get down with his new and now battered plane 565 00:44:05,000 --> 00:44:07,880 and more importantly, himself in one piece. 566 00:44:08,039 --> 00:44:09,800 Speaker 6: Wow, he is lucky to be alive. 567 00:44:11,440 --> 00:44:14,559 Speaker 1: But how did this total novice manage to get airborne? 568 00:44:16,880 --> 00:44:20,199 Speaker 12: Really, it's very simple to make an aeroplane fly. You 569 00:44:20,280 --> 00:44:23,400 apply some thrust with the engine while he was taxing. 570 00:44:24,960 --> 00:44:26,880 You apply a little bit more thrust than the airplane 571 00:44:26,880 --> 00:44:31,199 starts to accelerate him. If it gets to beyond the 572 00:44:31,239 --> 00:44:34,000 point which is called V one. This is the point 573 00:44:34,039 --> 00:44:37,079 at which the aeroplane doesn't have enough space to stop 574 00:44:37,119 --> 00:44:39,480 before it reaches the end of the runway, then you 575 00:44:39,559 --> 00:44:41,400 might say, well, what I do? And if you pull 576 00:44:41,440 --> 00:44:45,360 the nose up by pulling the yoke backwards. The airplane 577 00:44:45,360 --> 00:44:49,199 will then lift the nose and before you know where 578 00:44:49,199 --> 00:44:52,159 you are, this machine that's designed to be a bird 579 00:44:52,280 --> 00:44:59,280 will start flying. 580 00:45:03,760 --> 00:45:05,480 Speaker 6: Oh my god, it's gonna star and die. 581 00:45:07,320 --> 00:45:10,679 Speaker 12: So we've got a situation here that this person who's 582 00:45:10,719 --> 00:45:13,880 found is now a pilot rather than a driver is 583 00:45:13,960 --> 00:45:14,440 in the air. 584 00:45:14,599 --> 00:45:18,360 Speaker 6: Come on, buddy, get it together now. 585 00:45:18,559 --> 00:45:20,599 Speaker 12: The yoke that he's holding is a little bit like 586 00:45:20,639 --> 00:45:21,440 a steering wheel. 587 00:45:21,679 --> 00:45:22,519 Speaker 1: If you turn it to. 588 00:45:22,440 --> 00:45:25,519 Speaker 12: The left, you actually actuate the ailerons at the end 589 00:45:25,559 --> 00:45:28,599 of the wings so that they will make the aircraft 590 00:45:28,679 --> 00:45:30,800 bank a little bit, and that makes the aircraft turn. 591 00:45:40,519 --> 00:45:42,199 Speaker 10: So you can drive it like a car. 592 00:45:42,320 --> 00:45:44,599 Speaker 12: You can steer the steering wheel and make it go 593 00:45:44,679 --> 00:45:47,079 around so you can see the runway beneath him and 594 00:45:47,119 --> 00:45:51,199 realize that you can actually go back. The big issue 595 00:45:51,239 --> 00:45:53,239 is how is he going to make it go down 596 00:45:53,960 --> 00:45:55,840 safely and stop on the runway. 597 00:45:57,559 --> 00:46:01,119 Speaker 1: To land a light aircraft, the pilot should stabilize the 598 00:46:01,159 --> 00:46:04,320 plane with the help of the control wheel before using 599 00:46:04,320 --> 00:46:09,280 it to line up the plane with the airstrip. Then, 600 00:46:09,519 --> 00:46:12,079 when the plane is just off the ground, the throttle 601 00:46:12,159 --> 00:46:14,639 is pushed in and the control wheel is pushed forward, 602 00:46:15,119 --> 00:46:19,079 which allows the plane to gently touch down back wheels first. 603 00:46:22,480 --> 00:46:25,119 Speaker 12: As we're approaching, we should be putting our flats out 604 00:46:28,480 --> 00:46:31,519 to make this flying machine have at a slow speed 605 00:46:31,800 --> 00:46:34,360 aircraft that we'll still have enough lift to cruise down 606 00:46:34,440 --> 00:46:43,800 that final approach. This guy is lucky to get the 607 00:46:43,840 --> 00:46:51,679 airplane back on the ground, but as they say in 608 00:46:51,719 --> 00:46:54,079 all the best movies, don't do this at hone. 609 00:46:53,920 --> 00:46:57,360 Speaker 6: Folks, Wow, he is lucky to be alive. 610 00:46:59,199 --> 00:47:01,599 Speaker 1: Every time we fly, we put our lives in the 611 00:47:01,599 --> 00:47:05,800 pilot's hands, but flight crew mistakes are rare and valuable 612 00:47:05,880 --> 00:47:09,599 lessons are learned every time. The odds of dying in 613 00:47:09,639 --> 00:47:14,039 a plane crash are around one in eleven million. You're 614 00:47:14,119 --> 00:47:17,119 much more likely to be struck by lightning or attacked 615 00:47:17,119 --> 00:47:22,960 by a shark. Since the first commercial flight in nineteen fourteen, 616 00:47:23,559 --> 00:47:28,559 airlines have improved safety beyond all recognition, and flying has 617 00:47:28,639 --> 00:47:30,320 simply never been safer.