1
00:00:54,640 --> 00:01:59,680
Speaker 1: It's Ben dire Way.

2
00:02:13,919 --> 00:02:16,560
Speaker 2: Who is this, I don't know, it's me. It's Amid the.

3
00:02:16,560 --> 00:02:21,280
Speaker 3: Ruins, a guy who makes dire Way of music. It's

4
00:02:21,319 --> 00:02:32,400
Amid the Ruins and sense dire Way of music.

5
00:02:52,360 --> 00:02:54,639
Speaker 2: What I've talked about in you know, probably one hundred

6
00:02:54,719 --> 00:02:59,400
articles at Jason Analysis is the implementation of the AI

7
00:02:59,560 --> 00:03:03,400
smart in the giant smart cities, which is what IBM

8
00:03:03,439 --> 00:03:06,159
talks about publicly building. And that's where we're going, and

9
00:03:06,199 --> 00:03:08,280
that's what I think we have to be really concerned about.

10
00:03:08,280 --> 00:03:10,919
So all of these tensions, they are kind of a

11
00:03:11,080 --> 00:03:17,560
long term strategy to basically get everybody moved into mega cities.

12
00:03:18,000 --> 00:03:20,280
They'll be forced to they'll be forced off of land

13
00:03:20,319 --> 00:03:24,439
and so forth for environmental reasons and basically concoct and

14
00:03:24,599 --> 00:03:29,680
invented environmental nonsense. Then you'll be stuck in some hell

15
00:03:29,800 --> 00:03:36,520
hole megacity in a basically a carbon size apartment, living

16
00:03:36,520 --> 00:03:39,759
over a target or something, or inside of the target

17
00:03:39,800 --> 00:03:42,759
or Walmart. As I said several years ago, it's actually

18
00:03:42,759 --> 00:04:30,160
come true. Now there's actually target cities. This is all

19
00:04:30,240 --> 00:04:33,079
part of the long term globalist strategies. But to get there,

20
00:04:33,360 --> 00:04:39,319
you've got to have the constant clash the constant alchemical

21
00:04:39,560 --> 00:04:43,759
blending and mixing and smashing together right out of Manicheanism

22
00:04:43,800 --> 00:04:48,759
to produce the convergence, to produce the synthesis. And that's

23
00:04:48,800 --> 00:04:51,639
what's crucial in all this and what is absolutely true

24
00:04:51,839 --> 00:04:56,920
from an alchemical esotery, philosophical, angioglotical perstructive the fact that

25
00:04:57,519 --> 00:04:59,920
the rule elite seek to be a.

26
00:05:01,839 --> 00:07:11,879
Speaker 4: Jason also dot com.

27
00:07:11,920 --> 00:07:16,560
Speaker 2: You can't try to fix today's problems politically, and this

28
00:07:16,639 --> 00:07:19,600
is what so many people that all circles and pot

29
00:07:19,759 --> 00:07:23,160
ride and all whatever on media, they all seem to

30
00:07:23,160 --> 00:07:26,079
think that there's like a political solution to man it's problems.

31
00:07:26,519 --> 00:07:29,720
And really the whole of modernity is built on this

32
00:07:30,680 --> 00:07:35,360
neopagan concept of political salvation, and there is no political

33
00:07:35,399 --> 00:07:39,279
salvation for man because man's problems are not essentially political,

34
00:07:40,040 --> 00:08:18,680
they're spirriful. The hierarchy of how man views himself in

35
00:08:18,680 --> 00:08:21,399
the world has been inverted. I've covered over and over

36
00:08:21,439 --> 00:08:23,800
and over the white papers that actually discussed how to

37
00:08:24,040 --> 00:08:27,279
invert and subvert that changing images of man right welcome.

38
00:08:28,160 --> 00:08:32,559
So what has to happen is that we back to

39
00:08:32,639 --> 00:08:35,080
that high IQ stuff. Now, it's time to get back

40
00:08:35,120 --> 00:08:40,600
to that high accus stuff. Welcome. Yes, I have to

41
00:08:40,639 --> 00:08:42,480
have a piece of ginger in my mouth. I don't care,

42
00:08:42,519 --> 00:08:44,440
boomer if you don't like it every time I have

43
00:08:44,519 --> 00:08:48,120
a piece of gum or gender of boomer says disgusting.

44
00:08:50,679 --> 00:08:53,799
Do you not eat food? Do you not chew gum?

45
00:08:55,120 --> 00:08:57,399
Are you a gnostic being? Are you the form of

46
00:08:57,480 --> 00:09:02,480
human You don't actually engage in the normal human activities

47
00:09:02,480 --> 00:09:11,039
of shooting gum and eating disgusting foods. Well, maybe one

48
00:09:11,080 --> 00:09:14,840
day we will ascend into the gnostic stratosphere like you.

49
00:09:16,120 --> 00:09:20,639
But I need sugar and candy from a beat us

50
00:09:21,039 --> 00:09:26,000
And if you can't handle that, then you can. Then

51
00:09:26,200 --> 00:09:29,480
don't let the door hit you on however that goes.

52
00:09:29,559 --> 00:09:32,720
Don't let your ass hit your face on the way

53
00:09:32,759 --> 00:09:37,679
the door or whatever. That is. Welcome. Yeah, they I

54
00:09:37,720 --> 00:09:40,200
went to a boomer. I don't mean to be just

55
00:09:40,240 --> 00:09:42,639
be telling my boomers about it was a boom or

56
00:09:42,679 --> 00:09:45,840
haircut place. And if you go to old man barber,

57
00:09:45,919 --> 00:09:49,960
like a like a legit barber with the peppermint candy

58
00:09:49,960 --> 00:09:53,720
cane out front, you get the same haircut like you

59
00:09:53,720 --> 00:09:56,519
could pit from all these styles and I did. Don't

60
00:09:56,519 --> 00:09:58,480
give a damn. You're gonna get the same haircut. You're

61
00:09:58,480 --> 00:10:02,720
gonna get the Millid Harry Marine Corps cadet haircut. Even

62
00:10:02,759 --> 00:10:06,240
if you told that dude, I want a spiky mullet

63
00:10:06,279 --> 00:10:09,480
like THEO Vaughn, you're gonna get Marine Corps and he's

64
00:10:09,480 --> 00:10:12,360
gonna turn you around and to spin you around and say,

65
00:10:12,440 --> 00:10:15,039
there you go. I gave you what you wanted. That's

66
00:10:15,080 --> 00:10:17,799
literally what happened. I told that dude, I want to

67
00:10:18,440 --> 00:10:22,799
one on the side and straight up when that goes

68
00:10:22,840 --> 00:10:25,240
into that boomer's ears, which you don't think you could hear,

69
00:10:25,600 --> 00:10:29,080
he just heard, give him the military cut, because that's

70
00:10:29,120 --> 00:10:33,600
the only haircut you get at the peppermint candy stick

71
00:10:33,639 --> 00:10:37,960
boom or barbershop. Baby, I almost swallow this so people

72
00:10:37,960 --> 00:10:47,399
don't bitch. All right, we're going full whiteboard today, y'all.

73
00:10:47,440 --> 00:10:49,919
It's gonna be heavy. It's gonna be hot and heavy

74
00:10:51,039 --> 00:10:57,440
in a safe, bo sexual way. Now, the book that

75
00:10:57,480 --> 00:10:59,559
we're gonna be loosely looking at as kind of a

76
00:10:59,639 --> 00:11:01,879
rough I said for a long time I would get

77
00:11:01,879 --> 00:11:06,159
to this book. We're finally going to cover doctor Faser,

78
00:11:07,440 --> 00:11:13,600
doctor Faser Array, doctor Laser Feser, five proofs for the

79
00:11:13,600 --> 00:11:18,399
Existence of God, and he picks five philosophers, Aristotle, Platinus, Augustine,

80
00:11:18,399 --> 00:11:22,159
Aquinas Leibniz. Now there's a lot of good places in

81
00:11:22,200 --> 00:11:25,720
this book, a lot of really good chapters. The majority

82
00:11:25,720 --> 00:11:27,519
of this will be covering in Part two for the

83
00:11:27,559 --> 00:11:34,960
subscribers for this public installment, we'll be covering chapter three,

84
00:11:36,159 --> 00:11:39,960
the Augustinian Proof, because of course it's the closest that

85
00:11:40,039 --> 00:11:44,159
we get to transcendental argumentation in this book. There's a

86
00:11:44,200 --> 00:11:47,080
lot of good arguments in this chapter, a lot of

87
00:11:47,080 --> 00:11:50,120
the arguments that you've heard me use. So I was

88
00:11:50,159 --> 00:11:52,960
glad to see Phaser using a lot of these arguments

89
00:11:53,039 --> 00:11:57,559
because of course there's similarities with transcendental types of arguments

90
00:11:58,799 --> 00:12:03,440
in this chapter to the transcendental argument for God. But

91
00:12:03,480 --> 00:12:06,159
remember that the transit argument for God is not identical

92
00:12:06,200 --> 00:12:10,240
to all transcendental arguments. I can make a transcendental argument

93
00:12:10,279 --> 00:12:15,159
for the necessity of universals, the necessity of the self, right,

94
00:12:15,279 --> 00:12:17,840
that's not the same as the argument at a paradigm

95
00:12:17,960 --> 00:12:21,159
level for the necessity of the existence of God. There's

96
00:12:21,159 --> 00:12:25,080
a couple of places where Phaser comes pretty close, and

97
00:12:25,919 --> 00:12:29,200
he will make the divine conceptualism argument that you hear

98
00:12:29,240 --> 00:12:31,440
me make all the time. But we're going to supplement

99
00:12:31,480 --> 00:12:36,600
it with the real solid version, the tweaked version from

100
00:12:36,639 --> 00:12:39,720
Saint Maximus. And Phaser is not aware of Maximus. He

101
00:12:39,759 --> 00:12:42,399
doesn't know about the Logi doctrine. He doesn't know how

102
00:12:42,440 --> 00:12:46,039
the Logi doctrine is different from the exemplar doctrine of

103
00:12:46,039 --> 00:12:49,639
Aquinas and so forth. So we're going to point out

104
00:12:49,639 --> 00:12:52,600
where things go awry, but we're also going to point

105
00:12:52,639 --> 00:12:56,000
out the many, many good places. And then in part

106
00:12:56,000 --> 00:13:00,960
two we'll cover the other chapters on Aristotle, UH, Aquinas,

107
00:13:01,000 --> 00:13:03,960
and Aliveness, and Plutonis, and there will be places in

108
00:13:04,080 --> 00:13:06,159
there as well. I mean, there's a there's areas of

109
00:13:06,240 --> 00:13:07,960
Liive notes that you've heard me talk about over there

110
00:13:08,000 --> 00:13:10,799
over the years that are pretty insightful. Loive Neutz has

111
00:13:10,840 --> 00:13:13,799
some good arguments that come up in this chapter of

112
00:13:13,799 --> 00:13:20,120
the Augustinian Proof that will be referring to UH. And

113
00:13:20,159 --> 00:13:24,399
then we will look at a couple of interesting points

114
00:13:24,559 --> 00:13:27,360
that I was reminded of in Basil. Someone a long

115
00:13:27,399 --> 00:13:29,360
time ago had heard me say in one of the talks,

116
00:13:30,120 --> 00:13:32,320
where do you get the argument that Aristotle believes in

117
00:13:32,360 --> 00:13:35,240
a great architect of the universe? UH? And I could

118
00:13:35,240 --> 00:13:37,639
not remember exactly where the phrase was, because, of course,

119
00:13:37,679 --> 00:13:40,200
as you can see, the works of Aristotle are very

120
00:13:40,279 --> 00:13:43,759
vast uh. And then I was looking back through Bazils Hexamaran,

121
00:13:44,279 --> 00:13:47,399
and I found where Basil makes the argument. As you

122
00:13:47,440 --> 00:13:51,559
can see what you hear me say so almost always

123
00:13:53,759 --> 00:13:56,639
just what the Eastern Fathers say, like, I'm not coming

124
00:13:56,720 --> 00:14:00,919
up with this stuff out of my but it's not

125
00:14:01,000 --> 00:14:04,320
just made up. I'm just really just repeating stuff that

126
00:14:04,360 --> 00:14:08,559
I've imbibed from primarily Cappadocians. When it comes to the

127
00:14:08,639 --> 00:14:11,320
Church fathers, obviously the cap Docian said the preeminence because

128
00:14:11,320 --> 00:14:17,519
the Cappadocians gave us the subtled triology. Really there's not

129
00:14:17,519 --> 00:14:21,039
a whole lot of development in triadology after the Cappadocians.

130
00:14:21,960 --> 00:14:24,679
There's development in the sense of explication when it comes

131
00:14:24,679 --> 00:14:28,240
to Christology after the Cappadocians. But this is as we

132
00:14:28,360 --> 00:14:31,320
had a pretty heated debate in the discord the other

133
00:14:31,399 --> 00:14:36,080
night with a Roman Catholic, a Scootist. There's really not development.

134
00:14:36,120 --> 00:14:38,759
I mean, what you see John Damascus Present is really

135
00:14:38,759 --> 00:14:41,919
a representation of what's in the Cappadocians. So for us

136
00:14:41,960 --> 00:14:46,000
Athanasius and Cappadocians that's pretty much if of the Trinity.

137
00:14:46,039 --> 00:14:51,159
The only other explication is Gregory of Cyprus and Palamos

138
00:14:51,240 --> 00:14:55,960
in relation to eternal manifestation at Blackgrenee and the Palomite Synods.

139
00:14:56,000 --> 00:14:58,399
That's really it. But that's already in Basil and John

140
00:14:58,480 --> 00:15:05,960
Damascus eternal manifestation. So there's really the impasse I'm constantly

141
00:15:06,000 --> 00:15:10,279
realizing when we are debating with Catholics is Cappadocians is

142
00:15:10,320 --> 00:15:13,519
the lack of familiarity with Cappadocians. And that's why a

143
00:15:13,559 --> 00:15:16,279
good place to start is the Shassensky Philly Oqua book,

144
00:15:16,279 --> 00:15:18,080
which we covered. We did a whole stream, three hour

145
00:15:18,120 --> 00:15:21,840
stream on that because Sashensky, who was Reuni eight at

146
00:15:21,840 --> 00:15:26,440
the time, essentially admits that there's no double procession hypostetic

147
00:15:26,440 --> 00:15:31,120
origin proof in the East in the first seven centuries

148
00:15:31,120 --> 00:15:36,639
at all. There's not one proof. Augustine is really the

149
00:15:36,720 --> 00:15:41,200
only father that can be brought forth to support that position,

150
00:15:41,879 --> 00:15:44,759
but it doesn't really matter because the dogmatic theology of

151
00:15:44,759 --> 00:15:48,840
the Cappadocians is what's confirmed in the councils. Anyway, That's

152
00:15:48,840 --> 00:15:50,120
not what we're going to talk about tonight, where it's

153
00:15:50,120 --> 00:15:52,960
about Phaser and we're gonna go through the chapter on

154
00:15:53,080 --> 00:15:55,679
the Augustinian proof, because once again we're also going to

155
00:15:55,720 --> 00:15:59,399
see that when you hear me make tag, it's not

156
00:16:00,279 --> 00:16:03,519
it's very similar to the arguments that we find Augustine

157
00:16:03,519 --> 00:16:12,399
making At times. Augustine presents a divine conceptualism argument. And

158
00:16:12,600 --> 00:16:14,320
of course we want to remind you that if you

159
00:16:14,320 --> 00:16:18,000
want to support and ask questions we have philosophical questions,

160
00:16:18,600 --> 00:16:21,240
feel free to ask those via super chat there to

161
00:16:21,240 --> 00:16:23,639
support the stream in the channel. And then in the

162
00:16:23,639 --> 00:16:26,080
next few days I will make part two of this

163
00:16:27,559 --> 00:16:31,519
available for pay subscribers to jayson Alysis, covering the rest

164
00:16:31,559 --> 00:16:34,159
of the Phaser book, and then we're also going to

165
00:16:34,200 --> 00:16:38,759
look at a couple places in the Russian Philosopher. Now,

166
00:16:38,799 --> 00:16:41,639
this is not a new argument and Andreev, but it's

167
00:16:41,840 --> 00:16:46,679
present in a very well stated way in Andrea's little

168
00:16:46,679 --> 00:16:51,960
book Orthodox Pulgic Theology, but it's also stated in Mystical Theology,

169
00:16:52,559 --> 00:16:56,159
and it's also stated in last Key's Experience of God

170
00:16:56,279 --> 00:16:58,639
on One. And this is the argument that a bear

171
00:16:58,799 --> 00:17:03,320
monotheistic ads entity is not a sufficient kind of deity

172
00:17:04,039 --> 00:17:07,039
or God, because that God will necessitate a world to

173
00:17:07,119 --> 00:17:11,319
be God over and therefore that's not our God, because

174
00:17:11,680 --> 00:17:14,200
the God that needs eternal matter, the God that needs

175
00:17:14,200 --> 00:17:17,440
an eternal world to be God over for God to

176
00:17:17,480 --> 00:17:19,960
have meaning, for him to be a first cause of

177
00:17:20,880 --> 00:17:23,759
Ariostol is more consistent because he says that that leads

178
00:17:23,799 --> 00:17:28,599
to the view of eternal first heavens eternal matter for

179
00:17:28,720 --> 00:17:32,359
him to form. And we'll see that Aristota will make

180
00:17:32,400 --> 00:17:36,079
this argument in book twelve of the Metaphysics, Basil will

181
00:17:36,079 --> 00:17:38,240
make fun of it, and so we will see that

182
00:17:38,279 --> 00:17:42,640
Basil supports the Orthodox conception of apologetics to the fact

183
00:17:42,680 --> 00:17:45,000
that they don't mean the same thing by natural theology

184
00:17:45,519 --> 00:17:49,359
as the Thomas do. Well, let's get to phaser. I'm

185
00:17:49,400 --> 00:17:53,359
going to start with the Augustinian proof. Before we do that,

186
00:17:53,400 --> 00:17:56,319
I want to mind, you guys, just a little bit

187
00:17:56,319 --> 00:17:58,519
of the basics here, because we may have some people

188
00:17:58,519 --> 00:18:06,359
who are new to these ideas or topics and they

189
00:18:06,440 --> 00:18:09,680
might find a little bit of this abtuse. But we're

190
00:18:09,720 --> 00:18:14,920
gonna be looking at abstract entities today, universals, concepts, numbers.

191
00:18:14,960 --> 00:18:17,839
You hear me invoke this argument all the time, and

192
00:18:18,240 --> 00:18:20,000
that's why I was delighted to finally get to this

193
00:18:20,079 --> 00:18:22,880
chapter because this chapter pretty much makes all the arguments

194
00:18:23,000 --> 00:18:26,599
I make there are arguments in Augustine. So nothing I'm

195
00:18:26,640 --> 00:18:29,559
saying is that out of the ordinary. We are taking

196
00:18:29,559 --> 00:18:31,880
the argument a little bit further and showing that it

197
00:18:31,960 --> 00:18:36,039
directly points to the triune God and not the generic

198
00:18:36,119 --> 00:18:40,480
theism God, which is essentially of no use to apologetics whatsoever.

199
00:18:40,559 --> 00:18:43,599
What's the point of doing apologetics that we're proving the

200
00:18:43,640 --> 00:18:48,440
same god as Islam, scientology, Joe's witnesses. Right, that's a

201
00:18:48,480 --> 00:18:52,000
worthless first cause. That's not to say there's not a

202
00:18:52,000 --> 00:18:53,680
first cause. It's just saying it's not a good argument.

203
00:18:53,720 --> 00:18:55,960
And we will see that these kinds of arguments we

204
00:18:56,039 --> 00:19:00,519
made here in questions and doubts, all right, I remember

205
00:19:00,559 --> 00:19:06,480
that when we are looking at make sure you guys

206
00:19:06,480 --> 00:19:08,960
can hear me. Yeah, welcome everybody, be sure. Hit Like

207
00:19:10,599 --> 00:19:20,839
when we're looking at the notion of abstract objects, universals, numbers, concepts, propositions,

208
00:19:21,559 --> 00:19:27,759
laws of logic, we're looking at objects that are unlike

209
00:19:27,880 --> 00:19:32,799
the objects of our world. So we're gonna remember Platonism here.

210
00:19:32,799 --> 00:19:36,599
We're gonna use Platonism as kind of our exemplar to

211
00:19:37,359 --> 00:19:40,720
branch off from. So if we remember Plato's ideas of

212
00:19:40,799 --> 00:19:44,319
the forms. Plato thought that the realm of the forms

213
00:19:44,400 --> 00:19:49,039
was uniquely simple, It was uniquely one. It is summed

214
00:19:49,119 --> 00:19:53,640
up in the monad right the first primal unity. The

215
00:19:53,759 --> 00:19:57,359
forms are unchanging. The forms are impersonal in the sense

216
00:19:57,400 --> 00:20:00,200
that they're not like a human person. I know that

217
00:20:00,200 --> 00:20:03,920
the Plato doesn't really have the conception of personhood as subject,

218
00:20:04,160 --> 00:20:08,759
as personal subject the way that the Cappadocians will explain that.

219
00:20:08,799 --> 00:20:12,359
But regardless, it is important to mention that it's ideal

220
00:20:12,440 --> 00:20:16,960
and personal, immaterial, eternal, it's in stasis. This is very

221
00:20:16,960 --> 00:20:21,359
important because it's not in becoming. And then that's why

222
00:20:21,400 --> 00:20:24,759
Plato can point to things like well, numbers are the

223
00:20:24,799 --> 00:20:29,480
best example of this kind of thing. Right, So for Plato,

224
00:20:29,880 --> 00:20:33,480
they're in a third realm. They're not in our realm.

225
00:20:33,799 --> 00:20:37,359
They're in another higher realm. They're not in a mind

226
00:20:37,519 --> 00:20:39,920
per se, they're not in objects. So they must be

227
00:20:39,920 --> 00:20:44,359
in a third realm. Now, the important part is that

228
00:20:44,400 --> 00:20:48,279
when we look at this realm, it's usually characterized by

229
00:20:48,279 --> 00:20:51,480
the opposite the right, the realm that we inhabit. The

230
00:20:51,519 --> 00:20:56,119
realm that we inhabit is characterized by many. It's characterized

231
00:20:56,119 --> 00:21:01,480
by change, it's characterized by flux's characterized by being lesser

232
00:21:01,519 --> 00:21:04,039
in the chain of being according to how it relates

233
00:21:04,079 --> 00:21:06,160
to these things. So think about these things as higher

234
00:21:06,200 --> 00:21:10,400
on the spectrum, so to speak. The things that we

235
00:21:10,440 --> 00:21:14,279
experience are temporal. They come and go, and they participate

236
00:21:14,400 --> 00:21:17,920
us in becoming. So the problem, as you can see

237
00:21:17,960 --> 00:21:21,039
pretty quickly, which actually Phaser will mention, is that it

238
00:21:21,039 --> 00:21:24,799
doesn't really see how there's any relationship between these two

239
00:21:24,960 --> 00:21:30,279
disparate realms. Now, for Plato, his solution, one solution he

240
00:21:30,319 --> 00:21:32,559
thinks kind of works is what he calls matexas, which

241
00:21:32,559 --> 00:21:36,599
is participation, the idea that the faint reflections of this

242
00:21:36,680 --> 00:21:41,240
world participate quote unquote in the forms. But of course,

243
00:21:41,279 --> 00:21:43,759
as you can begin to see, this doesn't really solve much.

244
00:21:43,759 --> 00:21:47,839
It is still problematic because if this realm is essentially one,

245
00:21:48,400 --> 00:21:52,559
and the highest of this realm is pure unity, then

246
00:21:53,000 --> 00:21:56,519
it would seem to exclude the possibility of distinctions in

247
00:21:56,559 --> 00:22:00,559
this realm. How are the things of this realm distinct? Well,

248
00:22:00,599 --> 00:22:03,279
it's just ad hoc. Well they just are right. And

249
00:22:03,680 --> 00:22:08,240
as many of you guys know, what's the solution that

250
00:22:08,640 --> 00:22:11,920
this is a great example of ad hoc rescue, which

251
00:22:12,319 --> 00:22:15,279
the idiot atheists the other night in the debate decided

252
00:22:15,319 --> 00:22:18,480
it was not a fallacy, you could use them in debates.

253
00:22:18,519 --> 00:22:21,559
And so now you can use any informal fallacy in

254
00:22:21,599 --> 00:22:24,319
the debate because it's not a formal fallacy. As if

255
00:22:24,640 --> 00:22:27,200
formal and informal has anything to do with whether it's

256
00:22:27,519 --> 00:22:31,160
a non sequitor or not. Right, they're all non sequitors.

257
00:22:31,200 --> 00:22:34,519
It doesn't matter whether it's they don't follow in the

258
00:22:34,519 --> 00:22:44,160
context of a debate. So when we think about that realm,

259
00:22:44,680 --> 00:22:47,839
we have that basic outline there from Plato that's going

260
00:22:47,920 --> 00:22:50,759
to help us as we progress into this chapter from

261
00:22:50,799 --> 00:22:53,599
Phaser where we look into the pros and the cons.

262
00:22:54,599 --> 00:23:01,079
So we start by Phaser mentioning the notion of universe. Okay,

263
00:23:01,559 --> 00:23:08,960
the notion of particulars and of the general. So if

264
00:23:08,960 --> 00:23:12,599
we think of something general like cat ness, right, the

265
00:23:13,319 --> 00:23:16,440
idea of a cat. Then when we look at a cat,

266
00:23:16,640 --> 00:23:19,920
that that we see on the mat that is the particular,

267
00:23:20,200 --> 00:23:24,480
that's the instantiation of the common, the universal. For Plato,

268
00:23:24,920 --> 00:23:29,759
what's more real is not the physical, instantiated cat in

269
00:23:29,759 --> 00:23:34,720
front of you. What's more real is the universal cat.

270
00:23:35,079 --> 00:23:37,519
Right now, why do we speak of a universal cat

271
00:23:37,599 --> 00:23:42,720
or a universal idea. Well, Plato reason just pretty simply

272
00:23:42,799 --> 00:23:46,960
that that, obviously what makes a cat a cat is

273
00:23:47,000 --> 00:23:51,759
not that it has four legs, hair, two eyes, because

274
00:23:51,799 --> 00:23:54,759
a cat could lose any of those properties, right, and

275
00:23:54,839 --> 00:23:58,839
it still is a cat. Right. You know, Tabby cat

276
00:23:59,279 --> 00:24:02,960
Garfields out, they're running around. He gets drunk, he gets

277
00:24:02,960 --> 00:24:08,240
coked up, and he falls underneath Tony Sopranos range rover.

278
00:24:08,640 --> 00:24:11,839
He gets his leg run over. He owes Tony Soprano money,

279
00:24:12,160 --> 00:24:15,319
he doesn't pay up. Garfield gets his eye poked up. Right,

280
00:24:16,880 --> 00:24:23,839
He's still a cat. He doesn't lose catness because Tony

281
00:24:23,839 --> 00:24:27,519
Soprano took his eye on his leg, because of his

282
00:24:28,079 --> 00:24:36,240
fiendish habits. Thus, Plato argued, the essence of cat, the

283
00:24:36,279 --> 00:24:39,920
idea of cat, the form of cat, cannot be identified

284
00:24:40,000 --> 00:24:43,240
with any of the traits, nor merely just adding the

285
00:24:43,240 --> 00:24:48,440
traits up. There's something else, some higher order there that

286
00:24:48,680 --> 00:24:52,200
is that thing. Now, remember what's an essence. The essence

287
00:24:52,240 --> 00:24:54,279
is that which a thing must have to be that

288
00:24:54,359 --> 00:25:00,640
thing and no other thing. Now, with with that in mind,

289
00:25:00,720 --> 00:25:03,599
we can come to the notion of what universals are.

290
00:25:04,000 --> 00:25:06,759
So universals immediately relate to the problem of the one

291
00:25:06,759 --> 00:25:11,559
and the Many. Plato has a whole dialogue. If you've

292
00:25:11,599 --> 00:25:20,119
listened to the lectures, as we did throughout Plato's dialogues,

293
00:25:20,319 --> 00:25:24,240
you will know that, well, one of many comes up often,

294
00:25:28,480 --> 00:25:36,319
but I think it's in Fayeto. Faeto seems to be occupied, yes,

295
00:25:39,000 --> 00:25:42,000
And I will give you some sources for all you know.

296
00:25:42,079 --> 00:25:45,000
It all is out there, so you can go find

297
00:25:45,119 --> 00:25:47,079
the sources for the one of the many and the

298
00:25:47,160 --> 00:25:51,359
universals in I had it, and then I just lost

299
00:25:51,440 --> 00:25:52,200
my page.

300
00:25:51,880 --> 00:25:52,319
Speaker 4: Where to go.

301
00:25:56,000 --> 00:26:04,559
Speaker 2: Just read the Fayeto first of all. But here it

302
00:26:04,640 --> 00:26:23,680
is universals and participation comes up in Fato eight ninety nine,

303
00:26:23,799 --> 00:26:28,559
one hundred one oh one. And then out throughout the

304
00:26:28,559 --> 00:26:35,279
Faeta you'll get discussions about one in many, particularity, universality,

305
00:26:35,359 --> 00:26:38,359
or the forms of things. Obviously this shouldn't be controversial,

306
00:26:38,400 --> 00:26:47,240
but there's always somebody who wants to harass. So Phaser

307
00:26:47,279 --> 00:26:52,559
goes on to say, when we look at things like roundness, redness, triangularity,

308
00:26:55,119 --> 00:26:58,880
et cetera, these are properties or features that cannot be

309
00:26:59,000 --> 00:27:04,319
identified with any single object, right, and obviously they have

310
00:27:04,400 --> 00:27:07,680
to have some reality, because if we deny that they

311
00:27:07,680 --> 00:27:09,839
have some reality, then we're going to run into a

312
00:27:09,880 --> 00:27:15,319
whole host of epistemic metaphysical problems. So abstract objects then

313
00:27:15,359 --> 00:27:20,160
cannot be identified or reducible to matter or the instantiations

314
00:27:20,160 --> 00:27:24,000
of matter. If you remember the debate with Stefan, I mean,

315
00:27:24,000 --> 00:27:26,640
I was just making this simple argument when I was

316
00:27:26,640 --> 00:27:29,519
pointing out that seven coconuts is not the same thing

317
00:27:29,720 --> 00:27:36,000
as seven. Obviously, other arguments that philosophers invoke would be

318
00:27:36,039 --> 00:27:39,440
things like two plus two equals four. Obviously, the proposition

319
00:27:39,960 --> 00:27:42,279
the truth value of tupless two equals four is not

320
00:27:42,319 --> 00:27:46,000
identifiable to two rocks and two rocks. I mean, it's

321
00:27:46,039 --> 00:27:49,599
just pretty obvious that those two things are distinct. It

322
00:27:49,599 --> 00:27:53,039
doesn't take a whole lot of thinking power to realize that.

323
00:27:53,119 --> 00:27:57,920
But philosophers will also resort to things like possible worlds. Right, So,

324
00:27:57,960 --> 00:27:59,359
if you've been in the discord, if you've heard a

325
00:27:59,359 --> 00:28:03,720
lot of the argumentation that Father deconductor Antonius has given

326
00:28:03,839 --> 00:28:07,319
on possible worlds and how philosophers utilize possible worlds to

327
00:28:07,359 --> 00:28:12,359
demonstrate which things are logically impossible, then you'll know that

328
00:28:12,400 --> 00:28:16,720
those are examples of things that refute materialism, because materialism

329
00:28:16,799 --> 00:28:20,200
can't really explain how if everything is reducible to matter,

330
00:28:20,640 --> 00:28:23,559
there can be arguments that are sound and valid from

331
00:28:23,640 --> 00:28:27,279
logic that show the impossibility of the possible worlds being

332
00:28:27,319 --> 00:28:30,839
reducible to matter. And there's actually a paragraph where a

333
00:28:30,920 --> 00:28:36,559
phaser covers that. But the first one in many argument

334
00:28:36,720 --> 00:28:40,200
is that universals like triangularity, redness are not reducible to

335
00:28:40,279 --> 00:28:43,400
any of the particulars, because anytime we talk about these things,

336
00:28:43,799 --> 00:28:47,400
it makes no sense to reduce the predicates that we're

337
00:28:47,480 --> 00:28:51,880
using to the instantiations. There must be some notion of

338
00:28:51,920 --> 00:28:58,039
triangularity that's not just identifiable with the secondary characteristics or

339
00:28:58,079 --> 00:29:02,839
features of the object in front of us. And he

340
00:29:02,920 --> 00:29:05,079
goes on to point out that when we look at geometry.

341
00:29:05,119 --> 00:29:08,079
You've heard me make This argument from Roger Penrose comes

342
00:29:08,160 --> 00:29:11,680
up in the Mind of God book by Paul Davies.

343
00:29:12,799 --> 00:29:18,519
Mathematical principles are not invented. They're discovered. Okay, nobody invented

344
00:29:18,599 --> 00:29:21,440
or made up Mandelbrot sets. They were discovered. And the

345
00:29:21,480 --> 00:29:25,599
mathematicians who are honest that spend their lives on these

346
00:29:25,599 --> 00:29:28,680
topics will tell you that they often speak this way,

347
00:29:28,720 --> 00:29:33,319
that they are discovering truths in the mental scape, they're

348
00:29:33,319 --> 00:29:37,559
not making them up right. So this idiotic, atheistic, materialistic,

349
00:29:37,599 --> 00:29:42,400
reductionist argument that we just make up numbers, we just

350
00:29:42,519 --> 00:29:46,559
make up Pythagorean theorem. They's made up as if it

351
00:29:46,559 --> 00:29:51,119
would work consistently over time and across cultures if they

352
00:29:51,160 --> 00:29:56,359
were just made up. Ludicrous. So Paser covers that, and

353
00:29:56,359 --> 00:29:59,680
it shows that those are examples of principles that are universal.

354
00:30:00,559 --> 00:30:07,680
So he lists things like numbers, universal concepts, universal propositions,

355
00:30:08,799 --> 00:30:16,319
laws of logic, possible worlds. These are all examples of

356
00:30:16,400 --> 00:30:20,400
things that are utilized. They're not obviously not reducible to

357
00:30:21,039 --> 00:30:25,279
physical matter, other concepts that are useful in mathematics, like

358
00:30:25,400 --> 00:30:29,680
zero and infinity, any of the pi. Any of these

359
00:30:29,720 --> 00:30:33,880
things are obviously not identical to any specific thing under

360
00:30:33,880 --> 00:30:38,960
a microscope or any collection of molecules. He goes on

361
00:30:39,000 --> 00:30:40,880
to also point out the argument you've heard me make

362
00:30:40,960 --> 00:30:47,039
many times. This is from the philosophy of science. Husserl

363
00:30:47,079 --> 00:30:50,920
makes this argument science assumes the laws of logic and universals.

364
00:30:50,920 --> 00:30:53,440
If you heard the debate with Infidel Pharaoh that I

365
00:30:53,480 --> 00:30:55,279
had about a year ago, that was the summation of

366
00:30:55,279 --> 00:30:59,240
that whole debate. The whole debate was whether science is

367
00:30:59,599 --> 00:31:05,200
utilized in principles and laws for its argumentation and scientific

368
00:31:05,240 --> 00:31:09,519
process that are not immediately under the purview of empirical investigation.

369
00:31:10,599 --> 00:31:14,759
Obviously it does. So then he goes on to mention

370
00:31:14,839 --> 00:31:17,160
the argument from the nature of possible worlds. This is

371
00:31:17,200 --> 00:31:19,880
the argument that father Deacon Anonias makes, similar to it,

372
00:31:20,240 --> 00:31:24,160
that you can conceive of a possible world that is

373
00:31:24,200 --> 00:31:28,079
not reducible to matter, the laws of logic still hold. Therefore,

374
00:31:28,519 --> 00:31:32,559
how could you conceive of these things if all of

375
00:31:32,599 --> 00:31:36,680
these arguments, all this argumentation is reducible to matter. Right,

376
00:31:36,720 --> 00:31:39,240
So it just it's just a simple way to disprove

377
00:31:39,880 --> 00:31:46,319
the reducibility of logic in the realm of possible worlds

378
00:31:46,400 --> 00:31:53,440
to matter. Then he goes on to talk about phaser

379
00:31:53,519 --> 00:31:56,359
does about indirect argumentation. So then he goes on to

380
00:31:56,400 --> 00:31:59,000
say that this is the types of argument that you

381
00:31:59,039 --> 00:32:03,160
hear us make off. And as presuppositionalists, where we talk

382
00:32:03,200 --> 00:32:07,200
about the self detonating nature, you could say, to quote

383
00:32:07,240 --> 00:32:11,200
steph On here, the impossibility of the contrary in the

384
00:32:11,240 --> 00:32:13,680
sense that when you deny universals, you put yourself in

385
00:32:13,720 --> 00:32:16,359
a host of problems. One of those would be the

386
00:32:16,960 --> 00:32:20,240
immediate claim against what's called realism. So if we're affirming

387
00:32:21,279 --> 00:32:26,400
a nontological reality or status a metaphysical status to universals

388
00:32:26,640 --> 00:32:31,400
in some way, then we would be called a realist. Okay,

389
00:32:32,680 --> 00:32:34,759
not everybody has the same notion of realism. If you

390
00:32:34,799 --> 00:32:37,920
listened to last night's lecture, we talked about John Wickliffe,

391
00:32:37,920 --> 00:32:40,920
who was a ultra realist. He had basically a platonic

392
00:32:41,000 --> 00:32:43,920
type of view. So not everybody has the same notion

393
00:32:44,000 --> 00:32:46,640
of realism. But just at the level of the debate here,

394
00:32:46,680 --> 00:32:51,359
we're just talking about whether we believe that universal concepts

395
00:32:51,359 --> 00:32:56,319
and universals have a real existence, or whether they are

396
00:32:56,920 --> 00:33:00,920
reducible to matter, or whether they, as hes a different position,

397
00:33:01,000 --> 00:33:04,039
are have only a conceptual reality. And we're going to

398
00:33:04,079 --> 00:33:06,119
see the problem with that as well. As it falls

399
00:33:06,119 --> 00:33:11,000
into the syllipsoism, it becomes useless. But he argues that

400
00:33:15,160 --> 00:33:17,480
if you can think of a possible world where it's

401
00:33:17,880 --> 00:33:23,240
at least possible for the universals to exist, then it

402
00:33:23,359 --> 00:33:27,400
shows that universals are not dependent on a human mind

403
00:33:27,640 --> 00:33:32,480
for their existence, and so the mirror possibility of them

404
00:33:32,559 --> 00:33:36,599
shows that they are not reducible to matter. So those

405
00:33:36,599 --> 00:33:38,599
are a lot of different types of arguments against realism.

406
00:33:38,640 --> 00:33:41,400
Then he moves on to point out that if we

407
00:33:41,440 --> 00:33:46,839
think of general names like redness, red, et cetera, if

408
00:33:46,839 --> 00:33:52,680
you are to deny those and be a nominalist, nominalists

409
00:33:52,720 --> 00:33:58,640
or those who deny the reality of universal predicates or universals,

410
00:33:59,759 --> 00:34:02,880
then it's kind of a difficult to explain what are

411
00:34:02,880 --> 00:34:07,319
we predicating that's in common? And the most common response

412
00:34:07,319 --> 00:34:10,840
from the anomalists is that, well, what we're predicating is

413
00:34:10,880 --> 00:34:14,400
that they just have a similarity between them. Well, that

414
00:34:14,440 --> 00:34:17,719
begs the question, what is it that resembles the other thing?

415
00:34:18,199 --> 00:34:21,039
What is it that is the similarity? Right, that's the

416
00:34:21,159 --> 00:34:22,679
very question that we're asked. You can't just say, well,

417
00:34:22,719 --> 00:34:26,840
they're similar, because that's assuming that there's a universal category

418
00:34:27,079 --> 00:34:29,840
that's not instantiated there. That's the point of what we're

419
00:34:29,840 --> 00:34:34,880
trying to argue here. And even Bertrand Russell, himself an atheist,

420
00:34:35,079 --> 00:34:39,239
noted the difficulty of this regress that the resemblance argument

421
00:34:39,360 --> 00:34:43,239
that the noomalist often appeals to is itself a universal

422
00:34:44,199 --> 00:34:47,440
resemblance is a universal concept, and it would have to

423
00:34:47,440 --> 00:34:49,440
be the case for this argument to work, But then

424
00:34:49,480 --> 00:34:54,000
it's self reputing. If a stop sign resembles a fire truck.

425
00:34:54,440 --> 00:34:56,960
Since there are two different objects, then the thing that

426
00:34:57,000 --> 00:35:00,320
we call red has to be something more more than

427
00:35:00,480 --> 00:35:02,880
just the instantiate because that the objects are obviously different.

428
00:35:03,119 --> 00:35:05,760
So to just to say that they share quote resemblance

429
00:35:05,840 --> 00:35:08,559
is to assume that resemblance is a real state of

430
00:35:08,559 --> 00:35:12,599
affairs that occurs across the time and space. Right, because

431
00:35:12,639 --> 00:35:16,480
there's countless numbers of red objects in the world, and

432
00:35:16,519 --> 00:35:21,920
you're saying that the resemblance itself is consistent, and here's

433
00:35:21,960 --> 00:35:26,760
over time, it's invariant, right, because redness doesn't turn into

434
00:35:27,119 --> 00:35:30,199
the opposite of itself in terms of the resemblance itself,

435
00:35:30,679 --> 00:35:32,599
and the anomalist just has to say that, well, we

436
00:35:33,280 --> 00:35:37,880
just don't know. Well, then the anomalists can resort to

437
00:35:38,039 --> 00:35:42,320
another level of moving the argument to say that, okay,

438
00:35:42,400 --> 00:35:47,519
well I can avoid this dilemma by saying that we

439
00:35:47,599 --> 00:35:51,559
only call all of these examples resemblances merely because they

440
00:35:51,679 --> 00:35:54,960
resemble each other. They don't have an actual higher level existence.

441
00:35:55,559 --> 00:35:58,000
But this problem just moves this step to a higher

442
00:35:58,039 --> 00:36:03,360
level because he's phaser notes the various cases of resemblance

443
00:36:03,519 --> 00:36:07,800
resemble other various cases of resemblance. So now you just

444
00:36:07,840 --> 00:36:10,840
said what is the resemblance of resemblance? You see, So

445
00:36:10,880 --> 00:36:15,840
this higher order moving up the problem is also itself

446
00:36:15,840 --> 00:36:19,119
relying on a universal concept, and so this Bertran Russell

447
00:36:19,159 --> 00:36:26,840
notes would lead to an infinite regress. The next argument

448
00:36:26,880 --> 00:36:29,639
you've heard me make many times, which is the linguistic argument.

449
00:36:30,280 --> 00:36:37,920
Language predication assumes universal truth predicates. Right there, the tree

450
00:36:37,960 --> 00:36:45,239
is green, the what else is green, The social justice

451
00:36:45,440 --> 00:36:50,960
hair is green, the ice pop is green. So all

452
00:36:50,960 --> 00:36:53,599
three of those things are green. There are different things.

453
00:36:55,400 --> 00:37:00,000
And when we have a sentence that's meaningful for community,

454
00:37:00,559 --> 00:37:04,800
if we're actually communicating in a sentence, then greenness has

455
00:37:04,840 --> 00:37:08,199
to be something that is really meaningful and not reducible

456
00:37:08,239 --> 00:37:12,679
to the breath that's coming out of my mouth, not

457
00:37:12,760 --> 00:37:15,880
reducible to the gray matter in my head, not reducible

458
00:37:15,920 --> 00:37:19,519
to the molecules in the social justice greasy hair, or

459
00:37:19,599 --> 00:37:24,119
in the corn start popsicle, or in the tree leaves.

460
00:37:24,719 --> 00:37:27,119
So what are we predicating here? If it's something that's

461
00:37:27,159 --> 00:37:31,480
not real, it doesn't exist. Greenness is not real. Yeah,

462
00:37:31,559 --> 00:37:33,800
you see, we begin to we begin to have these

463
00:37:33,880 --> 00:37:39,000
ridiculous problems that now we utilize and communicate with all

464
00:37:39,000 --> 00:37:42,039
these things that are not real. But remember most of

465
00:37:42,039 --> 00:37:44,360
the time these are atheists who don't believe in made

466
00:37:44,440 --> 00:37:48,880
up things. But now all language itself is just made

467
00:37:48,960 --> 00:37:55,400
up and therefore meaningless. When I utter the word read,

468
00:37:55,559 --> 00:37:58,760
Socrates utters the word red, there are obviously particular distinct

469
00:37:58,800 --> 00:38:03,159
instances and utterances of the same word. Yet this word

470
00:38:03,199 --> 00:38:05,239
exists over and over in our utterances and in the

471
00:38:05,280 --> 00:38:07,840
concepts in our mind. And yet they're different minds. So

472
00:38:07,880 --> 00:38:12,480
therefore there's something beyond the instantiations that allows for the

473
00:38:12,519 --> 00:38:17,239
conveying meaning. Thus, words and language assume metaphysical realities. If

474
00:38:17,280 --> 00:38:19,679
you've been in the discord the last week, I probably

475
00:38:19,760 --> 00:38:22,559
made this point this argument at least ten times with

476
00:38:22,679 --> 00:38:26,280
different people, different atheists bringing this up, and they don't

477
00:38:26,320 --> 00:38:31,760
get it. Some do. In general, it is a notoriously

478
00:38:31,880 --> 00:38:36,360
very difficult position to defend. Dominalism leads ultimately to the

479
00:38:36,840 --> 00:38:39,519
possibility of knowledge. That's not Phaser saying that, that's me

480
00:38:39,599 --> 00:38:42,719
saying that it's completely destructive to the possibility of language,

481
00:38:42,760 --> 00:38:48,400
meaning knowledge, metaphysics, et cetera. And ultimately, when you move

482
00:38:48,480 --> 00:38:53,199
to the position that it's all just dependent upon a

483
00:38:53,280 --> 00:38:56,519
human mind, which we don't even have any concept, I

484
00:38:56,519 --> 00:38:58,480
mean to say that it depends on a human mind,

485
00:38:58,519 --> 00:39:01,559
assumes the universal concept of mind that all minds possessed.

486
00:39:01,639 --> 00:39:04,480
You can't even know that on this stupid position. It's

487
00:39:04,519 --> 00:39:09,559
a total collapse. It's totally stupid. It's really low IQ

488
00:39:09,880 --> 00:39:13,639
low brain stuff. But every atheist pretty much believes this.

489
00:39:13,719 --> 00:39:16,960
I mean, unless you're some weird variant of a platonic atheist,

490
00:39:18,039 --> 00:39:21,719
they believe this nonsense. They can't even make sentences. That's

491
00:39:21,719 --> 00:39:23,840
my chief argument against the atheists. If you listen, I

492
00:39:23,840 --> 00:39:28,519
always such you can't make a sentence. You'll say, but yeah,

493
00:39:28,559 --> 00:39:31,840
I just did, right, So that proves that your world

494
00:39:32,000 --> 00:39:37,480
is not true. That's tag right there. The argument from

495
00:39:37,599 --> 00:39:42,960
the objectivity of concepts and knowledge. Any objective, true statement,

496
00:39:43,000 --> 00:39:48,760
any claim, any concept itself, such as triangularity or redness.

497
00:39:51,440 --> 00:39:54,880
Assume that the mind has the same idea right for

498
00:39:54,960 --> 00:39:58,519
us to meaningfully communicate about any object, anything, any proposition,

499
00:39:58,559 --> 00:40:03,320
any sentence. We can't reduce the meaning to the gray

500
00:40:03,320 --> 00:40:07,000
matter because I have different gray matter, right, So how

501
00:40:07,039 --> 00:40:10,760
do we have if we reduce concepts to brain states?

502
00:40:11,320 --> 00:40:14,239
My brain states are not your brain states. Therefore communication

503
00:40:14,280 --> 00:40:16,960
would be impossible if there was not something else higher

504
00:40:17,000 --> 00:40:24,000
than all of the physicalist instantiations. Phaser goes on to

505
00:40:24,039 --> 00:40:27,199
make linguistic types of precondition arguments that you've heard me

506
00:40:27,239 --> 00:40:30,159
make a hundred times. Consider also the many things that

507
00:40:30,280 --> 00:40:34,079
must be the case just for communication to be possible.

508
00:40:34,199 --> 00:40:39,519
This is the preconditions transcendental argument about the possibility of communication.

509
00:40:40,079 --> 00:40:42,760
There's communication, and then there's a higher level of argument

510
00:40:42,760 --> 00:40:45,320
about what must be the case for communication to even

511
00:40:45,360 --> 00:40:49,960
be possible, two different levels of argumentation. And he quotes

512
00:40:52,599 --> 00:40:56,480
Frega's essay thought. So Fraga has an essay thought where

513
00:40:56,480 --> 00:40:59,079
he talks about the presubpositions of what must be the

514
00:40:59,119 --> 00:41:07,039
case for language to even be possible. Yes, exactly, been

515
00:41:07,039 --> 00:41:12,239
here making that argument for years against atheism and materialism.

516
00:41:13,800 --> 00:41:16,119
Then he goes onto the argument of the reductio of

517
00:41:16,159 --> 00:41:18,880
the impossibility of psychologism. That's an easy one. You've heard

518
00:41:18,920 --> 00:41:22,119
me make this argument many times, one of which would

519
00:41:22,119 --> 00:41:24,360
be the naturalist fallacy that if all of our brain

520
00:41:24,360 --> 00:41:27,679
states are part of a determined chemical process, then they're

521
00:41:27,719 --> 00:41:32,559
not really you making choices. Your brain states are illusorially

522
00:41:32,840 --> 00:41:35,239
it's an illusion that you are making choices and that

523
00:41:35,320 --> 00:41:38,639
you are coming to truths. You are merely a determined

524
00:41:38,719 --> 00:41:41,800
chemical process. So there's no you that stands behind these

525
00:41:42,960 --> 00:41:51,079
discoveries and these argumentations mind logic, right, these things cannot

526
00:41:51,079 --> 00:41:53,639
be reducible to matter. He says. It is necessary, it's

527
00:41:53,679 --> 00:41:56,519
necessary about our minds that we have concepts, standards of logic,

528
00:41:57,079 --> 00:42:00,199
et cetera. And they must be set forth, as we

529
00:42:00,239 --> 00:42:02,960
were saying, in order to have knowledge claims at all,

530
00:42:03,519 --> 00:42:07,719
to have the objective knowledge of or nature of the

531
00:42:07,760 --> 00:42:11,039
workings of things, our minds must be situated in this way,

532
00:42:11,039 --> 00:42:13,199
he says. He goes on to say, for to formulate

533
00:42:13,280 --> 00:42:16,679
and defend any claim, there must be an appeal to

534
00:42:16,800 --> 00:42:20,760
certain universal things like mind. Right, If I'm going to

535
00:42:20,840 --> 00:42:24,760
make an argument about minds or about states of affairs

536
00:42:24,760 --> 00:42:28,079
from my mind, I'm assuming mind, I'm assuming self, I'm

537
00:42:28,079 --> 00:42:34,760
assuming logic. It's that simple, not that hard of an argument. Now,

538
00:42:34,880 --> 00:42:37,800
I'm not empirically demonstrated all those things that I'm assuming.

539
00:42:38,920 --> 00:42:42,000
But remember what all almost nine ninety nine percent of

540
00:42:42,000 --> 00:42:44,400
these atheists all say don't believe in anything. This is

541
00:42:44,400 --> 00:42:52,039
empirically demonstrated brou Otherwise it's superstition. Now next, Phaser moves

542
00:42:52,079 --> 00:42:55,559
on to consider areas where we will have to begin

543
00:42:55,599 --> 00:42:59,000
to critique him, and if you want to ask questions,

544
00:42:59,039 --> 00:43:02,800
we got one there be feel free to leave super

545
00:43:02,880 --> 00:43:09,119
chet questions. Next he calls the solution to this that

546
00:43:09,199 --> 00:43:12,800
neither the nominalists nor the mere conceptualist positions, and the

547
00:43:12,840 --> 00:43:19,679
conceptualist position was just that abstract objects are not physical,

548
00:43:19,840 --> 00:43:22,159
they only exist as mental states. But that's just that

549
00:43:22,199 --> 00:43:26,079
doesn't really get you anywhere, because if everything is mental states,

550
00:43:26,119 --> 00:43:30,599
then you're stuck in psychologism, in syllipsism. The end result

551
00:43:30,679 --> 00:43:34,239
of that silypicism. So he says, so there's other versions

552
00:43:34,239 --> 00:43:38,920
of realism that we could give. There's Platonic realism, Aristotelian realism,

553
00:43:39,400 --> 00:43:43,119
and scholastic realism. Now, Phaser is not aware of the

554
00:43:43,119 --> 00:43:45,800
fact that Saint Maximus's view is not the view of

555
00:43:45,840 --> 00:43:48,599
Thomas Aquinas, and we will show that. We will demonstrate

556
00:43:48,639 --> 00:43:51,639
that here in a minute. Because Faser deals with the

557
00:43:51,679 --> 00:43:55,679
objections and he actually brings up the absolute devine suplicity

558
00:43:55,719 --> 00:43:57,360
objection that I'm going to bring up, and he doesn't

559
00:43:57,360 --> 00:44:01,079
rebutt it. He just says they're not really good objections,

560
00:44:01,400 --> 00:44:04,400
but he brings it up, but he doesn't say why

561
00:44:04,400 --> 00:44:08,039
it's a bad objection. It's a perfect objection, and we'll

562
00:44:08,079 --> 00:44:09,679
get to that in a minute. Anyway, So he calls

563
00:44:09,719 --> 00:44:15,079
the position scholastic realism. We'll call it Saint Maximus realism. Okay,

564
00:44:15,159 --> 00:44:19,719
because it shares some similarities with both Plato and with Aristotle,

565
00:44:19,760 --> 00:44:22,800
and Phaser will admit that the scholastic realism position he

566
00:44:22,840 --> 00:44:25,559
thinks does that, but it's very crucial. This is why

567
00:44:25,599 --> 00:44:32,800
Maximus does not locate the universals or the exemplars in

568
00:44:32,840 --> 00:44:36,320
the essence of God, and the logie are not the

569
00:44:36,360 --> 00:44:40,119
same thing as the essences of creatures. It's very easy

570
00:44:40,119 --> 00:44:44,559
to prove that. Maximus says that the universals can perish. Well,

571
00:44:44,599 --> 00:44:48,320
I'm sorry, but logi cannot perish. Right. If the essences

572
00:44:48,320 --> 00:44:51,320
of creative things were in in the divine essence, they

573
00:44:51,320 --> 00:44:55,440
couldn't perish, right, But universals can perish, Maximus says. So

574
00:44:55,480 --> 00:44:59,719
there's a distinction between universals. They're created in the logi.

575
00:44:59,760 --> 00:45:04,400
Wo around created. The universals are patterned on the uncreated logi,

576
00:45:05,039 --> 00:45:07,519
and the logi are not the essence of God. So

577
00:45:07,559 --> 00:45:15,280
the first he says, let's look at the solutions to nominalism,

578
00:45:15,400 --> 00:45:17,320
the different schools that we could go with. One school.

579
00:45:17,360 --> 00:45:21,440
He says, we could go with is platonic realism. And

580
00:45:21,480 --> 00:45:23,480
you heard me outline that. At the beginning. We talked

581
00:45:23,480 --> 00:45:26,400
about the forms, Plato's conception of the forms, and we

582
00:45:26,440 --> 00:45:31,079
talked about how these aren't really good. They seem to

583
00:45:31,119 --> 00:45:33,199
give a little bit of an answer to the immediate

584
00:45:33,280 --> 00:45:39,760
problem of reducing the the universals to the instantiations or

585
00:45:39,760 --> 00:45:42,519
to matter. It shows the problem there. But when we

586
00:45:42,599 --> 00:45:45,639
just say that there's another realm of these ideal things,

587
00:45:46,280 --> 00:45:48,519
we still got all these problems. Right, how do we

588
00:45:48,719 --> 00:45:53,599
relate that unchanging realm to this realm? In what sense

589
00:45:53,639 --> 00:45:56,559
do they participate? How do we avoid the third man argument? Say,

590
00:45:56,639 --> 00:46:00,199
there's a whole bunch of problems, the dualism problem with Platonism, right,

591
00:46:00,199 --> 00:46:03,559
Plato's ad hoc rescue of just saying, well, we know

592
00:46:03,639 --> 00:46:07,320
the forms because like we were reincarnated. Bro, that's literally

593
00:46:07,360 --> 00:46:10,519
his ad hoc rescue for his whole metaphysic. We were

594
00:46:10,599 --> 00:46:12,199
in the realm of the forms once and then we

595
00:46:12,280 --> 00:46:14,760
kind of fell into this one, and so we're remembering

596
00:46:15,320 --> 00:46:17,960
the forms from you know, the time than when we

597
00:46:17,960 --> 00:46:21,880
were all in the moment. That's not a good answer.

598
00:46:22,199 --> 00:46:24,639
That's a terrible answer, actually, but that's the best thing

599
00:46:24,679 --> 00:46:31,800
Plato has, and Phaser actually mentioned some of my critiques

600
00:46:31,800 --> 00:46:34,679
of Platonism, right, not everybody knows that the third man critique,

601
00:46:34,920 --> 00:46:37,599
that's ancient, even Plato brought it up. But there's other

602
00:46:37,639 --> 00:46:40,400
ones too, like the duality of the two realms, how

603
00:46:40,400 --> 00:46:43,840
do they actually relate. Plato's one in the many argument

604
00:46:43,880 --> 00:46:50,119
actually doesn't work because if the many particular objects that

605
00:46:50,119 --> 00:46:53,599
we experience are different objects, then how do they have

606
00:46:53,760 --> 00:46:58,199
forms that are not really different? Because remember that the

607
00:46:58,280 --> 00:47:01,599
forms of objects have to have a higher level perfection

608
00:47:01,719 --> 00:47:05,039
in terms of their simplicity. So ultimately they're all located

609
00:47:05,079 --> 00:47:08,199
in the monad, but the monad doesn't have real distinctions.

610
00:47:09,079 --> 00:47:12,239
Anytime you enter into the equation real distinctions, then you're

611
00:47:12,280 --> 00:47:16,039
moving into the lesser gradations of being, the lower rungs

612
00:47:16,079 --> 00:47:18,360
of the chain of being, because you're moving away from

613
00:47:18,360 --> 00:47:21,760
the one. So for Plato, the more distinct things are,

614
00:47:22,239 --> 00:47:24,679
the further down they are on the chain of being,

615
00:47:25,039 --> 00:47:28,440
down towards non being. That's why we're all striving to

616
00:47:28,480 --> 00:47:32,760
get back to unity with the one. So once you

617
00:47:32,840 --> 00:47:38,440
have that metaphysical presubosition about the ontological supremacy, of ultimate

618
00:47:38,519 --> 00:47:42,159
unity and simplicity. You have all these problems in your system,

619
00:47:42,559 --> 00:47:48,960
so manyness is on a lower status of being. And

620
00:47:49,079 --> 00:47:51,920
as you can imagine when the Church Fathers encounter this,

621
00:47:52,519 --> 00:47:55,559
it takes centuries of debating, especially throughout the Cappadocians, to

622
00:47:55,599 --> 00:47:59,079
try to demonstrate the fact that the threeness of God

623
00:47:59,280 --> 00:48:02,920
is not some how lesser than the unity of God.

624
00:48:04,440 --> 00:48:06,559
We'll come to that later when we look at andreaev

625
00:48:06,639 --> 00:48:10,480
and some of the quotes about love. But so basically

626
00:48:10,480 --> 00:48:12,480
a phaser just runs through some of the critiques and

627
00:48:12,519 --> 00:48:16,519
the problems with the blatonic response on realism, and one

628
00:48:16,519 --> 00:48:17,960
of the ones that he notes that is pretty good

629
00:48:18,119 --> 00:48:24,880
is a better objection would be to consider a universal

630
00:48:24,880 --> 00:48:31,119
concept like animality. Every individual animal is either rational as

631
00:48:31,199 --> 00:48:34,679
human beings are, or non rational as other animals are.

632
00:48:35,960 --> 00:48:40,360
So what is animality itself? Right? Precisely, because it is

633
00:48:40,440 --> 00:48:43,760
a universal it has to apply both to rational and

634
00:48:43,840 --> 00:48:47,559
non rational animals. But it can't itself include both rationality

635
00:48:47,559 --> 00:48:51,239
and non rationality, for these are contradictory properties, and thus

636
00:48:51,280 --> 00:48:55,400
the problem for saying the animality is located in a

637
00:48:55,519 --> 00:48:59,239
higher level reality of perfectionism in the forms. So we

638
00:48:59,320 --> 00:49:02,039
have to say that it inherently entails either rationality or

639
00:49:02,079 --> 00:49:06,199
non rationality. No individual thing can be neither rational nor

640
00:49:06,239 --> 00:49:10,039
non rational, and any existing thing has to be one

641
00:49:10,119 --> 00:49:14,039
or the other. Therefore, the universal concept of animality cannot

642
00:49:14,039 --> 00:49:17,079
be said to exist as an individual thing in its

643
00:49:17,079 --> 00:49:20,159
own right, as a self subsisting form, and so it doesn't.

644
00:49:20,239 --> 00:49:31,320
It seems to not work on that system. Another problem

645
00:49:31,480 --> 00:49:34,480
that I just pointed out. Phaser goes on to say,

646
00:49:34,639 --> 00:49:38,039
is that the things of our experience are not the

647
00:49:38,079 --> 00:49:41,199
forms themselves. So how do we even speak of a

648
00:49:41,239 --> 00:49:45,800
participation or a resemblance? Because remember, the characteristics the properties

649
00:49:45,840 --> 00:49:50,800
of the form are completely different than the characteristics of

650
00:49:51,119 --> 00:49:55,039
the particulars in our experience. So in what sense is

651
00:49:55,039 --> 00:49:57,840
there any kind of real relation between these two? How

652
00:49:57,880 --> 00:50:00,400
do they resemble? It makes no sense. This is the

653
00:50:00,440 --> 00:50:05,159
same argument you hear me make about ads same argument

654
00:50:05,159 --> 00:50:08,079
I make to the Muslims. It's the same point because

655
00:50:08,239 --> 00:50:12,239
any system that has the presuppositions of absolute simplicity in

656
00:50:12,280 --> 00:50:16,079
this sense will have a hell of a time an

657
00:50:16,079 --> 00:50:20,599
impossible task of trying to explain and locate the grounding

658
00:50:20,639 --> 00:50:24,719
of the particulars of this world in that thing doesn't work,

659
00:50:26,639 --> 00:50:35,480
and thus all ads systems will collapse. That's also, of course,

660
00:50:35,519 --> 00:50:39,719
one Maximus does not say that the essences of creatures

661
00:50:40,039 --> 00:50:44,400
are identical to logi. The essences of creatures are in

662
00:50:44,440 --> 00:50:48,159
the creatures. He agrees with with our Aristotle on that.

663
00:50:48,760 --> 00:50:53,440
But the creatures and their instantiations their particular there the

664
00:50:53,480 --> 00:50:58,280
logi of their being, their time coming to be, their existence,

665
00:50:58,320 --> 00:51:02,920
their providence. Every molecule, the body is patterned on the logi,

666
00:51:04,000 --> 00:51:07,320
but not identical to the logi, because the logi are

667
00:51:07,320 --> 00:51:10,920
in the divine mind. You're not identical to the divine mind, obviously,

668
00:51:12,880 --> 00:51:15,360
but many people make this mistake. They will identify the

669
00:51:15,360 --> 00:51:18,320
logi with the essences of created things. No, they're not.

670
00:51:18,599 --> 00:51:21,599
The essences of created things are in the objects, and

671
00:51:21,639 --> 00:51:24,760
he agrees with maxim with Aristotle there. But Maximus is

672
00:51:24,760 --> 00:51:28,360
also giving a nod to Plutinus by saying that the

673
00:51:28,400 --> 00:51:32,119
logi really are uncreated, because they exist in the divine

674
00:51:32,119 --> 00:51:35,559
mind and they come to be when God wills it. Therefore,

675
00:51:35,559 --> 00:51:38,679
they are thought wills about creatures, and so they are

676
00:51:38,719 --> 00:51:41,880
a different type of energy. They are a type of

677
00:51:42,000 --> 00:51:45,719
energy distinct from the eternal what pala Must calls the

678
00:51:45,840 --> 00:51:48,960
natural energies. That doesn't mean that there's non natural or

679
00:51:49,039 --> 00:51:51,599
unnatural energies. It's just a word that is used to

680
00:51:51,639 --> 00:51:55,280
signify the energies that would shine forth whether God created

681
00:51:55,440 --> 00:51:59,000
or not. And this comes from Athanatius argument against the Arians,

682
00:52:00,079 --> 00:52:04,599
and that's why we distinguish God's love glory right if

683
00:52:04,599 --> 00:52:07,239
he had not created, that would still be shining forth

684
00:52:07,320 --> 00:52:11,079
and reciprocated amongst the persons of the Trinity without a

685
00:52:11,119 --> 00:52:13,719
created order. This is why we're going to have the show.

686
00:52:13,800 --> 00:52:16,000
We're going to point out in a minute that Laski,

687
00:52:16,320 --> 00:52:20,960
Steanieloi Andreev's argument, and Saint Nichola Beeli Morovitch makes this

688
00:52:21,039 --> 00:52:25,480
argument too, that you can actually show that the Trinity

689
00:52:25,599 --> 00:52:31,440
is the only logical rational deity that avoids a necessary creation.

690
00:52:32,480 --> 00:52:36,119
Because if he's God, if he's Lord, who is he

691
00:52:36,239 --> 00:52:39,400
Lord and God in relationship to unless there's an is

692
00:52:39,400 --> 00:52:44,599
he eternal Lord, eternal God, If he's a single hypostasis,

693
00:52:45,400 --> 00:52:48,559
single God, then he must be Lord God over an

694
00:52:48,559 --> 00:52:55,840
eternal creation, unless he's Tryune and there's an eternal reciprocation

695
00:52:55,960 --> 00:52:59,519
of love and attributes like glory shining forth amongst the

696
00:52:59,559 --> 00:53:04,519
triad regardless of the created order. Right, But then when

697
00:53:04,559 --> 00:53:07,480
he creates on the basis of will, not on the

698
00:53:07,519 --> 00:53:10,480
basis of any necessary pattern in his essence, but only

699
00:53:10,519 --> 00:53:13,639
on the basis of will. And yes he did. They

700
00:53:13,920 --> 00:53:16,920
create on the basis of patterns that you could say

701
00:53:16,920 --> 00:53:18,519
in the divine mind that are called the logate. But

702
00:53:18,559 --> 00:53:21,119
he didn't have to bring them to be. He willed

703
00:53:21,119 --> 00:53:26,079
to bring them to be. That's why this view is different.

704
00:53:26,880 --> 00:53:29,760
But that's precisely where we're going to critique Phaser, because

705
00:53:29,760 --> 00:53:32,239
Phaser is not aware of Maximus. It doesn't appear to

706
00:53:32,280 --> 00:53:34,039
have any knowledge of Maximus at all. He thinks that

707
00:53:34,119 --> 00:53:36,039
really there's just a gust and or and Aquinas, and

708
00:53:36,079 --> 00:53:40,360
that sums up the whole exemplar doctrine. No, it doesn't.

709
00:53:43,239 --> 00:53:47,719
Next he moves to Aristotelian realism. And as you can imagine,

710
00:53:47,880 --> 00:53:52,079
Aristotle believes that animality, triangularity, redness, humanness are not in

711
00:53:52,079 --> 00:53:54,880
a third realm. They are located in the objects, so

712
00:53:54,920 --> 00:54:01,519
to speak of experience, the mind abstracts from these particular

713
00:54:01,519 --> 00:54:04,400
instances of the objects in terms of the phantasm it's

714
00:54:04,440 --> 00:54:07,599
able to in the mind. So the basically the exterior

715
00:54:07,639 --> 00:54:11,039
objects in Aerosol's view imprint upon our mind through the

716
00:54:11,079 --> 00:54:15,079
senses these different instances right, and in the mind, through

717
00:54:15,119 --> 00:54:19,239
that phantasm is able to abstract the universal. So we

718
00:54:19,280 --> 00:54:23,400
get a concept of the universal right that is present,

719
00:54:23,519 --> 00:54:27,320
so to speak, in the objects. The essence of the

720
00:54:27,360 --> 00:54:30,480
objects is in those objects. Of course, there's other problems

721
00:54:30,519 --> 00:54:33,960
with this view, which I've outlined in other papers and essays,

722
00:54:33,960 --> 00:54:37,599
which is that Aerosol seems to have this notion that

723
00:54:38,199 --> 00:54:42,360
objects are reducible to the essence of that object, and

724
00:54:42,400 --> 00:54:49,639
so therefore there's not really multiple universals or levels of

725
00:54:49,679 --> 00:54:54,360
participation in specific objects. But if that's the case, then

726
00:54:54,360 --> 00:54:59,199
they don't really possess different types of realities, and that

727
00:54:59,239 --> 00:55:01,960
becomes problem when we start talking about Christology, when we

728
00:55:02,000 --> 00:55:07,239
talk about anthropology in the Orthodox conception, and that's why

729
00:55:08,280 --> 00:55:12,559
there's a nod given to both Plato Aristotle. Plutonis in

730
00:55:12,760 --> 00:55:18,280
our tradition Maximus will make free use of these different

731
00:55:18,360 --> 00:55:20,880
systems when they're right and reject them when they're wrong.

732
00:55:21,760 --> 00:55:26,440
Let's look at now the divine conceptualism argument that Faser

733
00:55:26,480 --> 00:55:28,400
moves to that you hear me make often, and I'm

734
00:55:28,440 --> 00:55:30,639
going to tweak it because I don't think Faser he's

735
00:55:30,679 --> 00:55:33,320
on the right track here, but he doesn't really take

736
00:55:33,360 --> 00:55:36,639
it to the right place because he's still situating all

737
00:55:36,679 --> 00:55:43,480
this within quote natural theology. For Faser, this doesn't prove,

738
00:55:43,559 --> 00:55:46,880
this proves any kind of god. Right, Oh, it's going

739
00:55:46,960 --> 00:55:50,199
to prove a generic god that has omniscients. Oh so

740
00:55:51,480 --> 00:55:56,480
Judaism Islam. What good of an argument is that? But

741
00:55:56,599 --> 00:56:00,320
we will give some props because he will mention the

742
00:56:00,320 --> 00:56:03,840
fact that the divine conceptual argument that he locates first

743
00:56:03,880 --> 00:56:06,480
in Sant Augustine. He says that Augustine made the argument

744
00:56:06,559 --> 00:56:12,559
that universals, propositions, mathematical and logical truths, necessary and possible worlds,

745
00:56:12,599 --> 00:56:16,039
et cetera, or excuse me, necessary and possible states of

746
00:56:16,039 --> 00:56:21,000
affairs can only be logically grounded in an intellect or

747
00:56:21,000 --> 00:56:25,079
a divine mind that is infinite and eternal. Thus some

748
00:56:25,119 --> 00:56:28,280
form of realism has to be true. But the Platonic

749
00:56:28,320 --> 00:56:33,079
realism and the Riskytelian realism are severely deficient, and thus

750
00:56:33,119 --> 00:56:36,440
all we're left with is some form of a realism

751
00:56:36,480 --> 00:56:39,119
in which there's divine conceptualism. And basically what that means

752
00:56:39,119 --> 00:56:45,079
that we're grounding the We're locating and grounding the universals,

753
00:56:45,079 --> 00:56:49,239
et cetera, in the mind of God. But now remember,

754
00:56:49,880 --> 00:56:51,920
and he will mention this subjection at the end of

755
00:56:52,000 --> 00:56:54,960
this chapter, what is the Roman Catholic doctrine of divine

756
00:56:55,000 --> 00:56:58,159
ideas in terms of a quitness? Now, maybe a Scotis

757
00:56:58,239 --> 00:57:00,039
could get around this. I don't really think so. But

758
00:57:00,400 --> 00:57:03,679
because I mean John Denscotis and his Treatise on Unicity

759
00:57:03,679 --> 00:57:06,840
of God, he says all the same stuff about simplicity

760
00:57:07,119 --> 00:57:11,280
in terms of knowledge, will and act that Aquinas says

761
00:57:11,280 --> 00:57:13,320
he equates them all with the essence of God in

762
00:57:13,360 --> 00:57:15,719
a strict identity, even though he also says that there's

763
00:57:15,719 --> 00:57:20,159
a formal distinction. Whatever. I don't think that that position

764
00:57:20,199 --> 00:57:24,280
avoids the problem, because I think Scotis is drawing quite

765
00:57:24,280 --> 00:57:27,599
a bit from Augustine when it comes to some of

766
00:57:27,639 --> 00:57:31,760
these ideas. And if that's the case, then you're still

767
00:57:31,760 --> 00:57:33,920
gonna have the problem of locating the archetypes in the

768
00:57:34,039 --> 00:57:37,519
essence of God. In other words, even if you say

769
00:57:37,519 --> 00:57:41,000
that the divine ideas are formally distinct, which I'm not

770
00:57:41,039 --> 00:57:44,480
sure Scotis says that. Maybe he does, but it doesn't

771
00:57:44,480 --> 00:57:47,239
avoid the problem of saying that, but they're really ultimately

772
00:57:47,280 --> 00:57:54,000
identical to the essence of God. Either way, it doesn't

773
00:57:54,000 --> 00:57:57,039
matter because it's not Maximus's position, which is the correct position,

774
00:57:57,239 --> 00:58:03,800
which is that they are thought wills. So I didn't

775
00:58:03,800 --> 00:58:06,599
want to mention too. Even Augustine's argument is lacking because

776
00:58:06,639 --> 00:58:12,639
when Augustine makes this point again, what is this kind

777
00:58:12,679 --> 00:58:14,880
of God? I mean, we don't believe that God is

778
00:58:14,920 --> 00:58:21,760
just a singular divine mind. Okay, that's absolutely simple and

779
00:58:21,800 --> 00:58:24,840
contained all these universals. That's not our view. That's like

780
00:58:24,880 --> 00:58:29,559
a neoplatonic view. But that doesn't work because our God

781
00:58:29,599 --> 00:58:33,280
is the triune God who created the world, right. I mean,

782
00:58:33,320 --> 00:58:36,519
you could hold that view and hold to emanationism as neoplatonist.

783
00:58:36,599 --> 00:58:40,360
So what distinguishes this view from neoplatonism. Well, then you

784
00:58:40,360 --> 00:58:43,880
have to start injecting things like, well, this God's personal. Ah, yes, Now,

785
00:58:43,960 --> 00:58:46,199
if this God's personal, how do we know that it's

786
00:58:46,199 --> 00:58:50,000
not still just a singular personal God. That's why you

787
00:58:50,039 --> 00:58:52,800
have to bring in trinity, not just because of the

788
00:58:52,800 --> 00:58:55,760
one and many argument and grounding the one and the

789
00:58:55,760 --> 00:58:59,440
many in equal ultimacy in God in terms of the

790
00:58:59,440 --> 00:59:04,480
trinity the logi, but also in the sense of what

791
00:59:04,519 --> 00:59:11,519
we said earlier about necessary and freely willed creation, right,

792
00:59:12,360 --> 00:59:15,960
the single God. Right if we have the the Arisitilian

793
00:59:16,320 --> 00:59:20,360
or any sort of monotheistic concepts that strict monotheism in

794
00:59:20,360 --> 00:59:22,320
the sense of just one hypostasis.

795
00:59:23,360 --> 00:59:23,480
Speaker 3: Uh.

796
00:59:23,679 --> 00:59:26,519
Speaker 2: The problem with that position again is that in pretty much,

797
00:59:27,119 --> 00:59:29,559
maybe not every case, but a lot of the philosophers

798
00:59:29,559 --> 00:59:33,760
and theologians who've held that position, whether Muslim, Jewish, or whatever,

799
00:59:34,159 --> 00:59:39,400
they they oftentimes will accept the Aristotilian argumentation about eternal

800
00:59:39,440 --> 00:59:43,639
matter and eternal creation. Well, that's not our view. We

801
00:59:43,679 --> 00:59:46,000
don't want we believe in ex nilo, right, so that's

802
00:59:46,039 --> 00:59:48,719
not the same God as we believe, right. And you said, well,

803
00:59:48,719 --> 00:59:52,719
but so what Well, Basil specifically says Aristotle is an

804
00:59:52,719 --> 00:59:55,440
idiot and a blast number for saying that. I'm gonna

805
00:59:55,440 --> 00:59:59,480
show you that. So you what we start to realize

806
00:59:59,519 --> 01:00:02,280
is that you can't divorce your argumentation of God from

807
01:00:02,639 --> 01:00:06,159
what's revealed about God and posit a God who is

808
01:00:06,199 --> 01:00:10,239
a great architect working with eternal matter. That's masonry. That's

809
01:00:10,280 --> 01:00:14,079
not our view. So you have to have the whole

810
01:00:14,199 --> 01:00:18,159
Christian paradigm. That's what we're arguing for. We're not arguing

811
01:00:18,159 --> 01:00:22,440
for Aristotle's great architect of the universe. God an architect,

812
01:00:22,440 --> 01:00:28,400
works with existing matter. He doesn't create ex nilo. Oh well,

813
01:00:28,440 --> 01:00:30,880
we'll just tack that on later down the road as

814
01:00:31,079 --> 01:00:34,440
Thomas or whatever. Now that doesn't work because those are

815
01:00:34,440 --> 01:00:36,800
no good arguments. So we have to argue for the

816
01:00:36,800 --> 01:00:38,920
paradigm as a whole. Because guess what, none of the

817
01:00:38,960 --> 01:00:44,039
concepts that we're using here, universals, mind of God, laws

818
01:00:44,039 --> 01:00:51,199
of logic, existence, divine intellect, all of these terms that

819
01:00:51,239 --> 01:00:56,159
we're using are situated and explained within the paradigm. None

820
01:00:56,159 --> 01:00:59,159
of those terms are neutral. The laws of logic are neutral.

821
01:00:59,239 --> 01:01:02,800
They only makes sense and are coherent within the paradigm

822
01:01:02,800 --> 01:01:06,760
as a whole. That's, of course what Phaser does not

823
01:01:06,800 --> 01:01:10,679
get as a tonus. So as we see, even if

824
01:01:10,719 --> 01:01:12,960
we prove a divine mind or whatever, it's still not

825
01:01:13,000 --> 01:01:16,280
a very good argument because any Muslim, any Jew, could

826
01:01:16,320 --> 01:01:19,519
make that same argument and could argue that that the

827
01:01:19,599 --> 01:01:23,079
created world is eternal. Now Basil laughs at that and

828
01:01:23,079 --> 01:01:27,119
says that that is destructive to your whole argument for monotheism,

829
01:01:27,159 --> 01:01:32,000
because now you've given the attribute of eternality and uncreated

830
01:01:32,039 --> 01:01:34,719
to matter. But your whole argument was that God alone

831
01:01:34,760 --> 01:01:37,559
is God. But if God alone is God, and he's

832
01:01:37,599 --> 01:01:40,119
got to be God and Lord over someone or something.

833
01:01:41,760 --> 01:01:44,880
Then it seems to necessitate an eternally an eternal matter

834
01:01:45,000 --> 01:01:47,760
or creation that he's got over. Well, now you've made

835
01:01:47,800 --> 01:01:54,840
the created world premium materia, the first heavens, whatever matter eternal. Now,

836
01:01:54,960 --> 01:01:56,880
Basil says, he laughs, and he says, now you're an

837
01:01:56,880 --> 01:02:01,320
idiot because you have made in your quest to be

838
01:02:01,400 --> 01:02:05,400
a strict monotheist, you've now had to admit that matter

839
01:02:06,039 --> 01:02:10,840
takes on a divine property and has to be another hypostasis.

840
01:02:11,079 --> 01:02:15,840
So what you've got eternal God and eternal matter. That's dualism.

841
01:02:16,320 --> 01:02:19,840
We all know that there's serious problems for dualism. And

842
01:02:19,880 --> 01:02:23,760
if you have that dualist system, then how can I

843
01:02:23,760 --> 01:02:26,320
mean dualism can easily fall into the opposite of itself

844
01:02:26,320 --> 01:02:31,400
because now you've got two eternal principles are that necessitate

845
01:02:31,440 --> 01:02:34,519
one another? And as you know from pretty much every

846
01:02:34,599 --> 01:02:38,159
dualist system that's ever existed, this tends to lead to

847
01:02:38,199 --> 01:02:43,519
the conclusion that their intention do we need to flee

848
01:02:43,559 --> 01:02:47,119
to the first cause or are we stuck in the

849
01:02:47,159 --> 01:02:53,119
realm of matter and flux? You see, so dualist systems

850
01:02:53,239 --> 01:02:56,719
are incoherent they're stupid, they don't work, and the very

851
01:02:56,760 --> 01:02:59,679
position that the strict monotheistic position, which was intended to

852
01:02:59,719 --> 01:03:04,360
avoid wait polytheism and dualism, ends up falling right into it.

853
01:03:04,400 --> 01:03:08,920
When you ask about the doctrine of creation, Aerosol himself

854
01:03:08,960 --> 01:03:11,920
makes this argument. He says, the first mover to be

855
01:03:12,039 --> 01:03:15,519
pure act has to be eternally moving something or else

856
01:03:15,519 --> 01:03:17,280
it makes no sense, so he says it has to

857
01:03:17,280 --> 01:03:20,440
be the first heavens an eternal substance or matter that

858
01:03:20,480 --> 01:03:24,480
he's eternally moved. So there's no creation doctrine. So that's

859
01:03:24,480 --> 01:03:27,400
not our God. That's masonry. Did you know masonry teaches

860
01:03:27,440 --> 01:03:33,320
the great architect of the universe. Oh so, imagine using

861
01:03:33,360 --> 01:03:36,000
a bunch of Masonic arguments, like as a Christian who's

862
01:03:36,039 --> 01:03:41,480
borrow the Masonic arguments to argue for what thought thinking itself?

863
01:03:41,599 --> 01:03:50,199
Come on, now, back to the good point that Paser

864
01:03:50,280 --> 01:03:53,760
was making about universal concepts about the Augustinian argument, and

865
01:03:53,800 --> 01:03:55,880
then he moves to the good a good argument that

866
01:03:55,960 --> 01:03:58,719
Liiveniz makes about the eternality of truth. He says that

867
01:03:58,800 --> 01:04:04,679
the basic thrust of this argument is that liveness, borrowing

868
01:04:04,719 --> 01:04:10,519
from Augustine, made the argument that truth itself. It seems

869
01:04:10,559 --> 01:04:18,079
to suggest eternality. Right, So if Caesar, you know, if

870
01:04:18,199 --> 01:04:20,800
it was a cross the rubicon, you know, whatever year

871
01:04:20,840 --> 01:04:25,960
that was, And even though it's in the past, it's

872
01:04:26,159 --> 01:04:29,119
forever true, right, that Caesar crossed the rubicon. So the

873
01:04:29,159 --> 01:04:31,599
trueness of it, the event, even if it was temporal

874
01:04:31,880 --> 01:04:35,480
at least from this point on, is eternal. And it

875
01:04:35,519 --> 01:04:38,599
doesn't matter whether that was you know, whether there's a

876
01:04:38,639 --> 01:04:41,199
possible world where Caesar didn't have to do that, it

877
01:04:41,280 --> 01:04:43,800
doesn't matter, because that did happen. We believe that happened

878
01:04:43,800 --> 01:04:51,159
in some sense. Therefore, therefore the trueness of it is

879
01:04:51,239 --> 01:04:53,920
in a sense eternal. It will never be the case

880
01:04:54,119 --> 01:04:59,320
that Caesar crossed the rubicon and did not cross the rubicon, right,

881
01:04:59,360 --> 01:05:02,599
that's impot possible. So it will eternally be true that

882
01:05:02,679 --> 01:05:05,960
sees across the rubicon. Now, if that's the case, then

883
01:05:06,159 --> 01:05:09,920
the truthfulness of events or propositions or whatever cannot be

884
01:05:09,960 --> 01:05:15,960
identified in the material events themselves. Obviously. I mean, these

885
01:05:15,960 --> 01:05:18,639
are pretty simple arguments if you think about them. They

886
01:05:18,639 --> 01:05:23,119
do not the propositions and their truths. Arguments, he says,

887
01:05:23,119 --> 01:05:27,760
do not depend on the material world. Triangularity and redness

888
01:05:27,760 --> 01:05:32,639
et cetera, however, are universal, and therefore nominalism and conceptualism

889
01:05:32,920 --> 01:05:39,280
are false and do not work. The Polatonic realist solution

890
01:05:39,400 --> 01:05:44,119
doesn't work, the Arisitilian realist solution doesn't work. And so

891
01:05:44,239 --> 01:05:50,119
really the only option here is to not ground abstract

892
01:05:50,119 --> 01:05:54,320
objects only in the human mind. The human mind is changing,

893
01:05:54,360 --> 01:05:57,760
it's in flux, it's not it comes and goes in

894
01:05:57,840 --> 01:06:01,000
time and space. And as we point it out from Aristotle,

895
01:06:01,280 --> 01:06:05,599
you can't, i mean from Leibnans there, you can't reduce

896
01:06:07,000 --> 01:06:11,800
universals or the trueness of universals to the instantiations of

897
01:06:11,800 --> 01:06:15,760
the human mind. So the only other option really is

898
01:06:15,760 --> 01:06:19,719
to have a divine mind. By the way, he also

899
01:06:19,760 --> 01:06:24,840
points out that this makes sense too, because even by

900
01:06:24,880 --> 01:06:26,840
the way, even if you collected all the human minds,

901
01:06:26,920 --> 01:06:30,400
that still doesn't give you the universal. You see, where's

902
01:06:30,440 --> 01:06:34,599
the universal? How do you locate it? There's also a

903
01:06:34,719 --> 01:06:39,000
universal for every particular, that's Loiveness's point. So if that's

904
01:06:39,039 --> 01:06:44,360
the case, then the ultimate ground has to lie beyond individual,

905
01:06:44,440 --> 01:06:47,960
finite human minds. The only other possibility, given the fact

906
01:06:48,079 --> 01:06:53,719
that the universals and the particulars are an interlocking system

907
01:06:54,840 --> 01:06:56,840
you sure that. That's the argument I make all the

908
01:06:56,880 --> 01:07:00,840
time they relate to one another interlock. Given the fact

909
01:07:00,880 --> 01:07:06,559
that they interlocke, no finite mind can hold these together.

910
01:07:08,599 --> 01:07:10,559
You can't ground them in any finite mind, he says,

911
01:07:10,559 --> 01:07:12,159
even angels. If you were trying, oh well, maybe we

912
01:07:12,199 --> 01:07:13,960
can ground these in the minds of angel. It doesn't

913
01:07:13,960 --> 01:07:22,159
work because they're still finite right now. These logical relationships,

914
01:07:22,199 --> 01:07:25,480
he says, would hold whether or not this natural world existed,

915
01:07:25,760 --> 01:07:28,480
whether or not there was even any finite mind. So

916
01:07:28,559 --> 01:07:32,960
there must be a necessarily existing divine intellect which graps

917
01:07:33,000 --> 01:07:37,719
all the logical relationships, all the propositions, all the possibilities,

918
01:07:39,119 --> 01:07:44,679
and thus even the infinite number of mathematical propositions. And thus,

919
01:07:44,719 --> 01:07:49,880
if this is infinite, then you need an omniscient mind.

920
01:07:51,800 --> 01:07:55,400
There's no other options. The ultimate ground of existence of

921
01:07:55,400 --> 01:07:59,239
the abstract objects would thus have to be the divine mind.

922
01:07:59,480 --> 01:08:03,199
There's no there's no other options. Right, Well, why does

923
01:08:03,199 --> 01:08:06,440
this mind have to be omniscient? Now? He goes into

924
01:08:06,440 --> 01:08:09,920
pointing out that it gives some arguments about act as

925
01:08:09,920 --> 01:08:12,199
purist as to why this mind has to be omniscient,

926
01:08:12,239 --> 01:08:15,880
that that's somehow higher level perfection or something that if

927
01:08:17,119 --> 01:08:20,399
God has potentia, then somehow he's less perfect. Well, then

928
01:08:20,439 --> 01:08:23,000
he could then he didn't create freely, right, because we

929
01:08:23,039 --> 01:08:26,520
all believe that God could or could not create the world. Right,

930
01:08:26,880 --> 01:08:29,680
and if he freely created, or if we just make

931
01:08:29,720 --> 01:08:32,680
the simple argument that God had the potential to create

932
01:08:32,720 --> 01:08:36,079
the world in a different way, or is it logically

933
01:08:36,159 --> 01:08:39,000
possible that God created a world where there was no God,

934
01:08:39,199 --> 01:08:42,119
where there was no pope or aquinas if those are

935
01:08:42,159 --> 01:08:45,359
logically possible, and if I can reverse this argument and

936
01:08:45,359 --> 01:08:48,159
sound on the basis of God is pure potentiality with

937
01:08:48,319 --> 01:08:51,840
no with God's pure actuality no potentia, then all the

938
01:08:51,840 --> 01:08:54,600
potential must also be actualized. Right, You can reverse this

939
01:08:54,680 --> 01:08:59,760
argument either way. Then if all the potentia are actualized,

940
01:09:00,359 --> 01:09:02,720
and there are all of the worlds that are possible

941
01:09:02,960 --> 01:09:07,199
logically possible, then there's a world where there's no Aquinas

942
01:09:07,760 --> 01:09:10,880
and no pope, and so therefore the papacy is not necessary.

943
01:09:11,479 --> 01:09:14,239
By the way, show me how that's a false argument

944
01:09:14,319 --> 01:09:19,720
on these grounds. You can't, right, because again, listen to

945
01:09:19,760 --> 01:09:23,880
what I'm saying. So if God is pure act right

946
01:09:24,520 --> 01:09:27,119
with no potentia, I can take that argument in two

947
01:09:27,159 --> 01:09:30,640
different routes. I can go with the typical ADS critique

948
01:09:30,680 --> 01:09:35,239
and say, then creation was not freely done. God didn't

949
01:09:35,239 --> 01:09:38,199
have the potential to create or not create, right, there

950
01:09:38,239 --> 01:09:42,720
was no dunamus distinct from innergeia. Does God have the

951
01:09:42,840 --> 01:09:46,560
power to create a world? Of course he does. Did

952
01:09:46,600 --> 01:09:48,560
he have to create it? No, he freely created it.

953
01:09:49,199 --> 01:09:56,399
So then God is not excluded from all potentia. He

954
01:09:56,439 --> 01:10:00,960
does not have to actualize all the potentia. But if

955
01:10:00,960 --> 01:10:06,560
he's pure act with no potentia, then any potential possibility

956
01:10:06,800 --> 01:10:10,039
has to be actualized. Right. I can cut the argument

957
01:10:10,079 --> 01:10:13,960
either way. And if that's the case, is it logically

958
01:10:14,000 --> 01:10:16,760
possible that God can create a world where there's no

959
01:10:16,800 --> 01:10:21,279
Aquinas and no pope. Yes, then Aquinas and the pope

960
01:10:21,319 --> 01:10:24,279
are not logically necessary and the Roman Catholic system doesn't

961
01:10:24,319 --> 01:10:30,680
work anyway. Divine conceptualism. He tries to bring in absolute

962
01:10:30,680 --> 01:10:34,520
divine simplicity and act as purists. But there's a big

963
01:10:34,560 --> 01:10:37,960
problem with this. And that's going to be the last

964
01:10:37,960 --> 01:10:39,439
point here. We're going to make sure that I'm not

965
01:10:39,479 --> 01:10:44,520
going too close by the way in a few minutes here, Yes,

966
01:10:44,600 --> 01:10:47,359
please put the discord link, because we're gonna have Metropolitan

967
01:10:47,439 --> 01:10:51,199
Jonah giving Catechism classes in about twenty minutes in the Discord.

968
01:10:52,119 --> 01:10:54,800
So I'll be getting off here and then we can

969
01:10:55,159 --> 01:10:56,800
do the rest of this in the part two of

970
01:10:56,840 --> 01:11:00,000
the talk. Maybe I'll have to extend this into other talks,

971
01:11:00,000 --> 01:11:02,680
because I didn't really even get only got halfway into

972
01:11:03,119 --> 01:11:05,800
Phaser's chapter here. I didn't even get to Basil and

973
01:11:05,840 --> 01:11:08,880
Aristotle and andreav and I want to get to the

974
01:11:08,880 --> 01:11:19,640
sections of Aristotle that are relevant for this. But uh,

975
01:11:20,000 --> 01:11:33,239
Phaser makes one of my critiques against Platonism that now

976
01:11:33,279 --> 01:11:35,720
that way, we already covered that earlier. What does it

977
01:11:35,760 --> 01:11:39,359
mean to say that this world represents the forms? He's

978
01:11:39,359 --> 01:11:46,399
already said that, but I don't have time to do it.

979
01:11:46,479 --> 01:11:49,279
So Father Deacon, what we put Yeah, there's the discord

980
01:11:49,319 --> 01:11:52,359
link if anybody wants to join the discord, and you

981
01:11:52,359 --> 01:11:56,800
can hear the me'st falls and jonahs lectures. But let's

982
01:11:56,760 --> 01:11:59,600
see if we can get through this argument from from

983
01:11:59,600 --> 01:12:04,840
Phaser on divine conceptualism and will follow this through. So

984
01:12:04,880 --> 01:12:06,600
he gives us a series of steps, and he says

985
01:12:06,600 --> 01:12:09,880
there are three possible accounts of the abstract objects such

986
01:12:09,880 --> 01:12:16,840
as universals, propositions, numbers, and other mathematical objects and possible worlds. Realism, nominalism, conceptualism.

987
01:12:17,159 --> 01:12:21,439
There are decisive arguments in favor realism, there are insuperable

988
01:12:21,520 --> 01:12:25,479
arguments against nominalism, and there are insuperable arguments against conceptualism.

989
01:12:25,840 --> 01:12:29,159
So some version of realism must be true correct. I

990
01:12:29,199 --> 01:12:32,640
would agree with that. There are three possible versions of realism.

991
01:12:32,720 --> 01:12:36,680
Platonic realism, Aristilian realism, and what he calls scholastic realism,

992
01:12:36,720 --> 01:12:39,239
which we are going to modify to say the realism

993
01:12:39,319 --> 01:12:43,199
of Saint Maximus. If platonic realism is true, then abstract

994
01:12:43,239 --> 01:12:46,159
objects exist in a third realm, distinct from either the

995
01:12:46,199 --> 01:12:51,760
material world or any individual human intellect. If Aristilian realism

996
01:12:51,800 --> 01:12:55,239
is true, then abstract objects exist only in the human

997
01:12:55,439 --> 01:13:01,079
or in other contingently existing intellects. If scholastic or squish that.

998
01:13:01,439 --> 01:13:04,479
If Saint Maximus's realism is true, then abstract objects exist

999
01:13:04,600 --> 01:13:08,239
not only in contingently existing intellects, but also in at

1000
01:13:08,319 --> 01:13:12,920
least one necessarily existing intellect, namely the divine mind. There

1001
01:13:12,960 --> 01:13:17,359
are insuperable objections against the claim that abstract objects exist

1002
01:13:17,399 --> 01:13:19,840
in a platonic third realm, distinct from either the material

1003
01:13:19,840 --> 01:13:24,000
world or the intellect. Therefore, platonic realism is not true. Correct.

1004
01:13:24,000 --> 01:13:25,640
You know, we just covered all that in the in

1005
01:13:25,680 --> 01:13:29,000
the earlier part of the chapter. There are insupperable objects

1006
01:13:29,079 --> 01:13:31,760
against the claim that abstract objects exist only in the

1007
01:13:31,840 --> 01:13:35,800
human mind or in other contingently existing intellects. We covered

1008
01:13:35,800 --> 01:13:40,199
that earlier. Therefore, Ariscitilian realism is not true. So the

1009
01:13:40,319 --> 01:13:42,840
last option here is a form of what he calls

1010
01:13:42,840 --> 01:13:48,039
scholastic Saint Maximus's realism. So abstract objects exist not only

1011
01:13:48,119 --> 01:13:52,119
in contingently existing intellects, but also in at least one

1012
01:13:52,279 --> 01:14:00,840
necessarily existing intellect. Next, abstract objects such as universals, oppositions, numbers,

1013
01:14:00,840 --> 01:14:04,039
and other mathematical objects and possible worlds are all logically

1014
01:14:04,119 --> 01:14:07,000
related to one another in an interlocking way, such that

1015
01:14:07,079 --> 01:14:11,560
they form a system of ideas. Yes, interlocking. The reasons

1016
01:14:11,600 --> 01:14:15,039
for concluding that at least some abstraret objects exist necessary

1017
01:14:15,159 --> 01:14:18,760
in a necessarily existing intellect also entail that this interlocking

1018
01:14:18,800 --> 01:14:22,920
system of ideas must exist in a necessarily existing intellect,

1019
01:14:22,960 --> 01:14:25,760
the divine mind. Yes, we've argued that earlier. So this

1020
01:14:25,880 --> 01:14:29,560
interlocking system of ideas exists in at least one necessarily

1021
01:14:29,600 --> 01:14:35,000
existing intellect. This is where it becomes problem nineteen. And

1022
01:14:35,119 --> 01:14:39,359
necessarily existing intellect has to be purely actual. No, it doesn't.

1023
01:14:39,359 --> 01:14:42,479
I just gave you the argument as to why that's impossible.

1024
01:14:42,520 --> 01:14:44,600
It doesn't work, and he will even mention this argument

1025
01:14:45,079 --> 01:14:48,560
and not answer it. So there can be more than

1026
01:14:48,840 --> 01:14:52,000
So there cannot be more than one necessarily existing intellect.

1027
01:14:52,079 --> 01:14:54,880
We would agree with that. An intellect in which the

1028
01:14:54,920 --> 01:14:59,079
interlocking system of ideas in question exists, it would be

1029
01:14:59,159 --> 01:15:01,800
conceptually on anficient correct. We do agree with that. And

1030
01:15:01,840 --> 01:15:03,800
by the way, it has to be the triad. And

1031
01:15:03,840 --> 01:15:05,960
that's what we're going to argue as we move on.

1032
01:15:06,880 --> 01:15:09,359
Now he moves on to some more points that kind

1033
01:15:09,359 --> 01:15:11,439
of we would agree with it in a sense, but

1034
01:15:11,520 --> 01:15:14,319
he basically just concludes us by saying, therefore God exists, right,

1035
01:15:14,359 --> 01:15:16,920
the omniscient. But the problem is that what God are

1036
01:15:16,920 --> 01:15:20,800
we talking about. We have not distinguished this generic theism

1037
01:15:21,119 --> 01:15:24,800
of a sort from any other generic monotheism. But we

1038
01:15:24,840 --> 01:15:27,800
do not argue for generic monotheism. We argue for the

1039
01:15:27,840 --> 01:15:32,239
Father of our Lord, Jesus Christ, who eternally generates the

1040
01:15:32,239 --> 01:15:35,239
Son and eternally spirates the spirit. That's the only God

1041
01:15:35,239 --> 01:15:38,720
there is. And if we say that he is a

1042
01:15:38,760 --> 01:15:44,960
bare monotheism. Guess what Aristotle is the more consistent monotheist.

1043
01:15:45,760 --> 01:15:48,960
What does Aristotle say in book twelve of the Metaphysics?

1044
01:15:50,159 --> 01:15:56,199
Aerostol says in book twelve that he gives his definition

1045
01:15:56,359 --> 01:16:01,680
of actus purists and absolute simplicity in book twelve, chapters

1046
01:16:01,800 --> 01:16:04,680
five six seven. I'm trying to hurry so he can

1047
01:16:04,680 --> 01:16:07,920
get to metropolitan Jonah. But you'll notice that it's right here.

1048
01:16:07,920 --> 01:16:10,000
It's very clear. If you want to go read these

1049
01:16:10,039 --> 01:16:13,920
you can five sixty seven. He will speak of eternal matter,

1050
01:16:14,039 --> 01:16:18,359
eternal movement, eternal substance, that the first cause, the unmoved mover,

1051
01:16:18,560 --> 01:16:22,760
moves the first heaven eternally, as his first substance is

1052
01:16:22,840 --> 01:16:28,720
eternal substance, eternal matter. Basil, as we said, makes fun

1053
01:16:28,760 --> 01:16:32,760
of this. He says, you're a tard, do you think this?

1054
01:16:32,760 --> 01:16:35,760
This is in Hexameron humbily too at the very beginning,

1055
01:16:37,039 --> 01:16:40,399
and he will make fun of the great architect Deity.

1056
01:16:41,239 --> 01:16:44,560
And he's referring to this section of Aristol. So props

1057
01:16:44,560 --> 01:16:47,880
to father Deacon Annius for finding because the actually the

1058
01:16:47,920 --> 01:16:51,199
notes in the chafts that are wrong or some other

1059
01:16:51,600 --> 01:16:54,439
numbering system. So it took forever to find this, but

1060
01:16:54,520 --> 01:16:58,520
it's in book twelve five, six and seven. Aerosol is

1061
01:16:58,520 --> 01:17:06,039
more consistent because if the eternal first mover is an

1062
01:17:06,079 --> 01:17:10,359
eternal first mover, for that to mean anything coherent, he

1063
01:17:10,439 --> 01:17:17,840
has to eternally move something. If God is the eternal creator,

1064
01:17:18,920 --> 01:17:22,199
then he eternally creates or has a creation that's eternal,

1065
01:17:22,279 --> 01:17:28,680
which he's got over. These arguments are dumb. Therefore, you

1066
01:17:28,760 --> 01:17:33,600
can't hold to a bare monotheism and have the words

1067
01:17:33,640 --> 01:17:37,119
and predicates and names of him mean anything without eternal

1068
01:17:37,159 --> 01:17:41,960
creation for him to be God and Lord over. So

1069
01:17:41,960 --> 01:17:44,720
it's a very simple argument. And when we get to

1070
01:17:44,840 --> 01:17:47,199
part two, we'll look at how Andrea of responds to this,

1071
01:17:47,279 --> 01:17:49,720
how Losky and stan ELOI respond to this by pointing

1072
01:17:49,760 --> 01:17:52,600
out that this obviously shows that the Trinity is the

1073
01:17:52,600 --> 01:17:56,000
only God who really solves this. There's no other options, right,

1074
01:17:56,000 --> 01:17:59,640
There's no The dualism argument doesn't work. Sat Maximus will

1075
01:17:59,640 --> 01:18:03,880
refute the dualism God. The only one you're left with

1076
01:18:04,000 --> 01:18:06,159
is the Trinity. Okay, so it's not it's not that

1077
01:18:06,239 --> 01:18:11,479
difficult here. But I'll close the part with with Phaser

1078
01:18:11,520 --> 01:18:14,000
by pointing out, listen to what Phaser says here with

1079
01:18:14,119 --> 01:18:19,119
his objection the objections to realism and the problem is

1080
01:18:19,159 --> 01:18:23,520
in his Tomis system. William Wainwright suggests, based on Grim's objection,

1081
01:18:23,960 --> 01:18:27,000
there also seems to be an assumption of a model

1082
01:18:27,000 --> 01:18:30,760
of divine knowledge which would be rejected by those that

1083
01:18:30,840 --> 01:18:34,039
hold to God is absolutely simple or a non composite being.

1084
01:18:34,439 --> 01:18:38,920
In particular, it seems that it seems to assume that

1085
01:18:39,119 --> 01:18:41,720
the view that Phaser is arguing for it seems to

1086
01:18:41,720 --> 01:18:45,800
assume that truths that God knows correspond to discrete ideas

1087
01:18:45,800 --> 01:18:49,640
in the divine intellect. Well, yeah, if the things in

1088
01:18:49,680 --> 01:18:52,359
the in the world are grounded in the divine mind

1089
01:18:52,439 --> 01:18:55,680
in the Roman Catholic divine ideas argument, then if the

1090
01:18:55,720 --> 01:18:57,960
things in the world are really distinct, then they got

1091
01:18:58,000 --> 01:19:00,600
to be based on ideas that are really distinct. But

1092
01:19:00,640 --> 01:19:02,840
then you turn around and you say that the divine

1093
01:19:02,880 --> 01:19:05,880
ideas are absolutely identical to the essence of God, and

1094
01:19:05,880 --> 01:19:09,039
they're not really distinct. They're only virtually and not only distinct. Yeah,

1095
01:19:09,159 --> 01:19:12,520
it's a great argument. In particular, it seems to uh.

1096
01:19:13,520 --> 01:19:16,359
He says that in the divine intellect we could say

1097
01:19:16,359 --> 01:19:20,560
that these are a set but given the divine simplicity,

1098
01:19:20,680 --> 01:19:23,399
what we describe in terms of such discreet ideas is

1099
01:19:23,439 --> 01:19:27,840
really one and the same thing in God. Thank you

1100
01:19:27,880 --> 01:19:32,159
for admitting that, Facer, there is in God something analogous

1101
01:19:32,199 --> 01:19:37,760
to what we call our own intellects, so analogia, and

1102
01:19:37,800 --> 01:19:41,520
thus we grasp a proposition, for example, all men are mortal.

1103
01:19:41,960 --> 01:19:48,119
We grasp something analogous to what we call to what

1104
01:19:48,159 --> 01:19:50,840
we call a grasp, or the proposition that Socrates is

1105
01:19:50,840 --> 01:19:54,199
a man, and so forth. So these propositions, they're analogous

1106
01:19:54,239 --> 01:19:57,319
to something in the divine mind. But these are just

1107
01:19:57,399 --> 01:20:00,239
different ways of describing what in God is really one

1108
01:20:00,239 --> 01:20:04,760
and the same thing exactly. So how does that work?

1109
01:20:05,079 --> 01:20:08,640
Guess what? Phaser doesn't address it. He just goes on.

1110
01:20:09,840 --> 01:20:12,439
So the very thing that I would go to, the

1111
01:20:12,600 --> 01:20:16,000
very argument, Phaser doesn't even have reply to it. He

1112
01:20:16,079 --> 01:20:18,680
just says, uh, yeah, well it's different in God, okay,

1113
01:20:18,680 --> 01:20:23,560
But that's not an answer, and so he says these

1114
01:20:23,560 --> 01:20:26,199
objections are not powerful. Right In the next page, this

1115
01:20:26,239 --> 01:20:31,039
is the final page, he doesn't address that argument. He

1116
01:20:31,159 --> 01:20:34,399
just says that it's not you know, it's just different

1117
01:20:34,439 --> 01:20:36,960
in the divine intellect. But that's the very thing that's

1118
01:20:37,000 --> 01:20:40,279
in question. So Phaser, how do you avoid the critique

1119
01:20:40,279 --> 01:20:43,199
that you gave a play though, because you critiqued Platonic

1120
01:20:43,239 --> 01:20:47,159
realism by saying that the descriptors of what's in the

1121
01:20:47,239 --> 01:20:51,600
form in the monad are totally different than the descriptors

1122
01:20:51,600 --> 01:20:53,720
of the things in this realm that are supposed to

1123
01:20:53,720 --> 01:20:57,640
be analogous to or resemble it. You got the same problem,

1124
01:20:57,680 --> 01:21:00,960
dude when it comes to Aquinas, and you just pass

1125
01:21:01,000 --> 01:21:05,079
over that argument. You don't even address it. Maybe he'll

1126
01:21:05,079 --> 01:21:08,960
address I hope so right anyway, in part two, we'll

1127
01:21:08,960 --> 01:21:14,119
get to how the triad is necessitated and solves these

1128
01:21:14,159 --> 01:21:19,239
dilemmas via the exchange of love in the Trinity. And

1129
01:21:19,319 --> 01:21:22,279
this comes from Saint Nikolai Bila Morovich, Father's Donnie Lloyd

1130
01:21:24,439 --> 01:21:31,079
Vlader Lawski and Andrea the Russian apologist. Andrea, thank you, guys.

1131
01:21:31,119 --> 01:21:34,159
Let's get to these supertats really quick before we go

1132
01:21:34,239 --> 01:21:48,000
to Metropolitan Jonah, we find the first try to find

1133
01:21:48,039 --> 01:21:52,000
the first one? Where is it at all? Right? Too? Kind?

1134
01:21:52,119 --> 01:21:55,920
Tuken me is that Tolkien tu King donates two dollars.

1135
01:21:55,920 --> 01:21:58,680
He says, how do you square Christianity with technology? And

1136
01:21:58,720 --> 01:22:01,920
where is it heading? I would say, go watch father

1137
01:22:01,960 --> 01:22:06,039
Deacon doctor Anonius's talk on technology in Christianity. He did

1138
01:22:06,039 --> 01:22:09,079
a whole, really good long lecture on that, So I

1139
01:22:09,079 --> 01:22:12,159
would recommend that go to his channel over at the

1140
01:22:12,319 --> 01:22:18,760
Norwegian NOWS and you'll find that talk. Our emotions universal,

1141
01:22:19,239 --> 01:22:22,199
Nick says for five dollars. Yeah, in a sense, right,

1142
01:22:22,239 --> 01:22:25,920
So when we talk about the ontological status of emotions

1143
01:22:25,960 --> 01:22:30,680
and the propositions about emotions, those are all universal truth claims.

1144
01:22:30,720 --> 01:22:34,239
They're all they describe universal states of affairs and so forth.

1145
01:22:35,720 --> 01:22:38,720
All human beings possess emotions in some sense and degree,

1146
01:22:38,800 --> 01:22:42,079
unless they're vegetables or something I don't know, but so

1147
01:22:42,199 --> 01:22:47,359
in those senses, emotions are universal, and yes we can

1148
01:22:47,520 --> 01:22:50,680
we can speak of them in that sense. Jordan donates

1149
01:22:50,720 --> 01:22:53,000
ten dollars, Thank you, Jordan, and Funds donates five dollars.

1150
01:22:53,000 --> 01:22:55,760
Thank you, Funds And if you want to, of course,

1151
01:22:55,800 --> 01:22:59,640
the subscription to the site is in the just the

1152
01:23:00,479 --> 01:23:03,760
in the show description. You can subscribe to the website

1153
01:23:03,800 --> 01:23:06,800
and we'll get into more depth in the second half

1154
01:23:06,840 --> 01:23:10,199
of this when we have more time, and we'll look

1155
01:23:10,239 --> 01:23:13,239
at more phaser, we'll look at the other trinitarian points,

1156
01:23:14,079 --> 01:23:16,119
and we'll look at some of the arguments about LOGI

1157
01:23:16,199 --> 01:23:18,880
as well. That help explicate this and why we don't

1158
01:23:18,880 --> 01:23:21,840
believe the neoplatonic view, and how same Maximus is really

1159
01:23:22,159 --> 01:23:29,319
correcting our review from the neoplatonic view. And then we'll

1160
01:23:29,359 --> 01:23:31,680
look at where in Aristotle he talks about eternal matter

1161
01:23:31,720 --> 01:23:37,520
and all that stuff and what he's talking about. Yeah,

1162
01:23:37,760 --> 01:23:42,439
I mean, if you you know, they're not these arguments

1163
01:23:42,520 --> 01:23:45,680
might sound obtuse, but if you start to understand what

1164
01:23:45,680 --> 01:23:47,560
we're saying, they're not. They're not that bad. They're not

1165
01:23:47,560 --> 01:23:50,880
that hard. Uh So, match Falt and Jonah will be

1166
01:23:50,920 --> 01:23:54,880
doing a catechism lecture. I guess three or four. I'm

1167
01:23:54,880 --> 01:23:57,319
not sure where we are. I was off getting married,

1168
01:23:57,760 --> 01:24:00,319
so I'm a little late to the game. Here go

1169
01:24:00,319 --> 01:24:03,000
to the discord and then we'll have that link set

1170
01:24:03,079 --> 01:24:04,960
up for that. If you want the second part of

1171
01:24:05,000 --> 01:24:08,119
this talk in the next few days, subscribe Jasonnalysis at

1172
01:24:08,119 --> 01:24:14,680
the membership links in the show description. And anyway, hopefully

1173
01:24:14,680 --> 01:24:16,640
this was interesting. God bless everybody, have a good night.