Speaker 1: It's Ben dire Way.
Speaker 2: Who is this, I don't know, it's me. It's Amid the.
Speaker 3: Ruins, a guy who makes dire Way of music. It's
Amid the Ruins and sense dire Way of music.
Speaker 2: What I've talked about in you know, probably one hundred
articles at Jason Analysis is the implementation of the AI
smart in the giant smart cities, which is what IBM
talks about publicly building. And that's where we're going, and
that's what I think we have to be really concerned about.
So all of these tensions, they are kind of a
long term strategy to basically get everybody moved into mega cities.
They'll be forced to they'll be forced off of land
and so forth for environmental reasons and basically concoct and
invented environmental nonsense. Then you'll be stuck in some hell
hole megacity in a basically a carbon size apartment, living
over a target or something, or inside of the target
or Walmart. As I said several years ago, it's actually
come true. Now there's actually target cities. This is all
part of the long term globalist strategies. But to get there,
you've got to have the constant clash the constant alchemical
blending and mixing and smashing together right out of Manicheanism
to produce the convergence, to produce the synthesis. And that's
what's crucial in all this and what is absolutely true
from an alchemical esotery, philosophical, angioglotical perstructive the fact that
the rule elite seek to be a.
Speaker 4: Jason also dot com.
Speaker 2: You can't try to fix today's problems politically, and this
is what so many people that all circles and pot
ride and all whatever on media, they all seem to
think that there's like a political solution to man it's problems.
And really the whole of modernity is built on this
neopagan concept of political salvation, and there is no political
salvation for man because man's problems are not essentially political,
they're spirriful. The hierarchy of how man views himself in
the world has been inverted. I've covered over and over
and over the white papers that actually discussed how to
invert and subvert that changing images of man right welcome.
So what has to happen is that we back to
that high IQ stuff. Now, it's time to get back
to that high accus stuff. Welcome. Yes, I have to
have a piece of ginger in my mouth. I don't care,
boomer if you don't like it every time I have
a piece of gum or gender of boomer says disgusting.
Do you not eat food? Do you not chew gum?
Are you a gnostic being? Are you the form of
human You don't actually engage in the normal human activities
of shooting gum and eating disgusting foods. Well, maybe one
day we will ascend into the gnostic stratosphere like you.
But I need sugar and candy from a beat us
And if you can't handle that, then you can. Then
don't let the door hit you on however that goes.
Don't let your ass hit your face on the way
the door or whatever. That is. Welcome. Yeah, they I
went to a boomer. I don't mean to be just
be telling my boomers about it was a boom or
haircut place. And if you go to old man barber,
like a like a legit barber with the peppermint candy
cane out front, you get the same haircut like you
could pit from all these styles and I did. Don't
give a damn. You're gonna get the same haircut. You're
gonna get the Millid Harry Marine Corps cadet haircut. Even
if you told that dude, I want a spiky mullet
like THEO Vaughn, you're gonna get Marine Corps and he's
gonna turn you around and to spin you around and say,
there you go. I gave you what you wanted. That's
literally what happened. I told that dude, I want to
one on the side and straight up when that goes
into that boomer's ears, which you don't think you could hear,
he just heard, give him the military cut, because that's
the only haircut you get at the peppermint candy stick
boom or barbershop. Baby, I almost swallow this so people
don't bitch. All right, we're going full whiteboard today, y'all.
It's gonna be heavy. It's gonna be hot and heavy
in a safe, bo sexual way. Now, the book that
we're gonna be loosely looking at as kind of a
rough I said for a long time I would get
to this book. We're finally going to cover doctor Faser,
doctor Faser Array, doctor Laser Feser, five proofs for the
Existence of God, and he picks five philosophers, Aristotle, Platinus, Augustine,
Aquinas Leibniz. Now there's a lot of good places in
this book, a lot of really good chapters. The majority
of this will be covering in Part two for the
subscribers for this public installment, we'll be covering chapter three,
the Augustinian Proof, because of course it's the closest that
we get to transcendental argumentation in this book. There's a
lot of good arguments in this chapter, a lot of
the arguments that you've heard me use. So I was
glad to see Phaser using a lot of these arguments
because of course there's similarities with transcendental types of arguments
in this chapter to the transcendental argument for God. But
remember that the transit argument for God is not identical
to all transcendental arguments. I can make a transcendental argument
for the necessity of universals, the necessity of the self, right,
that's not the same as the argument at a paradigm
level for the necessity of the existence of God. There's
a couple of places where Phaser comes pretty close, and
he will make the divine conceptualism argument that you hear
me make all the time. But we're going to supplement
it with the real solid version, the tweaked version from
Saint Maximus. And Phaser is not aware of Maximus. He
doesn't know about the Logi doctrine. He doesn't know how
the Logi doctrine is different from the exemplar doctrine of
Aquinas and so forth. So we're going to point out
where things go awry, but we're also going to point
out the many, many good places. And then in part
two we'll cover the other chapters on Aristotle, UH, Aquinas,
and Aliveness, and Plutonis, and there will be places in
there as well. I mean, there's a there's areas of
Liive notes that you've heard me talk about over there
over the years that are pretty insightful. Loive Neutz has
some good arguments that come up in this chapter of
the Augustinian Proof that will be referring to UH. And
then we will look at a couple of interesting points
that I was reminded of in Basil. Someone a long
time ago had heard me say in one of the talks,
where do you get the argument that Aristotle believes in
a great architect of the universe? UH? And I could
not remember exactly where the phrase was, because, of course,
as you can see, the works of Aristotle are very
vast uh. And then I was looking back through Bazils Hexamaran,
and I found where Basil makes the argument. As you
can see what you hear me say so almost always
just what the Eastern Fathers say, like, I'm not coming
up with this stuff out of my but it's not
just made up. I'm just really just repeating stuff that
I've imbibed from primarily Cappadocians. When it comes to the
Church fathers, obviously the cap Docian said the preeminence because
the Cappadocians gave us the subtled triology. Really there's not
a whole lot of development in triadology after the Cappadocians.
There's development in the sense of explication when it comes
to Christology after the Cappadocians. But this is as we
had a pretty heated debate in the discord the other
night with a Roman Catholic, a Scootist. There's really not development.
I mean, what you see John Damascus Present is really
a representation of what's in the Cappadocians. So for us
Athanasius and Cappadocians that's pretty much if of the Trinity.
The only other explication is Gregory of Cyprus and Palamos
in relation to eternal manifestation at Blackgrenee and the Palomite Synods.
That's really it. But that's already in Basil and John
Damascus eternal manifestation. So there's really the impasse I'm constantly
realizing when we are debating with Catholics is Cappadocians is
the lack of familiarity with Cappadocians. And that's why a
good place to start is the Shassensky Philly Oqua book,
which we covered. We did a whole stream, three hour
stream on that because Sashensky, who was Reuni eight at
the time, essentially admits that there's no double procession hypostetic
origin proof in the East in the first seven centuries
at all. There's not one proof. Augustine is really the
only father that can be brought forth to support that position,
but it doesn't really matter because the dogmatic theology of
the Cappadocians is what's confirmed in the councils. Anyway, That's
not what we're going to talk about tonight, where it's
about Phaser and we're gonna go through the chapter on
the Augustinian proof, because once again we're also going to
see that when you hear me make tag, it's not
it's very similar to the arguments that we find Augustine
making At times. Augustine presents a divine conceptualism argument. And
of course we want to remind you that if you
want to support and ask questions we have philosophical questions,
feel free to ask those via super chat there to
support the stream in the channel. And then in the
next few days I will make part two of this
available for pay subscribers to jayson Alysis, covering the rest
of the Phaser book, and then we're also going to
look at a couple places in the Russian Philosopher. Now,
this is not a new argument and Andreev, but it's
present in a very well stated way in Andrea's little
book Orthodox Pulgic Theology, but it's also stated in Mystical Theology,
and it's also stated in last Key's Experience of God
on One. And this is the argument that a bear
monotheistic ads entity is not a sufficient kind of deity
or God, because that God will necessitate a world to
be God over and therefore that's not our God, because
the God that needs eternal matter, the God that needs
an eternal world to be God over for God to
have meaning, for him to be a first cause of
Ariostol is more consistent because he says that that leads
to the view of eternal first heavens eternal matter for
him to form. And we'll see that Aristota will make
this argument in book twelve of the Metaphysics, Basil will
make fun of it, and so we will see that
Basil supports the Orthodox conception of apologetics to the fact
that they don't mean the same thing by natural theology
as the Thomas do. Well, let's get to phaser. I'm
going to start with the Augustinian proof. Before we do that,
I want to mind, you guys, just a little bit
of the basics here, because we may have some people
who are new to these ideas or topics and they
might find a little bit of this abtuse. But we're
gonna be looking at abstract entities today, universals, concepts, numbers.
You hear me invoke this argument all the time, and
that's why I was delighted to finally get to this
chapter because this chapter pretty much makes all the arguments
I make there are arguments in Augustine. So nothing I'm
saying is that out of the ordinary. We are taking
the argument a little bit further and showing that it
directly points to the triune God and not the generic
theism God, which is essentially of no use to apologetics whatsoever.
What's the point of doing apologetics that we're proving the
same god as Islam, scientology, Joe's witnesses. Right, that's a
worthless first cause. That's not to say there's not a
first cause. It's just saying it's not a good argument.
And we will see that these kinds of arguments we
made here in questions and doubts, all right, I remember
that when we are looking at make sure you guys
can hear me. Yeah, welcome everybody, be sure. Hit Like
when we're looking at the notion of abstract objects, universals, numbers, concepts, propositions,
laws of logic, we're looking at objects that are unlike
the objects of our world. So we're gonna remember Platonism here.
We're gonna use Platonism as kind of our exemplar to
branch off from. So if we remember Plato's ideas of
the forms. Plato thought that the realm of the forms
was uniquely simple, It was uniquely one. It is summed
up in the monad right the first primal unity. The
forms are unchanging. The forms are impersonal in the sense
that they're not like a human person. I know that
the Plato doesn't really have the conception of personhood as subject,
as personal subject the way that the Cappadocians will explain that.
But regardless, it is important to mention that it's ideal
and personal, immaterial, eternal, it's in stasis. This is very
important because it's not in becoming. And then that's why
Plato can point to things like well, numbers are the
best example of this kind of thing. Right, So for Plato,
they're in a third realm. They're not in our realm.
They're in another higher realm. They're not in a mind
per se, they're not in objects. So they must be
in a third realm. Now, the important part is that
when we look at this realm, it's usually characterized by
the opposite the right, the realm that we inhabit. The
realm that we inhabit is characterized by many. It's characterized
by change, it's characterized by flux's characterized by being lesser
in the chain of being according to how it relates
to these things. So think about these things as higher
on the spectrum, so to speak. The things that we
experience are temporal. They come and go, and they participate
us in becoming. So the problem, as you can see
pretty quickly, which actually Phaser will mention, is that it
doesn't really see how there's any relationship between these two
disparate realms. Now, for Plato, his solution, one solution he
thinks kind of works is what he calls matexas, which
is participation, the idea that the faint reflections of this
world participate quote unquote in the forms. But of course,
as you can begin to see, this doesn't really solve much.
It is still problematic because if this realm is essentially one,
and the highest of this realm is pure unity, then
it would seem to exclude the possibility of distinctions in
this realm. How are the things of this realm distinct? Well,
it's just ad hoc. Well they just are right. And
as many of you guys know, what's the solution that
this is a great example of ad hoc rescue, which
the idiot atheists the other night in the debate decided
it was not a fallacy, you could use them in debates.
And so now you can use any informal fallacy in
the debate because it's not a formal fallacy. As if
formal and informal has anything to do with whether it's
a non sequitor or not. Right, they're all non sequitors.
It doesn't matter whether it's they don't follow in the
context of a debate. So when we think about that realm,
we have that basic outline there from Plato that's going
to help us as we progress into this chapter from
Phaser where we look into the pros and the cons.
So we start by Phaser mentioning the notion of universe. Okay,
the notion of particulars and of the general. So if
we think of something general like cat ness, right, the
idea of a cat. Then when we look at a cat,
that that we see on the mat that is the particular,
that's the instantiation of the common, the universal. For Plato,
what's more real is not the physical, instantiated cat in
front of you. What's more real is the universal cat.
Right now, why do we speak of a universal cat
or a universal idea. Well, Plato reason just pretty simply
that that, obviously what makes a cat a cat is
not that it has four legs, hair, two eyes, because
a cat could lose any of those properties, right, and
it still is a cat. Right. You know, Tabby cat
Garfields out, they're running around. He gets drunk, he gets
coked up, and he falls underneath Tony Sopranos range rover.
He gets his leg run over. He owes Tony Soprano money,
he doesn't pay up. Garfield gets his eye poked up. Right,
He's still a cat. He doesn't lose catness because Tony
Soprano took his eye on his leg, because of his
fiendish habits. Thus, Plato argued, the essence of cat, the
idea of cat, the form of cat, cannot be identified
with any of the traits, nor merely just adding the
traits up. There's something else, some higher order there that
is that thing. Now, remember what's an essence. The essence
is that which a thing must have to be that
thing and no other thing. Now, with with that in mind,
we can come to the notion of what universals are.
So universals immediately relate to the problem of the one
and the Many. Plato has a whole dialogue. If you've
listened to the lectures, as we did throughout Plato's dialogues,
you will know that, well, one of many comes up often,
but I think it's in Fayeto. Faeto seems to be occupied, yes,
And I will give you some sources for all you know.
It all is out there, so you can go find
the sources for the one of the many and the
universals in I had it, and then I just lost
my page.
Speaker 4: Where to go.
Speaker 2: Just read the Fayeto first of all. But here it
is universals and participation comes up in Fato eight ninety nine,
one hundred one oh one. And then out throughout the
Faeta you'll get discussions about one in many, particularity, universality,
or the forms of things. Obviously this shouldn't be controversial,
but there's always somebody who wants to harass. So Phaser
goes on to say, when we look at things like roundness, redness, triangularity,
et cetera, these are properties or features that cannot be
identified with any single object, right, and obviously they have
to have some reality, because if we deny that they
have some reality, then we're going to run into a
whole host of epistemic metaphysical problems. So abstract objects then
cannot be identified or reducible to matter or the instantiations
of matter. If you remember the debate with Stefan, I mean,
I was just making this simple argument when I was
pointing out that seven coconuts is not the same thing
as seven. Obviously, other arguments that philosophers invoke would be
things like two plus two equals four. Obviously, the proposition
the truth value of tupless two equals four is not
identifiable to two rocks and two rocks. I mean, it's
just pretty obvious that those two things are distinct. It
doesn't take a whole lot of thinking power to realize that.
But philosophers will also resort to things like possible worlds. Right, So,
if you've been in the discord, if you've heard a
lot of the argumentation that Father deconductor Antonius has given
on possible worlds and how philosophers utilize possible worlds to
demonstrate which things are logically impossible, then you'll know that
those are examples of things that refute materialism, because materialism
can't really explain how if everything is reducible to matter,
there can be arguments that are sound and valid from
logic that show the impossibility of the possible worlds being
reducible to matter. And there's actually a paragraph where a
phaser covers that. But the first one in many argument
is that universals like triangularity, redness are not reducible to
any of the particulars, because anytime we talk about these things,
it makes no sense to reduce the predicates that we're
using to the instantiations. There must be some notion of
triangularity that's not just identifiable with the secondary characteristics or
features of the object in front of us. And he
goes on to point out that when we look at geometry.
You've heard me make This argument from Roger Penrose comes
up in the Mind of God book by Paul Davies.
Mathematical principles are not invented. They're discovered. Okay, nobody invented
or made up Mandelbrot sets. They were discovered. And the
mathematicians who are honest that spend their lives on these
topics will tell you that they often speak this way,
that they are discovering truths in the mental scape, they're
not making them up right. So this idiotic, atheistic, materialistic,
reductionist argument that we just make up numbers, we just
make up Pythagorean theorem. They's made up as if it
would work consistently over time and across cultures if they
were just made up. Ludicrous. So Paser covers that, and
it shows that those are examples of principles that are universal.
So he lists things like numbers, universal concepts, universal propositions,
laws of logic, possible worlds. These are all examples of
things that are utilized. They're not obviously not reducible to
physical matter, other concepts that are useful in mathematics, like
zero and infinity, any of the pi. Any of these
things are obviously not identical to any specific thing under
a microscope or any collection of molecules. He goes on
to also point out the argument you've heard me make
many times. This is from the philosophy of science. Husserl
makes this argument science assumes the laws of logic and universals.
If you heard the debate with Infidel Pharaoh that I
had about a year ago, that was the summation of
that whole debate. The whole debate was whether science is
utilized in principles and laws for its argumentation and scientific
process that are not immediately under the purview of empirical investigation.
Obviously it does. So then he goes on to mention
the argument from the nature of possible worlds. This is
the argument that father Deacon Anonias makes, similar to it,
that you can conceive of a possible world that is
not reducible to matter, the laws of logic still hold. Therefore,
how could you conceive of these things if all of
these arguments, all this argumentation is reducible to matter. Right,
So it just it's just a simple way to disprove
the reducibility of logic in the realm of possible worlds
to matter. Then he goes on to talk about phaser
does about indirect argumentation. So then he goes on to
say that this is the types of argument that you
hear us make off. And as presuppositionalists, where we talk
about the self detonating nature, you could say, to quote
steph On here, the impossibility of the contrary in the
sense that when you deny universals, you put yourself in
a host of problems. One of those would be the
immediate claim against what's called realism. So if we're affirming
a nontological reality or status a metaphysical status to universals
in some way, then we would be called a realist. Okay,
not everybody has the same notion of realism. If you
listened to last night's lecture, we talked about John Wickliffe,
who was a ultra realist. He had basically a platonic
type of view. So not everybody has the same notion
of realism. But just at the level of the debate here,
we're just talking about whether we believe that universal concepts
and universals have a real existence, or whether they are
reducible to matter, or whether they, as hes a different position,
are have only a conceptual reality. And we're going to
see the problem with that as well. As it falls
into the syllipsoism, it becomes useless. But he argues that
if you can think of a possible world where it's
at least possible for the universals to exist, then it
shows that universals are not dependent on a human mind
for their existence, and so the mirror possibility of them
shows that they are not reducible to matter. So those
are a lot of different types of arguments against realism.
Then he moves on to point out that if we
think of general names like redness, red, et cetera, if
you are to deny those and be a nominalist, nominalists
or those who deny the reality of universal predicates or universals,
then it's kind of a difficult to explain what are
we predicating that's in common? And the most common response
from the anomalists is that, well, what we're predicating is
that they just have a similarity between them. Well, that
begs the question, what is it that resembles the other thing?
What is it that is the similarity? Right, that's the
very question that we're asked. You can't just say, well,
they're similar, because that's assuming that there's a universal category
that's not instantiated there. That's the point of what we're
trying to argue here. And even Bertrand Russell, himself an atheist,
noted the difficulty of this regress that the resemblance argument
that the noomalist often appeals to is itself a universal
resemblance is a universal concept, and it would have to
be the case for this argument to work, But then
it's self reputing. If a stop sign resembles a fire truck.
Since there are two different objects, then the thing that
we call red has to be something more more than
just the instantiate because that the objects are obviously different.
So to just to say that they share quote resemblance
is to assume that resemblance is a real state of
affairs that occurs across the time and space. Right, because
there's countless numbers of red objects in the world, and
you're saying that the resemblance itself is consistent, and here's
over time, it's invariant, right, because redness doesn't turn into
the opposite of itself in terms of the resemblance itself,
and the anomalist just has to say that, well, we
just don't know. Well, then the anomalists can resort to
another level of moving the argument to say that, okay,
well I can avoid this dilemma by saying that we
only call all of these examples resemblances merely because they
resemble each other. They don't have an actual higher level existence.
But this problem just moves this step to a higher
level because he's phaser notes the various cases of resemblance
resemble other various cases of resemblance. So now you just
said what is the resemblance of resemblance? You see, So
this higher order moving up the problem is also itself
relying on a universal concept, and so this Bertran Russell
notes would lead to an infinite regress. The next argument
you've heard me make many times, which is the linguistic argument.
Language predication assumes universal truth predicates. Right there, the tree
is green, the what else is green, The social justice
hair is green, the ice pop is green. So all
three of those things are green. There are different things.
And when we have a sentence that's meaningful for community,
if we're actually communicating in a sentence, then greenness has
to be something that is really meaningful and not reducible
to the breath that's coming out of my mouth, not
reducible to the gray matter in my head, not reducible
to the molecules in the social justice greasy hair, or
in the corn start popsicle, or in the tree leaves.
So what are we predicating here? If it's something that's
not real, it doesn't exist. Greenness is not real. Yeah,
you see, we begin to we begin to have these
ridiculous problems that now we utilize and communicate with all
these things that are not real. But remember most of
the time these are atheists who don't believe in made
up things. But now all language itself is just made
up and therefore meaningless. When I utter the word read,
Socrates utters the word red, there are obviously particular distinct
instances and utterances of the same word. Yet this word
exists over and over in our utterances and in the
concepts in our mind. And yet they're different minds. So
therefore there's something beyond the instantiations that allows for the
conveying meaning. Thus, words and language assume metaphysical realities. If
you've been in the discord the last week, I probably
made this point this argument at least ten times with
different people, different atheists bringing this up, and they don't
get it. Some do. In general, it is a notoriously
very difficult position to defend. Dominalism leads ultimately to the
possibility of knowledge. That's not Phaser saying that, that's me
saying that it's completely destructive to the possibility of language,
meaning knowledge, metaphysics, et cetera. And ultimately, when you move
to the position that it's all just dependent upon a
human mind, which we don't even have any concept, I
mean to say that it depends on a human mind,
assumes the universal concept of mind that all minds possessed.
You can't even know that on this stupid position. It's
a total collapse. It's totally stupid. It's really low IQ
low brain stuff. But every atheist pretty much believes this.
I mean, unless you're some weird variant of a platonic atheist,
they believe this nonsense. They can't even make sentences. That's
my chief argument against the atheists. If you listen, I
always such you can't make a sentence. You'll say, but yeah,
I just did, right, So that proves that your world
is not true. That's tag right there. The argument from
the objectivity of concepts and knowledge. Any objective, true statement,
any claim, any concept itself, such as triangularity or redness.
Assume that the mind has the same idea right for
us to meaningfully communicate about any object, anything, any proposition,
any sentence. We can't reduce the meaning to the gray
matter because I have different gray matter, right, So how
do we have if we reduce concepts to brain states?
My brain states are not your brain states. Therefore communication
would be impossible if there was not something else higher
than all of the physicalist instantiations. Phaser goes on to
make linguistic types of precondition arguments that you've heard me
make a hundred times. Consider also the many things that
must be the case just for communication to be possible.
This is the preconditions transcendental argument about the possibility of communication.
There's communication, and then there's a higher level of argument
about what must be the case for communication to even
be possible, two different levels of argumentation. And he quotes
Frega's essay thought. So Fraga has an essay thought where
he talks about the presubpositions of what must be the
case for language to even be possible. Yes, exactly, been
here making that argument for years against atheism and materialism.
Then he goes onto the argument of the reductio of
the impossibility of psychologism. That's an easy one. You've heard
me make this argument many times, one of which would
be the naturalist fallacy that if all of our brain
states are part of a determined chemical process, then they're
not really you making choices. Your brain states are illusorially
it's an illusion that you are making choices and that
you are coming to truths. You are merely a determined
chemical process. So there's no you that stands behind these
discoveries and these argumentations mind logic, right, these things cannot
be reducible to matter. He says. It is necessary, it's
necessary about our minds that we have concepts, standards of logic,
et cetera. And they must be set forth, as we
were saying, in order to have knowledge claims at all,
to have the objective knowledge of or nature of the
workings of things, our minds must be situated in this way,
he says. He goes on to say, for to formulate
and defend any claim, there must be an appeal to
certain universal things like mind. Right, If I'm going to
make an argument about minds or about states of affairs
from my mind, I'm assuming mind, I'm assuming self, I'm
assuming logic. It's that simple, not that hard of an argument. Now,
I'm not empirically demonstrated all those things that I'm assuming.
But remember what all almost nine ninety nine percent of
these atheists all say don't believe in anything. This is
empirically demonstrated brou Otherwise it's superstition. Now next, Phaser moves
on to consider areas where we will have to begin
to critique him, and if you want to ask questions,
we got one there be feel free to leave super
chet questions. Next he calls the solution to this that
neither the nominalists nor the mere conceptualist positions, and the
conceptualist position was just that abstract objects are not physical,
they only exist as mental states. But that's just that
doesn't really get you anywhere, because if everything is mental states,
then you're stuck in psychologism, in syllipsism. The end result
of that silypicism. So he says, so there's other versions
of realism that we could give. There's Platonic realism, Aristotelian realism,
and scholastic realism. Now, Phaser is not aware of the
fact that Saint Maximus's view is not the view of
Thomas Aquinas, and we will show that. We will demonstrate
that here in a minute. Because Faser deals with the
objections and he actually brings up the absolute devine suplicity
objection that I'm going to bring up, and he doesn't
rebutt it. He just says they're not really good objections,
but he brings it up, but he doesn't say why
it's a bad objection. It's a perfect objection, and we'll
get to that in a minute. Anyway, So he calls
the position scholastic realism. We'll call it Saint Maximus realism. Okay,
because it shares some similarities with both Plato and with Aristotle,
and Phaser will admit that the scholastic realism position he
thinks does that, but it's very crucial. This is why
Maximus does not locate the universals or the exemplars in
the essence of God, and the logie are not the
same thing as the essences of creatures. It's very easy
to prove that. Maximus says that the universals can perish. Well,
I'm sorry, but logi cannot perish. Right. If the essences
of creative things were in in the divine essence, they
couldn't perish, right, But universals can perish, Maximus says. So
there's a distinction between universals. They're created in the logi.
Wo around created. The universals are patterned on the uncreated logi,
and the logi are not the essence of God. So
the first he says, let's look at the solutions to nominalism,
the different schools that we could go with. One school.
He says, we could go with is platonic realism. And
you heard me outline that. At the beginning. We talked
about the forms, Plato's conception of the forms, and we
talked about how these aren't really good. They seem to
give a little bit of an answer to the immediate
problem of reducing the the universals to the instantiations or
to matter. It shows the problem there. But when we
just say that there's another realm of these ideal things,
we still got all these problems. Right, how do we
relate that unchanging realm to this realm? In what sense
do they participate? How do we avoid the third man argument? Say,
there's a whole bunch of problems, the dualism problem with Platonism, right,
Plato's ad hoc rescue of just saying, well, we know
the forms because like we were reincarnated. Bro, that's literally
his ad hoc rescue for his whole metaphysic. We were
in the realm of the forms once and then we
kind of fell into this one, and so we're remembering
the forms from you know, the time than when we
were all in the moment. That's not a good answer.
That's a terrible answer, actually, but that's the best thing
Plato has, and Phaser actually mentioned some of my critiques
of Platonism, right, not everybody knows that the third man critique,
that's ancient, even Plato brought it up. But there's other
ones too, like the duality of the two realms, how
do they actually relate. Plato's one in the many argument
actually doesn't work because if the many particular objects that
we experience are different objects, then how do they have
forms that are not really different? Because remember that the
forms of objects have to have a higher level perfection
in terms of their simplicity. So ultimately they're all located
in the monad, but the monad doesn't have real distinctions.
Anytime you enter into the equation real distinctions, then you're
moving into the lesser gradations of being, the lower rungs
of the chain of being, because you're moving away from
the one. So for Plato, the more distinct things are,
the further down they are on the chain of being,
down towards non being. That's why we're all striving to
get back to unity with the one. So once you
have that metaphysical presubosition about the ontological supremacy, of ultimate
unity and simplicity. You have all these problems in your system,
so manyness is on a lower status of being. And
as you can imagine when the Church Fathers encounter this,
it takes centuries of debating, especially throughout the Cappadocians, to
try to demonstrate the fact that the threeness of God
is not some how lesser than the unity of God.
We'll come to that later when we look at andreaev
and some of the quotes about love. But so basically
a phaser just runs through some of the critiques and
the problems with the blatonic response on realism, and one
of the ones that he notes that is pretty good
is a better objection would be to consider a universal
concept like animality. Every individual animal is either rational as
human beings are, or non rational as other animals are.
So what is animality itself? Right? Precisely, because it is
a universal it has to apply both to rational and
non rational animals. But it can't itself include both rationality
and non rationality, for these are contradictory properties, and thus
the problem for saying the animality is located in a
higher level reality of perfectionism in the forms. So we
have to say that it inherently entails either rationality or
non rationality. No individual thing can be neither rational nor
non rational, and any existing thing has to be one
or the other. Therefore, the universal concept of animality cannot
be said to exist as an individual thing in its
own right, as a self subsisting form, and so it doesn't.
It seems to not work on that system. Another problem
that I just pointed out. Phaser goes on to say,
is that the things of our experience are not the
forms themselves. So how do we even speak of a
participation or a resemblance? Because remember, the characteristics the properties
of the form are completely different than the characteristics of
the particulars in our experience. So in what sense is
there any kind of real relation between these two? How
do they resemble? It makes no sense. This is the
same argument you hear me make about ads same argument
I make to the Muslims. It's the same point because
any system that has the presuppositions of absolute simplicity in
this sense will have a hell of a time an
impossible task of trying to explain and locate the grounding
of the particulars of this world in that thing doesn't work,
and thus all ads systems will collapse. That's also, of course,
one Maximus does not say that the essences of creatures
are identical to logi. The essences of creatures are in
the creatures. He agrees with with our Aristotle on that.
But the creatures and their instantiations their particular there the
logi of their being, their time coming to be, their existence,
their providence. Every molecule, the body is patterned on the logi,
but not identical to the logi, because the logi are
in the divine mind. You're not identical to the divine mind, obviously,
but many people make this mistake. They will identify the
logi with the essences of created things. No, they're not.
The essences of created things are in the objects, and
he agrees with maxim with Aristotle there. But Maximus is
also giving a nod to Plutinus by saying that the
logi really are uncreated, because they exist in the divine
mind and they come to be when God wills it. Therefore,
they are thought wills about creatures, and so they are
a different type of energy. They are a type of
energy distinct from the eternal what pala Must calls the
natural energies. That doesn't mean that there's non natural or
unnatural energies. It's just a word that is used to
signify the energies that would shine forth whether God created
or not. And this comes from Athanatius argument against the Arians,
and that's why we distinguish God's love glory right if
he had not created, that would still be shining forth
and reciprocated amongst the persons of the Trinity without a
created order. This is why we're going to have the show.
We're going to point out in a minute that Laski,
Steanieloi Andreev's argument, and Saint Nichola Beeli Morovitch makes this
argument too, that you can actually show that the Trinity
is the only logical rational deity that avoids a necessary creation.
Because if he's God, if he's Lord, who is he
Lord and God in relationship to unless there's an is
he eternal Lord, eternal God, If he's a single hypostasis,
single God, then he must be Lord God over an
eternal creation, unless he's Tryune and there's an eternal reciprocation
of love and attributes like glory shining forth amongst the
triad regardless of the created order. Right, But then when
he creates on the basis of will, not on the
basis of any necessary pattern in his essence, but only
on the basis of will. And yes he did. They
create on the basis of patterns that you could say
in the divine mind that are called the logate. But
he didn't have to bring them to be. He willed
to bring them to be. That's why this view is different.
But that's precisely where we're going to critique Phaser, because
Phaser is not aware of Maximus. It doesn't appear to
have any knowledge of Maximus at all. He thinks that
really there's just a gust and or and Aquinas, and
that sums up the whole exemplar doctrine. No, it doesn't.
Next he moves to Aristotelian realism. And as you can imagine,
Aristotle believes that animality, triangularity, redness, humanness are not in
a third realm. They are located in the objects, so
to speak of experience, the mind abstracts from these particular
instances of the objects in terms of the phantasm it's
able to in the mind. So the basically the exterior
objects in Aerosol's view imprint upon our mind through the
senses these different instances right, and in the mind, through
that phantasm is able to abstract the universal. So we
get a concept of the universal right that is present,
so to speak, in the objects. The essence of the
objects is in those objects. Of course, there's other problems
with this view, which I've outlined in other papers and essays,
which is that Aerosol seems to have this notion that
objects are reducible to the essence of that object, and
so therefore there's not really multiple universals or levels of
participation in specific objects. But if that's the case, then
they don't really possess different types of realities, and that
becomes problem when we start talking about Christology, when we
talk about anthropology in the Orthodox conception, and that's why
there's a nod given to both Plato Aristotle. Plutonis in
our tradition Maximus will make free use of these different
systems when they're right and reject them when they're wrong.
Let's look at now the divine conceptualism argument that Faser
moves to that you hear me make often, and I'm
going to tweak it because I don't think Faser he's
on the right track here, but he doesn't really take
it to the right place because he's still situating all
this within quote natural theology. For Faser, this doesn't prove,
this proves any kind of god. Right, Oh, it's going
to prove a generic god that has omniscients. Oh so
Judaism Islam. What good of an argument is that? But
we will give some props because he will mention the
fact that the divine conceptual argument that he locates first
in Sant Augustine. He says that Augustine made the argument
that universals, propositions, mathematical and logical truths, necessary and possible worlds,
et cetera, or excuse me, necessary and possible states of
affairs can only be logically grounded in an intellect or
a divine mind that is infinite and eternal. Thus some
form of realism has to be true. But the Platonic
realism and the Riskytelian realism are severely deficient, and thus
all we're left with is some form of a realism
in which there's divine conceptualism. And basically what that means
that we're grounding the We're locating and grounding the universals,
et cetera, in the mind of God. But now remember,
and he will mention this subjection at the end of
this chapter, what is the Roman Catholic doctrine of divine
ideas in terms of a quitness? Now, maybe a Scotis
could get around this. I don't really think so. But
because I mean John Denscotis and his Treatise on Unicity
of God, he says all the same stuff about simplicity
in terms of knowledge, will and act that Aquinas says
he equates them all with the essence of God in
a strict identity, even though he also says that there's
a formal distinction. Whatever. I don't think that that position
avoids the problem, because I think Scotis is drawing quite
a bit from Augustine when it comes to some of
these ideas. And if that's the case, then you're still
gonna have the problem of locating the archetypes in the
essence of God. In other words, even if you say
that the divine ideas are formally distinct, which I'm not
sure Scotis says that. Maybe he does, but it doesn't
avoid the problem of saying that, but they're really ultimately
identical to the essence of God. Either way, it doesn't
matter because it's not Maximus's position, which is the correct position,
which is that they are thought wills. So I didn't
want to mention too. Even Augustine's argument is lacking because
when Augustine makes this point again, what is this kind
of God? I mean, we don't believe that God is
just a singular divine mind. Okay, that's absolutely simple and
contained all these universals. That's not our view. That's like
a neoplatonic view. But that doesn't work because our God
is the triune God who created the world, right. I mean,
you could hold that view and hold to emanationism as neoplatonist.
So what distinguishes this view from neoplatonism. Well, then you
have to start injecting things like, well, this God's personal. Ah, yes, Now,
if this God's personal, how do we know that it's
not still just a singular personal God. That's why you
have to bring in trinity, not just because of the
one and many argument and grounding the one and the
many in equal ultimacy in God in terms of the
trinity the logi, but also in the sense of what
we said earlier about necessary and freely willed creation, right,
the single God. Right if we have the the Arisitilian
or any sort of monotheistic concepts that strict monotheism in
the sense of just one hypostasis.
Speaker 3: Uh.
Speaker 2: The problem with that position again is that in pretty much,
maybe not every case, but a lot of the philosophers
and theologians who've held that position, whether Muslim, Jewish, or whatever,
they they oftentimes will accept the Aristotilian argumentation about eternal
matter and eternal creation. Well, that's not our view. We
don't want we believe in ex nilo, right, so that's
not the same God as we believe, right. And you said, well,
but so what Well, Basil specifically says Aristotle is an
idiot and a blast number for saying that. I'm gonna
show you that. So you what we start to realize
is that you can't divorce your argumentation of God from
what's revealed about God and posit a God who is
a great architect working with eternal matter. That's masonry. That's
not our view. So you have to have the whole
Christian paradigm. That's what we're arguing for. We're not arguing
for Aristotle's great architect of the universe. God an architect,
works with existing matter. He doesn't create ex nilo. Oh well,
we'll just tack that on later down the road as
Thomas or whatever. Now that doesn't work because those are
no good arguments. So we have to argue for the
paradigm as a whole. Because guess what, none of the
concepts that we're using here, universals, mind of God, laws
of logic, existence, divine intellect, all of these terms that
we're using are situated and explained within the paradigm. None
of those terms are neutral. The laws of logic are neutral.
They only makes sense and are coherent within the paradigm
as a whole. That's, of course what Phaser does not
get as a tonus. So as we see, even if
we prove a divine mind or whatever, it's still not
a very good argument because any Muslim, any Jew, could
make that same argument and could argue that that the
created world is eternal. Now Basil laughs at that and
says that that is destructive to your whole argument for monotheism,
because now you've given the attribute of eternality and uncreated
to matter. But your whole argument was that God alone
is God. But if God alone is God, and he's
got to be God and Lord over someone or something.
Then it seems to necessitate an eternally an eternal matter
or creation that he's got over. Well, now you've made
the created world premium materia, the first heavens, whatever matter eternal. Now,
Basil says, he laughs, and he says, now you're an
idiot because you have made in your quest to be
a strict monotheist, you've now had to admit that matter
takes on a divine property and has to be another hypostasis.
So what you've got eternal God and eternal matter. That's dualism.
We all know that there's serious problems for dualism. And
if you have that dualist system, then how can I
mean dualism can easily fall into the opposite of itself
because now you've got two eternal principles are that necessitate
one another? And as you know from pretty much every
dualist system that's ever existed, this tends to lead to
the conclusion that their intention do we need to flee
to the first cause or are we stuck in the
realm of matter and flux? You see, so dualist systems
are incoherent they're stupid, they don't work, and the very
position that the strict monotheistic position, which was intended to
avoid wait polytheism and dualism, ends up falling right into it.
When you ask about the doctrine of creation, Aerosol himself
makes this argument. He says, the first mover to be
pure act has to be eternally moving something or else
it makes no sense, so he says it has to
be the first heavens an eternal substance or matter that
he's eternally moved. So there's no creation doctrine. So that's
not our God. That's masonry. Did you know masonry teaches
the great architect of the universe. Oh so, imagine using
a bunch of Masonic arguments, like as a Christian who's
borrow the Masonic arguments to argue for what thought thinking itself?
Come on, now, back to the good point that Paser
was making about universal concepts about the Augustinian argument, and
then he moves to the good a good argument that
Liiveniz makes about the eternality of truth. He says that
the basic thrust of this argument is that liveness, borrowing
from Augustine, made the argument that truth itself. It seems
to suggest eternality. Right, So if Caesar, you know, if
it was a cross the rubicon, you know, whatever year
that was, And even though it's in the past, it's
forever true, right, that Caesar crossed the rubicon. So the
trueness of it, the event, even if it was temporal
at least from this point on, is eternal. And it
doesn't matter whether that was you know, whether there's a
possible world where Caesar didn't have to do that, it
doesn't matter, because that did happen. We believe that happened
in some sense. Therefore, therefore the trueness of it is
in a sense eternal. It will never be the case
that Caesar crossed the rubicon and did not cross the rubicon, right,
that's impot possible. So it will eternally be true that
sees across the rubicon. Now, if that's the case, then
the truthfulness of events or propositions or whatever cannot be
identified in the material events themselves. Obviously. I mean, these
are pretty simple arguments if you think about them. They
do not the propositions and their truths. Arguments, he says,
do not depend on the material world. Triangularity and redness
et cetera, however, are universal, and therefore nominalism and conceptualism
are false and do not work. The Polatonic realist solution
doesn't work, the Arisitilian realist solution doesn't work. And so
really the only option here is to not ground abstract
objects only in the human mind. The human mind is changing,
it's in flux, it's not it comes and goes in
time and space. And as we point it out from Aristotle,
you can't, i mean from Leibnans there, you can't reduce
universals or the trueness of universals to the instantiations of
the human mind. So the only other option really is
to have a divine mind. By the way, he also
points out that this makes sense too, because even by
the way, even if you collected all the human minds,
that still doesn't give you the universal. You see, where's
the universal? How do you locate it? There's also a
universal for every particular, that's Loiveness's point. So if that's
the case, then the ultimate ground has to lie beyond individual,
finite human minds. The only other possibility, given the fact
that the universals and the particulars are an interlocking system
you sure that. That's the argument I make all the
time they relate to one another interlock. Given the fact
that they interlocke, no finite mind can hold these together.
You can't ground them in any finite mind, he says,
even angels. If you were trying, oh well, maybe we
can ground these in the minds of angel. It doesn't
work because they're still finite right now. These logical relationships,
he says, would hold whether or not this natural world existed,
whether or not there was even any finite mind. So
there must be a necessarily existing divine intellect which graps
all the logical relationships, all the propositions, all the possibilities,
and thus even the infinite number of mathematical propositions. And thus,
if this is infinite, then you need an omniscient mind.
There's no other options. The ultimate ground of existence of
the abstract objects would thus have to be the divine mind.
There's no there's no other options. Right, Well, why does
this mind have to be omniscient? Now? He goes into
pointing out that it gives some arguments about act as
purist as to why this mind has to be omniscient,
that that's somehow higher level perfection or something that if
God has potentia, then somehow he's less perfect. Well, then
he could then he didn't create freely, right, because we
all believe that God could or could not create the world. Right,
and if he freely created, or if we just make
the simple argument that God had the potential to create
the world in a different way, or is it logically
possible that God created a world where there was no God,
where there was no pope or aquinas if those are
logically possible, and if I can reverse this argument and
sound on the basis of God is pure potentiality with
no with God's pure actuality no potentia, then all the
potential must also be actualized. Right, You can reverse this
argument either way. Then if all the potentia are actualized,
and there are all of the worlds that are possible
logically possible, then there's a world where there's no Aquinas
and no pope, and so therefore the papacy is not necessary.
By the way, show me how that's a false argument
on these grounds. You can't, right, because again, listen to
what I'm saying. So if God is pure act right
with no potentia, I can take that argument in two
different routes. I can go with the typical ADS critique
and say, then creation was not freely done. God didn't
have the potential to create or not create, right, there
was no dunamus distinct from innergeia. Does God have the
power to create a world? Of course he does. Did
he have to create it? No, he freely created it.
So then God is not excluded from all potentia. He
does not have to actualize all the potentia. But if
he's pure act with no potentia, then any potential possibility
has to be actualized. Right. I can cut the argument
either way. And if that's the case, is it logically
possible that God can create a world where there's no
Aquinas and no pope. Yes, then Aquinas and the pope
are not logically necessary and the Roman Catholic system doesn't
work anyway. Divine conceptualism. He tries to bring in absolute
divine simplicity and act as purists. But there's a big
problem with this. And that's going to be the last
point here. We're going to make sure that I'm not
going too close by the way in a few minutes here, Yes,
please put the discord link, because we're gonna have Metropolitan
Jonah giving Catechism classes in about twenty minutes in the Discord.
So I'll be getting off here and then we can
do the rest of this in the part two of
the talk. Maybe I'll have to extend this into other talks,
because I didn't really even get only got halfway into
Phaser's chapter here. I didn't even get to Basil and
Aristotle and andreav and I want to get to the
sections of Aristotle that are relevant for this. But uh,
Phaser makes one of my critiques against Platonism that now
that way, we already covered that earlier. What does it
mean to say that this world represents the forms? He's
already said that, but I don't have time to do it.
So Father Deacon, what we put Yeah, there's the discord
link if anybody wants to join the discord, and you
can hear the me'st falls and jonahs lectures. But let's
see if we can get through this argument from from
Phaser on divine conceptualism and will follow this through. So
he gives us a series of steps, and he says
there are three possible accounts of the abstract objects such
as universals, propositions, numbers, and other mathematical objects and possible worlds. Realism, nominalism, conceptualism.
There are decisive arguments in favor realism, there are insuperable
arguments against nominalism, and there are insuperable arguments against conceptualism.
So some version of realism must be true correct. I
would agree with that. There are three possible versions of realism.
Platonic realism, Aristilian realism, and what he calls scholastic realism,
which we are going to modify to say the realism
of Saint Maximus. If platonic realism is true, then abstract
objects exist in a third realm, distinct from either the
material world or any individual human intellect. If Aristilian realism
is true, then abstract objects exist only in the human
or in other contingently existing intellects. If scholastic or squish that.
If Saint Maximus's realism is true, then abstract objects exist
not only in contingently existing intellects, but also in at
least one necessarily existing intellect, namely the divine mind. There
are insuperable objections against the claim that abstract objects exist
in a platonic third realm, distinct from either the material
world or the intellect. Therefore, platonic realism is not true. Correct.
You know, we just covered all that in the in
the earlier part of the chapter. There are insupperable objects
against the claim that abstract objects exist only in the
human mind or in other contingently existing intellects. We covered
that earlier. Therefore, Ariscitilian realism is not true. So the
last option here is a form of what he calls
scholastic Saint Maximus's realism. So abstract objects exist not only
in contingently existing intellects, but also in at least one
necessarily existing intellect. Next, abstract objects such as universals, oppositions, numbers,
and other mathematical objects and possible worlds are all logically
related to one another in an interlocking way, such that
they form a system of ideas. Yes, interlocking. The reasons
for concluding that at least some abstraret objects exist necessary
in a necessarily existing intellect also entail that this interlocking
system of ideas must exist in a necessarily existing intellect,
the divine mind. Yes, we've argued that earlier. So this
interlocking system of ideas exists in at least one necessarily
existing intellect. This is where it becomes problem nineteen. And
necessarily existing intellect has to be purely actual. No, it doesn't.
I just gave you the argument as to why that's impossible.
It doesn't work, and he will even mention this argument
and not answer it. So there can be more than
So there cannot be more than one necessarily existing intellect.
We would agree with that. An intellect in which the
interlocking system of ideas in question exists, it would be
conceptually on anficient correct. We do agree with that. And
by the way, it has to be the triad. And
that's what we're going to argue as we move on.
Now he moves on to some more points that kind
of we would agree with it in a sense, but
he basically just concludes us by saying, therefore God exists, right,
the omniscient. But the problem is that what God are
we talking about. We have not distinguished this generic theism
of a sort from any other generic monotheism. But we
do not argue for generic monotheism. We argue for the
Father of our Lord, Jesus Christ, who eternally generates the
Son and eternally spirates the spirit. That's the only God
there is. And if we say that he is a
bare monotheism. Guess what Aristotle is the more consistent monotheist.
What does Aristotle say in book twelve of the Metaphysics?
Aerostol says in book twelve that he gives his definition
of actus purists and absolute simplicity in book twelve, chapters
five six seven. I'm trying to hurry so he can
get to metropolitan Jonah. But you'll notice that it's right here.
It's very clear. If you want to go read these
you can five sixty seven. He will speak of eternal matter,
eternal movement, eternal substance, that the first cause, the unmoved mover,
moves the first heaven eternally, as his first substance is
eternal substance, eternal matter. Basil, as we said, makes fun
of this. He says, you're a tard, do you think this?
This is in Hexameron humbily too at the very beginning,
and he will make fun of the great architect Deity.
And he's referring to this section of Aristol. So props
to father Deacon Annius for finding because the actually the
notes in the chafts that are wrong or some other
numbering system. So it took forever to find this, but
it's in book twelve five, six and seven. Aerosol is
more consistent because if the eternal first mover is an
eternal first mover, for that to mean anything coherent, he
has to eternally move something. If God is the eternal creator,
then he eternally creates or has a creation that's eternal,
which he's got over. These arguments are dumb. Therefore, you
can't hold to a bare monotheism and have the words
and predicates and names of him mean anything without eternal
creation for him to be God and Lord over. So
it's a very simple argument. And when we get to
part two, we'll look at how Andrea of responds to this,
how Losky and stan ELOI respond to this by pointing
out that this obviously shows that the Trinity is the
only God who really solves this. There's no other options, right,
There's no The dualism argument doesn't work. Sat Maximus will
refute the dualism God. The only one you're left with
is the Trinity. Okay, so it's not it's not that
difficult here. But I'll close the part with with Phaser
by pointing out, listen to what Phaser says here with
his objection the objections to realism and the problem is
in his Tomis system. William Wainwright suggests, based on Grim's objection,
there also seems to be an assumption of a model
of divine knowledge which would be rejected by those that
hold to God is absolutely simple or a non composite being.
In particular, it seems that it seems to assume that
the view that Phaser is arguing for it seems to
assume that truths that God knows correspond to discrete ideas
in the divine intellect. Well, yeah, if the things in
the in the world are grounded in the divine mind
in the Roman Catholic divine ideas argument, then if the
things in the world are really distinct, then they got
to be based on ideas that are really distinct. But
then you turn around and you say that the divine
ideas are absolutely identical to the essence of God, and
they're not really distinct. They're only virtually and not only distinct. Yeah,
it's a great argument. In particular, it seems to uh.
He says that in the divine intellect we could say
that these are a set but given the divine simplicity,
what we describe in terms of such discreet ideas is
really one and the same thing in God. Thank you
for admitting that, Facer, there is in God something analogous
to what we call our own intellects, so analogia, and
thus we grasp a proposition, for example, all men are mortal.
We grasp something analogous to what we call to what
we call a grasp, or the proposition that Socrates is
a man, and so forth. So these propositions, they're analogous
to something in the divine mind. But these are just
different ways of describing what in God is really one
and the same thing exactly. So how does that work?
Guess what? Phaser doesn't address it. He just goes on.
So the very thing that I would go to, the
very argument, Phaser doesn't even have reply to it. He
just says, uh, yeah, well it's different in God, okay,
But that's not an answer, and so he says these
objections are not powerful. Right In the next page, this
is the final page, he doesn't address that argument. He
just says that it's not you know, it's just different
in the divine intellect. But that's the very thing that's
in question. So Phaser, how do you avoid the critique
that you gave a play though, because you critiqued Platonic
realism by saying that the descriptors of what's in the
form in the monad are totally different than the descriptors
of the things in this realm that are supposed to
be analogous to or resemble it. You got the same problem,
dude when it comes to Aquinas, and you just pass
over that argument. You don't even address it. Maybe he'll
address I hope so right anyway, in part two, we'll
get to how the triad is necessitated and solves these
dilemmas via the exchange of love in the Trinity. And
this comes from Saint Nikolai Bila Morovich, Father's Donnie Lloyd
Vlader Lawski and Andrea the Russian apologist. Andrea, thank you, guys.
Let's get to these supertats really quick before we go
to Metropolitan Jonah, we find the first try to find
the first one? Where is it at all? Right? Too? Kind?
Tuken me is that Tolkien tu King donates two dollars.
He says, how do you square Christianity with technology? And
where is it heading? I would say, go watch father
Deacon doctor Anonius's talk on technology in Christianity. He did
a whole, really good long lecture on that, So I
would recommend that go to his channel over at the
Norwegian NOWS and you'll find that talk. Our emotions universal,
Nick says for five dollars. Yeah, in a sense, right,
So when we talk about the ontological status of emotions
and the propositions about emotions, those are all universal truth claims.
They're all they describe universal states of affairs and so forth.
All human beings possess emotions in some sense and degree,
unless they're vegetables or something I don't know, but so
in those senses, emotions are universal, and yes we can
we can speak of them in that sense. Jordan donates
ten dollars, Thank you, Jordan, and Funds donates five dollars.
Thank you, Funds And if you want to, of course,
the subscription to the site is in the just the
in the show description. You can subscribe to the website
and we'll get into more depth in the second half
of this when we have more time, and we'll look
at more phaser, we'll look at the other trinitarian points,
and we'll look at some of the arguments about LOGI
as well. That help explicate this and why we don't
believe the neoplatonic view, and how same Maximus is really
correcting our review from the neoplatonic view. And then we'll
look at where in Aristotle he talks about eternal matter
and all that stuff and what he's talking about. Yeah,
I mean, if you you know, they're not these arguments
might sound obtuse, but if you start to understand what
we're saying, they're not. They're not that bad. They're not
that hard. Uh So, match Falt and Jonah will be
doing a catechism lecture. I guess three or four. I'm
not sure where we are. I was off getting married,
so I'm a little late to the game. Here go
to the discord and then we'll have that link set
up for that. If you want the second part of
this talk in the next few days, subscribe Jasonnalysis at
the membership links in the show description. And anyway, hopefully
this was interesting. God bless everybody, have a good night.