Speaker 1: Imagine this, right, You find a USB drive in the
Speaker 1: parking lot, just lying there. Seems pretty harmless, Yeah, just
Speaker 1: a lost drive exactly. So you pick it up, maybe
Speaker 1: you're curious, maybe you want to return it. You plug
Speaker 1: it into your work computer and boom, just like that,
Speaker 1: an entire company's network potentially compromised. It's kind of scary
Speaker 1: when you think about it.
Speaker 2: It really is.
Speaker 1: Welcome to the deep dive. We're pulling back the curtain
Speaker 1: today on something both fascinating and frankly a bit chilling.
Speaker 1: We're doing a deep dive into social engineering, the art
Speaker 1: of psychological warfare, human hacking, persuasion and deception.
Speaker 2: It's quite a title, bit it fits.
Speaker 1: It really does. Our mission here is to basically break
Speaker 1: down how attackers use human psychology, not just software bugs,
Speaker 1: to get access to sensitive.
Speaker 2: Stuff, and crucially, how you can spot these things.
Speaker 1: Exactly, how you can protect yourself, your organization. All our
Speaker 1: insights today they come from this really comprehensive document that
Speaker 1: details all these techniques.
Speaker 2: Yeah, it's eye opening stuff because at its heart, social
Speaker 2: engineering it's about getting access to systems, data, even buildings
Speaker 2: by playing on our psychology, right.
Speaker 1: Using clever non technical tricks instead of like complex hacking.
Speaker 2: Precisely, an attacker doesn't need to be some coding wizard.
Speaker 2: They could just you know, call you up, pretending to
Speaker 2: be it support and.
Speaker 1: Try to get your password that way.
Speaker 2: Yeah, the main goal always is getting trust, making you
Speaker 2: want help them.
Speaker 1: Out, So it's less about the code itself and more
Speaker 1: about well, the conversation, the persuasion. This idea has been
Speaker 1: around forever basically, but it really hit the mainstream in
Speaker 1: the nineties, right with Kevin Mitneck.
Speaker 2: That's right, he really popularized the term. But yeah, the
Speaker 2: concept is ancient, and what's worrying is it's a growing.
Speaker 1: Threat because companies are spending fortunes on tech.
Speaker 2: Defenses exactly, firewalls, anti virus, all that, but social engineers
Speaker 2: they just find clever ways around it. They go for
Speaker 2: the people, the human element, which, unfortuate, yeah, often the
Speaker 2: weakest link in the whole security.
Speaker 1: Chain, and they've got this whole like arsenal of tactics.
Speaker 1: One you mentioned in the source. Pretexting sounds kind of serious.
Speaker 1: What is that exactly?
Speaker 2: Pretexting is, well, it's more than just telling a lie.
Speaker 2: It's creating a whole fabricated situation a completely made up scenario, okay,
Speaker 2: all designed to steal personal info or gain access. Yeah, so,
Speaker 2: like an attacker might pretend to be an IT auditor
Speaker 2: from outside.
Speaker 1: The company, with the whole backstory and everything.
Speaker 2: Oh yeah, really convincing enough to talk their way past security.
Speaker 2: Or there's a really disturbing case we found people pretending
Speaker 2: to be from a modeling agency.
Speaker 1: Oh wow.
Speaker 2: Yeah, manipulating women into sending compromising photos, all based on
Speaker 2: fake promises, fake interviews, just building trust to exploit them.
Speaker 1: That's deeply unsettling how they prey on trust and aspirations
Speaker 1: like that.
Speaker 2: It really is. The goal is always creating that fake
Speaker 2: but believable sense of trust.
Speaker 1: But sometimes they're less subtle, right, using like fear or urgency,
Speaker 1: which brings us to maybe the most common one, fishing.
Speaker 1: I think most people listening are probably run into this.
Speaker 2: Oh absolutely, Fishing is definitely the most common. And you
Speaker 2: know the signs, right, trying to get personal info, names,
Speaker 2: social security numbers, addresses.
Speaker 1: Right, using threats or making it seem super urgent.
Speaker 2: Yeah, you need to act now. And those suspicious links
Speaker 2: taking you to fake websites that look surprisingly real sometimes
Speaker 2: and it's.
Speaker 1: Weird even emails with bad grammar can still trick.
Speaker 2: People, It's true, and they often bundle fishing with malware now,
Speaker 2: like getting people to install cracked software from dodgy sources.
Speaker 1: Which is actually loaded with malware.
Speaker 2: Exactly like those fake Google playbooks apk's mentioned in the source.
Speaker 1: So far, it sounds like they're mostly taking stuff, But
Speaker 1: do they ever offer something to get what they want,
Speaker 1: like a trade?
Speaker 2: Definitely. That's where quid pro quote comes in. Literally something
Speaker 2: for something, okay, usually offering a service not really goods
Speaker 2: in return for information. So the classic is fraudster's calling
Speaker 2: pretending to be it offering help. Yeah, offering a quick
Speaker 2: fix for some made up computer problem if you just
Speaker 2: disable your anti virus first.
Speaker 1: I see where this is going right.
Speaker 2: Then they install malware, calling it a software update. We
Speaker 2: even saw examples of attackers getting office workers passwords for
Speaker 2: like a chocolate bar.
Speaker 1: Chocolate bar seriously for a password.
Speaker 2: Or cheap pen. It shows how little it can sometimes take.
Speaker 1: That's wow. It really highlights how easily we can be
Speaker 1: swayed sometimes. But beyond direct trades, they also use bait
Speaker 1: right with tempting offers. How does baiting work?
Speaker 2: Is it just online It's similar off and online. Yeah,
Speaker 2: free movie downloads, free music, just enter your log in
Speaker 2: details here.
Speaker 1: Classic bait.
Speaker 2: But it absolutely extends offline too. There's this really interesting
Speaker 2: case an organization's founder actually scattered USB drives around the
Speaker 2: company parking lot. USB drive yeah, loaded with the trojan virus.
Speaker 2: Employees found them, got curious, culled them in, pluged them
Speaker 2: in on, which activated a key logger grabbing their log
Speaker 2: in details. Shows how powerful simple curiosity can be.
Speaker 1: Wow. And then there's one I've definitely seen myself. Tailgating
Speaker 1: or piggyback.
Speaker 2: Yes, tailgaming. Basically, someone without the right badge or key
Speaker 2: card just follows an authorized person into a secure area.
Speaker 1: Like holding the door for someone exactly.
Speaker 2: The classic is someone dressed as a delivery driver, maybe
Speaker 2: carrying a box. They wait for an employee to badge in,
Speaker 2: then just ask politely, could you hold the.
Speaker 1: Door, And most people would right, just being polite.
Speaker 2: It relies on that natural courtesy. It's apparently pretty common
Speaker 2: in smaller or medium companies where security might rely more
Speaker 2: on oh I recognize that person. We read about one
Speaker 2: security tester who tailgated his way through multiple floors of
Speaker 2: a building, even into a financial firm's data.
Speaker 1: Room and just worked there unnoticed.
Speaker 2: For days, gathering info. It's pretty effective.
Speaker 1: It's just amazing how these basic human things curiosity, politeness,
Speaker 1: trust can be turned against us, even with fancy tech security.
Speaker 2: It really shows how deep those social behaviors run.
Speaker 1: So with all these different attack methods, who tends to
Speaker 1: be the most vulnerable? Who do they target most often?
Speaker 2: Well, the analysis we looked at consistently points to new
Speaker 2: employees being the most vulnerable. They don't know the ropes yet,
Speaker 2: maybe don't know who to trust. That makes sense, followed
Speaker 2: by contractors, HR people, executive assistants even it. Staff and
Speaker 2: business leaders can be targets. And the problem is a
Speaker 2: lot of organizations still don't have you know, solid awareness
Speaker 2: programs or.
Speaker 1: Training to be getting a big blind spot.
Speaker 2: A huge one, and these attacks, they can cost companies thousands,
Speaker 2: sometimes millions every year.
Speaker 1: It's clear the human factor is huge. But who are
Speaker 1: these social engineers? It's not just the stereotype of a
Speaker 1: hacker and a hoodie.
Speaker 2: Is it. Oh not at all. They come in all
Speaker 2: shapes and sizes, some friendly, some malicious. Understanding the players
Speaker 2: is pretty key. Okay, So yeah, you have hackers. That's
Speaker 2: the which most people have, often blending tech skills with
Speaker 2: these personal manipulation skills.
Speaker 1: But then there are the ethical ones, penetration testers.
Speaker 2: Exactly, pen testers. They have the same kinds of black
Speaker 2: hat skills, but they use them for good, to test
Speaker 2: a company's defenses, find a holes before the bad.
Speaker 1: Guys do, so they're hired to break in essentially.
Speaker 2: Pretty much without causing actual harm. Of course, then you've
Speaker 2: got identity thieves.
Speaker 1: Their game must have evolved a lot.
Speaker 2: Oh absolutely really complex impersonations now trying to get all
Speaker 2: your personal details name, address, bank info, ss N, birth date.
Speaker 2: They use everything they.
Speaker 1: Can find and spies of course, deception is their job description, right.
Speaker 2: Social engineering is like a massive part of espionage, building trust,
Speaker 2: extracting info. It's what they're trained for. But it's not
Speaker 2: always outsiders.
Speaker 1: You mean disgruntled employees.
Speaker 2: Yeah, that's a tricky one because their unhappiness is often hidden.
Speaker 2: Employers might miss the signs, like maybe they start volunteering
Speaker 2: for extra.
Speaker 1: Work and really why it's called protective.
Speaker 2: Behavior makes them look loyal, while they might be planning
Speaker 2: something where they complained about management a lot, seeking sympathy.
Speaker 2: Sometimes they're loners blaming the company, and watch out for
Speaker 2: sudden lifestyle changes, big spending, new car, good ego, or
Speaker 2: money driving them.
Speaker 1: So internal threats are a real danger. And you mentioned
Speaker 1: some surprising professions use similar techniques just ethically kind of.
Speaker 2: Yeah, think about executive recruiters or good salespeople. They're masters
Speaker 2: of elicitation, understanding what motivates people. Scam artists or con
Speaker 2: artists are brilliant at spotting victims and playing on greed.
Speaker 1: And even governments that's unexpected.
Speaker 2: Often overlooked. Yeah, but governments use authority, social proof scarcity
Speaker 2: all the time to get messages across influence behavior. Sometimes
Speaker 2: it's for good reasons, like public health campaigns, but the
Speaker 2: techniques are fundamentally social engineering, making messages stick.
Speaker 1: And even fields like psychology or.
Speaker 2: Law exactly, psychologists, doctors, lawyers, they all use techniques like elicitation, understanding, psychology,
Speaker 2: interviewing tactics to get information from clients, sometimes to manipulate it,
Speaker 2: sometimes just to understand it. Really shows social engineering is
Speaker 2: almost a science.
Speaker 1: There's even an equation for it.
Speaker 2: Yeah, the source distilled it down pretext plus attachment, degreed
Speaker 2: plus manipulation, target victimized it's methodical.
Speaker 1: So with all these different players, what are they actually after?
Speaker 1: What's the prize?
Speaker 2: It's pretty broad really, passwords obviously, keys, account numbers, access cards,
Speaker 2: ID badges, any personal info, details about computer systems, phone lists,
Speaker 2: internal websites or servers, intranet stuff, yeah, internet info, and
Speaker 2: crucially the names of people who do have access or privileges,
Speaker 2: anything that helps them get deeper in or gives them
Speaker 2: an edge.
Speaker 1: And how do they usually get this stuff. What are
Speaker 1: the common tricks we should be looking out for.
Speaker 2: Well, one big one now is friending, gating trust on
Speaker 2: social media, maybe starting a casual.
Speaker 1: Chat to eventually get you to click a bad link.
Speaker 2: Right or give up some info malicious attachments links to
Speaker 2: fake's eye. Then there's impersonal or social network squatting. Squatting, yeah,
Speaker 2: like taking over or spoofing an account of someone you know,
Speaker 2: sending you a message, maybe a tweet, pretending to be
Speaker 2: them asking for a favor, Hey, can you send me
Speaker 2: that spreadsheet?
Speaker 1: And because it looks like your friend, you might.
Speaker 2: Just do it exactly. Spoofing online identities is worryingly easy sometimes, and.
Speaker 1: The classic pretending to be someone on the inside.
Speaker 2: Posing as an insider Yeah, impersonating someone from it help desk,
Speaker 2: maybe a contractor trying to get passwords or other info.
Speaker 2: There was that study mentioned ninety percent of employees in
Speaker 2: one company trusted people posing.
Speaker 1: As colleagues ninety percent.
Speaker 2: Yeah, hand it over sensitive company info just because they
Speaker 2: look like they belonged. It's all about playing on that
Speaker 2: internal familiarity, that assumption of trust.
Speaker 1: Okay, let's shift gears a bit. We've talked about what
Speaker 1: they do, but the real magic or dark magic, is
Speaker 1: how they mess with our minds. Right, What are the
Speaker 1: basic psychological tricks they use.
Speaker 2: Yeah, the mind games are key. A big one is
Speaker 2: and confidence. Social engineers just act like they belong They
Speaker 2: radiate confidence, even.
Speaker 1: If they have a fake badge or whatever.
Speaker 2: Exactly, it's the posture, the way they carry themselves. It
Speaker 2: puts people at ease, makes them seem legit, like concert security.
Speaker 2: They look for people acting shifty, not just checking badges.
Speaker 2: Confidence is disarming, and.
Speaker 1: They probably try to control the conversation.
Speaker 2: Right away, definitely. Often by starting with a question, it
Speaker 2: immediately puts you slightly on the defensive, make you feel
Speaker 2: like you need to respond. They control the flow.
Speaker 1: From the start, subtly setting the terms.
Speaker 2: Right, and humans, Well, we're wired to return favors, aren't
Speaker 2: we That feeling of reciprocation.
Speaker 1: Oh yeah, if someone does something nice for you, I.
Speaker 2: Feel like you owe them. Social engineers exploit this constantly,
Speaker 2: maybe a small gift, a small favor. The source note
Speaker 2: of the timing is key. Oh so give a gift
Speaker 2: in the morning, then come back in the afternoon asking
Speaker 2: for something, maybe claiming they forgot something or there was
Speaker 2: a mix up. It feels less like a direct bribe,
Speaker 2: then more.
Speaker 1: Natural, sneaky, and humor. I bet that helps them seem
Speaker 1: likable big time.
Speaker 2: Using humor breaks down walls. Yeah, makes them seem friendly,
Speaker 2: less threatening. Yeah, helps them get info, maybe talk their
Speaker 2: way out of a tight spot, or just charm a
Speaker 2: gatekeeper like a security guard. A fake it call might
Speaker 2: feel less suspicious if the person on the other end
Speaker 2: is cracking jokes.
Speaker 1: Okay, this next one you mentioned from the source is wild,
Speaker 1: always stating a reason, especially using the word because.
Speaker 2: Isn't that fascinating? The copy machine study.
Speaker 1: Yeah, tell us about that again.
Speaker 2: Okay, so people try to cut in line. If they said,
Speaker 2: excuse me, I have five pages. May I use the
Speaker 2: machine because I'm in a rush. Ninety four percent let
Speaker 2: them cut.
Speaker 1: Makes sense. They gave a reason, right.
Speaker 2: If they just said, excuse me, I have five pages,
Speaker 2: May I use the machine? Only sixty percent agreed. But
Speaker 2: here's the crazy part. If they said, excuse me, I
Speaker 2: have five pages, May I use the machine because I
Speaker 2: need to make copies.
Speaker 1: Which is not really a reason at all.
Speaker 2: It's totally redundant. But three percent still let them cut
Speaker 2: ninety three percent.
Speaker 1: Wow.
Speaker 2: It shows we often react to the presence of a reason,
Speaker 2: the structure of because, not necessarily the logic of the
Speaker 2: reason itself, especially if we're stressed or busy. It's like
Speaker 2: a mental shortcut.
Speaker 1: So any reason is better than no reason. That's powerful
Speaker 1: and a bit scary.
Speaker 2: It really is.
Speaker 1: This leads nicely into elicitation. The source called it subtle
Speaker 1: extraction of information during an apparently normal and innocent conversation.
Speaker 1: Sounds super hard to spot.
Speaker 2: It is very low risk for the attacker, very hard
Speaker 2: to detect. You rarely even though you've given anything away.
Speaker 1: Why does it work so well?
Speaker 2: It plays on basic human nature. We want to be
Speaker 2: polite to strangers. We tend to talk more if someone
Speaker 2: praises us. Professionals like to sound knowledgeable. We respond if
Speaker 2: someone shows concern, and most people don't like to lie outright, so.
Speaker 1: They gently pull information.
Speaker 2: Out exactly maype you act, even just by answering a
Speaker 2: question or nudge you down a certain path. It also
Speaker 2: makes their main story, their pretext, seem.
Speaker 1: More believer and they have to be really good at
Speaker 1: conversation to pull this off.
Speaker 2: Oh yeah, masters of it. First, being natural, they have
Speaker 2: to sound and act like they belong, like an expert
Speaker 2: in whatever role they're.
Speaker 1: Playing, and educated on the topic.
Speaker 2: Definitely enough knowledge to talk intelligently. Pretending usually doesn't work
Speaker 2: for long, and maybe counterintuitively, not being greedy, meaning don't
Speaker 2: push too hard for information too quickly, let the target
Speaker 2: talk more, be patient. Use that reciprocation principle. Give a
Speaker 2: little info, get a little info. Rushing raises red flags.
Speaker 1: The source mentions specific elicitation techniques from a DAHS pamphlet.
Speaker 2: Yeah, things like ego appeals, subtle flattery, your job sounds
Speaker 2: really important, or finding mutual interest. Oh you're into compliance databases,
Speaker 2: I was just reading them extends the conversation.
Speaker 1: What about deliberate false statements?
Speaker 2: That's a clever one. Yeah, you say something wrong on purpose,
Speaker 2: knowing the other person will likely correct you with the
Speaker 2: real information.
Speaker 1: Ah, exploiting the need to be right exactly.
Speaker 2: Then there's volunteering information yourself, hoping they'll reciprocate with something
Speaker 2: equally valuable. Sets the tone and assume knowledge, acting like
Speaker 2: you already know things to get the conversation rolling and
Speaker 2: encourage them to add more detail.
Speaker 1: And the way they ask questions is critical to totally.
Speaker 2: Using open ended questions, what do you think about? Well?
Speaker 2: How does that work? Things you can't just answer yes
Speaker 2: or no to gets people talking.
Speaker 1: The pyramid approach right.
Speaker 2: Starting specific and getting broader or the reverse. Then closed
Speaker 2: ended questions for specific facts. Is your manager happy with
Speaker 2: the project? Leading questions like lawyers use hinting at the
Speaker 2: answer and assumptive questions, acting like you already know they
Speaker 2: have the info you want.
Speaker 1: All these subtle conversational tricks build up to the main act,
Speaker 1: which is pretexting, creating that whole fake scenario exactly.
Speaker 2: It's the foundation. Yeah, and the first rule of pretexting
Speaker 2: is research, research, research. The more they know, the better.
Speaker 1: Their chances, and they often target emotions.
Speaker 2: Absolutely. Malicious actors are ruthless. They exploit tragedies like nine
Speaker 2: to eleven or earthquakes for fake charity scams, or use
Speaker 2: celebrity deaths to lure people to bad websites using SEO tricks,
Speaker 2: playing on that surge of public interest.
Speaker 1: It's pretty dark, really dark, exploiting grief and shock like that.
Speaker 2: It is another principle personal interests increase success. It's easier
Speaker 2: to fake it if the pretext is something you actually
Speaker 2: know about or.
Speaker 1: Enjoy less chance of tripping up.
Speaker 2: Right avoids that cognitive dissonance in the target where something
Speaker 2: just feels off about your story. If you're pretending to
Speaker 2: be tech support but look terrified of a server rack,
Speaker 2: it won't work.
Speaker 1: Like method acting for criminals kind of.
Speaker 2: They even practice expressions or dialects, record themselves, try accents
Speaker 2: on strangers, and the phone is still huge easy to
Speaker 2: spoof caller ID now make it look like the call
Speaker 2: is coming from a bank head office, even the white house.
Speaker 1: Wow, and simpler is better for the.
Speaker 2: Story itself generally, Yes, Simpler pretexts better chances, fewer details
Speaker 2: to remember, less chance of contradiction, lets the target fill
Speaker 2: in the blanks with their imagination. Sometimes they even make small,
Speaker 2: calculated mistakes. Why makes them seem more human, more relatable.
Speaker 2: Nobody's perfect. Plus dressing the part helps Khakis and a
Speaker 2: polo for.
Speaker 1: Tech sport, and it needs to feel natural, not rehearsed exactly.
Speaker 2: Pretext should be spontaneous, Use an outline, not a rigid script.
Speaker 2: Be flexible, pay attention to the target's reactions and adapt.
Speaker 2: Practice makes perfect.
Speaker 1: And they don't just grab the info and run.
Speaker 2: Usually not, good social engineers provide a follow through or
Speaker 2: logical conclusion, like a doctor giving a diagnosis. They wrap
Speaker 2: things up, maybe give the target something to do next.
Speaker 2: It avoids immediate suspicion. If tech support just walked out
Speaker 2: after messing with the database, you get suspicious fast. They
Speaker 2: need to close the loop plausibly.
Speaker 1: This all feeds into the bigger picture of influence and persuasion,
Speaker 1: which sounds less like a trick and more like a science.
Speaker 1: Getting someone to think or do you want maybe without
Speaker 1: them even noticing it.
Speaker 2: Really is a science. The source laid out five key
Speaker 2: fundamentals for influence. First, set clear goals. Know exactly what
Speaker 2: you want to achieve before you even start.
Speaker 1: Have a target in mind, yes.
Speaker 2: Second, build rapport quickly connect with the target, get their attention,
Speaker 2: maybe even affect their unconscious mind advanced stuff.
Speaker 1: They need to be super observant too.
Speaker 2: Right absolutely. Third, be observant, aware of yourself, your surroundings,
Speaker 2: the target's reactions. Avoid getting lost in your own head
Speaker 2: your internal dialogue. Stay present. Fourth, be flexible.
Speaker 1: Adapt if things go wrong, exactly.
Speaker 2: Like bending a branch, not snapping a steel rod. If
Speaker 2: one approach isn't working, change tactics smoothly, don't seem rigid
Speaker 2: or unreasonable.
Speaker 1: And control their own feeling crucial.
Speaker 2: Fifth, be in touch with yourself. Understand and manage your
Speaker 2: own emotions. If you secretly hate smoking, it'll be hard
Speaker 2: to genuinely persuade someone to quit. Social engineers project the
Speaker 2: required emotion, not necessarily their true one.
Speaker 1: Okay, on those fundamentals, the source listed eight specific techniques
Speaker 1: they use for influence. First one reciprocation. We touched on that.
Speaker 2: Yeah, that deep seated need to return favors. They look
Speaker 2: for small chances to make you feel indebted subtly.
Speaker 1: Then obligation. How's that different?
Speaker 2: It's broader, more of a moral or social duty, like
Speaker 2: holding a door open leads to the next person holding
Speaker 2: the inner door. They might use smart complimenting, give a compliment,
Speaker 2: then make a request. Play on that feeling of social obligation.
Speaker 1: What about concession giving ground.
Speaker 2: Right, yielding on something to make the other person feel
Speaker 2: they should yield too, Okay, I'll meet you halfway. They
Speaker 2: might label the concession demand reciprocity later or given bit
Speaker 2: by bit to keep the exchange.
Speaker 1: Going and creating that limited time off or feeling that's scarcity.
Speaker 2: Things seem more valuable if they're rare or about to disappear.
Speaker 2: Sale ends Friday. Social engineers use this to rush decisions.
Speaker 2: Maybe combine it with authority. The CEO needs this fix
Speaker 2: by Monday. He's really upset.
Speaker 1: Urgency plus authority and authority itself is huge massive.
Speaker 2: We're conditioned from childhood to obey authority figures or at
Speaker 2: least defer to them. Social engineers fake authority all the time.
Speaker 2: Then there's commitment and consistency.
Speaker 1: People like to stick to their guns.
Speaker 2: Yeah, and they like others to be consistent too. It
Speaker 2: makes life simpler. Social engineers appear fully committed to their role.
Speaker 2: Their story makes them seem more believable, hardly to doubt
Speaker 2: once you start it.
Speaker 1: Interacting and just being likingable seems key.
Speaker 2: Fundamentally, people are way more easily influenced by people they like,
Speaker 2: so social engineers work hard to seem friendly, interested, trustworthy,
Speaker 2: makes the whole process smoother.
Speaker 1: Finally, social proof or consensus the bandwagon effect.
Speaker 2: Exactly everyone else is doing it. In confusing situations, we
Speaker 2: look to others to figure out how to act, So
Speaker 2: a social engineer might say, oh, lots of people have
Speaker 2: given me this info, or most departments handle it this way,
Speaker 2: especially powerful when the target is unsure, makes the request
Speaker 2: seem normal acceptable.
Speaker 1: No, it's definitely not just mind games. They use actual
Speaker 1: tools too, right, Beyond a winning smile, Oh.
Speaker 2: Yeah, physical tools still matter. Lockpicking isn't dead, especially in
Speaker 2: places without fancy electronic locks, and even electronic badges like RFID.
Speaker 1: Have issues like the Walmart example.
Speaker 2: Right. Inventory tracking is great, but if tags can be
Speaker 2: read by anyone, that's a tracking risk. Security is about
Speaker 2: the whole system, not just the lock type, and legitimate
Speaker 2: auditors use recording devices why to document successful tests, show proof,
Speaker 2: and use the footage for training captures all the details.
Speaker 2: It's not about shaming, it's about learning.
Speaker 1: End phones obviously central.
Speaker 2: Absolutely, the phone is still one of the most powerful tools,
Speaker 2: easy access, quick interactions, and cell phone vulnerability is high.
Speaker 2: We carry so much data and we're often quick to
Speaker 2: trust a believable.
Speaker 1: Caller, especially with caller ID spoofing Exactly.
Speaker 2: Apps on Android and iPhone make it trivial to look
Speaker 2: like you're calling from anywhere, head office, the bank, even
Speaker 2: the White House, as the source mentioned, makes it really
Speaker 2: hard to verify who's actually calling, and.
Speaker 1: Software tools must automate a lot of this now for sure.
Speaker 2: The Social Engineer Toolkit SCT is a big one. It
Speaker 2: helps create malicious emails, PDFs that can make those infected
Speaker 2: USB drives we talked about infectious media.
Speaker 1: And generate payloads.
Speaker 2: What are those payloads are things like reverse shells, basically
Speaker 2: code that creates a secret backdoor into a compromised computer,
Speaker 2: giving the attack. A remote access set makes this stuff
Speaker 2: much easier, even as a web interface.
Speaker 1: And tools to guess passwords.
Speaker 2: Yeah, password profilers tools like Who's Your Daddy or Common
Speaker 2: User Passwords Profiler. They scrape info about a target online
Speaker 2: then generate likely passwords based on common habits, birthdays, pet names, etc.
Speaker 2: Exploits our tendency to use guessable passwords.
Speaker 1: Combining tech with psychology. Okay, let's talk specific scams, those
Speaker 1: pickup lines they use, what works on social media?
Speaker 2: Oh, the classic friend in trouble scam? Hey, I'm stuck
Speaker 2: in New York lost my wallet? Can you wire money?
Speaker 2: Usually from a haged account, playing on sympathy totally or
Speaker 2: just check out this link looks like it's from a
Speaker 2: friend that leads to a dodgy site like that Twitter spam.
Speaker 2: Have you seen this video of you? Takes you to
Speaker 2: a fake login page.
Speaker 1: And the Facebook one.
Speaker 2: Someone has a secret crush on you. Download this app
Speaker 2: to find out who exploits curiosity, installs malware or adwear,
Speaker 2: steals your info?
Speaker 1: What about in the actual office face to face stuff?
Speaker 2: Common lines like Hi, it's Jack from tech support. We've
Speaker 2: detected an infection on your machine, plays on fear, aims
Speaker 2: to get passwords or remote access, or someone showing up Hello,
Speaker 2: I'm the rep from company X. Here to see mister
Speaker 2: Smith looks leg yet might have done their homework. Dress
Speaker 2: the part and.
Speaker 1: The door holding thing again?
Speaker 2: Yeah, excuse me? Can you hold the door? Left my
Speaker 2: key card at my desk late for a meeting. Standard tailgating,
Speaker 2: often with a fake badge for good measure how many
Speaker 2: times will we all just held the door without thinking guilty?
Speaker 1: It really does make you pause. Phishing emails still clearly
Speaker 1: work too.
Speaker 2: Absolutely, things like you want an EVA item but haven't
Speaker 2: paid click here plays on worries about your online reputation,
Speaker 2: or much worse, you've been laid off. Click here for
Speaker 2: sevence details.
Speaker 1: That's harsh.
Speaker 2: Yeah exploits job insecurity. Digital processes often link to fake
Speaker 2: w two forms two trying to get tax info, hits
Speaker 2: people where they're vulnerable.
Speaker 1: And then the really targeted attacks.
Speaker 2: Right exploiting disasters, donate to hurricane relief scams to steal identities,
Speaker 2: maybe followed by fake bank calls asking for your SSN.
Speaker 2: The Microsoft support calls.
Speaker 1: Where they claim your computer has a virus.
Speaker 2: Yeah, gets you to open event logs, convince you there's
Speaker 2: a problem, then trick you into installing remote access software
Speaker 2: like team Viewer so they can install malware. Hijacking trending
Speaker 2: Twitter hashtags to redirect people. That really nasty one subject
Speaker 2: about your job application.
Speaker 1: Sent in reply to real application.
Speaker 2: Exactly with malware attached. The FBI warned about one company
Speaker 2: losing one hundred and fifty thousand dollars from unauthorized wire
Speaker 2: transfers triggered this way, they adapt constantly to what's happening.
Speaker 1: The source had some big case studies too, real world examples.
Speaker 2: Yeah, the Google and Chinese hackers attack in twenty ten,
Speaker 2: super sophisticated, went on for months. The research employees on
Speaker 2: social media sent targeted messages from accounts that look like friends,
Speaker 2: got spyware installed, and the WikiLeaks stuff Bradley Manning using
Speaker 2: a CD labeled Lady Gaga to sneak out classified data,
Speaker 2: just lip synching while the data copied. Later attackers used
Speaker 2: public interest in wikiliks for phishing PDFs with malicious code,
Speaker 2: exploiting Adobe reader flaws, always writing the news.
Speaker 1: Cycle, and Facebook had that vulnerability exposed by researchers right.
Speaker 2: In twenty eleven, Egyptian researchers built a tool, the Facebook
Speaker 2: Profile Dumper. They wanted to show weaknesses, not cause harm,
Speaker 2: but the tool could automate creating fake profiles, frending the
Speaker 2: target's contacts, cloning the target's profile, and.
Speaker 1: Once a friend request was accepted, it.
Speaker 2: Could dump all the info and photos accessible through that connection.
Speaker 2: It really highlighted laws and Facebook's verification back then showed
Speaker 2: how easily. Trust networks could be infiltrated.
Speaker 1: Okay, so given all this, it feels overwhelming. How do
Speaker 1: we actually protect ourselves? It sounds like nobody is truly immune.
Speaker 2: You're right, No organization is totally immune, not even the
Speaker 2: White House. Remember that security conference test one hundred and
Speaker 2: forty calls, Almost everyone gave up info ninety percent click
Speaker 2: the badlink.
Speaker 1: So what's the first step?
Speaker 2: Learn to discern understand how these attacks work. You don't
Speaker 2: need to be an attacker, but knowing the techniques helps
Speaker 2: you spot the signs, the weird request, the too good
Speaker 2: to be true, offer the pressure tactics. It's like fire
Speaker 2: safety for your.
Speaker 1: Brain, plan your estate route mentally.
Speaker 2: Exactly, be proactive. And for organizations, raising staff awareness is
Speaker 2: absolutely critical. Build that security minded culture.
Speaker 1: How do you do that effectively?
Speaker 2: Make security training interesting? Maybe offer tips for personal security too,
Speaker 2: use eye catching posters, change them often. Maybe small rewards
Speaker 2: for good security habits, like a clean desk, policy newsletters,
Speaker 2: internet pages with clear policies and contacts, regular interactive training,
Speaker 2: not just boring lectures. And leadership has to buy in.
Speaker 1: Eithers need to walk the walk absolutely.
Speaker 2: If the bosses don't care, why should anyone else.
Speaker 1: There is that national campaign mentioned too.
Speaker 2: Yes, Stom think Connect came out of an Obama era.
Speaker 2: Push simple message right, just pause before you play, before
Speaker 2: you respond online on any device, take that moment.
Speaker 1: Ultimately, it comes down to the individual, the person at
Speaker 1: the keyboard.
Speaker 2: It really does. Securing the end user, yeah, because that
Speaker 2: person is usually the weakest link. The number one rule,
Speaker 2: never give out personal info or passwords unnecessarily. Your department
Speaker 2: shouldn't need another department's passwords. New systems need new unique credentials.
Speaker 2: And remember, legitimate banks or companies will not email or
Speaker 2: call you out of the blue asking for your log
Speaker 2: in details.
Speaker 1: And basic maintenance. Keep software updated.
Speaker 2: Such a simple thing but vital. Keep software updated all
Speaker 2: the time. Outdated stuff like old browsers or PDF readers
Speaker 2: huge security holes, even if you have firewall updates. Patch
Speaker 2: those holes. Avoid software known to be insecure. It's basic
Speaker 2: digital hygiene.
Speaker 1: And you mentioned scripts for employees, not like rigid lines,
Speaker 1: but guidelines.
Speaker 2: Yeah, outlines to help them handle tricky situations. Gives them
Speaker 2: confidence in a process Like that example, call comes in
Speaker 2: supposedly from the CEO's office demanding data. The script says,
Speaker 2: ask for callers idea in name, ask for project ID.
Speaker 2: If they don't provide it, tell them you need manage
Speaker 2: your approval via email.
Speaker 1: Then hang up empowers the employee.
Speaker 2: Exactly, puts them back in control, gives them a safe
Speaker 2: way to say no or escalate.
Speaker 1: And sometimes companies hire people to test these defenses, right a.
Speaker 2: Social engineering audit, a professional security auditor simulates at tax
Speaker 2: to test everything policies physical security people. But it's crucial
Speaker 2: to remember these auditors are the good guys. They follow rules.
Speaker 2: Their goal is to help the company improve, not get
Speaker 2: people fired.
Speaker 1: And if someone does fall for the audit, the device
Speaker 1: is clear, don't fire them.
Speaker 2: They've just had a very very powerful, very real lesson.
Speaker 2: They're probably now the most security of we're employee. You
Speaker 2: have turn it into a learning moment.
Speaker 1: This whole deep dive really hammers at home social engineering.
Speaker 1: It's not really about the tech, is it. It's about us,
Speaker 1: our human.
Speaker 2: Nature, politeness, curiosity, wanting to help ego, all the things
Speaker 2: that make us human. They just get twisted. It's the
Speaker 2: human os they're hacking, not just the computer os.
Speaker 1: And understanding these tactics, the elicitation, the pretext, the influenced techniques,
Speaker 1: It doesn't just make you safer, does it. It probably
Speaker 1: makes you a better communicator, more discerning in.
Speaker 2: General, I think so being aware of these dynamics definitely
Speaker 2: helps you navigate interactions more effectively, more safely, online and off.
Speaker 2: Knowledge is definitely power here.
Speaker 1: So as you, our listener, go about your day, think
Speaker 1: about your interactions online in person. What subtle favors have
Speaker 1: you maybe done recently? What reasons did you accept without
Speaker 1: really thinking? How can you use what we've talked about
Speaker 1: today to make sure you're the strongest link, not the
Speaker 1: weakest one, in your own secure, hardy chain