WEBVTT 1 00:00:00.880 --> 00:00:07.679 The Team House with your hopes, Jack Murphy and David Bark. 2 00:00:13.400 --> 00:00:16.640 Hey, everybody, thanks for joining us on the Team House, 3 00:00:16.800 --> 00:00:20.039 Episode one and forty seven. I'm Dave Park. This is 4 00:00:20.120 --> 00:00:23.679 Jack Murphy. Actually Jack is queuing us up behind the 5 00:00:23.719 --> 00:00:27.679 deck right now. D D couldn't be with us tonight, 6 00:00:27.719 --> 00:00:30.920 but so Jack's filling in for D and Jack, and 7 00:00:31.320 --> 00:00:33.039 we have a great guest with us tonight, a very 8 00:00:33.039 --> 00:00:40.719 special guest, Douglas Wise, former SIS six correct SIS six 9 00:00:41.399 --> 00:00:47.439 of the Central Intelligence Agency. So, Doug, the way we 10 00:00:47.560 --> 00:00:51.320 love to start these things is, you know, by learning 11 00:00:51.359 --> 00:00:54.759 how you got your superpowers? What is your origin story, 12 00:00:54.799 --> 00:00:56.719 where do you come from? How did all this happen 13 00:00:56.840 --> 00:00:57.679 in the very beginning. 14 00:00:59.600 --> 00:01:02.119 I mean, like many of your guests, the first thing is, 15 00:01:02.200 --> 00:01:04.040 let me just say it's an honor and a privilege 16 00:01:04.079 --> 00:01:07.680 to be with you and and to be able to 17 00:01:07.319 --> 00:01:11.040 to help provide a little bit of insight through my experience, 18 00:01:11.599 --> 00:01:14.680 you know, to this arcane world of you know, special 19 00:01:14.719 --> 00:01:19.159 operations and and UH and then the business of national 20 00:01:19.280 --> 00:01:23.040 tactical Intelligence. I also think it's a great thing for 21 00:01:23.079 --> 00:01:27.640 you guys to you know, provide a platform for for veterans, 22 00:01:27.760 --> 00:01:30.319 you know, to give voice to the voiceless, which I 23 00:01:30.359 --> 00:01:33.719 think is spectacularly great. And I just want to thank 24 00:01:33.879 --> 00:01:36.239 all of the people that have dialed in and and 25 00:01:36.319 --> 00:01:39.719 logged in today, you know, for supporting the program and 26 00:01:40.040 --> 00:01:42.959 for making this such a great success within the national 27 00:01:42.959 --> 00:01:45.640 security and the veteran community. So I think it's absolutely great. 28 00:01:45.879 --> 00:01:48.040 It's because of people like you, Doug, I mean, honestly 29 00:01:48.120 --> 00:01:50.159 like you. And if you make the show, not us, 30 00:01:50.200 --> 00:01:52.719 We just took a couple of du Gamoran, so we 31 00:01:52.799 --> 00:01:53.560 appreciate you. 32 00:01:54.560 --> 00:02:00.159 Well, well, I think you're you're uh, your participants are 33 00:02:00.159 --> 00:02:04.079 going to find me yammoring a lot myself, so I'll 34 00:02:04.079 --> 00:02:08.560 do my fair share of yamoring. Perfect. Yeah, So let 35 00:02:08.560 --> 00:02:12.919 me start at the end end for just a sec, 36 00:02:13.120 --> 00:02:15.759 and then I'll come back to the beginning if I could. 37 00:02:16.080 --> 00:02:18.000 My beginning is kind of unusual. I grew up on 38 00:02:18.039 --> 00:02:21.520 an homage farm. I don't think many people in the 39 00:02:21.560 --> 00:02:25.000 intelligence community started out. You know, I'll harvest and crops 40 00:02:25.000 --> 00:02:30.039 by hand in Bancaster County, Pennsylvania. You know, at the 41 00:02:30.120 --> 00:02:32.039 end of the ride, you know, I had the pleasure 42 00:02:32.759 --> 00:02:35.599 of serving in public source for fifty years. That's a 43 00:02:35.639 --> 00:02:39.439 half a century, and it was you know, not as 44 00:02:39.479 --> 00:02:42.840 I've said, and I think many of you who are 45 00:02:42.840 --> 00:02:45.800 listening to me and watching, I think you can kind 46 00:02:45.800 --> 00:02:48.280 of resonate with this that you know, I never had 47 00:02:48.280 --> 00:02:53.439 a bad day. I've had better days, right, but I've 48 00:02:53.439 --> 00:02:55.400 never had a bad day. I think the worst day 49 00:02:55.479 --> 00:02:59.199 that I've experienced was probably in December two thousand and 50 00:02:59.280 --> 00:03:02.319 nine when I was in Iraq and we had eight 51 00:03:02.360 --> 00:03:05.319 of our colleagues that were you know, murdered at CO 52 00:03:05.520 --> 00:03:08.280 space in Afghanistan, and I knew every one of them 53 00:03:08.520 --> 00:03:11.280 from the base chief on down. I knew all the 54 00:03:11.599 --> 00:03:14.520 all the officers, including the g RS guys who were 55 00:03:15.039 --> 00:03:17.520 who were wounded and fell in the line of duty. 56 00:03:17.639 --> 00:03:20.360 So you know, that was not a good day. But 57 00:03:20.400 --> 00:03:22.759 in the end, you know, I looked for the positive 58 00:03:22.879 --> 00:03:25.879 that you know, their sacrifice was not in vain because 59 00:03:25.879 --> 00:03:28.319 we took a hard look at the positive of that 60 00:03:28.919 --> 00:03:31.280 and we were a better agency and so they didn't 61 00:03:31.360 --> 00:03:35.400 die in vain. Their sacrifice actually produced probably life saving 62 00:03:35.520 --> 00:03:38.520 changes in the way we did business. But I never 63 00:03:38.560 --> 00:03:42.039 had I had a real, a real bad day. One 64 00:03:42.080 --> 00:03:44.039 of the things that's interesting is after you come out 65 00:03:44.080 --> 00:03:45.599 of the ride, and for those of you that are 66 00:03:45.639 --> 00:03:49.919 younger on this podcast and have either at the beginning 67 00:03:50.000 --> 00:03:54.479 of your national security journey or you you know, are 68 00:03:54.560 --> 00:03:57.520 contemplating you could take a look at me. This is 69 00:03:57.960 --> 00:04:00.439 on photoshop. This is what you're going to look like 70 00:04:00.479 --> 00:04:02.039 at the end of the ride. So if you want 71 00:04:02.080 --> 00:04:04.479 to if you want to look, if you want to 72 00:04:04.479 --> 00:04:07.560 look like a hard ridden mule, you know, beaten mule, 73 00:04:07.639 --> 00:04:10.879 well well then you know you may want to get 74 00:04:10.879 --> 00:04:14.439 off the train right now. But anyway, it was, it 75 00:04:14.520 --> 00:04:18.319 was great, but you know, the challenges galore throughout my 76 00:04:18.560 --> 00:04:20.839 entire career, and it didn't end when I left, as 77 00:04:20.879 --> 00:04:24.319 a matter of fact, because when I became the Deputy 78 00:04:24.360 --> 00:04:29.240 Director of DA, they rolled back my cover from day one, 79 00:04:29.600 --> 00:04:31.600 which went all the way back to nineteen eighty seven 80 00:04:31.680 --> 00:04:36.720 when I entered on duty with CIA. And if either 81 00:04:36.800 --> 00:04:38.879 you gentlemen are interested, you know, I'm more than happy 82 00:04:38.920 --> 00:04:41.680 to talk about that that process as well later. But 83 00:04:43.439 --> 00:04:45.319 you know, one of the things that when I came 84 00:04:45.319 --> 00:04:49.040 out from undercover, and and I'm able to tell people, 85 00:04:49.480 --> 00:04:53.519 you know, with even with great pride, quite frankly, and 86 00:04:54.279 --> 00:04:57.720 legitimate pride for the for the officers like you both 87 00:04:57.920 --> 00:05:01.759 who you know, I serve with, serve for who served 88 00:05:01.759 --> 00:05:04.959 for me, UH made it. You know, always a good 89 00:05:05.040 --> 00:05:10.240 day and often a better day. But you know, I 90 00:05:10.319 --> 00:05:12.680 when you come out from undercover and you can kind 91 00:05:12.720 --> 00:05:15.199 of shed and take off the jacket and you and 92 00:05:15.240 --> 00:05:18.519 you really expose your real self, you know, there's there's 93 00:05:18.560 --> 00:05:20.639 a lot of benefits to that because you can talk 94 00:05:20.680 --> 00:05:23.600 about the power and the majesty of the of what 95 00:05:23.720 --> 00:05:28.160 you experienced and and help to provide a little bit 96 00:05:28.160 --> 00:05:31.480 of insight into what those of us who are working 97 00:05:31.560 --> 00:05:35.360 outside the public eye, you know, what contributions that were 98 00:05:35.399 --> 00:05:38.000 making with the risks we're taking, the challenges we face, 99 00:05:38.959 --> 00:05:42.560 and and and how we feel when we when we 100 00:05:42.639 --> 00:05:46.040 do that, uh, sense of pride, the sense of accomplishment 101 00:05:47.079 --> 00:05:50.680 and UH. And so you know, being able to discuss 102 00:05:50.839 --> 00:05:53.519 that finally and attribute it to CIA is is a 103 00:05:53.519 --> 00:05:56.839 wonderful thing. But then what happens is usually to the 104 00:05:56.879 --> 00:06:01.199 person that you're talking to who may not know you. 105 00:06:01.240 --> 00:06:05.079 Particularly when I public speak as I do a fairmount, 106 00:06:07.160 --> 00:06:09.759 you know, you collide with the public perception of what 107 00:06:09.839 --> 00:06:13.240 a CIA officer looks like. Uh. And I think that 108 00:06:14.720 --> 00:06:17.360 you know, David, you and Jack would agree I do 109 00:06:17.439 --> 00:06:20.639 bear a striking resemblance to Daniel Craig. But I'm maybe 110 00:06:20.759 --> 00:06:24.199 maybe Matt Damon. I'm not. I don't. I don't look 111 00:06:24.199 --> 00:06:28.240 a lot like Matt Damon. But the but the perception 112 00:06:28.360 --> 00:06:32.879 of what CIA officer is, it is really framed by Hollywood. 113 00:06:33.600 --> 00:06:36.319 I do. I do a fair amount engagement with with Hollywood, 114 00:06:36.360 --> 00:06:38.040 and if you want to talk about that, we can 115 00:06:38.079 --> 00:06:41.680 talk about that as well. But I was given a 116 00:06:41.680 --> 00:06:45.199 prestigious invite to go speak at give an evening lecture 117 00:06:45.199 --> 00:06:50.000 at Chathamhouse in London on James Saint James Square. Wonderful institution. 118 00:06:50.720 --> 00:06:52.879 It is one of two think tanks that exists in 119 00:06:52.879 --> 00:06:55.319 the United Kingdom. In America, we have a lot of 120 00:06:55.360 --> 00:06:57.959 them in the United Kingdom. They have to are U, S, 121 00:06:58.040 --> 00:07:01.800 I and and Chattermouse. And Chatham House was where Chathamhouse 122 00:07:01.920 --> 00:07:04.600 Rule came from and they're the ones that started it. 123 00:07:04.680 --> 00:07:07.839 And so it was really an honor. And I had 124 00:07:07.879 --> 00:07:11.160 never been there and I had no idea what to expect. 125 00:07:11.759 --> 00:07:15.079 So I'm waiting in the wings of this huge auditorium 126 00:07:15.160 --> 00:07:21.600 insider building with my American program counter sponsor, my wife Cindy, 127 00:07:22.079 --> 00:07:25.439 you know, who was just absolutely spectacular, lay put up 128 00:07:25.439 --> 00:07:29.480 with me for decades and was a super professional in 129 00:07:29.519 --> 00:07:33.360 her own writer, as an FBI special agent, pioneer, female 130 00:07:33.759 --> 00:07:36.279 first pilot for the Bureau, female pilot for a whiles. 131 00:07:37.279 --> 00:07:39.560 I'm more proud of her than I am of myself. 132 00:07:40.759 --> 00:07:42.879 But she was in the audience because you know, I 133 00:07:42.879 --> 00:07:45.839 thought it'd be a great thing to share. And so 134 00:07:46.000 --> 00:07:48.560 the audio, quite frankly, autorium was getting full. So I 135 00:07:48.600 --> 00:07:53.480 turned to Jacob and I go, hey, Jacob, is this 136 00:07:53.519 --> 00:07:55.839 a big audience? And he looks at me. He says, 137 00:07:55.959 --> 00:08:00.560 second largest audience we've ever had here at Chathamouse, second 138 00:08:00.639 --> 00:08:04.839 second largist. I said, who, Who's who drew the biggest craft? 139 00:08:05.879 --> 00:08:09.120 And he goes, Benjamin Netanyao, he was here two weeks ago. 140 00:08:09.600 --> 00:08:12.199 And I go, well, I'm honored, but I'm not a 141 00:08:12.199 --> 00:08:17.000 Benjamin Yeo class figure. But the attractiveness for all of 142 00:08:17.040 --> 00:08:20.279 these people was the fact that I was acknowledged and 143 00:08:20.360 --> 00:08:24.000 open CI officers served in clandestine service. They marketed it 144 00:08:24.079 --> 00:08:28.879 heavily as a note for our audience. The British Secret 145 00:08:28.879 --> 00:08:33.639 Intelligence Stores have a secrecy agreement. We have sort of one, 146 00:08:33.919 --> 00:08:37.240 but they have one for life where they can't they 147 00:08:37.320 --> 00:08:42.039 can't acknowledge their association with m I six. So the 148 00:08:42.159 --> 00:08:46.679 fact that I was a spy and could acknowledge and 149 00:08:46.759 --> 00:08:50.120 could discuss by stuff, even though my topic was actually 150 00:08:50.399 --> 00:08:54.159 Russian disinformation. I think they came to see what a 151 00:08:54.200 --> 00:08:57.360 real spy looked like. So I hadn't really thought through 152 00:08:57.440 --> 00:09:01.159 what the what the collision would be from perception to reality, 153 00:09:01.159 --> 00:09:05.000 but I learned that pretty soon after the thing was over. 154 00:09:05.159 --> 00:09:07.720 So Jacob and I walk in, We sit down on 155 00:09:07.799 --> 00:09:10.679 the stage. There's a podium there. He's going to go 156 00:09:10.720 --> 00:09:13.960 introduce me. In the meantime, my wife's in the crowd 157 00:09:14.720 --> 00:09:17.440 and being an FBI special agent want to be you know, hey, 158 00:09:17.600 --> 00:09:20.720 your timeline target got to be tot is. Now this 159 00:09:20.759 --> 00:09:23.120 thing should have this thing should have be done here 160 00:09:23.200 --> 00:09:26.559 at that you know, at at seven pm. You know, 161 00:09:26.639 --> 00:09:29.360 she leans over and you know it's now seven ten, 162 00:09:29.519 --> 00:09:33.320 seven fifteen. So she leans over to ask the the 163 00:09:33.320 --> 00:09:35.960 British guy sitting next to her in the audience, and 164 00:09:36.039 --> 00:09:40.039 she goes, hey, uh, seven fifteen, it's supposed to start seven. 165 00:09:40.039 --> 00:09:43.559 When's this thing got stuck? And the guy goes, uh, man, 166 00:09:43.679 --> 00:09:45.240 I think it's going to be when that fat old 167 00:09:45.279 --> 00:09:51.519 guy introduces the c I speaker. And so when she's 168 00:09:51.559 --> 00:09:55.240 telling me that story, I go well, well, babe, didn't 169 00:09:55.240 --> 00:09:57.320 you only put him on the spot and tell him 170 00:09:57.360 --> 00:10:00.080 you were married to me? And she goes, nah, to 171 00:10:00.120 --> 00:10:02.000 apply the need to know principle, He didn't need to 172 00:10:02.000 --> 00:10:05.399 know that. So I'm under no illusion, you know that 173 00:10:05.919 --> 00:10:09.120 you know what I represent. Maybe this consonants with what 174 00:10:09.200 --> 00:10:13.559 the public expects. So again, kudos to you, gentlemen, for 175 00:10:13.639 --> 00:10:17.759 creating this platform that allows you know your guests many 176 00:10:17.799 --> 00:10:21.799 have done much more than I have along this special 177 00:10:21.840 --> 00:10:24.799 obsens Spina's journey, you know, to kind of a inform, 178 00:10:25.559 --> 00:10:30.120 dispel mythology, and to be able to maybe not inspire. 179 00:10:30.200 --> 00:10:33.519 I don't think I'll be inspirational, but maybe to you know, 180 00:10:33.600 --> 00:10:36.960 get over some obstacles and come and join the family, 181 00:10:37.000 --> 00:10:39.960 you know, put an application and be part of service 182 00:10:40.000 --> 00:10:42.840 to America and the safety and security of the American people. 183 00:10:43.279 --> 00:10:46.080 But anyway, back to you, gentlemen, where you want where 184 00:10:46.120 --> 00:10:46.720 you want to go from? 185 00:10:46.879 --> 00:10:50.840 Well, back to you, you're on an Amish farm, uh 186 00:10:51.200 --> 00:10:52.000 churn and butter. 187 00:10:52.200 --> 00:10:55.919 I suppose, oh, harvest, harvest and crops by hand, and 188 00:10:56.240 --> 00:10:59.320 that was that was nice. But you know, it's a long, 189 00:10:59.639 --> 00:11:03.639 complex journey to go from the Armish farm to northern Ohio. 190 00:11:03.720 --> 00:11:09.600 But it was my my father who actually ended up 191 00:11:09.720 --> 00:11:16.720 going Greatest Generation World War two vet uh, and you know, 192 00:11:16.879 --> 00:11:20.799 decided that, you know, he didn't want to do farm stuff, 193 00:11:20.960 --> 00:11:23.799 so he went to get an education, became an academic 194 00:11:23.840 --> 00:11:26.840 and moved the family. And so we moved to northern Ohio, 195 00:11:28.240 --> 00:11:30.879 which was kind of an interesting experience. Although Northern iiO 196 00:11:31.000 --> 00:11:33.879 was very agricultural, so that wasn't wasn't all that bad 197 00:11:33.919 --> 00:11:36.679 that you know, people didn't dress the same as we did, 198 00:11:36.759 --> 00:11:40.919 but the but it was kind of interesting. And I 199 00:11:40.960 --> 00:11:44.480 grew up there, you know, typical Midwest kid, you know, 200 00:11:44.600 --> 00:11:48.080 monocultural experience. You know, I don't believe there was a 201 00:11:48.120 --> 00:11:51.080 single Hispanic in my town. There was, I think a 202 00:11:51.080 --> 00:11:54.320 small number of African American families, and most of us 203 00:11:54.320 --> 00:11:57.159 were sliced white bread kids, you know, growing up to 204 00:11:57.600 --> 00:12:01.399 you know, four hundred kids in high school to varsity sports. 205 00:12:02.320 --> 00:12:05.639 And you know, ultimately it was John Glenn that appointed 206 00:12:05.639 --> 00:12:07.720 me to the military Academy at West Point. So I 207 00:12:07.840 --> 00:12:10.240 joined the class in nineteen seventy two. In nineteen sixty eight, 208 00:12:10.320 --> 00:12:14.080 not a not a good time in America, a very 209 00:12:14.120 --> 00:12:18.120 unpopular war, and so joining the military was not was 210 00:12:18.200 --> 00:12:22.080 not fashionable. Can I say that what John Glenn did 211 00:12:22.759 --> 00:12:27.639 was he used a screaming mechanism that doesn't exist anymore, 212 00:12:28.039 --> 00:12:30.440 and it was a civil service aptitude test and kind 213 00:12:30.440 --> 00:12:33.559 of like sat like, and all he did was use 214 00:12:33.600 --> 00:12:36.840 that to discriminate, you know, first order throw out to 215 00:12:37.000 --> 00:12:40.360 people that can't fill out the circle with their number 216 00:12:40.360 --> 00:12:43.480 two pencil, you know, throw that guy at So told 217 00:12:43.519 --> 00:12:46.720 to go to Findlay, Ohio, which is a modest sized 218 00:12:46.759 --> 00:12:49.080 town in north northern Iisle, a little south of Toledo, 219 00:12:49.600 --> 00:12:52.279 and go to the post office upper upper level ink 220 00:12:52.320 --> 00:12:54.600 well desks. You come in and they give you the 221 00:12:55.159 --> 00:12:57.960 test Booklet tell you don't open it up until we 222 00:12:58.039 --> 00:13:00.679 tell you because the time tests fill out the first page, 223 00:13:00.679 --> 00:13:03.519 and the first page all biographic, right right, So you're 224 00:13:03.559 --> 00:13:07.279 writing all that stuff down, putting your initials of your name, 225 00:13:07.679 --> 00:13:10.080 you know, down in the in the block and then 226 00:13:10.240 --> 00:13:13.679 the seminole block that found about midway was what academy 227 00:13:13.720 --> 00:13:16.440 are you are? Are you do you wish to attend? 228 00:13:17.000 --> 00:13:22.360 My dad flew in World War Two. Ultimately my younger 229 00:13:22.399 --> 00:13:27.720 brother he flew US fifteen Strike Eagles, and so I 230 00:13:27.759 --> 00:13:31.399 was raised to be an Air Force kid, you know, 231 00:13:31.480 --> 00:13:35.159 so my job was to go to the Air Force Academy. 232 00:13:35.200 --> 00:13:37.559 So it was a no brainer for me. So I marked, 233 00:13:37.600 --> 00:13:40.679 I put the darken that little circle, you know, Usafa. 234 00:13:41.559 --> 00:13:47.240 So there's a seat in front of me, and all 235 00:13:47.240 --> 00:13:50.080 of a sudden puff of air plot this guy sits 236 00:13:50.120 --> 00:13:52.080 down in front of me. His name is Kent Cartwright, 237 00:13:52.679 --> 00:13:55.320 you know Hollywood name, and Kent looked like the epitome 238 00:13:56.039 --> 00:13:59.120 of you know, weightlifting surfer, if there was such a thing. 239 00:13:59.399 --> 00:14:04.360 Broad show narrow waste captain of both the football and 240 00:14:04.399 --> 00:14:07.480 the basketball teams, had an active social life which I 241 00:14:07.519 --> 00:14:11.320 didn't have, and was an academic star and was the 242 00:14:11.480 --> 00:14:14.720 most popular guy in school, you know, homecoming king of 243 00:14:14.799 --> 00:14:17.600 the wholeworks. So I tap him on his shoulder and 244 00:14:17.639 --> 00:14:22.200 I go, hey, Kn't, what academy are you going? What 245 00:14:22.240 --> 00:14:24.519 do you academy are you going to? And he turns 246 00:14:24.519 --> 00:14:26.240 and looks at me and he goes, I'm going to 247 00:14:26.240 --> 00:14:30.279 Air Force Academy. And I go me. So I turned 248 00:14:30.320 --> 00:14:33.639 that number two pencil around and I just erace that, Usafa, 249 00:14:34.240 --> 00:14:37.039 and I just mark sense not the Coast Guard Academy, 250 00:14:37.120 --> 00:14:40.799 not doing that, Naval Academy. Now my mom knew my 251 00:14:40.840 --> 00:14:43.080 dad I wasn't eligible to go to the academy. So 252 00:14:43.320 --> 00:14:46.279 I'm going to USMA. So I have Max and said 253 00:14:46.279 --> 00:14:50.200 it the winds of fate blew cut right to the 254 00:14:50.240 --> 00:14:54.159 Air Force Academy. They threw him out after a semester. 255 00:14:54.799 --> 00:14:57.000 The other wind of fate blew me to West Point, 256 00:14:57.039 --> 00:15:00.799 and as I said, I entered and commissions second lieutenant 257 00:15:01.519 --> 00:15:04.240 in nineteen seventy two. So that's kind of my journey 258 00:15:04.840 --> 00:15:09.960 to get to that point, right, and not some not 259 00:15:10.039 --> 00:15:13.720 an outcome that I think anybody, any of my relatives 260 00:15:13.759 --> 00:15:17.639 back in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, would have anticipated. But anyway, 261 00:15:17.759 --> 00:15:19.759 that's that's that's my early story. 262 00:15:20.480 --> 00:15:23.799 Yeah, you had a pretty interesting military career. 263 00:15:23.840 --> 00:15:25.279 I mean, can you tell us a little bit about 264 00:15:25.279 --> 00:15:28.000 becoming a junior officer or some of your duty stations, 265 00:15:28.399 --> 00:15:28.919 what that was. 266 00:15:28.919 --> 00:15:32.720 Like for you. Well, yeah, that's a great question, thanks 267 00:15:32.799 --> 00:15:36.360 for asking. In nineteen seventy two, it was a bad 268 00:15:36.399 --> 00:15:38.679 time to be in the army. It was you know, 269 00:15:38.960 --> 00:15:43.759 racial violence, it was a narcotics related violence, ill discipline. 270 00:15:43.960 --> 00:15:47.960 You know, it was a draft army and it was 271 00:15:48.000 --> 00:15:51.440 a combination. There were you know, volunteers and the army 272 00:15:51.519 --> 00:15:54.879 was trying to transition, you know, read the book Prodigal Soldiers, 273 00:15:54.919 --> 00:15:59.000 and you'll really understand, you know, some of the courage 274 00:15:59.039 --> 00:16:02.039 that was necessary for the army to transform itself. And 275 00:16:02.159 --> 00:16:04.279 we had not yet gotten to the point where we 276 00:16:04.360 --> 00:16:07.120 even you know, began the first step of a twelve 277 00:16:07.200 --> 00:16:10.320 step program by acknowledging that the army was really in 278 00:16:10.440 --> 00:16:15.080 harm's way, quite frankly, de professionalized. It was ridden with 279 00:16:15.320 --> 00:16:20.480 all kinds of corruption, moral corruption, ethical corruption, tainted by 280 00:16:20.519 --> 00:16:24.679 this unpopular war, you know, underappreciated, not even under but 281 00:16:24.840 --> 00:16:28.720 not appreciated by the American people, really not understanding what 282 00:16:28.919 --> 00:16:32.399 Vietnam veterans had gone through, you know, all of the 283 00:16:32.440 --> 00:16:35.879 horrors of war, all the trauma, all the shock, you know, 284 00:16:36.080 --> 00:16:38.639 all of just the whrrors, and then to come back 285 00:16:38.720 --> 00:16:43.000 and not be welcomed back as a member of American society. 286 00:16:43.559 --> 00:16:46.039 And of course she had the whole thing of a 287 00:16:46.159 --> 00:16:49.919 deranged Vietnam veteran, right yet, that kind of mindset that 288 00:16:50.000 --> 00:16:52.279 I think a lot of people, a lot of people had, 289 00:16:53.039 --> 00:16:57.399 so entering the army at that time was a really 290 00:16:57.440 --> 00:17:00.279 difficult time. And I think one or more or of 291 00:17:00.360 --> 00:17:04.119 your guests I think had mentioned, uh, you know, pulling 292 00:17:04.200 --> 00:17:07.480 duty officer armed because you know, as a young officer, 293 00:17:07.519 --> 00:17:09.400 if you were alone, you didn't go alone into the 294 00:17:09.400 --> 00:17:12.119 barracks because that was that was the same thing as 295 00:17:12.160 --> 00:17:14.759 going being the point man, you know on a on 296 00:17:14.799 --> 00:17:17.000 a jungle patrol. You know you're going to hit a 297 00:17:17.000 --> 00:17:18.559 trip wire and you were going to be the first 298 00:17:18.599 --> 00:17:22.279 casualty of that, and uh, you know it was it 299 00:17:22.319 --> 00:17:26.400 was frightening, to say the least. But you know, here's 300 00:17:26.440 --> 00:17:31.680 how my first day, you know, in a real unit began. 301 00:17:32.200 --> 00:17:33.799 You know, I show up in the unit and I 302 00:17:33.799 --> 00:17:36.880 show up into the replacement detachment. On the walls of 303 00:17:36.920 --> 00:17:40.440 the replacement detachment these big posters and it said, if 304 00:17:40.480 --> 00:17:43.960 you're going to this outfit called this autobon number, somebody 305 00:17:43.960 --> 00:17:46.599 from the unit will figure out how to get you there. 306 00:17:46.960 --> 00:17:50.680 And so I called the unit and there was in 307 00:17:50.799 --> 00:17:53.720 the unit was the first battalion five or ninth Parish 308 00:17:53.799 --> 00:17:58.200 Airborne MECH Infantry. If there ever was a dichotomous concept 309 00:17:58.240 --> 00:18:02.119 having mechanized airborne battalion. We didn't do a lot of 310 00:18:02.200 --> 00:18:05.480 MECH because none of those M one one three's worked, 311 00:18:05.920 --> 00:18:07.839 and we never did any maintenance saw him to make 312 00:18:07.880 --> 00:18:10.640 sure they didn't work. Because we prefer to be paratroopers 313 00:18:10.720 --> 00:18:14.400 rather than the motor Pool monkeys. But uh, it was 314 00:18:14.720 --> 00:18:17.480 an elite unit at that time. If the US Army Europe, 315 00:18:17.759 --> 00:18:20.359 we were in an entire aborn morgety of the eighth Division. 316 00:18:20.559 --> 00:18:25.880 So I call, you know, uh, my sponsor expected to 317 00:18:25.880 --> 00:18:28.960 show up first. Lieutenant Morrison was his name. I don't 318 00:18:28.960 --> 00:18:31.680 know why I remember it. And all of a sudden 319 00:18:31.720 --> 00:18:34.599 I hear my name, you know, and I jump up excited, 320 00:18:35.480 --> 00:18:39.039 and I got a ton of wives, and I go, yeah, here, here, here, 321 00:18:39.319 --> 00:18:43.359 and E seven walks over and introduces himself because of 322 00:18:43.400 --> 00:18:46.960 a Sarah, welcome to Charlie Company, first time five a 323 00:18:47.039 --> 00:18:49.880 night parachute, and I said, well, thank you, So I 324 00:18:49.920 --> 00:18:52.839 appreate to welcome. Where's my sponsor? I thought he would 325 00:18:52.880 --> 00:18:54.880 come and get me, and he goes, nah, he de 326 00:18:55.079 --> 00:18:59.720 row style, he's gone, And uh, I said cheekily, not 327 00:18:59.759 --> 00:19:05.519 too seriously, but chicily. I said, well, I'm surprised the 328 00:19:05.559 --> 00:19:08.240 company commander didn't come to personally welcome me to the 329 00:19:09.400 --> 00:19:11.279 And he looks at me and he goes with tennant, 330 00:19:12.759 --> 00:19:19.160 you are the company commander. I'm your first off, so 331 00:19:20.880 --> 00:19:22.720 you can imagine you don't even know where to put 332 00:19:22.759 --> 00:19:25.319 your second Lieutenant bar you didn't even know you guys 333 00:19:25.319 --> 00:19:27.200 to go on the left or right, you know, And 334 00:19:27.240 --> 00:19:30.039 all of a sudden, now you know, everything you've ever 335 00:19:30.079 --> 00:19:33.200 been taught is now going to come into sharp focus 336 00:19:33.400 --> 00:19:38.240 or be defocused. So, without a doubt, I was the 337 00:19:38.359 --> 00:19:42.000 acting company commander for about ninety days of Charlie Company, 338 00:19:42.039 --> 00:19:45.440 and out of doubt, for me personally, it was the 339 00:19:45.480 --> 00:19:54.359 most formative, immersive, challenge laden leadership development experience that just 340 00:19:54.759 --> 00:20:01.319 really educated me on the thing to do and things 341 00:20:01.359 --> 00:20:05.160 not to do as the leader that in the Army 342 00:20:05.160 --> 00:20:10.240 of nineteen seventy two, And for me it was just 343 00:20:10.319 --> 00:20:16.200 a platinum, gold standard, absolutely spectacular leadership experience. 344 00:20:17.279 --> 00:20:20.599 How can you give us some examples. 345 00:20:20.680 --> 00:20:23.960 Yeah, I'll tell you. I'll explain what I mean by that. 346 00:20:25.400 --> 00:20:28.680 And my having said that that it was a formative 347 00:20:28.720 --> 00:20:32.839 and very invaluable leadership experience. To your question, I think 348 00:20:32.839 --> 00:20:36.680 if you asked the troopers a Charlie Company, I'm thinking 349 00:20:36.680 --> 00:20:39.240 they'd have a whole different perspective on my ninety days 350 00:20:39.240 --> 00:20:43.359 in command. I think they were sitting there happy that 351 00:20:43.440 --> 00:20:45.799 they weren't back in Vietnam. Every one of them were Vietnam. 352 00:20:45.880 --> 00:20:49.039 That's every one of them. Were draftings. You know, they 353 00:20:49.119 --> 00:20:51.519 knew that nobody could they could act anyway they wanted, 354 00:20:51.640 --> 00:20:56.400 and so they knew that there wasn't enough time for you, 355 00:20:56.400 --> 00:20:58.759 you know, you to threaten somebody what's sending you back 356 00:20:58.759 --> 00:21:01.960 to Vietnam. Have to ease it, come out? Did thirteen 357 00:21:02.000 --> 00:21:04.039 months in Vietnam come back? They had a short time 358 00:21:04.119 --> 00:21:06.279 left and then they were leaving the army for the 359 00:21:06.279 --> 00:21:10.079 most part, and so using the power majesty of a 360 00:21:10.119 --> 00:21:12.759 go bar of a second lieutenant and to be able 361 00:21:12.799 --> 00:21:16.839 to issue peremptory orders and expect them to be obeyed 362 00:21:16.960 --> 00:21:21.680 like all military academy cadets, and you know, pretend second 363 00:21:21.720 --> 00:21:24.480 lieutenants at the Infant Officer Basic Course and Ranger School 364 00:21:24.480 --> 00:21:27.960 at Bathronder School and all the other courses that I 365 00:21:28.039 --> 00:21:29.839 jumped atter school that I went that I went to 366 00:21:29.880 --> 00:21:33.480 in preparation for this assignment. You know, all of those 367 00:21:33.519 --> 00:21:38.559 skills were helpful but not essential. And so you quickly 368 00:21:38.599 --> 00:21:44.680 found out that you know, ordering, pressuring, you know, directing, 369 00:21:45.200 --> 00:21:51.200 and acting like an imperious you know, company commander was 370 00:21:51.279 --> 00:21:53.759 not going to get you to an outcome that would 371 00:21:53.880 --> 00:21:57.240 be useful for you personally and more importantly for the unit. 372 00:21:57.960 --> 00:22:01.400 Or would it benefit the soldiers early company at that point, 373 00:22:02.000 --> 00:22:04.400 And so I realized and got a chance to learn 374 00:22:05.440 --> 00:22:08.880 that sweet spot you got to be in. You've got 375 00:22:08.920 --> 00:22:11.279 to be strong, and you gotta be you got to 376 00:22:11.359 --> 00:22:16.160 show confidence, but not overconfidence. You got to make good decisions. 377 00:22:16.640 --> 00:22:19.400 You got to allow the soldiers' deaf some freedom of action, 378 00:22:19.599 --> 00:22:21.839 particularly at that point. You've got to allow the NCOs 379 00:22:21.920 --> 00:22:24.759 to really you know, you command and the NCO's lead. 380 00:22:24.799 --> 00:22:27.839 And I really learned the distinction between that as the 381 00:22:27.880 --> 00:22:31.200 Russians are finding out now, you know, when they're performing 382 00:22:31.240 --> 00:22:35.119 so poorly on combat because the NCO, we always joked 383 00:22:35.200 --> 00:22:39.079 right the backbone of the army was the nonconditioned officer corps. Well, 384 00:22:39.200 --> 00:22:42.400 guess what it turned out to be true. You know, 385 00:22:42.599 --> 00:22:45.359 Ukraine has proven that to the Russians beyond the shadow 386 00:22:45.400 --> 00:22:50.079 of death. And so knowing that, determining where that sweet spot, 387 00:22:50.400 --> 00:22:53.200 how hard you could push, you know, how often you 388 00:22:53.519 --> 00:22:55.880 had to push, but how much freedom but not too 389 00:22:55.960 --> 00:22:59.640 much freedom? You know what kind of relationship that you 390 00:22:59.680 --> 00:23:03.279 had to have with your E seven first sergeant and 391 00:23:03.319 --> 00:23:07.240 your six platoon leaders. Uh, you know, because I was 392 00:23:07.279 --> 00:23:09.279 the only officer in the company on top of that 393 00:23:09.880 --> 00:23:12.720 you know at the time. And so that was an 394 00:23:12.759 --> 00:23:19.559 interesting experience to say the least. And uh yeah, and 395 00:23:19.680 --> 00:23:22.200 the way you learn, at least the way I learned, 396 00:23:22.319 --> 00:23:24.920 it's not not the best way to learn, but the 397 00:23:24.920 --> 00:23:28.960 way I learned was by making mistakes. But you don't 398 00:23:29.000 --> 00:23:32.519 want to make big mistakes because then your soldiers will 399 00:23:32.920 --> 00:23:36.519 lose confidence in your ability. But you do have to 400 00:23:37.480 --> 00:23:39.480 you do have to get out on the edge, not 401 00:23:39.559 --> 00:23:42.440 over the tips of your skis. But you got to 402 00:23:42.480 --> 00:23:45.480 be leaning forward, and you got to be you gotta 403 00:23:45.519 --> 00:23:49.160 be you got to be comfortable in taking some risks 404 00:23:49.559 --> 00:23:55.640 when you're an inexperienced, you know, really naive commander and 405 00:23:55.720 --> 00:23:58.200 you're trying to command you know, men who are really 406 00:23:58.440 --> 00:24:03.160 combat veterans and who are you know, quite jaded and 407 00:24:03.519 --> 00:24:06.400 affected by the attitude of the American people and by 408 00:24:06.440 --> 00:24:09.880 the experience that they had traumatic in many respects, but 409 00:24:10.680 --> 00:24:13.559 you know, learning where that sweet spot is and learning 410 00:24:13.880 --> 00:24:17.319 how a good leader will be able to operate in 411 00:24:17.319 --> 00:24:20.720 that sweet spot, to be effective, to be confident, not 412 00:24:20.839 --> 00:24:25.119 over confident, not to be unaffective, to really be able 413 00:24:25.200 --> 00:24:30.119 to have your soldiers benefit for the period that you're 414 00:24:30.160 --> 00:24:33.519 in command, to have soldiers be at one level when 415 00:24:33.559 --> 00:24:36.599 you begin, and have them be at a better place 416 00:24:36.799 --> 00:24:39.960 at the end. I'm not sure I did that real well, 417 00:24:40.160 --> 00:24:43.000 but learning that I needed to do that in that 418 00:24:43.079 --> 00:24:46.640 ninety days was probably the most important thing for me. 419 00:24:47.240 --> 00:24:50.680 And I'll tell you what, the lessons I learned in 420 00:24:50.680 --> 00:24:57.559 those ninety days carried me forward and later on in 421 00:24:57.559 --> 00:25:01.519 my career. I mean, had the honor and a pleasure 422 00:25:01.599 --> 00:25:03.960 to be a company commander in the first Ranger Battalion 423 00:25:04.599 --> 00:25:07.000 when it was established. I was in the second wave 424 00:25:07.079 --> 00:25:12.960 of company commanders and then the only battalion. And you know, 425 00:25:13.319 --> 00:25:17.519 had I not really learned those lessons and applied those lessons, 426 00:25:18.200 --> 00:25:20.119 you know, I don't think the chief staff of the 427 00:25:20.240 --> 00:25:22.599 Army would selected me as one of the captains to 428 00:25:22.640 --> 00:25:25.960 come in and command then the premier unit in the 429 00:25:26.039 --> 00:25:29.960 United States Army, frankly, and I would have never I 430 00:25:29.960 --> 00:25:32.799 would have never developed into something that would have been 431 00:25:32.839 --> 00:25:36.279 even competitive for them. And then later on in my career, 432 00:25:36.319 --> 00:25:39.039 and as many of your guests have said, you know, 433 00:25:39.039 --> 00:25:41.880 it's a little awkward to talk about yourself accomplished. It's 434 00:25:41.920 --> 00:25:44.400 easy to talk about what you did. Talking about what 435 00:25:44.440 --> 00:25:47.799 you've accomplished. Kids to be a little self serving, but 436 00:25:48.400 --> 00:25:52.799 you know, I had the unexpected honor to be, you know, 437 00:25:53.440 --> 00:25:58.119 two years below the zone selectee to for and there's 438 00:25:58.160 --> 00:25:59.759 goods and bads in it. I lost a lot of 439 00:25:59.799 --> 00:26:02.440 time to learn what it's like to be a major 440 00:26:02.519 --> 00:26:05.039 in the United States Army, and that was unhelpful to me. 441 00:26:05.839 --> 00:26:08.240 But one at one point, you know, I think the 442 00:26:08.319 --> 00:26:12.359 statisticians would delia. I was one of six youngest lieutenant 443 00:26:12.359 --> 00:26:14.400 colonels in the United States Army when I made oh 444 00:26:14.400 --> 00:26:18.440 five and and so that's a good thing if your 445 00:26:18.559 --> 00:26:22.039 name is me. It's a bad thing if you want 446 00:26:22.079 --> 00:26:25.359 an lieutenant colonel that's got all the experiences that you 447 00:26:25.400 --> 00:26:29.200 want a lieutenant colonel to have when they make lieutenant colonel. Uh. 448 00:26:29.240 --> 00:26:32.240 And so for me, I found myself to be at 449 00:26:32.279 --> 00:26:35.400 a professional personal disadvantage by the time I got to five. 450 00:26:35.839 --> 00:26:38.839 Proud to be early select but really paid a huge 451 00:26:38.880 --> 00:26:43.519 price for that because I was woefully untrained and inexperienced 452 00:26:43.799 --> 00:26:48.160 to be a very good lieutenant colonel after my time 453 00:26:48.599 --> 00:26:52.880 in the in the Rangers. It was interesting because and 454 00:26:52.920 --> 00:26:56.279 I mean no disrespect to the US Army Recruiting Command 455 00:26:56.359 --> 00:27:01.119 or whatever they're calling it now, but I remember the 456 00:27:02.240 --> 00:27:05.559 team for mil person from the Hoffman Building, then the 457 00:27:05.599 --> 00:27:08.640 head of all Army Personnel, and the people from Infty 458 00:27:08.720 --> 00:27:11.240 branch or whatever. I don't remember. You know, they came 459 00:27:11.279 --> 00:27:13.640 down to Fort Stewart and they were giving us career 460 00:27:13.680 --> 00:27:15.960 advice and guidance and talking about, you know, what we've 461 00:27:15.960 --> 00:27:18.680 done and what was in the future, and you know, 462 00:27:19.000 --> 00:27:21.160 giving us an opportunity to say what we wanted, and 463 00:27:21.319 --> 00:27:23.720 they had the opportunity to totally reject all that and 464 00:27:23.759 --> 00:27:26.039 tell us what we're going to do anyway. And so, 465 00:27:26.240 --> 00:27:27.759 you know, I go down and they go, well, let's 466 00:27:27.839 --> 00:27:31.359 look at what's coming next for you, and so they 467 00:27:31.440 --> 00:27:34.519 open up the big musty book of Common Knowledge, you know, 468 00:27:34.559 --> 00:27:38.480 this big home boom, and they flipped through some parchment 469 00:27:38.599 --> 00:27:41.279 and then they go down. They finally wise, Wise, Wise, Yeah, 470 00:27:41.640 --> 00:27:43.880 there you are. Yeah, you're going to go back and 471 00:27:43.960 --> 00:27:48.200 teach at the Military kit And I said, no, sir, 472 00:27:48.279 --> 00:27:51.960 I'd rather just stay with troops, that's all right, And 473 00:27:52.039 --> 00:27:55.000 they go, okay, so you don't want to go back 474 00:27:55.039 --> 00:27:56.839 and be a member of the faculty at the Military KIP. 475 00:27:57.200 --> 00:27:59.200 I said no, I said, they want you to come back, 476 00:27:59.240 --> 00:28:02.599 and I said, I'm proud of my four years there. 477 00:28:02.920 --> 00:28:05.920 I didn't enjoy my four years there. I wasn't a 478 00:28:05.920 --> 00:28:10.720 good cadet. I was a crappy cadet. And quite frankly, 479 00:28:10.759 --> 00:28:13.960 if I never go back there again, I'll be perfectly happy. Ironically, 480 00:28:14.039 --> 00:28:15.920 my wife just encouraged me to go back to my 481 00:28:15.960 --> 00:28:19.200 fiftieth reunion. And I will tell you this, when you 482 00:28:19.240 --> 00:28:22.240 have a fiftieth reunion of any institution, there's a lot 483 00:28:22.279 --> 00:28:24.720 of old people there, you know, and I like to 484 00:28:24.759 --> 00:28:26.680 think I was one of them. There's a lot of 485 00:28:26.720 --> 00:28:28.519 old people there. A lot of guys brought their dads, 486 00:28:28.680 --> 00:28:34.359 I think, and so I said, no, I'd rather not go, 487 00:28:34.799 --> 00:28:37.079 and they go, not a problem, not a problem. We're 488 00:28:37.079 --> 00:28:40.359 flexible here. Let's see what the book the Common Knowledge 489 00:28:40.400 --> 00:28:42.440 has for you. So they go back a few pages 490 00:28:42.480 --> 00:28:45.119 and they go, oh, you're going to command a recruiting 491 00:28:45.160 --> 00:28:50.319 but diying in Detroit. And I, you know, kind of 492 00:28:50.319 --> 00:28:54.599 looked and went, hey, can we go back a few 493 00:28:54.599 --> 00:28:57.640 pages and talk about that West Point? And they go, yeah, 494 00:28:57.680 --> 00:29:01.200 we thought you'd kind of your senses stay. I ended 495 00:29:01.279 --> 00:29:04.680 up going off to graduate school and teaching and teaching 496 00:29:04.720 --> 00:29:06.880 at the Military Academy, but I only did two years there. 497 00:29:06.960 --> 00:29:09.759 So I went to troops and back to troops, and 498 00:29:11.680 --> 00:29:14.160 I had a couple of tactical assignments, and then I 499 00:29:14.279 --> 00:29:18.000 ended up at the Pentagon and deskhops for anybody that 500 00:29:18.119 --> 00:29:20.839 served in the Deputy Chief Staff for operations. I think 501 00:29:20.880 --> 00:29:23.279 it's called the G three of the arm now. And 502 00:29:23.319 --> 00:29:24.920 I was in the basement of the Pentagon where all 503 00:29:24.920 --> 00:29:29.200 the special ops guys were, And one day I got 504 00:29:29.839 --> 00:29:33.880 told that go up to the personnel office. You've got 505 00:29:33.880 --> 00:29:37.359 an RFO request for orders. You know you're going you 506 00:29:37.440 --> 00:29:39.839 got a new job. I didn't ask for a new job. 507 00:29:40.079 --> 00:29:44.000 They go, we're not interested in what you want. You 508 00:29:44.079 --> 00:29:46.640 go up get your So I go up in an RFO. 509 00:29:47.079 --> 00:29:50.359 It was pink if I recall correctly, and you know, 510 00:29:50.559 --> 00:29:52.839 it was a form that turned it out on pink paper, 511 00:29:53.440 --> 00:29:55.640 and it was at my name and date of birth 512 00:29:55.680 --> 00:29:58.039 and solid security under and all that, and then it 513 00:29:58.119 --> 00:30:02.839 said assignment day. It effective and it was like tomorrow, 514 00:30:04.039 --> 00:30:08.519 and then the to do what classified to do? Where 515 00:30:08.599 --> 00:30:10.559 classified to do this? So the whole thing was just 516 00:30:11.359 --> 00:30:13.480 useless in terms of me being able to figure it out. 517 00:30:13.680 --> 00:30:16.680 Nobody in desktops knew what was happening, and so what 518 00:30:17.200 --> 00:30:20.920 had happened is apparently CIA had asked for a military 519 00:30:20.960 --> 00:30:25.440 detail with you know, some semblance in my background, you know, 520 00:30:25.680 --> 00:30:28.359 my at my rank. And so the next thing I 521 00:30:28.440 --> 00:30:32.240 know is, you know, I'm going off to some mysterious organization. 522 00:30:32.359 --> 00:30:36.119 So I was told to call this number. So call 523 00:30:36.200 --> 00:30:39.200 this number, and a guy at the other end goes hello, 524 00:30:39.359 --> 00:30:43.839 and I go, oh, yeah, this is Colonel Wise. I 525 00:30:43.920 --> 00:30:46.880 just got a military piece of paper that told me 526 00:30:46.960 --> 00:30:48.400 that I was getting a new job, and I was 527 00:30:48.400 --> 00:30:50.160 supposed to call you, and I don't know who you are. 528 00:30:50.279 --> 00:30:54.240 And so I apologize if I'm bothering you, But maybe 529 00:30:54.240 --> 00:30:55.920 I called the wrong number. He goes, not, you called 530 00:30:55.920 --> 00:30:57.319 the right number. Here's what I want you to do. 531 00:30:58.279 --> 00:31:01.839 The intersection to three ninety five in Franconia Road. You 532 00:31:01.839 --> 00:31:05.920 know where that is. Yes, there's a hotel there. Interestingly enough, 533 00:31:06.079 --> 00:31:11.680 some years later a Russian kgb offster you know, hundred covers, 534 00:31:12.200 --> 00:31:15.079 was arrested by the FBI there meeting an American spot. 535 00:31:15.880 --> 00:31:19.000 So anyway, he says, go to that hotel, walk outside 536 00:31:19.279 --> 00:31:23.240 into Portico, have a red ball hat, have a magazine 537 00:31:23.319 --> 00:31:24.920 under your right arm. He's going to pick you up 538 00:31:24.920 --> 00:31:27.839 in a pickup truck. He's not you get in the back, 539 00:31:28.039 --> 00:31:30.000 don't talk to him. He's not going to talk to you. 540 00:31:30.680 --> 00:31:35.279 And all will be explained in two cours. So you know, 541 00:31:35.319 --> 00:31:38.920 I do the whole ball hat magazine under pickup truck 542 00:31:39.000 --> 00:31:40.759 shows up Johnny on the spot. I get in the 543 00:31:40.839 --> 00:31:44.039 back of the truck. You know, I want to be 544 00:31:44.079 --> 00:31:45.839 able to say, hey, thanks for giving me a ride. 545 00:31:45.839 --> 00:31:49.119 But you know I'm follow the rules, so you know, 546 00:31:49.920 --> 00:31:52.359 I have no idea. And then he drove me to 547 00:31:52.440 --> 00:31:57.559 CIA quarters where it became obvious to me he may 548 00:31:57.599 --> 00:32:00.319 not be the brightest bulb in the drawer. This to 549 00:32:00.359 --> 00:32:02.720 me that now I understand, you know what I'm going 550 00:32:02.799 --> 00:32:04.759 to do. Well, it turned out, you know, to be 551 00:32:04.960 --> 00:32:09.960 a a a temporary status as a detailer while all 552 00:32:10.039 --> 00:32:13.200 this excurity process and at that time was totally different 553 00:32:13.480 --> 00:32:16.400 than now we do. We have to be assessed as 554 00:32:16.400 --> 00:32:20.599 a full staff officer for CIA, uh, not just as 555 00:32:20.640 --> 00:32:24.079 a detail A go through the you know, the counterintelligence polygraph. 556 00:32:24.160 --> 00:32:27.440 We had a whole lifestyle than get abused by the poligrapher. 557 00:32:27.559 --> 00:32:30.960 And you know, someday when I pass away and I 558 00:32:31.000 --> 00:32:32.799 meet one of those guys in Hell, I'm going to 559 00:32:32.960 --> 00:32:37.039 kick his butt because you know, uh, you know, a 560 00:32:37.119 --> 00:32:41.440 number of them abused many of us. But uh I 561 00:32:41.680 --> 00:32:46.920 was asked to join the counter Terrorism Center, which was 562 00:32:47.119 --> 00:32:50.000 quite a new institution, was an innovative institution at the 563 00:32:50.000 --> 00:32:55.480 time because the director of Operations for CIA, WASH was 564 00:32:55.759 --> 00:32:59.519 organized geographically. And of course, as some of you that 565 00:32:59.599 --> 00:33:03.680 are that are older than others, you know who may 566 00:33:03.839 --> 00:33:08.079 remember terrorism in the time of hijacked airplanes, the Ntebbi 567 00:33:08.240 --> 00:33:13.559 raid and by the Israeli Defense Force and and that 568 00:33:13.680 --> 00:33:16.720 period of time. You know Steedam being you know, murdered 569 00:33:16.720 --> 00:33:20.200 and thrown out on the Tarmact, and you know Egypt there, 570 00:33:20.759 --> 00:33:23.440 you know, aircraft being hijacked to Malta. You know, all 571 00:33:23.519 --> 00:33:26.680 of this stuff, all of which was state sponsored, but 572 00:33:26.880 --> 00:33:30.839 all of which was transnational in its execution. And so 573 00:33:31.079 --> 00:33:34.319 having to deal with the issue of terrorism which knew 574 00:33:34.319 --> 00:33:39.039 no boundaries. Terrorists generally don't care about political boundaries and 575 00:33:39.039 --> 00:33:42.640 they don't care about national affiliation so much. And so 576 00:33:43.160 --> 00:33:46.480 you know, some iconic last in CIA took a big 577 00:33:46.599 --> 00:33:53.160 risk and created the counter Terrorism Center and pulled us, 578 00:33:53.559 --> 00:33:57.599 pulled people out of the geographic divisions which is what 579 00:33:57.680 --> 00:34:00.519 they were called, and put them in to the counter 580 00:34:00.599 --> 00:34:04.920 terrorism Phil Mutt for example, you see him on CNN 581 00:34:04.960 --> 00:34:07.000 all the time. He and I were branch chiefs and 582 00:34:07.359 --> 00:34:10.320 counter Terrism Center together at the same time. Mike Schuyer 583 00:34:10.800 --> 00:34:14.119 a little crazy, uh, you know, Mike Schauer was another 584 00:34:14.159 --> 00:34:17.960 branch chief you know at that time. But you know, 585 00:34:18.079 --> 00:34:20.000 I think the reason why I was there one from 586 00:34:20.039 --> 00:34:25.719 my military backgrount and to be able to, you know, 587 00:34:25.800 --> 00:34:29.320 so they didn't have to waste a real talented, real 588 00:34:29.400 --> 00:34:33.679 CIA officer in this experiment known as the counter Terrorism Center, 589 00:34:34.000 --> 00:34:38.320 which was not career enhanced. Quite frankly, you know, you, 590 00:34:38.440 --> 00:34:40.320 as a young operator, you wanted to grow up in 591 00:34:40.360 --> 00:34:43.719 an area division the feudal lord owned you, abused you, 592 00:34:43.960 --> 00:34:46.880 rode you like a rented mule. But at the same time, 593 00:34:46.920 --> 00:34:50.639 if you were worthy of his attention and investment, you know, 594 00:34:50.719 --> 00:34:53.760 your career, you know, would be guided and enabled to 595 00:34:53.880 --> 00:34:58.719 nurture by by your division chief serving and counter Terrorism 596 00:34:58.760 --> 00:35:01.599 Center wasn't going to get you that nurturing and that 597 00:35:01.760 --> 00:35:05.159 mentoring and that that developing, and so nobody wanted to 598 00:35:05.199 --> 00:35:08.519 go there. So I'm being honest. I think you know, 599 00:35:08.559 --> 00:35:10.920 they picked me for a couple of reasons, one of 600 00:35:10.960 --> 00:35:12.760 which was they didn't want to waste to perfectly go 601 00:35:12.840 --> 00:35:14.920 to CIA. 602 00:35:14.000 --> 00:35:17.840 You know, know, just real quick, because you know, for 603 00:35:18.119 --> 00:35:21.280 a lot of our younger audience, you know, if they 604 00:35:21.280 --> 00:35:24.599 know anything about the CIA, like the counter Terrorism Center, 605 00:35:24.639 --> 00:35:28.960 the CTC has been basically the star of the CIA 606 00:35:29.159 --> 00:35:32.760 since nine to eleven, and so they might not understand why, 607 00:35:33.119 --> 00:35:35.880 you know, like why it was such a risk for 608 00:35:35.960 --> 00:35:40.320 somebody to take this idea when all these other, like 609 00:35:40.360 --> 00:35:42.960 you said, reasons were so siloed, Like what was so 610 00:35:43.079 --> 00:35:47.239 groundbreaking about CTC and what were some of the naysayers 611 00:35:47.360 --> 00:35:51.239 about it? Like like what because you think now we think, oh, 612 00:35:51.239 --> 00:35:54.400 a counter terrorism center that makes sense? Why wouldn't Why 613 00:35:54.440 --> 00:35:56.519 would that be a problem? But like what were the 614 00:35:56.519 --> 00:35:59.239 problems that they ran into in the early days. 615 00:35:59.559 --> 00:36:02.679 Yeah, I'll try to answer your question in a way 616 00:36:02.760 --> 00:36:09.039 that's understandable. You know, as I said, the Directorate of 617 00:36:09.079 --> 00:36:14.119 Operations both and Washington, d C and in the field, 618 00:36:14.400 --> 00:36:18.639 and the interaction between a CIA station chief which is 619 00:36:18.679 --> 00:36:23.119 the senior CIA officer, and a foreign location and the 620 00:36:23.159 --> 00:36:28.760 headquarters component of that are all ruthlessly geographically defined. Not anymore, 621 00:36:28.960 --> 00:36:31.599 but in the context to your question, back in the day, 622 00:36:32.119 --> 00:36:34.519 when before the comet hit the Earth and killed all 623 00:36:34.559 --> 00:36:37.599 the dinosaurs. And to give you a sense of scale, 624 00:36:37.599 --> 00:36:40.639 when I joined CTC back then count of Terris and Center, 625 00:36:41.320 --> 00:36:44.119 there were ninety four of us, and that included four contractors. 626 00:36:45.400 --> 00:36:47.960 At the time that I served in CTC as a 627 00:36:48.199 --> 00:36:51.320 senior Intelligence Service officer. When I came back to be 628 00:36:51.440 --> 00:36:55.440 the assistant director of Operations, there were two two hundred 629 00:36:55.440 --> 00:36:59.719 officers in that center. To your point, and further to 630 00:36:59.760 --> 00:37:04.440 your point, if you were a traditional CIA officer and 631 00:37:04.559 --> 00:37:08.920 a traditional geographic division and you hadn't served in a 632 00:37:09.039 --> 00:37:13.239 counter terrorism capacity, that had some career impacts too. And 633 00:37:13.280 --> 00:37:18.519 the idea was to incentivize talented officers to acquire that experience, 634 00:37:18.519 --> 00:37:21.639 and we needed that talent and we needed those officers 635 00:37:21.639 --> 00:37:25.599 to contribute. My career, like many like you, gentlemen, your 636 00:37:25.599 --> 00:37:29.360 career is defined by nine to eleven. You know mine 637 00:37:29.400 --> 00:37:33.760 as well, And so back to your question. You know, 638 00:37:34.000 --> 00:37:42.159 the demarcation between authorities were sharply defined by geography. You 639 00:37:42.239 --> 00:37:46.239 had the Near East Division, you had European Division, you 640 00:37:46.280 --> 00:37:49.440 had Africa Division, you had Latin America Division, you had 641 00:37:50.039 --> 00:37:54.880 you know, Asia Division, and the Boar and the boundaries 642 00:37:54.960 --> 00:38:01.719 between those divisions bureaucratically were impermeable and I horus. Nobody 643 00:38:01.800 --> 00:38:07.000 crossed and there were no defectors generally who who were 644 00:38:07.000 --> 00:38:09.280 of any value. You know, if you were a talented 645 00:38:09.320 --> 00:38:11.320 aufstar and you decided, hey, you know what, I'd like 646 00:38:11.360 --> 00:38:15.199 to serve an Asia division, your European division would would 647 00:38:15.239 --> 00:38:17.679 say absolutely, and the shoots you in the back as 648 00:38:17.719 --> 00:38:20.400 you kind of climbed over the border. Uh, it was, 649 00:38:20.519 --> 00:38:23.440 it was really, I mean, and I used the term 650 00:38:23.519 --> 00:38:27.639 feudal lords in a way that is very accurately descriptive, 651 00:38:27.679 --> 00:38:33.360 and yes it does negative connotations. And then and so yeah, uh, 652 00:38:33.440 --> 00:38:35.880 there were some negative aspects to both the people and 653 00:38:36.000 --> 00:38:40.440 the and the organization. So when the CIA, and I 654 00:38:40.480 --> 00:38:43.719 wasn't part of the discussion obviously, you know, I came 655 00:38:43.760 --> 00:38:46.480 in after the decision had been made. So there are 656 00:38:46.559 --> 00:38:50.719 probably many people who you could get on your podcast 657 00:38:50.760 --> 00:38:53.079 who could talk to you about the early history of 658 00:38:53.079 --> 00:38:57.400 the counter terrorisms much more authoritatively incredibly than me. But 659 00:38:57.599 --> 00:39:01.559 if you look at somebody who wanted to literally shatter 660 00:39:02.400 --> 00:39:06.639 the organizational structure of the Director of Operations, somebody had 661 00:39:06.639 --> 00:39:10.039 to make that decision, and obviously that decision had to 662 00:39:10.039 --> 00:39:12.840 be made, had to be endorsed or made, you know, 663 00:39:12.960 --> 00:39:15.960 at the director's level, right, it couldn't be made down 664 00:39:16.000 --> 00:39:19.440 at the GS twelve. And so you not only had 665 00:39:19.480 --> 00:39:22.400 to create a res on debt for this new enterprise, 666 00:39:22.679 --> 00:39:25.920 you had to rationalize the value it would it would 667 00:39:26.000 --> 00:39:29.159 bring because it would create all kinds of chaos and 668 00:39:29.199 --> 00:39:33.320 disruption if for another reason, just in a personnel system, 669 00:39:33.679 --> 00:39:37.960 in the cable traffic system, because nothing existed. You know, 670 00:39:38.119 --> 00:39:42.280 this was new enterprise created out of whole cloth. And 671 00:39:42.320 --> 00:39:45.199 it's a zero sum game in CIA. So it's not 672 00:39:45.280 --> 00:39:48.880 like you could just hire ninety four additional officers to 673 00:39:48.960 --> 00:39:54.159 be professional counter terrorism officers. And in fact, the term 674 00:39:54.199 --> 00:39:57.199 of art was you were home based in the geographic division. 675 00:39:57.960 --> 00:40:01.960 There was enough resistance that senior leadership of the agency said, 676 00:40:02.679 --> 00:40:06.719 will authorized CTC to be to come into existence, but 677 00:40:06.800 --> 00:40:09.840 it won't have the authority to home based officers. They 678 00:40:09.840 --> 00:40:14.679 didn't want officers to permanently homestead like you could in 679 00:40:14.719 --> 00:40:19.519 the geographic divisions. So I can only infer from what 680 00:40:19.639 --> 00:40:25.079 I know of the rigidity structure remarkable flexibility operation. 681 00:40:25.559 --> 00:40:27.639 Let me do I think Rick. 682 00:40:28.119 --> 00:40:30.880 When we interviewed Rick Prato, either either in his interview 683 00:40:30.960 --> 00:40:33.360 or in his book, he's talking about the really unique 684 00:40:33.360 --> 00:40:36.400 thing about CTC at that time being that they could 685 00:40:37.239 --> 00:40:40.159 read the reports the cable traffic coming from any division 686 00:40:40.639 --> 00:40:41.679 from everybody. 687 00:40:41.760 --> 00:40:45.039 Yeah, you're right, and thanks for mentioning that, because I 688 00:40:45.079 --> 00:40:47.559 was going to talk about, you know, one of the 689 00:40:47.639 --> 00:40:50.840 some of the challenges that the creation of CTC and 690 00:40:50.920 --> 00:40:53.599 some of the value. Reck and I were in CTC 691 00:40:53.719 --> 00:40:56.159 at the same time. So I'm a big fan of 692 00:40:56.280 --> 00:41:00.760 Rick Prodo. He really he made a huge cun let me, 693 00:41:00.880 --> 00:41:04.440 as you all know already, I haven't written a book yet, 694 00:41:04.440 --> 00:41:06.840 and I don't think so because you know, I don't 695 00:41:06.840 --> 00:41:08.920 have a big family, so I wouldn't sell very many. 696 00:41:09.119 --> 00:41:13.679 But the but you can imagine a terrorist, you know, 697 00:41:13.719 --> 00:41:16.719 a terrorist originates, you know, even if state sponsored terrorists 698 00:41:17.000 --> 00:41:20.440 originates in one country, transit to another country, ends up 699 00:41:20.480 --> 00:41:24.519 in a third country, links up with another dude, then 700 00:41:24.679 --> 00:41:27.800 travels to another part of the globe, gets all gunned 701 00:41:27.880 --> 00:41:29.960 up and equipped up. You know, it does this all 702 00:41:30.119 --> 00:41:33.599 pre mission rehearsals and then do this. So you can 703 00:41:33.639 --> 00:41:40.599 imagine if there is ruthless guarding of operational turf created 704 00:41:40.679 --> 00:41:44.840 by the structure of the do you'd have to coordinate 705 00:41:45.599 --> 00:41:49.639 and who would do the coordination whose terrorist is that right? 706 00:41:49.679 --> 00:41:53.320 You know, is that terrorist the wholly owned property of 707 00:41:53.360 --> 00:41:56.719 where that dude originated, where he transited, or where he's 708 00:41:56.719 --> 00:42:00.880 going to conduct the operation or everybody. So who's in charge? 709 00:42:00.920 --> 00:42:04.760 Everybody's in charge, but nobody's in charge. So somebody had 710 00:42:04.760 --> 00:42:07.599 the guts and the wisdom to create as they looked 711 00:42:07.599 --> 00:42:11.599 at this emerging terrorist threat as they got more violent 712 00:42:11.639 --> 00:42:15.800 and more large scale, to create this pioneering institution called 713 00:42:15.800 --> 00:42:20.480 the counter Terrorism Center, which ultimately became instantiated and was 714 00:42:20.719 --> 00:42:24.480 truly part of the magic of CIA in post nine 715 00:42:24.480 --> 00:42:27.199 to eleven. Time for it. And so once you had 716 00:42:27.239 --> 00:42:30.679 CIA to your point able to see all of the 717 00:42:30.719 --> 00:42:34.159 information flow from all the area divisions, none of the 718 00:42:34.199 --> 00:42:38.440 other area division terrorists could originate in any division. All 719 00:42:38.480 --> 00:42:42.320 that traffic for counter intelligence reasons was need to know 720 00:42:42.559 --> 00:42:45.679 for any division, wasn't need to know for AF division. 721 00:42:45.719 --> 00:42:49.360 So how do you break that compartmentation barrier in a 722 00:42:49.480 --> 00:42:54.199 timely enough fashion to actually mount an operation counter TERRORSM 723 00:42:54.280 --> 00:42:57.920 operation to interdict and maybe remove the guy from the battlefield. 724 00:42:58.719 --> 00:43:02.559 And so you know, we we had an optic sitting 725 00:43:02.599 --> 00:43:08.639 in seat TOC that no other division had in the agency. 726 00:43:09.320 --> 00:43:13.039 And so we proved our worth every day. I'm not 727 00:43:13.079 --> 00:43:16.800 saying I did. I'm saying that the officers who pioneered 728 00:43:16.800 --> 00:43:21.280 that center, you know, proved their worth every day in 729 00:43:21.320 --> 00:43:25.400 providing safety and security to Americans by this emerging threat. 730 00:43:25.840 --> 00:43:28.559 My job was very narrowly defined. I was a renditioned guy, 731 00:43:29.239 --> 00:43:32.280 and so my job was to help start the in 732 00:43:32.320 --> 00:43:38.159 perpetuate the nascent rendition program. And arguably, you know, we 733 00:43:38.199 --> 00:43:43.239 had a modicum the success. We captured Kanzi, the guy 734 00:43:43.239 --> 00:43:45.719 that killed our officers, We captured Ramsey YUSAF from a 735 00:43:45.800 --> 00:43:48.159 number of others, and we kind of learned and those 736 00:43:48.159 --> 00:43:53.599 were all weren't based renditions and so are also one 737 00:43:53.599 --> 00:43:58.119 of the by products of counter Terrorism Center was, you know, 738 00:43:58.320 --> 00:44:03.119 we were able to create partnerships with institutions across the 739 00:44:03.199 --> 00:44:07.719 US government that none of the area divisions wasn't because 740 00:44:07.800 --> 00:44:10.559 they didn't want to, they had no need to. With 741 00:44:10.880 --> 00:44:15.239 federal law enforcement, right, who's our natural partner, Federal Feer 742 00:44:15.320 --> 00:44:20.000 of Investigation, right, Federal law enforcement, Customs and Border Patrol 743 00:44:20.360 --> 00:44:24.280 you know now known ice. You know, yet all of 744 00:44:24.320 --> 00:44:29.800 these partnerships because of course, in the beginning days, we 745 00:44:29.920 --> 00:44:33.840 didn't have you know, non warranted operations directed to remove 746 00:44:33.960 --> 00:44:37.159 Terrace from the battlefield. We didn't have lethal authority except 747 00:44:37.159 --> 00:44:42.159 for personal protection when we're out on operations, and so 748 00:44:42.360 --> 00:44:44.719 it was warrant based, and so we had to have 749 00:44:45.320 --> 00:44:48.599 not only we would in the parlance of standard crystal, 750 00:44:49.159 --> 00:44:53.920 we would find and fix and then partnering with the FBI, 751 00:44:54.440 --> 00:44:57.760 they we would together do the finishing. But the front 752 00:44:57.760 --> 00:45:02.159 face of that finishing was very naturally and very appropriate 753 00:45:02.400 --> 00:45:06.679 preserve the judicial process because all of these guys, we 754 00:45:06.760 --> 00:45:10.400 brought back many minor terrorists. If there is such a 755 00:45:10.440 --> 00:45:15.079 thing to Rom's the use of class terrorists. You know, 756 00:45:15.400 --> 00:45:18.880 the Bohka operation, you're going to drop eight United Airlines 757 00:45:19.119 --> 00:45:21.719 out of the sky, you know in Asia, you know 758 00:45:21.840 --> 00:45:25.199 glad we took him off the battlefield and so our 759 00:45:25.199 --> 00:45:26.159 team got him. 760 00:45:26.239 --> 00:45:28.760 And it still happens today, right, But you don't see 761 00:45:28.760 --> 00:45:30.119 the CIA fingerprints on it. 762 00:45:30.159 --> 00:45:34.000 A lot of times you don't and that is very 763 00:45:34.039 --> 00:45:37.920 natural and very necessary, and because you know, our colleagues 764 00:45:38.199 --> 00:45:41.559 are you know, not acknowledged, and so they can't be 765 00:45:41.639 --> 00:45:46.920 in the front face of even major successes. Obviously, CIA 766 00:45:47.079 --> 00:45:51.639 IS has become more widely known for in the counter 767 00:45:51.719 --> 00:45:56.039 terrorism business because of their roles not only in Afghanistan, 768 00:45:56.079 --> 00:45:59.960 but in Iraq and in other places in the world. 769 00:46:00.239 --> 00:46:03.880 Quite frankly, you know, every station and base in the world. 770 00:46:04.239 --> 00:46:07.239 You know, I had a counter terrorism responsibility, and we 771 00:46:07.320 --> 00:46:11.079 understood that that was the existential threat to America. You know, 772 00:46:13.079 --> 00:46:15.559 Eastern Europe was still coming out of the disintegration and 773 00:46:15.639 --> 00:46:20.159 the Soviet Soviet Union, China was still you know, had 774 00:46:20.519 --> 00:46:23.480 you know, come on to the world stage, and North 775 00:46:23.559 --> 00:46:29.960 Korea was being its petulant teenager pubescent in the geopolitical terms, 776 00:46:30.079 --> 00:46:34.000 you know, you know, immature, you know, infantile behavior, but 777 00:46:34.039 --> 00:46:38.159 which was an irritation but not a not an existential issue, 778 00:46:38.679 --> 00:46:42.159 you know, And so it was terrorism that became the 779 00:46:42.159 --> 00:46:47.719 threat to Americans, particularly when America's was still as you know, 780 00:46:47.800 --> 00:46:51.159 global power with big embassies, and we had very active 781 00:46:51.199 --> 00:46:55.119 foreign policy, and we were very much at risk. And 782 00:46:55.159 --> 00:46:58.840 so having officers like many of us on this podcast, 783 00:46:59.440 --> 00:47:02.519 you know, to be part of that that process was 784 00:47:02.519 --> 00:47:06.320 was key and essential for American security and a huge 785 00:47:06.360 --> 00:47:10.239 part of American foreign policy and national security policy. As 786 00:47:10.280 --> 00:47:10.719 I think you. 787 00:47:10.679 --> 00:47:13.880 All know, the last what was it like five years 788 00:47:13.880 --> 00:47:17.039 of your military career, you were a liaison with the agency, 789 00:47:17.039 --> 00:47:18.159 with CTC. 790 00:47:19.639 --> 00:47:21.239 You spoke, You spoke a little bit about some of 791 00:47:21.239 --> 00:47:22.440 the things that you were evolved in. 792 00:47:22.599 --> 00:47:24.880 What was that like for you as I guess your 793 00:47:24.920 --> 00:47:28.800 career evolved and maybe your thoughts and perceptions evolved about 794 00:47:28.800 --> 00:47:29.519 the agency? 795 00:47:30.920 --> 00:47:31.239 What what? 796 00:47:31.239 --> 00:47:33.000 What was? What were some of your big takeaways from 797 00:47:33.000 --> 00:47:33.960 those five years? 798 00:47:34.639 --> 00:47:37.440 Well, the big takeaway for my five years is actually 799 00:47:37.559 --> 00:47:42.519 the magnitude of anti military attitudes inside c I A. 800 00:47:43.519 --> 00:47:46.199 And some of that was because you had, you know, 801 00:47:47.639 --> 00:47:51.159 young CIA officers with a modicum of military experience that 802 00:47:52.039 --> 00:47:54.679 you know, it was quite unpleasant for them, and so 803 00:47:54.800 --> 00:47:57.079 it was an opportunity for them to action that in 804 00:47:57.119 --> 00:48:00.679 some degree. Some of that, some of that minatory and 805 00:48:02.000 --> 00:48:05.519 negative attitude was out of ignorance and out of basing 806 00:48:05.599 --> 00:48:10.320 on tribal lore and and and and mythology that had 807 00:48:10.360 --> 00:48:14.440 no basis in fact. Uh, some of that was by 808 00:48:14.599 --> 00:48:17.719 you know yet you know guys that just now they 809 00:48:17.719 --> 00:48:21.599 could call General's bob, you know, as opposed to general right. 810 00:48:21.679 --> 00:48:26.400 And so I found I concealed my military affiliation in 811 00:48:26.480 --> 00:48:29.079 my time in the counter terraces. You know, I grew 812 00:48:29.119 --> 00:48:31.480 my hair bout the same length I have it now, 813 00:48:33.440 --> 00:48:35.760 and which was quite awkward when I went to retire 814 00:48:35.760 --> 00:48:37.559 from the army in nineteen ninety two, I had to 815 00:48:37.679 --> 00:48:40.480 get aircut nor to process out. You know, the bastards 816 00:48:40.519 --> 00:48:43.360 made me cut my hair. If you talk to anybody 817 00:48:43.480 --> 00:48:45.239 knew me back then, they go. We always thought he 818 00:48:45.320 --> 00:48:47.199 was an it guy, you know, because he had that 819 00:48:47.320 --> 00:48:53.400 long hair, and but I found the anti military attitude 820 00:48:54.159 --> 00:48:59.000 there was was was mystifying to me. The longer I 821 00:48:59.039 --> 00:49:01.000 stayed there, the more I am understood that it wasn't 822 00:49:01.039 --> 00:49:05.000 out of evil, it was out of really not understanding 823 00:49:05.760 --> 00:49:08.320 what the power of majesty that comes from the intersection 824 00:49:08.480 --> 00:49:11.679 of the military and CIA, which we learned and we 825 00:49:11.719 --> 00:49:13.639 can talk about that, you know, we learned in other 826 00:49:13.679 --> 00:49:19.400 battlefields and other places antecedent or Afghan experience. But I had, 827 00:49:20.159 --> 00:49:24.599 you know, my first leaderships as a real CIA now 828 00:49:24.639 --> 00:49:26.760 I had led as a branch chief. I had the 829 00:49:26.840 --> 00:49:31.880 rendition branch chief, and then rendition program was taken to 830 00:49:31.960 --> 00:49:35.880 a fine art by generations way beyond me, you know, 831 00:49:36.000 --> 00:49:40.400 to scale and professionalism far beyond what I and my 832 00:49:40.440 --> 00:49:43.519 team would have ever envisioned. And it was also across 833 00:49:43.559 --> 00:49:47.320 discipline team by the way, and interagency team. So it 834 00:49:47.400 --> 00:49:51.000 was kind of unique that we had, and nobody. And 835 00:49:51.039 --> 00:49:53.400 a nice thing about my job is nobody would say no, 836 00:49:54.119 --> 00:49:57.719 you know, because really you're not interested in saving American lives. 837 00:49:58.119 --> 00:49:59.880 You can say no and say maybe you don't want 838 00:49:59.880 --> 00:50:02.480 that guy to be a spy because we can't afford him, 839 00:50:02.559 --> 00:50:05.199 but oh really, you put a price tag on American lives, 840 00:50:05.440 --> 00:50:09.079 sir ma'am, and you immediately got a U. Well, well, 841 00:50:09.079 --> 00:50:11.880 I mean that's essentially by saying no to my budget request. 842 00:50:12.400 --> 00:50:15.519 You know what a sect you're doing, right, You're putting 843 00:50:16.400 --> 00:50:19.639 so and so. I had Actually, you know, I'm being 844 00:50:19.639 --> 00:50:23.400 a little facetious, but nobody said no, you know to 845 00:50:23.440 --> 00:50:25.079 those of us who are doing God's work in the 846 00:50:25.119 --> 00:50:29.239 counter terrorisms. Tenter, but the military editor is interested. So 847 00:50:29.280 --> 00:50:32.440 I retired in nineteen ninety two, took an appointment as 848 00:50:32.800 --> 00:50:35.880 had to go through the old security process again, matriculated 849 00:50:35.880 --> 00:50:39.760 as a full CI staff officer, got an appointment, and 850 00:50:39.800 --> 00:50:44.159 then I ended up advocating for my first official CIA 851 00:50:44.239 --> 00:50:49.840 leadership job, and I found it interesting. I interviewed with 852 00:50:49.880 --> 00:50:53.199 an SIS three, so he had an opening for a 853 00:50:53.199 --> 00:50:56.280 branch chief, and I figured, what a great place for 854 00:50:56.400 --> 00:50:59.960 me to begin, because I just was a branch chief 855 00:51:00.360 --> 00:51:05.159 of a large branch. Quite frankly, okay, and so I'm 856 00:51:05.159 --> 00:51:09.719 having this discussion and he goes. He goes, you were 857 00:51:09.760 --> 00:51:12.320 a military officer when you for the last five years, 858 00:51:12.480 --> 00:51:16.079 I understand. I go, yes. He goes, so when you 859 00:51:16.239 --> 00:51:20.280 led your branch, you were using military leadership and I go, 860 00:51:21.960 --> 00:51:24.360 no response, and he goes, what I need you to 861 00:51:24.360 --> 00:51:29.239 do is use CIA leadership. And I go, sir, I'll 862 00:51:29.280 --> 00:51:35.320 due respect. Leadership is leadership. There's different aspects of leadership 863 00:51:35.360 --> 00:51:42.280 that are environmentally you know, appropriate, but fundamentally defining the mission, 864 00:51:43.039 --> 00:51:46.199 identifying the task or accomplish the mission. Build a team, 865 00:51:47.000 --> 00:51:51.239 you know, resource them, help them understand opportunities, help them 866 00:51:51.320 --> 00:51:54.920 understand what obstacles are, provide feedback. I said, sir, that 867 00:51:54.920 --> 00:51:58.519 that's not the sole purview of the military or CIA. 868 00:51:58.920 --> 00:52:01.920 That's called leadership. One O one. So we had these molt. 869 00:52:02.039 --> 00:52:05.320 I had a two hour conversation with this guy, and 870 00:52:05.360 --> 00:52:08.280 he said he was very gracious, and he was very patient, 871 00:52:08.320 --> 00:52:13.760 and he's very understanding of my plotting discussion academic though 872 00:52:13.760 --> 00:52:17.880 it may have been about the issue of leadership. Uh. 873 00:52:17.960 --> 00:52:20.679 And finally at the end he said that he said, hey, look, Doug, 874 00:52:21.079 --> 00:52:23.480 I really got to admire you. You gave it your best shot, 875 00:52:24.239 --> 00:52:26.360 he said. But you know, and I understand what she said. 876 00:52:26.800 --> 00:52:29.000 A lot of it makes sense, he says, But in 877 00:52:29.039 --> 00:52:31.880 the end, I need somebody that's led in CIA before. 878 00:52:32.800 --> 00:52:36.480 I'm thinking back of my mind. You know, well, if 879 00:52:37.119 --> 00:52:39.679 leading in CIA for the first time requires you to 880 00:52:39.760 --> 00:52:43.239 have led before, then that wasn't the first time. So 881 00:52:43.320 --> 00:52:45.559 how are you going to ever lead if you got 882 00:52:45.599 --> 00:52:48.280 to have led before you? So I couldn't figure out 883 00:52:48.360 --> 00:52:51.760 the logic that he was applying, right, And so I 884 00:52:51.840 --> 00:52:55.039 finally I said, sir, look, you've been very gracious for 885 00:52:55.119 --> 00:52:58.519 your time. I've taken way more time than I had 886 00:52:58.519 --> 00:53:01.360 asked for. You know, you listen to me. You gave 887 00:53:01.400 --> 00:53:04.960 me my opportunity to speak, and I respect your decision 888 00:53:05.159 --> 00:53:08.360 and I'll just go away. And he goes, well, thank 889 00:53:08.360 --> 00:53:10.760 you very much. I appreciate it, says I did learn something, 890 00:53:11.039 --> 00:53:13.000 and I said, I'm glad, and I start to go, 891 00:53:13.079 --> 00:53:15.880 and I go, but sir, can I can I just 892 00:53:15.920 --> 00:53:18.920 make one more point? And he goes, yeah, what's your 893 00:53:18.960 --> 00:53:21.719 final point? I goes, there's only one officer in this branch, 894 00:53:22.320 --> 00:53:26.320 and I'm and that's the branch chief. It's a branch 895 00:53:26.400 --> 00:53:31.039 of one officer, it'd be me working for me. I said, 896 00:53:31.079 --> 00:53:38.719 take the risk, and he sits back and he goes, well, yeah, 897 00:53:38.760 --> 00:53:43.280 that's a good point. So anyway, the point of my 898 00:53:43.320 --> 00:53:46.679 long story is this is all predicated in this somehow, 899 00:53:47.719 --> 00:53:50.840 you know, somehow the perception of what the military was right. 900 00:53:51.079 --> 00:53:56.639 And as you all know, if there is a critical 901 00:53:56.920 --> 00:54:03.239 not just necessary, but it's strategic partner for CIA among 902 00:54:03.280 --> 00:54:07.480 the many strategic partnerships, certainly within the IC, but outside 903 00:54:07.559 --> 00:54:11.079 the IC, it's certainly CIA regardless to enough to be 904 00:54:11.239 --> 00:54:17.119 s sad in my day. You know, paramills the strategic 905 00:54:17.159 --> 00:54:20.000 partnership is with the special operations community of the United 906 00:54:20.039 --> 00:54:24.519 States military. And if America has a machine that is 907 00:54:24.719 --> 00:54:28.840 paramount and pre eminent in the world of clandestine operations, 908 00:54:29.159 --> 00:54:34.519 it's because of the intimacy between those two communities. Extraordinary, extraordinary. 909 00:54:35.599 --> 00:54:38.000 We could not have done what we did without our 910 00:54:38.119 --> 00:54:41.840 special operations partners, whether they were whites offt or blacksof 911 00:54:43.480 --> 00:54:46.920 And I'm convinced that our soft partners, if they were 912 00:54:46.920 --> 00:54:49.960 on this. I mean, don't get me wrong. CIA is 913 00:54:50.000 --> 00:54:52.360 an acquired taste. I get it. I get it. We're 914 00:54:52.360 --> 00:54:55.880 an acquired taste we're kind of like Caviat, very expensive 915 00:54:56.559 --> 00:54:59.920 and we're not very flavorful, but you know, we are neutral. 916 00:55:01.079 --> 00:55:03.519 But the fact of the matter is that the partnership 917 00:55:03.559 --> 00:55:07.480 between our two communities was what has brought us success 918 00:55:08.480 --> 00:55:12.239 in the counter terrorism domain. Yes, it's from the skills, 919 00:55:12.360 --> 00:55:15.159 the talent, the experience and the application, the leveraging of that, 920 00:55:15.559 --> 00:55:17.800 and the dedication and commitment of the women and men 921 00:55:17.840 --> 00:55:21.119 who have given up years of their lots to become 922 00:55:21.199 --> 00:55:24.239 experts on terrorism and how to defeat it, how to 923 00:55:24.280 --> 00:55:27.199 mitigate it. Yes, I get that in both communities. But 924 00:55:27.280 --> 00:55:30.960 the reality is that's that intersection, that power that is 925 00:55:31.159 --> 00:55:34.039 more powerful than the arithmetic some of our two halves. 926 00:55:34.760 --> 00:55:39.239 And you know it is I can say now, and 927 00:55:39.280 --> 00:55:43.320 I know you degree and all of our colleagues who 928 00:55:43.360 --> 00:55:47.079 on this podcast who have had similar experiences would agree. 929 00:55:47.360 --> 00:55:51.440 You know, the collaboration and the cooperation between the two 930 00:55:51.440 --> 00:55:56.800 communities was not only mission success, but it was also 931 00:55:56.960 --> 00:56:01.960 life saving at the same time. And I can say 932 00:56:02.000 --> 00:56:05.119 that today, but back in the early days, it was 933 00:56:05.199 --> 00:56:08.280 really hard. It was really hard, and it wasn't all 934 00:56:08.880 --> 00:56:13.159 anti CIA attitude out of the Special Operations community, who 935 00:56:13.199 --> 00:56:15.400 in and of itself as a reason to be prideful 936 00:56:15.440 --> 00:56:18.679 and self sufficient, you know, and and highly skilled and 937 00:56:18.760 --> 00:56:22.760 highly committed and courageous, very capable. But you know, we 938 00:56:23.039 --> 00:56:25.440 learned an awful lot of lessons, and some of them 939 00:56:25.480 --> 00:56:29.360 hard won by blood and sand, by learning how to 940 00:56:29.400 --> 00:56:33.000 work together. But you know, we began with baby steps, 941 00:56:33.039 --> 00:56:35.320 and those baby steps eventually got us to be a 942 00:56:36.000 --> 00:56:39.320 you know, one hundred meters sprinters, world class printers. 943 00:56:40.199 --> 00:56:43.760 Working to that relationship is now formalized under its a 944 00:56:43.880 --> 00:56:47.719 defense sensitive support system, right that isn't that the bureaucratic 945 00:56:47.760 --> 00:56:50.880 mechanism that allows the two organizations to support one. 946 00:56:51.320 --> 00:56:55.119 It allowed essentially for our audience, it allowed it's a 947 00:56:55.199 --> 00:57:02.599 it's a highly classified process to essentially share capability, you know, 948 00:57:02.800 --> 00:57:06.400 to it's a very it's bureaucratic, but it's very crisp, 949 00:57:06.639 --> 00:57:11.880 and it really allows essentially, you know, special operations Community 950 00:57:11.920 --> 00:57:14.400 to go to Special Operations Amazon and order up some 951 00:57:14.519 --> 00:57:17.719 CIA stuff. It allows us to go to CIA Amazon 952 00:57:17.800 --> 00:57:20.519 and order up some soft stuff you know, when we needed. 953 00:57:20.719 --> 00:57:24.679 And blending of authorities and blending of funding and yeah, 954 00:57:24.840 --> 00:57:26.119 consistent with American. 955 00:57:27.280 --> 00:57:31.480 I'll give a very public example for the audience out there. 956 00:57:31.519 --> 00:57:35.119 The big laden rate is alleged to be or not alleged. 957 00:57:35.159 --> 00:57:37.039 I think Obama said so in his memoir. That was 958 00:57:37.079 --> 00:57:39.800 a CIA operation executed by Jaysack. 959 00:57:40.760 --> 00:57:43.840 Yeah, and we actually did something similar to that when 960 00:57:43.880 --> 00:57:46.199 I was a Chief of Station in Iraq. It certainly 961 00:57:46.280 --> 00:57:49.760 wasn't of the import by any means, but we did 962 00:57:49.880 --> 00:57:54.800 test this process where under my authority we did something 963 00:57:54.840 --> 00:57:59.760 in a sovereign nation, non non allied nation that that's 964 00:58:00.000 --> 00:58:02.880 our nation was unwilling to do at our request. So 965 00:58:03.119 --> 00:58:08.760 under our authority, you know, we positioned our special operations 966 00:58:08.800 --> 00:58:12.360 colleagues to go do something. Uh. And so, you know, 967 00:58:12.480 --> 00:58:16.440 learning how to work together in that very unique way 968 00:58:16.800 --> 00:58:22.280 right through the defense Sensitive Support system is was you 969 00:58:22.320 --> 00:58:25.639 know again this was all pioneering, right, Yeah, we were 970 00:58:25.639 --> 00:58:28.639 all we were all pioneers. You know, there's no there 971 00:58:28.719 --> 00:58:31.280 was no book, you know, you go chapter nine how 972 00:58:31.280 --> 00:58:33.800 to work with Jason there there was no such a thing. 973 00:58:36.199 --> 00:58:38.679 So ahe no, I'm sorry, but you know you could 974 00:58:38.679 --> 00:58:41.840 you talk about this with like the ct like CTC 975 00:58:42.519 --> 00:58:45.039 sort of the sniff test that went on between the 976 00:58:45.039 --> 00:58:48.159 CIA and the military, you know initially because there was 977 00:58:48.199 --> 00:58:51.079 distrust on both sides. Was it similar? I mean, did 978 00:58:51.119 --> 00:58:54.199 you have that same experience with the FBI with the 979 00:58:54.239 --> 00:58:56.880 rendition program when you needed there like did did they 980 00:58:56.880 --> 00:58:58.920 look at you like you guys are all assassins and 981 00:58:58.960 --> 00:59:01.159 you're looking at them like you all sticks up your asses? 982 00:59:02.559 --> 00:59:05.559 Now it's a good question, you know. We're there similar 983 00:59:05.639 --> 00:59:09.119 challenges with other strategic partners in the early days, and 984 00:59:09.400 --> 00:59:12.039 quite frankly, my my experience was now with with with 985 00:59:12.079 --> 00:59:14.280 the FBI, because the lanes and the road were quite clear. 986 00:59:14.800 --> 00:59:17.159 We were the find We were the find and fixed guys, 987 00:59:17.280 --> 00:59:20.119 and the FBI were the finished guys. Uh. Yeah, we 988 00:59:20.119 --> 00:59:23.320 were part of the finishing process because we had presence overseas, 989 00:59:23.559 --> 00:59:26.920 we could deploy overseas. We had we had we had, 990 00:59:27.800 --> 00:59:30.639 we had point A to point B capabilities that the 991 00:59:30.719 --> 00:59:32.599 f b I didn't possess. This is before they were 992 00:59:32.639 --> 00:59:35.920 legal legal attaches and every embassy in the world. And 993 00:59:35.960 --> 00:59:39.480 so the f b I was pioneering and having extra 994 00:59:39.599 --> 00:59:43.440 territorial squads and in the FBI and and getting involved 995 00:59:43.480 --> 00:59:47.239 in in mitigating the criminal and terrorst threat before it 996 00:59:47.360 --> 00:59:52.039 got to inside the United States was pioneering for the FBI. 997 00:59:52.760 --> 00:59:59.199 I didn't find as much, uh much attitudeinal collision between 998 00:59:59.719 --> 01:00:02.440 count or terrorism center. Others may have a different view. 999 01:00:02.760 --> 01:00:07.239 So I was in a rendition business. The agents we 1000 01:00:07.320 --> 01:00:10.519 worked with were just extraordinary. 1001 01:00:10.639 --> 01:00:14.039 So your marriage then was not one of political necessity 1002 01:00:14.239 --> 01:00:15.960 to bring two kingdoms together. 1003 01:00:17.599 --> 01:00:22.639 We both realized that, you know, that they can't do 1004 01:00:22.719 --> 01:00:26.039 what needs to be done by themselves. And we certainly 1005 01:00:26.119 --> 01:00:31.960 realized that, you know, we can't acquire evidence, acquire you know, 1006 01:00:32.199 --> 01:00:38.760 transport fugitives back to federal custody and mount a prosecution. 1007 01:00:38.880 --> 01:00:43.519 That that's nobody wants CIA to do. Law enforcement. Constitution 1008 01:00:44.039 --> 01:00:47.079 doesn't like that, right, you know, so stick to your lanes. 1009 01:00:47.320 --> 01:00:50.360 We were able to do that. The friction comes in 1010 01:00:51.079 --> 01:00:55.400 generally when when you have overlapping capabilities and overlapping authorities, 1011 01:00:55.880 --> 01:00:58.559 and then you get into the you know, I won't 1012 01:00:58.599 --> 01:01:00.440 do it on the podcast, but I can show you 1013 01:01:00.559 --> 01:01:04.719 the title fifty title ten scars I have and they 1014 01:01:04.760 --> 01:01:07.039 had when the mL and you know, the militarily is 1015 01:01:07.119 --> 01:01:14.679 on element wars in the early years, and but it's 1016 01:01:14.840 --> 01:01:21.119 really where you had you were operating separately, but you 1017 01:01:21.199 --> 01:01:28.000 had overlapping authorities and sometimes you had undisclosed overlapping presence 1018 01:01:28.639 --> 01:01:32.079 in each other's I used the term battle space because 1019 01:01:32.119 --> 01:01:36.239 I think it's probably the best descriptive. And then we 1020 01:01:36.360 --> 01:01:42.159 learned that actually that's a prescription for disaster, right. And 1021 01:01:42.239 --> 01:01:46.920 so over time we learned through exchange of hostages and 1022 01:01:47.320 --> 01:01:52.320 just through just brute force, uh, training and educating and 1023 01:01:52.360 --> 01:01:59.639 beating the drum that you know, the military, you know, 1024 01:01:59.719 --> 01:02:02.159 and I and I said all the time, I said, 1025 01:02:02.559 --> 01:02:05.920 we need to identify opportunities to help our soft brothers, 1026 01:02:06.559 --> 01:02:09.199 you know, succeed. And I like to think that they're 1027 01:02:09.239 --> 01:02:12.760 doing the same thing. When we observe behaviors that are 1028 01:02:12.800 --> 01:02:17.440 not consistent with CIA normative behaviors, I urged all my 1029 01:02:17.519 --> 01:02:23.039 officers take a deep breath, impute evil, because what they're 1030 01:02:23.079 --> 01:02:27.719 doing may be very consistent with their mission, their organization, 1031 01:02:27.840 --> 01:02:31.480 and their own culture and authorities. And so doing a 1032 01:02:31.480 --> 01:02:35.840 little investigative work before you enter into judgment mode is 1033 01:02:35.880 --> 01:02:39.119 the most helpful thing. And I told my officers every day, 1034 01:02:39.199 --> 01:02:41.679 talk to any of the officers serve with me interact. 1035 01:02:41.880 --> 01:02:44.760 I said, it's been a good day. When you can 1036 01:02:44.800 --> 01:02:49.199 say that you helped another officer CIA or not succeed, 1037 01:02:49.880 --> 01:02:53.400 that by definition is a good day, you know. And 1038 01:02:53.480 --> 01:02:56.360 so we learned an awful lot and I think the 1039 01:02:58.239 --> 01:03:01.000 probably the classroom where we learned at was in the 1040 01:03:01.079 --> 01:03:04.639 Bosnian theater of operations. And if I don't know whether 1041 01:03:04.679 --> 01:03:05.119 you might. 1042 01:03:05.000 --> 01:03:09.079 Be interested in it, yeah, it was those early assignments 1043 01:03:09.159 --> 01:03:11.239 before you got into the Balkans. I mean you were 1044 01:03:11.239 --> 01:03:13.360 a branch chief of one I think you said, and 1045 01:03:13.719 --> 01:03:15.199 what were some of those early jobs? 1046 01:03:15.239 --> 01:03:18.400 But before you got sent to the Balkans, I. 1047 01:03:18.480 --> 01:03:21.039 Was a branch chief multiple times. I was what it 1048 01:03:21.079 --> 01:03:23.519 was called a group chief, which was you know, one up. 1049 01:03:23.920 --> 01:03:26.440 Think of a branch chief as being an infter squad. 1050 01:03:27.079 --> 01:03:30.199 Think of a group chief as kind of being a 1051 01:03:30.199 --> 01:03:32.360 little more than a platoon leader, because you had much 1052 01:03:32.559 --> 01:03:36.719 more than just you know, twenty people. I was also, 1053 01:03:38.440 --> 01:03:41.519 you know, I was base chief a couple of times. 1054 01:03:42.639 --> 01:03:45.199 Throughout the entirety of this process. I was a station 1055 01:03:45.320 --> 01:03:49.199 chief four times. And I might say, as an aside 1056 01:03:49.199 --> 01:03:51.960 for your audience, you gentlemen know this many many in 1057 01:03:51.960 --> 01:03:54.119 the audience tough, but some might not. You know, a 1058 01:03:54.159 --> 01:03:57.119 typical CI station is quite small and modest and deep, 1059 01:03:57.599 --> 01:03:59.960 and we have a broad range of obligations and record 1060 01:04:00.000 --> 01:04:02.760 gronments and uh, you know a lot of us very 1061 01:04:02.800 --> 01:04:05.400 sensitive and we can't talk about it here. But but 1062 01:04:05.800 --> 01:04:08.679 you know, for the most part, they're right quite modest. 1063 01:04:08.719 --> 01:04:12.599 I mean, these are not like Treadstone class CIA presence. 1064 01:04:12.599 --> 01:04:15.800 If I could use adjacent Bourne analogy, the Treadstone was evil. 1065 01:04:15.800 --> 01:04:18.760 We're not evil. But the fact of the matter is that, 1066 01:04:19.519 --> 01:04:24.199 uh to your question. You know, I had really escalatory 1067 01:04:24.280 --> 01:04:30.039 and graduate graduating, you know, leadership experiences both at Starfleet Command, 1068 01:04:30.639 --> 01:04:33.079 you know, and in the field, which helped prepare me 1069 01:04:33.239 --> 01:04:36.400 to be you know, my first chief of station job, 1070 01:04:37.440 --> 01:04:40.440 which was in the Balkans. I was another chief of 1071 01:04:40.480 --> 01:04:44.480 station in the Balkans as well, and I supported a 1072 01:04:44.519 --> 01:04:46.400 number of programs in the Balkans. I was a base 1073 01:04:46.480 --> 01:04:49.800 chief in the Balkans, you know, And and that experience, 1074 01:04:50.559 --> 01:04:53.800 you know, was where quite frankly, you know, as as 1075 01:04:54.159 --> 01:04:57.320 all the people in the audience know. You know, America 1076 01:04:57.519 --> 01:05:01.599 invested eavily and built in creating order out of chaos. 1077 01:05:02.079 --> 01:05:04.000 You know, you had to date in the courts, which 1078 01:05:04.039 --> 01:05:07.440 I think a lot of us who experienced and who 1079 01:05:07.480 --> 01:05:09.760 benefited from that. You know. It's a great way to 1080 01:05:09.880 --> 01:05:12.159 end the war and end genocide, but it's a real 1081 01:05:12.199 --> 01:05:15.320 crappy way to birth a country, you know, and try 1082 01:05:15.360 --> 01:05:20.159 to imbue it with jeffersony empluralistic democratic tendencies, you know, 1083 01:05:20.400 --> 01:05:24.320 with all the trauma that comes from genocide, you know, 1084 01:05:25.519 --> 01:05:29.119 and so America's investment, which was quite controversial at the time, 1085 01:05:29.239 --> 01:05:32.480 and I wasn't a policy maker, so I'm not facile 1086 01:05:32.559 --> 01:05:35.840 in the intimate policy history and all the blood letting 1087 01:05:35.960 --> 01:05:39.960 that probably came from making this decision to deploy US 1088 01:05:39.960 --> 01:05:44.199 military forces. Nobody wanted to put US soldiers in harms way. 1089 01:05:44.960 --> 01:05:48.159 Nobody did. Nobody wanted to put US forces into a 1090 01:05:48.199 --> 01:05:53.000 situation eerily similar to Vietnam. What was the US interest 1091 01:05:53.079 --> 01:05:56.519 in Vietnam? There was no Domino theory of play here 1092 01:05:56.880 --> 01:06:00.119 in the Balkans, so you know, rationalizers didn't need and 1093 01:06:00.199 --> 01:06:03.159 have that. There was no Gulf of Tonk in analogy, 1094 01:06:03.639 --> 01:06:06.039 you know. And and even though that was fake if 1095 01:06:06.039 --> 01:06:09.679 you read the Pentagon Bakers, uh, you know, none of that. 1096 01:06:10.239 --> 01:06:14.880 This was an unforced initiative by the United States government, 1097 01:06:14.960 --> 01:06:18.440 on both the military side and on the non military side, 1098 01:06:18.599 --> 01:06:24.320 particularly in diplomatic and CIA. This was unforced. We weren't required, 1099 01:06:25.199 --> 01:06:27.840 and by doing what we did it did incur risk. 1100 01:06:28.079 --> 01:06:32.119 We had no risk. And by putting Americans into that 1101 01:06:32.280 --> 01:06:36.800 environment automatic whether they're a ten Special Forces Group colleagues, 1102 01:06:37.320 --> 01:06:41.360 whether they're for you know, Dave Grange's Divisions colleagues, whether 1103 01:06:41.400 --> 01:06:45.119 they're in Multinational forces because we're part of ESPORT and 1104 01:06:45.239 --> 01:06:47.880 on before IPHO and then spur I was there for 1105 01:06:47.960 --> 01:06:52.719 all of that. And this was America at its finest. 1106 01:06:53.960 --> 01:06:56.880 This was a story that should make Americas proud. It's 1107 01:06:56.880 --> 01:07:00.519 going to get lost in the very necessary asked the 1108 01:07:00.679 --> 01:07:04.639 discussion on Ukraine. But this was America at its finest. 1109 01:07:04.719 --> 01:07:07.800 We didn't have to do this. No Americans were harmed 1110 01:07:07.800 --> 01:07:14.840 by this genocide, weren't even injured. No Americans the big debate, 1111 01:07:15.039 --> 01:07:18.119 no American equities. And the reason why we had made 1112 01:07:18.119 --> 01:07:22.920 this investment is because of what makes America great, American 1113 01:07:22.960 --> 01:07:26.960 core values. That's why we were there. We were the 1114 01:07:27.000 --> 01:07:31.400 power projection of American core values into an environment that 1115 01:07:31.559 --> 01:07:36.360 was absent of anything similar to American core values. You 1116 01:07:36.440 --> 01:07:39.800 were having women and children that had just been slaughtered, 1117 01:07:40.280 --> 01:07:46.880 hundreds of thousands of Boshniaks slaughtered on the battlefields and 1118 01:07:46.920 --> 01:07:50.199 then the towns and the villages. And when you go 1119 01:07:50.360 --> 01:07:53.039 and part of your job is to find mass graves, 1120 01:07:53.440 --> 01:07:56.920 which wasn't hard because you could see body parts sticking 1121 01:07:57.039 --> 01:08:00.119 up out of the ground. That was the easiest part 1122 01:08:00.159 --> 01:08:03.840 of what we were there to do. And CIA's presence 1123 01:08:04.000 --> 01:08:09.000 was traditional CIA presence to be able to provide actionable 1124 01:08:09.039 --> 01:08:12.880 intelligence to a wide variety of customers and to be 1125 01:08:12.920 --> 01:08:16.680 able to inform the policy makers, because again, America was 1126 01:08:17.239 --> 01:08:22.159 pioneering its way through this very ambiguous, ill defined environment, 1127 01:08:22.800 --> 01:08:28.520 highly politically charged, you know, post genocide trauma and anger 1128 01:08:29.000 --> 01:08:32.840 and need for revenge, and Americans were there to kind 1129 01:08:32.840 --> 01:08:37.960 of be the cadmium rod in this geopolitical reactor. And 1130 01:08:38.079 --> 01:08:44.039 America did amazing work. They did American work just extraordinary. 1131 01:08:44.119 --> 01:08:48.600 And I'm exempting myself from that. But in the in 1132 01:08:48.680 --> 01:08:53.039 that battle space with CIA where our special Operations colleagues, 1133 01:08:53.119 --> 01:08:53.439 and I. 1134 01:08:53.359 --> 01:08:55.800 Think a number of year I'll point out we've had 1135 01:08:55.880 --> 01:08:58.279 a bunch of them on the show. George Hand was 1136 01:08:58.640 --> 01:09:01.319 one of the wrecking guys with Delta over there. Ron 1137 01:09:01.359 --> 01:09:05.520 Moehler was there with the agency. H K roy pen name. 1138 01:09:05.600 --> 01:09:07.079 I don't know if you knew him or not, but 1139 01:09:07.159 --> 01:09:09.319 he I think he went the first U c I 1140 01:09:09.359 --> 01:09:13.960 A station in Sarajevo. He was obviously there investigated a 1141 01:09:14.000 --> 01:09:18.359 Sabornita for the agency. They sent him over there. Geez, 1142 01:09:18.439 --> 01:09:20.479 who else have we talked to that was in the bulkans? 1143 01:09:20.520 --> 01:09:22.159 I mean quite a few people on the show in 1144 01:09:22.159 --> 01:09:22.520 the past. 1145 01:09:22.880 --> 01:09:26.960 Well, I worked very intimately with a young Army captain 1146 01:09:27.039 --> 01:09:34.840 named Scotty Miller. Yeah, who some some on the podcast 1147 01:09:34.960 --> 01:09:39.880 may know, you know, the future you know, future Delta commander, 1148 01:09:39.960 --> 01:09:43.119 future JAZA commander in future ISAF commander, you know, uh, 1149 01:09:44.199 --> 01:09:47.640 just a legendary, iconic American in his own right. But 1150 01:09:47.720 --> 01:09:51.199 he was just a young captain, you know, sitting up 1151 01:09:51.279 --> 01:09:54.640 there in a special Mission unit in TUSA, And so 1152 01:09:55.840 --> 01:09:58.920 that was hard. We learned very quickly that their culture 1153 01:09:59.039 --> 01:10:02.520 and their their US, you know, both with ten Special 1154 01:10:02.520 --> 01:10:06.399 Forces as well as Special Mission Unit, their ethos mirrored arrow. 1155 01:10:07.079 --> 01:10:10.600 And as your guests that have preceded me have told you, uh, 1156 01:10:10.640 --> 01:10:12.960 you know, we learned a lot. We learned. We learned 1157 01:10:12.960 --> 01:10:15.680 how to respect each other's capabilities. We learned how to 1158 01:10:15.920 --> 01:10:23.600 without judgment, to understand shortcomings in capabilities, understand strengths. We 1159 01:10:23.680 --> 01:10:26.840 understood how to how to respect each other, how to 1160 01:10:27.159 --> 01:10:30.920 not be caught up in mythology and misperception. We were 1161 01:10:30.960 --> 01:10:33.920 we were sharing the mission, we were sharing the risk 1162 01:10:34.199 --> 01:10:38.000 such as it was, and our success was very dependent 1163 01:10:38.079 --> 01:10:42.760 upon mutually supporting each other. Uh and uh. And it 1164 01:10:42.880 --> 01:10:48.680 was a way for us to really understand, you know how, 1165 01:10:49.399 --> 01:10:53.159 you know, for us to learn the hard, difficult to 1166 01:10:53.239 --> 01:10:57.880 learn lessons on how to coo, cooperate, collaborate, to how 1167 01:10:57.920 --> 01:11:02.319 to share and and and how to disagree in a 1168 01:11:02.359 --> 01:11:05.920 respectful way that doesn't affect each other's mission or the relationship. 1169 01:11:06.600 --> 01:11:12.359 You know, we learned that as young. I wasn't chronologically young, 1170 01:11:12.439 --> 01:11:15.600 because you know, I had a job before CIA that 1171 01:11:15.720 --> 01:11:19.319 wasn't working for dead, and so I was chronologically ordered 1172 01:11:19.600 --> 01:11:23.159 older and so but all of us, I was experientially young, 1173 01:11:23.479 --> 01:11:28.720 you know, just fifteen, and so was young you know 1174 01:11:29.079 --> 01:11:35.039 in see I speak. And so, you know, the opportunity 1175 01:11:35.199 --> 01:11:41.199 to undertake this exciting mission to represent the ideal of 1176 01:11:41.279 --> 01:11:46.079 America to an environment that is absent of any concept 1177 01:11:46.119 --> 01:11:50.760 of American idealism, and to be able to save lives, 1178 01:11:50.800 --> 01:11:52.600 to be able to bring order out of chaos, to 1179 01:11:52.680 --> 01:11:57.279 help the United States foreign policy, to bring genocide to 1180 01:11:57.359 --> 01:12:00.800 an end, and to do something about that genocide, and 1181 01:12:00.880 --> 01:12:04.560 in many cases, to bring the perpetuators and the perpetrators 1182 01:12:04.880 --> 01:12:09.399 of that genocide to justice. The American presence in the 1183 01:12:09.439 --> 01:12:12.680 Balkans was all of that, was all of that and 1184 01:12:12.880 --> 01:12:14.800 all of us that were part of their rom Uller 1185 01:12:14.880 --> 01:12:17.520 and the other game. You were proud to be part 1186 01:12:17.560 --> 01:12:20.520 of that because it's one of the reasons why we 1187 01:12:20.600 --> 01:12:24.239 signed up for this. Me granted as a draftee to 1188 01:12:24.279 --> 01:12:26.720 the agency, but I could have left, I could have 1189 01:12:26.800 --> 01:12:28.920 retired and not signed. 1190 01:12:28.560 --> 01:12:30.119 On to the agency. 1191 01:12:30.159 --> 01:12:35.159 But the opportunity to spend decades with extraordinary people doing 1192 01:12:35.199 --> 01:12:40.079 extraordinary things in extraordinary places is not an opportunity you 1193 01:12:40.119 --> 01:12:43.039 want to ever turned out. And so I was smart 1194 01:12:43.119 --> 01:12:45.960 enough at the time to be able to say, no, 1195 01:12:46.039 --> 01:12:49.000 you know what, I'm not interested in making money in 1196 01:12:49.039 --> 01:12:51.760 my time. When I took an appointment with CIA, I 1197 01:12:51.880 --> 01:12:56.000 forfeited my military retirement. It wasn't put in escrow, and 1198 01:12:56.039 --> 01:12:58.800 they pay me when I leave federal service. There was 1199 01:12:58.920 --> 01:13:03.000 dual compensation that statute, which lasted for eight years my 1200 01:13:03.119 --> 01:13:08.159 CIA CIA service that I forfeited my military retirement in 1201 01:13:08.279 --> 01:13:11.000 exchange for Yeah, it was all all civil service. Pack. 1202 01:13:11.199 --> 01:13:14.680 They eventually what are they called, not revoked the legislation 1203 01:13:14.920 --> 01:13:18.840 that they whatever you do to laws, Yeah, repeal, that's 1204 01:13:18.880 --> 01:13:22.000 really repeal. Uh. They repealed that because they realized they 1205 01:13:22.039 --> 01:13:26.600 were you know, they were you know, essentially disincentivizing some 1206 01:13:26.760 --> 01:13:31.159 incredibly talented you know, military officers from joining CIA. 1207 01:13:31.319 --> 01:13:33.640 It's almost it's almost punitive in a way to say 1208 01:13:33.680 --> 01:13:36.319 you can't, you don't get your military retirement because now 1209 01:13:36.399 --> 01:13:37.920 you because now you're doing this. 1210 01:13:38.800 --> 01:13:42.039 Yeah. Yeah, But the bottom line of my my long 1211 01:13:42.079 --> 01:13:44.960 oration and my my bo aviation and I apologize to 1212 01:13:45.039 --> 01:13:49.640 you gentlemen into all the participants of the podcast, but uh, 1213 01:13:50.159 --> 01:13:51.960 you can tell I'm kind of passionate about what we 1214 01:13:52.079 --> 01:13:55.319 did there, and we couldn't have done alone. This was 1215 01:13:55.359 --> 01:14:00.079 a whole of government, uh, and a spectacular accomplishment of 1216 01:14:00.119 --> 01:14:02.199 the United States of America at a very difficult time, 1217 01:14:02.880 --> 01:14:06.159 you know, political political turmoil in America coming out of 1218 01:14:06.239 --> 01:14:09.439 the Vietnam experience. You know, it's the first time that 1219 01:14:09.560 --> 01:14:13.159 the modern army, you know, the reformed army, you know, 1220 01:14:13.359 --> 01:14:16.479 CIA came through its own reformation, the Church and Pike 1221 01:14:16.520 --> 01:14:19.960 Committee hearings, all in the Crown Jewels and all of that. 1222 01:14:20.199 --> 01:14:22.399 You can go back and study that we were a 1223 01:14:22.479 --> 01:14:25.560 totally different agency than we were back then, the United 1224 01:14:25.600 --> 01:14:29.119 States Army Special Forces to come from my day, you know, 1225 01:14:29.159 --> 01:14:32.479 whereas an alternate specialty. And you were a shitty SF 1226 01:14:32.600 --> 01:14:36.319 officer and a shitty traditional officer at the same time. 1227 01:14:36.720 --> 01:14:40.359 Works Yet you're a shitty aviator and you were a 1228 01:14:40.439 --> 01:14:42.760 shitty tanker. You know, you weren't good at both. That 1229 01:14:42.880 --> 01:14:44.640 was great. You always tapped a guy on a helmet 1230 01:14:44.720 --> 01:14:46.560 and said, how long have you been flying? Well, I 1231 01:14:46.720 --> 01:14:48.680 just came out of a tank armor company. Come in. 1232 01:14:48.960 --> 01:14:51.520 You're going, oh wow, how about having that warrant officer 1233 01:14:51.600 --> 01:14:54.239 take the controls? You know? Is that kind of thing? 1234 01:14:54.319 --> 01:14:57.039 And so this was a professional army, this was a 1235 01:14:57.119 --> 01:15:01.520 professionalized intelligence community. It had learned a lot of lessons, 1236 01:15:01.600 --> 01:15:04.560 had a lot to learn, and out of that came 1237 01:15:04.800 --> 01:15:10.319 a lot of incredible connective tissue that ultimately that we 1238 01:15:10.520 --> 01:15:14.119 all who went to Afghanistan, you know, benefited from and 1239 01:15:14.800 --> 01:15:16.039 saved lives and accomplished. 1240 01:15:16.880 --> 01:15:20.760 Tell us that's really that's really interesting because I feel 1241 01:15:20.840 --> 01:15:24.840 like that's a story that doesn't really get told. First off, 1242 01:15:24.880 --> 01:15:28.399 Bosnian is kind of Bosnian is kind of a forgotten endeavor, 1243 01:15:29.199 --> 01:15:31.079 uh you know across I mean, I was I was 1244 01:15:31.119 --> 01:15:33.359 in the military when bosiing was going on, But to me, 1245 01:15:33.479 --> 01:15:37.279 it was just something that a few people wasn't huge. Yeah, 1246 01:15:37.279 --> 01:15:39.720 a few people went to, you know, is this random thing? 1247 01:15:40.520 --> 01:15:43.000 But I think that at least for me a lot 1248 01:15:43.000 --> 01:15:47.680 of times, the perception is nine to eleven Afghaniste in 1249 01:15:47.720 --> 01:15:51.920 Iraq like nine was was that was that formative moment 1250 01:15:52.199 --> 01:15:57.600 for you know, uh, special operations and the CIA. But 1251 01:15:58.680 --> 01:16:01.760 but you're saying that it it goes back to actually 1252 01:16:01.800 --> 01:16:05.800 bossing where those were those roots our first our first 1253 01:16:05.880 --> 01:16:08.960 laid you know, and and it grew from there. 1254 01:16:09.720 --> 01:16:10.079 You bet. 1255 01:16:10.359 --> 01:16:16.560 And I believe that neither CIA nor are special forces, 1256 01:16:17.119 --> 01:16:21.760 both white and black special operators both like white and black, uh, 1257 01:16:22.239 --> 01:16:25.079 would have been able to be as as as responsive 1258 01:16:26.079 --> 01:16:32.239 uh and as and as flexible and as and us 1259 01:16:32.359 --> 01:16:35.199 included if we hadn't had that experience in in the 1260 01:16:35.359 --> 01:16:38.079 in the Balkans. Uh. Yep, there's still a lot of 1261 01:16:38.159 --> 01:16:41.000 lessons to be learned. Yeah, there's some latency, you know, 1262 01:16:41.039 --> 01:16:45.159 and that's very understandable. But we shortened the timeline from 1263 01:16:45.680 --> 01:16:49.319 orders to to action by what we what we all 1264 01:16:49.439 --> 01:16:52.319 experienced out of out of the boss name theater. 1265 01:16:52.880 --> 01:16:56.000 Yeah, that's fascinating and you know, like we appreciate you 1266 01:16:56.119 --> 01:16:59.479 sort of pointing that out because again that is like 1267 01:16:59.720 --> 01:17:01.760 by doesn't get much attention. 1268 01:17:02.159 --> 01:17:06.119 They were pioneering the nandhunting that came to dominate what 1269 01:17:06.239 --> 01:17:08.439 we were doing in Iraq and Afghanistan. 1270 01:17:08.000 --> 01:17:10.359 Right, which really is the fine picks finished cycle. 1271 01:17:12.119 --> 01:17:14.760 Yeah. Yeah, and we and we didn't do we didn't 1272 01:17:14.840 --> 01:17:18.000 call it that. I didn't stand the crystal creating the 1273 01:17:19.600 --> 01:17:23.239 definition of F three A right, right, right, But we 1274 01:17:23.359 --> 01:17:28.279 were functionally developing that kind of process, I guess, you know, 1275 01:17:28.439 --> 01:17:33.000 in addition to national intelligence collection and provision to policymakers 1276 01:17:33.039 --> 01:17:36.239 and ambassadors, because there's a lot of political interest in 1277 01:17:36.960 --> 01:17:40.720 making this work. Yeah, you know, I'm under no illusion 1278 01:17:40.800 --> 01:17:43.399 the impact of the United States from nine to eleven dwarf. 1279 01:17:44.079 --> 01:17:46.560 You know, you know what we did in Bosnia, and 1280 01:17:46.640 --> 01:17:49.640 so I'm not offended at all that it is kind 1281 01:17:49.680 --> 01:17:53.560 of fallen beneath the American consciousness. But for those of 1282 01:17:53.720 --> 01:17:57.520 us that have experienced that, I think anybody on this 1283 01:17:57.680 --> 01:18:02.279 podcast and anybody who anybody talks to and carry some 1284 01:18:02.439 --> 01:18:06.319 of my remarks will find a deep resonance between what 1285 01:18:06.479 --> 01:18:10.119 we all experience. I'm exempting the conventional unit because we 1286 01:18:10.159 --> 01:18:12.079 didn't have a lot to do with you know, the 1287 01:18:12.119 --> 01:18:15.640 big armored divisions and mechanized divisions that rotated out in 1288 01:18:15.720 --> 01:18:18.119 and out of Bosnia. But I'm talking about you know, 1289 01:18:18.199 --> 01:18:21.600 our Special Forces and Special Mission unit. Uh. You know, 1290 01:18:21.720 --> 01:18:24.880 we learned a lot and we became fast friends, tight 1291 01:18:25.039 --> 01:18:28.880 colleagues through that experience, and it's it's saved us a 1292 01:18:28.920 --> 01:18:31.000 lot of time and a lot of lives on future 1293 01:18:31.039 --> 01:18:33.560 battlefield that we could not possibly imagine. 1294 01:18:33.800 --> 01:18:36.479 What was the next assignment. Then after your Bolcan years. 1295 01:18:36.399 --> 01:18:42.560 Doug, let's see in Sarajevo, my my third time in Sarajevo, 1296 01:18:44.800 --> 01:18:48.039 I was promoted to the Senior Intelligence Service unexpectedly given 1297 01:18:48.119 --> 01:18:52.319 the fact that you know, most of my background was 1298 01:18:52.640 --> 01:18:54.840 you know, I didn't go to George Washington University. Mom 1299 01:18:54.840 --> 01:18:58.079 and dad didn't work for CIA. You know, I didn't 1300 01:18:58.079 --> 01:19:02.000 speak five languages. I didn't I hadn't you know, spent 1301 01:19:02.119 --> 01:19:05.560 an extraordinary amount of time overseas outside the military context. 1302 01:19:06.199 --> 01:19:09.279 And and so I considered it It's very true, and 1303 01:19:09.399 --> 01:19:12.720 I know it sounds very begging for compliments, but I 1304 01:19:12.920 --> 01:19:16.760 considered myself part of the blue collar of the director 1305 01:19:16.840 --> 01:19:21.560 of Operations. I didn't come with the with that kind 1306 01:19:21.640 --> 01:19:26.920 of Washington education and development kind of kind of background, 1307 01:19:27.239 --> 01:19:30.479 and so I figured I was I was the military 1308 01:19:30.560 --> 01:19:33.479 equivalent of uh, you know, in the Navy, you'd say 1309 01:19:33.520 --> 01:19:36.560 a Mustang, right, right, And I was the I was 1310 01:19:36.600 --> 01:19:39.640 the CIA equivalent of kind of the you know, the 1311 01:19:40.439 --> 01:19:43.239 East six who went to O c S came a 1312 01:19:43.279 --> 01:19:47.840 COMPS an officer, you know. But having said that, you know, 1313 01:19:48.039 --> 01:19:51.479 the unexpected, totally unexpected. I think a lot of a 1314 01:19:51.520 --> 01:19:53.399 lot of women and men who get promoted to the 1315 01:19:53.439 --> 01:19:58.399 senior service are are grateful, uh, but they're they don't 1316 01:19:58.439 --> 01:20:01.279 expect it. But I think they probably know whether they're 1317 01:20:01.800 --> 01:20:04.560 made of the right stuff, and so the promotion isn't 1318 01:20:04.600 --> 01:20:07.840 a surprise, and they get enough feedback, you know, what 1319 01:20:07.960 --> 01:20:10.960 they have to do to improve, to make themselves more competitive, 1320 01:20:11.079 --> 01:20:13.399 and they get a lot of interaction by their senior 1321 01:20:13.479 --> 01:20:17.760 mentors and chain command. And you know, I guess I 1322 01:20:17.880 --> 01:20:20.359 got some of that. I don't remember, but I didn't 1323 01:20:20.399 --> 01:20:22.560 take any offense if I didn't, because I didn't think 1324 01:20:22.600 --> 01:20:25.319 I was worthy of it, quite frankly, you know. And 1325 01:20:25.479 --> 01:20:30.159 I appealed to my boss. I appealed passionately to my boss, 1326 01:20:30.640 --> 01:20:32.680 please don't bring me back at the end of my 1327 01:20:32.760 --> 01:20:39.800 command tour from to Starfleet command. You know, I don't 1328 01:20:39.920 --> 01:20:42.199 have my light saber is just not going to work 1329 01:20:42.279 --> 01:20:47.520 back there, and my Jedi knight you know, fire passion, 1330 01:20:47.600 --> 01:20:50.640 they will go disappear. Look, send me to any crappy 1331 01:20:50.680 --> 01:20:54.439 place you want, where you need a good, solid field leader. 1332 01:20:55.399 --> 01:20:58.560 I'll go lead myself again as I did my first 1333 01:20:58.680 --> 01:21:01.399 leaders are. I made it the argument I possibly could, 1334 01:21:01.720 --> 01:21:04.520 and it seemed to fall on deaf ears. And the 1335 01:21:04.560 --> 01:21:06.279 next thing I know is I get a call from 1336 01:21:06.319 --> 01:21:09.399 a guy you made may know, Zay Rodriguez, who is 1337 01:21:09.479 --> 01:21:13.000 the DdO at the time, who said, I got some 1338 01:21:13.119 --> 01:21:15.640 good news and I got some bad news. The good 1339 01:21:15.720 --> 01:21:23.279 news is we've selected you for promotion to the Senior 1340 01:21:23.319 --> 01:21:27.199 Intelligence Service. The bad news is you're in a g 1341 01:21:27.359 --> 01:21:31.680 S fifteen position. You're coming back to Storrowfleet Command. And 1342 01:21:32.399 --> 01:21:34.960 he said, so you're coming back to the counter Terrorism Center. 1343 01:21:35.000 --> 01:21:37.920 And I was the deputy for the director of Ops 1344 01:21:38.039 --> 01:21:40.640 for CTC and I did that. You know, when I 1345 01:21:40.720 --> 01:21:45.640 came back, that was my first SIS job. And I 1346 01:21:45.760 --> 01:21:48.560 had a couple I had. I had a couple of assignments. 1347 01:21:48.880 --> 01:21:51.279 I think I was in you know, what's now known 1348 01:21:51.359 --> 01:21:54.159 as the Center for Cyber Intelligence. I think I dabbled 1349 01:21:54.199 --> 01:21:57.000 in that a bit. Somebody said, well, you got you 1350 01:21:57.119 --> 01:22:00.560 got a graduate degree in an arcane sign it's you're 1351 01:22:00.640 --> 01:22:05.600 perfect for this. Yeah, yeah, well maybe I don't remember 1352 01:22:05.640 --> 01:22:08.520 any of that. I can't even read my dissertation and 1353 01:22:08.720 --> 01:22:12.399 understand what I wrote. And so I did that for 1354 01:22:12.479 --> 01:22:16.399 a little bit, and I had another assignment in there. 1355 01:22:17.199 --> 01:22:22.960 Memory escapes me. It was a highly classified project that 1356 01:22:23.079 --> 01:22:27.359 I worked which was known to very very few, and 1357 01:22:28.079 --> 01:22:31.039 it was quite an exciting thing. The cool thing is 1358 01:22:31.199 --> 01:22:34.199 is you can apply the cult of secrecy and you 1359 01:22:34.319 --> 01:22:37.479 can emanate that, you can exude the cult of secrecy, 1360 01:22:37.560 --> 01:22:40.239 and that makes you very special. The bad news is 1361 01:22:40.319 --> 01:22:42.680 you can't cooperate and collaborate with anybody. You just can't 1362 01:22:42.680 --> 01:22:44.760 tell anybody what you're doing, so you got to do 1363 01:22:44.800 --> 01:22:47.960 all the work yourself, and that sucks. I'm just telling you. 1364 01:22:48.520 --> 01:22:51.079 So a team building how you get a team of one? 1365 01:22:51.640 --> 01:22:54.000 You know? Okay, this is great, this is great. But 1366 01:22:55.319 --> 01:23:01.159 if memory serves me correctly, I went from there back 1367 01:23:01.239 --> 01:23:03.920 to Iraq, and we didn't talk about my affirmative Iraq 1368 01:23:03.960 --> 01:23:05.560 E three and four. 1369 01:23:05.720 --> 01:23:08.479 Yeah, before Iraq, I want to ask you because you 1370 01:23:08.560 --> 01:23:11.039 told me after nine to eleven, like two days later, you. 1371 01:23:11.079 --> 01:23:13.199 Were you were gone, you Iraq out I was gone. 1372 01:23:14.119 --> 01:23:15.520 What happened on nine to eleven for you? 1373 01:23:15.760 --> 01:23:18.600 Yeah? Yeah, and and so on nine to eleven. You know, 1374 01:23:18.680 --> 01:23:22.239 I kind of I kind of skipped over some history here, 1375 01:23:22.840 --> 01:23:26.079 and I attribute that to my age. You know, I'm 1376 01:23:26.079 --> 01:23:28.079 seventy two years old, so I'm becoming a little mentally 1377 01:23:28.159 --> 01:23:30.560 infirm here. I don't impute that to all seventy two 1378 01:23:30.640 --> 01:23:34.479 year olds, but to me. So, I was in Bosnia 1379 01:23:34.479 --> 01:23:36.439 as part of as I said, you know, as I 1380 01:23:36.600 --> 01:23:38.279 gave you more than you ever wanted to hear about 1381 01:23:38.319 --> 01:23:41.840 America's presence in Bosnia. So nine to eleven, we're sitting 1382 01:23:41.880 --> 01:23:45.159 there and the first aircraft I did the tower and 1383 01:23:45.359 --> 01:23:49.079 we all rushed into to scramble to watch TV. And 1384 01:23:49.199 --> 01:23:53.439 I remember to myself it was it was just shocking. 1385 01:23:53.920 --> 01:23:57.000 And I remember the way I rationalized and dealt with 1386 01:23:57.159 --> 01:24:01.720 that sickening feeling in my stuff was I said, oh, 1387 01:24:01.840 --> 01:24:05.159 this is a navigation era, this is some pilot you know, 1388 01:24:05.359 --> 01:24:08.439 pilot out art attack. You know, never occurred to me, 1389 01:24:08.680 --> 01:24:12.000 even though I had done tech counter terrorism for like 1390 01:24:12.119 --> 01:24:15.439 ten years, you know, the fact of matter, I was 1391 01:24:15.560 --> 01:24:21.039 just sitting there, you know, mystified, shocked, mystified, sickened by 1392 01:24:21.159 --> 01:24:25.399 that and it wasn't. But you know, after, you know, 1393 01:24:25.560 --> 01:24:31.039 America's policymakers really digested what had happened, you know, from 1394 01:24:31.279 --> 01:24:33.960 the attacks on nine to eleven to two aircraft Flight 1395 01:24:34.119 --> 01:24:37.239 ninety three in the attack on the Pentagon. And ironically, 1396 01:24:37.359 --> 01:24:41.159 one of the officers of my cross agency, large cross 1397 01:24:41.279 --> 01:24:44.640 agency team that I had in the field from DUD 1398 01:24:44.920 --> 01:24:49.560 from uniform military, multiple civilian agencies, and yet and some 1399 01:24:49.720 --> 01:24:52.560 of our special Forces College. So we had a pretty 1400 01:24:52.600 --> 01:24:56.319 powerful team. One of my team members who happened to 1401 01:24:56.319 --> 01:25:00.439 be named Mike stan who meant who left immediate because 1402 01:25:00.560 --> 01:25:03.560 Sad called him back immediately. U s a d and Mike, 1403 01:25:03.640 --> 01:25:06.680 of courses, all of the snow is the first American 1404 01:25:06.720 --> 01:25:08.840 to die in the line of duty, you know, and 1405 01:25:08.920 --> 01:25:12.920 the expulsion of al Qaeda and Taliban from Afghanistan. Mike 1406 01:25:13.079 --> 01:25:15.840 was really just a spectacular guy. He was. He was 1407 01:25:15.920 --> 01:25:20.199 everything you'd ever want in any kind of officer, a 1408 01:25:20.319 --> 01:25:25.720 gentleman warrior, you know, just extraordinary, gracious, courteous and yet 1409 01:25:26.079 --> 01:25:28.800 steal hard. You know. Of course he's a former marine, 1410 01:25:28.880 --> 01:25:33.560 right and uh so I lost him immediately there it 1411 01:25:33.720 --> 01:25:36.199 was like hours, if I recall correctly, Boom. He was 1412 01:25:36.319 --> 01:25:39.039 summoned back. We sent him back a couple of days 1413 01:25:39.119 --> 01:25:42.239 later after they made a decision to mount the US response. 1414 01:25:42.319 --> 01:25:47.039 Of course, he had Jawbreaker, which you know you've covered extensively. UH. 1415 01:25:47.439 --> 01:25:50.920 And my job, I was immediately summoned up to US 1416 01:25:51.039 --> 01:25:54.560 Yukon to work with then to me a very unknown 1417 01:25:55.359 --> 01:25:58.119 UH Seal one star who some of you may have 1418 01:25:58.199 --> 01:26:02.199 heard named Bill mccraven, who's the commander of SAKI, and 1419 01:26:02.399 --> 01:26:05.359 we were trying to figure out what it was that 1420 01:26:05.600 --> 01:26:08.560 the US in command in soak here needed to do 1421 01:26:08.720 --> 01:26:11.760 in response, you know, because the attack on the homeland 1422 01:26:11.920 --> 01:26:13.960 was not going to be the only attack. And it 1423 01:26:14.079 --> 01:26:16.760 certainly added because there have been three embassies hammered hard 1424 01:26:17.000 --> 01:26:20.039 the usas cole Kobar Towers. We had all kinds of 1425 01:26:20.520 --> 01:26:24.079 explosive history in the business of terrorism up to this point. 1426 01:26:24.800 --> 01:26:26.840 And the other thing that my job was to be 1427 01:26:26.960 --> 01:26:30.720 able to work with soak here to prepare the support, 1428 01:26:31.319 --> 01:26:36.600 the special operations support requirements because of the emerging soft 1429 01:26:37.319 --> 01:26:44.880 contribution to America's response. Then I went back to back 1430 01:26:44.920 --> 01:26:49.159 to Washington, d C. To you know, to equip myself 1431 01:26:49.279 --> 01:26:51.680 to gun up and get ready to go to Afghanistan. 1432 01:26:51.800 --> 01:26:55.279 Myself and I and I remember one of your guests, 1433 01:26:55.720 --> 01:27:01.920 can't I can't remember who, uh Mick maybe who said 1434 01:27:02.760 --> 01:27:04.399 who talked a little bit about it. I think you 1435 01:27:04.439 --> 01:27:06.720 asked him the question. Tell us about the time that 1436 01:27:06.840 --> 01:27:09.720 you were preparing to go to Afghanistan. Mine was spending 1437 01:27:09.840 --> 01:27:12.479 hours in r I. I remember going in there in 1438 01:27:12.479 --> 01:27:17.560 a place for stripped I think, you know, yeah, yeah, yeah. 1439 01:27:17.760 --> 01:27:20.600 And I remember going in there and you know, one 1440 01:27:20.600 --> 01:27:23.000 of the ari I sales sales ladies comes up to 1441 01:27:23.039 --> 01:27:24.840 me and says, so can I help you? And I go, yeah, 1442 01:27:24.840 --> 01:27:26.279 I got this list. I need to get all this 1443 01:27:26.359 --> 01:27:29.039 stuff on pick cash. I need all this all this stuff, 1444 01:27:29.079 --> 01:27:31.680 and I need it right now. And she goes. You're like, 1445 01:27:32.199 --> 01:27:35.840 you're like the fiftieth guys been in here. I think 1446 01:27:35.960 --> 01:27:37.800 I think a lot of stuff. I think they bought 1447 01:27:37.800 --> 01:27:40.319 all that stuff. So, you know, I had to run around, 1448 01:27:40.319 --> 01:27:41.960 you know, and others like me that were in the 1449 01:27:42.479 --> 01:27:45.479 in the in the latency part of the response, you know, 1450 01:27:45.600 --> 01:27:49.079 the month after sort of thing, and so you know, 1451 01:27:49.159 --> 01:27:54.039 you're buying sleeping bags and all kinds of stuff because again, 1452 01:27:54.760 --> 01:27:57.000 you know, as as I think a number of your 1453 01:27:57.039 --> 01:27:59.760 guests of you know, Cee, I was not. You know, 1454 01:28:00.000 --> 01:28:03.760 our military things was not de regord for CIA, right 1455 01:28:03.760 --> 01:28:06.359 it is today, but back then it was. It was 1456 01:28:06.399 --> 01:28:10.119 an aberration. It was an afterthought. Those were the officers 1457 01:28:10.159 --> 01:28:14.560 that would get you in trouble because those retired Special 1458 01:28:14.640 --> 01:28:18.199 Forces E eights that were now GS twelves and thirteen's. 1459 01:28:18.600 --> 01:28:21.760 There's no good it's going to come. Have a ground branch, 1460 01:28:22.159 --> 01:28:24.680 a ground branch team. I've been a cos couple of 1461 01:28:24.720 --> 01:28:27.960 times for ground branch guys. I know the mythology. Having 1462 01:28:28.039 --> 01:28:30.880 him come from a community, I wasn't as fearful, but 1463 01:28:31.359 --> 01:28:33.880 no good could come from having a ground grand branch guys. 1464 01:28:33.920 --> 01:28:37.279 And you go, you know, you know your your family 1465 01:28:37.319 --> 01:28:39.520 aren't safe, the animals aren't safe. Fruit and not safe 1466 01:28:39.640 --> 01:28:41.520 is going to know up all that, you know, all 1467 01:28:41.600 --> 01:28:45.960 of that kind of bizarre thing, you know. So there 1468 01:28:46.199 --> 01:28:51.760 was paramount. So CIA was not prepared to go. I 1469 01:28:52.000 --> 01:28:55.520 when I when I had my team in Afghanistan, we 1470 01:28:55.680 --> 01:29:01.279 had a Sony Vial laptop through an encrypt to an 1471 01:29:01.319 --> 01:29:05.920 in mar set. We were creating cable traffic and Microsoft 1472 01:29:06.079 --> 01:29:10.399 word you know. Yeah, we had Satcom And that was 1473 01:29:10.560 --> 01:29:12.760 just to tell the gang back at Starfleet that we 1474 01:29:12.840 --> 01:29:16.199 had a couple of files for them, and then perhaps 1475 01:29:16.279 --> 01:29:19.239 maybe in another episode sometime, you know, if you ever 1476 01:29:19.279 --> 01:29:21.159 want me back, I can tell you a little more about, 1477 01:29:21.680 --> 01:29:26.520 you know, that kind of pioneering that was done by 1478 01:29:26.640 --> 01:29:29.319 many who didn't way more than I did, in way 1479 01:29:29.399 --> 01:29:32.520 more dangerous places. You know, My my gang was in 1480 01:29:32.640 --> 01:29:35.960 a sadabab, you know, way up in the southern end 1481 01:29:36.039 --> 01:29:40.000 of the Conor Valley north of Jilal. But but you know, 1482 01:29:40.119 --> 01:29:42.319 we were learning how to how to do this. We 1483 01:29:42.399 --> 01:29:46.239 were you know, creating capability on the fly, you know. 1484 01:29:46.359 --> 01:29:49.520 And I was just a cognet machine. I wasn't a driver. 1485 01:29:49.760 --> 01:29:53.439 I wasn't you know, a pioneer leader. I wasn't taking 1486 01:29:53.520 --> 01:29:57.520 the decisional risks, you know. I was just excited and happy, 1487 01:29:57.680 --> 01:30:00.680 you know, coming out of that bossing exp It's flush 1488 01:30:00.760 --> 01:30:04.479 with pride, you know, wanting to you know, be part 1489 01:30:04.520 --> 01:30:08.399 of America's response, you know, to bring justice and righteous 1490 01:30:08.479 --> 01:30:12.199 revenge to those that had you know, killed our citizens 1491 01:30:12.279 --> 01:30:15.239 and those of other nations who had despoiled our country, 1492 01:30:15.800 --> 01:30:18.840 you know, forever, and as you know, I, like all 1493 01:30:18.880 --> 01:30:21.079 of us you know who served there, proud to be 1494 01:30:21.199 --> 01:30:24.479 part of that, whether in the early days or even 1495 01:30:24.560 --> 01:30:27.920 more dangerous quite frankly, you know, days that most of 1496 01:30:28.000 --> 01:30:32.159 you served in Afghanistan, we could even go downtown and 1497 01:30:32.279 --> 01:30:35.399 have dinner at an Afghan restaurant, you know, without getting 1498 01:30:35.439 --> 01:30:39.359 blown up and shot and stabbed, you know where. Many 1499 01:30:39.399 --> 01:30:43.600 of you weren't able to do that, but you know 1500 01:30:43.880 --> 01:30:47.800 it was and we immediately began to apply the experiences 1501 01:30:47.840 --> 01:30:50.239 that I just discussed the length, you know, and the 1502 01:30:50.359 --> 01:30:54.560 lessons that we learned, you know, and that you know 1503 01:30:54.640 --> 01:30:57.079 what turned out to be a much more pacific battle 1504 01:30:57.119 --> 01:31:01.199 space known as the Balkans. But uh, you know, who 1505 01:31:01.239 --> 01:31:05.000 do you find in places like Afghanistan? You know, no 1506 01:31:05.119 --> 01:31:08.560 longer Captain Scottie Miller. I think he was Major Scottie Miller, 1507 01:31:09.000 --> 01:31:11.760 maybe lieutenant colonel, So you found it was you know, 1508 01:31:11.840 --> 01:31:14.680 as I think we all used the expression same dude's different. 1509 01:31:14.439 --> 01:31:15.520 Places, right right. 1510 01:31:16.199 --> 01:31:20.960 Yeah, And now I obviously don't don't mean by using 1511 01:31:21.039 --> 01:31:24.079 the term dude that it's just all men, because number 1512 01:31:24.079 --> 01:31:27.520 of courageous female officers and operators have served as well, 1513 01:31:27.920 --> 01:31:31.760 and we're part of our growth. But you know, we 1514 01:31:31.920 --> 01:31:33.880 benefited from I think what we learned. 1515 01:31:34.760 --> 01:31:39.039 Yeah, yeah, what was the trajectory like for you when 1516 01:31:39.079 --> 01:31:41.680 you got into theater and you make it sound like 1517 01:31:41.720 --> 01:31:43.680 were you in the background kind of running logistics for 1518 01:31:43.800 --> 01:31:45.319 these guys or what what was your role? 1519 01:31:45.680 --> 01:31:48.399 No, No, I was. I was. I was part of 1520 01:31:48.479 --> 01:31:53.680 the operational presence there. Uh so, my my engaging with 1521 01:31:53.840 --> 01:31:57.439 soak you're on the support side. That ended when I 1522 01:31:57.560 --> 01:31:59.880 left and I went back and I became part of 1523 01:32:00.039 --> 01:32:04.359 the operational CIA operational package. I want to say, initially 1524 01:32:04.479 --> 01:32:07.840 we had you know, probably the sum total. I think 1525 01:32:08.560 --> 01:32:11.359 the guy you should have on here was Hank Hankrupton's 1526 01:32:11.399 --> 01:32:16.199 deputy guy named John Massey and an amazing American in 1527 01:32:16.319 --> 01:32:19.159 his own right. He has a little blemish because he's 1528 01:32:19.159 --> 01:32:22.319 a Naval Academy graduate and he's the nuclear guy too, 1529 01:32:22.479 --> 01:32:27.159 you know, like that who's that guy Rickover? Or is 1530 01:32:27.239 --> 01:32:29.479 that that? Was that a German pilot in World War One? 1531 01:32:29.560 --> 01:32:31.800 I don't remember who was the guy started nuclear Navy. 1532 01:32:31.840 --> 01:32:34.399 I don't know the Navy is relevant to me, but 1533 01:32:35.119 --> 01:32:38.640 the but uh, you know, the total numbers. But I 1534 01:32:38.680 --> 01:32:40.439 think we only had like I think it was around 1535 01:32:40.520 --> 01:32:44.640 twenty eight, you know, in the initial initial presence there. So, 1536 01:32:45.119 --> 01:32:48.640 but we had a huge force multiplier in uh in 1537 01:32:48.920 --> 01:32:54.720 in uh you know, the the g's and in Swick speak, 1538 01:32:56.199 --> 01:32:59.760 the g's from the Northern Lions. And so the picture 1539 01:33:00.079 --> 01:33:02.920 you so kindly put on the advertisement for this was 1540 01:33:03.279 --> 01:33:05.920 my leadership team. With my team. It was myself a 1541 01:33:05.960 --> 01:33:09.039 ground branch guy, and we had one hundred Northern Alliance 1542 01:33:09.640 --> 01:33:11.760 you know, colleagues that were there to take the fight 1543 01:33:11.840 --> 01:33:15.079 to the enemy. And that was not unique at all, 1544 01:33:15.880 --> 01:33:17.920 and so there are very few in the beginning. So 1545 01:33:18.039 --> 01:33:19.720 I was in Afghanist Fans and opera. 1546 01:33:19.760 --> 01:33:20.920 Which team were you guys on. 1547 01:33:22.000 --> 01:33:27.760 It was called Team Mike and it was like I said, 1548 01:33:27.760 --> 01:33:30.119 it was in Masadaba at the southern end of the 1549 01:33:30.199 --> 01:33:35.399 Knar Valley. What was interesting is we occupied a totally 1550 01:33:35.600 --> 01:33:42.479 shredded Soviet Russian military installation. I could motorized artillery. It 1551 01:33:42.600 --> 01:33:45.399 was at a Mujahdin it like literally just eradicated it 1552 01:33:45.880 --> 01:33:48.479 off the face of the earth that I plowed through 1553 01:33:48.800 --> 01:33:51.640 a bunch of rubble. And I found because thank you 1554 01:33:52.079 --> 01:33:55.920 for the climate there which is absent of rain, I 1555 01:33:56.079 --> 01:34:00.359 found a real Russian military map with hands draw on 1556 01:34:00.479 --> 01:34:06.479 military symbols to show where they positioned, you know, rifle 1557 01:34:06.560 --> 01:34:10.960 companies and infantry platoons in the mountains around around the 1558 01:34:11.039 --> 01:34:14.439 Sadabad and so I have that framed, you know, on 1559 01:34:14.600 --> 01:34:16.439 the wall on my I Love Me and I Love 1560 01:34:16.479 --> 01:34:21.239 You wall here in New Mexican or New Mexico home. 1561 01:34:22.119 --> 01:34:25.840 But I was an operator to your question, and I 1562 01:34:26.000 --> 01:34:28.439 came back and I was the acting because we didn't 1563 01:34:28.479 --> 01:34:31.520 have a permanent station. I was the acting deputy chief 1564 01:34:31.560 --> 01:34:36.079 of station my second go around, and so that took 1565 01:34:36.159 --> 01:34:38.680 me through the end of two thousand and two. I 1566 01:34:38.800 --> 01:34:42.239 became a chief of station after that for a year, 1567 01:34:42.279 --> 01:34:45.079 and in Iraq happened. And then I got a call 1568 01:34:45.199 --> 01:34:48.760 from the Deputy Director of Operations said, have your wife 1569 01:34:48.880 --> 01:34:51.079 pack you out. I want you I want you to 1570 01:34:51.239 --> 01:34:58.680 Kuwait in twenty four hours. So that's how things are done. 1571 01:35:00.640 --> 01:35:04.960 What yeah, you know, I know that, like like bases 1572 01:35:05.000 --> 01:35:06.800 like a sod of body, and then going into Iraq 1573 01:35:06.840 --> 01:35:10.000 when it first started, Like those were very unique circumstances. 1574 01:35:10.439 --> 01:35:15.720 But you talk about going back to Starfleet Command with 1575 01:35:15.880 --> 01:35:18.600 your light Stabur and I love the I love the 1576 01:35:18.640 --> 01:35:22.520 coalvision of the two worlds. But but you know, when 1577 01:35:22.560 --> 01:35:25.520 you talk about Starfleet Command, obviously you're talking about Langley. 1578 01:35:25.720 --> 01:35:28.920 What was it like being at Langley? It was different 1579 01:35:29.000 --> 01:35:32.199 than being at a base or a station somewhere else 1580 01:35:32.279 --> 01:35:32.720 in the world. 1581 01:35:33.760 --> 01:35:37.479 Well, I suppose it's kind of you all are military veterans, 1582 01:35:37.520 --> 01:35:40.119 and you will understand as well, the vast majority of 1583 01:35:40.199 --> 01:35:43.399 your audience it's the same thing when they go okay, 1584 01:35:43.560 --> 01:35:47.039 you're going to the Pentagon. What you know, your first 1585 01:35:47.079 --> 01:35:50.439 reaction is this, you want to go vomit, You want 1586 01:35:50.439 --> 01:35:52.439 to go you want to go buke in the street. 1587 01:35:52.920 --> 01:35:54.800 You know, what did I do wrong? You know? And 1588 01:35:54.880 --> 01:35:57.680 then what happens is you end up serving and I 1589 01:35:57.920 --> 01:36:01.560 jokingly and very critical as a many officers you know 1590 01:36:01.800 --> 01:36:04.720 who are operators. You know, there's life forms in CIA 1591 01:36:04.800 --> 01:36:08.000 that love Starfleet Command. You know, they like to commute 1592 01:36:08.039 --> 01:36:09.359 and they like to live, and they don't want to 1593 01:36:09.359 --> 01:36:13.479 be overseas. Vast majority of them are are you know, 1594 01:36:13.920 --> 01:36:17.920 hunger for the core business of what CIA does, whether 1595 01:36:18.159 --> 01:36:21.399 you're an operator or an analysts, board officer, a techops officer, 1596 01:36:21.920 --> 01:36:25.319 or something in between. But there are many officers who 1597 01:36:25.439 --> 01:36:28.199 don't need to go overseas and make a seminal and 1598 01:36:28.359 --> 01:36:32.239 existential contribution to what we're trying to do overseas, and 1599 01:36:32.279 --> 01:36:35.760 they're very necessary and just like service in the Pentagon, 1600 01:36:36.319 --> 01:36:38.359 and granted, you know I was in the Pentagon, as 1601 01:36:38.359 --> 01:36:40.520 a No. Five And for those of you that have 1602 01:36:40.640 --> 01:36:43.399 never served in the Pentagon is No. Five. There is 1603 01:36:43.520 --> 01:36:46.920 no lower life form in the Pentagon, in an army 1604 01:36:47.000 --> 01:36:52.920 lieutenant colonel. Yeah, you don't even you don't even get 1605 01:36:53.079 --> 01:36:57.720 donuts for generals, get donuts for for sixes. You know, Hey, 1606 01:36:57.880 --> 01:37:00.800 you go over there and attract the index away from 1607 01:37:00.840 --> 01:37:03.439 those uster making you know, doing some real work. You 1608 01:37:03.560 --> 01:37:05.479 go over there, Carl, you go sit there in the corner. 1609 01:37:05.680 --> 01:37:07.600 Go get me a Dona. Yes, sprinkley. I like to 1610 01:37:07.640 --> 01:37:11.199 watch sprinkles on my Donna and cream into coffee and 1611 01:37:11.319 --> 01:37:12.600 let me know when it comes back, because I don't 1612 01:37:12.640 --> 01:37:16.319 want to call it. And so there's no lower you know, 1613 01:37:17.119 --> 01:37:19.960 you know, you know, just insignificant life per formed in 1614 01:37:20.640 --> 01:37:23.279 a lieutenant colonel and Pentagon. But what you do see 1615 01:37:23.399 --> 01:37:26.279 is the same thing that I found out in my service. 1616 01:37:26.279 --> 01:37:29.800 And I began life at Star Free Command. So I 1617 01:37:30.039 --> 01:37:33.760 understood and it made me a better field leader. I 1618 01:37:33.960 --> 01:37:38.520 understood the culture of head quarters. I understood the challenges 1619 01:37:38.680 --> 01:37:42.760 that they were facing. I understood the sludge in the 1620 01:37:42.840 --> 01:37:46.720 machine and why the sludge is not capricious sludge, it 1621 01:37:46.840 --> 01:37:53.960 is inexorable, just necessary slowness and glacier times. It's just 1622 01:37:54.079 --> 01:37:58.760 part of large bureaucracies, even chrisp bureaucracies like CIA, which 1623 01:37:58.840 --> 01:38:02.560 is probably the Christmas of them all. Without question. You 1624 01:38:02.600 --> 01:38:04.479 know you have sixteen days after nine to eleven, you 1625 01:38:04.560 --> 01:38:07.239 have Gary schron and Johnpricker on the ground right, no 1626 01:38:07.439 --> 01:38:08.680 other institution. 1627 01:38:09.479 --> 01:38:12.439 The agency has Correct me if I'm wrong, Doug, But 1628 01:38:12.520 --> 01:38:15.279 I mean the only political appointees you guys really deal 1629 01:38:15.359 --> 01:38:17.560 with is like the director director and maybe a chief 1630 01:38:17.600 --> 01:38:19.920 of staff and the director and. 1631 01:38:19.920 --> 01:38:21.920 The deputy director of political appointance. 1632 01:38:22.159 --> 01:38:25.800 And then when I had someone tell me once about 1633 01:38:25.840 --> 01:38:28.520 when you guys deployed for that first Afghanistan trip, like 1634 01:38:28.600 --> 01:38:31.119 the very like short fuse on the chain of command, 1635 01:38:31.239 --> 01:38:34.399 like from the President to the director to maybe like 1636 01:38:34.439 --> 01:38:36.640 the head of SAD or something like that. I mean, 1637 01:38:36.640 --> 01:38:38.640 you tell me, Doug, but I mean it was a 1638 01:38:38.760 --> 01:38:40.760 very short fuse going from point A to point B. 1639 01:38:41.560 --> 01:38:43.840 You had it. You hit it right on the head. 1640 01:38:44.439 --> 01:38:50.920 And that that short interval between the most senior decision 1641 01:38:50.960 --> 01:38:55.680 makers in our government and the Plebeian operator based chief 1642 01:38:55.840 --> 01:39:01.319 like me on the ground that was built and with 1643 01:39:01.520 --> 01:39:04.960 great risk, because all of a sudden you add a 1644 01:39:05.119 --> 01:39:08.319 guy like me talking to a guy like George Tennant, 1645 01:39:09.479 --> 01:39:13.680 you know, and you could only imagine that George taking 1646 01:39:13.760 --> 01:39:19.640 advice from a GS fifteen versus taking advice from Sis four, 1647 01:39:19.840 --> 01:39:23.399 five and six, advice that is well formed, well studied, 1648 01:39:23.479 --> 01:39:26.600 well wrung out, well read teamed, and all you got is, 1649 01:39:27.159 --> 01:39:30.920 you know, opinions from a wellspring of opinion GS fifteen. 1650 01:39:31.479 --> 01:39:34.920 You know, who thinks that he knows everything is to 1651 01:39:35.039 --> 01:39:37.279 know that's useful for the director, you know kind of thing. 1652 01:39:37.720 --> 01:39:39.279 And the same thing happened when I was chief and 1653 01:39:39.359 --> 01:39:45.079 station in Iraq, conversations with the Leon Paneta, for example, 1654 01:39:45.119 --> 01:39:49.600 when he was the director and Leon's deputy, you know. 1655 01:39:51.000 --> 01:39:59.439 And so that shortening of the chain of information and 1656 01:39:59.600 --> 01:40:02.600 the chain I guess, well is it? You know that 1657 01:40:03.039 --> 01:40:06.399 that Air Force colonel created that oodle thing? Right, I 1658 01:40:06.399 --> 01:40:09.159 don't know what to stand for, but you know, at 1659 01:40:09.239 --> 01:40:10.399 least one of those os. 1660 01:40:11.760 --> 01:40:14.439 Decide an act Yeah, yeah, yeah. 1661 01:40:14.720 --> 01:40:19.479 For us, it was act and then engage sometimes uh 1662 01:40:20.199 --> 01:40:24.560 and other times it was where you know, the director 1663 01:40:24.840 --> 01:40:29.479 understood the confidence and the trust and confidence at all 1664 01:40:29.600 --> 01:40:33.279 levels of his chain of command. And and so you know, 1665 01:40:33.560 --> 01:40:36.000 being able to take a phone call from the director 1666 01:40:36.039 --> 01:40:40.800 of the Central Intelligence Agency who's part writer is the 1667 01:40:40.880 --> 01:40:45.520 President of the United States, the pre d and I uh, 1668 01:40:46.399 --> 01:40:49.760 you know that shows that the agency has a trust 1669 01:40:49.840 --> 01:40:52.680 and confidence. Because they didn't have that, they wouldn't have 1670 01:40:52.680 --> 01:40:55.680 been able to shorten that decision making timeline, right, you know, 1671 01:40:55.800 --> 01:40:58.079 because nobody would have allowed a guy like me to 1672 01:40:58.159 --> 01:41:02.079 talk to provide advice and recommendation to senior officers on 1673 01:41:02.199 --> 01:41:04.880 the seventh floors. Yeah, or directly to the d d 1674 01:41:05.000 --> 01:41:07.560 O or to the to the Director of the Counter 1675 01:41:07.640 --> 01:41:09.199 Terrorisms Doug. 1676 01:41:10.399 --> 01:41:12.840 I'm going to ask you about a rack in one second. 1677 01:41:12.920 --> 01:41:16.159 I just want to pay a bills here real quick 1678 01:41:16.279 --> 01:41:18.159 and tell our viewers about sap Gear. 1679 01:41:18.640 --> 01:41:21.319 There are a veteran owned company. 1680 01:41:22.640 --> 01:41:25.640 They are a safety asset production retail store that specialize 1681 01:41:25.680 --> 01:41:29.640 that is a handmade and unique survivability products. Each innovative 1682 01:41:29.640 --> 01:41:32.840 product is designed to be discrete while focusing on functionality. 1683 01:41:33.239 --> 01:41:36.399 One of the company's product highlights is the GTFO wrist 1684 01:41:36.479 --> 01:41:39.560 straft that's made out of tungsten. 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If you guys are interested in 1719 01:43:16.680 --> 01:43:18.880 supporting the show, if you want to get access to 1720 01:43:18.960 --> 01:43:22.399 bonus episodes and segments and get access to all of 1721 01:43:22.439 --> 01:43:25.479 our episodes ad free, there's a link down the description 1722 01:43:25.560 --> 01:43:28.840 of this video or podcast to our Patreon page and 1723 01:43:28.920 --> 01:43:30.279 you can jump on there right now. 1724 01:43:30.479 --> 01:43:32.920 And we really appreciate all the people who support the 1725 01:43:32.960 --> 01:43:37.199 stream absolutely, so Doug, back to you. 1726 01:43:38.840 --> 01:43:42.119 Tell us about you told us that you got pulled 1727 01:43:42.159 --> 01:43:44.920 into Iraq on about a twenty four hour notice. 1728 01:43:45.800 --> 01:43:47.039 Tell us about that experience. 1729 01:43:48.399 --> 01:43:53.600 Well, again, you know, I need I need to full disclosure. 1730 01:43:53.720 --> 01:43:56.279 I'm on the record of having said in public on 1731 01:43:56.439 --> 01:44:00.399 TV and in print in print that I thought the 1732 01:44:00.479 --> 01:44:03.640 invasion of Iraq was the worst foreign policy decision in 1733 01:44:03.720 --> 01:44:10.760 modern American history. It opened it geopolitical tectonic plates that 1734 01:44:10.880 --> 01:44:14.760 we had no idea what we were creating, because we 1735 01:44:14.840 --> 01:44:17.520 had no plan in the notion that we could create, 1736 01:44:17.680 --> 01:44:21.520 you know, pluralistic Jeffersonian democracy in Iraq with all the 1737 01:44:21.640 --> 01:44:27.880 secretarian vicious sectarian fighting, and anytime you remove a brutal dictator, 1738 01:44:27.960 --> 01:44:32.159 you know how the dictators roll very brutally, and you ask, hey, 1739 01:44:32.159 --> 01:44:33.920 you're a dictator, why you got to be so brutal, 1740 01:44:34.279 --> 01:44:37.159 because I'd be dead if I didn't, because I got 1741 01:44:37.319 --> 01:44:39.760 to keep you know, my hands on a pressure cooker 1742 01:44:39.880 --> 01:44:43.680 that lives going to fly right up. So anyway I 1743 01:44:43.880 --> 01:44:46.760 was at the time, I wasn't quite as as I 1744 01:44:46.880 --> 01:44:50.239 didn't have that insight, but I was proud again, you know, 1745 01:44:50.359 --> 01:44:53.479 to be part of the next grand American experiment to 1746 01:44:53.600 --> 01:44:56.680 move American foreign policy and to kind of be part 1747 01:44:56.960 --> 01:45:01.720 of a cog in the new SI machine and the 1748 01:45:01.880 --> 01:45:05.279 next big, big thing that we were doing, which was Iraq, 1749 01:45:05.399 --> 01:45:09.039 and CIA played it. And I don't go through the details, 1750 01:45:09.079 --> 01:45:11.920 but there's probably some people that I give you a good, 1751 01:45:12.159 --> 01:45:16.359 good description of what we faced. But we accomplished an 1752 01:45:16.399 --> 01:45:20.640 awful lot. We were lean main CIA machine in Iraq, 1753 01:45:20.880 --> 01:45:24.800 and it was a bad time in the beginning because 1754 01:45:25.399 --> 01:45:28.520 apparently there were a lot of people there that didn't 1755 01:45:28.720 --> 01:45:32.920 like Americans. You know, there are a lot of Kurds 1756 01:45:33.159 --> 01:45:36.319 and a number of Shia in the beginning were appreciative 1757 01:45:36.760 --> 01:45:41.159 that we removed this brutal dictator. But there are apparently 1758 01:45:41.239 --> 01:45:44.399 a lot of Sunnis who took great offense at our 1759 01:45:44.560 --> 01:45:49.039 removal of Saddam, in our our destruction of the entire 1760 01:45:49.319 --> 01:45:56.119 Sunni socialist socialist system of power and wealth and support 1761 01:45:56.600 --> 01:46:00.960 that existed. And of course the bath party we were taking. 1762 01:46:01.079 --> 01:46:05.760 I have it's a video, but it's it's audio because 1763 01:46:05.760 --> 01:46:09.920 it's at night. We would take when we were first there, 1764 01:46:10.880 --> 01:46:16.359 seventy six indirect fire shots at night at what was 1765 01:46:16.439 --> 01:46:20.560 the American presence inside the Green what would ultimately become 1766 01:46:20.600 --> 01:46:24.920 the Greens On. It was just a gigantic impacteria, seventy 1767 01:46:25.000 --> 01:46:28.359 six you could count them all, from artillery to rockets 1768 01:46:28.439 --> 01:46:32.520 to mortars, and it was just a very very difficult 1769 01:46:32.600 --> 01:46:36.960 time and we were getting hit every every night. And then, 1770 01:46:37.039 --> 01:46:41.439 of course, as the American military presence went from you know, 1771 01:46:41.680 --> 01:46:45.720 from you know, invaders, and I say that in a 1772 01:46:45.840 --> 01:46:48.520 very positive way, not in a negative way, and as 1773 01:46:48.600 --> 01:46:51.279 they consolidated their games and as they were able to 1774 01:46:52.199 --> 01:46:54.760 really start to deal with some of these vets in life. 1775 01:46:55.359 --> 01:46:59.560 Strangely and bizarrely turned to normal where you could actually 1776 01:46:59.640 --> 01:47:03.600 go down on town, you know, along the river and 1777 01:47:03.800 --> 01:47:08.520 actually have some mos goof, you know, in a restaurant. Now, 1778 01:47:08.960 --> 01:47:11.560 you know, the last time we ate in this restaurant, 1779 01:47:12.399 --> 01:47:15.199 you know, thirty days later it was totally blown up 1780 01:47:15.800 --> 01:47:18.840 by a suicide bomber. And that was that was late 1781 01:47:18.920 --> 01:47:22.880 in two thousand and four. I want to say, but 1782 01:47:24.279 --> 01:47:27.760 I considered a rock to be you know again, you know, 1783 01:47:28.000 --> 01:47:31.319 just an opportunity to do a lot, and when we 1784 01:47:31.439 --> 01:47:34.600 were sort of missionary, like I guess at the time 1785 01:47:34.680 --> 01:47:38.840 myself included bringing some kind of better outcome for the 1786 01:47:38.880 --> 01:47:42.640 Iraqi people. Maybe that's naive. I believe that was naive 1787 01:47:42.680 --> 01:47:47.600 and myself at the time. But you know, the American 1788 01:47:47.680 --> 01:47:55.039 soldiers tremendous courage under very adverse circumstances, and particularly as 1789 01:47:55.079 --> 01:47:58.600 the years went on, you know, two thousand and seven hardyre, 1790 01:47:58.680 --> 01:48:02.720 Iraq hard. But we were there again in the early days, 1791 01:48:02.760 --> 01:48:04.520 you know, our natural partners who were there with our 1792 01:48:04.600 --> 01:48:08.760 Natural Partners Special Mission Unit, and of course it was 1793 01:48:09.000 --> 01:48:15.399 Stand the Crystal and who was himself transforming at Jaysak, 1794 01:48:15.520 --> 01:48:18.760 which was the National Mission Force into the premier counter 1795 01:48:18.840 --> 01:48:23.239 terrorism force that we now know and love today. You know, find, fix, 1796 01:48:23.319 --> 01:48:27.319 and finish, and he and his staff battle engineered you know, 1797 01:48:27.640 --> 01:48:34.079 that shortening that that information circle from intel to actioning 1798 01:48:34.199 --> 01:48:37.760 that intel where you pull guys off the objective. And 1799 01:48:38.000 --> 01:48:41.039 many of you know this far better than me, and 1800 01:48:41.159 --> 01:48:44.039 many of you participated in this. You know, where you'd 1801 01:48:44.079 --> 01:48:47.159 be pulling a guy off an objective and you'd be 1802 01:48:47.239 --> 01:48:50.439 interrogating them in the air on the way back. Another 1803 01:48:50.520 --> 01:48:55.439 assault force is waiting to action that before they're even back. 1804 01:48:56.279 --> 01:48:58.479 And so you all of a sudden have one force 1805 01:48:58.560 --> 01:49:03.960 coming back, another force going and and that requires a professional, professional, 1806 01:49:04.560 --> 01:49:12.079 competent lethal choreography that is unparalleled in military experience of 1807 01:49:12.159 --> 01:49:18.000 my view, and it showcases just extraordinary capabilities. And so 1808 01:49:18.520 --> 01:49:21.960 in the end, you know, that was intelligence driven. You know, 1809 01:49:22.119 --> 01:49:24.640 you needed intelligence to make that happen. That was the 1810 01:49:24.800 --> 01:49:29.439 fuel that started that process and it was the fuel 1811 01:49:29.479 --> 01:49:33.039 that kept going. And Jason pioneered a huge amount of that, 1812 01:49:33.640 --> 01:49:37.720 and CIA to our natural partnership, you know, we were 1813 01:49:37.800 --> 01:49:40.800 feeding into that as well. And the CIA presence and 1814 01:49:40.880 --> 01:49:43.239 I'm not going to talk about numbers, but you know 1815 01:49:43.359 --> 01:49:48.680 the CIA presence expanded dramatically, uh interact, and eventually, you know, 1816 01:49:48.840 --> 01:49:51.520 we became the size of what you could argue was 1817 01:49:51.600 --> 01:49:56.159 an ifter brigade, which isn't much for the army, but 1818 01:49:56.279 --> 01:49:58.800 for CIA is an extraordinary investment. 1819 01:49:59.079 --> 01:50:01.359 You were the OPPS chief over there early on. 1820 01:50:01.600 --> 01:50:03.560 I was the OP chief in the beginning, and then 1821 01:50:03.600 --> 01:50:05.680 I was chief of station in eighty nine and ten. 1822 01:50:06.239 --> 01:50:10.199 Got an opportunity to see liberation, to transition a sovereignty. 1823 01:50:11.119 --> 01:50:13.800 And so it's interesting to see, you know, kind of 1824 01:50:13.840 --> 01:50:19.600 those book and experiences, you know, and you know, challenging, 1825 01:50:19.760 --> 01:50:24.600 to say, the least largest usse embyssee in the history 1826 01:50:24.640 --> 01:50:29.600 of diplomacy, and as my CV my bio rip at 1827 01:50:29.640 --> 01:50:33.279 the time, at the time, it was the largest station 1828 01:50:33.479 --> 01:50:34.920 in the agency's history. 1829 01:50:35.159 --> 01:50:37.399 I have I have a ton of questions for you, Doug. 1830 01:50:37.520 --> 01:50:39.319 Some of them you may even be able to answer. 1831 01:50:40.159 --> 01:50:40.800 I'll try. 1832 01:50:44.000 --> 01:50:44.039 You. 1833 01:50:44.600 --> 01:50:46.159 I think you said you were a chief of station 1834 01:50:46.359 --> 01:50:47.720 four times throughout your career. 1835 01:50:48.359 --> 01:50:52.319 What were the unique challenges of running intel, running case 1836 01:50:52.399 --> 01:50:55.960 officers out into a war zone like bag Dad. How 1837 01:50:56.119 --> 01:50:58.479 how did that differ than some of your previous assignments. 1838 01:50:59.439 --> 01:51:03.039 Well, if, for example, if you were a case officer 1839 01:51:03.159 --> 01:51:07.720 in Geneva. You know, one, you weren't likely to get 1840 01:51:07.920 --> 01:51:11.399 killed on your way to an agent meeting. Your agent 1841 01:51:11.640 --> 01:51:14.039 was not likely to be killed while you were meeting 1842 01:51:14.119 --> 01:51:16.720 him along with yourself, and you weren't likely to be 1843 01:51:16.880 --> 01:51:22.840 killed coming back. And that's not meant to disparage traditional 1844 01:51:23.039 --> 01:51:26.439 espionage by any means that it is hard. It's more 1845 01:51:26.479 --> 01:51:29.560 than just meeting a dude, Okay, And you could talk 1846 01:51:29.560 --> 01:51:32.239 about I couldalk about that at length, which would be 1847 01:51:32.640 --> 01:51:35.600 digressive for what you're trying to accomplish here. But the 1848 01:51:35.680 --> 01:51:40.319 reality is we had to take the traditional elements of espionage, 1849 01:51:41.600 --> 01:51:47.000 the trade craft that worked for CIA for generations since 1850 01:51:47.079 --> 01:51:51.159 nineteen forty seven, and we add to it, carefully, adapt that, 1851 01:51:51.439 --> 01:51:55.880 tailor it, and modify it so that we could still 1852 01:51:56.079 --> 01:52:01.800 do the business of meaning human beings and extracting intelligence 1853 01:52:01.920 --> 01:52:07.600 through that meeting without bringing extraordinary risk to that individual 1854 01:52:07.760 --> 01:52:11.760 that is working on bath of the United States subjectives 1855 01:52:12.680 --> 01:52:15.640 and our own officers. And how do you do that, 1856 01:52:16.000 --> 01:52:19.800 because inherently that has to be a non public, very 1857 01:52:19.960 --> 01:52:25.880 secret enterprise and in a non lethal environment in the Genevas, 1858 01:52:26.840 --> 01:52:29.520 you know, in the Paris, you know, blends of the 1859 01:52:29.560 --> 01:52:35.920 world extraordinary counterintelligence pressure. Don't get me wrong with Moscow. 1860 01:52:37.119 --> 01:52:41.319 Impossible to work there. You know, it takes an incredibly 1861 01:52:41.640 --> 01:52:44.279 special officer to do that. I would never be able 1862 01:52:44.319 --> 01:52:46.520 to do that. I was never able. I would never 1863 01:52:46.600 --> 01:52:50.720 be good enough. So I wouldn't have done well in 1864 01:52:50.840 --> 01:52:55.520 the traditional espionage business. But because of my military background, 1865 01:52:56.000 --> 01:52:59.560 because of my counter terrorism experience in CIA, I think 1866 01:52:59.640 --> 01:53:05.159 I was well experienced enough to be a constructive part 1867 01:53:05.319 --> 01:53:08.439 of the adaptive process to figure out how does CIA 1868 01:53:08.520 --> 01:53:12.359 do business without getting people killed and still providing you know, 1869 01:53:13.000 --> 01:53:17.840 valuable and intelligence for the policymaker and actionable intelligence, you know, 1870 01:53:17.920 --> 01:53:21.720 for the war fighter. And so we had to do 1871 01:53:21.840 --> 01:53:24.680 a lot of a lot of adaptation, a lot of modification, 1872 01:53:25.319 --> 01:53:28.760 and kudos to the officers who took those risks when 1873 01:53:28.840 --> 01:53:32.000 we were trying new stuff for the first time. You know, 1874 01:53:32.439 --> 01:53:35.840 you had no idea. I don't say you implying that 1875 01:53:35.920 --> 01:53:38.520 I was part of it. They had no idea that 1876 01:53:38.600 --> 01:53:40.199 they were going to come back from them, right. 1877 01:53:41.119 --> 01:53:45.880 You know, did you feel that your mission over there 1878 01:53:46.199 --> 01:53:50.479 was shifting from the agency's traditional strategic intelligence mission to 1879 01:53:50.560 --> 01:53:53.640 now collecting more like tactical level intelligence, Oh. 1880 01:53:53.600 --> 01:53:56.159 Without a doubt, and that that cause, and that was 1881 01:53:56.279 --> 01:53:59.960 very necessary. Quite frankly, as I, as I told my offer, 1882 01:54:00.079 --> 01:54:02.279 there is all the time, and I reinforced it with 1883 01:54:02.439 --> 01:54:05.680 our colleagues, whether it's in Afghanistan, what is in Bosnia 1884 01:54:05.760 --> 01:54:09.119 for that matter, or in Afghanistan, or in Rock or 1885 01:54:09.239 --> 01:54:13.159 in serially, you know, I said, job one is forced protection. 1886 01:54:13.760 --> 01:54:18.840 Keeping American soldiers alive is job one. Everything else it 1887 01:54:18.920 --> 01:54:23.319 is totally subordinate to that top priority. We will spare 1888 01:54:23.520 --> 01:54:28.199 no effort to keep American women and men alive. That 1889 01:54:28.479 --> 01:54:31.960 is a sacred obligation and we must do that. That 1890 01:54:32.119 --> 01:54:34.800 is job one. Nothing else going to be done. The 1891 01:54:34.920 --> 01:54:38.720 second priority ends up being providing the intelligence so that 1892 01:54:38.840 --> 01:54:43.199 our military partners could smoke on the battlefield those that 1893 01:54:43.359 --> 01:54:46.920 are creating the force protection issues that we were trying 1894 01:54:46.960 --> 01:54:50.479 to mitigate. And so job one force protection, job to 1895 01:54:50.800 --> 01:54:55.439 actionable intelligence to the warfright. Then, of course, CIA, unlike 1896 01:54:56.159 --> 01:54:59.279 you know, our military colleagues that are very focused on CT, 1897 01:54:59.479 --> 01:55:03.079 very focused still going uh. You know, we had the 1898 01:55:03.159 --> 01:55:06.399 broader rate broader we had to worry about the stability 1899 01:55:06.479 --> 01:55:08.239 of Iraq. We had to worry about Iraq, we had 1900 01:55:08.239 --> 01:55:10.880 to worry about Saudi Arabia. We had to worry about 1901 01:55:10.920 --> 01:55:13.079 the golf Arab States, We had to worry about the 1902 01:55:13.159 --> 01:55:17.600 third country presence there. And even though Bagdad was an 1903 01:55:18.399 --> 01:55:23.199 incredibly challenging environment, there were still other embassies that were there, 1904 01:55:23.319 --> 01:55:26.000 and other diplomats, and they all played a role in 1905 01:55:26.439 --> 01:55:28.840 either helping us or impeding us, and so we had 1906 01:55:28.880 --> 01:55:31.600 to pay attention to them and had to engage them. 1907 01:55:32.239 --> 01:55:38.880 And so the broad, incredibly complex and diverse mission that 1908 01:55:39.039 --> 01:55:45.000 cias everywhere and every place that it is was complicated 1909 01:55:45.439 --> 01:55:49.239 and made more existential by job want to jump to 1910 01:55:50.520 --> 01:55:55.000 and that required a very special structure, a very special culture, 1911 01:55:55.359 --> 01:55:59.399 and more importantly, some just extraordinary women and men who 1912 01:55:59.439 --> 01:56:03.520 were really who volunteered to come out to that kind 1913 01:56:03.520 --> 01:56:08.680 of environment. You know, thrived in most cases in that 1914 01:56:08.840 --> 01:56:11.720 kind of environment. And it really says a lot about 1915 01:56:12.399 --> 01:56:17.920 you know, those young and often inexperienced CIA officers who 1916 01:56:18.000 --> 01:56:21.920 I hold in the highest of regard because they volunteered 1917 01:56:22.000 --> 01:56:24.600 to get involved in something that they had absolutely no 1918 01:56:24.760 --> 01:56:29.199 idea what the con personal consequences were. I think as 1919 01:56:29.359 --> 01:56:33.800 soldier kind of recognized we expect that you kind of 1920 01:56:33.920 --> 01:56:38.439 expect that, right and and uh and and but in 1921 01:56:38.840 --> 01:56:43.640 in CIA, because you know, we didn't train for war, right, 1922 01:56:43.880 --> 01:56:48.560 we didn't train for war, and and not not you know, 1923 01:56:48.760 --> 01:56:53.560 not a major portion of c I A, you know, 1924 01:56:54.079 --> 01:56:58.720 got the Afghan experience. So there were officers rogered up 1925 01:56:59.439 --> 01:57:05.520 to leave family, single moms, single parents, single officers, married officers, 1926 01:57:05.720 --> 01:57:09.880 huge families, small families, you know, elder care issues, you know, 1927 01:57:10.159 --> 01:57:16.000 all of the obligations of life. And these remarkable officers 1928 01:57:16.520 --> 01:57:20.239 were willing to set that aside, to undertake a task 1929 01:57:20.359 --> 01:57:23.760 and put themselves into an environment that they had absolutely 1930 01:57:23.920 --> 01:57:27.319 no conscious appreciation for it. And it was such a 1931 01:57:27.439 --> 01:57:31.560 dynamic and unpredictable environment that you could think that this 1932 01:57:31.680 --> 01:57:35.239 neighborhood of Bank Dad was actually pretty safe, and then 1933 01:57:35.279 --> 01:57:39.119 you find out that ussed wrong, you know, because it 1934 01:57:39.279 --> 01:57:44.680 changed literally last minute. And so I sit and just 1935 01:57:44.880 --> 01:57:48.199 hold in the highest regard. I obviously hold my military 1936 01:57:48.319 --> 01:57:51.840 colleagues in extraordinary high regard, and that goes without saying. 1937 01:57:51.920 --> 01:57:57.039 But you know our CI officers, and what's interesting, I mean, 1938 01:57:57.079 --> 01:58:00.880 you think you had an EFTRA brigade size investment in Okay, 1939 01:58:01.640 --> 01:58:04.600 and I had a SUB I had like the twelfth 1940 01:58:04.720 --> 01:58:08.239 largest air force in the world. I had everything from 1941 01:58:08.800 --> 01:58:13.520 you know, shall we say traditional CIA authorities. And what 1942 01:58:13.680 --> 01:58:18.520 else say euphemistically is non traditional military authorities always say 1943 01:58:19.680 --> 01:58:26.279 aggressive authorities, which we used in times when our military colleagues, 1944 01:58:26.319 --> 01:58:29.920 by policy, were precluded from exercising, you know, their own 1945 01:58:30.359 --> 01:58:36.359 aggressive authorities, shall we say. And you know that was 1946 01:58:36.960 --> 01:58:41.079 a large number of officers that were there that you know, 1947 01:58:41.399 --> 01:58:44.840 that adapted and they learned, and they worked together, and 1948 01:58:45.960 --> 01:58:48.359 they were sharing the mission with their own colleagues, and 1949 01:58:48.359 --> 01:58:51.720 they were sharing the mission with their military conart and 1950 01:58:51.800 --> 01:58:53.840 they were committed each other's success. And I know I 1951 01:58:53.960 --> 01:58:57.479 sound like I'm a Polyannish guy and I'm over exaggerating. 1952 01:58:57.560 --> 01:59:01.600 And for those that haven't had that EXPERI I understand 1953 01:59:01.680 --> 01:59:05.439 why you'd probably think I'm being a little traumatic. But 1954 01:59:06.359 --> 01:59:08.760 I can't begin to tell you that I don't think 1955 01:59:08.800 --> 01:59:12.359 I'm exaggerating very much. If I am, it's not by intent, 1956 01:59:12.560 --> 01:59:15.680 but it's just I don't know. 1957 01:59:16.039 --> 01:59:20.560 I'm curious about you know, your because and this is 1958 01:59:20.600 --> 01:59:23.199 sort of fast forwarding a bit to ask you to 1959 01:59:23.279 --> 01:59:25.840 reflect on something that you may have thought while you 1960 01:59:25.920 --> 01:59:28.359 were there at a future day. But you did eventually 1961 01:59:29.119 --> 01:59:31.520 become the deputy director of the d i A. The 1962 01:59:31.640 --> 01:59:35.159 d A was very active, but also the DEA doesn't 1963 01:59:35.199 --> 01:59:37.920 get much credit for anything at all, really, but they 1964 01:59:37.960 --> 01:59:41.239 were very active there in Baghdad, particularly in those early 1965 01:59:41.359 --> 01:59:45.439 years and everything, being at the station and being being 1966 01:59:45.520 --> 01:59:48.920 the big dog of the intelligence world, as you know, 1967 01:59:49.560 --> 01:59:53.800 as the CIA is. What did you have an impression, awareness, 1968 01:59:53.880 --> 01:59:58.399 and knowledge opinions of the D I A presence there, Uh, 1969 01:59:59.520 --> 01:59:59.880 the d. 1970 02:00:00.079 --> 02:00:05.640 I mean obviously there wasn't. The answer was, strangely yes, 1971 02:00:06.840 --> 02:00:09.439 I had a positive view of the military, irrespective of 1972 02:00:09.520 --> 02:00:11.359 what part of the Defense Department you came from. So 1973 02:00:12.119 --> 02:00:15.279 I was predisposed to look for the positive and maybe 1974 02:00:15.560 --> 02:00:18.119 that maybe it didn't make me unique, but it may 1975 02:00:18.359 --> 02:00:21.279 put me in a select part of I think the 1976 02:00:21.439 --> 02:00:26.520 CIA workforce. Second was, you know I had found in 1977 02:00:26.640 --> 02:00:29.520 my formative experience with the power Majesty of the d 1978 02:00:29.760 --> 02:00:34.399 D was in Bosnia, where I had a major defense 1979 02:00:34.520 --> 02:00:40.920 human Defense case officer operator presence there, all of whom 1980 02:00:41.039 --> 02:00:45.960 had gone through the formative same formative experience operational certification 1981 02:00:46.119 --> 02:00:50.680 experience that we CIA officers went through in the same 1982 02:00:50.760 --> 02:00:55.000 location actually with a shared gagery of trainers and educators, 1983 02:00:56.359 --> 02:00:59.159 and in the same environment against the same task so 1984 02:00:59.319 --> 02:01:03.199 we were virtually identical life forms and so we're now 1985 02:01:03.359 --> 02:01:07.439 serving together. So I had an extraordinary positive. Plus, there 1986 02:01:07.600 --> 02:01:12.319 was significant defense human separate presence there. There was a 1987 02:01:12.399 --> 02:01:14.920 strategic base that they had to and then there was 1988 02:01:14.960 --> 02:01:18.600 this thing I think called Eskimo Base that was there 1989 02:01:18.680 --> 02:01:21.680 that was doing their thing, and the inmacy and cooperation 1990 02:01:22.279 --> 02:01:26.319 was absolutely important. And I think any of those base 1991 02:01:26.399 --> 02:01:29.399 chiefs would tell you that CIA was a really good 1992 02:01:29.479 --> 02:01:32.760 partner because we really respected their capabilities and what we did. 1993 02:01:32.960 --> 02:01:36.159 I carried that and so yes, there was a DIA 1994 02:01:36.279 --> 02:01:39.000 presence in the rector was right across the street at 1995 02:01:39.079 --> 02:01:42.479 FOB Union three, if I recall correctly, and I would 1996 02:01:42.520 --> 02:01:45.479 go all there all the time as a CIA station 1997 02:01:45.680 --> 02:01:49.039 chief of that with a major amount of presence, a 1998 02:01:49.600 --> 02:01:56.479 massive diversity of responsibilities. Investing my time was an expression 1999 02:01:56.560 --> 02:02:00.800 of what I thought was valuable, right right. I went 2000 02:02:00.960 --> 02:02:07.159 over to that little detachment almost every day. Wow, and 2001 02:02:07.600 --> 02:02:11.439 I had developed as close a partnership and interestingly enough, 2002 02:02:11.960 --> 02:02:14.560 that detachment was not just what you and I now 2003 02:02:14.720 --> 02:02:18.960 call Defense Glandestine Service defense human that they were all. 2004 02:02:19.079 --> 02:02:23.439 They were actually uh you know, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, 2005 02:02:23.880 --> 02:02:26.479 you know agents that were in there. There were agents 2006 02:02:26.560 --> 02:02:31.680 from other federal law enforcement who themselves to source operations. Right, 2007 02:02:32.199 --> 02:02:34.199 maybe they don't use the same trade craft in the 2008 02:02:34.239 --> 02:02:36.640 same kind of environment, but they were also out there, 2009 02:02:37.159 --> 02:02:40.159 you know, putting themselves at risk to provide intelligence. And 2010 02:02:40.840 --> 02:02:43.640 of course, being the quote the d n I REP, 2011 02:02:44.520 --> 02:02:48.319 you know, the Defense the Director of National Inteligence Rep, 2012 02:02:48.439 --> 02:02:53.359 the senior intelligence officer in Iraq, MY job was to 2013 02:02:53.479 --> 02:02:56.000 integrate and coordinate. So yeah, I had an obligation to 2014 02:02:56.960 --> 02:03:00.760 make sure I gathered all the intel guys, you know, 2015 02:03:00.920 --> 02:03:04.359 under my warm embrace. But the reality is I did that, 2016 02:03:04.520 --> 02:03:07.880 whether I was required to do that or not, because 2017 02:03:07.920 --> 02:03:10.800 I really thought that those those women and men over there, 2018 02:03:10.880 --> 02:03:13.920 we're bringing some significant value to what we're trying to 2019 02:03:13.960 --> 02:03:19.520 accomplish in our our compound. So yeah, DIA was there 2020 02:03:19.720 --> 02:03:24.119 in space, and you're right, d I A doesn't the credit. 2021 02:03:24.560 --> 02:03:27.720 It's the part of that Stuart's positioning in the political 2022 02:03:27.760 --> 02:03:31.720 battle space. But the IC in Washington, d C. Part 2023 02:03:31.760 --> 02:03:36.439 of that's due because of just the necessary obligations of 2024 02:03:36.600 --> 02:03:39.600 secreceed and part of that's because they just don't have 2025 02:03:39.760 --> 02:03:44.640 the prominent infrastructure for collection. I think everybody's probably heard 2026 02:03:44.680 --> 02:03:47.640 of military ad tche so every one of them works 2027 02:03:47.680 --> 02:03:52.039 for the director of di A. They're all dias, Okay, 2028 02:03:53.159 --> 02:03:55.680 So the defense at say, service works for the director 2029 02:03:55.720 --> 02:03:58.720 of d You know, some people know that, some people don't. 2030 02:03:58.760 --> 02:04:02.560 But everybody's heard of military ada chet. Probably very few 2031 02:04:02.560 --> 02:04:05.840 people have heard of the defense Clint. Fewer still because 2032 02:04:05.880 --> 02:04:10.159 they toil away and anonymity to a degree which is 2033 02:04:10.199 --> 02:04:13.119 imposed on them, but it's a very necessary part so 2034 02:04:13.199 --> 02:04:15.600 they can be effective. So yeah, they don't get the 2035 02:04:15.680 --> 02:04:19.319 credit they deserve. And there are remarkable officers and de 2036 02:04:19.439 --> 02:04:23.399 I as an inherently an all source analytic agency, and 2037 02:04:23.479 --> 02:04:27.760 that's what the culture India is. It's designed to support 2038 02:04:28.279 --> 02:04:33.039 the analytic machine and the purity of the analytic processes 2039 02:04:34.279 --> 02:04:36.479 within d i A. So it it does have a 2040 02:04:36.680 --> 02:04:40.159 very analytic you can smell, you know, it's very analytic 2041 02:04:40.720 --> 02:04:43.279 smell in the enter of the building, joking, but you 2042 02:04:43.319 --> 02:04:45.000 can smell it when you have the building. 2043 02:04:47.359 --> 02:04:50.640 So, I know, we're kind of just hitting the wavetops here, Doug, 2044 02:04:50.760 --> 02:04:53.720 and I know we're probably gonna have to have you 2045 02:04:53.840 --> 02:04:57.439 back again on some time because we're glossing over so much. 2046 02:04:57.520 --> 02:05:00.279 But what came after Iraq for you? After you know, 2047 02:05:00.439 --> 02:05:02.960 twenty ten, well. 2048 02:05:02.960 --> 02:05:08.640 After Iraq, the Director of Operations thought that the best 2049 02:05:08.680 --> 02:05:12.119 place for me to take my multiple years as a 2050 02:05:12.199 --> 02:05:16.399 COS multiple times a CS. And I should say for 2051 02:05:16.520 --> 02:05:19.880 your audience that may not be as familiar with the 2052 02:05:20.199 --> 02:05:24.079 CIA structures as some of us are. You know in 2053 02:05:24.199 --> 02:05:26.199 the director and first thing is you know in the 2054 02:05:26.279 --> 02:05:32.720 Director of Operations, I would guess probably you know less 2055 02:05:32.760 --> 02:05:36.000 than a quarter operators get to be a CS one time, 2056 02:05:37.479 --> 02:05:40.640 and with me having the privilege and the honor to 2057 02:05:40.720 --> 02:05:44.079 be a four times extraordinary, it says more about the 2058 02:05:44.199 --> 02:05:47.359 agency's risk taking than it does about my competency. But 2059 02:05:48.680 --> 02:05:51.479 I think that the Deputy Director of Operation time guy 2060 02:05:51.560 --> 02:05:54.199 named Mike Silik, who was a consultant for the for 2061 02:05:54.359 --> 02:05:58.439 the Americans and wrote a book about the Russian intel 2062 02:05:58.479 --> 02:06:01.960 operations in the United States. Great guy, former marine is 2063 02:06:01.960 --> 02:06:05.399 the anything I could say bad about him? Uh via 2064 02:06:06.119 --> 02:06:10.760 Harvard Graduate Vietnamese linguist if you can believe that marine interesting, 2065 02:06:11.039 --> 02:06:12.560 Mike is an amazing. 2066 02:06:12.279 --> 02:06:15.920 Guys do the Vietnamese have Yeah? 2067 02:06:16.439 --> 02:06:21.399 And uh yes, so uh so Mike decided that you know, 2068 02:06:21.479 --> 02:06:26.000 whatever it is that I represented, uh, that he needed 2069 02:06:26.079 --> 02:06:29.279 that as part of the you know, the training machine. 2070 02:06:30.039 --> 02:06:34.119 So uh, you know, the agency has not allowed me 2071 02:06:34.199 --> 02:06:36.199 to use the F word, and I'm not talking about 2072 02:06:38.560 --> 02:06:40.800 you know the other F words. Training. 2073 02:06:41.000 --> 02:06:42.760 Training, the next generation of spies. 2074 02:06:42.880 --> 02:06:45.319 Yeah, training, Yeah, training. I was in charge of all 2075 02:06:45.359 --> 02:06:51.920 operational training for at an undisclosed location. But you know, 2076 02:06:52.039 --> 02:06:54.560 Mike thought that I had a contribution to make him 2077 02:06:54.560 --> 02:06:58.079 growing the next generation of me and UH and to 2078 02:06:58.199 --> 02:07:02.279 be able to do that, you know, at our facility, 2079 02:07:02.920 --> 02:07:06.159 it was a singular honor. And given my blue collar 2080 02:07:06.319 --> 02:07:10.359 perception I was, I was kind of a fish out 2081 02:07:10.399 --> 02:07:13.479 of water. I felt very out of water. Well, I 2082 02:07:13.640 --> 02:07:16.199 was there because I just didn't still you know, here 2083 02:07:16.239 --> 02:07:21.119 I am an SIS three or four, you know. Now, 2084 02:07:21.840 --> 02:07:24.600 you know it was at twenty and ten. You know, 2085 02:07:24.720 --> 02:07:27.840 I'm now from nineteen eighty seven to two thousand and 2086 02:07:27.880 --> 02:07:29.720 ten at that much time in the agency, and I'm 2087 02:07:29.760 --> 02:07:33.640 still you know, I wasn't acting like it, but I 2088 02:07:33.800 --> 02:07:36.920 certainly believed it. You know, I still wasn't worthy of 2089 02:07:37.399 --> 02:07:40.479 this kind of opportunity. I really didn't think I was worthy. 2090 02:07:41.119 --> 02:07:43.359 And maybe there are others that would I agree with 2091 02:07:43.439 --> 02:07:51.239 that as well, But you know, that was a wonderful 2092 02:07:51.279 --> 02:07:55.239 opportunity to kind of go back and see how you know, 2093 02:07:55.800 --> 02:08:00.640 the big the big training machine worked and you know, 2094 02:08:00.880 --> 02:08:03.840 to be an advocate, to be a champion, to be 2095 02:08:03.920 --> 02:08:07.760 able to take credit for you know, the training cadret 2096 02:08:08.079 --> 02:08:12.199 of both former officers as well as current officers, military 2097 02:08:12.199 --> 02:08:18.039 accomplished military officers, and I should say other non military, 2098 02:08:18.119 --> 02:08:22.760 NONKAY members of the leadership and training cadret as well, 2099 02:08:23.199 --> 02:08:27.439 who themselves were graduates of that program. So it was 2100 02:08:27.479 --> 02:08:31.000 a wonderful opportunity for me to really reconnect with the 2101 02:08:31.079 --> 02:08:35.640 basics of espionage and and really realize, hey, how much 2102 02:08:35.720 --> 02:08:38.720 I failed to learn and how much I had learned 2103 02:08:38.760 --> 02:08:43.039 but forgotten. Yeah, and so for me, it really as 2104 02:08:43.079 --> 02:08:47.000 I think anybody who was an instructor you know at 2105 02:08:47.079 --> 02:08:49.399 that location, we'll tell you they came out of that 2106 02:08:50.039 --> 02:08:52.560 as a much better operator than they did going into 2107 02:08:52.640 --> 02:08:53.279 that assignment. 2108 02:08:53.680 --> 02:08:57.840 Had there been many changes from the time you went 2109 02:08:57.960 --> 02:09:01.720 through to the time that you you worked there, or 2110 02:09:02.600 --> 02:09:04.560 did they really hold on to that core? 2111 02:09:07.760 --> 02:09:16.439 The certification for case officers is predominantly unchanged because quite frankly, 2112 02:09:16.680 --> 02:09:22.199 it's all about the fundamentals. And so even if you 2113 02:09:22.319 --> 02:09:27.920 know your instructor was a retired officer who spent his 2114 02:09:28.159 --> 02:09:32.079 or her career in Eastern Europe and in Moscow, and 2115 02:09:32.159 --> 02:09:39.600 had no exposure to Afghanistan, rock coin, CTC, none of that. Fundamentally, 2116 02:09:39.680 --> 02:09:42.439 you can't be a good CTC officer unless you understand 2117 02:09:42.479 --> 02:09:46.000 the basics of espionage. And that's where you learn it. 2118 02:09:46.720 --> 02:09:50.640 And yes, there are adaptations there. There are always improvements 2119 02:09:50.720 --> 02:09:54.199 to the course as you would expect, you know, interjection 2120 02:09:54.359 --> 02:09:57.479 of modern technology, because that was critical and important for 2121 02:09:58.000 --> 02:10:01.439 officers to understand the benefit. It's the risk of technology. 2122 02:10:02.159 --> 02:10:06.800 And what you found is down in those in those locations, 2123 02:10:07.279 --> 02:10:11.119 you found you know, the record of science and technology, 2124 02:10:11.680 --> 02:10:16.960 presence and training and graduate level, you know, courses. You 2125 02:10:17.079 --> 02:10:19.439 found the rector of analysis. So all of a sudden 2126 02:10:19.520 --> 02:10:23.640 you find in that environment, in close geographic proximity, all 2127 02:10:23.640 --> 02:10:25.640 of a sudden you find the other tribes that are there. 2128 02:10:26.520 --> 02:10:30.640 And then after I left that location and became the 2129 02:10:30.760 --> 02:10:35.520 Grand Puba, I was the you know, the Emperor Palpatine 2130 02:10:35.840 --> 02:10:40.720 of the entire training machine. Uh. You know, we tried, 2131 02:10:40.880 --> 02:10:46.960 we built a greater integration from a visionary standpoint, you know, 2132 02:10:47.520 --> 02:10:52.439 even more integrate and better integrate and develop better appreciation 2133 02:10:52.800 --> 02:10:55.760 for the different life forms within the doos, some of 2134 02:10:55.880 --> 02:11:00.399 which you mentioned, Uh, you know, targeters, cmos, you know 2135 02:11:00.680 --> 02:11:05.279 support officers all of that, and I only you know, 2136 02:11:05.960 --> 02:11:08.720 kind of kicked that rock down the hill. I fought 2137 02:11:08.880 --> 02:11:12.600 the visionary battle. But it was you know, guys like uh, 2138 02:11:12.960 --> 02:11:17.159 you know, Darryl Blocker, who's who's an over officer, Mike 2139 02:11:17.319 --> 02:11:21.319 Lacombe who was a multiple COS in Iraq, who had 2140 02:11:21.359 --> 02:11:23.199 been my d c O S when I was there. 2141 02:11:24.000 --> 02:11:29.720 There were guys like like Lacombe who really really made 2142 02:11:29.840 --> 02:11:36.520 the transformation of that entire you know, operational training enterprise 2143 02:11:37.079 --> 02:11:39.760 to be a modern one, to reflect the demands of 2144 02:11:40.880 --> 02:11:44.359 the environment in which modern CI officers were finding themselves. 2145 02:11:45.520 --> 02:11:49.880 And so, you know, my role was minor, and it 2146 02:11:50.039 --> 02:11:52.439 was and it was interesting. If I could go back 2147 02:11:52.479 --> 02:11:55.560 to something I said is you know what I did 2148 02:11:55.880 --> 02:11:58.199 was created a vision where you come in entry on 2149 02:11:58.359 --> 02:12:02.640 duty and you go to graduated leadership and operational development 2150 02:12:02.680 --> 02:12:06.680 process until you ended up as a as a proto 2151 02:12:06.800 --> 02:12:10.000 wretched pensioner at the end of the ride. And there 2152 02:12:10.079 --> 02:12:14.159 were some CIA officers who are quite you know, you know, 2153 02:12:14.800 --> 02:12:19.600 impervious to and insoluble and new ideas. Fortunately minority. You know, 2154 02:12:19.880 --> 02:12:25.319 I had conversations like this, which is where that's not 2155 02:12:25.439 --> 02:12:28.560 going to work. And I go why not. And they go, well, 2156 02:12:28.600 --> 02:12:30.560 because it's not. It's just not gonna work. We don't 2157 02:12:30.560 --> 02:12:32.920 have time, we don't need any of that, and it's 2158 02:12:32.960 --> 02:12:38.079 not gonna And I said, what's the fundamental objection? And 2159 02:12:38.159 --> 02:12:42.520 they would go, well, well, let me not object let 2160 02:12:42.600 --> 02:12:46.479 me just say this. Let me go. You're a military guy, right, 2161 02:12:46.680 --> 02:12:49.319 isn't that where you can I go, yes, sir, And 2162 02:12:49.399 --> 02:12:52.960 I go, yeah, that's a military thing. That whole thing, 2163 02:12:53.680 --> 02:12:56.479 that whole thing from basic course to advanced course, to 2164 02:12:56.600 --> 02:12:59.720 leaven Worth to the work College, you know, all of 2165 02:12:59.800 --> 02:13:03.680 that stuff. It's a military thing that's not us. So 2166 02:13:04.319 --> 02:13:08.000 going back to my conversation in nineteen ninety two on 2167 02:13:08.880 --> 02:13:15.079 you know, this non existent process of military leadership versus 2168 02:13:15.159 --> 02:13:19.119 CIA leadership, now I'm facing that, you know, you know, 2169 02:13:19.319 --> 02:13:22.960 as a very senior officer in the Director of Operations, 2170 02:13:23.159 --> 02:13:25.720 I thought it was very ironic. The good news is 2171 02:13:26.199 --> 02:13:28.600 that their vision didn't take the day. It was guys 2172 02:13:28.680 --> 02:13:31.920 like Blocker and Mike Lacom and others who followed them 2173 02:13:32.439 --> 02:13:35.600 that really made it happen and created a fully integrated 2174 02:13:36.760 --> 02:13:41.279 program that you know, is still under improvement every day 2175 02:13:41.920 --> 02:13:42.960 that that thing exists. 2176 02:13:43.520 --> 02:13:47.960 This is a little spicy but you were also a 2177 02:13:48.039 --> 02:13:51.000 senior guy during a time where the agency had some 2178 02:13:51.159 --> 02:13:56.960 pretty spectacular public successes and failures. You had the the 2179 02:13:57.359 --> 02:14:01.279 Biladen raid, you had been Ghazi happening, you're the director 2180 02:14:01.359 --> 02:14:05.439 stepped down. I was just curious, if you're from your perspective, 2181 02:14:05.439 --> 02:14:08.079 if you had any insights into sort of the internal 2182 02:14:08.159 --> 02:14:11.159 dynamics of what was happening in the agency as those 2183 02:14:11.199 --> 02:14:13.479 events kind of unfolded in a very public way. 2184 02:14:15.560 --> 02:14:20.000 Any institution that's going to be buffeted around by anomalous 2185 02:14:20.159 --> 02:14:25.439 behavior by the environment, outside forces, and certainly by behaviors 2186 02:14:25.479 --> 02:14:29.239 of individual officers, whether they're junior officers or senior officers. 2187 02:14:31.199 --> 02:14:34.560 But the agency's got a resilience that is is just 2188 02:14:34.800 --> 02:14:39.479 another another example of why it's such a remarkable institution. 2189 02:14:40.840 --> 02:14:40.960 Uh. 2190 02:14:41.520 --> 02:14:45.359 When you have a number of very public incidents like 2191 02:14:45.479 --> 02:14:48.079 the one you mentioned, one you didn't mention was the 2192 02:14:49.119 --> 02:14:51.920 you know, the leaking of the IG investigation on a 2193 02:14:52.000 --> 02:14:53.199 detention program. 2194 02:14:54.119 --> 02:14:54.680 The RDI. 2195 02:14:54.880 --> 02:15:02.680 That RDI, Yeah, that was quite controversy controversial, and I 2196 02:15:02.840 --> 02:15:03.319 remember that. 2197 02:15:03.520 --> 02:15:06.760 Diane Feinstein was publicly saying that the CIA was going 2198 02:15:06.800 --> 02:15:08.039 to be disbanded over. 2199 02:15:08.000 --> 02:15:15.720 That Californian What can you say, Uh, you know, no, 2200 02:15:15.920 --> 02:15:19.720 just no disrespect to the fine people of California. We 2201 02:15:20.079 --> 02:15:24.920 need California because you know, for various reasons. But the 2202 02:15:25.520 --> 02:15:28.359 liberal thought it just happens to be one in Hollywood 2203 02:15:28.520 --> 02:15:33.399 might be another Silicon Valley. But the politicians, you know, 2204 02:15:33.520 --> 02:15:37.079 Devin Ninyas and others not not so helpful. Uh But 2205 02:15:37.159 --> 02:15:40.479 I don't want to get political here. But the it 2206 02:15:40.600 --> 02:15:43.319 really is because of the strength of the agency workforce, 2207 02:15:43.960 --> 02:15:46.960 you know, the commitment to not only American core values, 2208 02:15:47.000 --> 02:15:52.920 but also the agency ethos. You know of being right 2209 02:15:53.279 --> 02:15:56.960 when nobody's looking at you, whether you are being right, 2210 02:15:57.520 --> 02:16:00.279 you know you're doing the right thing when nobody's looking thing. 2211 02:16:00.960 --> 02:16:04.680 And so you kind of you know that stuff's going 2212 02:16:04.760 --> 02:16:07.760 to happen. You can't plan for it. You just plan 2213 02:16:08.000 --> 02:16:13.520 for an existence of some negative thing, and you know, 2214 02:16:13.880 --> 02:16:16.039 you just get beyond it. You got to get through 2215 02:16:16.119 --> 02:16:19.600 all that. And because the agency officers, you know, the 2216 02:16:19.680 --> 02:16:22.840 women and men regardless of the tribe you know, and 2217 02:16:23.079 --> 02:16:26.640 in the agency are just so remarkably resilient. You know, 2218 02:16:27.680 --> 02:16:31.159 there are remarkable people throughout federal service who are who 2219 02:16:31.199 --> 02:16:33.680 are remarkable. Don't get me wrong, I'm not saying that 2220 02:16:33.799 --> 02:16:37.600 the only remarkable stuff that exists in federal service is 2221 02:16:37.680 --> 02:16:41.200 in CIA. You know, the personal side of me wants 2222 02:16:41.280 --> 02:16:45.840 to say that, professional side say that, but the reality 2223 02:16:46.000 --> 02:16:48.879 is it's the strength of the and the caliber and 2224 02:16:49.120 --> 02:16:52.520 the quality of the people and the leaders in CIA 2225 02:16:52.639 --> 02:16:55.559 that make it so resilient and we get through that stuff, 2226 02:16:55.840 --> 02:17:00.799 whether it's Durham investigating guys like me and others, whether 2227 02:17:00.920 --> 02:17:04.000 it's you know, all the things that you mentioned, whether 2228 02:17:04.000 --> 02:17:09.719 it's rd I, whether it's you know, traitorous behavior by 2229 02:17:10.120 --> 02:17:18.120 by respected colleagues. You know, Jim Nicholson was a branch 2230 02:17:18.200 --> 02:17:20.760 chief in CTC when I was there, you know, and 2231 02:17:20.920 --> 02:17:27.440 he of course was recruited by the KGB. And you know, 2232 02:17:27.520 --> 02:17:31.799 it's just to answer your question, it's the the strength 2233 02:17:31.959 --> 02:17:35.360 of the agency's officers and the strength of the culture 2234 02:17:36.239 --> 02:17:40.040 and in the commitment to do what's right. You know, 2235 02:17:40.159 --> 02:17:42.639 we get beyond that. We just say, Okay, this happened, 2236 02:17:42.879 --> 02:17:45.840 let's fix the agency and let's move forward. 2237 02:17:46.319 --> 02:17:49.360 Well, the agency is also sort of in this unique 2238 02:17:49.479 --> 02:17:54.159 position where if there is somebody if something goes wrong, 2239 02:17:54.559 --> 02:17:58.079 or if somebody does something wrong that like the agency, 2240 02:17:58.479 --> 02:18:04.920 there failure is whether it's organizational or individual or mistakes 2241 02:18:05.000 --> 02:18:09.000 or whatever get broadcasts, but none of this successes ever 2242 02:18:09.399 --> 02:18:13.559 really get recognized. So it's easy for the public. It's 2243 02:18:13.639 --> 02:18:17.920 easy to paint this very dark picture of this shadow 2244 02:18:18.120 --> 02:18:22.200 organization when all you hear about it is the things 2245 02:18:22.239 --> 02:18:23.600 that don't go right, you know. 2246 02:18:25.360 --> 02:18:29.159 And I think that's an excellent comment that that is. 2247 02:18:31.120 --> 02:18:34.840 That's the most important thing actually that's been said during 2248 02:18:34.959 --> 02:18:38.760 this podcast today is that question and the reason, and 2249 02:18:38.879 --> 02:18:40.920 it really gets to the heart of why you and 2250 02:18:41.000 --> 02:18:46.000 your platform exist, right why the teamhouse exists because all 2251 02:18:46.079 --> 02:18:50.680 of the professionals that you have is as speakers, we 2252 02:18:50.799 --> 02:18:56.559 all come from that underappreciated, under understood community, and so 2253 02:18:56.879 --> 02:19:02.440 you give us an opportunity to appropriately explore and help 2254 02:19:02.520 --> 02:19:07.200 to educate and help to spell mythology. And he wrote misperception. 2255 02:19:07.959 --> 02:19:10.760 And that's why I'm telling you a lot of my 2256 02:19:11.719 --> 02:19:15.799 very traditional minded CIA colics, probably a number of current 2257 02:19:15.879 --> 02:19:19.719 officers who may be part of your listeners watch it 2258 02:19:19.799 --> 02:19:22.479 on YouTube, might sit and go, you know, I can't 2259 02:19:22.479 --> 02:19:25.520 believe that guy's out there just blabbering away, just yack 2260 02:19:25.680 --> 02:19:29.520 and yack and yac and about stuff. And I think 2261 02:19:29.600 --> 02:19:33.520 I have because I can't, because I'm undercover and because 2262 02:19:33.719 --> 02:19:37.680 that my career represents a decent part of the agency, 2263 02:19:38.479 --> 02:19:43.239 you know, and so I can do my part and 2264 02:19:43.719 --> 02:19:48.719 taking advantage of your kind invitation and and be able 2265 02:19:48.799 --> 02:19:52.639 to speak and be part of this incredibly respected enterprise 2266 02:19:52.760 --> 02:19:58.280 known as Teamhouse podcast. Uh, and so being able to 2267 02:19:59.000 --> 02:20:01.719 you know, be a little more transparent with the American people. 2268 02:20:02.000 --> 02:20:05.440 Well he wrote what you said, Dave. You know, and 2269 02:20:05.680 --> 02:20:10.239 and current officers can't do, you know, because they because 2270 02:20:10.239 --> 02:20:14.360 there's stuffs too secret. But former officers like me can 2271 02:20:15.120 --> 02:20:18.920 give our opinions and our perceptions and and and to 2272 02:20:19.079 --> 02:20:23.399 talk about you know, the you know, in very general terms, 2273 02:20:23.479 --> 02:20:27.920 you know, the magic that makes CIA so remarkable. And 2274 02:20:28.120 --> 02:20:31.360 in the end, as I've said multiple times at nauseum, look, 2275 02:20:31.440 --> 02:20:36.040 the magic is because of the magicians and CIA, you know, 2276 02:20:36.520 --> 02:20:39.280 and all of those women and men, all those officers, 2277 02:20:39.760 --> 02:20:41.639 you know, our magicians in every. 2278 02:20:41.440 --> 02:20:43.639 Way shape you make it sound like Disneyland, Doug. 2279 02:20:44.840 --> 02:20:48.120 Yeah, well we have a couple of goofiest. You know. 2280 02:20:48.239 --> 02:20:50.639 He retired to he retired to New Mexico. 2281 02:20:50.879 --> 02:20:57.520 So, uh, you know, did you did you see a 2282 02:20:57.680 --> 02:21:01.920 shift in agency culture or the PRB where where we're 2283 02:21:02.319 --> 02:21:06.639 where it started to become okay for guys once their 2284 02:21:06.680 --> 02:21:10.360 covers were rolled back to to publicly speak because you 2285 02:21:10.479 --> 02:21:13.559 know that it I don't know if it was ever 2286 02:21:13.600 --> 02:21:17.280 a rule, but it sort of wasn't acceptable. 2287 02:21:16.639 --> 02:21:20.879 For a very long period of time that you early 2288 02:21:21.040 --> 02:21:23.239 early on you know, we we as you well know, 2289 02:21:23.559 --> 02:21:26.000 and you mentioned we sign on entry on duty a 2290 02:21:26.079 --> 02:21:32.719 lifetime obligation for pre publication, review of any any prepared remarks, 2291 02:21:32.920 --> 02:21:37.840 any document, any publication or if in fact you had 2292 02:21:38.920 --> 02:21:39.719 rendered to me. 2293 02:21:40.719 --> 02:21:42.559 All of the questions you were going to ask me, 2294 02:21:42.680 --> 02:21:45.959 I would have had to write up an answer sith that, okay, 2295 02:21:46.040 --> 02:21:49.440 we all sign up for that. It's burdensome, it's real 2296 02:21:49.559 --> 02:21:53.520 painting about. And where the frustration came from is because 2297 02:21:53.559 --> 02:21:58.040 the agency didn't live up to its side of the obligation, okay, 2298 02:21:58.799 --> 02:22:02.479 and the agency would sludge it up that they found 2299 02:22:02.559 --> 02:22:05.719 something that was they was unappealing, and they had amateurs 2300 02:22:05.799 --> 02:22:08.479 that were doing it. They didn't have a system. And 2301 02:22:08.520 --> 02:22:13.239 I'm not denigrating, you know, the earlier generations of those 2302 02:22:13.959 --> 02:22:17.399 suffering officers that served in the PRB, but the reality 2303 02:22:17.520 --> 02:22:21.799 is nobody had ever put any serious systemic, any time 2304 02:22:21.879 --> 02:22:27.399 and attention into creating a system that allowed the agency 2305 02:22:27.479 --> 02:22:31.040 to live up its side of that that obligation, and 2306 02:22:31.120 --> 02:22:34.280 then what would happen inexorably when the agency didn't. They 2307 02:22:34.319 --> 02:22:37.159 should have guys and galas who would just say, you know, 2308 02:22:37.440 --> 02:22:39.520 screw up. I'm not a publisher anyway, what are they 2309 02:22:39.559 --> 02:22:41.440 going to do? I'm out of the agency. They got 2310 02:22:41.479 --> 02:22:44.319 to fire me. I don't have a clearance. You know, 2311 02:22:44.600 --> 02:22:46.200 what can they do? I don't I don't work for 2312 02:22:46.280 --> 02:22:48.520 the agency. I'm not a green badger. You know what 2313 02:22:48.680 --> 02:22:50.799 leverage did they have with me? You know, some federal 2314 02:22:50.840 --> 02:22:54.280 prosecutor are going to prosecute me for publishing the you know, 2315 02:22:54.840 --> 02:22:57.239 a document and the stife for brief. You know that 2316 02:22:57.239 --> 02:22:59.840 they didn't clear with the PRB. You know, no, they 2317 02:23:00.079 --> 02:23:03.280 the agency has very little options when it comes to 2318 02:23:03.399 --> 02:23:05.639 those of us on the outside. It don't live up 2319 02:23:05.680 --> 02:23:08.760 to our obligation. But the agency had to do its 2320 02:23:08.840 --> 02:23:11.079 part to keep us on task because it had to 2321 02:23:11.120 --> 02:23:15.000 create a realistic response. The response was pathetic in the 2322 02:23:15.040 --> 02:23:19.920 early days, horrible pathetic. Now it is very crisp. The 2323 02:23:20.079 --> 02:23:24.440 other thing that the agency made a dramatic change is 2324 02:23:24.760 --> 02:23:29.280 in the early days of the previous presidential administration, if 2325 02:23:29.280 --> 02:23:32.479 an officer was to say something that was politically unappealing 2326 02:23:32.559 --> 02:23:35.200 to the White House, the agency would try to wrap 2327 02:23:35.280 --> 02:23:40.079 that up in terms of redacting that as a contingent 2328 02:23:41.120 --> 02:23:45.959 contingency for approval of your document. In the early days, 2329 02:23:46.280 --> 02:23:50.639 the agency's PRB was known as the Pre Publication Review Board. 2330 02:23:51.840 --> 02:23:56.959 Now it's known as the PCR, the pre Publication Classification 2331 02:23:57.639 --> 02:24:01.840 Review Board, because its mandate is to review for classified information, 2332 02:24:01.959 --> 02:24:08.479 not for inconvenient facts and truths and opinions that a 2333 02:24:08.680 --> 02:24:12.879 certain White House administration you know, found to be unappealing 2334 02:24:12.959 --> 02:24:16.559 and was pressuring in the agency, you know, to stifle 2335 02:24:16.600 --> 02:24:19.920 those of us that were exercising our First Amendment rights. 2336 02:24:19.959 --> 02:24:24.000 But again back to my point about how resilient the 2337 02:24:24.120 --> 02:24:27.840 agency is now transformative it can be. It immediately responded 2338 02:24:28.120 --> 02:24:30.879 when that criticism was loving boom, got it right. You 2339 02:24:31.040 --> 02:24:35.159 send something to the PRB. In some cases they will 2340 02:24:35.200 --> 02:24:38.840 turn it around within hours. Wow, they've got they've got 2341 02:24:38.879 --> 02:24:41.719 a chrisp machine. Now. Now, if you're writing a book, 2342 02:24:42.719 --> 02:24:47.840 you know, and and it is a turgent tone, of 2343 02:24:47.959 --> 02:24:52.799 immense number of pages and consists of every boring fact 2344 02:24:52.879 --> 02:24:56.719 about your agency existence from all the e pas except 2345 02:24:56.760 --> 02:24:59.920 for performance awards. You've got all the meetings, you attended 2346 02:25:00.520 --> 02:25:03.959 everything at that and you don't know And so yeah, 2347 02:25:04.040 --> 02:25:06.799 they've got to shot that out to people that actually 2348 02:25:06.959 --> 02:25:10.559 understand where the secrets reside and who are the custodians 2349 02:25:10.600 --> 02:25:13.600 of secret. So there is a little latency in there 2350 02:25:14.479 --> 02:25:17.760 that is very very reasonable and very realistic. But if 2351 02:25:17.799 --> 02:25:20.360 you're writing an article for political magazine or for the 2352 02:25:20.440 --> 02:25:22.879 Cipher Brief, which I think is a great outlet too, 2353 02:25:24.040 --> 02:25:27.319 and if you guys published documents as part of your podcast, 2354 02:25:27.399 --> 02:25:30.440 which I wouldn't recommend you to do, I might stick 2355 02:25:30.479 --> 02:25:35.000 with your business file. You know, you find that the 2356 02:25:35.079 --> 02:25:41.079 PREB was very very responsive. Now they've made some dramatic improvements. 2357 02:25:41.200 --> 02:25:43.360 I mean, I know, you know some former colleagues of 2358 02:25:43.399 --> 02:25:46.600 yours have had to file lawsuits against the agency to get. 2359 02:25:46.520 --> 02:25:48.840 There, Mark a well known attorney. 2360 02:25:50.280 --> 02:25:52.680 But at the same time, I mean, just from our 2361 02:25:52.760 --> 02:25:55.159 own experience interviewing people here on the show who have 2362 02:25:55.239 --> 02:25:57.959 had their books put through PRB, I mean, there is 2363 02:25:58.079 --> 02:26:00.479 a quite a bit of material that they do, let 2364 02:26:01.120 --> 02:26:04.479 you know, former agency employees say publicly, which is uh. 2365 02:26:05.040 --> 02:26:06.719 As you mentioned at the beginning of the show, you 2366 02:26:06.799 --> 02:26:07.639 will probably. 2367 02:26:07.399 --> 02:26:11.440 Never find an I six officer from modern era on 2368 02:26:11.600 --> 02:26:14.879 this show talking because they can't they can't buy a lot. 2369 02:26:15.000 --> 02:26:18.079 Yeah, yeah, well you could get them on. But he 2370 02:26:18.200 --> 02:26:22.639 or she would be a foreigner gun wealth officer. Yeah, now, 2371 02:26:22.799 --> 02:26:26.520 I mean would that be a very thin veil? I 2372 02:26:26.879 --> 02:26:31.559 think so. But you know you're right, absolutely right. Yeah, 2373 02:26:31.600 --> 02:26:34.200 and you and you got to give credit with credits, dude. 2374 02:26:34.799 --> 02:26:38.879 That's a tough job. That's a tough job. Suppose I'm writing. 2375 02:26:39.840 --> 02:26:42.879 I suppose I'm making stuff up. I'm writing a book 2376 02:26:42.879 --> 02:26:46.079 about my agency experience, and I talk about you know, 2377 02:26:46.159 --> 02:26:51.920 the agency's you know, development of cold fusion reactors that 2378 02:26:51.959 --> 02:26:55.680 could power to meet the entire global energy needs, you know, 2379 02:26:55.719 --> 02:27:01.239 and and and the pr B Sitstan says, all right, 2380 02:27:01.360 --> 02:27:04.280 it's could that be compartment? Could that be real? This guy? 2381 02:27:04.600 --> 02:27:07.280 You know, I'm making it up? You know. So you know, 2382 02:27:07.360 --> 02:27:11.719 when you when you read fiction and very closely mirror 2383 02:27:13.000 --> 02:27:16.760 the real world, and even in the most naive of 2384 02:27:16.879 --> 02:27:20.319 cases where you make up some bit of trade crafter, 2385 02:27:20.479 --> 02:27:23.760 you make up some technical widget, you know, wizard and 2386 02:27:23.840 --> 02:27:27.719 only Q could love. Uh you may you may not 2387 02:27:27.879 --> 02:27:31.159 even know that there is such a very similar to that. Yeah, 2388 02:27:31.200 --> 02:27:33.879 all of a sudden, there's some SAP some places, right, 2389 02:27:34.719 --> 02:27:35.959 you know, and and then all. 2390 02:27:35.799 --> 02:27:37.840 Of a sudden you find I've seen it on the 2391 02:27:38.239 --> 02:27:42.319 on the military side where there were things, you know, 2392 02:27:42.479 --> 02:27:46.760 factual inaccuracies in the book American Sniper that were called 2393 02:27:46.799 --> 02:27:50.079 out and the authors of the book said, whoa, whoa, 2394 02:27:50.079 --> 02:27:52.559 whoa hold up, This book went through d O D review. 2395 02:27:53.639 --> 02:27:56.200 So d O D who said all this is true. 2396 02:27:56.239 --> 02:27:58.319 It's like, no, they didn't. D O D reviewed your 2397 02:27:58.360 --> 02:28:01.639 book for classified information. They're not a fact check. That's 2398 02:28:01.680 --> 02:28:03.799 not that's not what they're doing. And that's not what 2399 02:28:03.920 --> 02:28:05.920 a c O D review represents of your book. 2400 02:28:06.079 --> 02:28:09.680 And when the per B gives you their response, uh, 2401 02:28:10.120 --> 02:28:14.319 you know that little caveat is is explicit as part 2402 02:28:14.399 --> 02:28:16.719 of the pr B, you know where they sit and 2403 02:28:16.840 --> 02:28:19.959 go you all we reviewed was for for you know, 2404 02:28:20.040 --> 02:28:25.000 embargoed content. We're not we're not validating this. We're not verifying, 2405 02:28:25.079 --> 02:28:28.200 we're not corroborating, you know, at all. And it'd be 2406 02:28:28.239 --> 02:28:30.399 impossible for them to do that quite frankly. 2407 02:28:30.680 --> 02:28:30.879 Yeah. 2408 02:28:31.520 --> 02:28:31.719 Yeah. 2409 02:28:31.760 --> 02:28:33.920 And and the thing is, like we've talked about this before. 2410 02:28:34.000 --> 02:28:39.879 When when some of these uh LARPers, you know, some 2411 02:28:40.040 --> 02:28:42.120 of these people who claim to have been in the 2412 02:28:42.200 --> 02:28:45.760 CIA never were our boy Wayne Simmons, you know, and 2413 02:28:46.040 --> 02:28:47.680 they get to a certain point people are like, well, 2414 02:28:47.680 --> 02:28:50.079 what how come the CIA doesn't call him out? It's like, 2415 02:28:50.600 --> 02:28:53.559 because that's how they retain to dieing ability with with 2416 02:28:53.959 --> 02:28:56.479 people who were. If they were to sit there, if 2417 02:28:56.479 --> 02:28:58.559 they call out somebody who wasn't, but then they don't 2418 02:28:58.600 --> 02:29:00.799 call out somebody who says they were, then what does 2419 02:29:00.840 --> 02:29:01.280 that tell you? 2420 02:29:02.280 --> 02:29:02.479 Yeah? 2421 02:29:03.000 --> 02:29:05.840 Right, yeah, yeah, they can't get in that business. 2422 02:29:06.879 --> 02:29:09.319 Yeah, the pure bee can't be the truth police, got 2423 02:29:09.399 --> 02:29:12.680 to be the classification police, right, and their remit ends there. 2424 02:29:13.479 --> 02:29:16.600 Uh But you know, bottom line is, I think the 2425 02:29:16.680 --> 02:29:19.239 pure be has come a long way, and it's it's 2426 02:29:19.479 --> 02:29:22.840 it's meeting the needs of those of us, you know. 2427 02:29:23.440 --> 02:29:26.040 I want to get stuff in the public domain as 2428 02:29:26.159 --> 02:29:30.559 part as part of the providing appropriate insight so that 2429 02:29:30.639 --> 02:29:33.600 the American people could be more informed citizens. And that's 2430 02:29:33.600 --> 02:29:36.280 what you're all about. That's what you guys provide this 2431 02:29:36.479 --> 02:29:41.040 remarkable platform for dudes like me, you know, and others 2432 02:29:41.239 --> 02:29:43.879 have done far more. Doug to be able to explain. 2433 02:29:44.079 --> 02:29:46.079 I would love to have you back on the show 2434 02:29:46.120 --> 02:29:48.360 again because we've we've run two and a half hours 2435 02:29:48.399 --> 02:29:51.639 here and We still haven't talked about Ukraine, we haven't 2436 02:29:51.639 --> 02:29:53.639 talked about Cereal, we haven't talked about your time at 2437 02:29:53.680 --> 02:29:55.760 d i A. We haven't talked about your life after 2438 02:29:55.840 --> 02:29:59.719 the agency and becoming a wretched pensioner as you. 2439 02:30:02.120 --> 02:30:04.200 So I would love to have you on again to 2440 02:30:04.319 --> 02:30:06.159 kind of talk a little bit more. 2441 02:30:07.399 --> 02:30:09.440 But I really appreciate your time tonight and kind of 2442 02:30:09.520 --> 02:30:13.680 illuminating all of us to some of these issues, some 2443 02:30:13.840 --> 02:30:15.000 really unique insights. 2444 02:30:15.040 --> 02:30:18.399 I think, well to me, who needs to give you, 2445 02:30:18.600 --> 02:30:21.799 gentlemen thanks as well as the participants in the broadcast, 2446 02:30:22.280 --> 02:30:25.280 you know, both this podcast and the many other stuff 2447 02:30:26.000 --> 02:30:29.760 sort of honor that you've already produced. Again, you know, 2448 02:30:30.799 --> 02:30:34.120 there's no other you know thing that that hasliked this, 2449 02:30:34.360 --> 02:30:37.719 and so it's it was a singular honor for you 2450 02:30:37.920 --> 02:30:40.479 to reach out to me and ask me to come on. 2451 02:30:41.040 --> 02:30:44.040 It's our honor. Like we're just like you said, we're 2452 02:30:44.040 --> 02:30:46.520 a couple of shows who like have some cameras and 2453 02:30:46.760 --> 02:30:49.680 and a YouTube channel of basement and yeah, exactly like 2454 02:30:50.000 --> 02:30:53.680 we We deeply deeply appreciate you know, you and and 2455 02:30:53.840 --> 02:30:57.959 everybody else who agrees to come on and spend a 2456 02:30:58.040 --> 02:31:00.760 Friday night with us. We appreciate all of our viewers, 2457 02:31:00.840 --> 02:31:02.280 you know, people who make this show happen. 2458 02:31:02.879 --> 02:31:03.000 Uh. 2459 02:31:03.200 --> 02:31:06.799 We appreciate our Patreon supporters a little bit more than 2460 02:31:06.879 --> 02:31:10.760 just our regular viewers, but not much, not much because 2461 02:31:10.760 --> 02:31:13.840 they pay the rent. We have a couple of questions 2462 02:31:13.879 --> 02:31:17.719 from from our viewers, uh, speaking of money that we 2463 02:31:19.040 --> 02:31:20.920 we want to get to Jackson, thank you very much, 2464 02:31:21.719 --> 02:31:25.920 He says, what was your experience with the paramilitary uh 2465 02:31:26.559 --> 02:31:30.959 the p m oos like and how much has the 2466 02:31:31.120 --> 02:31:33.760 organization transformed over the course of the G one? 2467 02:31:35.239 --> 02:31:37.239 Well, I mean, you know that that's a whole other 2468 02:31:37.360 --> 02:31:40.040 episode right there right if we could, we could discuss 2469 02:31:40.120 --> 02:31:42.399 that and and I think would be useful to have 2470 02:31:42.719 --> 02:31:44.639 more than just one dude on. I think we have 2471 02:31:44.719 --> 02:31:45.840 a little panel. 2472 02:31:45.559 --> 02:31:46.719 Discussion that would be amazing. 2473 02:31:46.760 --> 02:31:48.799 I think to get it to get other, you know, 2474 02:31:49.040 --> 02:31:51.920 other perspectives on that, you know, because you want to 2475 02:31:51.959 --> 02:31:55.040 get a broad view rather than just you know, my narrow, 2476 02:31:55.120 --> 02:32:02.799 myopic view. Uh. One the paramilit to PMO Paramilitary Operations officers, 2477 02:32:03.280 --> 02:32:07.000 which are you know, certified to be case officers to 2478 02:32:07.079 --> 02:32:10.600 handle to develop and handle spies, recruit spies and handle them, 2479 02:32:11.280 --> 02:32:14.920 and to also be able to continue to maintain their 2480 02:32:15.079 --> 02:32:18.280 military skills, because everyone of them had a military background, 2481 02:32:18.719 --> 02:32:21.440 whether it's you know, ten years or whether it was 2482 02:32:21.440 --> 02:32:24.760 a full career, whether you were a traditional you know, 2483 02:32:24.879 --> 02:32:28.079 military officer, or whether you were coming from a special 2484 02:32:28.159 --> 02:32:32.799 mission unit. You know, paramilitary officers bring a unique capability 2485 02:32:32.879 --> 02:32:38.959 to the agency. You combine that with the extraordinary authorities, 2486 02:32:40.040 --> 02:32:43.840 your operational authorities and financial authorities of the agent, and 2487 02:32:44.079 --> 02:32:47.879 you got a tool, a foreign policy tool is second 2488 02:32:47.920 --> 02:32:50.600 to none for the President of the United States. So 2489 02:32:51.319 --> 02:32:55.040 those women are currently serving them the Special Activity Center, 2490 02:32:55.120 --> 02:32:57.600 who are not all of them are p and moos. 2491 02:32:57.920 --> 02:33:01.799 Many of them are just paramilitary experts, if I could 2492 02:33:01.920 --> 02:33:03.639 use that term. I don't know what the term of 2493 02:33:03.760 --> 02:33:04.040 art is. 2494 02:33:04.319 --> 02:33:07.559 I think paramilitary specialists. I think it is a special 2495 02:33:07.639 --> 02:33:09.840 for the Green Badgers at this point. 2496 02:33:10.280 --> 02:33:13.120 Yeah, and and uh, you know, I think, you know, 2497 02:33:13.559 --> 02:33:17.639 the combination of all that expertise is extraordinary. The challenge 2498 02:33:17.680 --> 02:33:20.360 with PMOS is you got to maintain your military your 2499 02:33:20.399 --> 02:33:24.200 paramilitary skills, and yet you got to maintain your case 2500 02:33:24.239 --> 02:33:27.879 officer skills. And both of those sets of skills are 2501 02:33:27.959 --> 02:33:31.840 quite perishable. So it is a very tough tough job 2502 02:33:32.719 --> 02:33:36.680 to maintain that because you know, the two years you're 2503 02:33:37.040 --> 02:33:41.120 the deputy chief of station and in some station someplace, 2504 02:33:41.959 --> 02:33:45.239 you know, that's two years somebody else's carrying your rucksack 2505 02:33:45.360 --> 02:33:53.680 and sac. I have always been well by every paramilitary officer, 2506 02:33:54.120 --> 02:33:58.840 whether they're pm specialists or whether they're pmos, I have 2507 02:33:58.920 --> 02:34:04.040 always well or they are an extraordinary enabler, they are 2508 02:34:04.079 --> 02:34:08.520 an extraordinary capability. I have found them to be constant 2509 02:34:08.680 --> 02:34:12.959 professionals in every way. Uh. Yeah. Sometimes they wear ocalice 2510 02:34:13.000 --> 02:34:15.600 inside an embassy and we don't fire at the pants on, 2511 02:34:15.760 --> 02:34:18.799 but we just if somebody comments on that, we just 2512 02:34:18.879 --> 02:34:22.040 tell them they're from this fifth Special Forces Group. I 2513 02:34:22.120 --> 02:34:22.920 don't know any better. 2514 02:34:24.440 --> 02:34:26.280 With their mouths open, they put their elbows on the 2515 02:34:26.360 --> 02:34:26.760 table and. 2516 02:34:28.280 --> 02:34:32.639 I'm obviously I'm obviously kidding. But you know, paramountary offsters 2517 02:34:32.680 --> 02:34:36.879 have been been, I've been I've had an exceptionally positive, 2518 02:34:37.000 --> 02:34:42.360 uniformly positive experience with them. In terms of the transformation 2519 02:34:42.520 --> 02:34:46.000 of the agency, it is uh. I mean, first thing is, 2520 02:34:46.239 --> 02:34:50.440 we we have a totally re engineered and restructured agency. 2521 02:34:51.520 --> 02:34:54.399 Controversial to some degree. I am one of the critics 2522 02:34:54.479 --> 02:34:57.319 of that U but then again I never served under them, 2523 02:34:58.200 --> 02:35:02.040 so I don't open criticize it because who am I 2524 02:35:02.280 --> 02:35:07.440 to criticize something I never experienced. But the agency is 2525 02:35:07.479 --> 02:35:11.440 physically restructured to meet the modern demands on the senior 2526 02:35:11.520 --> 02:35:15.600 agency leadership and on the intelligence requirements of its customer base. 2527 02:35:16.680 --> 02:35:21.200 The agency has created another director, the Director to Digital Innovation. 2528 02:35:22.040 --> 02:35:26.440 That's to reflect, you know, the impact of digital based 2529 02:35:26.520 --> 02:35:30.239 technology in terms of capabilities and threats. So you have 2530 02:35:30.360 --> 02:35:33.680 the Director of Digital Innovation, which in and of itself 2531 02:35:33.719 --> 02:35:36.719 has evolved since its birth in some years ago. So 2532 02:35:36.959 --> 02:35:43.399 that's all changing, and so you know, and the Director 2533 02:35:43.520 --> 02:35:47.200 to Support has mutated in a positive way over time, 2534 02:35:47.719 --> 02:35:50.920 and the Director of Analysis is always so well plugged 2535 02:35:50.959 --> 02:35:54.840 into the customer community and the collect and community kind 2536 02:35:54.879 --> 02:35:58.600 of they're the connective tissue in the bridge. And they 2537 02:35:58.680 --> 02:36:04.079 have evolved in restructure and their training program has kept 2538 02:36:04.159 --> 02:36:09.600 pace with that with modern demands. So the agency of 2539 02:36:10.760 --> 02:36:14.280 the Central Intelligence Agency that I served in is not 2540 02:36:14.479 --> 02:36:17.879 the Central Intelligence Agency today. If I went back, and 2541 02:36:18.000 --> 02:36:22.000 I don't. I've been back four times, one time to 2542 02:36:22.440 --> 02:36:24.840 do a personal meeting with Gina Asport, whom I know 2543 02:36:24.959 --> 02:36:27.639 and admire very well, and it was at the end 2544 02:36:27.680 --> 02:36:32.520 of her ride. The other was for promotion and in 2545 02:36:32.600 --> 02:36:37.719 a medal ceremony. And so it is an agency that 2546 02:36:37.959 --> 02:36:42.520 in some respects I wouldn't recognize. But the commitment of patriotism, 2547 02:36:42.639 --> 02:36:48.760 the capability, competency, the energy, the passion to patriotism, you know, 2548 02:36:49.040 --> 02:36:52.440 it's the same. But the agency is totally different. And 2549 02:36:52.600 --> 02:36:54.719 that's the way it needs to be. It needs to 2550 02:36:54.799 --> 02:36:58.399 be a different agency. And three years from now, the 2551 02:36:58.520 --> 02:37:01.120 kids that are serving in the agency today, I shouldn't 2552 02:37:01.200 --> 02:37:05.600 use the word kid, but now everybody's a kid. You 2553 02:37:05.719 --> 02:37:10.280 guys are kids. They uh, you know, it's it won't 2554 02:37:10.319 --> 02:37:13.479 be the agency that they recognize her. The elements that 2555 02:37:13.520 --> 02:37:17.120 are recognize. The core values that the agency are immutable 2556 02:37:17.159 --> 02:37:20.159 and haven't changed, right, And that's that's the most important thing. 2557 02:37:20.639 --> 02:37:24.719 At his core, it's still the same oss that it 2558 02:37:24.959 --> 02:37:29.799 was like, it's it's still the same people with the 2559 02:37:29.959 --> 02:37:33.799 same desire to serve the country, no matter how that 2560 02:37:34.280 --> 02:37:35.159 service changes. 2561 02:37:35.879 --> 02:37:39.440 Yeah, the way you serve the nation and the American 2562 02:37:39.520 --> 02:37:43.840 people has dramatically changed. But you're absolutely right that the 2563 02:37:43.959 --> 02:37:46.399 commitment and the focus on the safety and security and 2564 02:37:46.440 --> 02:37:49.319 the well being and the American people this paramount in 2565 02:37:49.520 --> 02:37:52.440 CIA that will never change, right Yeah. 2566 02:37:53.280 --> 02:37:57.239 Uh, And then uh, I think last comment even as 2567 02:37:57.239 --> 02:37:59.760 any question. Thank you, love Star. We really appreciate it, 2568 02:38:00.000 --> 02:38:03.799 and no questions. Thank you three for your services and 2569 02:38:03.879 --> 02:38:07.840 sacrifice self selflessly given when called upon by your tribe. 2570 02:38:09.280 --> 02:38:12.239 Guys, we will see all of you next Friday with 2571 02:38:12.639 --> 02:38:16.040 Fred Galvin, one of the first MARSOC officers. 2572 02:38:16.440 --> 02:38:18.479 He has a book out about their. 2573 02:38:18.360 --> 02:38:21.719 For Marsocks first deployment to Afghanistan, some of the controversies 2574 02:38:21.760 --> 02:38:22.159 around it. 2575 02:38:23.040 --> 02:38:26.440 So we'll be talking about the controversies. Yeah, big time massive. 2576 02:38:27.879 --> 02:38:29.760 So we'll talk to Fred next Friday. 2577 02:38:30.760 --> 02:38:32.959 Doug again, thank you so much for joining us tonight, 2578 02:38:33.040 --> 02:38:34.639 taking you know, two and a half hours out of 2579 02:38:34.680 --> 02:38:36.639 your Friday evening to speak with us. 2580 02:38:37.079 --> 02:38:38.159 And I'll be in touch. 2581 02:38:38.239 --> 02:38:39.639 I mean, if it's cool with you, I'd love to 2582 02:38:39.719 --> 02:38:42.040 reschedule you again, maybe sometime over the summer. 2583 02:38:42.920 --> 02:38:47.200 Yeah, absolutely I would. I would let the trauma of 2584 02:38:47.319 --> 02:38:49.479 what I had to say it. 2585 02:38:50.799 --> 02:38:53.000 It was such an honor, It was such an honor 2586 02:38:53.040 --> 02:38:55.520 for us to have you on it. Really we deeply, 2587 02:38:55.639 --> 02:38:56.600 deeply appreciate it. 2588 02:38:57.159 --> 02:39:00.639 Like, look, you guys are remarkable. I appreciate it very much. 2589 02:39:00.719 --> 02:39:02.600 I look forward to coming back, and we ought to 2590 02:39:02.680 --> 02:39:05.079 do that panel thing sometime in the future. 2591 02:39:05.280 --> 02:39:05.840 That would have been. 2592 02:39:06.000 --> 02:39:08.360 Doesn't have to include me, but I can help you 2593 02:39:08.399 --> 02:39:09.159 field the panel. 2594 02:39:09.600 --> 02:39:13.319 No, that would be amazing and you would absolutely Thank you, tagles, 2595 02:39:13.360 --> 02:39:15.079 thank you everybody, and I have a great night.