Speaker 1: We embark on a new journey today. How are you doing, Thomas,
I'm very well. Thanks for hosting me. This one is
going to be This one's interesting to me because I
was alive for part of this, and I was sentient.
I mean, I remember a lot of this. So we
had teased about talking about the Cold War, but you
said that you had a We're going to start at
the end and then go back to the beginning. So
what do you got?
Speaker 2: Well, it's a few things here. I want to explain
my rationale before we deep dive into it. You know,
I don't want to presume the viewers and the listeners
have knowledge that they don't. I mean, I'm not saying
that anybody's not smart or anything, but some of this
stuff has become someone is terror just because the way
the news cycle doesn't properly provide context to historical events,
particularly where there's military variables involved, and you know, political
narratives be can paramount to characterize these things. But also
it's as hard to place one self conceptually in an
epoch that has totally passed. You know, I went through that.
When when when people like my parents need to talk
about the fifties and the sixties and things. You know,
I mean, all all people go through that. But you
know the reason why I indicated, you know, I want
to I'm treating this as kind of the end was
the beginning. Everything that is happening today in political terms
and in foreign policy terms, in terms of the in
terms of the guiding ideology of Washington. And I say
ideology not ideology, is plural because I really do believe
that there's a true consensus there. There there's no opposition
party in Washington at all. I mean, arguably since nineteen
thirty three there hasn't been real opposition, but in discrete
policy terms, there was. Now that that no longer exists.
There's an absolute quorum. There's one ideology. There's one strategic vision.
There's one there's there's one sense of when intervention and
force is is is legitimate, and that that is totally
ideologically driven. It's not it's not driven by rategic variables
of a realistic, even particularly concrete in nature. You know,
it's very much based on a very abstract things and
ideological things. But the only way to understand why that
is the case, and the only way to understand why
Ukraine is the designated battleground. And the only way to
understand why Russia, the Russian Federation as it exists today,
has been slated for annihilation UH is to understand how
the Cold War resolved and why it resolved the way
it did. So to begin, I'm going to go back
to the last sort of conflict cycle of the Cold
War very briefly, to speak on Dayton. Dayton was born
in two things. For those that don't know Dayton was
it was a It was an It was an explicit
and series of implicit agreements between the United States and
so Union warsaw pack to not engage in direct strategic competition.
Part of this over the act that UH America was
losing the Cold War militarily, not just in Vietnam, but
on secondary battlefronts like Angola. The the Indo Pakistan War
was very much an attempt to UH, owing to the UH,
to the then NACI sent of Soviets split that the
Soviet turnist and hedging China with with India, you know,
being a huge populous country. Pakistan was kind of the
American response to that, you know, creating trying to cultivate
Pakistan as a proxy. But these things are not going well,
and obviously direct intervention. There's this weird period between the
end of the military draft and you know, the the
the kind of full development of the all volunteer force
and the full development implementations becoming known of the revolution
and military affairs, you know, the entailerything from command to
control technology to global positioning intelogy you know, to uh too,
smart munitions becoming the norm rather than the exception. Okay,
there's a strange kind of period between those two things
where the US Army was operating on a shoe string budget.
I mean the whole not just the army, the whole military.
There was no political will in Washington for the overseas
communism in the Third World in Europe to become very stagnant.
But in the Third World it had this great animating power,
and there were the Soviets were blessed with a great
deal of proxies who were already in being, you know,
uh in cadri with a full cadre structure, and you know,
men under arms that could facilitate military outcomes that very
much benefited the Soviets. All they really needed was a
constant to play of weapons, and the Soviets could kind
of take a hands off approach. So from about nineteen
seventy three onward, you know, this this kind of this
kind of strategic paradigm ragned. However, during that period, the
technology that that underpins strategic nuclear weapons dramatically improved, you know,
owing to the over to the early revolution in computing technology,
to going to increase improved circular error probable from you know,
things like the space program, you know, and just owing
the owing the real satellite technology. We'll get into that
a minute. What I mean, you know what it we
take for granted that satellite imaging, you know, gives you
a real time picture of the battle space, but that
was not the case until the late nineteen seventies, probably
until nineteen eighty. Okay, so uh, this endured until nineteen
seventy nine. In nineteen seventy nine, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. Uh,
and that really alarmed people because, for reasons we ate
into in a moment beyond the obvious, it was misunderstood
why that happened. I know, mister Trump said it was
to fight Islamic terrorism. That doesn't make any sense. Other
people claim that, well, it was the president doctrine you
know that being that the Soviet Union declared that it
would intervene on behalf of the socialist community of nation
is to preserve socialism. Okay, that was the rationale, the pretext.
What it really was was that outside of Moscow, the
primary command and control hub for Soviet strategic nuclear forces
was in Kazakhstan or was it, Yeah, it was in Kazakhstan, Okay,
And that's why not accidentally that for Star City is
you know where the Soviet Union and later of the
Russian Federalation you'll, launched their space vehicles from. So if
Afghanistan could be flipped or could have been flipped and
transformed into a Western client state with basing rights there, uh,
the Soviets have been looking at a situation where there
there's strategic nuclear command and control would be decavitated, you know,
at least a substantial portion of it, and that was
not acceptable now and drop of even the bredgion that
was at the hell Andy drop off was really kind
of the that the shadow executive of the Soviet Union.
You know, the Soviet political structure was very not just
because the party in the state were were interstitially combined
with one another, but because who was the true executive,
you know, varied, you know, generally it was a man
will a communitions have all offices, you know, like the UH.
He'd often would be a man who held both the
premiership and the General Secretary of the Communist Party. Other
times it was it was it was far more UH
Opigue and UH and drop off reigned formally as UH
as as as you know, the the General Secretary from
eighty two to eighty four, but I'd argue that probably
fromout nineteen sixty nine he was a true shadow executive
of the Soviet Union, and he was a very brilliant guy.
And the world as its structured today and the fate
of the Soviet Union and decisions made therein for better
and ill o very much dimster and drop of, But
it was his decision doing vade Afghanistan, and he was
looking many steps ahead in terms of, you know, the
implications for the strategic nuclear balance and UH, the ability
of the Soviet Union to survive the Ball from the
Blue nuclear assault, which was a real concern for reasons
we'll get into. And it's some it's difficult to emphasize
how dangerous it was. They have two superpowers fully mobilized
with massive nuclear arsenals on hair trigger alert at all
time when the technological curve was really moving towards removing
human decision makers from the equation. You know, the only
to with the narrowing temporal window of decision making in
the event of nuclear war, this is really becoming out
of it was really kind of becoming removed from human hands.
You know, technology is it's own momentum and societies at
scale where you're talking about literally hundreds of millions of
people and you know, thousands on thousands on thousands of
aggregate decisions, you know, can vote control or trajectory of
that massive state. You know, these these things can't just
easily be moved one or the other and the perial
breaks cancas be put on an apparatus of that scope,
scale and complexity, you know, Like I mean, this is
this is fundamental to understanding the do you.
Speaker 1: Think they go ahead, let me ask, do you think
that they did that because of you know, Daniel Olisburg
put out the Doomsday Machine, which really shined a light
on what he saw in the nuclear policy. What was
the way in the late fifties, early sixties, how the
how nukes were being overseen. Do you think that that
because of the way that could have turned into a disaster,
they possibly thought that, well, if we turned this over
into more of a even starting to talk about AI
and things like that, it would be better than having
humans handle.
Speaker 2: This definitely, and the progenitor, like the proverbial father of AI,
is new strategic nuclear war planning. The idea was this, okay,
and I'm jumping a little bit ahead because he asked,
I want to kind of deal with this now. By
the nineteen eighties, you know where true parody existed when
the superpowers in terms of strategic nuclear forces and being
as well as capabilities, a bolt on the blue strike
if launched by hypersonic cruise missiles from Europe against the
Soviet Union, they would have as little as five minutes
to render a decision on retaliation. The United States would
have longer, but we're talking about eight to fifteen minutes
in the case of the United States. I'm not gonna
bore people with the details. Ifought that would have played out,
it would have involved things like an SLBM assault launched
at the depressed trajectory, the spoof early warning systems detonating
a groundburst detonation. Thus an e MP would knock out
remaining early warning. But the point is, like, imagine the
situation where, okay, you know, if IF IF IF policy
is to you know, even the policy it's to launch
on warning, not launch on confirmation of assault. It's like, okay,
it's two in the morning, you know, American time, or
in Moscow. You wake up the way of the United States,
or you wake up the General Secretary. You know, you say,
mister President, you know, we we just received what confirmation
like incoming assault. He's got eight minutes to decide, like
how he's gonna retaliate, if he's gonna retaliate, what their
retali he's gonna entail. What force is gonna be availed
to it, whether it's gonna be countervol counterforcement, not counter value,
whether it's gonna be you know, full spectrum attack. That
it's we're at the point where this too totally academics,
that's not possible. Okay. So the idea was you've got
to be able to discern absolute indicators before you know,
not not just before launch detection, but before even was
considered early morning detection. If you could code those indicators
into variables that could be rendered as inputs. Then your
AI could tell you when you're facing imminent assault. But
the problem with that is, like when do you decide,
when do you decide to launch? Is that when there's
an over a fifty percent probability of him in an attack,
When when it's eighty percent, when it's anything over ten percent,
you know, when it's five percent. You know, these deeper
parodies make this incredibly difficult. But regardless, there was a
secondary issue too. And I'm gonna get into this now
because this is a perfect kind of way to kind
of slide into it. As Dayton ended Carter, who gets
a batter wrap and that don't get me wrong, Carter
was not a good president, but he was not a
terrible man. He was actually a very moral man and
he did some good things. One of the good things
he did was in nineteen seventy nine Carter Carter tacked
William Odum. It was a general, very brilliant guy. Odum
was rare because he kind of had the logistical brilliance
of Omar Bradley, but he was also a real warrior,
you know, he was like a soldier's general. He understood combat.
He really understood nuclear weapons. Okay, I think it's kind
of a counterpart in the total counterpart would be somebody
like Blackjack Pershing. But William Odom went through the presidential
decision making a handbook and literally something that existed for
nuclear war, and it was incredibly opig It was incredibly obtuse,
It was not up to speed in terms of the
technology of the day, and it didn't give the president
any real ability to to It didn't give any liberty
of action respective war plan. Now part of that is
because it was a drafted in literally ninety sixty five,
So basically what it entailed it and in the core
of this of this presidential handbook was the was the PSYOP,
not the psychological operation, the SIOP, the single Integrated Operational Plan,
because this day there's an SIOP, but it is totally
different and it's changed many times. But as of nineteen
seventy nine, it was this arcane document that was no
longer relevant, and it basically gave the president a handful
of menu options. It was literally listed as response menu.
It was counter value and counter force assault against the
Soviet Union. All warsaw pack states were strategic nuclear forces
are based and the same for the People's Republic in China.
There's another menu option that was the same thing for
China and the USSR and war's unpacked. There's another menu
option that was the reverse. There's another one that was
just strictly counterfeit, strictly counterforce, no counter value. A lot
of this came from the fact they were talking about
a moment ago about satellites. Okay, until about nineteen eighty
or like nineteen seventy nineteen eighty, US satellites that would
that would provide data on the basing location of enemy forces.
There were always several weeks out of date because these
satellite to take their pictures, the little film would be
deposited a canister that cancer would fall to earth and
be recovered from the ocean. It would be retrieved, developed
and analyzed. So somebody were talking about months out of
date information. And one of the things that Soviets did,
which was kind of cunning in its simplicity, rather than
a veiling their land based ICBMs and to the super
hardened structures, they put them on trucks and mobile launch vehicles.
Like everybody's seeing the footage, I mean, at least if
you're a kid like when I was, you know, there'd
be these ominous as hell. Uh uh, they'd be this
ominous A little footage from the Moscow military parades, these
SS nineteen, these huge ICBMs on these trucks, you know
literally okay, they were they moving them around every single day,
you know. Uh. And that the spoof uh, the spoof
enemy targeting. And there's like the totally crazy stuff like
by the by the mid eighties NSA satellites and d
I satellites, they were photographing the soil and the Soviet
Union and East Germany. Uh to detect tracks from these
vehicles because based on their depth, you could tell if
the payload with some you know, with something of the
wave in SS nineteen or not. Like it's totally insane,
like not insane as and stupid or bad like, but
like totally insane, like the amount of work and and
like man hours that went into this, you know, uh,
people can't even can see with somebody today. But so
what Carter and Odom decided was there was another thing
too that was disturbing what the SIOP and the entire
the entire response plan. It was that by the time,
by the state of technology of nineteen seventy nine, it
was just accepted that in the event of a bolt
from the Blue assault or an unforeseen escalation of conventional
war wherein you know, the enemy, the enemy just you know,
goes on in you know, escalates the counter value nuclear assault,
it was just accepted that the president would be dead
and all civilian decision makers would be dead. So the
only people who would be able to manage the response
would be strategic air Command based as they were in
a super hard in places like Sheyan Mountain as well
as in the looking Glass aircraft that was the airborne
command post. That's really disturbing. It's also damn when constitutional
you can't craft a war plan and be with an
article be parameters. That's says, well, the president's gonna die,
so you know general powers or general to may or
general so and so he's not that de facto president,
you know, he's he's he's lord high executioner, and that
he's totally in control of the strategic nuclear forces. But
also he's just like the reigning like government official who's
going to survive, so it all comes down to him.
That's a very dangerous situation. Among other things, and also
like I said, patently, and Gon's a divisional. Carter said,
that's not acceptable. So what Carter did was he ordered
Owe him to draft a a comprehensive response plan. Basically,
bring the SIOP up to speed, account for deeper parodies,
account for up to the moment intelligence that could be
gleaned from you know, the then contemporary satellite systems that
would allow for h you know, instantaneous retargeting as needed
and things like this. Carter demanded that there be that
part of this plan include designated civilian national command authorities.
You know, basically the president and his cabinet would all
be issued these ID cards that all had a code, okay,
and the code would constantly change. But these men and
a handful of women are in the cabinet, the executive cabinet,
they have to every day, they'd have to report on
their whereabouts and if they left the ad Distion of Columbia,
they have to report like every hour as to where
they were. So they and there was a series of
military bases and hardness structures that they would be designated
to travel to wherever they were an event of war.
So basically, long story short, a system was put into place.
This was not completed until about ninety eighty forty five,
but the system was in place where in there was
no way that every civilian mansional command authority would be killed. Okay,
there would always be someone who could manage the war
on behalf of the executive and the civilian leadership. Okay,
there's other things too, But what this basically what this
all came down, you're taken together. This meant that, owing
to the technology of the time and then the evolving
state of warfare, command and control, uh, smart munitions, everything else,
it became America was planning to in event of nuclear war,
to fight and win a nuclear war. This caused I'll
get the consternation from people who didn't really understand deeper parodies,
even some people who should have. You know, people had
this ongoing kind of delusion that d MAD was one
part kind of talking point, one part kind of in
joke of within the nuclear fraternity in the earliest days.
Mutually assured destruction is not literally mean the end of everything.
Assured destruction is a victory metric and strategic nuclear warfare.
It's the point at which an enemy society can no
longer reconstitute the wage war it's basically the point the
attrition point at which you kill an enemy society, which
is a horrific metric because in the case of the
Soviet Union or America as a nineteen seventy is that
entailed about seventy or eighty million people. Okay, But this
idea that the only reason nuclear weapons exists is to
make sure they're never used like that, that's an absurdity.
And it's also it just wasn't by the nineteen seventies.
The nineteen seventies, you had you had multiple independently targeted
re entry vehicles, you had decoys, you have ways to
spoof early warning radar, you had hypersonic missile platforms that
that uh that that that wouldn't you know that that
didn't that didn't even travel on ballistic trajectory. Like it
was totally obsolescent. And uh, as William Otem said, he said,
look uh he said at the time, and he read it,
he read it. Reiterated later to one of his biographers,
He's like, I had an obligation that if America was
attaged with nuclear weapons, I had an obligation, you know,
in contro with the president, to fight and win a
nuclear war. And he's absolutely right with the other kind
of perverse feature of mad and that kind of whole
ethos it's like I'm obligated to commit suicide and so
it was like, you know, eighty million other people because oh,
we failed in our effort to maintain peace to the
balance of terror. Like it's there's something crazy about it,
but that's uh, that's basically what ushered in the final
phase of the Cold War. Now I want to fast
forward a bit to, uh, what exactly happened when, uh,
it became clear that not just cracks in the edifice
of the Soviet Empire emerging, but that there was a
genuine structural crisis underway. And part of our this developed, oh,
is the personalities quite literally of George Herbert Walker Bush
and Mikhail Gorbachew. Now, mister Bush, I've got to drop
some biographical biographical background on Bush if it was to
make any sense. I'm not trying to bore anybody. Bush
was a very dynamic guy, frankly, and he's not a
well loved individual, and that's fine. I'm not saying people
should like Bush it and like morally or think that,
you know, he was like a good man or something,
but he had an incredibly in depth understanding of the
nuances of the strategic balance under the Cold War. But
he was head of the CIA in nineteen seventy four
when something very controversial happened see the US. As I
made the point before and the Rady in context, the
CIA really lost its cachet in the sixties and subsequently
with the Gates hearings. And it wasn't just that people
were morally outraged by things like the Phoenix program, which
they put squarely on the shoulders of CIA. And when
really kind of responsibility if you want to look at
that way, if you do this as a great evil
kind of arrested equally with Army intelligence and mcavee, SAG
the Pentagon itself. But you know, one of the reasons
this is misplaced and people that like CIA is kind
of the the seat of of of deep state power,
it's really not. And it was really really low by
a lot of very hawkish Cold warriors. So something happened
in nineteen seventy four. There's something of this day that
is that is corralled by UH the intelligence services called
the National Intelligence Estimate. It's it's become kind of meaningless
now because intelligence and the whole all intelligence game is
totally different today. And we could do an episode on
that if if anybody's interested, but I'm not gonna deep
dive into that because that's just too much kind of
collateral stuff. But the UH, it was the belief of
UH everybody from you know, kind of hawkish senators and congressmen,
you know, to Pentagon types, two guys in army intelligence,
you know, to UH, to UH, to round Reagan himself,
who you know, as early as as as the mid seventies,
you know, had his eyes on a White House bid.
You know, the believes that the CIA was not feeding
they were not feeding good data to UH, to those
to whom they were accountable, civilian or military. The claim
was that they were consistently underestimating Soviet capabilities as well
as just kind of internal dynamics from that so within
the Soviet Union, relating to the leadership cast, as well
as relating to probable decisions that the Soviets would make
and when confronted with with with with crises, with crises
both of man and without their sphere of influence. So
it was proposed that what was called Team B be
corralled as a competitive analysis exercise. Now, what was the
mandate of quote unque Team b Uh? There it was
commissioned to aggregate and analyze data from diverse sources basically
any available intelligence sources that were then relied upon, Okay,
to judge the accuracy, comprehensive nance the predictive value of
the national intelligence estimate of the preceding several years. Okay, Now,
the folks at Team be it was sixteen experts total,
and I'll get into who those men were in just
a minute. They were divided into three teams, okay, or yeah,
teams or classes if you will. One of them was
to study specifically low altitude Soviet air defense capabilities, which
again I don't want to bore anybody, but this relates
to things uh you know, UH stealth technology didn't exist yet,
but it was understood that this was in the wings
and even were it not, platforms like the like what
became the B one bomber. H. You know. The idea
was that you can fly below conventional radar strikes super
harden targets with uh with very very heavy uh nuclear weapons.
Uh you know, this most effective way to knock knock
out uh these counterforce targets. So even even though it
seems like overly specific and esoteric, I mean, that's that's
why this was such and such a priority. Okay, the
study of low effect that those and capabilities of low
altitudes pesically low altitude Soviet there def it's capabilities in
places like Moscow, in places like Kazakhstan. Okay. Another team
was a study the accuracy of land based Soviet and
more so packed ICBMs. Okay, the circular error probable. Traditionally,
the Soviets larded their their launch vehicles and warheads that
had absolutely massive throw weight. So even if they lost
a substantial amount of them, you know, it's ah to
ABM technology. Those that hit would would would be absolutely devastating.
That's kind of how they resolve the you know the issue.
I mean America at every different Amora's ethos kind of
the opposite. Remember's idea was eventually, you know, to create
basically smart munitions uh on strategic play in in in
the strategic arsenal and pepper the target area with with
sub megaton warheads, which which is far far more devastating
than one massive uh UH device. For reasons I don't
fully understand. I'm sure physics guys could like shift some
light on. And finally, and most importantly, the third, you
know team, within Team B, there were always to study
Soviets strategic priorities and how this interface with policy orientation. Basically,
what's the Soviets the Soviet what's the Soviet doctrin on
nuclear war? Like when would they truly escalate? And beyond
that in more and more kind of global figuratively little
terms like what is their grand strategy? Like how does
the Soviet Union aim to increase its power in this
kind of uncertain epoch that we're entering now. Who was
on this team and you're gona understand, You're going to
understand why I made a big deal about Bush and
Uh and Uh like Bush the man in personality, This
team was headed by Richard Pipes Uh. It included Uh,
Daniel Graham, William Van Cleeve, uh foy D Kohler, Seymour Weiss,
Paul Wolfowitz, and Paul Knits, who'd been the creator of
the Committee and the Present Danger in nineteen fifty, which
over over time at various iterations, all of which basically
it's it's it's not really relevant now, but that was
always kind of the uh that that was always that
was that was GONDA, the that was the Plitable Action
Committee of Cold War hawks. Okay. Now, if you notice
from that list that has ticked off these like the
Fathers and neo Conservatism, not philosophically but in policy terms,
that is not an accident, okay. And these guys basically
were saying, well, Busch's CIA is totally competence and they
do not know what they're doing. Okay. And uh. Thus,
when Bush was brought on board as Reagan's VP, Reagan
was surrounded with neo conservatives as advisors. And I would
go as far as to argue people like Oliver North,
people like Poindexter, people like l. Hag who didn't last
long in Middle these guys were ultra hawkish, but they
were not Innoka. And so however, Neocon's very much had
Reagan's ear, and Reagan himself is something of a Neocon. Okay,
he was in He was a Roosevelt new dealer who
you know, had a kind of Sall and the Road
in Damascus moment in the UH in the post war years. Okay, Uh,
I mean that's a whole another issue. But so Bush
was basically the company man who who was Reagan's press
admission of the White House, and Bush and Reagan did
not like each other. And when Bush found himself elected president,
he was surrounded by men, uh who had gone on
to very story and powerful roles in a policy planning
corners and the national security apparatus, who were very, very
hostile to his worldview and who did not view him
as particularly competent. Okay, Bush tried to insulate himself with
with with his own loyalists, and I think he did
that in large measure. You know, people like Baker, people
like Scowcroft. He's kind of a complicated figure in terms
of his values. He had Neo Connage tendencies. But first
and foremance he was loyal to Bush. And uh when
Bush took office, you know, uh February nineteen eighty nine. Again,
not only was this kind of TV faction that would
much later he become kind of known to the public
as you know, the Neocon Cabal, some aspect of it
at least. Uh. Not only were they insinuated very much
into the into the national security apparatus, but you know,
certain expectations have been raised by Reagan. You know, Reagan
and Gorbachev. Uh had this tremendous report and that was legit,
That was that was real. That wasn't. Bush found the
speed of things very alarming. A few months before Bush
took uh before inauguration day, Bush actually tad Henry Kissinger,
and he asked him to contact Gorbachev's and intermediary. Kissinger
secretly traveled to Moscow and he met with Gorbachev and
Kissinger explained as ordered that there would not be a
steamless transition of administrations from Reagan to Bush. And Groza
was kind of put out by this as well as
taken aback, you know, and Garbachhaw said, well, why what
Kisnder articulated was exactly what Bush instructed him to. He said, Look,
there's a danger here of a structural and political nature.
You know, a reckless US president could totally derail the
transition away from communism. You know, there could be a
coup of hardliners, which there was, and we'll get into that,
but that was not until what it appeared. Uh, there
could be uh there gonna be open civil war between
the nationalities, and that did happen in some theaters. Uh,
there could be a complete Weimar style collapse, which also
did happen to some degree. What Kissinger relayed in essence
was Bush had told him, you know, an American president
could be much to derail the transition away from communam,
but could do little to grease the skids, UH to
the facility of the projects more rapidly. Now to understand
what Bush's vision was, it was a lot like Nixon's.
After Nixon left office, Now, as you probably remember about
my age, he Nixon kind of got a second lease
on life by the mid late mid to late nineteen eighties.
He wrote some very good books on the strategic situation.
He wrote a lot about the Cold War, which frankly
was Nixon's like raison detrop and you know, and even
he was even tapped by CNN during the Gulf War
like not infrequently show it before he died. But Nixon
and Bush, their idea was this. Their idea was that
we can preserve the Soviet Union as some kind of
benign structure, at least for the time being. You know,
what what has to be paramount is total nuclear disarmament
and UH and then gradual demobilization of conventional forces until
such that they're drawn down to basically nothing more than
the kind of Weimar style, you know, constabulary force to
manage internal life or ethnic conflict or things like this.
In Bush's case, it was very much a kind of
it was very much kind of the vision of Roosevelt
that you know, the United States and the Soviet Union
would kind of govern the planet literally with you know,
Moscow as a junior partner, but that you know, this
massively federated structure that took up literally one sixth of
the earth should remain intact because the alternative is just
too unpredictable and uh, it seems unrealistic to us, I
mean regard regardless of the merit of such things on
their own terms or such concepts with how you've token
the art. There's a singular fixation among policy planners after
Nuremberg of at all costs is preventing armed conflict. And
if you look at government as some kind of progressive
instrumentality in in live looking as as either a necessary
evil or as a means by which you know, the
posterity and historical mission of a people is preserved, you
kind of view this as the zenith of government. So
the Bush Faction, if you want to call it, that
contra the neo kon or pronoun faction. This was their vision. Okay.
In contrast, the guys who had staff Team B and
who would now become these gott uber hawks in sinuated
into various roles. They viewed the Soviet Union as quite
literally evil. They like, that was not i probole, That's
the way they looked at it. Some of this was
some of this was ethno sectarium going to the background
of a lot of these men. Some of it was
was not. It was just you know, guys who are
not of that particular background, but who who just viewed
it as evil incarnate. So their idea was it had
to be destroyed. Now, you know, if we destroy the
Soviet Union by open warfare, so be it. If that's
what you know, God or or or a fortuna or
whatever ordains. Or if we destroy it, you know, by
by dismantling it through you know, a detonation strategy of
you know, stirring up the nationalities against against against Mother
Russia and against each other. You know, uh, if if
we if we destroy it by you know, imposing a
kind of looting operation on it that that strips of
its natural wealth, strips it of its natural resources and
national wealth and control of such commodities they're in. You know,
we can just run your act prostrate and impotent. That
was the competing viewpoint. And this is not iperbole. These
these people spoke very openly. This Dick Cheney uh went
on a record as saying quite literally quote fuck them.
They lost when confronted with, you know, the kind of
Bush Baker vision which seems incredibly reckless from metals to
your politics. But this, uh, this said the uh, this
is the effect of really kind of really kind of
driving a wedge between Bush and GORBACHEWF. And this this was, uh,
this is exacerbated because one of uh when when one
of Bush's first acts as president, he visited Poland. You know,
in Poland was kind of ground zero of anti Soviet
not just the anti Soviet sentiment, but of organized resistance,
you know, like Valenca and the solidarity movement. Bush did
not like Valenza. It's I think part of that was
kind of inherent snobbery because Valentza was very much a proletarian.
I think bushvidiam is a rail rouser. What Bush did
was he met with General Geraldzelski. And again, if I'm
butchering these names. I apologize every bed with that. I
don't like any any Slavic guys or girls of listening,
like don't hesitate to correct me in the comments or whatever.
But I'm not good with these pronunciations. But gerald Zelski
was an interesting guy. Uh. He was the only military
man who was a chief of state of a warsaw
pet state, which is interesting to me at least because
tone deaf is. The Soviets were like as bad as
their optics were. Uh, they realized in some basic way
that they couldn't just install you know these like military
uh strong men in the several satellite states. But Poland,
this is I mean, Poland was under martial law from
from nineteen eighty eighty one onward. But Geraldzelski was a
tragic guy. You know. He he looked ominous because it
was in uniform and he'd wear these really dark sunglasses.
Jeraldzelski's eyes were ruined by snow blindness. He was a
he was a Polish and he was he was he
was a Polish national of noble birth when the Soviets
invaded eastern Poland in nineteen thirty nine, owing to his
parentage and and pedigree. He was sent to a gulag
and uh spent years at hard labor and uh the
glare off the snow ruined his eyes. But he you know,
was telling too that he was that the Soviets had
to rely on him. You know that there really really
there there were no there were no dedicated Polish Communists,
you know, it was it was more of a the
the pole Communists. Poland was more of a contribance even
than the D d R or any or anything else
within the Warsaw deck structure, which is interesting. But Bush
and Geraldzelsky had a certain rapport, and Bush went as
far as to convinced gerald Zelski to stand for president
when uh, when Poland UH had their first multi party election.
And Bush was criticized roundly and uniformly for that. But
his notion was, uh that you know, Gerlzelski, once uh,
the once the once Moscow's boot is no longer on
the neck of the Polish nation figuratively and literally. A
man like Gerlzelski can really rise to the occasion. And
I understand that even if that's not realistic in context.
But this was Bush's notion, Okay, and it was his defense.
What he said later in his own words, were he
wasn't gonna go to he wasn't going to visit the
Eastern Block and go on thumping his chest and trying
to stick it to the Soviets that their system was crumbling.
And he also would loud really large over US policy,
you know, in nineteen fifty three, in nineteen fifty six,
in ninety sixty eight, the Soviets these were and square
level UH interventions or and crackdowns on the people, first
in East Germany, then in Hungary, then Czechoslovakia. There was
an understanding among among in not just Bush, but among
you know, people on kind of both sides of the
divide in terms of how to proceed with the situation
developing in the East, that if we push this too
hard or get too greedy in terms of demanding results
and demanding too much too soon, and we we may
we may see you know, some kind of we may
see some kind of stalin his backlash and and UH
a full scale invasion of Poland then and and it
would be a massacre. So I'm not I'm not sitting
here saying again that people should like it was forty
one or should like share that view, but I'm just
trying to give a balanced perspective. And it was his
view was not born of some kind of Simpleton's delusion,
even if it was not realistic. But what, uh, what
ultimately did happen was, uh, it was very interesting and
really conspiratorial, kind of figuratively and literally. And again we're
kind of gonna come back to the CIA and it's incompetence.
And I know people think I overstate this, but consider
this William Crowe. He was another general who was gonna
he would have been considered something like a minister without
portfolio served a European government. But he was close to
Bush forty one and Baker and spoke Croft and that
whole coterie. He said, the CIA literally in mid nineteen
eighty nine, he said there was still there were still
showing dispatches that spoke about the USSR as if it
was twenty years earlier. They were claiming that Gorbachev was
simply a biting the bresident doctrine. But you know, he
was reluctant to deploy force because he was trying to
lull the West into a false sense of security. It's
like they were in in In Crow's words, he said,
it says if the CIA didn't never see the news.
He said it was as if like they'd take just
kind of official dispatches from East Berlin or Moscow kind
of knock a percentage off, and the credibility you then
released that is basically you know fat you know, oh
the East Berlin says that you know, the that the
regime of Strowger than ever that must be true, or
you know, the like like Grochev's the General secretary and
he says there's gonna be no, you know, they're not
gonna they're not gonna drop the planet economy and the
Soviet Union will remain. So that's that's the fact. I mean,
I'm not I'm not using that probably that this this
was literally what they were saying. And I mean that
anybody again thinks the CIA is like the seat of
of shadow of government or the intelligence community has got
to consider that Defense intelligence really, I mean not forget
the tangent, but but defense intelligence, the d i A.
They really they really got of became the guts of
US intelligence in a basic way. Okay them the n
s A and you know, uh a lot of quasi
private uh entities that you know, our contract and things
like that. But the as everybody knows, uh, the great
foil to gorbich Off is Yelston. But Yelton's the sentence.
Yelton was not this kind of great democratizer. I mean
he he's viewed that way because uh, you know he
uh he was kind of the king of the referendum.
But you know it's not people have this idea, I
think because it's byzantine literally, but also like memories are short,
I mean, including my own. I'm not saying I'm like
above this or something. People seem to remember this as
you know, there was a you know, the Soviet Union
finally held elections, Yelton beat Gorbachev, and then there was
some kind of referendum to dismantle the Soviet Union. Like
that's not what happened when Yelson seized the power. It's
what Gorbachev was, you know, kidnapped by the koup lotters.
Yelton presieded to raise to the Russian White House declare
himself for all practical purposes President of the Russian Federation.
Upon ascending to that role, and I mean there was
a referendum insinuating him into that role, he declared the
Soviet Union to be abolished. So the office is Gorbachev
held's a General Secretary of the Communist Party ceased to
hold any meaning because the entity that Gorbachev held that
office in was was abolished by Dick Todd, which is
very strange. Now, who are Yeltsin's backers. There's a combination
of kind of radical reformers, you know, these uh, these
kind of uh this kind of wild West capitalist types
who kind of saw the looming anarchy as a as
as opportunities for great proper potential. But it was also
a lot of stalin As hardliners who uh hated gorbachew
Now why did they back Yelson? I mean the kind
of conventional wisdom as well. They just wanted power in
the new regime. I don't know if it's that simple, man.
I think some of them thought that Yelson would rook Garbicheff. Yeah,
they have to settle for a rumpt state of just
you know, Russia basically. But I think they thought that
Yelton was just gonna return things to the status quo
after that. But then he didn't, And why didn't he
do that? I think he was basically bought off by
you know Team B the Oconn faction, like fearatively and
literally bought off. I can't prove that with receipts, but
I I've thought about this a lot, I've studied a lot,
and I've read a lot of direct testimony in the
in the epoch, I I think that's what happened. Now. Also,
you know, Putin became Yelton's successor, and Putin had a
variety of roles, like some some more prestigious than others,
and at certain junctures he was sidelined. I mean that
never in In in some disgraceful way. But the fact
that Putin himself and Putin is not some hardliner, but
he has a product in the old system. Okay, if
yelt didn't really was this kind of oren't liberal. I'm
using it in these terms, in the terms of the
regime employs them. I don't mean that he that's what
he actually is. But if he also has got this
arch capitalist or former you know, neoliberal ideologue, like he
would not have had men like Provement in his orbit.
He would not have he would have had him take
he would not have made him taken up a shot
or something but these guys would have been pensioned off
and and and sent far away from from Moscow furgively
and literally. But again I'm not I don't speak Russian
or read it, and I'm not some kind of expert
on the Russian people, their culture or the Soviet Union.
But I am convinced that that's what that's what happened. It. Uh,
there's also something that people got to consider, the other
kind of factor or constellation of factors that rooked and
pushed his vision. And uh, I don't want to go
off track, because this is its own topic that's very dense,
but you know, the casting of Sloping on the Lilow
as this mass murdering nationalist extremists. He was the State
Department's guy, and he was the guy who was viewed
as the moderate they could work with by Washington, and
Boyce very much wanted to keep you with Slavia together.
What happened was Helmut Cole, who I think was about
as as nationalists as any is any chance that the
Buddhist Republic could be or can be. When two Jamon's
Croatian it cleared independence, Cole recognized them immediately, and then
the die was cast. There was gonna be war in
the Balkans, and that was key to forming contemporary identities.
That's why, in a very proximate way, and I'm sen directly,
the Slavic Orthodox identity became paramount again. That's why Bosniaks
became very Maslem. Again. There's a whole lot of a
national soldialist inclined German guys who like Ingo Hasselbach was.
He was not an attractive guy, but he was a
skin ahead and he was he was very involved in
in in the in the right wing and in the DDR.
You know, he and his people recruited a bunch of
Germans to go fight for Croatia. And this was very real.
There's not some This was not some Ukraine kind of
situation of guys, you know, kind of pretending to be
things they're not and and strange kind of propagandasm really
makes sense like this, this really was, uh a kind
of a kind of return to to to Europe's identitarian
status quo. Now in the wake of this, uh, you know,
obviously the view that run out was not that won out,
was not the Bush forty one view. And you know,
the what was also in my opinion kind of Nixon view.
Although he had Bush part of the ways and key issues,
what went out was the Neo con view. Literally, and
what you're seeing Ukraine is the culmination of this kind
of thirty year effort of the detonation strategy of radicalizing
the nationalities. Like that's what it is. It also has
to do with preventing Europe from a from a you know,
becoming at all autonomous, because a Russian German concord is
is really what is the path that's superpowered them? Okay,
but and I mean no, I mean ron there's many
many guys in Washington who don't care about Ukraine or Russia,
and that's their notion. However, the faction we're talking about,
they very very much have an ancestral hatred of Russia
and they very very much abide this idea that you know,
the structures rotten, it should be destroyed. If we can
utilize Ukraine as a kind of torpedo, so be it.
You know, if we can any way we can, any
way we can, we can facilitate the real detonation on
on the frontier. We want to do it. Uh, it's
really that simple. But that's I know, it seems like
I jumped around a lot, but these are the key
developments to understanding what happened. And like I said, next time,
we'll we'll start out with the Berlin Airlift. I think
that's a good starting point because, as I guess there,
that have to be the start of the Cold War, Okay,
and from there we'll go in like linear terms. But
I thought that this was important. I hope I didn't
bore anybody or put anybody off by doing it that way.
But that's, uh, that's I think we're all stop for now.
Speaker 1: Well, let me let me ask you a question. Yeah,
you'll keep going, You'll keep going a little bit. What
would happened if Ducacus would have got elected in nineteen
eighty eight.
Speaker 2: That's a really interesting question. And it's interesting you raise
that because the other day on Twitter I was talking
to some of the fellas about the fact that there
was an actual policy divide, like a real cleft, you know,
between uh national security hawks and and people who thought
that time could be preserved. Do Cougress was definitely from
the ladder tendency, and then it was held against him.
You know, there's that famous people People think Caucuss is
kind of Howard Dean stream scream moment is when he
was writing in that tank, like looking like an idiot
with like a homon like the wrong way, you're trying to.
Speaker 1: Look like snooky.
Speaker 2: Yeah, but I actually exerience kind of a badass though,
like Stewie fights Threat Barren, like uh, Couress took like
a fucking jig off. But yeah, but he looked and
if even if Tocagass had been more of kind of
a like a like a manly like photogen a guy,
it was so it was so contribed. It's him trying
to look like you have tough on defense, gonna be
in this tank, you know, you know, yeah, yeah, you know,
the hell with even but it's uh, but the Caucus's cabinet.
I mean, I think Caucuss was uh. I think docungss
was was a tackling dummy who was he was a
four inclusion that that people wanted another Reagan term and
they weren't gonna get that obviously. And Bush was the
closest thing. And even though Bush was very very at
odds with the Reagan and people associated them, I mean
just I mean, you know how voters are, especially in
those days. Yeah, of course, yeah, any any even a
guy like Mondale kind of an old kind of an
old line, more running the mill democratic than Kaye's kind
of a weird nominee. You know. He was like like,
I'm not being pressed, but he was. He was like
this ethnic politician, franky. Yeah, even a more traditional U
kind of Democrat, he would have had real problems, especially
if at a hospital Congress. But it's also the U,
I do believe. And Bush made this point too. I mean,
despite everything I just said about Bush's Bush very very
very much believed in negotiating the end of the Soviet
negotiating with the Soviet unions that ended from position of
very very profound strength, okay, And I think that was essential.
I think it overla like a conciliatory executive who'd approached
the Soviet who'd approached kind of the failing Soviet Union
as hey, what we want to re establish Theayton That
could have been a game changer. Maybe one thing to
temb Coterie was right about. If they were right about anything.
I think wolf Fords himself, I think, is the source
of this and I agree with it, and I don't
I say a wolf Witz at all. He said that
Soviet Union by nineteen seventy four to seventy five, I
was said of the Third World, nobody had any respect
from Marxist Leninism people in the Soviet Union. Their quality
of life was better than the Third World, but not
by hell of a lot. Nobody believed that, you know,
the Soviet Union was leading the world and the sciences
or something. All the Soviet Union had was arguably the
world's mightiest military arguab with the mightiest army that ever existed.
If the only thing, the only thing making you a
superpower is your military and the fact you've got eight
thousand uh nuclear weapons, that changes things. That means power
projection becomes becomes overvalued. It means the entire discourse within
the state apparatus kind of orbits around hard power. And
that's very what happened North Korea today. Yeah, it's superpower scale.
I mean that's and I the so this idea that
the Soviet Union was bent on world domination in a
very in a in a very concrete and brutal way.
I believe that the United State has been on world domination. Two.
But the United States had a way of subverting on
societies other than you know, we're going to level you
and decimate you and genocide you. I mean, America would
do that too if they had to, but that wasn't
just like the option of first recourse. And I have
no doubt. And Gorbio his memoirs made this point, if this,
if every about every decade, okay, ninety fifty, in ninety
sixty two, nine seventy three, and eighty three, the world
came closer, very very close to nuclear war, and each
time arguably it was like even closer like the Cold War,
and definitely continued. I mean, let's take continue to like
the late nineties just even and so like by nineteen
ninety five ninety six, you know, nuclear weapons are basically
all now in space, you know, and it's okay, like
that was like a three minute warning time, you know,
basically like the Soviets like blank, It's like, okay, we
got to destroy them. I mean, like, what would happen
then in a crisis, you know, or like it eventually
it would have happened. That would mean the world would
have ended. But there would have been probably forty million
people dead or like one hundred million people dead, and
that would have changed everything. Man, that would have changed
life on earth forever, like not in like horror movie terms,
but the terminator. But if like a hundred million people
died in nuclear war, like the world would never be
the same, you know. And it's in ways we can't
even imagine, you know, I mean think about that. It so,
I mean one of the things that so one of
the reasons the Soviet Union, even guys I think believe
I know this, even guys who believe in the system,
they knew they had to find a way out of
the Cold War, Like they knew it. Because again, this
technology cannot be controlled. And people think it's and I'm
not just saying people are dumb or something. They just
don't have a comparative basis. People think that something like
the Soviet Union of nineteen eighty five, it's not like
you know, the office you work at, even of a
big company of like fifty thousand people, Like, it's not
something like any one man or one hundred men or
a thousand men can just control you know. It's like,
once once the apparatus gets in motion towards kind of
a nuclear war vector, that's just what it's going to happen,
you know. And I mean that that was what was happening,
you know, and this was not some paradoig fantasy or something,
you know. I mean, so that's one of the reasons.
I guess I'm kind of I've got kind of a
I've got kind of a like like guys in the
right set, you've got like a soft view of Bush,
for one. I mean maybe I do. I don't know,
but I mean whatever, I don't care what people think
about my takes on on on chief executives of history.
But there was like what it is described didn't happen, okay,
and some of that we owe to people like Bush. Okay.
Uh yeah, the Cold Wars would have happened in the
first place. You know, World War can not have happened,
but but it did happen. So that's where we were at.
You gotta judge things in their epoch. So that's I realize.
That's the name complete answer, the best the best I
can do. That's a great question, thank you. Yeah.
Speaker 1: He I just remember them selling, oh he's from Massachusetts,
and they tried to connect him to be like the
next Kennedy or something like that. It was just.
Speaker 2: I mean Bush, you know, God loved Bush. But other
than and Bush was actually a great commander in chief
and the way he managed the Gulf War with with
like like like a like a Prussian officer the highest
caliber would okay. But other than that, I mean Bush
was not a man and the people. I mean, that's
why he got smoked in the three way race with
Clinton and Parole. But I mean the fact that Bush
was able to sweep the country against ducaucas It's like, look, man,
it's like you're getting. If you're getting smoked by Bush,
you know, it's like you've got you're not a viable candidate.
See docs was a weird like a guy like greetor
Scott Greer. He'd be a good guy to take that
up with because like he, I mean, he knows like
electoral politics like the back of his hands, Like I
really don't. I mean I know the outcome, but it's
I don't have like deep takes on that stuff generally,
But do Coucress was a weird He was a weird
nominee man. He definitely was. He definitely was.
Speaker 1: I think that is gonna be a great first episode.
Give your plugs and we'll end it.
Speaker 2: Yeah, then you pete. Uh. The main place people should
hit me up as h on my substick. It's real,
real Thomas seven seven seven at substack dot com dot
substack dot com. Sorry, you can find me on t
gram Telegram at t dot emmy slash v number seven
h seven seven seven. I bet on Twitter once again
because Elon seems to not be laying the hammer down
on people. You know, for the record, man, like I've
never actually violated Twitter in terms of service. I'm not
just saying like I never have, you know, but I've
been banned like half a dozen times. But you can
find me there at Triskellian Jahad. The first t is
number seven, but I'll post it's posted up in my
substack and stuff and just go there. And I mean,
for all I know, in like two days won't be
there anymore. So it's and I am launching the day
and YouTube channel. Please don't think I'm being a total flake.
I've just had a lot on my plate in terms
of content and like other stuff. But I it is
moving forward. I got an announcement. I think people will
be happy about him. I'm debating the jfk assassination in
a few days with a guy that I got a
lot of respect for and he's actually a college professor
of the right kind. He's like a right wing history
but he does agree with me profound me so that
people will dig that. I'm going to do it on
a live stream, so well, I'll hit people to that.
And that's what I got. And thank you very much, Pete.
I really appreciate your hosting me. I really, I really
appreciate people watching and comment and stuff. I really mean that,
I'm not just being poor.
Speaker 1: Well, I can't wait for until we go back to
the beginning because that's where the intrigue of that is.
Speaker 2: Oh yeah, no, it's really yeah. Yeah, no, I'm very
excite man, and I'm very very I'm very stoked that
you you had had this notion for us to do
this series. So thank you very much again.
Speaker 1: All right, thank you, take care of Thomas. Welcome everyone
back to the Pete Kenyonas Show. Got Thomas seven seven
seven here, and we're going to get into some stuff
not only about the Cold War, maybe we'll talk to
some current events. How are you doing, Thomas?
Speaker 2: Very well, Thanks for hosting me again. Yeah, I was thinking,
I mean your point before we went why you were
talking about the election results, and I agree with you.
I think that warrant mentioned, not just because the kind
of thing is important, but what's happening in Russia and
in Central Europe at present. I believe it's I believe
the current conflict cycle is resolving somewhat peaceably, if not ideally,
from you know, my own perspective, but I mean, it's
going to remain relevant for the foreseeable future. And this
is approximately caused by the Cold War. And if we're
talking about anything of a foreign policy nature or anything
relating to the strategic situation as it stands in twenty
twenty two, where we're talking about phenomenon events and even
personages like the primary players are our people who who's
who can only be understood in the context of the
Cold War. And also some of the fellas on t
GRAM we're asking some questions about the topic, and we
can get into some of those two. I mean, there's
a lot of stuff that they were asking, some of
which is kind of like ahead of where we're at
on the timeline, some of which relates more to the
revision of stuff we were dealing with with a second
World War, but a long last moving forward, we'll cover
all of those, But I just briefly I'm not some
poll watcher like our friend Scott Career, DJ Scutty g
uh Internet cereal thriller and uh Beltway kill a but uh,
but I'm not making fun of him. He's a good
dude and he's been nice enough to host me on
IT show a few times. And I don't know why
anybody would do that if they're a reputable person, because
I like that seems like I.
Speaker 1: Really appreciate that.
Speaker 2: No, no, no, I say, it's like it seems like
it would cause you a lot of grief and like
not a lot of benefit. I mean, you're you're a
guy who's you're not like a fringe guy, but you're
a guy who's not afraid to like deal with like
radical things, not radical things like oh that's awesome and radical,
like you know, people have like radical tendencies. I don't
think I have those tendencies, But I ideal with stuff
that is a magnet for censorious uh type of uh enforcers.
That's all I meant. But he's got you know, he's
got a real uh. He guys like him and like
and like our guy Paul Fahrenheit. I always tap them
for kind of their thoughts on on you know, on
on during election the season because they're really like clued
in to that and I am not. However, uh national elections, Uh,
I tend to I tend to pick presidential contest pretty
well in primary season. But regardless, I didn't think there's
any big surprises, man. And I know this morning I
got on Twitter like that that uh that uh that
sling blade guy in Pennsylvania. Uh like Bubba Feder person
or whate the fuck his name is or Feder federal woman,
federal person. I don't know what he. Uh, I mean
they're that and like the he because you know, the
diabolical doctor Oz going down in flames made a lot
of people upset. But the Republicans, they they won huge
in Florida, like statewide and uh jd Vance came after
to Ohio. I mean, grant, I'm not at loop, but
I like look at those things as like a win, man.
I mean, I like, unless I'm missing something like that's
that's a win. And they obviously got twenty twenty. They
got the white I was twenty twenty four unless they
joined the kind of witch hunt against their guy, mister Trump.
Speaker 1: Desantist turned ten ten districts, in Miami that are normally
blue red.
Speaker 2: Yeah, that's insane. I mean the state of Florida is
now like a safe red state, and that's crazy. I mean,
not like objectively, but I mean considering the last twenty years,
the way things have gone. I mean that I don't
see how there's not a win. I mean, were they
expecting like some nationwide sweep. I don't. I mean, I
I don't know. They seem I think they should be happy.
But all I saw, I mean, granted, like social media
is its own thing and sometimes forget how weird it is,
and presidents. I haven't been on it for a minute,
but like this morning, like I got all these like
got all these Twitter alerts, these like Republican type guys
who were not not Scott Greer. He's a very he's
a very not only a sensible guy, but he doesn't
go in for that kind of stuff. You had to
read Balance for you. But a whole bunch of these
kind of Internet you know, GOP cheer leaders. They were
acting like they were acting like there's some crushing defeat
or something. And so then like I started like looking
at their returns, I'm like, what the fuck are they
upset about man like im contemporary metrics. That seems like
a win. But again, what do I know. I'm I'm
a guy who writes about stuff from long ago and
speculates about the future. Maybe I don't really like plugged
into the present day, but I don't know man like that.
And yeah, the sand this is a phenom I'm not
going to be impressed with the saying is I mean
as a political operator, like he's dope, he's very good
at what he does. And yeah, it's very impressive the
way he's been able to flip uh you know, some
key some key jurisdic jurisdictions at the local level. But uh, yeah,
I I don't. I don't know what they're I don't
know why they're crying in their fucking corn flakes. But
again I'm not I'm not some pole watcher or some
freaking builtway expert. Quite the contrary. You know down in
Texas when you were where people fire up about Trump
and stuff or they just kind of like whatever, Oh they.
Speaker 1: Just wanted to be Beto. Yeah they want yeah, yeah,
they I mean there are a lot of people, you know,
you go around Austin and you see some bedo signs.
Once you get outside of Austin, once you're in the cities,
you'll see some when you get out of there, out
of the cities there, you'll see some every once in
a while, but it's mostly you know, I think most
of the people from Texas really don't like Abbott, but
they really can't stand Beto.
Speaker 2: Yeah, Texas is a weird Texas kind of a I'm
not saying bad things about Texas. I like Texas and
I like Texas people, but their political culture is kind
of strange, you know, Like there's a like Rick Perry,
Franky's a weird guy. I mean, I know he's not.
Speaker 3: I know he's not.
Speaker 2: You know the I know he's not. He doesn't have
the cash that he did, you know, uh some years back.
I like nationally, I never I never bought the height
that he was going to be impactful on the national stage.
But he was a weird guy even for like even
as you know, even as a state ball like I
I mean, Frankly, w is the sentence he was kind
of weird. I mean, I don't think I don't I
don't think it's weird that I mean, w Frankly had
his shipped together a lot more when he was when
he was younger. But I thought it was weird that,
I mean, to Texas really liked him. You don't forget
that W was actually he had a he had a
very strong rapport of this constituency in Texas. And then
in his first term as president, like this idea that
you know, everybody always hated W and he was just
this failed politician. That's not true at all. I mean,
nobody has to. I don't like the guy, and I
nobody nobody should. But he's you know, he he he
did not. You can't simply buy your way uh to
uh to competitiveness, no, even especially if anything that might
work against you. When I say like textas okay, guy
like Bush, So I mean, I yeah, it's but I
thought it was weird that of all, I thought it
was weird. He struck me as like the kind of
twenty first century version of a Rockefeller Republican. And I'm like,
why why is Texas like this guy's home base? But
I mean, what do wh I know? And he was
big on he was big on gun rice, and he
was big pro death and the enemy back. And then
he's like those were issues that were kind of still
up for grabs. So I don't know.
Speaker 1: Back in back in six somebody had put a video together.
It was a split screen video and it was it
was W in the gubernatorial debate in like ninety two,
and then it was W in the presidential debate in
two thousand and four. Right, yeah, Oh, in ninety two,
he's just I mean, no notes, no, no, I mean,
there was no teleprompter. He had everything in his head
and he was right. And then in two thousand and
four it was, you know.
Speaker 2: The guy. I think Bush had some I think two things.
I think, first of all, I'm the last guy I
can like put shane on anybody with substance to use problem.
So not like saying that, oh Bush, you know they
drove a year, they'd drunk. But I think he probably relapsed. Frankly,
I mean he was acting like somebody who did okay,
because yeah, I mean the guy it's not like he man.
I think also get some health problems that we're not
let on on do because yeah, it wasn't just I
mean I remember some of his apologists just being like, oh,
he you know, it's just like nerves. He's not used
to the office. It's like in Texas is a huge
state man, and like he's not. He was not some
freshman congressman. He was a fucking governor. You know, you
can't tell me he's like scared of the camera or something.
It's you know, he was not. He was. He was
compromised in some way, you know, whether it was health related,
ing the illness or substance abuse or whatever. And again,
like I said, I'm not like putting shade on it.
I'm the last person to do that. But but yeah,
he was like two different people. It was really weird.
I'll see how that foot you're talking about. But we can,
we can dive into the Cold Wars. That's something I
know a hell of a lot more. I know a
hell of a lot more about than I do. Uh,
the goings on in the swamp I kind of wanted
to get into. You know, there's this big debate like
to this day, and frankly, it's actually some decent scholarship
coming out about the Cold War, not as much revision
as stuff as I would like. And that's kind of
one of the things I believe I'm like here on
earth to do. I mean, I'm not I'm not being melodramatic,
Like I really believe that, because like there's not there's
a million guys who are World War Two revisionists, and
that's dope. That's that's important, Okay, But frankly, there's there's
almost nobody dealing with the Cold War and in a
critical capacity. So I think we're doing important stuff here
in that regard. I mean we always are, but in
any event, there's a scholarly debate going on. It's like
when the Cold War ensued. I mean you can't. It's
tricky because obviously, when you're talking about a discrete armed conflict,
even when it's complicated as as the Second World War,
you know, you can kind of identify points at which
the status of relations fundamentally changed. You know, September third,
ninety thirty nine, you know, the Western Allies declared war
on the German Right, Okay, that starts starting point, Like, yeah,
there was hostilities emerging and active before then, but there's
not there's not any such point in the Cold War.
And the kind of tonal shift, not just in optics
and narrative, but in policy, uh, from between the Truman
administration that Roosevelt administration was dramatic. I know, people on
our side don't like Truman. I mean, I I've got
i Truman was not an evil man. He was not uh,
he was not a gangster like Roosevelt. He didn't have
the hubris of Roosevelt. I've got mixed feelings about Truman.
I don't think Truman should have been president. Okay, But
if we're talking about his moral character, and if we're
talking about what constituted his policy orientations with the Soviet Union,
he was in a very very difficult position and most
of the variables that were framing the decisions he had
to make it had nothing to do with his own sympathies.
You know, he quite literally inherited this bizarre situation whereby
Germany was occupied by the four powers of the United States, UK,
and then France got a seat at the table. I mean,
there's a total other issue in the in the Soviet Union,
there was there was no not only was there no
permanent status of of of you know, well now there's
no prodent peace treaty in the running. Nobody was even
talking about it, and it wasn't even clear like what
that would constitute. And really the only thing that it
set the tenor of relations at Yalta or at Tehran.
Everybody thinks Yelta's kind of word like everything, you know,
everything kind of was set in perverbial stone. It was not.
It was Tehran in forty three. That's when Roosevelt seeded
Berlin to Stalin, which seems crazy unless you understand the
new Dealer ideology, which we we delved into in earnest
in our whole World War two series. But beyond that,
what's facinating to me is even men who you would
think would have known better, like Eisenhower. Okay, Eisenhower, whatever
else can be said about him, the guy was something
of a savant in terms of logistical, an engine hearing,
military matters, and he was a protege of pershing blackjack
person who's an under understated figure in the very histories
he hasn't made. Eisenower said, uh. Eisenwer said uh to
one of his adjutants, And this is related by Omar Bradley,
you know. Uh. When there was discussion as to, you know,
the issue of allowing the Soviets to take Berlin, Eisenwer
said something effective with my god, like who would want it?
You know they're gonna lose, you know, one hundred thousand
men taking it, and Bradley's he was stupefied by that.
He's like, well, what do you mean, you know, like
how you know I can say that, you know? Uh
and uh. And Eisenhower retorted with something like, well, as
a military objective, it's meaningless, you know what, what significance
does it hold? You know what? Bradley said, Well, you know,
in a few years, that's gonna be quite clear, you know.
And Malotov Uh, you know, the Soviet foreign minister, Old
Bolshevik that he was, like a lot of those guys,
he actually had a pretty strong sense of geopolitics, and
he said, you know, what happens in Berlin decides the
fate of Germany. What happens in Germany decides to fade
of Europe. So if you look at a map of
I mean, I can't pull it up now, but those
who are inclined to do so. If you look at
if you look at a map of divided Berlin, it's
strange because the Soviet sectors kind of bulges East Berlin
extended uh to Mitte, which was kind of the historical
core of the Berlin city center. That was like the
municipal like Hobb traditionally of Berlin. You know, that's where
city Hall was, you know, that's where Parliament was, That's
all these other traditional structures and administrations, the machinery and
the machinery of garment were. So it was obvious why
Stalin was making these demands. Okay, I mean it wasn't
and it wasn't just for prestige or something. Rose elenal
problem with that. But Roosevelt also what he the only
the only kind of signaling he'd given to uh Stalin
was that Tehran. And then before he died, apparently according
to people at Cordell Hull, he said, Roosevelt stated to
Stalin as well as to you know, his cabinet in
the Apartment of State and uh In Department of War,
that oh, well, you know, American forces, I can't see
them staying in Europe beyond two years? Why would they?
You know which I don't think you can chalk up
to naivete because Roosevelt was uh Roosevelt is not naive,
whatever else we can say about him. And you know,
like we discussed in the you know earlier, we discussed
a couple of times even before we began a dedicated
series on the Cold War. You know, the New Dealer
vision was, uh, you know, a con a permanent concord
between the United States and the Soviet Union with the
United Nations. That's kind of a world legislature, you know,
the Security Council being uh, I mean, ultimately this is
what what what what what developed? But this is what
they had in mind, you know, early on, even the
Security councilor it's equivalent being you know, kind of like
the upper House, the General Assembly being the lower house,
you know, in America, having having a monopoly on atomic weapons,
you know, therefore, you know, being able to reign in
the Soviets when they were when there was policy disputes
out of governing the world. But even that, aside the UH,
there's no possible outcome where uh, where in neutral Germany
or a demilitarized Germany is tolerated. Okay, you know the
UH true Truman took Truman took the oth of office
with a hostile Congress, the UH. Even though even the
Republicans gutted as they were, the America First Movement had
been cast into disrepute, and some of these people had
actually been prosecuted and hounded and terrorized. Sounds kind of familiar.
But Robert Taff still made who remained like a strong
voice on Capitol Hill as kind of the you know,
the opposition, and even people who are interventionists, you know,
even like hawk as Republicans who who who are not isolationists,
you know, they were they were demanding essentially that you know,
Germany not be allowed to just fall into the Soviet
sphere of influence outright, So looking ahead, unless Roosevelt's plan
quite literally was a simply just seed Europe to the communists,
you can't really come to either conclusion, okay, and it's
not me just being like the famatory makes a minio
logical point, like what other conclusion can you come do?
You know? In one of the UH despite what despite
that kind of public face like pretty much everything and
well I'm gonna get into Berlin airlift in a minute,
and and what that signifies. But pretty much all the
negotiations with Stalin from UH from nineteen forty five onward
were or in basically bad faith about we're talking about
the stands in Germany because again, I mean, nobody was gonna,
no nobody in America, regardless of political strike, was going
to allow in neutral Germany, Okay, because that meant that
there's absolutely no point in fighting the Second World War,
and the Second Worlder should not have been fought. But
whether the strategic logic of the war planners in America,
at all costs journey must be prevented from capturing the East,
whether that's by a concord, a peaceable concord relatively between
Germany and the Soviet Union, whether it's by conquest, you know,
with Hitler at the helm. I mean today as we see,
I mean, what what that? This is what underlies the
Ukraine War? Is it not the fact that the fact
that the interdependence facilitated by from Merkle and mister Putin
was not something that America is going to tolerate, because
that's the only way that Europe casts off the shackles
of America in the UK and becomes a super Okay,
So even no matter where anybody fell in the political spectrum,
you know, they were not just going to allow demilitarized Germany,
but wherein you know, just by accident geography and proximity,
they were going to be incorporated into the Soviet sphere
of influence in some basic way. So there's that. I
mean probably there's there's there's more there than then we
have time to cover right now. But I I think
that that it's not a mystery, but it is enigmatic
as to what exactly Roosevelt's intentions were, and especially when
considers too that I mean Roosevelt and knowing certain terms,
knew that he was not going to liver along. Okay,
So I what how how exactly saw the world developing
after he was gone? Is? UH? Is is an open
ended question. And again, I mean, Roosevelt was a lot
of things, but he was not Joe Biden. He was
not Senile Okay, any it was really wasn't until the
final months of his life, was really compromise, and he
wasn't really you know, running running the country or the
war and an executive capacity anyway. But it uh, But
back to back to UH, back to UH. The topic
at hand, what to give an idea of how kind
of slap dash for lack of a better word, the
led administration that divided Germany was there was AH, what
was emplement was called the Common Common to Tourah and UH.
It was representatives of the United States, the Soviet Union,
the UK, and France meeting in UH, this kind of
mini UH executive council, and they were supposed to come
to they were supposed to going to terms on how
Berlin was to be administered, you know, in Berlin being
you know, to Maladov's point, you know, Berlin being quite literally,
you know, the kind of heart and lungs of Germany
and Germany being you know, the the axial pivot of Europe.
The idea was, well, what's the sayings of Berlin has resolved,
you know, the UH, the state, the stands of Germany
proper will be resolved, and then you know that this
this will just be a you know, UH, a done deal,
which seems incredible. Anybody could entertain that possibility is anything realistic?
As time as time passed to be unclear that not
only did the Soviets have absolutely no intention of of
allowing a Western military presence in Berlin, but the Soviet
delegates UH. The Soviet delegate neither him nor any of
his UH nor any of his UH adjutants spoke English.
The American delegation nobody spoke Russian. You know, a couple
of people were like trying to communicate like pigeon French
kind of like across the aisle. Like this whole thing,
this whole thing was was a ridiculous charade, you know,
like the most petty issues that be debated for weeks
sometimes months. The uh, the Russians were demanding. UH, they
issued something and the sorry and the Sonian language is
not unintentional. They produced a document called the Fourteen Points,
which which basically demanded that in the Eastern sector of
Berlin there could be like no no quote profiteering at
the expensive workers and things like this, you know, like
it was. Uh, it's basically like a radical socialist manifesto
saying that you know, the the the only, the only,
the only legitimate capitol producer in in this arbitrarily designated
eastern sector in Germany, you know, was Moscow and nobody
else the UH And finally this carried on for a good,
uh close to two years, and UH finally UH a
clerical staff, some kind of skeleton crew remained at UH
at UH at the at these at these meetings, representing
the Soviet Union. But on by August first, nineteen forty eight,
some UH, some representatives U un ceremonious we removed the
Soviet flag, took all their files, clean up their offices,
and the Soviets has never returned. You know, they were
they they they essentially like it was basically like a
solid boycott that killed the enterprise because it had it
had no no, no even second reason, that forced a
law without all for resident of all four occupation states present,
what's more significant to show you kind of the the
dysfunctional state of East Germany. I've noticed that a lot
of people, I mean people, obviously, I'm talking about court historians. Okay,
they're obsessed with the personages of the Third Reich uh
generally because they want to cast on those cutitive like possible,
but even more sensible, even more sensible people, you know,
they fixate very much. And the individuals who constituted sort
of the control group of the party and of and
of the of the state. You don't find that a
lot with East Germany, Okay, Now, not in any sort
of the imagination suggesting that these men were nearly as
dynamic as those who constituted the the NSDAP or that
the DDR was you know, some some kind of you know,
independent power into itself, that they wielded any great authority
or power of projection capability. However, it was in fact
part of the German state. Okay, even if you don't
even if even if that is now people didn't recognize
its legitimacy as as a sovereign regime. It you know,
twenty million Germans lived there. Berlin was within its borders
and it was, uh, it was quite literally at the
front lines of of of the geostrategic divide for forty years. Now.
Who who came to run the d DR? Well, the
Soviets tapped h Walter Ubert. Walter Ubercht was even an
exiled member of the KPD. You know, he'd been uh,
even an active revolutionary in the Weimar years, you know,
into the UH into the years of the the Third Reich,
and like a lot of communists, you know, he he
realized that he was gonna be prosecuted and imprisoned if not,
if not shot, and he fled to the Soviet Union.
Ulbrich was deployed to Berlin before the cessation of hostilities.
He arrived in April thirtieth what was called the Ulberton Group.
There are various various functionaries, uh, prisoners, anti fascist prisoners
of war, you know, various guys like Ulbert himself, who
whould fought for the Reds in Spain and then UH
and then and then found amnesty and in in the
Soviet Union after the ascendancy of the n sd A P.
But these guys uh and and all and and all
and there there was what was called the Akerman group
who was deployed to Sacks and the Eve, the Sabatka group,
two to UH to Mechlenberg, you know, all named after
their their cadre leader, you know. And Anton Akerman of
the sonianed Akerman group, he was part of the he
the functionary of the communist youth movement in Germany in
the twenties, you know. Then he joined the KPD. H
he was sentenced to death in absentia, you know, and
after nineteen thirty three. Like these guys are basically the
whole post war coterie of Germany. They were the old
like KPD control group. So that meant that, you know,
not only they've they've been they've been gone for ten
sometimes twenty years. They hadn't been they hadn't been a home,
you know, so they were it's not like they had
UH cadres and being on the ground, I mean even
among the Communis who stayed behind. You know, people were like,
who the hell are these guys? You know, they had
no they had no real mandate from people. Okay, I
mean arguably, you know, when you're under occupation by the
Soviet Union, it can't be said that any kind of
genuine expression of popular will is possible. But this was
especially contrived. And famously when Lubrick derived, you know, everybody
knew who he was, you know, because he he was uh,
you know, he he arrived in in you know, in
uh in what had been East Prussia initially you have
to have been you know, like liberated by the Soviets,
and uh there were Germans who were some of communist
sympathetic who said, oh, you have no idea like what
they're doing to us, meaning the Red Army. You know,
this this this rape and this and this, this pillage
and this destruction, you know, And Ubert said, uh, you
know that that's fascist propaganda. I don't believe that. You know,
if you utter that again, I'll have you shot. You know,
people were like, who the hell is this guy? You
know what I mean, like he they uh so even
what I'm getting at is that even even he consider
that people were not enthusiastic about you know, the KPD
or its legacy party coming to coming to dominate the
state apparatus ubric teddy unique like lack of of credibility.
You know, they might as well have just deployed you know,
some some some Russian apparatchick from uh from Moscow or
from or from at Vostok, you know, like what what
what was even the point? But I believe, in my opinion, uh,
it was basically for the benefit of the outside world.
Like they were saying like, hey, look, you know we're
we're not We're not afraid of Germans having, you know,
sovereignty over the run affairs like mister Ubrich is you know,
he's a German national, you know, so z Ackerman or
I believe that's what it was all about. And uh,
I mean the stories never would have trusted a genuine
uh yeah, I mean even a genuine like radical socialist
movement that was truly indigenous to Germany like that the
war had changed all that. But I people are often
they often say like, you know, how can they how
could the uh how cold the Soviets think that the
people just spotted the s c D. You know, it's like, well,
I I don't, I don't. I don't think that was
the point. I think the point was, you know, they
it was, it was it was a kind of it
was a kind of alibi when the eviction was raised
that you know this, this was nothing but a hostile
occupation and all but name. But in any event, and
then when I say the se D the in the
in the in the in the Soviet occupation sector, there
was U. The KPD, UH declared uh E merged with
the Social Democrats and became the Party of Socialist Unity. Okay,
the real party of the d d R was not
the KPD, it was the s D. Okay, just for
reference sake. But as this UH, as this was developing,
there was UH in in the west, there was there
was not a clear kind of policy trajectory. Now enter
entered George Kennon. Kennon was the He was the de
facto ambassador to the Soviet Union. He was actually the
charge of the affairs. Okay, but I mean, for all
pradical purposes, he was the ambassador. You know what Kennon's uh.
What Kennon's not known for is UH is is the
long the long memo Okay, there was so so named
because it was the longest State Department dispatcher ever said
by telegram. It was all over five thousand words, the
Long Telegram, not the Long Memo. I find this to
be the most mischaracterized document or statement of the Cold War,
save maybe for Cruisehip's quote secret speech. Okay, the term
containment was, yes, it was coined by this telegram, but
uh Kenan was not calling for some kind of hawkish
military resistance to the Soviet Union. Like Kenyon was profoundly
an a communist, he was horrified by the Soviet Union,
but he was not a military man, and he was
not proposing any kind of military doctrine what he When
the Long Telegram was expanded to an essay length, it
appeared in Foreign Affairs, which at one time was a
great periodical. I've not looked at it in years. I
assume it's kind of woke and silly like everything else,
or it's full of crazy people want to like attack
everybody on this planet for no reason. But at one
time it was it was. It was not just a
lot of prestige behind it, but it had real cachet
because it was very serious. But the actual title of
the long Telegram expanded to proper pay per form with
sources of Soviet conduct, And that's exactly what it was about.
Ken It was a rare kind of occidental man. And
I'm not trying to be offensive or say bad things
are Russian people, but they're very different. Okay, They're very
different than the West. Even the best of times, even
when they had a more normal government, it was difficult
to decipher their intentions. And there was not just linguistic barriers.
There's there's cultural barriers that relate to symbolic psychology and
historical experience and all kinds of other things. But Kennon's
enterprise was, I've got to try to make the Department
of Stay in the Department of War, and more importantly,
mister Truman understand the world to the Soviets eyes. Now,
kenn said that, uh, there's not gonna there's never there's
no one. You're not gonna be able to come to
come to terms with the Soviet Union, Okay, he said,
you so get that out of your head right away.
In policy terms, he said, the Soviets are never going
to give you what you what what you want. They're
not gonna either They're they're not gonna abide Roosevelt's vision
of you know, ruling the world with Uncle Sam as
a junior partner. They're they're not gonna accept the United
States has a benign influence in Europe. You know, they're
not They're not gonna view, uh, any of America's move
outside the out of side of its immediate sphere of
influences is legitimate, and that owes to a few things.
It was the It was that it was the Russian
traditional Russian fixation on security, and in very basic terms,
the Russians need defense in depth, and Russia is a
state that is in a nation that is constantly attacked
by its enemies. So there's that. Now you add to
that the overlay of Marcist Leninist city ology, which at
that time it's still very much was still very much
interstitially bound up with kind of the Russian political mind.
They've viewed the United States is not much different than
the Third Reich, and they've give the third right because
that is still doesn'ts of evil and the view the
United States and the UK as capitalist states and crisis
who at all costs are gonna pursue an adversarial pass
with the Soviet Union, because the only way capitalist states
can keep from cannibalizing one another is to find an
enemy from without. Okay, now this is boiler plate Leninism,
but the Soviets that actually believe that, and kend Of
made the point that, you know, unlike in the United States,
unlike in the UK, you know, where political discourse is
kind of this, it is almost kind of this. It's
almost kind of like play acting in the Soviet. Soviet
leaders like when they say things, they actually mean exactly
what they say, even if it sounds crazy. The Soviet
Union is not an able transparent but the official statements
coming from the Kremlin are actually exactly what the and
you can extrapolate that to today when the Russian government
is is a formal statement that's actually exactly what they mean. Now,
don't get me wrong. The Kremlin then is now is
literally byzantine. Russian political culture is totally opig is massively conspiratorial. Uh,
it's all screwed up. But you don't have like weird actors,
you know, just kind of saying things in Russian political
life like you do in the West. It's totally different.
And obviously American political culture then was not nearly as
degenerate as now, but there was some of that. And
this was a very important point. And so Kennon's point
was what he meant by containment is this, he said,
the way the world's gonna be ordered, the way this
entire planet, the fate of this entire planet, quite literally
in political and structural terms, political structural terms and sociological ones,
it's going to be decided by who can win over
the developing world and the Third World and the Soviet
you mean, Kennon pointed out, has a lot of cachet
there because the third world is full of people who
are already kind of radicalized. They've not had a good
experience with the white Western world. Part of that is
the scapegoating. Part of that is, you know, just kind
of the tragedy of when traditional societies, especially primitive ones,
and again I'm not saying that cunitively, that's just an
accurate assessment, you know, collide with modernity, you know, and
the UH and UH and the double edged sort of technology,
you know, and you know, the quote unquote what weav
was progress, but what they view as you know, very
very traumatic UH processes and beyond that, the uh just
within you know we we we even in the nineteen fifties,
you know, uh, people in America had come to look
at Bolshevism and and Marxist Leninism outside of you know,
academic corners and things like the Man in the Street
used as something that did not really deliver and if
uned as basically alien and those of the interviewers basically alien,
uned as something that you know, was was was not
was not it's not animated him towards you know, some
kind of impassionate defense of the ideology. Okay, but in
the Third World that was not the case at all.
I mean really until the eighties, Marcus Lennon hasn't had
great cache in the Third World. And if you want
to understand the Cold War and White endored for so
long that is why, okay, I mean long after there
was any kind of risk of you know, France, uh,
you know, people in France going to the polls and
voting in some Stalinist party. So long after you know,
Gus Fall and his friends said any any chance of
turning you know, the teamsers unied into a some kind
of Communist client, you know. Uh, in in places like Angola,
you know, places like Nicaragua, in places uh, in places
you know, like Indonesia, there was there was still cachet
who communism. Okay, So Kenn said, UH, there's got to
be a broad spectrum uh attack on communism, particularly uh,
you know, in terms of UH, in terms of suaging
anxieties about uh the development model of the West. You know,
that means not disturbing and upsetting uh indigenous cultures where
it's not essential to do so in order to uh,
in order to create a political culture that you know
is suitable for American goals. You know that means that
you know, not over reliance on on the military aspect
of competition, but you know, demonstrating uh, demonstrating uh American
systemic superiority that we can see you away, you know, scientifically, culturally, technologically,
you know, uh, in the arts, like all all of
these things. Unfortunately, the people are selective in especially in
policy terms, and what they what they take from UH
these kinds of broad based position statements of of inspired
people like Kenon. So the way people read uh the
Kenon uh the Long Telegram and the Canon memo is oh,
we've we've we've got to challenge the Soviet Union militarily
at all costs. Uh, basically like in every theater where
where they assert themselves and that uh and then that
and thus Kennon and that this was this was the
bane of his existence for his whole life. And he
made that clear, uh decade after decade that he was
called the quote father of containment. But at the event,
regardless of the fact that Kennon did not appreciate being
forced to go to the court of public opinion to
co sign, you know, what became containment as policy with
what was fleshed out in his in his position paper. Uh.
You know, Truman had a problem because Truman was facing
an increasingly aggressive Soviet Union that was quite clearly doing
everything that could to lock uh the West out of
Berlin and ultimately locked the West out of Germany at all.
And as we said, he had a hostile Congress. Already
people had become very, very soured on the idea of
the Soviet Union, not just as an ally but as
a benign influence in the world. And furthermore, you know,
one of the things we were speaking of Tehran, uh,
the Tehran's Summit, not not fleshing out what the status
of Berlin and the status that German Germany would be
moving forward. It didn't indicate anything as to how, what
what what would become of the world where you know,
the UK is simply you know, UH just simply declared
these people in the dominions to have like, you know,
to to have like rights of British citizenship now, you know,
and like these these these territories in Africa you know
that were being that were they were being seated to
indigenous rule and divested from you know, from the from
the French and from the Belgians. You know, like what
like what how do we manage these places? You know,
like what moving forward? Like you know, who's going to
take the lead here? You know, is is it going
to be you know, is it gonna be under some
kind of like u N jurisdiction? Is it going to
be under the jurisdiction of the former colonial authority? You know,
this was not clear and this caused huge problems and
it led to UH. It led to UH and what
I considered to being one of the first UH active
crisis of the Cold War. One of the many horrible
things UH we can say about Churchill and they are
many you know that trying to resort diperbole as it
became clear posti alta in Churchill's mind that the United
States was not gonna do anything to preserve the British Empire,
like why why it goes to show you the man's
fundamental lack of understanding under the character of Roosevelt, but
of you know, the emerging kind of geopolitical culture of
uh of the epoch. Turchile hascided that something had to
be done to guard the UK's fledging interest in the Mediterranean.
So he approached Stalin and Molotov without Roosevelt's knowledge, and
he drafted this is an absurd document what was called
the Percentages Agreement, quite literally, where he wrote out what
percentage of influence the Soviet Union be allowed and the
UK would be allowed, and he territories the Mediterranean like
literally writing, well, the you know, the US is organ
ten percent influence in Greece and London hast of ninety percent,
Like how any rational person I think that's the way
fear of influence works, And what the hell is ninety
percent influence in our political terms? The whole thing is absurd,
it's it's crazy it's literally crazy. But Greece was the
first state post war really when the Germans withdrew from
Greece and forty four a communist insurgency jumped off. And
it was very complicated like who the players wore and
everything like that, but it was the UK deployed to
prevent a communists takeover. People sympathetic to the communists. They
you referred to it as the second White Terror in Greece.
There's a lot of mercenary action there. It was. It
was actually a very it was a bloody conflict, okay,
but the uh but the point is that, uh, you know,
this is also what later led you know, a decade
subsequent to the Suez Crisis or and that led Eisenhower
to kind of you know declaring uh a status of
uh of of relations for the Middle East, you know,
and shutting uh, shutting the French, the French and the
UK out of it permanently. And in those days too,
Eisenow was the last president. It wasn't all the old
and as this issue. But at any event, you know,
there was not uh what what whatever Truman thought about containment,
you know, however hawkish or conciliatory, he felt about the
Soviet Union. If he wanted to continue as president, he's
gonna have to take some gonna firm line, at least
what appeared to be such. He's gonna have to articulate
some kind of policy and make clear, you know what,
what the conflict diets were, that if the Soviets traversed them,
there would inevitably be war. And uh, a lot of that.
It was the experience of Korea and how NATO was formed.
And the next episode is gonna be the Native episode,
and it's hugely important, especially today. But I don't want
to jump into that now, but to continue the uh,
the the real kind of key incident, in my opinion,
or like a series of events, what started the Cold Wars.
The Berlin Blockade. Okay, and as as people probably imagine,
even people who you know don't reel out of the
Cold War, you know, West Berlin was one hundred and
ten miles into the Soviet occupation sector. Okay, it was.
It was. The entirety of Berlin was in with the game,
the DDR and the western half. The only way you
could access it civilian or military vehicles was by dedicated
access routes. There's roads for the duration of the Cold
War that were literally dedicated access routes for like US
military and civilian uh and West European traffic, you know,
to pass through the d d R, you know, to
reach West Berlin and then to return the dedicated access
road and that was the only traffic permitted there. And
that was the case early on. I mean they they
these routes were later you know, on a formalized like
structurally as a matter of law, but uh, it was uh,
the the Soviets weren't weren't simply allowing uh you know
open uh aggress and egress of Americans and British and
French civilian or military in and out of West Berlin.
But they weren't. They they did not outright blackaded it before.
But what was kind of the straw that broke the
camel's back was uh the uh as the United States
uh as uh as like as a true economic policy
kind of took shape, I mean just not a necessity.
I mean, this just proceeded, you know, a formal political
uh outlook, let alone policy on West Berlin. But uh,
I mean the economy had to rebuild because people, i mean,
their infrastructure was destroyed. You know people, people weren't being
fed what and it became, uh, it became imperative. First
and foremost introduced a viable currency, so the uh, the
United States introduced the Deutsche mark, which is interesting because
it's interesting, I mean, like a lot of people think
of the deutsch mark because I mean the deutsch park
was I mean the strongest currency in Europe and which
I saw him. I'm taking them engagement the other day.
You know, the Germans didn't sign the Matric Treaty because
they wanted to get off the deutsch Mark. It was
owing to political pressures and other things. But people have
an idea of it. It's just kind of us like
it's kindrad Aden now where you know, and and like
the and like the Buddhist Republic, like Deutsche Bank or whatever.
Just uh just saying like, okay, this is a successor
to the rice market. That is not what happened. It
was he was occupation and authorities who introduced it then
and very much UH sold the Nasson West Berlin government
on it. But uh, the Soviets went nuts uh when
this happened, and uh they banned uh they banned uh
there the Deutsche mark from uh the from the the
Eastern zone of occupation. And yes they were literally arresting
people for for for for using it. So in the
Eastern in the Eastern occupations or Berlin, people resorted using
cigarettes as a defective currency. Like no, lie, I think
I mean that quite literally shows you, like what a
prison society this was from from jump, I guess. I mean,
I don't even have a particularly putitive view of the
d d R, and I mean that that should be
clear to anybody. But the uh, the introduction of the
new currency, uh when when you know, before with we
would all in the in the course of all the
failed four powers uh administrative bodies. You know, the one
thing that the Soviets that opposed unconditionally was uh, you know,
the introduction of of a private enterprise in the East
occupation zone. Okay, because there's no way they could to
controlled that, I mean obviously, and it couldn't have Eventually
if the Soviets had played their cards right, I'm talking
like years later, if not decades, I think they could
have made East Berlin kind of like they could have
viewed it treated, they could have treated kind of like
you know that the Chicoms treat Hong Kong. But I
mean that was many years off, like they this could
not that was not in the in the cards in
ninety forty eight, especially not by you know, the shock
therapy is the introduction of of of this new currency
back by uh, you know, back by American dollars. Okay
that there's no way, but the uh it was, uh,
things changed. The deutschbeer was introduced on June seventeenth nine
or June eighteenth, June eighteenth, ninety forty eight. The next
day Soviet guards suddenly cracked down, you know, suddenly suddenly
people uh the relatively kind of free ingress into into
East Berlin. You know, people are being stopped and searched.
People are being turned back. You know, UH trains are
being halted, any freight shipments, any old water transport. They
had to secure special permission from the Soviet authorities, not
from the East Berlin authorities, from the Soviets themselves. The
uh and UH got in the final uh got got
to the point of no return. Three day subsequent, on
the twenty first, the Soviets halted a US military supply
terrain to Berlin and sent it back. So essentially, as
always refused resupply of the United States Army forces in
Europe and even the idea in Berlin because Berlin, again,
Berlin was one hundred and ten miles into the interior
of the d DR. There's only at that time there's
only about three thousand US combat troops on the ground,
about two thousand British. The Soviets had a comprable size
force in East Berlin, but the Soviets had three hundred
thousand forces and being throughout you know, Eastern Germany proper, so,
I mean, if they came to war, there's those those
guys in US Berlin were dead, you know, they they
would have been slaughtered. I mean, so that this was
an ominous thing, you know. And uh, that same day,
the twenty second in June, the Soy's announced that they
were introducing the East German Mark in their own zone
of occupation. It was to be the only only legitimate,
only legitimate currency. And uh, later on, which is really
really weird. In East Berlin, Uh, I'm talking like into
the eighties, there were specialty shops, there were there were
like duty free shops where non East German citizens were visiting,
they could they could buy stuff with foreign currency. Like
cigarettes or liquor or like or like other things like food,
like like like specialty food items. But but they were
like designated foreign currency shops. I mean kind of like
the the hoops that these Marxist Lennon states jumped through.
They got to maintain the fiction that their currencies were
actually worth something is really really weird, you know what
I mean. It's it's called like you know the old
movie Brazil, Uh say, attire movie. I think, yeah, yeah,
like yeah, it reminds me of that in some basic way.
But it was a June twenty fourth. Uh, the Soviets
severed land and in water connections between the non Soviet
zones in Berlin, so all all ground rail or water
traffic was cut off. Like nobody, nobody got in or
out of West Berlin. Okay, the uh the uh. They
couldn't cut off obviously like electricity and water, because that
would have been an own goal, because I mean Berlin
was quite literally just divided down the center with this
kind of artificial like what like on a battle map,
be considered like a salient, but it you know, there wasn't.
It was not. People sometimes had this idea that there
was something like rhyme or reason to how Berlin was divided,
like there was not. So I mean it's not that
you couldn't cut off utilities to half of Berlin but
not the other half, but just the same West Berlin
at the time, UH, at the time it was blockaded,
and that's just over like a month's where like it
was between like thirty five and forty five like days
with the food, something like fifty days where the coal.
It was like a very critical situation. And the entire
the entire United States Army just total forces and being
by ninty forty eight have been reduced about half a
million men. The UH total force in the Western sector
were about eight thousand, nine hundred Americans, about seventy six
hundred British, about six thousand French. UH there was only
thirty one thousand combat forces and all of West Germany.
So I mean, if it came to war like a
both Soviet attack, total Soviet military forces in the Soviet
sector were one point five million. Now, the United States
at that point that night still a monopoly and the
atomic bomb, but I mean, what do you if if
if if communist force is trewe to Berlin, what are
you gonna do you know, you're gonna, you gonna you
didn't you had launch an atomic assault in Berlin and
waste drooling people and all the Berliners. I mean this, this,
this was this was very very and frankly it was
a uh it was a gamble of the sort that
Stalin did not usually take. But interestingly it was Lucius Clay.
Uh he was a commander of a the U. S.
Occupation zone, you know, he said it was he said
Curtis LeMay. Interestingly, le May wanted to do a he
wanted to he wanted to mobilize atomic capable of B
twenty nines an assault the Soviet sector but you know,
like like nukeam you know, and uh and and mobilized
with infantry they were available in West Berlin, uh or
in West Germany, you know, and then to forcee delivery
West Berlin with them after after this, after a massive
atomic assault on Soviet forces with with B twenty nines.
But uh that uh that that that suggestion was not invited, obviously,
But I I it was not some kind of mad man.
I'm a I'm I'm quite fond of May in history,
and I think he's kind of unduly characterized as this
kind of like Jack d Ripper type, you know, like
in in Strange Love but UH loses Clay. Uh. It
was uh in concert with uh a lot a lot
of a lot of civilian types who you know, we're
still we're still kind of uh, we're still kind of
situated into into government and quasi military roles owing to
the war only being three years past. US Army Corps
engineers UH, US Army Air Forces. The Berlin airlift, UH
was really uh, it was really kind of an amazing
It was really kind of an amazing not just the
not just policy coup, but sort of strategic rooking of Stalin.
But it it it it Uh. It demonstrated the feasibility
of uh of airpower in uh and not just in
military capacities. I mean, which was obvious, but it it's
some ways weird. It sounded maybe more coporable with the
idea of you know, huge amounts of air traffic in
and out of a major city, you know, and there
there's there's a there's literally ideas before like oh there's
gonna be like pollution and noise and things like it.
You know, these like thousands and thousand, thousands of sorties
in and out of Berlin. Uh. That that kind of
changed things. Uh. And that's I mean, honestly, that's like
a lot of time. How people become habituated to do technologies.
It's not any kind of uh, it's not it's not
any kind of small thing. I mean, there was guys
like LeMay himself and these guys, ticularly guys who fought
with the Army Air Forces in the Pacific. You know,
they developed these uh they you know, they they developed
these uh, these these assault routes from the Mariannas Islands
and things, and uh, you know, there was the ex
pres experience of the airlift uh over the quote hump
of the Himalayas, you know, from India to China. But
it was military guys who kind of understood the potential
of air power it broad spectrum application, you know, military
and civilian and commercial use. Like the man in the
street really didn't. Then the Berlin Airlift. Uh, the Berlin
Airlift changed it. Uh it uh it uh. But le
May was he uh In terms of staffing decisions, he did,
and he did. He did end up appointing a lot
most of the key figures in executive roles who uh
who May the airlift happened General Joseph Smith not to
be confused, but like the father of Mormonism, he was
he'd been uh but Smith had been like there's a
huge amount of guys who served and served under le
May during the war who went on like prestige rolls
and including Robert McNamara or uh yeah McNamara. H Smith
had been uh la made chief of staff uh when
LaMDA B twenty nine command like in India and then
in the Mary honest, Uh you know loss Clay wasn't
under Lay's command. But I mean they you know, they
made acquaintance during the war. But the uh, it demonstrated,
it demonstrated what was possible. And it also uh it
was such a collaborative effort between I mean it had
to be even in the United States in the UK,
I mean, for better or worse, you know, like and
I'm not tragged in the UK. You know, the UK
remained airstrip one in a real way obviously because of
this and owing you know, like we like we talked
about is an FDR is kind of inconsistent and frankly,
Eve Pierant signaling about the status of U UK US
relations uh post uh bellam. It wasn't clear like what
role the UK would add here or whether or not
the United States would raise a finger to defend you know,
key strategic interest, not not just the interests of the empire,
which regulating an interest in the United States and in
preserving for any reason, but I mean the adults. So
I mean it was it solidified the quote I hate
the term special relationship. And there's all kinds of like
things that are are far far less than admirable that
that entails. But apparently, like uh collaborative strategic terms, it
solidified you know, the US UK UH concord, particularly as
regards UH operational coordination with UH with their forces, and
that's no small thing. And before the revolution in military
affairs and decades before contemporary commanding control, that was incredibly difficult. Uh.
They really can't be overstated. I mean, something like Berlin
AirLand would be the hell of a hell of an
operation today. But I mean you're talking about like you're
talking about like radios, the cutting edge of like commanding
control technology and nine forty eight, like think about this,
it's like stuff. So that's like it's son's less what
like the Rockie talkies he played with his kid in
like the early eighties, you know that. UH. But the
the UH that was UH, that was the UH that
was the that that was the opposite of the Cold
War in UH in in real terms. And I don't
I don't think anybody would. I don't think anyone would
dispute would dispute that. And there were shenanigans too, like
the there was one single municipal election for all of
Berlin in UH in ninety forty six, and the the UH,
the Socialist Unity Party didn't pull pathetically yourself and they
only polled like you know, and that that's what put
the Christian Democrats on the map, not just in West Berlin,
but it's like the Bundesst Republic like Conservative party, but
the Soviets basically they're basically they were like, you know, okay,
the hell with it, Like we're not we're not gonna
pursue a political solution, you know, with because obviously they
weren't gonna they weren't gonna get you know, because my
Berlin had been like the that had been like the
Communist art Land, you know, like in the our years,
I and people people post the question like not not
as curious like readers, but like historians who like are
deeply understand you know, uh rush of the era. They're like,
why did the Russians do this? And uh, it was
just to get the lay of the land. I'm telling you.
I mean that that's it makes total sense from Stalin's perspective.
Stalin was Stalin was what if Stalin's was a guy
even the personality type today because there him like a
dada junkie like Stalin was obsessed with informational awareness, you know,
like he really was. And it's I guarantee. You just said, like, well,
let's I mean, let's see, let's let's hold an actual election,
like a legit election, and let's see what was more
We got on the ground, Okay, about twenty twenty five percent,
that's fair. We can build coveredies around there. But this
is never gonna happen again, you know. But that's I
think we're coming about an hour. I think we'll stop
there and uh well, uh well, deep dive into I
realized this might have been the most exciting episode, but
it was important because otherwise we're we're dealing with a
huge phenomenon, and that being the cold war where no
actual kind of starting starting point or tab list has
been identified. But well, we're gonna get into the Korean War,
the formation of NATO, and it's the Truman doctrine next episode.
Speaker 1: That sounds great plugs.
Speaker 2: Well then yeah, we're I'm very happy to report that.
I mean you might see it. I've got I've got
this cool uh like backdrop. I'm in the Apocalypse. I
fought my production values. Uh and also like I got,
I got a video editor to join like our production team,
and he's great. Uh So the YouTube channel is finally
gonna launch. Uh. I I'm back on Twitter now because
Elon is apparently giving people like me a amnesty. Uh.
You can find me at Triskellian Jahad. The first T
is a number seven. You can find me on substack
uh at real Thomas seven seven seven. And I mean
you can find me, like I said when I in
in about it in a few days when I when
the unit vannel doesn' launch, I'll upload a lot of
this stuff there and it's uh Thomas TV in front
of these Thomas seven seven seven. I know that's corny
is supposed to be. It's a riff on Dave TV.
If you're old like me, you remember, well there's Dave TV.
I got Thomas TV. So yeah, but thank you, Pete.
I really really appreciate it.
Speaker 1: No problem, we'll pick it up again next week. Thanks Thomas.
I want to welcome everyone back to The Pea Show,
Part three with Thomas seven seven seven.
Speaker 2: How are you doing, Thomas, I'm very well. Thanks for
hosting me. There's a few things I wanted to talk
about today, and I want people to not be shy
if I'm being too scater shot, I'm not focused enough.
The Cold War is such a massive topic and it
touches and concerns all kinds of theory matters, you know,
which is kind of like my wheelhouse, but it also
you know, in terms of practical affairs and very quantifiable things,
you know. It it really kind of it created the
contemporary strategic landscape, you know, and it endured for it
endured for a century. So there's so much there. You've
kind of got to pick and choose what you emphasize.
I'm trying to go and lineit your order, because you know,
that's and whatever you're whatever you're trying to whatever, whatever
your emphasis is in in in revisionism, you know, you
need to be as rigorous as you would in any
other historical study. I mean that doesn't mean just you know, relating,
relaying facts and documenting events for its own sake. But
I don't just want to be taking off a list
of you know, what I consider key events or something. However,
if if I'm if I'm getting ahead of myself, or
if there doesn't to be a kind of tie that
binds to make the narrative listenable or intelligible, please tell
me in the comments, and not going to get upset.
What was on my mind a lot lately, especially because
in the morning a couple of days a week, uh,
my dad gives me a ride downtown for stuff I
gotta do. And you know, I listened to eight ninety
AM Talk Radio, which isn't it's not garbage like NPR,
but it's garbage of a different sort. And they have
all these polemical takes from you know, these like retired
you know, captains and majors, you know, like kind of
like third rate want to be war college types, you know,
as well as you know, some of these kind of
DeSantis type Republicans or kind of like the token conservatives
on on the panel on these morning talk radio programs.
You know, there's there's it's it's interesting the way these
guys talk about Russia. Okay, because Russia kind of like
dar al Islam. You're still allowed to say basically prejudice
things about it, you know, because it's not you know,
it's it's not part of that kind of protect it's
not conceptually you know, incorporated into you know, the the
victimology narrative. Okay. But also there's even as even if
they erastinated as people are in America, you know, especially
in terms of these you know, the kinds of people
who populate media, what remains the original media at least,
you know, even academic types who who couldn't tell you
anything about their own heritage and are not very racially
conscious at all. There remains this kind of atavistic fear
of Russia. And that's not just some that's not that's
not just some kind of hackneyed poetical take that people
like Lavrov you know, drop uh on the on the
floor of the you on General Assembly in order to
make a point or to scandalize people. That really is true,
and to understand the Cold War, you've got to understand
You've got to really understand why that came about. I've
been reading lately. There's this book by Michael Proudon and
it was released interview, different titles, The Value I've got,
it's under the titled The Mongol Empire. There's another one.
There's another addition, identical book, you know, called called Storm
out of Asia. But what it's all about is it's
all about when the Europeans made first contact with the Mongols,
you know, in the thirteenth century a d okay. Now
why was this so significant? Well, you know, the Europeans
since ten ninety five and intermediately been at war with U,
with the Saracens, you know, at Salahadeen and his descendants.
You know that this was a crusading ero, okay. And
what was fascining about that is that it was the
only time until I me, unless you count you know,
the Napoleonic Wars, which were kind of more convenience than
than than than you know, than a unity of faith obviously,
you know, it's really the only time we had it,
you know, truly European armies, you know, going off to
the war against the common civilizational enemy. However, some of
that kind of concord had been had been reached with
the Mauslims. Okay, I mean sometimes, you know, sometimes there's
relative peace that reigned, you know in UH, in the
Kingdom of Jerusalem. You know, after that Battle of hot
Team and UH the Moslim conquest, things deteriorated, but you know,
there's just kind of like an ongoing thing. But in
the twelve you know, in the twelve twenty, something of
these rumors came about that there was this huge marauding army.
It was just slaughtering everything in its path, and a
lot of people in monasteries and monks, they're like, well,
you know this, this, this is the scourge of God
and he's punishing you know, the infidel Moslims, but he's
also punishing these pagan tribes to populate the step, you know,
because all these barbarian people are literally being driven west
to the European frontier and saying, you know, there's these
men on horses, there's long torsos, and they kill everybody.
You know, when they like those left alive, you know,
they take the women as slaves and they you know,
they force the men into you know, into into Duty
of Janis series. Basically you know, and they and they
drive them, you know, out front, and you know they
take they take the first blow when we when they
encounter their enemies, and their enemies are everybody but them.
And some people thought this was just nonsense, say, these
are primitive Pagans, they're you know, they they don't know
that hell are talking about. They probably smet the Saracens,
you know. Other people said there were Jews who said, like, well,
you know King David his combit, you know, and he's
coming to punish you for the way you've treated the Jews,
you know, and he's coming to punish Jews too, who've
like forgotten God. Well, obviously with none of those things
was the Mongols, okay, and the association of the East
with this barbarian element that never really left okay, And
I mean it never really left in the European cultural
mind and conceptual horizon. But it also never really left
literally okay, Like I'm not I'm not saying Russians are
a bunch of Mongols or barbarians. But there was this
this massive, uh, this massive monolithic force emerge it from
the step that was just destroying everything in his path,
assimilating everything that was left alive or left standing like
literally into its into its structure. You know. That's that's
really what the Soviet Union was. Okay. And at the
at the at the at the s s uh Yunker schools,
the uh, the Proudings book was actually given officers, okay,
and that that significant. Himler didn't assign Himler and Paul Houser.
They didn't have people reading the International jew They didn't
have people reading Clouds of Wits. I mean, people didn't
read Clouds with was Py the curriculum. But you know,
the book you got my graduate graduation was this book
by proud him Both because it's you know, it's always
it's saying, you know this, this is your enemy. You know,
this is what you know. You're you're in You're you're
a knight of the new uh Blood Order of of
of Europe, you know, in the s s and this
is what we're fighting against, you know, because where the
where the we're the watch on the Rhine. Okay. But
also after you know, three hundred years of of the
Westphalian paradigm, it you know, uh, the reality of true
total war was was in and again okay, and uh
that they cannot be emphasized enough, and even it sounds corny,
but you can glean things from you know, uh, you can,
you can you can discern symbolic psychological things even in
kind of trashy media. You know, and I watch I
didn't watched it in years. You know, I like a
lot when I was a little kid. You know, Red Dawn,
you know, with Patrick Swayze and see Thomas Howell. You know,
the that's actually kind of an interesting movie, like as
a period piece mostly, but you don't like the black
history teacher when when the when when when the town
first gets assaulted by like the Soviets and the Sandinistas
and the Cubanos. He's teaching a class about gang is Khan, okay,
And that's like not an accident, there's really like on
the nose, okay. But so when you consider that, you
consider that, you know, Europe is literally this kind of
indefensible peninsula that you know it that that's the way
you got to understand. That's way you gotta understand the
Second World War. That's way you've got to understand essentially
the entire the entire nuh, the entire European uh military
orientation and uh, the you know, and the and uh
and the the this this you know, the the striving
eastward of UH of Teutonic peoples. And in the Cold War,
this was very much kind of transposed to America. Okay,
there was there was very much a racial component here. Okay,
even though there were strange things going on in America.
You know, there was the the fact that the Soviet
Union became, you know, a superpower and without annihilated oh
do uh oh to the United States align with it,
to to crush uh imperium Europa with you know, under
the under the German Reich. But you know, nevertheless, uh,
you know, these uh, the these things re emerge again
and again. It's it's almost like a it's almost like
a natural structural form that like snatched back in a place,
even when people try to corrupt it or mold it
into different configurations. But I uh, what I want to
talk about today is the war in Korea, and this
bear is directly what we're talking about. And the Cold
War actually was fought in terms of hot war. I
mean all kinds of ledgered Maine, and there was there
was true violence in Europe of but it was all
I mean, it was never there was. There was never
a general war fought in Europe during the Cold War.
There was. The Cold War was literally grew hot in Asia. Okay,
the Cold War where there was lead in the air
between you know, mass conventional forces. They have been in Asia,
and it's not accidental, and uh that's not uh, it
wasn't just a matter of you know, well, you know
this is a place where this is a place, these
are this is a theater where you know, the Soviets,
the Americans respect that we can push and not resk,
triggering you know, the the apocalyptic conflict diad that's gonna
lead to general nuclear war. And interestingly or fascinatingly, in
the final phase of the Cold War, which will get
into later, the real catalysts behind Reagan's five hunder I
mean it's actually James Webbs, but I mean the the
Reagan Administration's six hundred ship Navy was that they wanted.
They wanted nuclear battle platforms and and and and supporting
the fleet elements. You know, it was essentially like forest forest.
The Soviet Union War was uppack to fight a two
front nuclear war, if you can think of nuclear wars
having a front, a rather two theater nuclear War and this, uh,
this caused a serious problem from Frank drop of Uh
a special I mean bresident of it began really under Carter,
but that that's one of the things that really really
kind of rooked the Soviet ambitions. Uh. It wasn't just
the revolution of military affairs and and like the technological
edge being lost, but getting into the Korean War. And
again I hope those in't two like scatter Shot. We
got into the Berlin Airlift last episode, you know, and
in the Cold War, you know, the Cold War, the
Cold War it formally kicked off by then, okay, and
then in nineteen forty nine, the story has developed their
own atomic capability. You know. We can get into the
Rosenbergs maybe next episode if you want. I I didn't
know if you wanted to cover the act. It's kind
of controversy to you and people's strong feelings about it.
Speaker 1: Oh, I don't know.
Speaker 2: No, we need to cover that, Okay, we'll do that
next next episode. We're gonna deal with the early espionage issues.
We're gonna deal with like the Cambridge Five and the
Rosenbergs and Alger Hisss and Roy Khane who prosecuted the Rosenbergs.
But I want to stay to the Korean War in
the Orient with this episode. So here we are in
nineteen fifty Secretaria State Dean Atchison, who he's there's there's
been a lot of revisionist takes on him that are
pretty unflattering. But Adisin was kind of a peculiar. I
think it was kind of anna feat uh aristocrat type
of the sore of the worst source. But I mean
that's just my opinion. There's definitely even worse chief diplomats,
but uh Absison's great blunder. I think it's inarguable. In
January thirteen, nineteen fifty, you know, mind you this was
as we talked about, uh, we talked about, you know,
the desire to draw down conventional forces and rely upon
that you know, the the the atomic bomb, you know,
to resolve basically military exigencies, you know, in the threat
of massive escalation. That this was creating problems as you know,
the Cold War uh be you know, began to heat
up in earnest quite literally, but there had not yet
been an open challenge to uh to Truman. Okay, there
had not yet been uh, I mean, other than the
Berlin Blockade, which was I I mean that that was
that was not a conventional provocation, you know, owing to
the bizarre occupation regime and the fact that you know,
Germany was permanently in limbo as a matter of law,
you know, because there it was, it was quite literally
under occupation authority, and there was no there was there
was no end in sight and no pathway to a
permanent peace treaty emergent. But the the UH, you know,
the first true kind of challenge UH to UH to
UH to American burgeening American and Germany was the Korean War.
And I think of the Korean War and why it
happened UH as somewhat analogous to why UH the First
Gulf War happened. It had to do with incorrect signaling
by UH, by by US diplomats. Like when I say incorrect,
there really is a correct way to not disclose UH intentions. Well,
at the same time, the turn reckless acts by you know,
by national enemies, and that's deplomats must have instincts to
know when to resort to such measures and must have
a basic understanding of how to code their language such
that you know, the signals can be clearly read while
still you know, keeping keeping potential, keeping intentions, actual potential,
you know, relatively hidden as need be a sustained credibility.
But Danaison certainly did not do that. What Deanagison did
on January thirteenth, nineteen fifty, he addressed he should have
speech to the National Press Club, and what he said
was this, When he was asked about, you know, what
the policy was towards the communists in Asia, he said, Look,
he literally said, there's a defensive perimeter in Asia. He said,
the extens from Japan, do the Reikus Islands down to
the Philippines in the south. So quite literally, if you
look at a map that consumes kind of a line
through the Pacific, Okay, within which I mean obviously you know,
he like you, has sea lanes and things, but basically
it's it's it's like a it's quite literally like a
containment barrier, uh, you know, uh, bulwark against the against
the against the Asian land mass. Okay. Now, Stalin was
paying attention to this, as was Mao, And the way
they read that was that, well, you know, despite the
fact that Korea was under similar occupation in Germany, you know,
you had you had a you know, you had you
had a Soviet occupied UH. North you had a briefly
American and Allied occupied in the south, and then north
you had this UH kind of cargo cult Stalinist regime.
And in the South you basically had a military dictator ship,
but the military that was running it was not particularly capable. However,
there was not forces in being on the ground in
the South. UH, they had THEYD left Okay, and UH
the UH. The the understanding was that America is not
gonna defend Korea. Okay. Now why Stalin and Mao comed
in Korea is UH is what's significant because Korea was
not UH in Germany. And the reason why Korea today
remains dysfunctional is because it UH. It borders UH both
China and Russia, and so the striking distance of letty
vas stock it's a stones throw away from Japan. Like
quite literally, nobody wants to United Korea, but the Koreans,
you know, America doesn't. The Russians and Chinese will not tolerated.
Japan would not tolerated. This both supersedes and transcends UH
Cold War rivalries now obsolescent, but also UH but but
also as far less of a of a of a
potential conflict. Diad that that that could result in true
catastrophic escalation. It became that way because I'm a carthon.
We'll get to that in a minute. Okay, Now what
happened months later was on June twenty fifth, UH, the
North North Prey launched and massive assault of of the South.
It was a Sunday. President Truman. UH was at home
in Missouri, away from Washington. Dean Atchison was in Maryland
at his gentleman's farm. Henry Nis, who people the name
people were recognized from our earlier episodes did so, was
the Secretary of Defense. He was not a fishing trip
in New Brunswick, but nitsad. Decades later, he was the
principal architect of the Team Be exercise. He was a
huge early neo conservative, okay, massive extreme Cold War hawk.
He was the author of National Security Council Paper sixty eight,
which was drafted in April of nineteen fifty, and that
was one of the most important policy blueprints or policy
statements of the Cold War. It provided it provided the
roadmap for the permanent militarization of America of both conventional
forces and in strategic nuclear forces. From you know from
the time it was written the ninety nineteen fifty until
you know, the Soviet Union collapsed, you know, forty years later.
So he was a hugely significant guy, Okay, and uh,
his first, uh, his first kind of challenge political nature
was uh, was was butting heads with with you know,
mister George Kennan. And we we discussed earlier. I mean
Kennon obviously from what we discussed about him, and you know,
from what we've talked about or is this kind of
basic traits and character and it's kind of it's kind
of decency in his basic sense of caution. I mean,
he believed very much in strong defense, but you know,
the cautious application of force and the service they're in.
Kenn was one of the few men whatever people can say.
I mean, we'll get into why this isn't a minute.
But Kenan was really savaged in the era, in the
epoch by his opponents, including people like Mitza, you know,
for being you know, soft on communism and conciliatory towards
the Soviets. But kenn Uh, he had been adamant for
once prior to to the June twenty fifth that there
were definite indicators of communist military activity in Asia and
that they were going to assault somewhere. It was not
clear where the theater would be for such activity and
what the point of concentration would be and what would
be prioritized they're in but MacArthur staven Tokyo just did not.
They just disregard him entirely. They're like, this guy's in
the egg ahead, he's never been in uniform. He isn't
what the fuck he's talking about, and he can't even
you know, provide us conceptual model of like where this
is gonna jump off, you know, and what what we're
gonna forces, it's gonna entail, you know, and what and
what what what feeder is gonna be the primary area
of operation. So they totally disregarded it. Okay, but this
uh to give you an idea of kind of how
fubar the National security Estalishman was neither Truman, nor uh
Nis nor Atchison. It wasn't until they returned to Washington
from their respective you know, vacations that uh they found
out that Career was going to ressault because they saw
the newspaper lines. Okay, there was no structure in place
of of you know, notifying national command authorities of a
wartime emergency and branded. I mean, this was that this
was the dawn of the atomic age. But it doesn't matter.
I mean a you know, America, for better or worse,
had had had just come off of a total mobilization
and then you know, a mansion two front war. It
was unprecedented in scope, scale and intensity, so impossible to
rationalize as it is. That's the way things were when
Kenon uh arright that night. Kennon Ken at this point
was something of a minister without portfolio. Okay, Uh, he was.
He'd been dismissed, as you know, the kind of quasi
regent of the Department of State in Moscow. He'd ended
his tenure as a special consultant to the National Security Advisor.
But he, I mean, Ken was always in the executive orbit, okay,
because he was a brilliant guy and he uh, he
was the he was the foremost expert in the Soviet
Union and the Rush and Russian culture. Okay. The evening,
I'm sorry, evening at June twenty fifth, Kennon double time
to the Department of State and he said, look, he said,
the critical strategic matter here is that formosa Taiwan has
to be defended. He's like, if this is a general push,
and it may well be, you know, he said, Uh,
the secondary of Soul is the soult in South Korea,
the primary cult is gonna be on Formosa, and ultimately, uh,
there's gonna be a massive assault in Japan. Okay. If
if the Soviets are going all in in Asia and uh,
the Chinese, their Chinese proxies are going all in where
we're gonna we're gonna be We're gonna fight a world
war Japan, okay, which is very interesting. And uh, Taiwan
is interesting because Taiwan is actually zero strategic significant today.
And it shows you like the raw delusion of these
of these of these bizarre fucking idiots, like like missus Pelosi,
mister Biden, that they pretend that it's nineteen fifty and
that this matters, or that they actually have you know,
not only is there no steak in Taiwan, but this
idea that if I mean, if an American carry group
showed up declared the Taiwanese until the twenty two that
we're gonna defend you, like, they'd be totally befuddled. And
then they laugh in their face. You know, I mean
it's uh, it's incredible. But in nineteen fifty UH had
Taiwan fallen and had that ben you know, the like
Moscow and Stalin's ambition. Ken was absolutely right the and UH,
as we will see as we get deeper into this series,
the Soviets put remarkable pressure on Japan, and then the
Soviets roy is seeking out a weak spot as kind
of their counterweight to UH to UH to the situation
in Berlin especially and and the inner German border generally.
And that's when underlay cruise shifts on the serves amparently
reckless deployment a strategic nuclear forces at Cuba, which blew
up in his face. But UH, the UH finding a
finding a if the Soviets had been able to find
a soft spot as it were in uh the Asian
UH defense paradigm or structure rather wherein they could squeeze
Japan with a combination of you know, a hard power
threat and and soft power UH UH insteadivization, UH America
would have had a real problem in that regard. So
Ken was not just you know, dropping wild doomsday scenarios,
and what he was saying was very possible as it
was I Uh, I think I think Stalin was. Uh.
I think Stalin was testing Mau's loyalty and uh the
side still get split as complicated. There's profound cultural variables
there as well as political ones, as well as simple
uh well as well as things as simple as you
know the uh like like dang who was you know,
who's the shadow executive? I mean basically, after after mild
and after the Gang of Four got he was finding
this somewhat greedy and and so were and so was
his inner coterie and and and men like him and
men like them can be blocked. But also the reason
why uh it was it wasn't just owing to the
kind of nascent uh nascent uh nature of of the
of the of the Cold War paradigm during the last
years of Stalin's life. That that that that Pey king
was in basically unconditional alliance with Moscow is because they
were they were well to Stalin. I mean, Stalin was
a remarkable person. I maintained he was probably the most
powerful man who ever lived. Okay, hands down, But the
as Kenyon came to realize, uh, China very much was
the Soviet Union's proxy, and he treated it very much
like a client state, I mean a very important client state.
One was potentially great UH power, political potential and uh
military mobilizing potential. But nevertheless they very much treated them like, uh,
like a somewhat inferior race. Okay, not to be crass
about it. That is the reality of the situation. Kenda maintained,
you know, UH in that same vein like here, first
of all, like how how how is Truman able to
corral this this, this whole UH coalition effort. And again
the parallel with with the goal for stands out here,
although the way in which the coalition was uh was
corral is quite different. The USSR was boycotting the United
Nations at this point. Okay. Now, as as people probably know,
the Soviet Union had a permanent seat in the UN
Security Council. The UN Security Council access the defect will
higher House of the UN. If you're gonna look at
the UN as like a unit camera legislature of Nations, uh,
any permanent member of the Security Council was at veto
on any resolution. Okay, the Soviet Union, a boy was
boycotting this the UN. So they simply were their seat
was vacant. And why were they boycotting the UN. They're
a boycotting the UN because their proxy China had not
the UN and not permitted them to be set seated. Okay,
there was there's this absurd situation where the Americans were
demanding that chank I Scheck's government done from osa he
recognizes the true government of China. I I mean, I mean,
when you're sitting in pet king and you've got dominion
over nine nine hundred million people, you know, declaring like
you know, the guys on that you know, little island
over there, the real government, there's something that there's something
satirical about that. But this is why the Soviets were
boycotting the U. N That's when Truman, uh, through Antison,
you know, said look, you know this is this isn't
this is thet gregious violation of international law. You know, uh,
the the communists are are you know, in the front
that decency and you know, the the you know, the
the more is the civilized commnitiyan nations of assaulted Korea.
This this marvelous nass and democracy. You know, we we
we've got to rush to his defense. So that's what happened. Okay, Truman. Uh,
Truman wasn't any gonna, wasn't any kind of pure Wilsonian,
but he was like a liberal internationalist. So this this
kind of stuff really got him excited. He really he
really dug that sh and frankly, uh, politically it was uh,
it was a savvy move, Okay, I mean granted it's
Truman didn't do anything to facilitated and it was the
Soviets who were, you know, playing typical kind of comedy
games that uh, you know of a political theatrical nature
that facilitated it. But that's what happened. Now back to Kennon.
Kennon is observing all of this, and he's growing very
concerned because Kennon knows MacArthur pretty well and MacArthur was
just a weird guy. Uh. He lived with his parents
pretty much his whole life until he was pretty old.
He uh, he was immature, not in the way that
Churchill was like, he wasn't he wasn't like this kind
of buffoonish piggy drunk who was playing with army men
at age you know, twenty five. But he, like MacArthur,
had this kind of His father was a Medal of
Honor recipient who fought for the Union Army in the
ward due in the States. MacArthur himself, uh, he was
awarded the Medal of Honor in this in this anti
bandit action in the Pancho Villa era. But it was
strange and like it, it seemed very much like MacArthur
kind of coveted this medal of honor and he created
circumstances we're in. He could, he could, he could grab one,
but got a spinning facts in such a way that
would appeal to the you know, to the uh, to
those you know, commissioning such an award. He was not
a very attractive guy. And aside from that, there's a
reason why he was uh. He was sent to the
Pacific Theater. The Pacific Theater was an it was a
navy show. Okay. Now the runts there, those guys suffered
like nobody else, Okay, and they fought harder than anybody else.
I'm not saying that at all, but the Army in
in the Pacific War, they really were not center stage.
And that's like, uh something if you're one of the
reasons I like the film The Thin Red Line because
it's one of the few reasons it's about the army
in uh in the Pacific War, you know, not the
Marine Corps. And you get a sense of these guys
being literally in the middle of nowhere, and desertion in
the Pacific was almost zero because there's nowhere to desert too.
You know, you were in this green hell uh a
lot of time they weren't getting the gear they needed.
You know, things have become totally savage by this point.
But you know all that aside, I mean that that
that that there's enough there to constitute an episode and
the so own right, But the key takeaway is that
there's a reason why MacArthur was not given some theater
white command. You there's a reason why he wasn't given
an armored corps in Europe. Okay, there's the reason why
he was sent in the Pacific, where he was basically
under the thumb a guy's like Nimic's okay, because he
was a cowboy, he was a glory hound, and by
this point he was basically he was basically running Japan
like like like some kind of swaggering Cardillo, you know,
or some kind of like great white hunter or something.
And what, uh, what Kennon's view was is I don't
know what the hell this guy is gonna do. You
know Kennon's view as well. You know, MacArthur is in
his element with this, uh you know, if if, if,
if he sticks the mission and orientation of liberating Republic
of Korea. But in MacArthur decides he wants to collect
more medals and marcive led Evostok he's gonna start World
War three, you know. Now, I know there's like the
stupid cliche uh of a fucking idiots who were always
like talking about like, you know, talking about like general officers, like, oh,
there's some crazy generals gonna do something like not at
that times. That's a fucking retarded take. Butcars MacArthur's MacArthur
did crazy shit, and he didn't he didn't really respect
the chain of command, and kenn uh what Kenyon did was, Uh, Kenon,
he began very publicly saying, look, and this is fascinating
because in presage is obviously what ultimately resolved the Cold
War and what mister Nixon and Kissinger did. Kennon said, look,
he's like, we need to give MacArthur a free hand
in operational terms, so long as the mission remains limited
to the reliberation of of of their public career, not
the Congress in the North. He's like, concovenantly simultaneously, he's like,
we need to offer Beijing inducements to not cooperate with USSR.
You know. He's like, we should even offer them a
permanent seat on the UN Security Council if they're willing
to formally break with Moscow. Uh, And we should tell
him that, you know, a further dom is we will
recognize them unconditionally as a sole representative of the Chinese governments. Now,
John Foster Dulles wouldn't berserk when when Kennon said this,
and people are saying that Kennon was there, they were
they were saying he'd been like gotten to by the
Soviets because like awful slanderous things. He was literally just
shouted down and this really really hurt him. Okay, Uh,
As the Korean War started to go very poorly, and uh,
despite what they I don't I have no idea what
the age kids in school about this, But the Korean
War was incredibly unpopular. It was incredibly brutal, it was
incredibly bloody, you know, it was uh, and not not
in like Vietnam, in all kinds of ways. Okay, I
don't want to go through a laundry list of grotesque
things that happened. And and the awful thing is the
guy who had to go there suffered through. But there
was a lot of commonality, Okay, not just owing to
the owing to the fact that we're talking about, you know,
Asian battlefeaters. But this, uh, this really, uh this this
really Kenyon. Kenyon really got kind of sandbagged until uh
until the Eyesenhower era. Well we'll get into that too
as we progress. Also, we're gonna come back to Cannon
again and again now just because I've got a huge
escheme for Kennon. But he's a key player in the
Cold War. And like I said it, uh I, I
give Nixon all credit for the facility in the Sino
Soviets split, because he's the man who actually facilitated it
in an executive role. Conceptually, this was this was George
Kennon's kind of augury and instinct for for uh, for
hard power politics. But as the war dragged on, Truman
did increase naval patrols and and just overall naval present
the Pacific and especially in the Taie went straight and
hugely signed, huge significance Truman Beige basically bankrolling the French
War and into shining against the viet min Okay, and uh,
you know, America's involvement in into China goes back to
the late forties in some capacity. And uh, this idea,
this kind of Oliver Stone Howard, is an idea that like,
you know, Vietnam was a lie man and look at
a bunch of fish as generals and capitalists just decided
to fight a war there. Like that's not true at all,
and it's not okay, and you've got to look at
you gotta look at Korea, You've got to look at Vietnam.
You've gotta look at this entire paradigm I talked about
that ultimately kind of resolved in uh, this sort of
massive escalation or yeah, massive escalation of forces and being
in the Pacific, you know, in the Reagan area. You
gotta look at this. It's all part of like a
common paradigm. Okay, you can't look at these things in isolation. Now.
What Kennon did do during this time is he started
writing a lot in policy journals. Okay, and he kind
of back in those days, you still had public intellectuals
that we talked about, and Kennon first and foremost among
among socially, among social science types and political theorist types.
I mean, he was he was the king, Okay. So
Kenny started kind of making his case to the American
people and to kind of like you know, uh and
kind of like the learned you know, uh like top
layer of h the civilian world and Kennya's plan for uh.
I mean, we we think of history in the rearview
mirrorcause that's inevitable. Everybody comes to Monday morning quarterback when
they're like looking backwards. Kenna was pretty convinced, along with
everybody else, that there was probably gonna be there's probably
gonna be a world war within several years, and at
some point there was gonna be a catastrophic nuclear war.
That was inevitable in his view. And I understand why
you thought that. And Frankly had had growichav and Reagan
not found a way to end end that, uh, that
paradigm uh there there would abstutely would have been at
some point, you know, being in nineteen ninety three, two
thousand and three, two thousand and thirty three, it would
have happened eventually, but I'm sorry you calling it so
I've been another weather. But uh, the Kenon view was this, Okay,
this is this was Kennon's kind of grand design for
how to not to de escalate, but like get out
of the Cold War without without seeding ground to the
point that America is totally compromised. Okay, he said, there's
got to be looking a comprehensive settlement with the Soviets
that would terminate astillities in Korea because because if if,
if hostilities went on in definitely He's like, eventually, you know,
the Chinese by then, where you know, we're fighting a
general war on the peninsula against the U went that
American let you went forces. You know, He's like, eventually
they're either gonna get the upper hand or we're gonna escalate,
or we're gonna find ourselves in a general war with
the Soviet in the Chinese. So we've got to find
some kind of way of pull a plug on this
and go back to pre war you know, presumably go
back to pre war lines of demarcation. In the thirtieth parallel,
he was like, we got to admit that People's Republic
China the United Nations in some capacity. Okay, even if
we're not gonna give him a permanent seat on the
Security Council, we can't pretend this government is not legitimate.
There's a billion people who live under this government. You know,
they're they're they're they're the third most powerful state on
this planet. This is ridiculous. He's like kind of coma,
and we need to we need to allow a PLEBIS
site and Derman Taiwan's future and Kenya's like, don't worry,
the Taiwanese are gonna overwhelmingly vote for independence. But he's like,
we've got to do it. And uh, we've got to
allow third party monitors, you know, so that it's they
can just be said that, you know, these Taiwanese are
are under the heel of some called Billow, who in
turn is taking orders from the White Man or whatever. Okay.
And finally, and finally, this is a this is most
significant and this is fast. Kenn said, to prevent massive
escalation in in the Pacific theater, and uh, to Aviy
was probably you know, gonna this paradigm that is probably
gonna result in a nuclear war. He's like, we need
to bring about a neutral and de militarized Japan. Uh No,
no U S Force is there, you know, No, uh no,
not not not even a token kind of Japanese army.
You know. He's like, Japan, Japan needs to become just
the neutrals on okay, And uh that's the only way
moving forward. Uh, We're gonna keep it off the table,
as you know, the it's kind of like the prize
objective in the Pacific. And also this is long forgotten
to history, other than there's a you occasionally come across
copy uh, mostly like grand students come across headlines from
the seventies and stuff. When the Japanese Red Army faction
was killing p people because they dropped a lot of bodies.
But communism had real momentum in Japan, it was entirely
possible that Japan would go red. Okay, that's a whole
nother story. But just for contact, it seems weird that
Kennan is like emphasizing that, look like we gotta we've
got to basically like take Japan out of the Cold
War entirely. That's why. Okay, And in turn, he said, finally,
he said that we're entering into a catastro. What's gonna
He's like, we're in arms race with the Soviet Union.
He's like, which we can probably win just because we
we can essentially like in definitely outspend them on weapons.
But he's like, at some point the Soviets are probably
going to go all in and assault us, you know,
with everything they have, rather than just lose. Okay, So
he's like, we need to reduce some veryan capabilities to
a mixed like a mixed combined arms force that's capable
of dealing you know, a concentrated and devastating blow on
a limited front, but basically anywhere on this planet. And
that was very pressing in too, okay because that that
kind of thing. He became dominant by the end of
the Cold War definitely and even beyond, although the strategic
landscape is totally changed, and arguably arguably the reason why
that that uh that notion has gained legs is for
totally different reasons. But I mean there's all kinds of
factor of the plane of that, you know, like political,
technological in others. But Kenon uh, Kennon had I guess
I'm getting is this Kennon hit or he wasn't something
on augur and light or anything. But he put Kennon
ahead of his peers, particularly in the issue not of
the of Korea but also Asia generally get an understanding
of h understanding of cause as in politics, because causality
and politics it I mean cause causality and human affairs
obviously isn't like causality in physics or something. I mean,
everybody can see that, But in politics is a peculiar
domain of human endeavor, and there's a weird kind of
causation in politics. Part of this owes to what men
and command rules have to do to maintain credibility. Part
of it has to do with the way humans perceive
threat at scale. Part of it has to do with
just how decisions are made in uh in in in
technology driven societies where uh you know where uh that
that that that that wields such great power over the
forces that animate them that you know, uh oftentimes, once
once the decision one one, once the decision making process
set in motion, it really cannot be stopped. Kind of
had instincts for all this stuff, and he kind of
understood the implications that thistrategic matters as they were happening,
and That's what really makes a political theorist, particularly like
an IR theorist, is you can look at you can
you can look at affairs as they unfold, and you
can basically disturb the trajectory of of of of the
of war and peace parents. I can't think I better
way to put it, But that's kind of.
Speaker 1: Have we lost that now or is it just we're
so far gone with leadership, our leadership being I mean,
why can't we see something like this when it comes
to NATO. Is it because we're the aggressors? Is because
we're in the wrong?
Speaker 2: Is it?
Speaker 1: I mean what you're describing, I mean these people, the
people you're describing that would be considered enemies of the
enemies of the regime.
Speaker 2: What it's It's complicated, but a point it made the
people again and again. You know, during the Cold War,
guys who had the best, in the brightest, they were
basically corralled in the government. I mean, if you were
a nuclear physicist, you went to work in Los Alamos.
If you're some brilliant game theorist, you know you you
got you got sent to Harvard and then you gotta
send us some pending on funded think tank to figure
out how to wage nuclear war. You know, if you're
like a brilliant economist, you know, you'd, uh, you'd you'd
meet with the president and you'd say like, okay, like
what's the best way? You know, the Marshall Plan was
great for politics, but it didn't do a whole lot
for you know, capital and return on investment and for
technological development. You know, how can we how can we
how do we build up Korea? How can we build
up you know, Taiwan? You know, how can we build
up you know these uh, these kind of key proxy
regimes to fight the Soviet Union, you know, like nowadays,
like the only people who go to government are real losers.
I mean it's it's like it's like weirdos, freaks, like
like literally like half assed actors, you know, like weird
people who have like nothing going for him, but they
have some desperate need to like be famous or something.
Like any guy, any guys, anything going for him is
gonna have nothing to do with governments, you know, Like
why what you I mean that's part of it.
Speaker 1: Are these people like I have a friend, his son
is a genius engineering trying to raytheon or offered him
an insane amount of money, and he's like, I just can't,
I can't work for these people. Is that what's happening now?
Because because basically we have a corporate run government that
the best and the brightest are just going straight into
the corporations.
Speaker 2: And then the guy, I mean, look at it look okay,
like like like fifty years ago or even forty years ago,
like in the early eighties, I got like Elon Musk,
he'd be like working in governments, you would have been
like making you would have been going on TV debating
Carl Sagan to like, no, this is why we need
SDI you know, No, this is why we need to
roll back communism, Like no, this is while you know,
we need to scrap the A b M Treaty and
develop weapons platforms that you know truly hasplaited first right potential,
Like that's what you'd be doing, Like now, who the
hell is gonna go? Who the hell's gonna go debate
with AOC about whether like kids should learn about anal
sex or not in seventh grade like that, Like, who
the hell is gonna do that? Like any normal person
that's totally beneath them, and they wouldn't like selling themselves
that way. But also it's like government is for losers,
you know, it's it's for people like the bidens. You know,
it's it's for it's for people like AOC, it's for uh,
it's for or it's for guys or or or it's
for kind of like uh, or's for kind of like
you know, guys like the scantists who have some kind
of like like stride or nurses just need to like
you know, see their face on TV or something like.
You know, people have something going for them, like aren't
going to anything have anything to do with it. And
I mean, but it's also part of the problem. I mean,
like we talked about before, and I'm sure people think
that I'm flowing a dead horse here, that maybe I
overstate my case, but even aside of the fact that
we've got like a hostile regime that's wholly destructive and
like an enemy of the people and stuff, even in
like let's say you have like a normal regime of
like of like normal people, like the government has structured
it's only structured to really fight the Cold War and
not much else. I mean, it's like why does it
even exist? You know, there's there's like there's something of
a there's there's more than there's more than a modicum
of fraud to it too, you know it, and people
see through that, like at a highly intelligent guy aside
of the fact that there's nothing government is doing that
got positively interested in. Now he's not, he's not gonna
go he's not gonna go pretend that like, you know,
he's he's he's he's actually accompisting something by working in
some idiotic bureaucracy. You like, you know when you I mean,
if people want to Jerry Portnell, I mean, I'm a
big science fiction guy, so I love Jerry Parnell, but
you know he, uh the Committee on the Present Danger,
he really kind of took over that, uh that role.
I mean that the Committee on the Present Danger went
back to the fifties, but in the eighties he truly
made it into like a a into like a military
science like political action committee. Okay. And Pornell was the
guy who put like S ANDDI on the map. Okay.
That's why the Cold War, I mean, dynamic people were
in government because of the Cold War. Okay, That's that
is why they were there, like they weren't. There is
government as awesome armor because they really want to. They
all want to figure out, you know, how to draft
a school curriculum for like poor kids, because they weren't
like past laws like make gay people feel better about themselves.
I mean like they they were there to fight the
Cold War and that's it. And uh, the Cold War
was something that comes like a paradigmic that happened once
in a thousand years if that, And people realize that
on some deep level, even when it was horrifying, and
even when people would have done anything to get out
of it, you know, when like and at junctures, you know,
like like Cuba of sixty three or sixty two, you know, uh,
you know, uh, the seventy three war and like able Archer,
even even even as horrifying as that stuff was, like
people realize like you know, these were these were apocal
or shatering events than I'm participating in. That's why.
Speaker 1: Yeah, I mean you go back to like you know,
they would send Carl Sagan out to make an argument
for them. Now, who is their scientist now, Neil deGrasse, Tyson,
Bill Nye. Guys who can get Guys who can get
owned on Twitter by like yeah by people kids anonymous
anonymous accounts.
Speaker 2: Yeah, like like anonymous, and they're they're like high school
kids too. Yeah, it's like saying like there's plenty of
short high school kids. But the point is, yeah, these
guys are gonna get ebarrassed by just like like sixteen
year old John.
Speaker 1: There's just no one. It seems like there is no
one who's impressive anymore. And if they are impressive, you like,
you know, it's like to a certain extent, Elon Musk
I think is an impressive guy, but he's also you're
also like, what the hell does this guy believe? You know,
it's like he you don't know what his ideology is,
if he has one at all.
Speaker 2: Yeah, I don't only think he does. I mean generally
business moguls don't. I mean, I defend Musk a lot
because I mean he's a high speed blow dray guy.
He's the one who's keeping real space tech alive, and
he's doing incredible thing. I mean, it's the fact, like
the stuff he's done for telecom is incredible, Okay, and uh,
you know he's he's the things he's he's introduced are
are game changers, you know, I mean not just in
telecom like across the board. I mean he has an
eccentric weirdo but uh, I mean all all these guys are.
But I mean I'm glad he's around and he you know,
I's he's a great man and and like not in
the sense of I love him and think he's awesome,
but and by any objective metric. But that's you know, government,
You know, government is going to attract users when it doesn't.
I mean they were this is I don't wanna go
too of our field and I'll wrap, but I want
to up in the hour. But but I mean, uh
I government is gonna cease to exist as as as
we know it today in the next two hundred years.
Like I'm not saying like the state will wither, you know,
like some utopian anarchists or some you know kind of
like low key uh like Trotsky or something, But you're not.
It's just not gonna have you know, a center of
now people stuff like you know the twentieth century. Uh.
Features that that that created this regime are gonna be
so remote as to be like not even intelligent anymore. So,
Like a lot of what government does as it's make work,
uh business the day to day is just not gonna
exist and you work, and plus it's be like a
natural devolution, you know, like you're gonna like localism is
gonna become just like more and more thing it already is.
But so I think the problem is gonna take care
of take care of itself in some basic way. But
that's uh, that's there's something I I can't thought. I
thought there was something I wanted to bring up an conclusion. Again,
I swear I'm not going to senile.
Speaker 1: But well I I derailed you. It's just that, you know,
when you think, yeah, when you think back on the
Cold War, there were so many you know, it is
as psychotic as it was at many points. There were
so many impressive people out there, and give it, you know,
talking coming up with technology. I mean it, we just don't.
I'm not saying we need another Cold War. I'm just
saying it's just when you look at what we have
today compared to uh, the people that we were looking
at then, it's just like what the hell happened? Man?
It's like idio, you know, it's like idiocrasy. It like
snuck up on us. Yeah, in a decade.
Speaker 2: No, it's only nuts. I mean, like I said, I
I found it jarring. Like you know, the Clinton administration
was jarring because I mean Clinton was such a fucking slob.
But these people like, ah, there's something really wrong on them.
And it was like it wasn't even gradual. It was
like okay, I mean whether you like Bush forty one
or not, I mean he was he was a high speed,
low drag guy, you know, in that whole. And James
Baker was when I was a kid, like a team
like James Baker was like like a here. I really
looked up to them, you know. But these you know,
I go from that kind of very heavy, severe in
both good and bad ways regime you know, to Bill
Clinton and it's kind of like Merry band a circus
freaks like it. It was bizarre, man, Like it was jarring.
But I mean that's why, like I said, I can't
it was a joke on Like these boomers were like
who like flying to like, you know, rages about Donald Trump.
You know, these like the same assholes were like telling
us thirty years ago like you gonna get with the times, man,
you like, Bill Clinton is the future, Like we don't
want your white male stuff anymore. But you know, it's
like you can't like turn around and say, like you're
outraged at some reality TV show stars as the president.
It's like you guys made this shit happen, you know,
like you're the ones who said that. Like we're a
bunch of squares and fishes and idiots who you know
want like weight meal stuff to rule, man, and you know,
we gotta get with the times. So it's like, you know, yeah, yeah, but.
Speaker 1: It's really and it's really only a matter of time
before people start begging for that to come back.
Speaker 2: Yeah, I mean, I've got my own. I mean I'm
very optimistic, man. I mean I don't worry about anything
now because I've been so awesome. I'mre like futterless, but
I you know, I'm like a Calvinist and stuff, and
like I you know, like stuff doesn't really bother me.
And but also like you know, I I see I
see causes for optimism all over the place, you know.
I mean there's a lot of like horrible things too,
but I mean there's always horrible things. You know. The
world is a falling place, man, like that that's that's why,
you know, That's that that's you know, we're all born
in sin But at any event, Uh yeah, well let's
let's uh, let's wrap up now because I don't want to.
I don't want to go into another big uh like
subtopic because it's coming up on the hour. But like
I said before we went live, man and i'm ah
the Felt was invited me to go with them to
the American Renaissance Conference this weekend. So that's where I
am going. I'm going to Nashville. So if you're there,
you will see me. If you seek me out. Please
don't try to assassinate me or something like, but you'll
cotch me at these things that they're they come as friends.
Speaker 1: But unfortunately, unfortunately, I don't think this is gonna come
out before the weekends.
Speaker 2: No fair enough, Yeah yeah, yeah yeah, but uh no,
I in any event, uh plus yeah, I mean, I'm on,
I'm on I'm I'm I'm on Twitter still because I
mean apparently, uh, I'm speaking of mister musk uh that
that the uh the woke uh censorship regime is done
and you can find me there you seeking he shall
find I'm on sub stick at real Thomas seven seven
seven that substack dot com as my podcast is at
the the sequel to Steel Storm is dropping in January.
I promise. I'm sorry for the delay. It was not
my fault, nor was it my dear publisher's fault, the
Period Press. We've had censorship problems on our own and
deep platforming problems. But it will be here in January.
I'm sorry you cannot be here for the holidays, but uh,
that is uh, that is where I'm at.
Speaker 1: I appreciate it. Yeah, until the next time. Thank you.
I want to welcome everyone back to the Pekenana Show,
part four of the Cold War Cold War series with
Thomas seven seven seven. How are you doing Thomas, and
very well?
Speaker 2: Thanks again. What I wanted to get into today we
finished off last week we talked her, Yeah, more like
a week and a half ago perhaps, but you know,
talking about the Berlin a Berlin airlift and the Korean War,
and I kind of finished up talking about the Korean War,
and I wanted to talk about the Buddhist Republic and
it's putical culture and how it developed the way it
did and into that the listeners will unders say what
I mean about why that's significant, But you know, the
Korean War, it uh, you know, like what we discussed
in the last episode about I was essential. Let end
you know, uh, containment is policy, you know, not just
as some sort of theory abstracted from from concrete military
decision making. You know, you've really got to understand the
Korean War as kind of the first iteration of that,
you know, and as well as you know what became
to great lectory, you know, policy towards the Communists for
the next the next forty years. And it's also too
that's when America trulyuated into the viet conflict. You know,
Like I made the point before, there's all kinds of
lives about the Vietnam War and just missed just kind
of misperceptions, some deliberate, some deliberately confabulated, you know, for
polemical leological reasons, supportive brought ignorance the idea that Vietnam,
which is kind of the opportunity the you know, owing
the the designs of you know, uh profiteers and financiers
and things, this nonsense and the it and arguably you know,
the Far East was there. It was far more dangerous
during the Middle and late Cold War than than the
European theater. I mean, obviously come to Europe that would
have been because basically a single conflict diad and had
it been triggered or trit the potential for catastrophic escalation
was was was ever present. But did you but there
was many many like diads potentially and how and where
uh uh, you know, actual warfare would ensue. That was
very difficult to predict. And you know, once hostilities didn't sue,
it was it was equally difficult to predict, you know,
what the potential of escalation was. You know, it's also
to the there there's there's more of a fluidity the
sphere of influence and things like this. But that's you know,
that's why Korea is important and it's also it uh,
it's it's essential to I think he were you kind
of the outcome of the Korean conflict, you know, in
terms of it's very pretty much Truman came under you know,
Truman left office really kind of in disgrace. It's not
I mean, he was he was an whenever he was
about Truman, and he was honest. He didn't have character issues,
he wasn't corrupt, but he was in the toilet on.
The Korean War was incredibly unpopular and you know, the
the very public rift between Truman and Carthur, which led
him Carter's dismissal. The Pike generally sympathized with MacArthur, not
just because you know, he was kind of this heroic
personas that had been very deliberately hated by you know,
by media, but also the view of the view of
Truman was that Truman's of gyms, you know, as stated
where to quote, restore peace and security on the Korean peninsula.
You know, there was you know, basically the re establish
the stay as quote lu of victory. And in Truman's words,
you know, we're waging the Christrean war, you know, not
just for for the sake of you know, deterring aggression
and and uh and they're prevailing and and you know,
and guarding the prevailing peace, but to quote protect our forces,
you know, and that's one of the officers in the
ground refer to that as an absurd tautology. You know,
your forces are there to protect your forces. I mean,
that doesn't that that's not why you go to war.
And you know we're talking about you know, not just
men's lives, uh, you know, and and and and expecting
them to sacrifice their lives in the national interest. You know,
you you really have an obligation to the country, not
just to those men and and their families and relations,
but you know to the country at large, you know,
to to wage war to.
Speaker 1: Win, you know, not not not to well an insult,
isn't it also an insult to the men on the ground. Oh,
we got to drop more forces in there because you
guys can't handle It's like the whole Afghanistan thing. We
have these Afghanic troops that we've that we've trained, and
you know, they have platoons, but they can't do it
on their own, So we got to get someone in there.
Speaker 2: Yeah. Yeah, that's a good point that it has the
effect of really kind of sapping moralele and and and
and kind of discouraging in any enthusiasm you know, for
the for the war effort, and it so I mean
I for for good for good reason. You know, Truman
was kind of savaged over his prosecution of the war.
But also suddenly you know, kind of court historians was
on the right and the left, they kind of they
kind of view this as as this real low point
for a you America and the Cold War, Uh, you know,
kind of a a precursor to what ensued during the
detent era after you know, Segon fell and things. But
I have a different take on that. I mean, that's
part of the reason we're doing this is is owing
the you know, the earth of with in his perspectives
and dealing with the Cold War. But in kiss interests diplomacy,
he's about the only kind of I mean, I said
Kissinger a lot because I you know, like before, for
whatever reason, people kind of on both sides the logical divide,
they they love kind of burning uh Kissinger at proverbial effigy,
but he in power political analyses, he's really second to none, Okay,
And he he made the point. Uh I got a
little bit further than he did, but or he does.
But he made the point that you know, uh, the
Stalin uh and and the Soviet Union ended up in
pretty in a pretty precarious position only to the Korean War,
the uh, the the you know, the there's a basic
ambiguity as to where American sphere of influence stuff in
Soviet interests began in the region. American did not the
forces and being even outside of Japan, really but even
that is our uh, you know, to prosecute a major
war in the Far East or they or they you know,
those forces weren't present before the outset of hostilities in
nineteen fifty you know, the UH in the aftermath of Korea,
you know, the the Department of Defense, it it asked
for the defense budget to be tripled, and it got
its way, and it truly integrated military alliance developed in
Europe under American Supreme Command. I mean that's built NATO
was the Korean War. Before that, there was you know,
talk of a European defense community. There was real hostility
to the you know to UH the UH the idea
of an in of of American for being in any
any in any real you know, numbers remaining in Europe.
And I'm not saying it's a good thing that that
that this is what happened, But in terms of UH
you know, relative power UH and and between the United
States and and the Soviet Union and what became the
warsaw packed, this really just really changed things uh uh
and and skewed the strategic landscape against the interests of
the communists. I believe the UH it it it gave
the United States a certain credibility in terms of multilateral action,
or at least the appearance of it. You know it
uh it bade basically Congress UH gave a blank check
to UH Eisenhower subsequently, you know, to beef up these
client regimes you know in Africa and the Ear East
and in the Orient, you know, and and throw huge
amounts of hardware at them. And you know, this was
this was the catalyst really for the you know, for
for American special warfare. I know, like Kennedy gets all
the credit for that, you know, and that's why you
know this this the spec War centers you know, literally
named for him. But you know this was really like
like spec war and special operations really became a thing,
you know, UH during the Eisenhower era, you know. And
then this oh to UH the experience of Korea and
things like that, and Stalin Stalin had been UH Stalin related.
I don't want the Korean War to happen. I mean,
he had, he didn't have any problem with it. He
greenlit it when uh when Mao U was able to
convince him. But Mao and and Kim Olt Sung were
able to convince him that you know, victory would be
rapid and initially, I mean it did appear that that
would be the case. You know, the the U Republic
of Korean forces got pushed back to Pusan and the
perimeter was this tiny little corner literally the Republic of
Korea until uh, I mean, those guys fought fought hard.
I'm not putting shade on on the South Koreans, but
I mean, you know, they they were, they were they
were totally routed. It wasn't. Uh, it wasn't until you know,
the the Incheon landings, you know, cut the country in
half basically, and uh, you know, the UN forces essentially
fought this kind of desperate rear reaction and uh and
pushed the communists all the way back like literally to
the Yellow River. And I mean obviously that you know,
that's what triggered intervention by the Red Chinese. But but
but playing you know, this was not despite someone like
the Cold the Cold War Hawks alleged this is not
Stalin like you know, sitting in Moscow, you know, trying
to you know, go to America into this Asian war,
you know, whereby then you know, uh, the pots whatever
have an opportunity on Berlin or something like that was
and then but it just you know, didn't go as planned, Like,
it's not what happened at all. But you know, the uh,
what Stalin was really doing, in my opinion is uh
Stalin realized that the Soviet Union needed China. Okay, the
Soviet Union needed China as much as the United States
needed Western Europe. Because what became the Warsaw Pact, this
was this was not some sort of you know, equivalent
to Western Europe or it's some sort of equivalent to
the you know, the capital base uh and and resources
human material that you know, America and the UK had
in NATO. Really all the Warsaw Pact was, with the
exception of East Journey was U was the defense court
on you know, it was literally space where in you know,
the right army could deploy in depth to protect itself
or the stage you know what they characterized to preemptive
as against NATO, so occupying occupying Poland with hostility, you know, uh,
you know, and you know, creating like a climber theme
in Bulgaria like this, these things are these not profiting
the Soviet Union and these things were huge dreams, okay,
But what the Soviets had was the Soviets had China
and even though China was you know, very very underdeveloped
at that time in power political terms, you know, pure
military terms, there's incredible power potential and frankly a communist
block that's literally from uh, you know, from Berlin uh
uh to uh to Handoi contiguously. I mean that that's
a good that that's about that's about a fifth of
this planet. Okay, just the just the raw kind of
geostrategic momentum of that is incredible. So this uh, this uh,
that was a lot of what underlay kind of this
this the apparently it's on the service kind of odd
posture that Stalin had towards towards the Chinese and and
the Chinese War against the Americans. But it also it
did lay the foundation for the sign of Soviets split
because the Soviets were not generous and there's and their
material support at China, and they very much made it
clear that you know, they dude China as their client
regime and uh, they would not Stalin would not commit
to a a proportionate response if if America deployed you know,
atomic weapons, uh you know what they were as as
atomic bombs, you know, against against the knees and don't
get me wrong. I mean mal himself, Uh well, I
think was something of a crazy person and somewhat primitive.
Frankly of mind, I I do believe he was basically
playing spoken and and he said knowing certain terms that
that you know, the you know, the reason why you know,
Pete King would not give its loyalty to to Cruse
Chef is because Crusier was not the man that Snalin
Wasn't you know, Stalin was a remarkable figure. I mean,
whatever else we can spout him. And but by my
point being that you know, the man was with Stalin
at the helm, the kind of relationship I just described,
you know, characterized by the Chinese being very much subordinate
to Moscow. Grudgingly, the Chinese would have accepted that under Stalin.
They would not accept that under you know, some under
some under some apparatic like like cruise chief or under
you know, some kind of uh you know, and under
some kind of uh you know, octapaneery and dictator like
prison of But that's what I said, the scope of
what I wanted to cover here what it did and
what what it did do on the communist side, uh
and in kind of like the victory column as it were.
I mean, China did fight the United States to a standstill,
and I mean that was no small thing, Okay, I mean, yeah,
the Chinese had certain advantages on the ground, but America
then had tremendous military might. You know, it's a huge
disterity and t G the Chinese absorb these casualties. But
I mean that you know that uh, that that emboldened,
that embolden, the hoaching, that emboldened Paul Pott, you know,
that emboldened uh you know, uh that bolden one hundred insurgencies,
you know on every continent that uh, you know, the
United States is not invincible, you know, and that uh,
I think that I think I can't really be overstated.
And you know when people people I had a kind
of substantiate my claim that you know, the Soviet Union
really you know, kind of developed uh not so subtle
credibility prop album and in uh in in in the
way of the Korean War, you know, it was it
was a year before Stalin died. It was March tenth,
ay to you know, some died basically right by after
cessation of hostilities, uh In uh in Korea, and uh
it was we talked about the Stalin memo or the
Stalin note last time, you know what was called the
heat nooked and and some of the some European media.
So later on, you know, when kind of the comments
this more publicized. But you know, Stalin's notion was uh,
a demilitarized Germany, you know, know, as a neutral zone.
You know, Germany being retained a kind of nominal military
force under a under its own authority. But you know,
all all all troops you know, gone from German soil
and a you know, and and then and this jury
neutrality enforced on Germany. How that would be enforced? I
was never really clear because nego she didn't reach that point.
I would assume, you know, uh, some kind of un
manny would have would have been you know that it was.
It was managed, but be as it may, there's a
reason why you don't. I mean, yeah, obviously the Soviet Union,
they're big, they're they're big. Problem was uh, you know,
the strategic and some of the fact that you know,
NATO was at their doorstep what became NATO, and then
you know it was at their doorstep. I realized NATO
was was uh incorporated forty nine but it was about
ten years, in my opinion, before it became a truly
you know, like it integrated comy force other than just
uh you know kind of a you kind of kind
of a kind of mandated for you know, operate within
the borders of these at least nominally sovereign states. But uh,
you know the reason, you know, you know, the reason
why Stalin made the effort when he did, you know,
if the Soviets were in this great kind of position
to strength and you know, in uh in power political terms,
you know, the Korean War was you know, really going
their way and really kind of uh you know, breaking
the face not just a Truman, but of uh of
the entire an entire kind of Cold War apparatus. I
mean that that would not that that's not what he
would have been doing, but the uh, it's also to
the fact that I mean it was dooming to fail
because I mean this was submitted a mere eight months
before the present election, you know, and I realize, you know,
I realized Eisenhower wasn't any arch warhawk, but he was
he was a military man, and he was he he
was viewed, uh you know kind of as uh, the
Soviets were afraid of him, number one. And that's that's all.
That's an interesting topic and to itself, but point being,
for better or worse, regardless of what everybody feels about
Eisenhower in history, you know, like he was, he was
viewed as the man to wage the Cold War, Okay,
and that that's really what kind of catapulticed him new office.
But even even taking Eisenower of the equation, obviously obviously
eight months out from uh from from a from a
presidential contest, nobody's gonna, you know, nobody's gonna be willing
to undertake uh, you know, some kind of shift in
uh in in status or relations with the Soviet Union,
you know, in in ninety fifty two of all of
all years. But what I want to kind of segue
into is the person at conray at add an Hour,
Like before I said a recording, I said, I wanted
to get into the culture that boomed this republic and
how they came about and why it came about. Understand
that you gotta understand ad Hour, you know, and now
was the first uh, he was the first post war chancellor.
I mean, if you if you if you if you
consider Western Germany, Ben you know, like the real Germany
or whatever and uh, you know, the success or state
of uh of of of of the German Reich. You know,
he was he was the first post war chancellor. And
if if you reject that, which I I don't think
people do with some might I don't, I don't get
to the current German state and particularly legitimate that. But
in terms of you know, linear political uh legacy, I
think I don't think it's controversy will do And if
I had now as the you know, as the first
uh real post uh war executive, but he uh, and
it was an interesting guy. And it's kind of fancy
to me that he was the man did for the role,
but it makes perfect sense. And it goes to show
you how America at one time I had a real
political plans of a man who really really understood kind
of the nuances of power of politics and you know,
the kind of deeper implications of of of what of
what of what chiefs of state represent both the the
people whom they rule all so to uh, you know,
allies and foes alike. And and there was a perfect
example of that. And now we're uh. He was born
in the seventy six, so He took office when he
was seventy three. He stepped down when he was eighty seven.
I believe that makes him the oldest Yean head of
state in the modern era. The ten and I think
was eighty four eighty five. I mean, and there was
a remarkable guy. And he and now I was born
in the Catholic Rhyanland, Okay, and he was born uh
literally you know what the kind of zene of the
Bismarck's Coulter kof and for those that don't know, you
know Bismarck the kind of arch Prussian Protestant. He did
not trust Catholics. He purged Kolics from the kind of
civil apparatus which had by that point was quite robust.
You know, Prussia was really kind of a modern state.
You know, they had they they had the kind of
the you know, real pension system if the I mean
it's anybody who can make like a kind of welfare
state apparatus work against the Germans, and they did. That
can't be argued. I'm not a particularly I'm not some
big government uh you know, Keynesian type or anything at all,
but even you know, I stipulate that pressure ran with
uh with true uh, you know, kind of military efficiency
and all the best uh, you know, in all almost
a lot of ways. But one of the things Bismarck
did was, uh he very very much purged Catholics from
uh positions of authority. And it was it wasn't brutal
in the sense of, you know, Catholics weren't rounded up
and shot or something and weren't availed U you know
that the physical violence, but they really were locked out
of out of political and cuffair as well practical purposes.
And and this this made it this, this had made
a huge impact on the end. Okay, not only because
he was a Catholic, but you know, his his family
was was very politically engaged, you know, and now himself
obviously this is you know, was his career path. He
he considered this, you know, very very unjust and because
he actually was devout, you know, and now it was
not his Catholicism is not superficial, and it wasn't just
it wasn't just you know, kind of a like a
perfunctory uh identitarian signifier. You know, he was very very Catholic,
and uh he found his way uh to the uh
to the center party, you know, way which was the
Catholic Party, you know, really of a of thet boch
it was uh nineteen oh five, nineteen oh six. Uh
and now he was like the city council Cologne a
few years later became the vice mayor of Cologne. You know,
he he was considered's not of a political prom okay
and he uh he was again too. He wore his
Catholicism on his sleeve. But he was respected pretty much
by everybody, I mean even by the even even kind
of the most you know, kind of by kind of
the most dedicated Persian like culture warriors. You know, everybody,
everybody respected him. You know, he was he was a
man of of my integrity, Okay he uh. He was
adamantly opposed at political extremism, but not in not not
in kind of the way that you know, Carl Schmidt disdained,
you know, the he was not the kind of the
parliamentarian who believes in endless discussion and supervisial compromises. And
now it really did believe that, you know, the cunning
of reason and history and you know, the kind of
the mind of God is what is what guides politics
and and and men are kind of limited participants and
in affairs of state it uh you know he uh
he was dedicated to rooting out disorder and official and
see irrationality. He was very much a moralist. You know,
he had no talent for corruption, but he uh you
know he had uh he he had no time for
for ideologies of of of the right as well as
the left, you know it. Uh I think uh, I
think of him as somewhat like uh. I think he
had something kind of with people like Dolphus in Austria. Okay,
frankly he was a centrist, yeah, yeah, but an authoritarian
when called for. But also again too, I mean very
not not at all secularists, you know, very very much
you know, Catholic, and his his orientation and and then
uh in his evaluation of of them of what you know,
the metric is for good government. But uh, I mean
his political culture is very different than the one they
had now emerged from. And the uh the kind of
the kind of the kind of quasi clericalism of somebody
like Dolphus, you know, like and I wasn't running around
you know, like like instilling priests and in the city
apparatus or something like that. Okay, but he but he
was he was not at all kind of the secularist
parliamentary and like I said that that people sort of
associate with with with you know, compromisers, the of the
of the kaiser Reich and the and the m Era,
you know, I mean the uh, the kind of the
kind of toxic parliamentarism that that Schmidt lamented. I mean, yeah,
obviously reached a zenith and Weimar for obvious reasons. But
this kind of thing is you know, like it really
it really did. And that's that's important to bear in
my mind. But no, so it became he became nationally
known during the Great War. Uh he uh he involved himself,
uh you know as as uh as as a merit colone.
He involved themself very much and managing never threw remedy,
you know, food shortages born of the embargo. Uh it
was an eally like uh like sausage derived from soy.
You think this these kinds of alternative uh food technologies
and power was responsible for getting of found you know,
which which was revolutionary in those days. You know. He
uh he worked handled with the army and uh availing
colone is uh as as a base of supply and
and as a hub, you know, to reconstitute forces and
things like this. You know, he uh he really really
rose to the occasion, you know, and became something of
a hero of figure in the minds of people, not
just in Cologne, but uh, you know, he became quite
well about the Reich. Uh however, uh he uh he
uh he was somebody who became something an intermediate, something
of an intermediary uh between uh, between elements and in Berlin,
which is interesting. And when it became clear that uh,
when it became clear that uh, the the French intended
to occupy the Prussian Ryeland, he had the Monciulolian notion
of dissolving, uh, dissolving the Ryeland and into a new
autonomous state kind of like a demilitarized zone that uh
would uh you know, with the stipulation that the French
would would not occupy it and uh the foreign element
would uh set foot on its soil. You know. It's
because it being this kind of like you know, nomenal
atime zone. And uh, both the Prussian uh governments and
yeah and uh and the Byment regime were totally against
I think planned to bring up Russia with the Via regime.
This was in nineteen nineteen. Yeah, I mean, I mean
before I mean, we have to advocate the what remained
of the right government was totally opposed to it, but
it was an The point is that was very that
was very forward looking in it's thinking and very much
uh and very subtle kind of and it's and it's cunning,
and that kind of became characteristic of our Uh. He
also too, uh when it was the treaty ever Sai,
which was presented formerly in June nineteen nineteen and now
we're new as anybody did, it was in the know
that some sort of punitive regime was gonna be coming
down the pipeline. And uh, I think his idea was that, uh,
you know, the less kind of like the more like evolved,
uh the Reich was like the harder it would be,
uh you know, to kind of bleed it dry. It's
uh you can kind of definitely, uh, you can kind
of definitely tie up reparations regime if you know, you
have this kind of if you have a kind of
bold the sovereignty, you know, in all kinds of ways.
So it's uh, he he had Germany's best interest in
mind in these things. He was doing what was interesting,
is he. Uh he, he very much collided with with
good staff Stressman and uh you know, I've I've made
the point before. I think in in our in one
of our previous series that Stressman was a compelling guy
and I think he's not. I think he's never really
given to think of MS is kind of account to
Ramsey McDonald. I think it's kind of an unsung figure
in British politics. And never looked at stress him as
being too Prussian. He looked at him as uh, you know,
not uh not not not just no a viable for
the chancellorship because Ed now did in fact covid uh
the office. But uh he uh you know, he viewed
his vision as fundamentally at odds with what was you know,
possible and feasible, and uh that's really kind of sabotage,
sabotage and naws designs. The idea was, uh, you know,
for the a coalition of the Christian Krants and the
and the and the Center Party, you know, uh to
uh to constant the ruling quors and and at our
true to form, he'd he'd he managed developed good offices
with the Social Democrats as well. He refused to negotiate
with the Communists, but he'd managed to decople a lot
of key figures of the Social Democrats from the KPD,
and this caused a lot of consternation obviously on the left,
which was you know, kind of a brilliant play by
add an Hour, but it also it ingratiated you know,
certain people to him that, you know, moving forward would
have facilitated, uh, you know, a real you know, a
coalition that actually had legs and trans of its ability
to to pass legislation and and and and take you know,
executive take unilateral action when required, and and and had
something of a mandate across the aisle, which was remarkable
for nineteen twenty six. But uh, his kind of is
his personal collisions with uh, with Stressmen ended all of that.
I mean that that could be a whole episode into itself.
But what's what's segnific again is when uh, you know,
the National Socialists uh breakthrough in in nin or breakthroughs
in nineteen thirty and thirty two. And now it wasn't
just Marri Cologne, but he was president of the Prussian
State Council, you know, and uh, obviously, uh, the National Socialists,
one of their key and stituency, not because they had
you know, said strong soup around when in elite circles
they certainly, but also just I mean, you know, appreciating
the political uh you know, the like the political core
of the German Reich. And now said on the Prussian
State Council meant that he was either going to have
to some kind of something, come to some kind of
concord or the National Socialists or step aside. And uh,
interestingly it uh went on the night of the Long
Knives and now was I actually arrested and uh not
allegedly for his own protection. And he wasn't harmed anyway,
and he was released after the after the uh you know,
after the after the dirty work of the bloody business
of we're out the revolutionaries was done. But he wrote
a ten page letter to Gering you know who. But
then uh was Galli or Prussia and as well as
the chief of the Prussian police, you know. And he
made the point at Geary and he said that, you know,
when when the National Socialist Party was banned, I allowed
your people to you know, fly your national flags and
Prussian buildings I build of uh you know, our public facilities,
you know, to the National Socialists, so you to hold
your meeting, you know, because I wasn't I was, I
wasn't gonna. I wasn't going to exclude German people and
you know veteran fighting minute that which most of you
were from the political discussion, you know. And this is
how you thank me is by placing me under arrest.
And apparently this really kind of hit Daring hard and
according to Spear as well as others, and I don't
there to be a valid uh the testimony particularly valid
on most matters, but on some things because he didn't
no reason to lie about it, I do, and I'm
according to Spear, Hitler made the point that Hour was
a good man and regardless of our differences within him,
our main National Socialists, you know, we we leave him alone,
you know. And that's basically what happened. I mean, he
was and now refused to He didn't he not only
he refused to join the party, but he he he
you know, he basically refused after the rest, he refused
to kind of cooperate in any meaningful way. Okay, so
he was unceremoniously removed from all you know, his his
remaining offices, like appointed offices, you know, and uh, you
know told uh, you know, you're free to go by
your business, but you know, in nice life, you've got
nothing coming. And and I actually spent uh some time
living in a monastery, you know. And in later years
he said that this is what he kind of had,
you know, he came to certain certain like epiphanies about
you know, uh, the German nation and and and what
configuration of state was was going to allow it to survive,
the German that survives the people and whatnot, which I
think is basically true, you know. And now was not
some he wasn't some intellectual or some student of history.
He wasn't he wasn't a guy like the Gaul or
like Adolf Hitler. You know, he is this kind of
guy pole star like we talked about, was his Catholic
faith and uh, you know kind of like a kind
of a pragmatic sense of of how to of of
how to constue to government. You know, that the Germans
could live with as a people, you know, but that
you know, if not ideal, would would allow their you know,
survival and perennial terms. And at the end of the day,
I mean, that's that's what the function of a government
is is guaranty of the posterity of a people. What
the and now we're being the man that the Allied
occupation authorities essentially chose to lead Germany is fascinating And
again it shows you how you know, again, at one time, however,
is guided the regime may have been in uh, you know,
just in pure in terms of pure competence, like America
at one time it had very very strong Department of State,
very very tight intelligence apparatus that allowed it to identify
you know who who you know who should be insinuated
into these roles. And I think within the bound ration
of what America and in the UK and France wanted
to accomplish in Germany like now we're the only end
I think could have done that. It kind of finally
what I now had going for him in their eyes,
he was he was. He was constitutionally anti Russian and
anti Soviet. What he did say when one of a
few topics he would pientificate elaborately on in theoretical and
historical terms was the relationship of Germany to the East
and UH specifically, you know, relationship of UH of the
German state UH to Russia, and uh, you know, he's said,
he talked about the kind of you know what in
his view was the love hate affair of Berlin with
with with Russia and the Russians, and you know, the
kind of kind of machiavilion u wit that you know,
kind of ultimately brings Germany into concord with the Russians
and other times than odds, depending on you know, the
depending on the characteristics of the extent strategic landscape as
well as the internal political situation. And uh and now
we're said, you know that that that that ends. Now,
you know, the Russians are, if not our enemies there,
they're certainly our adversaries. You know, we we we're gonna
stand with the West and with Europe and with the
Atlantics concord at all costs. He refused to recognize the
d d R at all. He said, it's not a
legitimate state, you know, he he denied, uh, he denied
them any diplomatic representation. And I mean that probably is
what more than any other single variable, uh is what
uh is what kind of made I now were acceptable
to the occupation of authorities, but it was it was
everything taken together, I mean there was the Soviet Union
were at Diamond, you know, ambitious guys who you know
hadn't been national socialists, but who hated the Russian I mean,
it's it's not like Nower had like a rare resume
in that regard, but this kind of that he had
a rare credit and an unusual sort of integrity. I
think that, coupled with this sort of unfinitional cold warrior
stance made him, uh, you know, kind of like the
natural choice. But again, I mean it's in the fact
that the fact that the men in charge could demonate
that he was a natural choice, uh, is a testament
to the fact that, again, at one time America had
a highly competent foreign policy establishment. What what what what's
in place now was literally can sleely illiterate? I just
I realize gonna make that point again and again people
are probably tired of it, but it's something that can't
be overstated. But interestingly, two, you know our he uh
he said that people need to say, you know, very
monck assessed veterans desert to be respected and they're patriots
and and he he said that you know, we're not
gonna put like shame on these men. But interestingly, the
reason why Auto Reamer and Hans Rudel, who both were
uh Reamer, was he still has the Socialist Rights Party,
you know, which was which in my name, was the
legacy party of the nsd P in real terms. And
they they were pro Sovietiet. They were nagatively anti Merican
and pro Soviet. And he, uh, he was, he was
very he very derisively referred to ad Now as quote
Rabbi ad Nour and uh, there's a lot there's been
a German right, the national Socialist right, who absolutely despise
ad Hour. But they that uh and I I I
understand cletely, like I get it, but it's not it's
not as simple as add now. We're as being like
I said, Nato Lackey or something or some or some
social democrat to uh, you know who saw an opportunity
and you spent the war years you know, uh, you
know his toy, the launder. You had to you know,
avoiding the front. Well so like avoiding the eye or
the authority. And suddenly you know he uh you know,
he started you know waving uh waving waving the natal
band or as soon as as as soon as uh
the Soviets were uh we're in Berlin. You know, he
had genuine entirety. Okay, Uh, I'm not gonna like I
obviously mouth went slides with guys like but in his
in his I mean, but uh, that's that's uh that
that it's I I wanted to decate based this entire episode,
and now we're into the senden See because that's I
realized something of a dry topic, but it's essential to
to understand and it could have very much gone a
different way. And I think the point about reading war
kind of building NATO because like and again I really
NATO was constant in nineteen forty nine, but there wasn't
really much to it then, Okay, and there's still still
hasn't even been decided. If you know, Germany was going
to be allowed to permitted the you know, re arm
at all in any capacity, and then what kind of
became the prevailing uh sensibility. Uh. You know, people make
the point a lot that the you know, the the
uh the uh western of an army UH had uh
such boring uniforms. That was by design because the original
a concept thing floated was a European the community wherein
uh there'd be a comedy command structure. You know, no
one state you know would have would would be dominant
and you know in an executive officer roles or in
command authorities and UH the you know, the the UN
a forum for the post the multinational force. It was
supposed to be devoid of anything that could be affiliated
with you know, national chawmanism or or something that could
be like identified with any particular UH country or or
cultural UH tendency. So you're left with UH. So the
the like then is now it's like these guys look
like bus drivers or something. It was opposed to, like
the Easterman Army even though which are like dope, but
it's you know, it's uh it. I think the key take.
But also, like I said, was that the UH and
we'll get into UH later on in this series two
the like ultimately and and in the final phase of
the Cold War, the key UH, the key strategic battle
strategic battlespace was was the the Pacific, you know, and
that that's one of the things that underlay UH the
Department of the Navy under Jim Webb, you know, UH
and UH Reagan's idea for a ship navy, you know,
the idea was, you know, to deploy battle platforms, uh
like survival battle platforms, eff to wave what amount to
do a two front nuclear war? We can think of
nuclear war as having fronts at all. But that's uh,
that's yeah. I mean the fact that the people like uh,
people like Kennon uh who talk about, you know, the
inherent danger of of the Far East and and they
kind of and and you know, again the fleet of
of possible conflict adds, I mean they're proven right. I
mean during the Cold War, like Asia was pretty much
always at war, and I mean America fought two major
wars there and probably have it as on others that
you know, we're kind of something short of you know,
open conflict, but but but very much not conditions at peace.
And I mean the there was a I mean that
that wasn't happening in Europe. I mean, yeah, I realize
again as I stated that, uh, there's really only one
conflict diet and possible in Europe, and it was a
catastrophic one. But that had the Korean War not happened,
or had it resolved some other way, uh, the entire
course of subsequents would have been different. And it and
it had MacArthur got his way some kind of uh,
it's not going to open it at war with uh
with And the problem is, I mean, I stipulate that
what was referred like we thought the tautology of well,
you know, we we we've got to defend Korea because
our forces are there, and we're going to fight to
defend our forces. I mean, that's nonsense. But if the
alternative is, you know, we we've got to push for
a total victory in Korea. But doing that means fighting
in China, and fighting China means you know, landing the
China goshiks nationalists there, and and and and waging war
to the end until you know, until the comments regime falls. Well,
if you do that, then you're at war with the
Soviet Union, you know, and then when and I mean,
there's this this is not the Cold War. Was it
was important, not to not just important, but I mean
and it was a next it was a question, it
was a next essential reality that uh, the conflict paradigms
couldn't just be considered in binary terms. And I mean
that even even up through the eighties, there was something too.
Uh I'm not talking about like the fools like Uh,
the kind of you know, the kind of the kind
of peace movement just calling for like you know, Libel
to sun. I mean, but some of the people you
know who really kind of like opposed the the the
reig and UH and tm B notion. It's it was,
you know, they're the Cold War announcing you can just
turn off. And it wasn't just a question of you know,
persuing a quite like a conciliatory posture or an aggressive posture.
You know, especially by the era of deep parodies, the
every every embolicy decision had had very serious consequences that
themselves and other consequences, not all of which can be foreseen.
You know, it's an incredibly dangerous time. But excuse me,
I'm just I'm getting over a flare up. So I
realized that sound crummy. I'm sorry, but uh, I'm gonna
wrap Uh I think that I think I'm gonna wrap
up this, uh this episode. And like I said, I
realized this was a bit dry. It's kind of it
was it's essential to lay foundation for some of the
you know, for some of the some events we're gonna
talk about, and we're gonna get into the Cuban missile crisis,
in Vietnam and the next episode. And I think that
everybody finds that sort of stuff exciting. I mean, at
least I do.
Speaker 1: But uh, you had also you had also met talking
about McCarthy.
Speaker 2: Yeah, let's let's we'll take that up next episode too,
because yeah, obviously we're getting in a well, yeah, we're
gonna we'll get into eyes and uh into Kennedy era. Yeah,
we about McCarthy.
Speaker 1: Yeah, all right, sounds great. Give your plugs and we'll
get out of here.
Speaker 2: Yeah, for sure, Thank you, Pete. You can find me
on substick uh real Thomas seven seven seven dot substick
dot com. That's where you can access to the podcast.
We drove a podcast every other week, you know, on
the same kind of stuff, you know, revisionism and and
and mostly political theory kind of topics. But you know,
I take up current events too, particularly Warren P's kind
of stuff when it's timely to do. So. You can
find me on Twitter at triskilli and jahad. Uh the
T is a number seven, but if you search for
Thomas seven seven seven, you should find me. That's mostly
where I active these days. I'm going to transition to
YouTube and you know, perhaps uh one or two other
video platforms on the first of January and make that
kind of the the primary place where I post up content.
But for now, that's that's where I can be found.
Speaker 1: I want to welcome everyone back to the pe Cononez Show,
continuing talking about the Cold War. I know a lot
of people are going to be really interested in this one.
Thomas seven seven seven doing Thomas very well.
Speaker 2: Thanks, Yeah, I hope so. And I wanted to get
some housekeeping stuff because I haven't addressed people directly for
a minute. I mean, not like I've got this huge
audience or something, but I do have some pay subscribers
who are adult because they make a lot of what
I do possible. That not much has gotten done the
last couple of weeks. That was second stuff, and I
think some of you notice. But obviously I'm I'm getting
back to dropping fresh stuff now. I mean literally right
now what we're doing here. But I'm gonna drop a
fresh pod this week and kind of get back on
top of stuff. So thank you for being patient. I
don't like believe people. I mean, I realize everybody's cool
about such things, but I mean people do pay to
like read my stuff, so I don't really like to
leave them hanging like that. But yeah, today, I wanted
to get into the Q and missile crisis today because
it's something it's key, not just understanding how the later
Cold War developed. I think of the later Cold War
as Bresnev onward. Okay, and Bresnev became General Secretary in
nineteen sixty four, okay. But the early Cold War you
can think of as you know, Stalin's tenure through mister
Krushcheff's regime and not not not not as temporally can
we think of that as the early Cold War. But
that was before parody set in, you know, strategic parody.
And people bandy a lot about nuclear weapons today, which
is another example, in my opinion, of how kind of
disengage the public policy UH discourses from the realities of things.
Nulear weapons are a practical purpose is obsolete, not not
because the technology is obsolete per se, but because they
don't really have utility in UH in it tactical or
a strategic sense outstead of a very peculiar paradigm. And
unfortunately or fortunately, depending on where you fall on the issue,
that that that paradigm emerged splendidly in in the twentieth century,
and uh what uh, what's what What's become sort of
dogma in terms of in terms of strategic analysis and
game theory derived from the precedent of the Cuman missile price.
It's more than any other singular event. This was somewhat
uh compromised reliance on the model that I just you know,
from relying upon the data derived from the Cuban missile
crisis and the models created therein in terms of strategic
forecasting and and nuclear war planning and deterrens and things
like that. H some of that was itself writered ops
a lescdent by the emergence at deeper parodies after ninety
seventy three seventy four. But the basic terms remain, and
the basic the basic conceptual model indoors. And I'm gonna
get into why it is in a minute, but first
we gotta understand understand the Cuban crisis. You can understand
the character mister Krushcheff, cruise schief became for a poetical purposes,
you know, chief Executive of the Soviet Union in nineteen
fifty eight. You know, I mean, there was always kind
of a strange or not always, but in most cases
there's an unusual sort of consolidation of offices that kind
of asituted the executive seat of power in the Soviet Union.
Sometimes that was a trifecta of sourts. Sometimes it came
down to the rule of one man. But it's it's superseded. Uh,
it's superseded in any single office, okay. And after the
death of Stalin in ninety fifty three, there there was
a lot of there's a lot of palace intrigues, as
it were. Okay, as well, we could probably imagine between
Stalin loyalists, you know, between and reformers as well as uh,
you know, between men who represented uh uh sympathies uh
common to the same faction, but you know, who had
personal designs on power. And Cruise Chef was emerging a
triumphant for a variety of reasons, uh, not the least
of which ironically, in the view of the West at
the time, I believe, and even in hindsight and even
among some revisionists, Cruiseiff really was something of a reformer,
you know, he was he was kind of a proto
Gorbachev in a lot of ways. People who cited this
because his posture was so aggressive and foreign policy as
regards efforts directify the strategic and balance. And we'll get
into what I mean by that in a moment. But Krustie,
if he is, he wanted to normalize the Soviet Union. Okay.
Now this presented a problem for few of the reasons
and the one and it was imperative for him to
normalize and thought relations with the West because otherwise nothing
was gonna get done. Okay. There there was going to
be some kind of interdependence between the East Block and
the West, Okay, regardless of what anybody's powerpelitical ambisions were. Okay,
that's that was just the reality of of of of
nascent globalism. And make no mistake, globalism began uh in
the ashes of the Second War. Okay, The fact there
wasn't realized until you know, the night of November nineth,
nineteen eighty nine and subsequent is is incidental. This was uh,
This was this was the enterprise comment of both Moscow
in Washington and and what form that it would all
the system would ultimately take once consolidated, was really what
underlay the political side of the Cold War. So Cruise
I've had to present a face of u of normalcy
or the outside world in some basic sense. However, as
we talked about, particularly in the last episode, when we
got into you know, the uh the the battleground of
the Third world and the need quite literally to you know,
to to disway the non like world into one's own
camp as a path of victory in the Cold War,
the uh the the only way to really animate these
these post colonial states and in these in these developing countries, uh,
to to take up the cause of Marxist Leninism was
to sell them in a basically radical program. Okay, That's
what was resonant with the people on the ground. That's
what uh, the cadres had been marinated in that kind
of you know, during World War two and after. Frankly,
that's what orthodox Marcust Leninism is. You know, it calls
for the It calls for the development of a truly
revolutionary sensibility where uh, you know, power flows from the
barrel of a gun quite literally. Okay, in tactical terms,
somebody like Mao was was far more of an orthodox
and Marguist Leninist than you know, the the the Eastern
Bloc cadres that uh that succeeded style. And Okay, I'm
notwithstanding the fact that I don't believe Mao what any
great understanding of Marxism. I don't think he understood it
at all, particularly, but on the tactical sides of political
revolutionary as somebody like Mao or probably more probably more
precisely Ho Chi Men was exactly what Lenin envisioned when
he when he when he when he contemplated you know,
world world socialist revolution. Okay, So there was this weird
dichotomy wherein the Soviets had to present a reformist face
to their chief advers series in the West, but you know,
they had to maintain a kind of a year of
uh of orthodox radicalism, you know, to their constituents, if
we can think of them, that where their cadres, you know,
in the Third World. And this was a very delicate
menuet and uh it. Frankie led the foundation of the
sign of Soviet Split, which we'll get into in coming episodes,
but that's a bit outside the scope for now. But
when Cruisie did take the helm of the Soviet Union
and the Soviet Union had some pretty substantial momentum technologically,
they were arguably winning the space race. You know, Sputnik
was uh was the first uh what was the first
man made object in orbit? The first man made object
in space was a V two rocket, so you can
thank the German Reich for that. But you know, Sputnik
was a This was a big deal, Okay, Like a
lot of people, uh, the people in the in the
nascent Pentagon at the time said well, this is just
a stunt. You know, it doesn't it doesn't it doesn't
prove anything. It didn't matter if anything or not. And
it didn't matter if you know, there's a direct military application,
you know, the parking a satellite in orbital space for
a few minutes. The point is that they were the
first to accomplish it, and this developed a kind of
momentum it zone in terms of perception. Okay, but the
Soviets had a real political problem that became a national
security problem that was ongoing even despite those victories in
this era. We talked about the Berlin Airlift last episode,
and you know how that really kind of was the
key initiatory or instigating event of the Cold War. I
think if we can identify any singular occurrence between ninety fifty,
well over one point five million people emigrated from the
Soviet occupied zone to West Germany, and most of these
people were young. They were prime working age, a dispportiond
an amount of engineers, men with military experience, people educated
in the sciences, uh, women of child during age. Yeah,
I mean this, this is a real problem. Okay. A
subtext uh to uh to to the issue of uh
emmigration across the inner German border a level was never
explicitly stated by their camp was uh one of the
reason Germany is coveted. It's it's it's not. It's not
just because of of of geostrategic accident and kind of
where you know Germany is located on the map. Okay.
It had to do with it had to do with
the human material. Okay, you can control the German population
that literally, the human resources they're in that that you
wield tremendous power in terms of your ability to mobilize
them for warfare. I mean, that's just a fact, Okay.
I mean if people want to say that it's not true,
or that the eugenics thinking, Okay, fine, you can label
whatever you want. It's a fact. And everybody accepted it. Okay,
there's a there's a reason why. There's a reason why
the d d R was was the jewel and the
crown of Warsaw pat Okay, And it wasn't. It wasn't
just because it was the westernmost point at which at
which the Soviets UH sphere of influence stretched. As this
went on, another another layer was insinuated into the into
the issue of into the issue of divided Germany as
the UH, as the four power UH regime fell apart,
and it became clear that, you know, demilitarization was not
in the cards. The Soviets came to realize that West
Germany as a basing hub for for American nuclear weapons
was was going to become the reality. And this had
already been accomplished in terms of low yeld tactical nuclear forces.
It had escalated beyond that, in part because UH the
strategic balance was still unstable. And we'll get into what
I mean by that in a moment, But the Soviets
were very very aware of this. So the problem was twofold,
you know. The problem was the fact that they were
literally hemorrhaging people by the sieve that was Berlin, because
the inner German border had been shot since ninety fifty three,
but Berlin, being one hundred and ten miles within East Germany,
represented a kind of It represented a kind of metaphorical valve,
as it were, wherein people could pass rather freely between
you know, the Eastern occupations owned in the West and
once in West Berlin. The West Berlin authorities under a
under the dominion of you know, of the United States,
the UK and France, they considered all German citizens to
just be citizens in Germany. They did not recognize East
Germany as a sovereign state. So East German people, these
German passports made it to West Berlin like they were
good to go. They they you know, they be granted
full rights of UH, the many bales and the Bonus Republic.
So there's the practical problem of of UH, of the
Soviets losing the human material they needed to wage the
cold work quite literally, there's the political problem of UH
of credibility, you know, UH in that you know, if
if you claim to represent the real Germany and the
U you know, the will of the working class and
the government situated in East Berlin, yet you're hemorrhaging people.
It UH it's a terrible look, frankly, and uh, the
entire uh, the the the entire communist enterprise again relied
upon the perception, especially in the Third World, you know,
to represent a competitive system that was an equitable alternative
to that in the West. And finally, as I just indicated, uh,
the permanent division and mobilization of Germany essentially allowed America
and the NASA and NATAL alliance to potentially maintain a permanent,
splendid first strike capability, you know, if they chose to
deploy strategic nuclear forces. At that time, there were no
hypersonic cruise platforms available, so we'll get into that later obviously,
but the solution of this was somewhat fascinating. There's a
terrible human cost, so I'm not being flippant. But on
August thirteenth, nineteen sixty one, at midnight, the East German
Border Police, the National Volks Army and elements of the
group of Soviet forced in Germany, it began to construction
on the Berlin Wall, Okay, and it wasn't clear at
first what they were doing. Ubrich had actually suggested this
based on analysis from National Voks Army engineers. The Soviets
did not think it was possible, and the Pentagon, interestingly
near me cort of engineer said it's probably impossible. But
to emphasize the point I just made about, you know,
the mentioned material if you will, of Germany, well, the
Germans found a way to quite literally wall in West Berlin,
which again I'm not making light of a terrible situation,
but the Berlin Wall remains an architectural marvel that really
I don't think, I don't I don't think anybody could
pull off other than the Germans. And I think we
can stand by this statement in confidence so that the
effect of lessening tensions, you know, there wouldn't be another
Berlin air lift type situation, you know, absent a state
of general war, it was unthinkable that Berlin v blockaded again. However,
that didn't obviously accomplished anything in terms of the remedying,
you know, the problem of of a basing availability in
West Berlin, and I mean the obviously it was key
keep in mind is that okay, I mean, the Soviets
could base their own nuclear forces in the d d R,
and they could threaten Europe with uh, you know, with
with with the threat of a cat is driving nuclear assault,
but that that that wouldn't matter. Like when it came down,
it was the ability to deter a threat in the
United States, and obviously the Soviets had no capability to
do that, which is why UH Cuba became so coveted. Now,
before we get into the actual development of the crisis,
let's get into what prevailing conceptual models were for UH
for strategic planning and in the nuclear age. Okay, the
two primary models were presented by Hans Morgenthau, who I
think I referenced in the last episode. You know, morgan
Tho is a traditional realist. Meerscheimer's a neorealist. You know,
as I indicated, he he deals with and dealt primarily
in structures and institutional u features and how they affect
outcomes as regards us as you know, as regards to
terrence and war fighting. You know, Morgan thal would he
basically presented an anthropological model buttressed by what he called
rational discipline and action. Like what did he mean by that?
He was saying. What he was basically saying is that,
you know, the bounded rationality to states at war or
political actors generally not they don't even have to be
states so the States obviously are the primary, the primary
actors in power political affairs. You know, at least from
sixteen forty eight to the present. That's changing, but it's
still endures, you know, regardless of how prerational or even
arguably irrational the origins of war are. Like what it's underway.
You know, war is guided by this bounded rationality. Okay,
the waging of it. It begs the question as to
how you know, as to how as the on this
has been demonstrated in the historical record, like an Accolade
Morgan that would say, well, over time, you know, there's there,
there's a remarkable continuity. Okay, if you're talking about great
powers at war, where they're talking about the British, the
United States, you know, Russian foreign policy, you know, even
the lesser regional powers like the Austranguria Empire, you know,
in the most failian era, at least over time, this
bears out. Okay, the the competing model, I mean maybe
not so much competing and absolute terms, but the uh,
the kind of game theory model you know that relies
more on codable variables if you were if you will,
you know, uh, based upon you know the availability of
war fighting technologies was kind of was presented by Thomas Shelling.
Shelling was primarily an economist, but he was a game theorist,
and he was a public intellectual of the sort that really,
uh really thrived during the Cold War, and I it
doesn't really exist anymore, at least not in public life.
Shilling's old point was that deterrence is accomplished, you know, not,
you know not not not by the propensities of the
individual men who are they who are the human decision makers,
you know, nor a by that relative balance of forces
on each side. But the stability they're in, and the
stability they're in comes down to available technologies, and uh,
in the nuclear age that it comes down to the
ability of uh each side to basically threaten the other,
whether a telecatory strike when attacked that you know, makes
a bolt from the blue assault cost prohibitive, you know,
unacceptable damage will be endured. In other words, Okay, showing
seminal texts was the strategy of conflict, Okay, throughout the
Cold War, this kind of a in foreign policy and
so either more either directly or obliquely into literally until
nineteen until the night of November ninet nineteen eighty nine,
showing is a controversial figure about his influence can't be
cannot be denied now based on both base based on
either of those models or both of them considered together.
Nineteen sixty two, really ninety sixties ninety sixty three was
so dangerous because they're an equilibrium and not yet set in.
There's a lack of there's a lack of informational awareness
on both sides as the absolute state of forces and
being and capabilities. Even uh, even if uh, even even
if that awareness had been even if those blinders could
be as it were, it could be overcome. I mean,
even if there was a situation a total uh information awareness.
There's the availability of delivery mechanisms and uh, whether you
know they're their operational status would have caused a situation
where it could have served either side's interests to strike
first without waiting for you know, an intelligence reveal, you know,
as the absolute status of forces on the opposing side.
What one what one can think of two men blindfolded, uh,
and neither's aware of the armament of the other, and
whether they're trying to draw a bead, you know, the
threatened the other to deter future hostile acts, but neither's
cable of seeing you know, his opponent, you know, and
that's really what in part created, you know, the the
danger of the Cuba situation. Now, how it first came about,
like why Cuba again, and more to do with the
accident of geography. As early as you'rely nineteen sixty two,
Raouel Castro, who UH was Fiddil's brother and was uh
in in some ways the shadow foreign policy executive of
Cuba throughout the Cold War, so we're not even two.
He visited Moscow, and it's believed that this is when
the Soviet Union began the large scale shipments of the
tech of technical and military aid to Cuba, you know,
including UH the men who were qualified to uh, you know,
to operate you know, strategic nuclear platforms. UH. August nineteen
sixty two is probably when UH is probably when the
actual plant missile platforms arrived in in in Q. They
were not yet operational, but this is when, you know,
this is when that disassembled components first arrived on the island. September. Interestingly,
the UH, the Kennedy administration declared that if Q became
a base for Soviet nuclear weapons, UH it would it
would be viewed as an active war. So this is
on everybody's mind before the crisis, before, but before the
crisis ensued, and before the reveal of UH, of the
actual basing of weapons on the island. This gives you
an idea of UH the dangerous game cruise if was playing. Frankly, okay, now,
it was Sunday, October fourteenth, that's when the famous or
infamous YouTube were Constance Flight took the photographs that you
know ultimately led to their reveal. It was a subsequent
Monday the fifteenth that conclusively, at the National Photographic Interpretation Center,
the YouTube film was analyzed and medium range ballistic missiles
were identified in your san crystal Ball without a doubt. Now,
thus ensued the most dangerous phase of the crisis. Today,
October the sixteenth, Kennedy and his UH and his principal
foreign policy Cabinet were briefed on the situation and discussions
began immediately on how to respond. Now, obviously there's two
principal courses. I mean, there's three, you'll get into that
in a minute. But in terms of action, the two
principal courses were, you know, a massive, a massive air assault,
possibly including nuclear forces, and a subsequent invasion of the island,
you know, the the destruction of the weapons platforms, the
overthrow of you know, the defeat and utter annihilation of
the Cuban army, the overthrow of the Castro regime, and
the occupation of Havana, which undoubtedly would you know, lead
to the deaths of you know, one hundred of thousands
of people, including you know, any Soviet soldiers on the
ground or alternatively sort of a naval quarantine blockade, and
the threat of future military action. Now interestingly, macnimer was
the man who had the third position, if you want
to look at it that way. Mcnamerr Said, don't do anything.
This doesn't matter. Why doesn't it matter, because you know,
these intermediate range platforms are going to be obsolete in
six months, and which was true, you know, and America
was about to replace their own Jupiter missiles with the
polar System, you know, which was a submarine launch ballistic
missile platform. And even whether they're not the case, mac
namara said, uh, you know, despite despite propaganda of the
contrary and despite Cruise of it's own statements, you know,
the Soviet unions, the Soviet Union probably adds between thirty
and eighty viable warheads. Okay, we get into a we
get into a nuclear with the Soviet Union, we can
annihilate them. I mean, yeah, you know, twenty million Americans
may die, but that's a war the Soviets can't win.
Do nothing. But that wasn't really the issue. If it was,
the issue was twofold. I mean, this the Minroe doctrine, obviously,
and that always UH is controlling on questions of the
power political affairs. Just on principle, you can't allow UH
a rival actor to deploy within the Western hemisphere. I mean,
if you do so, it's you you you're essentially making
hash with your own line in the sand, as it were.
It doesn't matter that, you know the I mean, I
mean even if even if the weapons deployed are already obsolescent,
it you know, it doesn't matter. And secondly, UH, you know,
as a matter of a political will, if America won't UH, I,
America won't fight ninety miles off its own coast to
prevent the deployment of UH strategic nuclear forces. The credibility
gap develops as to whether America is gonna fight and
sacrifice one hundred thousand men to defend West Berlin. You know,
I mean, God love macnamara, but there's you know, there,
there's a calculus beyond the beyond the merely uh strategic
that matters in these things, and particularly in the Cold War,
which was as much political as it was, you know,
a military contest, and you know about you know, who
can accomplish what within you know, the proverbial balance of terror.
On October seventeenth, before uh A, uh, before a formal
policy decision was reached, Kennedy ordered a what we consider
to be rapid reaction forces to be moved to bases
in the southeastern US. Further, YouTube flights and the photos
derived therein indicate additional sites and in total of sixteen
to thirty two missiles. So, in other words, even taking
with McNamara said a face value, which I believe, which
Kennedy did, and which I believe we can and you know,
and upon reflection, obsolescent or not, if those missiles are operational,
that's the potential for for an utterly devastating counter value
strike was definitely there, you know, I mean, this was
not an illusory threat, however anyone feels about it, and
the character of cashtro is UH is relevant too. You know,
Cashro whatever gonna be said about him was it was
was a true revolutionary in the purest sense. And he'd
repeatedly stated that, and this is revealed later and UH
communications between himself and UH and the Soviet Foreign Ministry
and proused of office itself that UH, in the United
States assaulted Cuba, the Soviet Union should go all in
and you know, just treated as an act of war
against the Communist block and and and and and the
launch of our missiles with an operational decades later, UH,
at the height of the conflict in Nicaragua, Casher was
convinced that the United States was going to directly intervene,
which might trigger a theater white conflagration, and he reiterated
that the Soviet Union, in the war's uppack, you know,
should consider UH, you know, a waging prempted nuclear war
against against NATO. I mean, he really believed this, you know,
this wasn't you know, it's easy dismiss that it's so
much bluster. In the case of many men like Cash,
it absolutely meant that, you know, I mean, I I
have no doubt about that. So consider that there's a
question as to whether or not, you know, what what
the Soviet response would have been if there was a
massive invasion in Cuba. I mean, there's there's it's more
than a remal possibility that you know, there would have
there they would have responded by launching whatever munitions that
were currently operational. Okay. And again even if that, you know,
even if that, even if that was a war, the
Soviet Union could not win that that that would have
that would that would have meant I need to thirty
million dead Americans, you know. Within hours, uh Thursday, October eighteenth,
Kennedy was visited by the Soviet Foreign Minister Gramico, who
asserted that the soviety to Cuba was purely defensive. Kennedy
had not yet revealed that he knew of the existence
of the missiles. He reiterated his public warning of the
previous September you know that deployment to Cuba strategic nuclear
forces would constitute an active war. Basically was signaling and
to give Gramco an out, I believe, okay it And
this also raised the question as to why why why
why didn't why didn't cruise to try to de escalate
when it should have been clear that Kennedy was signaling
through a kind of you know, would pass for secret
diplomacy in the post and number of era. Why why
didn't why what why didn't Why didn't Cruise your trying
to de escalate the situation. I've got my own ideas
on that, But what's an arguable is why, uh, why
Cruise it deployed these weapons in the first place, when
as we just acknowledged, you know, and as as mac
and at the time observed, you know, that this actually
didn't rectify the strategic balance imbalance on its own terms,
and it had the potential for catastrophic escalations. So why
why did he do that? I believe that this was
supposed to be as trump card as regards Berlin. I
believe that Kruse Scheff UH was going to demand on
the open floor of the United Nations that UH NATO
abandoned West Berlin and UH and UH and and UH.
And when Stevenson or whoever you know, haughtily would just say,
you know, it's laughable. Of course we're not going to
do that. At that moment, Cruise Shift would reveal, well,
you know, we've got operational weapons platforms in Cuba ninety
miles off your coast. You know, if you want them
to be removed, you know you'll you'll, you'll see Berlin
unconditionally our sphere of influence, which seems like the craziest
hell idea. But Cruise Shift was a gambler, you know,
for all of his for all of his tendencies UH
towards reform and a constill literatory posture and absolute terms
his uh, he viewed none of this as being truly
possible in power political terms, unless the Soviet Union could negotiate,
you know, from a position of uh. If not absolute,
you know, then a relative strength. That's what underlay all
of this. It was always a political uh ploy more
than a uh strategic uh move, if that makes any sense.
And that that's key, not just understanding the Soviet Union
in it's epoch, but I think the kind of Russian
national character. Like I don't speak Russian, I've never visited there.
I'm certainly not an expert on Russian people, their culture
or their affairs, but I do know something about power politics,
and uh, I think, uh I I I think that's
I think, I think I think this is key. Okay,
Putin himself is something of an unusual executive uh, even
for Russia, but generally in structural terms, what the Kremlin
does reflects this same kind of tendency in common. I
don't I think that's constant. It doesn't change. H. Yeah, up,
go ahead, we're gonna say something. Okay. October twentieth, UH
Kennedy UH finally decides on the quarantine plants are drawn up,
UH to blockade the island of Cuba, notified the American people,
and UH prepared for war if uh, you know, the
SOT Union opts to sue for war to break the
blockade the UH. During this time, Curtis la May maintained
evociferiously objected. And you know, I I've I made the
point again and again about you know it may being
really kind of a towering figure in uh, you know
in in uh, you know, really really throughout the Cold War,
but especially he just to force the man's personality and
I mean think about Kennedy. You basically it was waiting
up feel bad to kind of win the respect to
the military establishment. I mean, he was a veteran and
a war hero, but he was given something of a
punk rich kid on the beltweigh by many and back
in those days, I mean you had a lot more
serious people who you know, kind of carved out niches
for themselves, and the National security apparatus, you know, what
we do was the deep state. Today, you know, you
got Curtis LeMay, Uh, you know, demanding uh, you know,
demanding Kennedy give an assault order, you know, backed up
really by you know, the entire Pentagon apparatus. And in
those days, you know, Strategic Air Command was king. You know,
it very much eclipsed the Army in terms of its
you know, uh cloud and policy and in policy authority,
you know, things like this. You know, I mean whatever,
I'm not some great fan of Kennedy at all. I
think anybody kind of instinctively discern who's h at all
familiar with my content? But uh, you know the guy
did Kennedy did have balls, and he needed that have backbone. Okay,
that can't be denied. What really what we're really solidified
Kennedy's position, though he consulted with uh, General Walter Sweeney
of a tact the Layer Command, who you know, uh
and and you know, going back to the Second World War,
you know, the fighter Mafia and Strategic Air Command liked
at this kind of ongoing rivalry. I there's there's military
guys who claim, well, yeah, there's you know, obviously, you know,
Kennedy tapped Sweeney because he wanted to foil to a A.
I don't think that's true. I think it was because
Sweeney was the man who such that experts existed in
those days on you know, how to knock out on
how to knock out strategic new clear platforms. You know,
Sweeney was it. And Sweeney said that, you know, even
if even with the best possible mission outcome, he cannot
guarantee one hundred percent destruction of of the missiles. Okay,
So again you know, this raise the question as to well,
I mean, the moment, there's a possibility that's not you know,
and it's it's greater than a slim possibility that the
moment Cuba came under result, if these platforms were in
fact operational, the launch order would be given, you know,
and who even knew the situation on the ground. I mean,
one would have hope that the Soviet Army technicians responsible
for the deployment what have ultimate authority, But I mean,
who's to say, you know, that can't be guaranteed and
in a a proverbial fog of warst situation. Expressly, delegate
authority doesn't always carry the day anyway. Monday, October twenty second,
Kennedy consulted the former presidents Hoover, Truman, and Eisenhower. Briefed
them on the situation, you know, asked for their support
if in fact the country uh you know was uh
what what was going to go to war. He received
his He received, you know, absolute blessing from all three men.
He formally established Kennedy did the Executive Committee of the
National Security Council Young insisting of mc namara, McGeorge, Bundy,
Curtis Lamey, Bobby Kennedy, who probably should not have been
in on the conversations. He was the President's brother and
there's a conflict of interest there, but you know he
was for better or worse. But that's uh, you know,
the the smoke filled room, uh with all the personalities
mentioned they I just mentioned present. You know, you see
this like dramatized on like History Channel stuff like that's
that's what they're depicting, the depicting the Executive Committee of
the National Security Council. Okay, ultimate A. Kennedy Kennedy wrote
directly to Khrushchev, which seems like a breach of protocol. Uh.
But the Cold War was strange in this regard. You know,
it's it's really in my opinion, said the President too.
You know, there's like people that people talk later in
the Cold War, by the by the Carter era, it
was the quote you know, like bat phone or the
red phone in the White House that was the hotline
of the Kremlin and vice versa. You know. Uh, this
idea of of of of heads of state directly kindacting
one another across uh, across across the enemy divide and
a potential crisis like it seems improper and the traditional
kind of laws and customs of war. But the Cold
War and in some ways was you know, a breach
of precedent. But in then regardless of of that, that
the merit of that, or the efficacy of that, or
the effectiveness of of a neutralizing potential crises. Uh, it
was probably the correct move for Kennedy to directly right
to cruise if by telegram, and he did him. Uh,
he did this prior to addressing the you know, the
American people by television, which was frankly like you know,
a sign of respect and say allowing cruise to safe face,
you know. And uh, the key uh, the key phraseology
of the telegram was quote, I have not assumed that
you or any other sane man would, in this nuclear
age liberally plunge the world into war. What he was
saying again was basically, you know, deployment to Cuba as
an act of war. And I'm giving you an out here,
okay when I'm well within my rights as President United
States simply to you know, assault the island, neutralize the threat,
and ask questions later. And uh, regardless of whether is
correct for Kennedy directly addressed crews with the man himself
and not go the diplomatic channels. Uh that that that
was the correct statement, I believe. So again, we gotta
we've got to give credit recruited to do it to
mister Kennedy, however else anybody feels about him. Seven pm
that evening October twenty second, That's when Kennedy speaks on
television revealing the existence of the Soviet missiles in Cuba,
announcing the establishment of the quarantine and declaring that you know,
and until the missiles are removed unconditionally and and and
completely you know, the the the the quarantine will not
be lifted, and failure to do so, you know, we'll
constantly with an active war Secretary of Stateton Dean and
rusk Uh formally notified the Soviet ambassador, which again, uh,
that's not just part of good office, is it indicated
the severity of Kennedy's statement, that's essentially what you do
when incident, you know, preceding a formal declaration of war. Okay,
So that's another thing to consider as well. Also, like
we talked a lot about, even though I don't really
accept the mere Sermi model about institutions determining you know,
the course of power, political events and crisis outcomes, there
is a momentum to the apparatus of government, particularly as
regards war and peace, and once kind of the mechanism
of war mobilization is in place, it's very, very difficult
to put the brakes on it. Okay. The fact that
Kennedy was entirely serious about going to war, waging nuclear
war over Cuba, that itself created conditions of escalation. I'm
not saying that's the wrong thing to do at all.
Quite the contrary, is the right thing to do. But
this added to the danger. At every step decisions that
are made that lead to UH real world outcomes in
the national security apparatus in a state of readiness and deployment,
it creates an elevated UH. It creates an elevated danger. Okay,
there's there's a sociological question there, there's a comics question
of you know, managed relationship to technology. I A lot
of that stuff is like far beyond my abilities, okay
to analyze. But what I just stated is indisputably true. Susay,
October twenty third. The following day, Assistant Secretary of State
Martin he Uh start a resolution from the Organization of
American States and the oas UH. I mean, these days
we think of it as you know, primarily like a
trade block and things like that. During the Cold War,
obviously it had it had it had profound UH geostrategic significance,
you know, because any if you're gonna wage war in
Latin America, which was a very real possibility throughout the
duration of the Cold War, a quorum of support from
friendly regimes they were in was absolutely essential for obvious reasons.
The the Soviets proceeded UH two UH to deploy submarines
UH to the Caribbean Sea, which were facing off immediately
opposite the the the US Navy blockade vessels, which again
to the UH and indicated UH a Soviet willingness to
fight and to keep uh, you know, to fight at
least defensively if Cuba was assaulted, you know, I mean, Uh,
it became clear immediately that the Soviets were intending to
fight for Cuba, like to what degree they're going to
do that, whether the missiles were operational or not. You know,
the the Soviet Navy was going to fight, and that
added another uh, that ended another wrinkle, as it were,
because even if, even if, even if the Bliss, even
if the nuclear capable platforms were not operational, a conventional
war in Cuba with the Soviet Union, obviously there was
gonna be some sort of response in Berlin, Okay, I mean,
and then it's you know, you're, you're, you're, you're, you're
dealing with the potential conflict diad that were result in
the Third World War at some point, you know, down
down down range of of of hostilities. Wednesday, October twenty
fourth Cruiser responded to the Kennedy UH, to the Kennedy
telegram stating that, uh, the Soviet Union does not respond
to ultimatums under threat, you know, uh, stating quote, if
we react we as these demands, it would mean guiding
oneself and one's relationship with other countries, not by reason.
By submitting to arbitrariness, you are no longer appealing to reason,
but wish to intimidate US. Thursday October twenty fifth was
when the crisis could be said to have broke in
some ways. Soviet freighters that have been bound for Cuba
turned back to Bucharest UN Secretary General. The UN Secretary
General called for a quote cooling off period during which
the embargo would be temporarily lifted and you know, only
non military product would be permitted to pass through. This
is rejected outright by the Kennedy administration and grounds they
would leave the missiles in place the removal which was
an express condition but a negotiation. Priday, October twenty sixth,
with the date of the infamous cashiw letter urging cruise
shift to initiate a first strike against the United States
an event of invading of Cuba. Whether Cruth did responded
or not, or whether Ramigo responded whether the ambassador to
Cuba had any sort of formal response in the Kremlin,
It's not clear. But again there's an inference that can
be drawn here. I believe not only the Cubans not
have the authority to launch the missiles, I don't believe
they were capable of it. There's an entire protocol to
launching a nuclear missile. It's not just a question of
pushing a button or having the right code, you know it, uh,
like in the movies. So the odds of ah of
just a general like counter value AsSalt nuclear result if
Cube had been invaded, I think it's somewhat remote. I
don't think I'm reading too much into this statement by Castro.
I mean, why this was a private communication at cruise
if like, well, why would cash will be you know,
flexing in that kind of private capacity, Like it doesn't
It doesn't make sense otherwise, you know, you know what
I mean, like it yeah, yeah, yeah, but it the
uh finally and finally, UH resolution ultimately came when the
cruise schiff wrote a long, rambling letter a second letter,
a few drafts of which, when the Soviet archives were open,
were found and leading a lot of people to believe
the cruiser was drunk when he wrote or dictated it,
which is probably true. It's not just you know, some
kind of punitive revisionist account like cruise Iff really was
drunk and in the execution of his official duties a lot,
you know it, uh, which oh was in part ohs
you know, to his his apparent instability. This is the
source of the of the quote, you know, demand that
America pledged to not invade Cuba, Like what in power politics?
What is some open ended pledge and not invade another
country amount? I mean that that doesn't amount to anything,
even as a face saving measure. It doesn't really make
any sense. This is immediately followed up by a second
letter from Moscow, which probably came from gram Ego or
from somebody in the Politburo Standing Committee or it's equivalent.
This second letter demanded actual conditions be met, primarily the
removal of Jupiter missiles from Turkey. Now Turkey and Italy
were these Jupiter missiles were intermediate range ballistic missiles that
have been deployed in I think nineteen fifty seven, fifty seven,
fifty eight around there, maybe as late as fifty nine,
but I'd have to double check that. I'm sure somebody
in the comments will wrake me over the colls if
I'm misstating the date they were deployed in Italy and
deployed in Turkey. As I said, by this, at this
point they were not strategic nuclear forces based in West Germany.
But the Soviets made much of this at the UN
in their own propaganda and formal objections to Department of State.
But these Jupiter missiles were on the cust of being obsolete,
you know, like we talked about earlier, the Polaris submarine
system was due to be launched within months, and it
was ultimately fielded in sixty three sixty four. And so
I mean this is basically meaningless. I mean, okay, as
a safe face, as a face saving gesture, maybe it
carried some weight, but I I think the I think
the Soviets were were still very much lagging and in
terms of the technological gap as regards strategic nuclear delivery systems,
that changed dramatically in the seventies for reasons we'll get
into in subsequent episodes. But this was the source of
this was the source of the concession. If you want
to look at it like that to UH remove to
remove the missiles from Turkey, and that UH that night,
UH Robert Kennedy met secretly with the Soviet ambassador and
they reached a basic understanding that the Soviet Union would
draw their their strategic nuclear platforms from Cuba under United
Nations supervision. In addition to UH an American pledge, you know,
this pledge not to invade you, and a secret understanding,
as it was referred to two, you know, to remove
the Jupiter MISSIALI from Turkey. And this too, I believe,
substantiates what I just said about the Soviets not really
realizing that the Jupiter platform was going to be absolutely
because like if it was just a face saving measure,
why wouldn't they make it public? Like they thought these
platforms were viable and they thought they were getting something,
you know it because the fact that it was UH,
the fact that it was not an above board concession
that the defeats the entire purpose of any of any
political theater that you know, might have might might have
been utilized by way of it of such a gesture. Now,
the problem with UH that the problem was this, and
in the view of people like LeMay but also in
the in the minds of people like Shelling and Trank,
even people like Herman Khan, there's a sense that eventually
conflict with the Soviet Union was inevitable, okay, and owing
the precedent of the twentieth century, that seemed reasonable. That
wasn't just a warmonger's kind of fantasy, you know, it
wasn't just you know, something that you know, cynical career
is in the national security establishment, like to say, or
bandy about, because it rationalized, you know, the kind of
cloud they had. I mean, yeah, there was some of that.
But if you were if you were, if you were
a middle aged man in nineteen sixty two, who who
whose entire career had been as a you know, in
public service, directly insinuated in the national security establishment, like
your entire your your entire professional life had been characterized
by by by by negotiating crises of a of of
of of basic national security and and and and conditions
of of general warfare or price short of but approaching
general warfare. You know this this just seemed to be
the reality the twentieth century strategic landscape. So that being said,
if eventually, you know, conflict is inevitable. You've got an obligation,
you know, to defend the United States at all costs.
And if that means preemptively, you know, waging a nuclear
war against the Soviet Union and we're so upacked, you know,
to absolutely defeat them before strategic nuclear parody is accomplished,
then that is, in fact, you know, not just the
moral thing to do, but that is what you're obligated
to do incident to you know, your office and the
duties incumbent they're in. And that was really kind of
the This underlay a lot of what was going on
in you know, the proverbial war room, Okay, around Kennedy.
It wasn't just you know, it wasn't you know, like
the way people like Oliver Stone characterize it, like these
kind of crazy cold warhawk warmongers, and you know, these
kinds of men of like better natured you know, saying no,
we're not going to go to war, Like it's not
that's entirely the wrong way to conceptualize it. I mean, yeah, again,
I don't have any illusions about a lot of these
people at all. Like there were there were personalities, you know,
insinuated in and rolls the highest authority in the Cold
War who definitely were like that, you know, who definitely
did not have the national interests in mind, or they
thought they did, but you know, they were clouded by
you know, matters of a of a pride or or whatever.
I mean. I think I think Thomas Power as being
one of those types. Frankly, but this is uh, but
that's what's essential to keep in mind, particularly because like
I said, even people, even people are somewhat you know,
sympathetic to you know politics, the right or you know,
revisionist perspectives. You know, they continue to cast people like, uh,
they can cast people like as what I just said,
these kinds of strange love or Janette Ripper type characters.
But uh, it uh, forgiving of this was kind of dry.
It was essential to kind of explain like how that
entire paradigm developed of the Cuba crisis, and it's uh,
the shadow of it loomed large. I don't just mean
like in metaphorical terms, but uh, in terms of how
policy was conducted as regards to Terrence and and uh
and the strategic balance and the Cold War, and this
really endured until nineteen eighty three and nineteen eighty three
was so dangerous, you know, I mean that's the Able
Archer era. That's the way it kind of Cold War
storians think of it. But but preceded Able Archer. And
one of the things that you know, created the conditions
that that that that led to the war scare was
uh that threatened to play event of the person two
platform in West Germany, you know, which really was a
game changer, and you know, the the end of day
Todd really kind of shattered the assumptions that underlay uh,
you know, deterrence uh from the Cuban missile crisis onward.
That's a complicated issue, but we'll get into uh, we'll
get into uh Johnson, Vietnam and Nixon next episode. Nixon
is gonna take more than one episode, but I will
at least like get into uh Nixon's first term next time,
UH incident, our discussion of uh of Johnson and Vietnam
and all right, I mean we'll see, depending on how
long your own to go, but yeah, we'll we'll we'll
get into some of that stuff. Uh yeah, yeah, And again,
forgive me if that was a if this was a
dry episode, it was essential to kind of lay foundation
for what comes subsequent No.
Speaker 1: I think this is a a topic of interest for
a lot of people. I can't let you go without
mentioning having you mentioned the Bay of Pigs.
Speaker 2: Yeah it, Uh, I think what the Bay of Pigs
owes to more than anything. I mean, the traditional kind
of discourse on it, you know, is it's like, do
we blame like, you know, the CIA and Department of State,
or do we blame the president of the National Security Establishment.
It's not that simple. There's a lot of there's a
long history. Uh. I was reading about Angola a lot
some years back, and you know, one of the reasons
why those poor guys, uh who ended up a servant
under callon a guy got got massacred, I mean by
the Cubans and by the by the Angolan out forces.
Like holding Roberto. He basically sold British intelligence and CIA
a bill of goods, you know about the reality of
like forces and being on the ground and what they
were capable of. The anti Castro Cuban Bobby Similarly, they
either shipped together a lot more than somebody like mister Roberto,
but they had a lot more money, and they had
a lot more flash, and they had a lot more
kind of cloud than they did actual capabilities. Okay, I
think there's a lot of people even in the intelligence community,
and I've got nothing nice to say generally about, you know,
the CIA of the era. But I think they had
I I think, I think they had good intentions within
the irrationality of what they were trying to accomplish. And uh,
I think, uh I, I yeah, it was nive. Maybe
maybe it was naive to think that they could accomplish
what they set out too with what I'm onted to
a skeleton crew of of cowboy type mercenaries and UH
and self styled uh uh you know, and self styled
uh counter revolutionaries. But they also they underestimated the strength
of UH of of Castro and the gameness of a
of the Cuban army. And this was entirely clear into
later Like speaking of Angola, you know, the Cubans deployed
fifty thousand deep to Angola. They fought the South African
Defense Forces. It was with the Crack army, you know,
and they they met him head on, you know, the Cubans. Uh,
the Cubans were basically constantly deployed throughout the Cold War,
you know, like they they really believed in the margins
Len and his cause did Uh would air cover have
made a difference? I mean, I it wouldn't have hurt
any But I mean I don't this idea too. It's like, okay,
let's say, you know, let's say uh, let's let's let's
say this. Uh, let's say this kind of like you know,
mercenary army, you know, had uh had ground assault air
craft and and air cover all day. You know, Cuba
cub would have just like Commy's cub wouldn't just like
fallen apart the minute like these guys marched on on Havana.
I mean, the Cuban still was. I mean, the Cuba
they were. They're down for the cause. I mean, in
this day as much as anybody can be. I mean it, uh,
I mean I read it like that. I don't think
it was realistic, the only the only Uh yeah, I don't.
I don't think there's a military solution to the Cuba problem,
you know, like there, I just don't. I mean that's
my take on it, like at a glance, And we
can do a dedicated episode on it if you want.
There's a lot there, but that's just you know, I
my point is it's like, I mean, even one of
the reasons that you know, and like jump to go
a little bit outside the scope. But you know, let's say,
let's say the counterfactual developed that you know, we I
I kind of touched on. You know, let's say that
you know, let let's take let's say America did assault
Cuba in nineteen in nineteen sixty two, okay, and then
the nukes weren't operational, and the Soviets didn't do anything
and lynn and it didn't escalate. It was just you know,
the Marines and us Aeerborne Corps or eighteen Airborne Corps
and you know, uh and uh in the us araforce
pounding the hell out of Cuba, you know, killing half
million people. You know, like what what then where you
I mean affecting some permanent hosta ogervation at Cuba like
would have been a bloodbath, you know, like think like
think about that, like that would that would have been
a complete freaking mess, you know, Like I don't, I
don't uh, I don't think there was a I don't
think there was a political there. I don't think it
was a military solution to it. One of the reasons why,
you know, I'm one of the few people, even though
I'm far from any kind of like like Cold War
hawk in in the study of history as I think,
you know, but I consistently praise I, you know, us
efforts uh in uh in, you know, in in the
Cone of South America and then later you know in
uh in in Central America and the Panama Canal zone,
you know, to resist uh warsaw packed ingress because that
was absolutely essential, because that would have in military terms,
America was actively losing the Cold War in the final phase, okay.
And if if Latin America had truly gone red in
these key locations, that would have that that that would
that would that would have totally changed things. But notice
what Nixon and then later Reagan administration didn't do is
didn't go in heavy you know, they made they went
into a very small footprint, okay, and they developed very
effective convolutionary cadres. You know what I'm saying that the
conferences weren't like nice guys or something, Okay, like the
Bison was not a nice guy. There was neither general finish,
but they were effective guys, and they weren't they weren't
just guys who were in it to you know, get
paid and advanced their own you know kind of cloud
and status. I mean, but my point is that, you know,
the the American uh national security apparatus treated it as
a political problem. Not is this like military exigency, you know,
like we're gonna we're gonna going to Nicaragua with fifty
thousand marines and kill everybody like that. No, that that
that that doesn't work. So that's my But it's complicated.
Then I'm not a military guy. But again I I don't.
I don't think what I'm suggesting can be h disputed
in any kind of absolute sense. But yeah, that that's
that's just that's my take on it. At UH got
to bed a.
Speaker 1: Glance or in short, rather what one thing you said
early on about the million and a half basically Soviets
pouring into West Germany. Yeah, those who hate Germany and
want to destroy her have never stopped that attack, have
they of just pouring foreigners into there? Too?
Speaker 2: No? I don't. I And that's what's key is that
the and that was I mean, that was the Hokey's
whole point about the Cold War, Okay, Yaqui's whole point
was that, Look, yeah, East Germany is is a horrible regime.
In some ways, it's you know, uh, you know, in
some ways it's it's it's literally dystopian. But it's not
going to be here forever. And it's not it's not
destroying you know, the cultural and and and like racial
foundation of the country. You know, like you can weather
that storm, like you can't whether the storm of you know,
the US NATO socially engineering Germany out of existence. I mean,
that's what we're seeing to the you know, and that's
what I constantly, like I constantly brush up against people,
you know, not just online, but I mean that this
happens to me in person when I'm in at venues
where you know, the issue is being discussed. Like I
think I'm like defending Stalinism or something like I'm not okay,
but that's not the point, you know, Like I don't
see how this can be disputed anymore. Okay. It's like
you think, uh, you think you know, I mean, it's like,
how how can anybody, how can anybody dispute that? You know,
I mean it well, I mean it's just like the
this this state, I mean that that that's that's the
you know, Yaqui was a was a genius because he
was you know he was he was writing about this
and night and you know in nineteen fifty eight, fifty
nine or whatever, like even before you know, he wasn't.
He wasn't some guy like me, like you know, looking
at history in the interview mirror, you know, I mean,
but look at I mean, look at look look at
the former East Block. Okay, yeah, those states have terrible
problems today, but they don't have the problems of some
you know, some some crazy of some crazy Zionists or
uh you know, elite or or or these are these
kinds of DeVos types, you know, declaring that you know,
they would you know they you know, when we need
to import as many you know, thritable populations as possible
because you know, this this this country is you know
too orthodox or too Catholic, or you know, or too
white or too German. I mean that that's that that's
a that's an existential problem that can't be overcome. Okay,
Like if you've got fucked up government in Romania or Croatia,
it's like, well, yeah, okay, governments that part of the
world where is fucked up. It's different than having, you know,
a social engineering regime with endless resources that's trying to
annihilate you as as a culture and as a people.
You know, like one you can handle, the other you can't.
I mean, but I mean, I guess that's a topic
for another UH episode or series entirely. But yeah, I mean,
that's that's the issue with the Cold War. Nobody's I mean,
maybe maybe there's some people claim that, you know, the
the the East Bloc regimes were good regimes. I mean,
I'm sure you can find some Marxist fossil at some
college saying that. I'm certainly not saying that. But that's
not the point. You know, you got to look at
these outcomes.
Speaker 3: Yeah, there's nuance there when you yeah, yeah, yeah, the least, Yeah,
when you read, when you read Jacky, especially when you
read The Enemy of Europe, You're you're experiencing a nuance.
Speaker 2: No, exactly. And it's also, let's two bear in mind,
like the Cold War by design wasn't supposed to happen.
I mean, whether it's like okay, even if you're this
art kind of like anti communist and everything, it's like, well, okay,
you know that the the Cold War happened basically because
the concord fell apart between Washington and Moscow. You know,
the idea was, you know, everybody in Washington who you
had any meaningful authority, was perfectly okay with you know,
essentially half half the planet being uh, you know, being
under the being under the heel of Stalinism. So it's
it's either here or there, you know, like whether somebody
like me and in the historical records defending or condemning
that system. I mean, you know, it's like the fix
was in like by America. Like it's these regimes didn't
emerge out of nowhere and were not for America, the
uh you know, communism would have u would have uh
what would have been annihilated from this planet and in
nineteen forty one. But the but yeah, yeah, exactly.
Speaker 1: That's a great way to end it. Uh, give your plugs,
we get out of here.
Speaker 2: Yeah, for sure, man at uh I you can find
the podcast and some of my long form on the substack.
It's uh real Thomas seven seven seven dot substack dot com.
And once again, forgive my uh absence from producing fresh
stuff the last couple of weeks. Uh, but I'm I'm
back in the saddle. I promise, Uh, we'll be back
to the regular kind of bi weekly schedule. You can
find me on Twitter at Triskellian Jahad. The T is
the number seven. It's one word otherwise. We're gonna launch
the YouTube channel, uh January first. I know that that's
been one and coming. I decided to push it back
to January a few weeks back because I want to
do it right and I've got a great production team
helping me, which is what I needed because I'm kind
of a tech retard and at long last Imperium Press
and I found a printer for steel Storm two, so
that is going to drop in January, and that's what
I got.
Speaker 1: Awesome. Thank you, Thomas. Till the next time. I can't
wait