1 00:00:00,280 --> 00:00:05,080 Speaker 1: One, and welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles. We're gonna 2 00:00:05,120 --> 00:00:07,879 pick up where we left off with the last episode 3 00:00:08,000 --> 00:00:11,720 and we're going to continue looking at the OIG report 4 00:00:12,160 --> 00:00:17,199 into the circumstances surrounding Jeffrey Epstein's death. And in our 5 00:00:17,280 --> 00:00:20,760 last episode, we were talking about the discovery of the 6 00:00:20,839 --> 00:00:25,559 security camera system recording issues. So let's pick right up 7 00:00:25,879 --> 00:00:30,839 with Section B response on August eighth and ninth to 8 00:00:30,960 --> 00:00:35,960 discovery of the recording failure. On August eighth, following discovery 9 00:00:36,079 --> 00:00:40,200 of the recording failure, Company one Service records reflect that 10 00:00:40,320 --> 00:00:45,520 the electronics technician contacted a Company one technical support representative, 11 00:00:45,920 --> 00:00:50,119 who ultimately determined that two hard drives within DVR two 12 00:00:50,600 --> 00:00:54,679 had failed. According to the electronics technician and the Company 13 00:00:54,719 --> 00:00:59,240 one Service request record, the Company one representative informed the 14 00:00:59,280 --> 00:01:03,640 electronics technician that the two drives needed to be replaced 15 00:01:03,880 --> 00:01:07,200 and that DVR two needed to be rebuilt in order 16 00:01:07,280 --> 00:01:11,599 for the cameras to record again. The electronics technician told 17 00:01:11,640 --> 00:01:15,439 the OIG that he informed a Company one technician that 18 00:01:15,519 --> 00:01:18,879 he had to obtain the drives from mcc New York's 19 00:01:18,920 --> 00:01:24,840 computer services manager. The electronics technician further stated that he 20 00:01:25,200 --> 00:01:28,000 left the institution at the end of his shift and 21 00:01:28,079 --> 00:01:30,760 did not obtain the hard drives and did not continue 22 00:01:30,799 --> 00:01:34,640 to work on the matter. The electronics technician told the 23 00:01:34,640 --> 00:01:37,879 OIG he had no idea why he did not stay 24 00:01:37,920 --> 00:01:40,760 at the facility to resolve the problem that day, but 25 00:01:40,840 --> 00:01:44,519 he noted for the OIG that he had not historically 26 00:01:44,760 --> 00:01:48,879 been required to stay after his shift ended to work 27 00:01:48,920 --> 00:01:51,799 on such matters, and even if he had begun working 28 00:01:51,840 --> 00:01:54,480 on the DVR that day, he would not have completed 29 00:01:54,480 --> 00:01:57,680 the work on August eighth due to the time it 30 00:01:57,799 --> 00:02:02,560 takes for the rebuilding process. The OIG found that the 31 00:02:02,640 --> 00:02:07,799 electronics technicians immediate supervisor, the facility manager, was on leave 32 00:02:07,879 --> 00:02:10,840 that week and therefore was not told on August eight 33 00:02:11,159 --> 00:02:15,639 about the DVR recording failure. The facility manager confirmed that 34 00:02:15,680 --> 00:02:18,639 he did not learn about the camera's problem until days 35 00:02:18,680 --> 00:02:23,520 after Epstein's death. The electronics technician told the OIG that 36 00:02:23,560 --> 00:02:25,960 he did not report the problem to the lock and 37 00:02:26,080 --> 00:02:30,120 security supervisor, who was the acting facility manager in the 38 00:02:30,120 --> 00:02:35,520 facility manager's absence. The SIS lieutenant told the OIG that 39 00:02:35,599 --> 00:02:39,719 after the electronics technician had examined the system on August eight, 40 00:02:40,159 --> 00:02:43,639 the electronics technician informed her that the cameras were not 41 00:02:43,759 --> 00:02:47,639 recording and said, I'm going to stay and do overtime tonight. 42 00:02:48,280 --> 00:02:51,800 Based on his comment, the SIS Lieutenant assumed that the 43 00:02:51,840 --> 00:02:55,719 electronics technician would remain at the institution after his shift 44 00:02:55,800 --> 00:02:59,960 ended that day to correct the issue. The electronics technician 45 00:03:00,240 --> 00:03:02,919 told the OIG there must have been some sort of 46 00:03:03,000 --> 00:03:05,919 miscommunication because he did not say he was going to 47 00:03:05,960 --> 00:03:09,840 work overtime and resolved the problem that same evening since 48 00:03:09,879 --> 00:03:12,840 he knew the problem could not be fixed in one evening. 49 00:03:13,360 --> 00:03:17,280 The electronics technician told the OIG that in hindsight, he 50 00:03:17,319 --> 00:03:19,800 should have stated at the institution to be in work 51 00:03:19,800 --> 00:03:23,439 on the problem that same day. The Sis Lieutenant told 52 00:03:23,439 --> 00:03:27,599 the OIG that she verbally informed the captain on August 53 00:03:27,599 --> 00:03:31,639 eight that the cameras were down, but BOP records reflect 54 00:03:31,680 --> 00:03:35,800 that the captain left the institution before the malfunction was discovered. 55 00:03:36,520 --> 00:03:39,240 The captain told the OIG that he did not learn 56 00:03:39,240 --> 00:03:43,080 about the DVR recording issue until after Epstein's death on 57 00:03:43,120 --> 00:03:46,080 August tenth, when he asked to see video related to 58 00:03:46,120 --> 00:03:50,319 the Epstein incident. Associated ward I confirmed she was with 59 00:03:50,439 --> 00:03:54,159 the SIS Lieutenant on August eighth when the camera problem 60 00:03:54,280 --> 00:03:57,919 was discovered, but she told the OIG she only knew 61 00:03:58,039 --> 00:04:01,000 video could not be replayed. She did not know the 62 00:04:01,039 --> 00:04:05,360 recording system for certain cameras was down. She could see 63 00:04:05,360 --> 00:04:08,439 live video from the cameras on the date and therefore 64 00:04:08,479 --> 00:04:12,960 assumed that they were recording. According to the electronics technician, 65 00:04:13,120 --> 00:04:16,319 after he reported the work on August ninth, twenty nineteen, 66 00:04:16,600 --> 00:04:20,000 and attended to other matters throughout the day, the electronics 67 00:04:20,040 --> 00:04:24,040 technician obtained the replacement hard drives and attempted to perform 68 00:04:24,199 --> 00:04:29,079 the repair sometime late in the day. However, the electronics 69 00:04:29,079 --> 00:04:33,279 technician told the OIG that no SIS staff were present 70 00:04:33,600 --> 00:04:35,879 at the time to give him access to the room 71 00:04:36,160 --> 00:04:39,519 in which the DVR room was located, so he requested 72 00:04:39,560 --> 00:04:42,639 access from the only other individual who had a key 73 00:04:42,720 --> 00:04:46,920 to the space, Correctional Officer Number four. According to the 74 00:04:46,959 --> 00:04:51,399 electronics technician, Correctional Officer number four denied a access to 75 00:04:51,439 --> 00:04:54,399 the room because CO four shift was ending at four 76 00:04:54,439 --> 00:04:58,120 pm and CO four was unable to stay to accompany 77 00:04:58,199 --> 00:05:01,639 him in the space while the the electronics technician performed 78 00:05:01,639 --> 00:05:06,360 the work. According to the electronics technician, CO four said 79 00:05:06,639 --> 00:05:09,240 he would be at the institution the following day to 80 00:05:09,319 --> 00:05:13,000 provide the electronics technician access to the room, so the 81 00:05:13,040 --> 00:05:17,600 electronics technician decided to postpone the repair until the following day. 82 00:05:18,399 --> 00:05:21,959 The electronics technician said his decision was influenced by the 83 00:05:22,000 --> 00:05:25,560 fact that he had historically been told by mcc New 84 00:05:25,600 --> 00:05:28,720 York supervisors that such matters did not have to be 85 00:05:28,759 --> 00:05:32,360 attended to until the following day, and even if he 86 00:05:32,399 --> 00:05:36,040 had replaced the hard drives that day, the rebuilding process 87 00:05:36,079 --> 00:05:39,279 would have taken twenty four hours to complete and would 88 00:05:39,319 --> 00:05:44,199 therefore not have finished until the following day anyway. Part c. 89 00:05:45,439 --> 00:05:50,680 Shoe Camera locations and operational status on August tenth. The 90 00:05:50,759 --> 00:05:54,839 electronics technician arrived at the institution around six am on 91 00:05:54,920 --> 00:05:59,680 August tenth, twenty nineteen, and shortly thereafter, before he could 92 00:05:59,680 --> 00:06:02,759 begin working on the DVR system, he heard the staff 93 00:06:02,839 --> 00:06:06,439 body alarm sound, and he reported to the shoe to assist. 94 00:06:07,240 --> 00:06:10,759 Later that day, he asked to pull potential video from 95 00:06:10,759 --> 00:06:15,240 cameras located in and around the shoe. The electronics technician 96 00:06:15,519 --> 00:06:18,839 eventually determined that most of the cameras in the shoe 97 00:06:19,279 --> 00:06:23,199 area were assigned to record to DVR two, while the 98 00:06:23,240 --> 00:06:27,560 cameras assigned to DVR two were providing live video streams 99 00:06:27,639 --> 00:06:31,680 on August ninth and tenth, twenty nineteen. No recordings from 100 00:06:31,720 --> 00:06:34,839 those cameras were available due to the DVR two hard 101 00:06:34,920 --> 00:06:38,600 drive issue, which the FBI later determined had occurred on 102 00:06:38,680 --> 00:06:43,600 July twenty ninth, twenty nineteen. Among the cameras whose video 103 00:06:43,839 --> 00:06:46,279 was not recorded was the camera at the end of 104 00:06:46,399 --> 00:06:49,639 L Tier, the shoe tier in which Epstein was housed. 105 00:06:50,319 --> 00:06:53,120 Only two cameras in the vicinity of the shoe area 106 00:06:53,439 --> 00:06:56,839 were recording to DVR one at the time of Epstein's death. 107 00:06:57,480 --> 00:07:00,279 One camera was located on the upper level edge rants 108 00:07:00,519 --> 00:07:03,920 to the ten South Unit, a housing unit adjacent to 109 00:07:04,000 --> 00:07:07,920 the shoe, near the door mcc new York staff referred 110 00:07:07,920 --> 00:07:12,319 to as the forty six door. That camera captured video 111 00:07:12,360 --> 00:07:14,839 of a large part of the common area of the shoe, 112 00:07:15,240 --> 00:07:18,839 including the shoe officer's station, and portions of the stairways 113 00:07:19,160 --> 00:07:22,959 leading to the different shoe tiers, including the tier containing 114 00:07:23,000 --> 00:07:27,560 Epstein's cell. Thus, anyone entering or attempting to enter the 115 00:07:27,720 --> 00:07:30,680 L Tier from the common area of the shoe on 116 00:07:30,720 --> 00:07:33,399 August ninth and tenth would have been picked up by 117 00:07:33,399 --> 00:07:37,639 the video recorded by that camera. Epstein cell door, however, 118 00:07:38,000 --> 00:07:40,600 was not in the camera's field of view. The other 119 00:07:40,680 --> 00:07:44,879 camera that was recording was located in one of the 120 00:07:45,000 --> 00:07:48,319 ninth floors two elevator bays and provided video of the 121 00:07:48,399 --> 00:07:52,560 ninth floor fire exit and two of the floors four elevators. 122 00:07:53,399 --> 00:07:56,560 The available video showed that at approximately seven to forty 123 00:07:56,639 --> 00:08:00,879 nine pm on August ninth, Epstein was a scorded toward 124 00:08:00,959 --> 00:08:04,399 the L Tier stairway by an individual believed to be 125 00:08:04,560 --> 00:08:08,680 the evening watch shoe officer in charge. At approximately ten 126 00:08:08,720 --> 00:08:12,639 thirty nine PM, and unidentified COO appeared to walk up 127 00:08:12,680 --> 00:08:15,879 the L Tier stairway and then reappeared within view of 128 00:08:15,920 --> 00:08:19,560 the camera at ten forty one pm. This is believed 129 00:08:19,560 --> 00:08:22,639 to be the last time anyone entered El Tier before 130 00:08:22,680 --> 00:08:27,639 approximately six thirty am on August tenth. Between approximately ten 131 00:08:27,800 --> 00:08:31,560 forty pm on August ninth and just before six thirty 132 00:08:31,600 --> 00:08:35,600 am on August tenth, the OIG did not observe on 133 00:08:35,720 --> 00:08:40,480 the recorded video any COO or other individual enter any 134 00:08:40,559 --> 00:08:44,039 of the shoe tiers, which is consistent with co Tovin 135 00:08:44,080 --> 00:08:48,360 Noel and material handler Michael Thomas's admissions to the OIG 136 00:08:48,879 --> 00:08:52,039 that the shoe rounds and counts were not conducted during 137 00:08:52,039 --> 00:08:57,200 that timeframe. At approximately six twenty eight am, an unidentified 138 00:08:57,360 --> 00:09:01,440 officer was observed on the L Tier stairway, presumably to 139 00:09:01,519 --> 00:09:05,600 deliver breakfast food trays. Between six twenty eight am and 140 00:09:05,720 --> 00:09:10,080 six thirty two am, an unidentified officer believed to be Noel, 141 00:09:10,639 --> 00:09:13,919 moved back and forth several times between the L Tier 142 00:09:14,000 --> 00:09:18,919 stairway and the shoe officer's station. At approximately six thirty 143 00:09:18,960 --> 00:09:22,840 three am, additional officers entered the Shoe and ascended the 144 00:09:22,840 --> 00:09:27,480 El Tier stairway, presumably after Noel activated her body alarm 145 00:09:27,720 --> 00:09:31,960 when Epstein was discovered hanged in his cell. As noted above, 146 00:09:32,240 --> 00:09:34,720 the camera at the end of the El Tier was 147 00:09:34,759 --> 00:09:38,360 providing a live video feed at the time of Epstein's death, 148 00:09:38,720 --> 00:09:42,840 but the video was not being recorded. The electronics technician 149 00:09:42,919 --> 00:09:47,240 told the OIG that certain mcc New York personnel, including 150 00:09:47,240 --> 00:09:51,960 the Control Center SIS personnel, but Warden, most lieutenants, and 151 00:09:52,279 --> 00:09:55,799 the electronics technician, had access to the live video feed 152 00:09:55,960 --> 00:10:00,559 of the institution's security cameras. He explained that to view 153 00:10:00,600 --> 00:10:04,519 the live video feed of a particular camera, an employee 154 00:10:04,519 --> 00:10:07,440 with access would need to key in the specific camera 155 00:10:07,679 --> 00:10:10,600 into the security camera system to call up the live 156 00:10:10,639 --> 00:10:14,960 feed with terms conditions eighting plus. The correctional Systems officer 157 00:10:15,200 --> 00:10:18,279 who was working at the control center on August tenth 158 00:10:18,279 --> 00:10:21,120 from twelve am to eight am, and the morning watch 159 00:10:21,159 --> 00:10:25,360 operations lieutenant both told the OIG that the only live 160 00:10:25,399 --> 00:10:28,799 feed from the shoe on their screens was video from 161 00:10:28,799 --> 00:10:32,000 the cameras showing the shoe's common area, and they did 162 00:10:32,039 --> 00:10:35,360 not perceive a need to take the necessary steps to 163 00:10:35,399 --> 00:10:38,720 see the live feed from the shoe el tier from 164 00:10:38,799 --> 00:10:42,879 either of their duty stations. On the evening Epstein died. 165 00:10:43,960 --> 00:10:46,919 The warden, who was not scheduled to work on August tenth, 166 00:10:47,000 --> 00:10:51,720 twenty nineteen, arrived at the institution later that morning after 167 00:10:51,799 --> 00:10:55,320 being notified of Epstein's death and was informed that most 168 00:10:55,360 --> 00:10:58,679 of the cameras in the shoe were not recording. He 169 00:10:58,759 --> 00:11:02,559 told the OIG that when the SIS lieutenant arrived at 170 00:11:02,559 --> 00:11:05,879 the facility that morning, he informed her that the shoe 171 00:11:05,919 --> 00:11:10,360 cameras had not been recording, and the SIS lieutenant explained 172 00:11:10,519 --> 00:11:14,080 that the hard drive issue had been detected on August eight. 173 00:11:14,799 --> 00:11:18,080 He told the OIG that prior to August tenth, he 174 00:11:18,240 --> 00:11:21,919 was unaware that the DVR two issue had been detected 175 00:11:21,919 --> 00:11:25,879 on August eighth, and that approximately half of the facility's cameras, 176 00:11:26,120 --> 00:11:29,360 and in particular, the cameras in the shoe, were found 177 00:11:30,000 --> 00:11:34,399 to not be recording on that date. The electronics technician 178 00:11:34,720 --> 00:11:38,559 told the OIG that the warden had instructed electronics technician 179 00:11:38,840 --> 00:11:42,480 to try and recover any potential shoe video and that 180 00:11:42,639 --> 00:11:45,440 may have been recorded by the cameras assigned to the 181 00:11:45,519 --> 00:11:50,639 malfunctioning DVR two system, but the electronics technician was unable 182 00:11:50,720 --> 00:11:54,879 to find anything. The electronics technician further said that the 183 00:11:54,919 --> 00:11:58,960 warden wanted to have the facilities cameras recording again as 184 00:11:59,000 --> 00:12:02,960 soon as possible, so he instructed the electronics technician to 185 00:12:03,039 --> 00:12:08,960 begin repairing DVR number two. Part D FBI forensic analysis 186 00:12:09,000 --> 00:12:14,120 of the DVR system. FBI evidence documents revealed that on 187 00:12:14,159 --> 00:12:18,360 August tenth, twenty nineteen, the FBI seized all our drives 188 00:12:18,600 --> 00:12:23,360 contained within the DVR two system. On August fourteenth, twenty nineteen, 189 00:12:23,679 --> 00:12:27,679 the FBI returned to mcc New York and seized additional 190 00:12:27,799 --> 00:12:33,120 DVR two components. On August fifteenth, twenty nineteen, the FBI 191 00:12:33,240 --> 00:12:37,840 sees the entire DVR one system. The FBI's Digital Forensic 192 00:12:37,879 --> 00:12:42,799 Analysis Unit in Quantico, Virginia, received mcc new York's DVR 193 00:12:42,879 --> 00:12:47,320 system on August sixteenth, twenty nineteen, and began to conduct 194 00:12:47,320 --> 00:12:53,039 a forensic analysis of the system. According to FBI forensic reports, 195 00:12:53,200 --> 00:12:57,919 DVR two did not start successfully. The Digital Forensic Analysis 196 00:12:58,000 --> 00:13:01,879 Unit found that the system contained three faulty hard drives. 197 00:13:02,120 --> 00:13:05,799 The FBI forensic report states that the three drives were 198 00:13:05,840 --> 00:13:10,200 repaired by an FBI Advanced Data Recovery Specialist, but the 199 00:13:10,279 --> 00:13:14,720 DVRs were never able to be assembled successfully. The forensic 200 00:13:14,799 --> 00:13:18,879 report further state that an FBI computer scientist and the 201 00:13:18,919 --> 00:13:23,440 company's one technician reviewed the DVR two controller logs and 202 00:13:23,559 --> 00:13:27,840 found that there had previously been catastrophic disc failures and 203 00:13:27,919 --> 00:13:31,399 no recordings would have been available after July twenty ninth, 204 00:13:31,559 --> 00:13:36,559 twenty nineteen. When the OIG asked the electronics technician about 205 00:13:36,559 --> 00:13:40,120 his findings by the FBI, he told the OIG he 206 00:13:40,240 --> 00:13:43,720 was unaware that cameras were not recording to DVR two 207 00:13:43,799 --> 00:13:47,200 between July twenty ninth and August eighth of twenty nineteen. 208 00:13:47,759 --> 00:13:51,519 Neither the warden nor the sis lieutenant was aware the 209 00:13:51,559 --> 00:13:55,240 cameras assigned to DVR two had not been recording since 210 00:13:55,360 --> 00:14:00,279 July twenty ninth, twenty nineteen. The company won technician could 211 00:14:00,320 --> 00:14:04,600 not recall working with the electronics technician on any DVR 212 00:14:04,679 --> 00:14:08,879 issues prior to August eighth, twenty nineteen, but he said 213 00:14:08,879 --> 00:14:12,480 that if the entire DVR two server went down on 214 00:14:12,600 --> 00:14:16,440 July twenty ninth, twenty nineteen, no video would have been 215 00:14:16,480 --> 00:14:20,080 able to have been retrieved from that point forward from 216 00:14:20,159 --> 00:14:24,200 any of the cameras recording to DVR two. All right, folks, 217 00:14:24,200 --> 00:14:27,879 that's gonna bring chapter six to its conclusion. In our 218 00:14:27,919 --> 00:14:31,080 next episode, we're gonna pick up with the OIG report, 219 00:14:31,440 --> 00:14:36,879 and that's going to be with Chapter seven conclusions and recommendations. 220 00:14:37,159 --> 00:14:40,279 And then once we have this whole entire OIG report 221 00:14:40,440 --> 00:14:43,919 added to the catalog without my commentary, then I'm gonna 222 00:14:43,919 --> 00:14:46,159 go back and we're gonna go through certain parts of 223 00:14:46,200 --> 00:14:50,360 it again, but with added commentary, because it's taking everything 224 00:14:50,399 --> 00:14:53,480 in my power not to have my aapp running while 225 00:14:53,480 --> 00:14:56,360 I'm reading through this. All right, folks, All of the 226 00:14:56,399 --> 00:14:59,480 information that goes with this episode can be found in 227 00:14:59,519 --> 00:15:02,759 the descript as for me. And then Welcome back to 228 00:15:02,799 --> 00:15:07,240 the Epstein Chronicles. We're going to pick right back up 229 00:15:07,279 --> 00:15:10,759 with that OIG report, and in this episode, we're going 230 00:15:10,840 --> 00:15:16,279 to start looking at Chapter seven Conclusions and Recommendations, Part 231 00:15:16,320 --> 00:15:21,639 one Conclusions. Our investigation and review of the Federal Bureau 232 00:15:21,720 --> 00:15:27,279 of Prisons custody care and supervision of Jeffrey Epstein identified 233 00:15:27,360 --> 00:15:32,039 numerous and serious failures by employees of the Metropolitan Correctional 234 00:15:32,120 --> 00:15:36,399 Center located in New York, New York MCC New York, 235 00:15:36,879 --> 00:15:41,799 including falsifying BOP records relating to inmate counts, en rounds, 236 00:15:41,840 --> 00:15:45,919 and multiple violations of MCC New York and BOP policies 237 00:15:46,200 --> 00:15:51,120 and procedures which compromised Epstein's safety, the safety of other inmates, 238 00:15:51,480 --> 00:15:57,120 and the security of the institution. Specifically, we found that 239 00:15:57,320 --> 00:16:00,159 MCC New York staff failed to undertake the z or 240 00:16:00,200 --> 00:16:04,000 acquired measures designed to make sure that, among other things, 241 00:16:04,240 --> 00:16:08,799 Epstein and other inmates were accounted for and safe, such 242 00:16:08,799 --> 00:16:13,559 as conducting inmate counts and thirty minute rounds, searching inmate cells, 243 00:16:13,840 --> 00:16:18,120 and ensuring adequate supervision of the Special Housing unit, and 244 00:16:18,200 --> 00:16:23,440 the functionality of MCC New York's security camera system. We 245 00:16:23,519 --> 00:16:28,799 further found that multiple BOP employees submitted false documents claiming 246 00:16:28,840 --> 00:16:32,200 that they had performed the required counts n rounds, and 247 00:16:32,240 --> 00:16:35,960 that several MCC new York staff members lacked candor when 248 00:16:36,039 --> 00:16:40,360 questioned by the Office of the Inspector General about their actions. 249 00:16:41,279 --> 00:16:44,799 Two MCC New York employees, Touvin Owell and Michael Thomas, 250 00:16:44,799 --> 00:16:49,639 were charged criminally with falsifying BOP records relating to their 251 00:16:49,679 --> 00:16:53,639 conducting inmate counts and rounds. The US Attorney's Office for 252 00:16:53,679 --> 00:16:57,639 the Southern District of New York subsequently entered into deferred 253 00:16:57,639 --> 00:17:01,120 prosecution agreements with Noel and Tom Thomas, and the court 254 00:17:01,200 --> 00:17:05,640 dismissed all charges against them. After Noel and Thomas successfully 255 00:17:05,960 --> 00:17:10,039 fulfilled the terms of their agreements. Prosecution was declined by 256 00:17:10,039 --> 00:17:13,119 the US Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New 257 00:17:13,200 --> 00:17:16,640 York for other MCC New York employees assigned to the 258 00:17:16,680 --> 00:17:20,799 shoe on August nineth and tenth, twenty nineteen, who the 259 00:17:20,839 --> 00:17:25,960 OIG found also created, certified, and submitted false documentation regarding 260 00:17:26,000 --> 00:17:29,200 inmate counts and rounds on the day before and the 261 00:17:29,279 --> 00:17:33,799 day of Epstein's death. The OIG also found that the 262 00:17:33,960 --> 00:17:37,359 mcc new York staff failed to carry out the psychology 263 00:17:37,440 --> 00:17:41,480 departments directive that Epstein be assigned to cellmate, and that 264 00:17:41,559 --> 00:17:44,839 an mcc new York supervisor allowed Epstein to make an 265 00:17:44,960 --> 00:17:49,279 unmonitored phone call the evening before his death. The OIG 266 00:17:49,480 --> 00:17:53,160 determined that the combination of these and other failures led 267 00:17:53,200 --> 00:17:57,039 to Epstein being alone and unmonitored in his cell with 268 00:17:57,119 --> 00:18:01,519 an excessive amount of bed linens from approximately ten pm 269 00:18:01,839 --> 00:18:04,519 on August ninth until he was discovered hanged in his 270 00:18:04,599 --> 00:18:09,400 cell at approximately six thirty am the following day. Additionally, 271 00:18:09,680 --> 00:18:13,680 the OIG found that staffing shortages, a persistent issue for 272 00:18:13,720 --> 00:18:18,000 the BOP, compromised the ability of mcc new York staff 273 00:18:18,279 --> 00:18:23,039 to adequately supervise inmates, as detailed below. We make a 274 00:18:23,119 --> 00:18:27,079 number of recommendations to the BOP to address the serious 275 00:18:27,160 --> 00:18:32,400 issues we identified during our investigation and review. While the 276 00:18:32,400 --> 00:18:37,680 OIG determined that mcc new York staff committed significant violations 277 00:18:37,680 --> 00:18:42,559 of BOP and mcc new York policies and falsified records 278 00:18:42,720 --> 00:18:46,720 relating to their conducting inmate counts and rounds, the OIG 279 00:18:46,920 --> 00:18:53,160 did not uncover evidence that contradicted the FBI's determination regarding 280 00:18:53,200 --> 00:18:56,960 the absence of criminality in connection with how Epstein died. 281 00:18:57,680 --> 00:19:00,960 All MCC new York staff members who were interviewed by 282 00:19:01,000 --> 00:19:03,680 the OIG said that they did not know of any 283 00:19:03,720 --> 00:19:07,599 information suggesting that Epstein's cause of death was something other 284 00:19:07,680 --> 00:19:12,400 than suicide. Likewise, none of the interviewed inmates provided any 285 00:19:12,440 --> 00:19:16,079 credible information that Epstein's cause of death was something other 286 00:19:16,319 --> 00:19:20,119 than suicide. As detailed in Chapter four of this report, 287 00:19:20,400 --> 00:19:23,200 the Shoe was a housing unit within the MCC New 288 00:19:23,279 --> 00:19:27,519 York where inmates were securely separated from the general inmate 289 00:19:27,599 --> 00:19:32,119 population and kept locked in their cells for approximately twenty 290 00:19:32,119 --> 00:19:35,240 three hours a day to ensure their own safety as 291 00:19:35,279 --> 00:19:38,920 well as the safety of staff and other inmates. Access 292 00:19:38,960 --> 00:19:42,319 to the Shoe was controlled by multiple locked doors. The 293 00:19:42,319 --> 00:19:46,359 primary entrance to the shoe, main exterior entry door, was 294 00:19:46,440 --> 00:19:49,880 opened remotely by a staff member in mcc new York's 295 00:19:49,880 --> 00:19:54,039 centralized control center. Additionally, there was a second locked door 296 00:19:54,200 --> 00:19:57,640 at the main entrance main interior entry door, which could 297 00:19:57,640 --> 00:20:00,440 be opened only with the key held by a limited 298 00:20:00,519 --> 00:20:04,960 number of correctional officers while on duty. Within the Shoe, 299 00:20:05,039 --> 00:20:08,160 the entrance to each tier could be accessed only via 300 00:20:08,359 --> 00:20:11,440 a single locked door at the top or bottom of 301 00:20:11,480 --> 00:20:15,680 the staircase leading to the individual tier. Keys to open 302 00:20:15,680 --> 00:20:18,559 the locked tier doors were available only to a limited 303 00:20:18,640 --> 00:20:22,160 number of cos while on duty. Each tier had eight cells, 304 00:20:22,559 --> 00:20:25,720 each of which could house either one or two inmates. 305 00:20:26,319 --> 00:20:29,279 Each individual cell, which was made of cement and metal, 306 00:20:29,559 --> 00:20:32,720 could be accessed only through a single locked door, to 307 00:20:32,799 --> 00:20:35,839 which only a limited number of cos had keys while 308 00:20:35,839 --> 00:20:39,200 on duty. The Shoe cell doors were made of solid 309 00:20:39,240 --> 00:20:42,920 metal with a small glass window and small locked slots 310 00:20:42,920 --> 00:20:46,960 that correctional staff used to handcuff inmates and provide food 311 00:20:47,200 --> 00:20:51,319 and toilet trees two inmates as a further security measure. 312 00:20:51,559 --> 00:20:54,680 During each shift, a limited number of the coos had 313 00:20:54,759 --> 00:20:58,920 keys while on duty. While BOP policy in practice require 314 00:20:59,000 --> 00:21:01,799 that all shoe in makes be locked in their cells overnight, 315 00:21:02,279 --> 00:21:05,440 the OIG found no evidence indicating that the door to 316 00:21:05,480 --> 00:21:08,200 Epstein's cell, or any other cell in the shoe tier 317 00:21:08,480 --> 00:21:11,319 in which Epstein was housed, was unlocked on the evening 318 00:21:11,720 --> 00:21:15,920 of August ninth and tenth, twenty nineteen, after Shoe staff 319 00:21:15,960 --> 00:21:19,440 locked Epstein in his cell at approximately eight pm. Shoe 320 00:21:19,440 --> 00:21:22,920 staff told the OIG that at approximately eight pm on 321 00:21:22,960 --> 00:21:25,920 August ninth, all shoe inmates were locked in their cells 322 00:21:26,200 --> 00:21:29,440 for the evening, and that there was no indication that 323 00:21:29,519 --> 00:21:31,720 any of the other inmates could have gotten out of 324 00:21:31,759 --> 00:21:35,000 their cells. Epstein did not have a cell mate after 325 00:21:35,039 --> 00:21:38,400 inmate Iree was transferred out of mcc New York on 326 00:21:38,440 --> 00:21:41,359 August ninth, and therefore Epstein was alone in his cell 327 00:21:41,559 --> 00:21:45,079 the evening of August ninth and tenth. The door to 328 00:21:45,119 --> 00:21:48,759 Epstein's cell was visible from the shoe officer's station, and 329 00:21:48,880 --> 00:21:52,680 co Tove Noel and material handler Michael Thomas told the 330 00:21:52,720 --> 00:21:56,319 OIG that no one entered or exited epstein cell during 331 00:21:56,319 --> 00:22:00,000 their shift on August tenth. Both of them further described, 332 00:22:00,000 --> 00:22:02,720 I'm delivering breakfast to the el tier at about six 333 00:22:02,880 --> 00:22:06,200 thirty am on August tenth, and al Noel unlocked the 334 00:22:06,240 --> 00:22:09,240 door to the el tier. Thomas entered the el tier 335 00:22:09,599 --> 00:22:12,559 and called for Epstein, and then Thomas unlocked a cell 336 00:22:12,640 --> 00:22:17,200 door when Epstein failed to respond. Additionally, the three inmates 337 00:22:17,200 --> 00:22:19,839 who were housed in the same shoe tier as Epstein 338 00:22:20,079 --> 00:22:22,519 on August ninth and tenth, who had a direct line 339 00:22:22,559 --> 00:22:25,799 of sight to the door of epstein cell from their cells, 340 00:22:26,119 --> 00:22:30,119 stated that no one entered or exited epstein cell after 341 00:22:30,200 --> 00:22:33,319 the shoe staff returned Epstein to is cell on the 342 00:22:33,359 --> 00:22:37,480 evening of August ninth, which is consistent with the security 343 00:22:37,480 --> 00:22:42,160 measures in place within the MCC New York Shoe. Further, 344 00:22:42,359 --> 00:22:45,880 the OIG analyzed the available recorded video of the shoe, 345 00:22:46,119 --> 00:22:49,000 which was limited to the common area of the shoe, 346 00:22:49,240 --> 00:22:52,640 including the shoe officer's station. Due to the mcc New 347 00:22:52,759 --> 00:22:57,359 York security camera systems video recording issues that we detailed 348 00:22:57,359 --> 00:23:01,839 in chapter six, the OIG is annownalysis of the recorded 349 00:23:01,920 --> 00:23:05,960 video did not identify any CEOs other than those assigned 350 00:23:05,960 --> 00:23:08,559 to the shoe during that time frame or had a 351 00:23:08,559 --> 00:23:13,039 specific reason for visiting the shoe, or other individuals present 352 00:23:13,279 --> 00:23:16,359 in the common area of the shoe approach any of 353 00:23:16,400 --> 00:23:20,119 the shoe tiers, including the L tier where Epstein was housed, 354 00:23:20,319 --> 00:23:24,720 between approximately ten forty pm on August ninth and approximately 355 00:23:24,960 --> 00:23:29,160 six thirty am on August tenth. In some the OIG's 356 00:23:29,200 --> 00:23:33,759 investigation did not find any evidence that anyone was present 357 00:23:34,240 --> 00:23:37,599 in the L Tier during that time frame other than 358 00:23:37,640 --> 00:23:40,519 the inmates who were locked in their assigned cells on 359 00:23:40,680 --> 00:23:44,480 that tier of the shoe. We also noted that the 360 00:23:44,519 --> 00:23:47,960 surveillance cameras in the L Tier as shown in the 361 00:23:47,960 --> 00:23:51,160 photograph in Figure six. Pot seven was in plain view 362 00:23:51,200 --> 00:23:53,720 of the inmates, and therefore the inmates would have been 363 00:23:53,799 --> 00:23:58,000 aware that any hallway movements, including into or out of 364 00:23:58,039 --> 00:24:02,000 Epstein's cell, were being livest and could be monitored, even 365 00:24:02,039 --> 00:24:06,119 if unbeknownst to them, the digital video recording system was 366 00:24:06,160 --> 00:24:09,640 not recording the live stream at the time. As the 367 00:24:09,680 --> 00:24:13,920 OIG is noted in numerous prior reports regarding the goop's 368 00:24:14,000 --> 00:24:18,160 camera system, BOP staff and inmates are aware of where 369 00:24:18,200 --> 00:24:22,240 prison cameras are located, and often engage in wrongdoing in 370 00:24:22,319 --> 00:24:27,200 locations where they know cameras are not located. Additionally, the 371 00:24:27,240 --> 00:24:30,799 OIG did not observe on the recorded video of the 372 00:24:30,839 --> 00:24:34,119 Shoe common area that Noel and Thomas, who were seated 373 00:24:34,160 --> 00:24:37,960 at the desk at the Shoe Officer's station immediately outside 374 00:24:38,000 --> 00:24:41,200 the L tier during that time period, at any time, 375 00:24:41,359 --> 00:24:44,920 rose from their seats or approached the L tier. We 376 00:24:45,000 --> 00:24:48,279 additionally found that Thomas and Noel's reaction on the morning 377 00:24:48,519 --> 00:24:51,680 of August tenth, upon finding Epstein hanging in his cell, 378 00:24:52,279 --> 00:24:56,039 as described to us by Thomas, Noel, the responding lieutenant, 379 00:24:56,160 --> 00:25:00,400 and inmates, was consistent with their being unaware of any 380 00:25:00,400 --> 00:25:04,640 potential harm to Epstein prior to Thomas entering Epstein's cell 381 00:25:04,920 --> 00:25:08,680 at about six thirty am on August tenth. We further 382 00:25:08,759 --> 00:25:12,400 noted that Epstein had previously been placed on suicide watch 383 00:25:12,680 --> 00:25:16,559 and psychological observation due to the events of July twenty third, 384 00:25:16,839 --> 00:25:21,039 twenty nineteen, that numerous newses made from prison bed sheets 385 00:25:21,240 --> 00:25:23,960 were found in his cell on the morning of August tenth, 386 00:25:24,599 --> 00:25:26,720 and that he had signed a new last will and 387 00:25:26,759 --> 00:25:30,640 testament on August eighth, two days before he died. No 388 00:25:30,759 --> 00:25:34,839 weapons were recovered from Epstein's cell after his death. Additionally, 389 00:25:34,839 --> 00:25:38,599 the inmates who were interviewed consistently reported that on the 390 00:25:38,640 --> 00:25:42,359 evening Epstein died, the Shoe staff did not systematically conduct 391 00:25:42,480 --> 00:25:45,480 or required rounds and counts, which was one of the 392 00:25:45,480 --> 00:25:49,279 primary mechanisms for the Shoe staff to ensure the safety 393 00:25:49,440 --> 00:25:53,480 and security of inmates housed in the Shoe. As a result, 394 00:25:53,559 --> 00:25:57,119 Epstein was unmonitored and locked alone in his cell for 395 00:25:57,359 --> 00:26:01,319 hours with an excess amount of linens, which provided an 396 00:26:01,359 --> 00:26:06,200 opportunity for him to commit suicide. Finally, the medical examiner 397 00:26:06,240 --> 00:26:10,160 who performed the autopsy detailed for the OIG why Epstein's 398 00:26:10,160 --> 00:26:14,519 injuries were more consistent with and indicative of a suicide 399 00:26:14,559 --> 00:26:19,480 by hanging rather than homicide by strangulation. The medical examiner 400 00:26:19,599 --> 00:26:23,319 also told the OIG that the ligature furrow was too 401 00:26:23,359 --> 00:26:26,480 broad to have been caused by electrical cord of the 402 00:26:26,480 --> 00:26:30,079 medical device in Epstein's cell, and the blood toxicology tests 403 00:26:30,160 --> 00:26:35,079 revealed no medications or legal substances were in Epstein's system. 404 00:26:35,359 --> 00:26:39,240 The medical examiner also noted the absence of debris under 405 00:26:39,279 --> 00:26:43,359 Epstein's fingernails, marks on his hands, contusions to his knuckles, 406 00:26:43,680 --> 00:26:47,400 or bruises on his body that would have indicated Epstein 407 00:26:47,640 --> 00:26:50,759 had been in a struggle, which would have been expected 408 00:26:50,759 --> 00:26:55,240 if Epstein's death had been a homicide by strangulation. This 409 00:26:55,319 --> 00:26:57,599 is not the first time that the OIG has found 410 00:26:57,640 --> 00:27:01,359 significant job performance and management failures on the part of 411 00:27:01,440 --> 00:27:06,799 BOP personnel and widespread disregard of BOP policies that are 412 00:27:06,839 --> 00:27:09,880 designed to ensure that inmates are safe, secure, and in 413 00:27:09,920 --> 00:27:13,960 good health. For instance, the OIG's December twenty twenty two 414 00:27:14,039 --> 00:27:18,000 investigation and review of the GOP's handling of the transfer 415 00:27:18,000 --> 00:27:22,960 of James Whitey Bulger identified serious job performance and management 416 00:27:22,960 --> 00:27:27,200 failures at multiple levels within the BOP. Similar to the 417 00:27:27,200 --> 00:27:31,319 Bulger report, the numerous and serious transgressions that occurred in 418 00:27:31,400 --> 00:27:34,799 this matter came to light largely because they involved a 419 00:27:34,880 --> 00:27:39,039 high profile inmate. The fact that serious deficiencies occurred in 420 00:27:39,079 --> 00:27:43,279 connection with high profile inmates like Epstein and Bulger is 421 00:27:43,400 --> 00:27:48,359 especially concerning given that the BOP would presumably take particular 422 00:27:48,440 --> 00:27:53,200 care in handling the custody in care of such inmates. Regrettably, 423 00:27:53,400 --> 00:27:57,480 the OIG has encountered similar issues on many other occasions. 424 00:27:57,799 --> 00:28:02,720 For example, the OIG is investigation numerous allegations related to 425 00:28:02,799 --> 00:28:08,079 the falsification of a official GOP documentation concerning inmate counts 426 00:28:08,079 --> 00:28:11,720 and rounds, several of which have resulted in criminal prosecution. 427 00:28:12,319 --> 00:28:16,880 The OIG currently has two open investigations into allegations of 428 00:28:16,960 --> 00:28:21,599 falsified inmate count and round documentation, each involving an inmate 429 00:28:21,680 --> 00:28:26,359 death by suicide and homicide or escape from a GOOP facility. 430 00:28:27,200 --> 00:28:31,720 This investigation and review also revealed the direct impact of 431 00:28:31,960 --> 00:28:36,920 insufficient staffing levels on inmate safety. Witnesses repeatedly told the 432 00:28:36,960 --> 00:28:40,920 OIG that counts, round cell searches, and other methods of 433 00:28:40,920 --> 00:28:46,480 inmate accountability were not undertaken because correctional staff were working 434 00:28:46,559 --> 00:28:50,039 multiple shifts, including one staff member who worked twenty four 435 00:28:50,039 --> 00:28:54,160 hours straight, and were tired and overwhelmed with the duties. 436 00:28:54,640 --> 00:28:58,599 As discussed in greater detail in our recommendations, the OIG 437 00:28:58,759 --> 00:29:03,200 is repeatedly found the need for BOP to address staffing shortages. 438 00:29:03,680 --> 00:29:07,079 Most recently, in March of twenty twenty three, the OIG 439 00:29:07,240 --> 00:29:12,400 found that the coronavirus disease twenty nineteen pandemic accelerated the 440 00:29:12,400 --> 00:29:16,400 effects of pre existing BOP medical and non medical staffing 441 00:29:16,400 --> 00:29:20,640 shortages and issue the OIG as identified as a concern 442 00:29:20,880 --> 00:29:25,359 for the BOP since at least twenty fifteen. Further, the 443 00:29:25,400 --> 00:29:29,960 OIG has repeatedly found that BOP personnel have not consistently 444 00:29:30,000 --> 00:29:33,400 been attentive to the needs of inmates at risk for suicide. 445 00:29:33,720 --> 00:29:38,160 In this investigation, that inattention manifested in the failure of 446 00:29:38,279 --> 00:29:42,200 mcc New York staff and supervisors to ensure that Epstein 447 00:29:42,519 --> 00:29:46,279 was assigned to cellmate as required by mcc new York 448 00:29:46,519 --> 00:29:51,400 Psychology Department directive issued after July twenty three, twenty nineteen, 449 00:29:52,640 --> 00:29:55,200 in which Epstein was discovered in his cell with an 450 00:29:55,240 --> 00:29:59,119 orange cloth around his neck. In March twenty twenty three's report, 451 00:29:59,480 --> 00:30:02,759 the OIG, he found that BOP psychology staff did not 452 00:30:02,880 --> 00:30:06,400 assess the suitability of a single cell assignment for five 453 00:30:06,440 --> 00:30:09,200 of the seven inmates who died by suicide while in 454 00:30:09,279 --> 00:30:13,359 COVID quarantine units between March twentieth and April twenty twenty one. 455 00:30:14,200 --> 00:30:18,240 The OIG's twenty seventeen report on the BOP's use of 456 00:30:18,359 --> 00:30:22,400 restrictive housing for inmates with mental illness also noted that 457 00:30:22,519 --> 00:30:26,400 single selling may present risk to inmate mental health, and 458 00:30:26,559 --> 00:30:30,119 both the recommendations from that report regarding the use of 459 00:30:30,160 --> 00:30:34,720 oversight of single selling remain open as of March of 460 00:30:34,799 --> 00:30:38,960 twenty twenty three. Lastly, as discussed in greater detail in 461 00:30:39,000 --> 00:30:43,640 the conclusions and recommendations that follow, the persistent deficiencies of 462 00:30:43,680 --> 00:30:48,039 the BOP security camera systems are well documented in long standing. 463 00:30:48,680 --> 00:30:52,680 The combination of negligence, misconduct, and outright job performance failure 464 00:30:53,079 --> 00:30:56,920 documented in this report all contributed to an environment in 465 00:30:56,960 --> 00:31:00,000 which arguably one of the most notorious inmates and us 466 00:31:00,000 --> 00:31:03,720 the BOP's custody, was provided the opportunity to take his 467 00:31:03,799 --> 00:31:07,839 own life, resulting in significant questions being asked about the 468 00:31:07,880 --> 00:31:10,960 circumstances of his death, how it could have been allowed 469 00:31:11,000 --> 00:31:15,240 to happen, and most importantly, depriving his numerous victims, many 470 00:31:15,279 --> 00:31:17,799 of whom were underage girls at the time of the 471 00:31:17,839 --> 00:31:21,400 alleged crimes, of their ability to seek justice through the 472 00:31:21,440 --> 00:31:25,599 criminal justice process. The fact that these failures have been 473 00:31:25,680 --> 00:31:29,319 reoccurring once at the BOP does not excuse them and 474 00:31:29,359 --> 00:31:32,759 gives additional urgency to the need for the Department of 475 00:31:32,960 --> 00:31:38,000 Justice and BOP leadership to address the chronic staffing, surveillance, security, 476 00:31:38,680 --> 00:31:43,319 and related problems plaguing the BP. The OIG is completed 477 00:31:43,480 --> 00:31:47,519 its investigation and is providing this report to the GOP 478 00:31:48,000 --> 00:31:52,839 for appropriate action. Unless otherwise noted. The OIG applies the 479 00:31:52,880 --> 00:31:57,720 preponderance of evidence standard in determining whether DOGA personnel have 480 00:31:57,799 --> 00:32:03,079 committed misconduct. RIT System Protection Board applies the same standard 481 00:32:03,359 --> 00:32:07,200 when reviewing a federal agency's decision to take adverse action 482 00:32:07,279 --> 00:32:11,759 against an employee based on such misconduct. C five USC 483 00:32:12,039 --> 00:32:15,799 Section seventy seven oh one C one B and five 484 00:32:15,920 --> 00:32:19,279 CFR Section twelve oh one dot fifty six B one 485 00:32:19,559 --> 00:32:22,759 Section two. All Right, folks, that's going to wrap up 486 00:32:22,759 --> 00:32:26,480 this episode here and in the next episode, we're gonna 487 00:32:26,519 --> 00:32:30,319 pick up on the recommendations. All of the information that 488 00:32:30,359 --> 00:32:33,599 goes with the episode can be found in the description box.