Speaker 1: One, and welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles. We're gonna
pick up where we left off with the last episode
and we're going to continue looking at the OIG report
into the circumstances surrounding Jeffrey Epstein's death. And in our
last episode, we were talking about the discovery of the
security camera system recording issues. So let's pick right up
with Section B response on August eighth and ninth to
discovery of the recording failure. On August eighth, following discovery
of the recording failure, Company one Service records reflect that
the electronics technician contacted a Company one technical support representative,
who ultimately determined that two hard drives within DVR two
had failed. According to the electronics technician and the Company
one Service request record, the Company one representative informed the
electronics technician that the two drives needed to be replaced
and that DVR two needed to be rebuilt in order
for the cameras to record again. The electronics technician told
the OIG that he informed a Company one technician that
he had to obtain the drives from mcc New York's
computer services manager. The electronics technician further stated that he
left the institution at the end of his shift and
did not obtain the hard drives and did not continue
to work on the matter. The electronics technician told the
OIG he had no idea why he did not stay
at the facility to resolve the problem that day, but
he noted for the OIG that he had not historically
been required to stay after his shift ended to work
on such matters, and even if he had begun working
on the DVR that day, he would not have completed
the work on August eighth due to the time it
takes for the rebuilding process. The OIG found that the
electronics technicians immediate supervisor, the facility manager, was on leave
that week and therefore was not told on August eight
about the DVR recording failure. The facility manager confirmed that
he did not learn about the camera's problem until days
after Epstein's death. The electronics technician told the OIG that
he did not report the problem to the lock and
security supervisor, who was the acting facility manager in the
facility manager's absence. The SIS lieutenant told the OIG that
after the electronics technician had examined the system on August eight,
the electronics technician informed her that the cameras were not
recording and said, I'm going to stay and do overtime tonight.
Based on his comment, the SIS Lieutenant assumed that the
electronics technician would remain at the institution after his shift
ended that day to correct the issue. The electronics technician
told the OIG there must have been some sort of
miscommunication because he did not say he was going to
work overtime and resolved the problem that same evening since
he knew the problem could not be fixed in one evening.
The electronics technician told the OIG that in hindsight, he
should have stated at the institution to be in work
on the problem that same day. The Sis Lieutenant told
the OIG that she verbally informed the captain on August
eight that the cameras were down, but BOP records reflect
that the captain left the institution before the malfunction was discovered.
The captain told the OIG that he did not learn
about the DVR recording issue until after Epstein's death on
August tenth, when he asked to see video related to
the Epstein incident. Associated ward I confirmed she was with
the SIS Lieutenant on August eighth when the camera problem
was discovered, but she told the OIG she only knew
video could not be replayed. She did not know the
recording system for certain cameras was down. She could see
live video from the cameras on the date and therefore
assumed that they were recording. According to the electronics technician,
after he reported the work on August ninth, twenty nineteen,
and attended to other matters throughout the day, the electronics
technician obtained the replacement hard drives and attempted to perform
the repair sometime late in the day. However, the electronics
technician told the OIG that no SIS staff were present
at the time to give him access to the room
in which the DVR room was located, so he requested
access from the only other individual who had a key
to the space, Correctional Officer Number four. According to the
electronics technician, Correctional Officer number four denied a access to
the room because CO four shift was ending at four
pm and CO four was unable to stay to accompany
him in the space while the the electronics technician performed
the work. According to the electronics technician, CO four said
he would be at the institution the following day to
provide the electronics technician access to the room, so the
electronics technician decided to postpone the repair until the following day.
The electronics technician said his decision was influenced by the
fact that he had historically been told by mcc New
York supervisors that such matters did not have to be
attended to until the following day, and even if he
had replaced the hard drives that day, the rebuilding process
would have taken twenty four hours to complete and would
therefore not have finished until the following day anyway. Part c.
Shoe Camera locations and operational status on August tenth. The
electronics technician arrived at the institution around six am on
August tenth, twenty nineteen, and shortly thereafter, before he could
begin working on the DVR system, he heard the staff
body alarm sound, and he reported to the shoe to assist.
Later that day, he asked to pull potential video from
cameras located in and around the shoe. The electronics technician
eventually determined that most of the cameras in the shoe
area were assigned to record to DVR two, while the
cameras assigned to DVR two were providing live video streams
on August ninth and tenth, twenty nineteen. No recordings from
those cameras were available due to the DVR two hard
drive issue, which the FBI later determined had occurred on
July twenty ninth, twenty nineteen. Among the cameras whose video
was not recorded was the camera at the end of
L Tier, the shoe tier in which Epstein was housed.
Only two cameras in the vicinity of the shoe area
were recording to DVR one at the time of Epstein's death.
One camera was located on the upper level edge rants
to the ten South Unit, a housing unit adjacent to
the shoe, near the door mcc new York staff referred
to as the forty six door. That camera captured video
of a large part of the common area of the shoe,
including the shoe officer's station, and portions of the stairways
leading to the different shoe tiers, including the tier containing
Epstein's cell. Thus, anyone entering or attempting to enter the
L Tier from the common area of the shoe on
August ninth and tenth would have been picked up by
the video recorded by that camera. Epstein cell door, however,
was not in the camera's field of view. The other
camera that was recording was located in one of the
ninth floors two elevator bays and provided video of the
ninth floor fire exit and two of the floors four elevators.
The available video showed that at approximately seven to forty
nine pm on August ninth, Epstein was a scorded toward
the L Tier stairway by an individual believed to be
the evening watch shoe officer in charge. At approximately ten
thirty nine PM, and unidentified COO appeared to walk up
the L Tier stairway and then reappeared within view of
the camera at ten forty one pm. This is believed
to be the last time anyone entered El Tier before
approximately six thirty am on August tenth. Between approximately ten
forty pm on August ninth and just before six thirty
am on August tenth, the OIG did not observe on
the recorded video any COO or other individual enter any
of the shoe tiers, which is consistent with co Tovin
Noel and material handler Michael Thomas's admissions to the OIG
that the shoe rounds and counts were not conducted during
that timeframe. At approximately six twenty eight am, an unidentified
officer was observed on the L Tier stairway, presumably to
deliver breakfast food trays. Between six twenty eight am and
six thirty two am, an unidentified officer believed to be Noel,
moved back and forth several times between the L Tier
stairway and the shoe officer's station. At approximately six thirty
three am, additional officers entered the Shoe and ascended the
El Tier stairway, presumably after Noel activated her body alarm
when Epstein was discovered hanged in his cell. As noted above,
the camera at the end of the El Tier was
providing a live video feed at the time of Epstein's death,
but the video was not being recorded. The electronics technician
told the OIG that certain mcc New York personnel, including
the Control Center SIS personnel, but Warden, most lieutenants, and
the electronics technician, had access to the live video feed
of the institution's security cameras. He explained that to view
the live video feed of a particular camera, an employee
with access would need to key in the specific camera
into the security camera system to call up the live
feed with terms conditions eighting plus. The correctional Systems officer
who was working at the control center on August tenth
from twelve am to eight am, and the morning watch
operations lieutenant both told the OIG that the only live
feed from the shoe on their screens was video from
the cameras showing the shoe's common area, and they did
not perceive a need to take the necessary steps to
see the live feed from the shoe el tier from
either of their duty stations. On the evening Epstein died.
The warden, who was not scheduled to work on August tenth,
twenty nineteen, arrived at the institution later that morning after
being notified of Epstein's death and was informed that most
of the cameras in the shoe were not recording. He
told the OIG that when the SIS lieutenant arrived at
the facility that morning, he informed her that the shoe
cameras had not been recording, and the SIS lieutenant explained
that the hard drive issue had been detected on August eight.
He told the OIG that prior to August tenth, he
was unaware that the DVR two issue had been detected
on August eighth, and that approximately half of the facility's cameras,
and in particular, the cameras in the shoe, were found
to not be recording on that date. The electronics technician
told the OIG that the warden had instructed electronics technician
to try and recover any potential shoe video and that
may have been recorded by the cameras assigned to the
malfunctioning DVR two system, but the electronics technician was unable
to find anything. The electronics technician further said that the
warden wanted to have the facilities cameras recording again as
soon as possible, so he instructed the electronics technician to
begin repairing DVR number two. Part D FBI forensic analysis
of the DVR system. FBI evidence documents revealed that on
August tenth, twenty nineteen, the FBI seized all our drives
contained within the DVR two system. On August fourteenth, twenty nineteen,
the FBI returned to mcc New York and seized additional
DVR two components. On August fifteenth, twenty nineteen, the FBI
sees the entire DVR one system. The FBI's Digital Forensic
Analysis Unit in Quantico, Virginia, received mcc new York's DVR
system on August sixteenth, twenty nineteen, and began to conduct
a forensic analysis of the system. According to FBI forensic reports,
DVR two did not start successfully. The Digital Forensic Analysis
Unit found that the system contained three faulty hard drives.
The FBI forensic report states that the three drives were
repaired by an FBI Advanced Data Recovery Specialist, but the
DVRs were never able to be assembled successfully. The forensic
report further state that an FBI computer scientist and the
company's one technician reviewed the DVR two controller logs and
found that there had previously been catastrophic disc failures and
no recordings would have been available after July twenty ninth,
twenty nineteen. When the OIG asked the electronics technician about
his findings by the FBI, he told the OIG he
was unaware that cameras were not recording to DVR two
between July twenty ninth and August eighth of twenty nineteen.
Neither the warden nor the sis lieutenant was aware the
cameras assigned to DVR two had not been recording since
July twenty ninth, twenty nineteen. The company won technician could
not recall working with the electronics technician on any DVR
issues prior to August eighth, twenty nineteen, but he said
that if the entire DVR two server went down on
July twenty ninth, twenty nineteen, no video would have been
able to have been retrieved from that point forward from
any of the cameras recording to DVR two. All right, folks,
that's gonna bring chapter six to its conclusion. In our
next episode, we're gonna pick up with the OIG report,
and that's going to be with Chapter seven conclusions and recommendations.
And then once we have this whole entire OIG report
added to the catalog without my commentary, then I'm gonna
go back and we're gonna go through certain parts of
it again, but with added commentary, because it's taking everything
in my power not to have my aapp running while
I'm reading through this. All right, folks, All of the
information that goes with this episode can be found in
the descript as for me. And then Welcome back to
the Epstein Chronicles. We're going to pick right back up
with that OIG report, and in this episode, we're going
to start looking at Chapter seven Conclusions and Recommendations, Part
one Conclusions. Our investigation and review of the Federal Bureau
of Prisons custody care and supervision of Jeffrey Epstein identified
numerous and serious failures by employees of the Metropolitan Correctional
Center located in New York, New York MCC New York,
including falsifying BOP records relating to inmate counts, en rounds,
and multiple violations of MCC New York and BOP policies
and procedures which compromised Epstein's safety, the safety of other inmates,
and the security of the institution. Specifically, we found that
MCC New York staff failed to undertake the z or
acquired measures designed to make sure that, among other things,
Epstein and other inmates were accounted for and safe, such
as conducting inmate counts and thirty minute rounds, searching inmate cells,
and ensuring adequate supervision of the Special Housing unit, and
the functionality of MCC New York's security camera system. We
further found that multiple BOP employees submitted false documents claiming
that they had performed the required counts n rounds, and
that several MCC new York staff members lacked candor when
questioned by the Office of the Inspector General about their actions.
Two MCC New York employees, Touvin Owell and Michael Thomas,
were charged criminally with falsifying BOP records relating to their
conducting inmate counts and rounds. The US Attorney's Office for
the Southern District of New York subsequently entered into deferred
prosecution agreements with Noel and Tom Thomas, and the court
dismissed all charges against them. After Noel and Thomas successfully
fulfilled the terms of their agreements. Prosecution was declined by
the US Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New
York for other MCC New York employees assigned to the
shoe on August nineth and tenth, twenty nineteen, who the
OIG found also created, certified, and submitted false documentation regarding
inmate counts and rounds on the day before and the
day of Epstein's death. The OIG also found that the
mcc new York staff failed to carry out the psychology
departments directive that Epstein be assigned to cellmate, and that
an mcc new York supervisor allowed Epstein to make an
unmonitored phone call the evening before his death. The OIG
determined that the combination of these and other failures led
to Epstein being alone and unmonitored in his cell with
an excessive amount of bed linens from approximately ten pm
on August ninth until he was discovered hanged in his
cell at approximately six thirty am the following day. Additionally,
the OIG found that staffing shortages, a persistent issue for
the BOP, compromised the ability of mcc new York staff
to adequately supervise inmates, as detailed below. We make a
number of recommendations to the BOP to address the serious
issues we identified during our investigation and review. While the
OIG determined that mcc new York staff committed significant violations
of BOP and mcc new York policies and falsified records
relating to their conducting inmate counts and rounds, the OIG
did not uncover evidence that contradicted the FBI's determination regarding
the absence of criminality in connection with how Epstein died.
All MCC new York staff members who were interviewed by
the OIG said that they did not know of any
information suggesting that Epstein's cause of death was something other
than suicide. Likewise, none of the interviewed inmates provided any
credible information that Epstein's cause of death was something other
than suicide. As detailed in Chapter four of this report,
the Shoe was a housing unit within the MCC New
York where inmates were securely separated from the general inmate
population and kept locked in their cells for approximately twenty
three hours a day to ensure their own safety as
well as the safety of staff and other inmates. Access
to the Shoe was controlled by multiple locked doors. The
primary entrance to the shoe, main exterior entry door, was
opened remotely by a staff member in mcc new York's
centralized control center. Additionally, there was a second locked door
at the main entrance main interior entry door, which could
be opened only with the key held by a limited
number of correctional officers while on duty. Within the Shoe,
the entrance to each tier could be accessed only via
a single locked door at the top or bottom of
the staircase leading to the individual tier. Keys to open
the locked tier doors were available only to a limited
number of cos while on duty. Each tier had eight cells,
each of which could house either one or two inmates.
Each individual cell, which was made of cement and metal,
could be accessed only through a single locked door, to
which only a limited number of cos had keys while
on duty. The Shoe cell doors were made of solid
metal with a small glass window and small locked slots
that correctional staff used to handcuff inmates and provide food
and toilet trees two inmates as a further security measure.
During each shift, a limited number of the coos had
keys while on duty. While BOP policy in practice require
that all shoe in makes be locked in their cells overnight,
the OIG found no evidence indicating that the door to
Epstein's cell, or any other cell in the shoe tier
in which Epstein was housed, was unlocked on the evening
of August ninth and tenth, twenty nineteen, after Shoe staff
locked Epstein in his cell at approximately eight pm. Shoe
staff told the OIG that at approximately eight pm on
August ninth, all shoe inmates were locked in their cells
for the evening, and that there was no indication that
any of the other inmates could have gotten out of
their cells. Epstein did not have a cell mate after
inmate Iree was transferred out of mcc New York on
August ninth, and therefore Epstein was alone in his cell
the evening of August ninth and tenth. The door to
Epstein's cell was visible from the shoe officer's station, and
co Tove Noel and material handler Michael Thomas told the
OIG that no one entered or exited epstein cell during
their shift on August tenth. Both of them further described,
I'm delivering breakfast to the el tier at about six
thirty am on August tenth, and al Noel unlocked the
door to the el tier. Thomas entered the el tier
and called for Epstein, and then Thomas unlocked a cell
door when Epstein failed to respond. Additionally, the three inmates
who were housed in the same shoe tier as Epstein
on August ninth and tenth, who had a direct line
of sight to the door of epstein cell from their cells,
stated that no one entered or exited epstein cell after
the shoe staff returned Epstein to is cell on the
evening of August ninth, which is consistent with the security
measures in place within the MCC New York Shoe. Further,
the OIG analyzed the available recorded video of the shoe,
which was limited to the common area of the shoe,
including the shoe officer's station. Due to the mcc New
York security camera systems video recording issues that we detailed
in chapter six, the OIG is annownalysis of the recorded
video did not identify any CEOs other than those assigned
to the shoe during that time frame or had a
specific reason for visiting the shoe, or other individuals present
in the common area of the shoe approach any of
the shoe tiers, including the L tier where Epstein was housed,
between approximately ten forty pm on August ninth and approximately
six thirty am on August tenth. In some the OIG's
investigation did not find any evidence that anyone was present
in the L Tier during that time frame other than
the inmates who were locked in their assigned cells on
that tier of the shoe. We also noted that the
surveillance cameras in the L Tier as shown in the
photograph in Figure six. Pot seven was in plain view
of the inmates, and therefore the inmates would have been
aware that any hallway movements, including into or out of
Epstein's cell, were being livest and could be monitored, even
if unbeknownst to them, the digital video recording system was
not recording the live stream at the time. As the
OIG is noted in numerous prior reports regarding the goop's
camera system, BOP staff and inmates are aware of where
prison cameras are located, and often engage in wrongdoing in
locations where they know cameras are not located. Additionally, the
OIG did not observe on the recorded video of the
Shoe common area that Noel and Thomas, who were seated
at the desk at the Shoe Officer's station immediately outside
the L tier during that time period, at any time,
rose from their seats or approached the L tier. We
additionally found that Thomas and Noel's reaction on the morning
of August tenth, upon finding Epstein hanging in his cell,
as described to us by Thomas, Noel, the responding lieutenant,
and inmates, was consistent with their being unaware of any
potential harm to Epstein prior to Thomas entering Epstein's cell
at about six thirty am on August tenth. We further
noted that Epstein had previously been placed on suicide watch
and psychological observation due to the events of July twenty third,
twenty nineteen, that numerous newses made from prison bed sheets
were found in his cell on the morning of August tenth,
and that he had signed a new last will and
testament on August eighth, two days before he died. No
weapons were recovered from Epstein's cell after his death. Additionally,
the inmates who were interviewed consistently reported that on the
evening Epstein died, the Shoe staff did not systematically conduct
or required rounds and counts, which was one of the
primary mechanisms for the Shoe staff to ensure the safety
and security of inmates housed in the Shoe. As a result,
Epstein was unmonitored and locked alone in his cell for
hours with an excess amount of linens, which provided an
opportunity for him to commit suicide. Finally, the medical examiner
who performed the autopsy detailed for the OIG why Epstein's
injuries were more consistent with and indicative of a suicide
by hanging rather than homicide by strangulation. The medical examiner
also told the OIG that the ligature furrow was too
broad to have been caused by electrical cord of the
medical device in Epstein's cell, and the blood toxicology tests
revealed no medications or legal substances were in Epstein's system.
The medical examiner also noted the absence of debris under
Epstein's fingernails, marks on his hands, contusions to his knuckles,
or bruises on his body that would have indicated Epstein
had been in a struggle, which would have been expected
if Epstein's death had been a homicide by strangulation. This
is not the first time that the OIG has found
significant job performance and management failures on the part of
BOP personnel and widespread disregard of BOP policies that are
designed to ensure that inmates are safe, secure, and in
good health. For instance, the OIG's December twenty twenty two
investigation and review of the GOP's handling of the transfer
of James Whitey Bulger identified serious job performance and management
failures at multiple levels within the BOP. Similar to the
Bulger report, the numerous and serious transgressions that occurred in
this matter came to light largely because they involved a
high profile inmate. The fact that serious deficiencies occurred in
connection with high profile inmates like Epstein and Bulger is
especially concerning given that the BOP would presumably take particular
care in handling the custody in care of such inmates. Regrettably,
the OIG has encountered similar issues on many other occasions.
For example, the OIG is investigation numerous allegations related to
the falsification of a official GOP documentation concerning inmate counts
and rounds, several of which have resulted in criminal prosecution.
The OIG currently has two open investigations into allegations of
falsified inmate count and round documentation, each involving an inmate
death by suicide and homicide or escape from a GOOP facility.
This investigation and review also revealed the direct impact of
insufficient staffing levels on inmate safety. Witnesses repeatedly told the
OIG that counts, round cell searches, and other methods of
inmate accountability were not undertaken because correctional staff were working
multiple shifts, including one staff member who worked twenty four
hours straight, and were tired and overwhelmed with the duties.
As discussed in greater detail in our recommendations, the OIG
is repeatedly found the need for BOP to address staffing shortages.
Most recently, in March of twenty twenty three, the OIG
found that the coronavirus disease twenty nineteen pandemic accelerated the
effects of pre existing BOP medical and non medical staffing
shortages and issue the OIG as identified as a concern
for the BOP since at least twenty fifteen. Further, the
OIG has repeatedly found that BOP personnel have not consistently
been attentive to the needs of inmates at risk for suicide.
In this investigation, that inattention manifested in the failure of
mcc New York staff and supervisors to ensure that Epstein
was assigned to cellmate as required by mcc new York
Psychology Department directive issued after July twenty three, twenty nineteen,
in which Epstein was discovered in his cell with an
orange cloth around his neck. In March twenty twenty three's report,
the OIG, he found that BOP psychology staff did not
assess the suitability of a single cell assignment for five
of the seven inmates who died by suicide while in
COVID quarantine units between March twentieth and April twenty twenty one.
The OIG's twenty seventeen report on the BOP's use of
restrictive housing for inmates with mental illness also noted that
single selling may present risk to inmate mental health, and
both the recommendations from that report regarding the use of
oversight of single selling remain open as of March of
twenty twenty three. Lastly, as discussed in greater detail in
the conclusions and recommendations that follow, the persistent deficiencies of
the BOP security camera systems are well documented in long standing.
The combination of negligence, misconduct, and outright job performance failure
documented in this report all contributed to an environment in
which arguably one of the most notorious inmates and us
the BOP's custody, was provided the opportunity to take his
own life, resulting in significant questions being asked about the
circumstances of his death, how it could have been allowed
to happen, and most importantly, depriving his numerous victims, many
of whom were underage girls at the time of the
alleged crimes, of their ability to seek justice through the
criminal justice process. The fact that these failures have been
reoccurring once at the BOP does not excuse them and
gives additional urgency to the need for the Department of
Justice and BOP leadership to address the chronic staffing, surveillance, security,
and related problems plaguing the BP. The OIG is completed
its investigation and is providing this report to the GOP
for appropriate action. Unless otherwise noted. The OIG applies the
preponderance of evidence standard in determining whether DOGA personnel have
committed misconduct. RIT System Protection Board applies the same standard
when reviewing a federal agency's decision to take adverse action
against an employee based on such misconduct. C five USC
Section seventy seven oh one C one B and five
CFR Section twelve oh one dot fifty six B one
Section two. All Right, folks, that's going to wrap up
this episode here and in the next episode, we're gonna
pick up on the recommendations. All of the information that
goes with the episode can be found in the description box.