Speaker 1: Welcome to the deep dive. We're here to well navigate
Speaker 1: the complicated stuff and pull off the key insights from
Speaker 1: today's source. And today we're really digging into Ben Buchanan's book,
Speaker 1: The Cybersecurity Dilemma, Hacking, Trust and Fear between Nations. Our
Speaker 1: mission really is to cut through the complexity, you know,
Speaker 1: where cybersecurity bums up against international relations. We want to
Speaker 1: extract the core ideas about how nations actually operate, how
Speaker 1: they build trust or maybe more often, how they don't,
Speaker 1: and how they handle this well, this digital battlefield exactly.
Speaker 2: And b Canon puts this concept, the cybersecurity dilemma right
Speaker 2: at the center. It's the lens for looking at these
Speaker 2: modern conflicts. The basic idea is when a country tries
Speaker 2: to make itself safer online, those very actions can end
Speaker 2: up looking threatening to others, and that can, you know,
Speaker 2: unintentionally wratchet up tensions. It's this constant high stakes balancing act.
Speaker 1: Yeah, and to make it real, Buchanan starts with a
Speaker 1: pretty chilling example. Remember the reported twenty fifteen Russian hack,
Speaker 1: the one that hit the White House communication system. I
Speaker 1: mean this was just like stealing some files. It showed
Speaker 1: the dilemma perfectly. They reportedly got into President Obama's emails,
Speaker 1: sensitive stuff, legislative things, scheduling, you name it. A senior
Speaker 1: officially even called it one of the most sophisticated intrusions
Speaker 1: we've ever seen. That's pretty stark. And it wasn't just
Speaker 1: a White House. There were breaches at the Pentagon Joint
Speaker 1: Chief State Department. So this isn't just theory. Buchanan uses
Speaker 1: these real world examples and even draws on things like
Speaker 1: the Snowden revelations, not really for the whole civil liberties debate,
Speaker 1: but more to show the mechanics, the how and why
Speaker 1: of these cyber ops. Okay, so let's unpack this core idea,
Speaker 1: the security dilemma. I. Buchanan traces it way back right
Speaker 1: to classical international relations. For listeners maybe not so familiar.
Speaker 1: Where does this actually come from? And how does he
Speaker 1: connect that ancient idea to well, today's digital world.
Speaker 2: It's fascinating. Actually, the roots go way way back to Thucydides,
Speaker 2: you know, the ancient Greek historian is history of the
Speaker 2: Peloponnesian War. He talks about that famous standoff between Athens
Speaker 2: and Mellows and the Athenians basically say, look, the strong
Speaker 2: do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.
Speaker 2: It's brutal, and that captures this idea of anarchy in
Speaker 2: the international system. There's no world government, right. It's not
Speaker 2: like inside a country where you have laws and police
Speaker 2: between nations. It's more like Hopps' state of nature solitary, poor, nasty,
Speaker 2: brutish and short, not Locke's idea of ordered government. So
Speaker 2: political scientists like John Hurst and the historian Herbert Butterfield
Speaker 2: they formalize this. They said, Look, when one state tries
Speaker 2: to get more power just to feel secure, it automatically
Speaker 2: makes other states feel ass secure, and those other states react,
Speaker 2: They build up their own power, and you get these
Speaker 2: dangerous arms races. It just feeds on itself. Mistrust everywhere, right, and.
Speaker 1: That maps directly onto intelligence gathering, doesn't it bu Canon
Speaker 1: brings in Michael Herman, a British signals intelligence guy. Herman
Speaker 1: pointed out that even if you're just collecting intel defensively,
Speaker 1: the country you're spying on sees it as threatening. So
Speaker 1: why is intelligence so crucial? I mean, obviously states need it,
Speaker 1: but how does that need feed the dilemma? Oh?
Speaker 2: It's absolutely vital. Intell is about foresight, about knowing what's coming.
Speaker 2: Think about Pearl Harbor or nine to eleven. Those disasters
Speaker 2: show exactly why states need good intelligence to prevent surprises,
Speaker 2: to protect people. But and this is the core paradox.
Speaker 2: States collecting that intel usually see their own actions as
Speaker 2: you know, necessary, even benign, defensive, but the state being
Speaker 2: spied on, they see it as provocative, as potentially hostile.
Speaker 2: Buchanan uses the Cold War, like in nineteen eighty three
Speaker 2: as an example. Reagan and his team were apparently genuinely
Speaker 2: baffled that the Soviets thought the US might attack. George Schultz,
Speaker 2: Secretary of State, then called Soviet fears incredible. He just
Speaker 2: couldn't believe it. But then years later, Gorbachev admitted he
Speaker 2: hadn't really grasped how much fear his side's actions were
Speaker 2: causing in the US. So each side thinks they're the
Speaker 2: good guys, just defending themselves, and the other side is
Speaker 2: the aggressor. It's the cycle of misperception.
Speaker 1: Okay, So if that's the backdrop, this constant suspicion, what
Speaker 1: does it mean for offensive cyber operations. Buchanan calls this
Speaker 1: the intruder's view. Okay, some of the big examples he
Speaker 1: uses to show why States Field they need to go
Speaker 1: on the attack in cyberspace.
Speaker 2: Well, he kicks off with Stucksnet. That was a real
Speaker 2: game changer. It was this incredibly sophisticated bit of malware
Speaker 2: aimed at Iran's Nten's nuclear facility back in twenty ten.
Speaker 2: And it didn't just steal data, It physically damaged things.
Speaker 2: It subtly broke about one thousand centrifuges over time. It
Speaker 2: was so stealthy, so effective that the Iranians actually arrested
Speaker 2: some of their own people, thinking they were spies sabotaging
Speaker 2: the plant. So yeah, it showed you could get real
Speaker 2: world physical or kinetic as they say, effects from a
Speaker 2: purely digital attack.
Speaker 1: That was huge, And Stuck's Net, even though it was devastating,
Speaker 1: was maybe just scratching the surface of what was being planned.
Speaker 1: Bu can And talks about nitro Zeos. Can you tell
Speaker 1: us more about that? That scale sounds enormous.
Speaker 2: Oh, absolutely. Nitro Zius was basically a massive US contingency plan.
Speaker 2: The idea was, if needed, to use cyber capabilities to
Speaker 2: take down huge swathes of Iranian infrastructure. We're talking power grids,
Speaker 2: transportation systems, air defenses, the works. The scale was just immense.
Speaker 2: Thousands of people involved, tens of millions of dollars spent
Speaker 2: just getting the access embedding tools deep inside Iranian networks.
Speaker 2: They were apparently checking this access sometimes nightly, just to
Speaker 2: make sure it was still there, ready to go. Now,
Speaker 2: the plan itself was never actually activated because the Iron
Speaker 2: nuclear deal happened in twenty fifteen, but the existence of
Speaker 2: nitro Z shows you the level of planning, the ambition,
Speaker 2: and the strategic thinking behind these offensive cyber preparations.
Speaker 1: So if you can run operations like stuck Scent or
Speaker 1: prepare something like nitro Z, you need the right tools.
Speaker 1: I was really struck by what Buchanan says about zero days.
Speaker 1: These sound like the ultimate cyber weapon. What are they exactly?
Speaker 2: Yeah, they really are kind of the secret sauce in
Speaker 2: the cyber arsenal. A zero day is basically a vulnerability,
Speaker 2: a flaw in software that nobody knows about yet, or crucially,
Speaker 2: the vendor, the company that made the software doesn't know
Speaker 2: about it, so there's no patch, no fix available. This
Speaker 2: makes them incredibly valuable for an attacker because it gives
Speaker 2: you a way into system that well, nobody's guarding against.
Speaker 2: It's a secret door if you. Cannon points out the
Speaker 2: NSSAY reportedly paid over twenty five million dollars in just
Speaker 2: one year to one French company just for the zero
Speaker 2: days that company found. That kind of money tells you
Speaker 2: just how critical these things are operationally.
Speaker 1: And it's not just about getting in. Is if Buchanan
Speaker 1: talks about achieving persistence, that sounds clingy and pretty ominous.
Speaker 1: What does that actually involve and why is it such
Speaker 1: a big deal.
Speaker 2: Persistence is about sticking around. It means burrowing really, really
Speaker 2: deep into a target system, not just installing some malware
Speaker 2: on the hard drive, but getting into the system's firmware
Speaker 2: or even the bio sets, the basic input output system
Speaker 2: that starts the computer up. When you're in, at that level, it's,
Speaker 2: as Buchanan quotes, virtually impossible to get them out. You
Speaker 2: could wipe the hard drive, reinstall everything, the operating system,
Speaker 2: all the software, and the implant, the malicious code could
Speaker 2: still be there waiting. Security folks call it the race
Speaker 2: to the bear metal. Getting as low level as possible,
Speaker 2: bu Caan incites research from Kaspersky Labs, suggesting the US
Speaker 2: developed ways to do this against hard drives from pretty
Speaker 2: much all the major manufacturers. Researchers called it an ultimate
Speaker 2: persistence mechanism, next level you've never seen before. It's about
Speaker 2: having that permanent, hidden foothold, right, So.
Speaker 1: They're basically moving into the digital foundations of the house,
Speaker 1: not just breaking a windows. Yeah, that's a defender's nightmare. Yeah,
Speaker 1: which leads to why they do this. What are the
Speaker 1: operational incentives? Buchanan points to, why build these deep persistent footholds.
Speaker 2: It comes down to preparation. States want to do detailed
Speaker 2: reconnaissance before any potential conflict. It's officially called cyber operations
Speaker 2: in Preparation of the Environment or COPE fancy term, but
Speaker 2: it means mapping the territory. Buchanan mentions DARPA's Plan X program.
Speaker 2: This was about building this constantly updated digital map of
Speaker 2: potential targets, figuring out vulnerabilities, placing tools so you could
Speaker 2: launch cyber operations really quickly if needed. The goal, quite explicitly,
Speaker 2: was to dominate the cyber battlespace. It's about having everything
Speaker 2: lined up ready to go at a moment's notice.
Speaker 1: And what's really tricky here is, Buchanan points out, is
Speaker 1: this dual use problem. The access you need for spying
Speaker 1: often looks exactly like the access you need for an attack.
Speaker 1: Can you give us examples? And why does he say
Speaker 1: these ops are often opaque sort of hard to grasp
Speaker 1: for traditional military folks.
Speaker 2: Yeah, this dual use thing is absolutely central to the
Speaker 2: whole dilemma. The tools and access for espionage often are
Speaker 2: the same tools and access needed for attack. He uses
Speaker 2: the hacks on Saudi Ramco, the Oil Giant, and Sony pictures.
Speaker 2: In both cases data was destroyed, hard drives wiped at
Speaker 2: a Ramco, massive data deletion at Sony, but data was
Speaker 2: also stolen embarrassing emails, employee data, movie scripts from Sony.
Speaker 2: Same access, different goals or maybe even both goals at once,
Speaker 2: And they're opaque to traditional military planners because well, cyber
Speaker 2: isn't like tanks and planes. You can't easily count cyber
Speaker 2: weapons or see troops massing on a border. It's invisible,
Speaker 2: hard to quantify, hard to fit into establish military doctrines.
Speaker 2: This makes it really difficult to integrate cyber into broader
Speaker 2: strategic planning and to assess the true threat level.
Speaker 1: Okay, let's clip the coin. Now, let's talk about the
Speaker 1: defender's view. Protecting networks against all This sounds like a
Speaker 1: monumental task. U Canon calls it a massive and largely
Speaker 1: secret effort. What kind of fight has the NSA, for example,
Speaker 1: been waging just to keep network secure?
Speaker 2: It's a constant, uphill battle. You take the NSA, they've
Speaker 2: been in this long running fight against Chinese cyber intrusions,
Speaker 2: which they code named Byzantine Hades. Buchanan says there were
Speaker 2: over five hundred major cases attributed to this one actor group.
Speaker 2: It just shows the sheer persistence and sophistication attackers brain.
Speaker 2: Even the most capable agencies are constantly playing defense, trying
Speaker 2: to patch holes and detect breaches.
Speaker 1: And sometimes the best defense is offense. Buchanan mentions this
Speaker 1: tactic of hacking the hackers that sounds pretty bold. How
Speaker 1: did the NSA apparently use this against Chinese operations?
Speaker 2: Yeah, it's a fascinating turn about. So in response to
Speaker 2: one specific Chinese intrusion camp code named Byzantine Candor, the
Speaker 2: NSA's threat operations center their cyber hunters, they actually managed
Speaker 2: to break into five computers that the Chinese hackers were
Speaker 2: using to launch their attacks from. This gave the NSA,
Speaker 2: as Buchanan puts it, excellent sources of data on what
Speaker 2: the attackers were doing, their tools, their targets. They can
Speaker 2: basically watch them in action, which is invaluable for figuring
Speaker 2: out how to stop them and protect US networks.
Speaker 1: So how do defenders spot these intruders, especially the really
Speaker 1: sophisticated ones. Buchana goes through different detection methods. Let's start
Speaker 1: with pattern.
Speaker 2: Matching, right. Pattern matching is a common technique. It relies
Speaker 2: on finding known indicators of compromise or IOCs. These can
Speaker 2: be simple things like atomic indicators specific IP addresses or
Speaker 2: domain names known to be used by attackers, or they
Speaker 2: can be computed indicators like cryptographic hashes basically digital fingerprints
Speaker 2: of known malicious files. And then there are behavioral indicators,
Speaker 2: which are more about the patterns of activity, how an
Speaker 2: intruder moves through a network, the sequence of commands they use.
Speaker 2: It's like recognizing a burglar's typical methods.
Speaker 1: Okay, but what if the attackers are using brand new
Speaker 1: tools like those zero days we talked about? Pattern matching
Speaker 1: might miss that, right? What about things like network security
Speaker 1: monitoring or memory analysis exactly.
Speaker 2: That's where those more advanced techniques come in. Network security
Speaker 2: monitoring is about watching all the traffic going in and
Speaker 2: out of a network. You collect it, analyze it, looking
Speaker 2: for anything unusual, any anomalies that don't fit the normal patterns,
Speaker 2: even if you don't know exactly what the attack looks
Speaker 2: like yet. And memory analysis is really powerful too. Instead
Speaker 2: of just looking at file stored on the hard drive,
Speaker 2: you examine what's currently running in the computer's RAM, it's
Speaker 2: active memory. This can catch malware that tries to hide
Speaker 2: itself or exploits like zero days that might not leave
Speaker 2: many traces on the disc. It sees what the computer's
Speaker 2: doing right now.
Speaker 1: The NSA also has this concept of foreign intelligence and
Speaker 1: supportive dynamic defense. Sounds like using spy data to directly
Speaker 1: improve security. You an example of how that actually works
Speaker 1: in practice.
Speaker 2: Yeah, it's exactly that, connecting the dots between intelligence gathering
Speaker 2: and network protection. It's a direct feedback loop. Buchanan mentions
Speaker 2: that by twenty eleven, the NSA's defensive systems armed with
Speaker 2: this intelligence could block something like twenty eight different categories
Speaker 2: of threats. Automatically, and there was this one specific case
Speaker 2: where they stopped a byzantine Haites attack targeting four very
Speaker 2: senior US military leaders, including the Chairman of the Joint
Speaker 2: Chiefs of Staff. So that's intelligence directly preventing a potentially
Speaker 2: serious breach at the highest levels. It shows the operational value.
Speaker 1: Then there's this really interesting almost cloak and dagger concept
Speaker 1: fourth party collection, piggybacking on other countries hacking operations. How
Speaker 1: does that work and what does it do to trust,
Speaker 1: maybe even between allies.
Speaker 2: It gets pretty murky. Yeah, the example Buchanan uses involves
Speaker 2: the Five Eyes Alliance, you know, the US, UK, Canada, Australia,
Speaker 2: and New Zealand. They apparently targeted South Korea's signals intelligence operations.
Speaker 2: They weren't just trying to learn what South Korean knew
Speaker 2: about North Korea from their spying. They were sometimes even
Speaker 2: hijacking the tools the exploits that South Korea was using
Speaker 2: against North Korea and repurposing them for Five Ey's own use.
Speaker 2: As you can imagine this kind of thing, Knowing that
Speaker 2: even your partners might be intercepting your operations can read
Speaker 2: a lot of paranoia, as Buchanan puts it within intelligence circles.
Speaker 2: It really complicates trust.
Speaker 1: Which brings us back to a fundamental debate. Is cyberspace
Speaker 1: inherently a fence dominant We hear that a lot. President
Speaker 1: Obama said offense is moving faster than defense. Michael Hayden,
Speaker 1: former NSA director, was even stronger, there's almost nothing inherent
Speaker 1: in the domain that plays to the defense.
Speaker 2: Is that the whole story? Though? What's the counter argument?
Speaker 2: It's definitely a common view that the attacker always has
Speaker 2: the edge, and there's some truth to it, But defenders
Speaker 2: and experts push back a bit. Richard Bettlich, a defense pioneer,
Speaker 2: pointed out that attackers often have a huge advantage in focus.
Speaker 2: They study one target system deeply. Defenders have to protect everything,
Speaker 2: and Bruce Schneier, another top expert, famously said a sufficiently funded, skilled,
Speaker 2: motivated adversary will get in, which sounds bleak, but the
Speaker 2: nuance is important. While perfect defense might be impossible, good defense,
Speaker 2: good preparation, good information sharing, smart strategies can make the
Speaker 2: attacker's job much harder, much more expensive, and much riskier.
Speaker 2: So it's not that defense is futile, but it is
Speaker 2: incredibly challenging.
Speaker 1: Okay, So pulling this all together, what does this cybersecurity
Speaker 1: dilemma mean for overall stability between nations? How is it
Speaker 1: different from the old Cold War security dilemma with nukes
Speaker 1: and tanks.
Speaker 2: Well, A key difference Buchanan highlights is the lack of
Speaker 2: physical geography in cyberspace. You don't have oceans or mountains
Speaker 2: acting as natural buffers or borders. It's inherently global and interconnected.
Speaker 2: And maybe more importantly, sober capabilities are just fundamentally ambiguous.
Speaker 2: It's incredibly hard to look at a cyber tool or
Speaker 2: an intrusion and know for sure if the intent is
Speaker 2: purely defensive like mapping networks to protect from better or
Speaker 2: offensive like preparing for an attack. That ambiguity is a
Speaker 2: huge source of tension.
Speaker 1: That ambiguity must make it incredibly difficult to dial things down.
Speaker 1: How does Buchanan suggest that just having good basic security
Speaker 1: baseline defenses can help? And what about all the noise
Speaker 1: he mentions like those ten million attacks?
Speaker 2: Right? He argues that strong baseline defenses are actually crucial
Speaker 2: for managing the dilemma. If your own networks are reasonably secure,
Speaker 2: you can filter out a lot of the background noise
Speaker 2: you mentioned as the former director of the OPM, the
Speaker 2: US Personnel office that got massively hacked, talking about ten
Speaker 2: million attacks a month. But most of that is just
Speaker 2: automated scanning background radiation of the Internet, not serious state
Speaker 2: level threats. Good defenses help you separate the signal from
Speaker 2: that noise, so you can focus your resources on the
Speaker 2: genuinely sophisticated, potentially dangerous intrusions. It simplifies the picture.
Speaker 1: Okay, so defense helps, but that ambiguity is still there.
Speaker 1: Trust seems essential. Buchanan looks back at the Cold War again,
Speaker 1: specifically the hot line. How does that serve as a
Speaker 1: model for cyber diplomacy.
Speaker 2: The hotline between Washington in Moscow, set up after the
Speaker 2: Cuban missile crisis, was vital. It was used during the
Speaker 2: nineteen sixty seven Arab Israeli War other crises. It provided
Speaker 2: that direct, immediate communication channel. It allowed leaders to quickly
Speaker 2: clarify intentions, ask questions, and hopefully avoid misunderstandings escalating into
Speaker 2: something catastrophic. There was even a lower level warmline for
Speaker 2: operational folks to talk. It showed that even bitter rivals
Speaker 2: saw the need for communication to manage.
Speaker 1: Risk and we've seen attempts to apply that lesson to
Speaker 1: cyber right. What about efforts between say the US and China.
Speaker 2: Yeah, despite all the friction, there have been ongoing efforts
Speaker 2: high level talks, joint working groups focusing specifically on cyber issues.
Speaker 2: The results have been let's say mixed. China walked away
Speaker 2: from talks for a while after the US indicted some
Speaker 2: PLA officers for hacking, but then they eventually came back.
Speaker 2: But the existence of these channels is important. They provide
Speaker 2: a place to air grievances, discuss norms, and try to
Speaker 2: build at least a minimal level of understanding. Even if
Speaker 2: trust is scarce.
Speaker 1: Beyond just talking, you can brings up costly signals. These
Speaker 1: are actions a state takes that clearly show its trustworthy
Speaker 1: because the action involves some kind of sacrifice. What are
Speaker 1: some historical examples he uses.
Speaker 2: He points to things like Khrushchev unilaterally pulling Soviet troops
Speaker 2: out of Austria in the fifties. That wasn't just talk,
Speaker 2: it was a tangible reduction in military presence. Or think
Speaker 2: about Gorbachev making big concessions in arms control treaties like
Speaker 2: the inf Treaty or pulling out of Afghanistan. These were
Speaker 2: actions that cost the Soviets something, either strategically or politically,
Speaker 2: but they signaled a genuine shift in policy, and Buchanan
Speaker 2: notes how these actions gradually changed Reagan's perception of the
Speaker 2: Soviet Union away from the evil empire rhetoric. They demonstrated
Speaker 2: trustworthiness through sacrifice.
Speaker 1: And this idea of costly signals applies directly to cyber
Speaker 1: specifically with those zero day vulnerabilities. How can handling a
Speaker 1: zero day demonstrate trustworthiness?
Speaker 2: It's a really clear example. So a government finds a
Speaker 2: zero day flaw, what does it do? Option one keep
Speaker 2: it secret, use it for spying or potential attacks. That's
Speaker 2: the offensive advantage. Option two may be selled on the
Speaker 2: black market. Option three tell a software vendor so they
Speaker 2: can fix it, patching the hole for everyone. Choosing option
Speaker 2: three means giving up your secret weapon. You sacrifice that
Speaker 2: operational advantage for the sake of broader cybersecurity, for collective defense.
Speaker 2: That's a costly signal. Buchanan mentions the US has a
Speaker 2: formal process, the vulnerability's equities process, trying to weigh these
Speaker 2: offensive versus defensive equities, and he quotes the Dutch government's
Speaker 2: clear stance encryption good, backdoors bad. It's about signaling commitment
Speaker 2: to overall security, even at a cost.
Speaker 1: Okay. Lastly, attribution and response. Knowing who did it is crucial.
Speaker 1: The Sony Pictures hack is the big case study here.
Speaker 1: How is the US so sure it was North Korea?
Speaker 1: And what does this tell us about the role of
Speaker 1: private companies?
Speaker 2: Now, Attribution is notoriously hard in cyber but in the
Speaker 2: Sony case, the US government expressed very high confidence it
Speaker 2: was North Korea. B Canon suggests this confidence came largely
Speaker 2: from pre existing acts access the US likely had inside
Speaker 2: North Korean networks, giving them visibility into the operation as
Speaker 2: it happened or shortly after. Intelligence was key, But the
Speaker 2: Sony case also highlighted the growing role of the private
Speaker 2: cybersecurity industry in attribution. These companies have global sensor networks,
Speaker 2: deep technical expertise. They often publish their own detailed analyzes
Speaker 2: of major attacks. This sometimes forces government's hands, making previously
Speaker 2: secret operations public and adds another layer to figure out
Speaker 2: who's behind a major incidence.
Speaker 1: And when a state does attribute an attack, the response
Speaker 1: doesn't have to be another cyber attack, right What other
Speaker 1: tools were in the toolbox.
Speaker 2: Absolutely, you can in stresses that responses don't need to
Speaker 2: be inkind. You don't have to hack back just because
Speaker 2: you're hacked. States can use other instruments of national power.
Speaker 2: Economic sanctions are a big one. The US use them
Speaker 2: against North Korea after Sony, or diplomatic actions like indicting
Speaker 2: foreign military officers, as the US did with Chinese PLA members.
Speaker 2: These are political signals. They show resolve imposed costs and
Speaker 2: demonstrate that cyber actions have consequences without necessarily escalating things
Speaker 2: in the cyber domain itself.
Speaker 1: So wrapping this up, you canon, really leaves us wrestling
Speaker 1: with this core tension, this cybersecurity dilemma. In this hyper
Speaker 1: connected world, states are constantly trying to secure themselves, but
Speaker 1: those very actions almost inevitably look like potential threats to others.
Speaker 1: It's this fragile, ongoing struggle, it.
Speaker 2: Really is, And it leaves you, the listener, with a
Speaker 2: pretty fundamental question, doesn't it. Given how ambiguous cyber tools are,
Speaker 2: how hard it is to tell defense from offense, can
Speaker 2: things like costly signals and talking shops truly build lasting
Speaker 2: stability or are we just stuck in this cycle and
Speaker 2: what does this constant simmering tension between nations online mean
Speaker 2: for your daily life, for the security of the data
Speaker 2: you rely on, the services you use, the very infrastructure
Speaker 2: that underpins our digital world. It kind of forces you
Speaker 2: to think about how these high level state games filter
Speaker 2: down and affect us all, and whether genuine trust is
Speaker 2: even possible in this domain.