WEBVTT 1 00:00:00.040 --> 00:00:00.640 All right. 2 00:00:00.880 --> 00:00:05.480 As you can tell, we are a top notch organization here, 3 00:00:05.519 --> 00:00:07.960 and we never wait till last second to find out 4 00:00:07.960 --> 00:00:09.759 if your headphones and microworking. 5 00:00:10.800 --> 00:00:15.359 Uh we were jacking it up when South End Catholic? 6 00:00:15.560 --> 00:00:15.800 Right? 7 00:00:16.239 --> 00:00:18.640 So your South End I'm the Catholic part. 8 00:00:18.839 --> 00:00:21.359 And who was your home court? Picnic? What's your goal 9 00:00:21.399 --> 00:00:24.800 to picnic? Mine was Saint Paul's and Saint Lawrence? What 10 00:00:24.960 --> 00:00:25.640 was yours? 11 00:00:26.079 --> 00:00:28.079 Actually I belonged to Saint Paul's. 12 00:00:28.079 --> 00:00:30.879 Now, oh okay, picnic man. Good. 13 00:00:31.719 --> 00:00:34.520 So before we get to cybersecurity, this is Louisville, so 14 00:00:34.520 --> 00:00:36.560 we got to see how many connections we have here. 15 00:00:36.920 --> 00:00:42.280 Uh so Angelie Angela Maurici, right, yes, and you went 16 00:00:42.320 --> 00:00:44.399 there for two years and then you were were you 17 00:00:44.479 --> 00:00:46.119 the first graduating class of holy Cross? 18 00:00:46.399 --> 00:00:47.359 Second graduating Oh? 19 00:00:47.359 --> 00:00:50.119 Okay, got you all right, all right, second graduating class 20 00:00:50.159 --> 00:00:54.920 of holy Cross. Then you went to Purdue for industrial engineering? Okay, 21 00:00:54.960 --> 00:00:57.039 So what did you do with your cybersecurity? And we 22 00:00:57.039 --> 00:01:00.560 were discussing there was no cybersecurity at that time, not. 23 00:01:00.600 --> 00:01:02.640 At that time, no, I mean, and that's the thing 24 00:01:02.679 --> 00:01:02.960 about it. 25 00:01:02.960 --> 00:01:05.640 You'd be flexible because at the time, if anybody said 26 00:01:05.640 --> 00:01:07.680 you're going to be doing cybersecurity in thirty years. 27 00:01:07.680 --> 00:01:08.560 I would be like, what's that? 28 00:01:08.719 --> 00:01:09.200 What is that? 29 00:01:09.280 --> 00:01:12.079 Right? Nobody knew that's how people were just passing notes 30 00:01:12.120 --> 00:01:13.439 like China would pass it over. 31 00:01:17.079 --> 00:01:17.719 At that time. 32 00:01:18.280 --> 00:01:21.159 I mean I had some computer classes, but if I 33 00:01:21.200 --> 00:01:24.040 wanted to do my homework, I had to sign up 34 00:01:24.040 --> 00:01:26.239 for a time in the computer lab. 35 00:01:26.599 --> 00:01:29.760 Whit. Yeah, my wife and I were talking about and 36 00:01:29.760 --> 00:01:33.040 we'll get into the cybersecurity security because it's very interesting. 37 00:01:33.439 --> 00:01:35.120 My wife and I were talking about the other night. 38 00:01:35.680 --> 00:01:40.000 At the radio station, we had one computer and you 39 00:01:40.040 --> 00:01:43.480 had to reserve it to either write a letter or 40 00:01:43.519 --> 00:01:47.280 an email, and the and the the internet was dial up, yes, 41 00:01:47.319 --> 00:01:49.200 and you was just sit there for five minutes saying. 42 00:01:50.719 --> 00:01:57.799 Kind I kind of miss those days. So Sherry dot 43 00:01:57.879 --> 00:02:01.319 Hue is who we're talking to now. You you went 44 00:02:01.359 --> 00:02:02.920 to work after Purdue, You went to. 45 00:02:03.879 --> 00:02:06.040 I went to work for the Navy at Naval Lordnan's 46 00:02:06.079 --> 00:02:06.599 here in town. 47 00:02:06.760 --> 00:02:08.199 All right, So what did you do there? 48 00:02:08.759 --> 00:02:10.039 I worked on a gun system. 49 00:02:10.080 --> 00:02:12.680 I worked on the Mark seventy five seventy six millimeters 50 00:02:12.680 --> 00:02:14.240 sixty two caliber gun system. 51 00:02:14.520 --> 00:02:16.400 Wow, just rattle as off. 52 00:02:16.560 --> 00:02:17.240 She's so cool. 53 00:02:18.000 --> 00:02:21.759 The problem was, though, in nineteen ninety is that at 54 00:02:21.759 --> 00:02:23.520 that time, women weren't allowed to board ship. 55 00:02:24.159 --> 00:02:26.879 WHOA, what are you? Are you serious? 56 00:02:27.159 --> 00:02:27.439 Yeah? 57 00:02:28.120 --> 00:02:30.360 Nineteen nine women weren't allowed. 58 00:02:30.000 --> 00:02:33.560 On board right, right, So. 59 00:02:32.599 --> 00:02:34.159 So did you have to stand on the dock in 60 00:02:34.240 --> 00:02:39.759 y'all directions? You're gonna wanna two degrees northwest? 61 00:02:42.080 --> 00:02:42.360 Yeah? 62 00:02:42.680 --> 00:02:44.840 And the thing about it is so since I couldn't 63 00:02:44.879 --> 00:02:46.639 do that, I mean there were other things I could do. 64 00:02:46.719 --> 00:02:47.759 I would work on things. 65 00:02:48.120 --> 00:02:51.879 But from there I got into other programs, and eventually 66 00:02:51.960 --> 00:02:55.639 I got into intelligence programs, and so that was very interesting. 67 00:02:56.199 --> 00:02:59.120 When you get an intelligence is that a risk because 68 00:03:00.240 --> 00:03:04.599 or is it because you're with intelligence and people are 69 00:03:04.639 --> 00:03:08.360 trying to copy or get intelligence from us? Is that 70 00:03:08.439 --> 00:03:11.159 a risk on you when you take a job like that, it. 71 00:03:11.080 --> 00:03:13.479 Can be right because you can be a target for 72 00:03:13.599 --> 00:03:16.479 somebody who wants to compromise you. 73 00:03:17.360 --> 00:03:17.719 Yeah. 74 00:03:17.879 --> 00:03:21.000 So we do actually provide a lot of training to 75 00:03:21.120 --> 00:03:23.680 people on what you know, if like, if I were 76 00:03:23.719 --> 00:03:25.919 to go out even to a party, that's what I'm saying, 77 00:03:25.960 --> 00:03:29.280 I meet somebody foreign national, I would have to report 78 00:03:29.360 --> 00:03:29.800 that back. 79 00:03:30.000 --> 00:03:33.719 Yeah. They pinpoint guys or people, not guys or women, 80 00:03:33.759 --> 00:03:36.479 but people that have gambling issues. They haven't divorced or 81 00:03:36.479 --> 00:03:38.599 their cheating on their wife or something like that, and 82 00:03:38.599 --> 00:03:40.719 then they have leverage on them and that's how they 83 00:03:40.759 --> 00:03:42.560 get in, right, That's exactly, and that's what is So 84 00:03:42.599 --> 00:03:44.240 you've got to keep your nose clean if you're going 85 00:03:44.319 --> 00:03:45.159 to be in that business. 86 00:03:45.599 --> 00:03:47.960 When you're intelligence and people ask you, hey, what do 87 00:03:48.000 --> 00:03:49.439 you do for a living, do you get a standard 88 00:03:49.479 --> 00:03:50.759 answer of I'm a cook. 89 00:03:52.039 --> 00:03:56.039 That's what I was going to say on the SEF 90 00:03:58.120 --> 00:04:02.319 So shearing a tastic career and somehow now you are 91 00:04:02.360 --> 00:04:05.759 in cybersecurity and then you work for who? So you 92 00:04:05.800 --> 00:04:08.479 wrote an article right from the career journal. 93 00:04:08.240 --> 00:04:11.479 I did about it was back in July about the 94 00:04:11.560 --> 00:04:16.240 ransomware attack on the Jeffson County and clerk's office. And 95 00:04:16.680 --> 00:04:19.720 we watched that for about four days. And you know, 96 00:04:20.759 --> 00:04:22.759 the thing that kind of got me, that really perked 97 00:04:22.759 --> 00:04:26.480 me up was the statement the first day that there 98 00:04:26.600 --> 00:04:30.319 was no data that was stolen. You can't know that 99 00:04:30.959 --> 00:04:32.839 in a day, right, you know, you have to do 100 00:04:32.920 --> 00:04:36.120 forensics in order to really find out what happened and 101 00:04:36.519 --> 00:04:38.480 did they have access to anything. And of course, as 102 00:04:38.519 --> 00:04:41.160 we know, a few weeks later, they finally did come 103 00:04:41.199 --> 00:04:43.399 out and say, yeah, there was some data that was taken. 104 00:04:44.160 --> 00:04:48.040 So you know, I watched it, and there are several 105 00:04:48.040 --> 00:04:49.879 things that I saw from the outside looking in, And 106 00:04:49.879 --> 00:04:55.240 I don't have any internal knowledge of what happened. This 107 00:04:55.279 --> 00:04:57.680 is just from as a you know, subject matter expert 108 00:04:57.720 --> 00:04:58.759 watching the situation. 109 00:04:59.759 --> 00:05:00.800 There things that I. 110 00:05:00.720 --> 00:05:04.600 Saw that probably happened and things that we could look 111 00:05:04.639 --> 00:05:07.240 at as lessons learned that when we're talking. You know, 112 00:05:07.279 --> 00:05:10.360 we work a lot with city and county governments, We 113 00:05:10.399 --> 00:05:13.759 work a lot with small businesses and nonprofits, and so 114 00:05:14.000 --> 00:05:16.000 we use this as you know. It was a few 115 00:05:16.079 --> 00:05:17.879 days later I went and I was talking with a 116 00:05:17.959 --> 00:05:21.000 county judge in eastern Kentucky, and I said, well, you 117 00:05:21.040 --> 00:05:23.639 don't want to be like Jefferson County Clerk's office, do you, 118 00:05:23.759 --> 00:05:26.319 because this is what happened. But here's what you need 119 00:05:26.360 --> 00:05:29.240 to do to protect yourselves, to prevent this from happening. 120 00:05:29.519 --> 00:05:31.480 Is there's no perfect closed loop. 121 00:05:31.720 --> 00:05:32.199 There is not. 122 00:05:32.720 --> 00:05:35.920 Okay, So what scares me a little bit of what 123 00:05:35.959 --> 00:05:38.759 you just said was we're not sure what they took. 124 00:05:40.360 --> 00:05:45.000 So the so you have that, which is it's crazy 125 00:05:45.040 --> 00:05:46.759 to me. So they were in they were wandering in 126 00:05:46.800 --> 00:05:49.199 your room. Basically, they were in your house and they 127 00:05:49.240 --> 00:05:51.399 were in your bedroom and you're not sure what they took. 128 00:05:52.000 --> 00:05:56.279 But okay, so then it goes to how many times 129 00:05:56.279 --> 00:05:58.600 do you even catch the people wandering around in your room? 130 00:05:59.000 --> 00:06:01.480 Like you caught these people, but how many people go 131 00:06:01.560 --> 00:06:04.439 into a system take what they want and you know, 132 00:06:04.639 --> 00:06:05.920 you don't know they were ever there. 133 00:06:06.160 --> 00:06:10.040 You're exactly right because this could have happened previously, and 134 00:06:10.079 --> 00:06:12.160 they didn't do it as a ransomware. They could have 135 00:06:12.279 --> 00:06:16.879 just come in and stolen data and went on their way. 136 00:06:16.920 --> 00:06:18.720 Did they pay the ransom? Do you know? 137 00:06:18.920 --> 00:06:19.800 I don't think they did. 138 00:06:20.120 --> 00:06:24.439 Okay, the last I heard is they this is that's 139 00:06:24.519 --> 00:06:27.040 what we consider double extortion. 140 00:06:27.240 --> 00:06:27.959 Okay, Okay. 141 00:06:28.040 --> 00:06:31.079 The first extortion was we've locked down your systems, you 142 00:06:31.120 --> 00:06:33.800 can't get in pay us the ransom. So the county 143 00:06:33.800 --> 00:06:36.879 clerk's office that we're not paying the ransom. We have backups. 144 00:06:36.879 --> 00:06:38.879 We can rebuild our system. So that's what took them 145 00:06:38.920 --> 00:06:41.160 a week. Yeah, they had to rebuild like three hundred 146 00:06:41.240 --> 00:06:45.399 computers from their backups. Okay, so then what the bad 147 00:06:45.439 --> 00:06:47.800 guys do is they come back and say, okay, you 148 00:06:47.879 --> 00:06:50.319 got yourself back up and running, Well, we took some data, 149 00:06:51.439 --> 00:06:54.240 so if you don't pay us, we're going to release 150 00:06:54.279 --> 00:06:54.959 that data. 151 00:06:55.079 --> 00:06:58.079 Oh well, isn't all of our stuff out there anyway? 152 00:06:58.160 --> 00:07:00.480 Because sometimes I freak out and go, you know. 153 00:07:00.639 --> 00:07:03.560 What you're saying is Dwight saying you look at the 154 00:07:03.560 --> 00:07:05.879 company and go it was just your turn right. 155 00:07:06.319 --> 00:07:08.120 Kind of Yeah? I mean think about it. 156 00:07:08.120 --> 00:07:09.879 How many times have you gotten a letter in the 157 00:07:09.920 --> 00:07:13.040 mail that, Oh my god, God, exactly right? 158 00:07:13.399 --> 00:07:17.120 Okay. Sherry Dnahues, who were talking to a cyber security. 159 00:07:16.759 --> 00:07:23.120 Expert Commonwealth Sentinel cybersecurity was hate again. Commonwealth Sentinel cybersecurities 160 00:07:23.480 --> 00:07:24.279 with the car? 161 00:07:25.399 --> 00:07:28.319 Why the cars? The people that sell cars had an 162 00:07:28.319 --> 00:07:31.439 issue with their cybersecurity? Did they not? So they couldn't 163 00:07:31.480 --> 00:07:32.160 sell cars? 164 00:07:32.240 --> 00:07:32.399 Right? 165 00:07:32.439 --> 00:07:35.439 They were? They were shut down for days, I thought, 166 00:07:35.439 --> 00:07:37.720 maybe longer than that. Do you know any deals to 167 00:07:37.800 --> 00:07:38.120 that one? 168 00:07:38.199 --> 00:07:40.560 No? I don't know details on it, but but I 169 00:07:40.639 --> 00:07:43.680 know what it was. There was a software program that 170 00:07:43.720 --> 00:07:46.079 they used for I don't know if it was there 171 00:07:46.120 --> 00:07:49.839 inventory or exactly what it was, but all of these 172 00:07:50.680 --> 00:07:53.480 car dealerships were using the same software and that is 173 00:07:53.519 --> 00:07:56.800 what got high right, and so if you are dependent 174 00:07:56.839 --> 00:07:59.839 on that software, you know now you know, it's just 175 00:07:59.839 --> 00:08:02.600 like with hospitals when they have all the electronic health 176 00:08:02.639 --> 00:08:05.000 records and then all of a sudden they can't access them. 177 00:08:05.000 --> 00:08:07.319 They're having to do everything by hand now, by paper 178 00:08:07.360 --> 00:08:10.120 and pen. And you know, do they know how to 179 00:08:10.160 --> 00:08:13.000 do that? You know, if you have somebody who's you know, 180 00:08:13.040 --> 00:08:16.319 been a nurse for two years, they may not know 181 00:08:16.360 --> 00:08:18.959 how to do it, where somebody maybe been there thirty 182 00:08:19.040 --> 00:08:20.399 years they remember. 183 00:08:20.040 --> 00:08:20.720 How they did it. 184 00:08:21.399 --> 00:08:25.240 Usually, Tony today would not ever let me say if 185 00:08:25.279 --> 00:08:28.240 I can speak on my behalf in Tony's behalf, stop me. 186 00:08:29.079 --> 00:08:33.000 But if I may, Tony and I are the dumbest 187 00:08:33.080 --> 00:08:36.399 people that station, yet somehow we're the smartest people at 188 00:08:36.480 --> 00:08:41.519 Station two. And here's what I mean. Emails come to us, 189 00:08:41.759 --> 00:08:43.840 all right, and if it's not an internal email and 190 00:08:43.879 --> 00:08:46.200 it says, hey, you know, check your four one K 191 00:08:46.320 --> 00:08:50.080 or whatever it might be, if you click on it halftime, 192 00:08:50.120 --> 00:08:52.000 it's a virus. The other half the time is the 193 00:08:52.039 --> 00:08:55.000 company make pretending that it's a virus. Right, So it's 194 00:08:55.039 --> 00:08:57.519 a result we just don't open our emails, thank you. 195 00:08:57.919 --> 00:08:59.919 And so last week there was an amendment to my 196 00:09:00.120 --> 00:09:04.399 contract I was supposed to sign and that this is true. 197 00:09:04.519 --> 00:09:06.679 So Michael Jordan called me, he goes, dude, you got 198 00:09:06.679 --> 00:09:08.759 to sign the contract, and so when did you email? 199 00:09:08.799 --> 00:09:12.039 He goes, I didn't email you. It came from x YZ. 200 00:09:12.960 --> 00:09:15.440 Well I looked it up, and XYZ has been trying 201 00:09:15.440 --> 00:09:16.720 to get in touch with me since the. 202 00:09:16.639 --> 00:09:19.120 Beginning of June's not kidding. I don't answer any emails. Yes, 203 00:09:19.600 --> 00:09:20.840 I don't not take any chances. 204 00:09:20.919 --> 00:09:23.200 Since the beginning of June. They've been trying to get 205 00:09:23.240 --> 00:09:25.080 in touch with me. Well, I say all that to 206 00:09:25.120 --> 00:09:30.000 say this, if, for example, the county clerk's office, if 207 00:09:30.000 --> 00:09:32.279 they were to open one of these malt where emails 208 00:09:32.360 --> 00:09:35.519 or something, is there not something in place like a 209 00:09:35.519 --> 00:09:36.519 firewall to. 210 00:09:36.759 --> 00:09:37.480 Well, that's the thing. 211 00:09:38.679 --> 00:09:41.200 That's exactly what the problem was there. 212 00:09:41.320 --> 00:09:44.720 So when we look at cybersecurity, it's a layered approach. 213 00:09:45.240 --> 00:09:48.159 There is no one defense that is going to keep 214 00:09:48.200 --> 00:09:50.840 you from being attacked unless you are not connected to 215 00:09:50.879 --> 00:09:51.320 the internet. 216 00:09:51.559 --> 00:09:52.159 Wow. 217 00:09:52.600 --> 00:09:55.159 So the first thing you do is you do protect 218 00:09:55.240 --> 00:09:58.480 the perimeter. Okay, you do protect internally. When we're looking 219 00:09:58.519 --> 00:10:01.840 at internally, well, you do need to have anti virus, 220 00:10:01.919 --> 00:10:04.080 firewalls and all that, but so many people they will 221 00:10:04.120 --> 00:10:08.639 get something, you know, just whatever, and Okay, we're secure, 222 00:10:09.159 --> 00:10:11.759 and I fear that may be part of what happened 223 00:10:11.759 --> 00:10:15.320 here is they The quote they had was we had 224 00:10:15.360 --> 00:10:17.960 the best systems money could buy. Okay, you put that 225 00:10:18.000 --> 00:10:19.960 in place, but you you have to baby city. 226 00:10:20.559 --> 00:10:23.399 Who are these bad actors are? They're not here? 227 00:10:24.080 --> 00:10:24.159 No? 228 00:10:25.120 --> 00:10:27.960 I heard that the FBI said it was Russia, but. 229 00:10:28.519 --> 00:10:31.720 You know, no Russia. 230 00:10:31.879 --> 00:10:34.159 What are they going to do with our d MV records? No? 231 00:10:34.159 --> 00:10:37.639 No, no, they need the soci security numbers, your banking numbers, 232 00:10:37.759 --> 00:10:39.759 information and all that. They take your money. 233 00:10:39.799 --> 00:10:40.399 And here's the thing. 234 00:10:40.399 --> 00:10:41.759 And a lot of people will say that, you know, 235 00:10:41.879 --> 00:10:44.759 a small business or a small city or Kenyon will say, well, 236 00:10:44.759 --> 00:10:47.399 why are they going? What is our information worth to them? 237 00:10:47.639 --> 00:10:49.679 It's not worth anything to them. It's worth something to you. 238 00:10:50.279 --> 00:10:51.279 Yeah, I got you. 239 00:10:51.960 --> 00:10:54.159 So, just like your home computer, if somebody were to 240 00:10:54.200 --> 00:10:56.200 get into your home computer and take all the pictures 241 00:10:56.240 --> 00:10:59.120 of your child as a baby. Now, they don't care 242 00:10:59.159 --> 00:10:59.919 about that, but you do. 243 00:11:00.159 --> 00:11:02.039 I think it's scary that people can wander around in 244 00:11:02.080 --> 00:11:04.159 those places and know and then and people not know 245 00:11:04.240 --> 00:11:06.159 that they were there. But you can set up these walls. 246 00:11:06.200 --> 00:11:09.000 This is why we have the dual confirmation. When you're 247 00:11:09.200 --> 00:11:11.600 when you're just accessing your email and the and the 248 00:11:11.679 --> 00:11:13.360 text number has to come and you have to punch 249 00:11:13.399 --> 00:11:15.919 in the text number, so it's double. I have to 250 00:11:15.919 --> 00:11:19.080 put my password and then the text number that I 251 00:11:19.080 --> 00:11:20.559 got texted to get my own email. 252 00:11:20.720 --> 00:11:24.240 Somebody trying to Amazon, and they have been trying to 253 00:11:24.240 --> 00:11:26.440 hack my Amazon for at least two much now, because 254 00:11:26.559 --> 00:11:29.840 I'll keep getting these here's your OTP number, do not 255 00:11:29.879 --> 00:11:31.679 share it, and I'll get five times a day. 256 00:11:31.799 --> 00:11:32.960 Yeah, somebody's trying to get in. 257 00:11:33.080 --> 00:11:34.919 Have you changed your password on your Amazon? 258 00:11:35.360 --> 00:11:35.639 Yes? 259 00:11:36.679 --> 00:11:42.080 Oh, he's lying to you. Yes, he has changed it. 260 00:11:42.399 --> 00:11:46.120 Uh teager password. The problem is he's probably your here's 261 00:11:46.159 --> 00:11:50.559 the other Probably I'm stupid because I have several different 262 00:11:50.639 --> 00:11:52.720 things that the same password. It's the same password. 263 00:11:52.919 --> 00:11:56.960 Oh no, no, it's all bad. That's one of the 264 00:11:56.960 --> 00:11:58.320 worst things that you can do. 265 00:11:58.440 --> 00:12:02.360 Right, And I'm sorry. It's so hard. I understand it's 266 00:12:02.399 --> 00:12:04.360 so hard. And I have Apple that will bring up 267 00:12:04.399 --> 00:12:06.440 my you know, I have them all there, but it's 268 00:12:06.480 --> 00:12:10.679 so hard to remember. What's the chase, right, what's the 269 00:12:10.799 --> 00:12:14.240 what's the LG and E, what's the what's the career 270 00:12:14.279 --> 00:12:15.440 journal of pastord? 271 00:12:15.799 --> 00:12:18.200 I mean, come on, well, at least do me a 272 00:12:18.200 --> 00:12:22.720 favor at least the important ones your bank account. Oh no, no, no, yeah, 273 00:12:23.000 --> 00:12:25.360 definitely have really hard ones for that. 274 00:12:25.799 --> 00:12:27.759 Yeah, I'm talking about Netflix, you know. 275 00:12:28.320 --> 00:12:32.240 Yeah LG so okay. But as a result of all 276 00:12:32.279 --> 00:12:34.519 this behavior has been going on for years digitally, I 277 00:12:34.600 --> 00:12:37.799 gotta tell you, I'm skeptical of anything. If I get 278 00:12:37.840 --> 00:12:40.879 a text it says, hey, your master card has been 279 00:12:40.879 --> 00:12:42.919 withdrawn or whatever, I just call the number on the 280 00:12:42.919 --> 00:12:45.879 back of my card. Uh. If someone sends me a 281 00:12:46.000 --> 00:12:49.000 video on social media, I never watch it. I never 282 00:12:49.080 --> 00:12:53.279 watch a video because never once best, no, never, what's 283 00:12:53.480 --> 00:12:57.440 best worst Canario. Best case scenario, I see a monkey 284 00:12:57.440 --> 00:13:00.120 scratching other monkey's button, they fall off the lamber. What 285 00:13:00.320 --> 00:13:01.360 stupid crab it might be? 286 00:13:01.759 --> 00:13:02.480 Let it entertain you. 287 00:13:02.639 --> 00:13:05.480 Worst case scenario, I click it. Now everything's gone. They 288 00:13:05.480 --> 00:13:07.840 got all my passwords a whole bit. I'm just skeptical 289 00:13:07.879 --> 00:13:09.759 of anything. Ditch, I'm an animalog guy. 290 00:13:09.840 --> 00:13:13.960 Sure here's another one. So the uh the other day 291 00:13:14.000 --> 00:13:16.919 when Microsoft went down, the problem was they have a 292 00:13:17.000 --> 00:13:22.000 monopoly on that software, and it's it's they're force everyone 293 00:13:22.120 --> 00:13:25.440 is forced to use that basically forced. I think there's 294 00:13:25.440 --> 00:13:27.559 two different choices you can make. They're one of them. 295 00:13:28.000 --> 00:13:30.679 So the nightmare for people like you and cybersecurity is 296 00:13:30.919 --> 00:13:34.120 when you have a monopoly like that you are, it's 297 00:13:34.120 --> 00:13:38.720 connected to everything right right, right, So that's got to 298 00:13:38.759 --> 00:13:40.799 be a nightmare. Where does this thing go? Do you 299 00:13:40.840 --> 00:13:43.799 think and you're you've been around a long time, what 300 00:13:43.799 --> 00:13:47.120 what do you think this thing? Where's cybersecurity going? And 301 00:13:47.159 --> 00:13:50.639 will be ever? I compare it to drug enforcement, like 302 00:13:50.679 --> 00:13:52.720 you just do your best, but you know it's getting in. 303 00:13:53.159 --> 00:13:55.360 Well, that's exactly right. We have to do our best. 304 00:13:55.519 --> 00:13:57.679 A lot of it comes down to users, just like 305 00:13:57.879 --> 00:14:00.559 you were talking about multi factor authentication, to have that 306 00:14:00.679 --> 00:14:04.679 code from your phone, that right there. If people would 307 00:14:04.720 --> 00:14:08.639 implement multi factor authentication, it saves about ninety five percent 308 00:14:09.519 --> 00:14:13.080 of malware at times, right because if you have to 309 00:14:13.159 --> 00:14:16.159 get that, you know, then people somebody can't steal your 310 00:14:16.200 --> 00:14:20.480 credentials and pretend they're you. But most of it comes 311 00:14:20.480 --> 00:14:25.120 down to education, educating our users, because you know you're 312 00:14:25.120 --> 00:14:27.960 talking about dea, Okay, I have a drug enforcement officer. 313 00:14:28.600 --> 00:14:31.159 If they're the only ones out there trying to catch 314 00:14:31.200 --> 00:14:34.279 the people that are selling rus, they're never going to 315 00:14:34.360 --> 00:14:36.440 get them. But it has to be the people that 316 00:14:37.039 --> 00:14:37.600 are on. 317 00:14:37.559 --> 00:14:40.639 The ground and that know and can you know, be 318 00:14:40.720 --> 00:14:42.000 part of the solution. 319 00:14:42.600 --> 00:14:45.720 So if we're training people and they're understanding not to 320 00:14:45.759 --> 00:14:49.000 click something, you know, one of the things that was 321 00:14:49.000 --> 00:14:51.720 said during the press conference for the ransomware attack was 322 00:14:52.720 --> 00:14:55.440 we had the best solutions, but they just got through 323 00:14:55.440 --> 00:14:56.320 that one little crack. 324 00:14:56.919 --> 00:14:57.960 And that's exactly right. 325 00:14:58.039 --> 00:15:00.759 We have to be right every time, but they only 326 00:15:00.840 --> 00:15:03.519 have to be lucky once to get through. And so 327 00:15:03.679 --> 00:15:06.080 we need to put like I said, layers, you know, 328 00:15:06.159 --> 00:15:10.759 we put we put MDR which is managed to detection 329 00:15:10.879 --> 00:15:14.759 and response on each device. Right something happens on that device, 330 00:15:14.840 --> 00:15:15.639 we can lock it down. 331 00:15:15.960 --> 00:15:17.759 Have you ever walked into a business that you're helping 332 00:15:17.799 --> 00:15:20.159 and went, oh my god, I cannot believe you haven't 333 00:15:20.159 --> 00:15:20.799 been hacked yet. 334 00:15:20.960 --> 00:15:27.639 Oh my god, you have no idea I got people 335 00:15:27.720 --> 00:15:29.440 you're just like, are you kidding me? 336 00:15:30.519 --> 00:15:34.120 And you're just you how lucky you are doing well? 337 00:15:34.440 --> 00:15:36.480 You should see her face, this is radio. You should 338 00:15:36.480 --> 00:15:37.720 have seen her face when I asked. 339 00:15:37.600 --> 00:15:40.639 What's the matter, boss, I'm just I'm on Russia to eBay, 340 00:15:40.679 --> 00:15:41.559 what's your problem? 341 00:15:42.399 --> 00:15:44.080 So how does somebody get ahold of you? If they're 342 00:15:44.080 --> 00:15:47.159 a company listening right now and want to use your services. 343 00:15:47.399 --> 00:15:48.679 How do they get ahold of you share it? 344 00:15:49.480 --> 00:15:53.840 Our number is five oh two zero nine eight eight five. 345 00:15:54.240 --> 00:15:56.200 The best thing to do is get on the Google 346 00:15:56.240 --> 00:16:01.080 machine and put in Commonwealth Centenral cybersecurity. I want to 347 00:16:01.159 --> 00:16:06.120 ask you what is we're talking right now? We're talking 348 00:16:06.159 --> 00:16:10.600 about businesses in their computers. Let's dumb it down a 349 00:16:10.639 --> 00:16:12.240 little bit for the two dumb guys in the room. 350 00:16:12.279 --> 00:16:15.799 Let's talk about best practices just for someone at home 351 00:16:16.159 --> 00:16:19.600 when it comes to their cybersecurity. What's the biggest mistake 352 00:16:19.720 --> 00:16:23.320 that most most people make when it comes to cybersecurity 353 00:16:23.360 --> 00:16:23.840 in the home. 354 00:16:25.360 --> 00:16:28.360 I think it's and I hate to say, but going 355 00:16:28.399 --> 00:16:28.799 back to. 356 00:16:28.799 --> 00:16:33.039 Passwords, making sure you have different passwords for everything, making 357 00:16:33.080 --> 00:16:36.639 sure that you are using multi factor authentication whenever you can. 358 00:16:37.440 --> 00:16:39.840 And I think one of the things that most people 359 00:16:39.960 --> 00:16:45.200 miss is patching, doing their updates. Oh, updating your your 360 00:16:45.200 --> 00:16:48.879 computers are important, Oh my gosh, because that's where they 361 00:16:48.919 --> 00:16:51.279 release any kind of security patches. 362 00:16:52.039 --> 00:16:53.720 Vulnerabilities are discussied. 363 00:16:53.320 --> 00:16:54.600 On the justing my stuff. 364 00:16:55.440 --> 00:16:58.159 I never do it, like my computer's screaming me. 365 00:16:58.360 --> 00:17:00.840 That's but Nick, that's why so slow. 366 00:17:00.799 --> 00:17:03.200 You update your phone? Because yeah, your phone that those 367 00:17:03.240 --> 00:17:04.079 are security passages. 368 00:17:04.119 --> 00:17:05.759 That's helping with security, is what you're saying. 369 00:17:05.599 --> 00:17:10.039 Helping security My passwords though this day's old. Yeah, so 370 00:17:10.160 --> 00:17:14.799 my password is always something really difficult, like one two three, 371 00:17:15.279 --> 00:17:17.480 like the LETTERY throw. I'm a curve ball, you know 372 00:17:17.519 --> 00:17:19.359 what I mean. They think I'm gonna go four, but 373 00:17:19.839 --> 00:17:22.000 then the next day I'll change it one two three G. 374 00:17:23.400 --> 00:17:25.720 I thought I had an ingenious one, and then it 375 00:17:25.759 --> 00:17:29.240 popped up on a top ten worst this is this 376 00:17:29.319 --> 00:17:31.480 is impossible, thank you, and then it was on a 377 00:17:31.559 --> 00:17:33.880 list of don't use this, and I was like, I'm 378 00:17:33.880 --> 00:17:36.079 an idiot. All right, here's my last question. Unless you 379 00:17:36.160 --> 00:17:43.359 have something else. Do you recommend which we buy insurance 380 00:17:43.440 --> 00:17:46.279 like LifeLock or whatever it's called. Which company would you 381 00:17:46.279 --> 00:17:50.680 would recommend to Joke Q public to buy because I 382 00:17:50.680 --> 00:17:51.000 have it? 383 00:17:51.119 --> 00:17:53.839 Or hang on Joe or Joan? 384 00:17:54.599 --> 00:17:58.759 Either way, Q public? Which one? I have it through 385 00:17:58.759 --> 00:18:00.839 one of my credit cards. Heaps and eye on it 386 00:18:00.920 --> 00:18:03.000 and I think I think we got LifeLock? Is there 387 00:18:03.039 --> 00:18:06.640 another company or for a personal use? Do you recommend 388 00:18:06.680 --> 00:18:07.440 those companies? 389 00:18:08.279 --> 00:18:11.640 I say, anything that you can do is I mean, 390 00:18:11.640 --> 00:18:14.839 you can't have too much protection, right, so anything like 391 00:18:14.880 --> 00:18:16.279 that is going to be good I don't. 392 00:18:16.480 --> 00:18:16.759 I don't. 393 00:18:16.759 --> 00:18:20.079 I wouldn't say anything is any better than another as 394 00:18:20.079 --> 00:18:23.839 long as you have something. 395 00:18:23.200 --> 00:18:24.279 But they're not protecting it. 396 00:18:24.680 --> 00:18:27.680 I think we need to give an examination. But those 397 00:18:28.240 --> 00:18:28.680 shut up. 398 00:18:28.759 --> 00:18:31.279 Those companies aren't firewalls. They're like, hey, if you get hacked, 399 00:18:31.279 --> 00:18:33.359 we'll help you out right. Isn't that what LifeLock and 400 00:18:33.400 --> 00:18:34.079 all them are they? 401 00:18:34.119 --> 00:18:36.759