Speaker 1: What's up everyone, and welcome back to the program. In
Speaker 1: this episode, we're getting right back to Judge Hipler's order
Speaker 1: on the genetic genealogy. Second in Marylyn VERUS King decided
Speaker 1: after Skinner, Riley, and Davis, the United States Supreme Court
Speaker 1: confirmed that the objective reasonableness of a privacy interest in
Speaker 1: DNA depends on how the DNA is actually used by
Speaker 1: the government, not what it is capable of revealing. Five
Speaker 1: sixty nine US four thirty five for sixty five twenty thirteen.
Speaker 1: At issue in King was a Maryland statute which permitted
Speaker 1: the warrantless acquisition of a buckle swab from an arrestee
Speaker 1: to obtain a DNA sample. Because the testing was for
Speaker 1: identification purposes, which is constitutionally permissible, and did not reveal
Speaker 1: genetic traits or private medical information, the Court found that
Speaker 1: it did not contravene and arrestees privacy in any way. Notably,
Speaker 1: the DNA testing in King was of the str alleles, which,
Speaker 1: unlike SNP time testing, are not known to have any
Speaker 1: association with genetic disease or any other genetic disposition. However,
Speaker 1: the Court signaled that it's how the DNA is tested
Speaker 1: that is legally relevant, not what it is capable of
Speaker 1: revealing to wit, and even if non coding alleles could
Speaker 1: provide some information, they are not in fact tested for
Speaker 1: that end. It's undisputed that law enforcement officers analyze DNA
Speaker 1: for the sole purpose of generating unique identifying number against
Speaker 1: which future samples may be matched. This parallels a similar
Speaker 1: safeguard based on actual practice in the school drug testing context,
Speaker 1: where the court deemed it significant that the tests at
Speaker 1: issue here look only for drugs and not for whether
Speaker 1: the student is, for example, epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic. If
Speaker 1: the future police analyze samples to determine, for instance, and
Speaker 1: arrestees predisposition for a particular disease or other hereditary factors
Speaker 1: not relevant to identity, that case would present additional privacy
Speaker 1: concerns not present here. Thus, under King, testing of lawfully
Speaker 1: obtained DNA samples may run a foul of the Fourth
Speaker 1: Amendment only if law enforcement uses it for purposes irrelevant
Speaker 1: to identification. Otherwise, it is no more of a search
Speaker 1: for Fourth Amendment purposes than the testing of fingerprints. C. Burns,
Speaker 1: nine eighty eight at three sixty six, Noting that if
Speaker 1: law enforcement had tested the defendants DNA to reveal physiology
Speaker 1: and health conditions, such as genetic predisposition to cancer, it
Speaker 1: might implicate privacy interests, but law enforcement did not do so.
Speaker 1: Rain Or ninety nine A three D that petitioner's DNA
Speaker 1: could have disclosed more intimate information is of no moment
Speaker 1: in the present case because there is no allegation that
Speaker 1: the police tested is DNA sample for that purpose State
Speaker 1: versus ad Hon Washington, two thousand and seven. While DNA
Speaker 1: has potential of revealing a vast amount of personal information,
Speaker 1: no privacy interest was implicated where the testing of DNA
Speaker 1: was limited to identification purposes. Here, defendant provided no evidence
Speaker 1: that SNP profile developed from q dot one one through
Speaker 1: IgG revealed any genetic predispositions or physiological or medical conditions.
Speaker 1: As mister Helwig testified, the SNPs that carry such sensitive
Speaker 1: information are not targeted or revealed in IgG because they
Speaker 1: are neither relevant, nor probative, nor appropriate to the identification process,
Speaker 1: which is the goal of IgG. Rather, IgG only implicates
Speaker 1: those SNPs associated with ancestry and genealogy in order to
Speaker 1: determine genetic associations, build a family tree, and identify potential
Speaker 1: genetic relatives of the uploaded SNP profile. It's simply an
Speaker 1: identification tool. In this regard, Carpenter is unavailing authority, as
Speaker 1: has been found by other courts addressing the issue of
Speaker 1: privacy interests in DNA. Generally, the CLI and Carbenter was
Speaker 1: not used as an identification tool. It was used as
Speaker 1: a comprehensive surveillance tool after a suspect had already been identified.
Speaker 1: At best, Carbenter can be applied to technologies that provide
Speaker 1: the government with comprehensive surveillance of known persons physical movements.
Speaker 1: This is not the type of information the DNA provided
Speaker 1: in this case. Law enforcement here extracted and analyzed the
Speaker 1: DNA of unknown suspects solely for identification purposes. It provided
Speaker 1: no information as to the location of a known person
Speaker 1: and does not begin to approach the surveillance described in Carpenter.
Speaker 1: Riley is distinguishable as well as it was context driven.
Speaker 1: Focusing on the lack of connection between the justifications underpinning
Speaker 1: the search incident to arrest, exception to the warrant requirement
Speaker 1: and a search of digital data on a cell phone,
Speaker 1: the court noted that after an arrestee cell phone is
Speaker 1: secured by officers, the digital data it contains cannot harm
Speaker 1: the officer or be destroyed. Thus the search of the
Speaker 1: digital data becomes solely a phishing expedition without justification. Here,
Speaker 1: by contrast, law enforcement analyzed the DNA from a crime
Speaker 1: scene item associated with a weapon for purposes of identifying
Speaker 1: the perpetrator. Identification is an accepted justification for testing DNA.
Speaker 1: Thus Riley is unavailing. Moreover, even assuming that there were
Speaker 1: sensitive genetic details revealed by the IgG performed here, the
Speaker 1: fact that the DNA was obtained from a crime scene
Speaker 1: and analyzed for purposes of identifying the perpetrator displaces any
Speaker 1: reasonable expectation of privacy. The Court of Appeals of Washington
Speaker 1: recently came to the same conclusion under similar facts. In
Speaker 1: state Verus Hartman, law enforcement extracted DNA from seamen and
Speaker 1: hairror left on a murdered victim's body. The DNA was
Speaker 1: then sent to a genealogy consultant, who uploaded a genetic
Speaker 1: profile to various genealogy databases for analysis. From that analysis,
Speaker 1: law enforcement learned that the suspect had alleles related to
Speaker 1: substance abuse, bipolar disorder, and baldness and was approximately nine
Speaker 1: percent Native American idea nine sixty. The genealogists use the
Speaker 1: information obtained from the databases and other resources to begin
Speaker 1: building a family tree, from which he learned there was
Speaker 1: an instance of misattributed paternity in the suspect's family. Her
Speaker 1: research ultimately appointed law enforcement toward the defendant. Like here,
Speaker 1: the defendant and Hartman argued he had a reasonable privacy
Speaker 1: interest in the DNA extracted from the seamen, which law
Speaker 1: enforcement violated through its analysis revealing private personal details. In
Speaker 1: declining to recognize his privacy interest as reasonable, the court
Speaker 1: observed it was a well established rule that analysis of
Speaker 1: evidence left behind at a crime scene does not require
Speaker 1: a warrant where the abandoned evidence contains DNA. Even though
Speaker 1: DNA contains a wealth of personal information, the court observed
Speaker 1: that the DNA was not only abandoned. The analysis performed
Speaker 1: by law enforcement was to determine the killer's identity and
Speaker 1: nothing more. Thus, even though the analysis reveal personal details,
Speaker 1: they were identifying characteristics that served to narrow the suspect
Speaker 1: pool and therefore did not run a foul of the
Speaker 1: Fourth Amendment. This holding highlights another important point. It is
Speaker 1: the status of the individuals whose DNA is tested that
Speaker 1: helps frame the reasonableness of the privacy expectation In Davis
Speaker 1: relied upon heavily by defendant, the Fourth Circuits holding arrested
Speaker 1: entirely on the fact that the DNA tested was taken
Speaker 1: from clothing police seized years earlier, when the defendant was
Speaker 1: a crime victim, noting, we agree with the District Court
Speaker 1: that a person who is solely a crime victim does
Speaker 1: not lose all reasonable expectation of privacy in his or
Speaker 1: her DNA material simply because it has come into the
Speaker 1: lawful possession of the police. And although Davis later was
Speaker 1: arrested because the police seized his clothing when he was
Speaker 1: solely a crime victim, we conclude that his latter arrest
Speaker 1: does not eradicate his expectation of privacy in his DNA material.
Speaker 1: In fact, the District Court affirmed in Davis drew a
Speaker 1: distinction between the analysis of crime scene DNA and other DNA,
Speaker 1: stating this finding would not, as the government argues, require
Speaker 1: the police to seek a warrant in order to analyze
Speaker 1: any items recovered from the crime scene for a DNA evidence,
Speaker 1: no one would argue, for example, that a rapist retains
Speaker 1: a reasonable expectation of privacy in the DNA contained in
Speaker 1: the semen that he leaves on his victim. Society considers
Speaker 1: it reasonable that if one has committed a crime, any
Speaker 1: evidence one leaves behind while doing so is fair game.
Speaker 1: The intentional volitional act of committing a crime itself supports
Speaker 1: the theory, and the criminal intends to abandon any privacy
Speaker 1: interests he has in his blood, fluid cells, etc. That
Speaker 1: he may leave behind at the crime scene. Furthermore, the
Speaker 1: very fact that a given area is a crime scene
Speaker 1: changes the balance of interest relevant to a Fourth Amendment
Speaker 1: analysis of the crime scene evidence. This distinction between crime
Speaker 1: scene DNA and other DNA likewise renders Skinner of no
Speaker 1: use to defendant. In Skinner, the urine was collected from
Speaker 1: employees for workplace purposes and subjected to testing. It was
Speaker 1: not obtained to be tested for identification purposes. It was
Speaker 1: obtained to test whether the employees had drugs or alcohol
Speaker 1: in their system. Had it been urine that was left
Speaker 1: by an unknown suspect out a crime scene and then
Speaker 1: tested to determine identity, the result will undoubtedly be different.
Speaker 1: Even legal Commentators who advocate for increased protection over DNA
Speaker 1: evidence agree that the Fourth Amendment does not prevent law
Speaker 1: enforcement from analyzing genetic evidence left at a crime scene.
Speaker 1: See Adrian and Kitchen genetic privacy and latent crime scene
Speaker 1: DNA of non suspects. How the law can protect an
Speaker 1: individual's right to genetic privacy while respecting the government's important
Speaker 1: interest in combating crime. If the DNA was found on
Speaker 1: the victim, on a murder weapon, or on another object
Speaker 1: closely related to the crime, that DNA may be analyzed
Speaker 1: without implicating the Fourth Amendment. In some defendant's arguments find
Speaker 1: no support under the law any privacy interests he can
Speaker 1: claim in his DNA was abandoned along with the sheath
Speaker 1: to which he claims no ownership or knowledge. Even if
Speaker 1: no such abandonment occurred, defendant has not demonstrated it is
Speaker 1: reasonable to recognize a privacy interest in DNA left at
Speaker 1: a crime scene, particularly when it's analyzed for identification purposes
Speaker 1: and nothing more. Further, to find that defendant retained a
Speaker 1: reasonable privacy interest in DNA left at the crime scene, indeed,
Speaker 1: on an item intimately associated with the suspected weapon, would
Speaker 1: have the untenable effect of eliminating the use of abandoned
Speaker 1: DNA as an investigative tool. As observed by the United
Speaker 1: States Supreme Court and King. This tool has utmost importance
Speaker 1: since the first use of forensic DNA analysis to catch
Speaker 1: a rapist and murderer in England in nineteen eighty six.
Speaker 1: Law enforcement, the defense bar, and the courts of ignite
Speaker 1: knowledge DNA testings on paralleled ability both to exonerate the
Speaker 1: wrongly convicted and to identify the guilty. It has potential
Speaker 1: to significantly improve both the criminal justice system and police
Speaker 1: investigative practices. Neither society nor the court are prepared to
Speaker 1: go where defendant seeks to take us. Therefore, because the
Speaker 1: development of the SNP profile did not contravene defendants Forth
Speaker 1: Amendment rights suppression is not warranted. All right, We're going
Speaker 1: to wrap up right here, and in the next episode
Speaker 1: we're gonna pick up with b. Defendant is not established
Speaker 1: a forth Amendment violation with regard to the trash pull
Speaker 1: and testing of DNA. Therefrom If you'd like to contact me,
Speaker 1: you can do that at Bobby Kopuci at ProtonMail dot com.
Speaker 1: That's bo B B y C. Ap u Cci at
Speaker 1: proton mail dot com, or if you prefer, you can
Speaker 1: find me on x at Bobby Underscore capu Cci. All
Speaker 1: of the links that go with this episode can be
Speaker 1: found in the description box. What's up everyone, and welcome
Speaker 1: back to the program. In this episode, we're going to
Speaker 1: spin back out to Moscow and we're going to pick
Speaker 1: up where we left off with Judge Hipler's ruling on
Speaker 1: the genetic information b Defendant has not established a Fourth
Speaker 1: Amendment violation with regard to the trash poll and testing
Speaker 1: of DNA therefrom. Defendant next asserts that law enforcement's trash
Speaker 1: poll from his parents Pennsylvania residence and subsequent DNA testing
Speaker 1: thereon constituted warrantless and on reasonable searches mandating suppression. He
Speaker 1: argues he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
Speaker 1: parents' garbage that was violated when the law enforcement arranged
Speaker 1: for a trash poll. The privacy interest, according to defendant,
Speaker 1: is predicated on not only Monroe County's municipal ordinance prohibiting
Speaker 1: anyone other than a garbage collector from collecting the Coburger's
Speaker 1: family's curbside trash, but also from the fact that the
Speaker 1: coburgers resided in a gated neighborhood and the garbage cans
Speaker 1: were on the driveway as opposed to a public area.
Speaker 1: While defending a knowledges minding precedent holds otherwise, he is
Speaker 1: ERTs is it time to rethink these decisions and find
Speaker 1: a reasonable expectation of privacy exists? If not under the
Speaker 1: Fourth Amendment, then under the increased protection afforded by Article I,
Speaker 1: Section seventeen of the Idaho Constitution. Alternatively, he argues that
Speaker 1: even if the trash pull was lawful, the testing of
Speaker 1: the DNA found on the items of trash was not
Speaker 1: under Skinner and Davis supra. However, after defendant filed his motion,
Speaker 1: the Idaho Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in Donado and
Speaker 1: rejected the very argument asserted by defendant here, i e.
Speaker 1: That a local waste management ordinance can create a reasonable
Speaker 1: expectation of privacy State vers Polie, Idaho twenty twenty four.
Speaker 1: An objective expectation of privacy is not created simply because
Speaker 1: an ordinance aimed at maintaining society's interest in sanitation dictates
Speaker 1: how trash is to be collected. As for the subsequent
Speaker 1: DNA testing of the discarded items. Relevant here is the
Speaker 1: abandonment theory. This court is bound by the decisions of
Speaker 1: the Idaho Supreme Court. There are no facts presented here
Speaker 1: that meaningfully distinguished this case from Donato or Polizi. That
Speaker 1: the garbage cans may have been placed in the coburger's
Speaker 1: driveway for collection, as opposed to on a public road,
Speaker 1: and that the coburger's neighborhood was gated are legally irrelevant factors,
Speaker 1: given that the garbage was placed for the purpose of
Speaker 1: having it collected by another state. Versus McCall, Idaho eight
Speaker 1: eighty five, two thousand and one, finding no reasonable expectation
Speaker 1: of privacy in garbage placed out for collection, regardless of
Speaker 1: whether it was in or outside the defendant's curtilage Greenwood,
Speaker 1: forty six, US at forty and forty one. Privacy interest
Speaker 1: in trash is lost when it's deposited in an area
Speaker 1: particularly suited for public inspection and public consumption for the
Speaker 1: express purpose of having strangers take it. Therefore, the trash
Speaker 1: poll did not contravene defendants for the amendment rights. Moreover,
Speaker 1: as already discussed, it's well settled that one abandons a
Speaker 1: privacy interest in one's DNA by discarding an item containing
Speaker 1: the DNA. By throwing away an item of trash containing
Speaker 1: his DNA, defendant cannot object to the testing of that DNA,
Speaker 1: particularly given that it was a standard DNA testing. Consequently,
Speaker 1: no suppression is warranted with respect to the trash pull
Speaker 1: and subsequent testing. See. Defendant cannot establish the search of
Speaker 1: the genetic genealogy databases implicated his Fourth Amendment rights. Defendant's
Speaker 1: final argument is that law enforcements warrantless search of the
Speaker 1: commercial genetic genealogy databases violated his right to privacy in
Speaker 1: his relatives genetic information. Observing that this issue has not
Speaker 1: been addressed by the United States Supreme Court or Idaho's
Speaker 1: appellate courts, he asks this court to recognize, as a
Speaker 1: matter of first impression that he has a reasonable expectation
Speaker 1: of privacy in the genetics he shares with his relatives,
Speaker 1: and further find that such privacy was not undermined when
Speaker 1: his relatives uploaded their genetic information to the commercial genetic
Speaker 1: genealogy databases. Alternatively, he claims that the FBI search of
Speaker 1: my heritage and ged match was unlawful because those databases
Speaker 1: were off limits to law enforcement both under the interim
Speaker 1: policy and those databases on terms. The State responds that
Speaker 1: defendant has failed to demonstrate our reasonable expectation of privacy
Speaker 1: either in any of the commercial genetic genealogy databases or
Speaker 1: in his relatives DNA. Even if Defendant could assert a
Speaker 1: privacy interest in the latter, the State contends that such
Speaker 1: interest was lost when such relatives shared that DNA with
Speaker 1: public by uploading it to the databases. Moreover, it argues
Speaker 1: that any violation by law enforcement of the terms of
Speaker 1: service of these databases or its own internal policies does
Speaker 1: not implicate the Fourth Amendment. The Court has already determined
Speaker 1: that defendant failed to show a legitimate privacy interest to
Speaker 1: challenge the development of the SNP profile from Q one
Speaker 1: dot one. If defendant does not have a reasonable expectation
Speaker 1: of privacy in the SNP profile, there is no basis
Speaker 1: to find an expectation of privacy in those portions of
Speaker 1: his SNP profile he shares with genetic relatives. However, to
Speaker 1: the extent the court's prior conclusion does not dispose of
Speaker 1: the issue, Defendant's assertions lack merit because one defendant has
Speaker 1: not shown a reasonable expectation of privacy in any of
Speaker 1: the commercial genetic genealogy databases or in his relatives DNA,
Speaker 1: and two any alleged violation by law enforcement of its
Speaker 1: own policies and those of the databases is not of
Speaker 1: constitutional importance. One defendant cannot demonstrate a reasonable expectation of
Speaker 1: privacy in common segments of DNA a relative as uploaded
Speaker 1: to the public sphere. To invoke the exclusionary rule to
Speaker 1: suppress evidence under the Fourth Amendment, a defendant must establish
Speaker 1: that his own personal rights were violated by an unlawful search.
Speaker 1: Fourth Amendment rights or personal rights, which, like other constitutional rights,
Speaker 1: may not be vicariously asserted. Date vers Rebo one sixty eight, Idaho,
Speaker 1: two thirty four, two thirty eight, four eighty two p
Speaker 1: Dot three D five sixty nine, five seventy three, twenty
Speaker 1: twenty one. Citing Rachis vers Illinois four thirty nine, US
Speaker 1: one twenty eight, one thirty three and thirty four nineteen
Speaker 1: seventy eight, defendant acknowledges that the search challenged is that
Speaker 1: of his relatives uploaded DNA and not his own. To
Speaker 1: get around this hurdle, he claims a reasonable expectation of
Speaker 1: privacy in the segments of shared DNA is relatives uploaded
Speaker 1: to the databases. This argument requires accepting that one, an
Speaker 1: individual has a privacy interest in the genetic makeup of
Speaker 1: another individual, and two that such privacy interest persisted despite
Speaker 1: the other individual sharing his or her genetic makeup with
Speaker 1: the public at large. The court will not make this leap. First,
Speaker 1: there is no authority for defendant's position, granted, given the
Speaker 1: novelty of using commercial genomic platforms as an investigative tool,
Speaker 1: there are a few cases addressing it. However, not one
Speaker 1: has found that a defendant has a reasonable privacy interest
Speaker 1: in a relative shared DNA. The primary case cited by
Speaker 1: both parties and his Hartman, where the State of Washington
Speaker 1: Court of Appeals rejected the defendant's contention that he had
Speaker 1: a privacy interest in those segments of his DNA he
Speaker 1: shared with relatives that was violated when law enforcement search
Speaker 1: commercial genealogy databases to find a familial match to the
Speaker 1: crime scene and the DNA that was found there. Like here,
Speaker 1: the defendant like in DNA to c Sli at issue
Speaker 1: in Carpenter and urge the court to follow Carpenter to
Speaker 1: find that his relatives voluntarily upload of their shared DNA
Speaker 1: did not forfeit his expectation of privacy in the information.
Speaker 1: The Court's determination that the defendant lacked a reasonable privacy
Speaker 1: interest in segments of shared DNA rested on multiple grounds.
Speaker 1: The Court first observed that the sole purpose of a
Speaker 1: genealogy database is to let others search for and share
Speaker 1: private information about the user's personal and family history for
Speaker 1: the purpose of finding relatives. To this end, the Court
Speaker 1: found shared DNA is unlike the CSLI and Carpenter, which
Speaker 1: was not shared for the purpose of public perusal. The
Speaker 1: Court further noted that the comparison of the DNA obtained
Speaker 1: from the crime scene to the genetic profiles of the
Speaker 1: defendant's relatives was limited to identification purposes and therefore did
Speaker 1: not support of privacy interest. In addition, the court found
Speaker 1: no historical protection for voluntarily share genetic material or for
Speaker 1: information posted on websites intended for public access Idea nine,
Speaker 1: seventy eight, and seventy nine. Consequently, the Court concluded that
Speaker 1: because law enforcement's investigation of the genealogy databases did not
Speaker 1: disturb a reasonable privacy interest, the defendant had no standing
Speaker 1: to challenge the search. Other courts addressing the issue have
Speaker 1: held similarly. Cee State versus west In twenty twelve WL
Speaker 1: one two two two nine eight AIS eight six' One District,
Speaker 1: Court october, first twenty twenty, One, minnesota finding no reasonable
Speaker 1: expectation of privacy in genetic identifying information voluntarily uploaded to
Speaker 1: genealogy database by defendant's. Relatives people Versus, williams seventy Seven
Speaker 1: Miscellaneous dot three d seven eighty, two seven eighty five
Speaker 1: one seventy eight N ys three d four twenty four
Speaker 1: to twenty. Three New York Supreme court twenty twenty, two
Speaker 1: finding that the defendant lacks standing to suppress evidence obtained
Speaker 1: through investigative genealogy search Because williams cannot assert a personal
Speaker 1: privacy interest in his RELATIVES dna. Profiles United states Versus,
Speaker 1: mitchell six fifty two F dot THREE d three eighty,
Speaker 1: seven four oh, Nine Third, circuit two thousand and. One
Speaker 1: in responding to the defendant's argument that collection of HIS
Speaker 1: dna upon arrest was improper because andrelia it could be
Speaker 1: used to investigate biological relationships between, Individuals court observed that
Speaker 1: he had no standing to assert the fourth the man
Speaker 1: rights of his. Relatives other than claiming That Hartman court
Speaker 1: fail to appreciate its. Holding defendant has not offered any
Speaker 1: basis or even reasonable analog from which The court could
Speaker 1: make the unprecedented finding that he has a personal privacy
Speaker 1: interest in someone ELSE'S. Dna while he may share segments
Speaker 1: of THIS, dna it's not his OWN dna that was
Speaker 1: searched in the genetic. Databases, further there is no evidence
Speaker 1: he took efforts to shield his genetic RELATIVES dna from
Speaker 1: the public. View See rebo one sixty, Eight. Idaho at
Speaker 1: two thirty nine forty two. P three D at five seventy,
Speaker 1: four noting that a defendant must show he sought to
Speaker 1: preserve the object of the search as. Private, thus since
Speaker 1: he cannot establish a personal expectation of privacy in the item,
Speaker 1: searched he cannot challenge the. Search, moreover any subjective privacy
Speaker 1: interest he claims in his RELATIVES dna is not. Reasonable
Speaker 1: one cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy in what
Speaker 1: is knowingly exposed a public View state. Vers, christiansen one thirty, One.
Speaker 1: Idaho even information exposed to just a single person results
Speaker 1: in forfeiture of a reasonable privacy interest under the third party. Doctrine,
Speaker 1: here defendant's relatives did not voluntarily share their genetic information
Speaker 1: with just a single. Entity they voluntarily shared it with
Speaker 1: hundreds of thousands of other participants See, hartmann five thirty
Speaker 1: four at four thirty. Four consumers frequently upload THEIR dna
Speaker 1: to consumer databases like ged match for the very purpose
Speaker 1: of learning and sharing with strangers the exact private information
Speaker 1: details about their ancestry and familial relations at issue. Here,
Speaker 1: consequently defendant cannot claim any subjective expectation of privacy he
Speaker 1: had was. Reasonable defendant warns that applying the third party
Speaker 1: doctrine mechanically TO dna would have disastrous. Results he points
Speaker 1: out THAT dna can reveal avasked array of private details
Speaker 1: about a. Person, further he argues it is not truly.
Speaker 1: Shared he notes that when one individual PROVIDES dna to
Speaker 1: a consumer genomic, platform the identities of hundreds of genomic
Speaker 1: relatives can be revealed through SHARED dna. Sequences, finally he
Speaker 1: observes that While idaho law protects genetic privacy in some,
Speaker 1: circumstances there are no comparable limits over law enforcement's use
Speaker 1: OF dna taken from a crime. Scene noting THAT dna
Speaker 1: can be left everywhere and last in the environment for
Speaker 1: a long, time he warns that the entire population could
Speaker 1: find themselves the targets of police investigation absent some. Control
Speaker 1: despite the defendants dystopian, warnings The court does not find
Speaker 1: a departure from settled Forth amendment principles is. Warranted In.
Speaker 1: Carboner The United States Supreme court observe that the application
Speaker 1: of third party doctrine does not turn solely on the
Speaker 1: act of. Sharing other factors to consider are the nature
Speaker 1: of the information sought and limitations on the revealing nature
Speaker 1: of the information five eighty FIVE us at three fourteen and.
Speaker 1: Fifteen doing, so The court declined to apply the third
Speaker 1: party doctrine to C sli data obtained from the defendant cellular. Carrier,
Speaker 1: first The court noted that THE csli data is not truly.
Speaker 1: Shared it logs the cell site record by virtue of
Speaker 1: its operation without any affirmative action on the user's part
Speaker 1: beyond powering. Up second, at it observed there are no
Speaker 1: limits on WHAT csli can reveal about a. Person the
Speaker 1: shared portions OF dna defendant relatives uploaded to genetic databases
Speaker 1: do not merit the same. Treatment while the court agrees
Speaker 1: THAT dna can be, revealing LIKE, csli SUCH dna was
Speaker 1: affirmatively shared in this. Case UNLIKE, csli defendant's relatives did
Speaker 1: not simply reveal the information as a byproduct of the
Speaker 1: participating in modern. Society they engaged in an affirmative act
Speaker 1: of uploading THEIR dna to public databases for the very
Speaker 1: purpose of sharing it with. Others, consequently the reasoning In
Speaker 1: carpenter does not. Apply, moreover A na suggestion that defendant's
Speaker 1: relatives preserve their expectation of privacy against law enforcement by
Speaker 1: sharing genetic information on databases that excluded law enforcement is also. Unavailing,
Speaker 1: first consent or non consent to a search goes to
Speaker 1: the reasonableness of the, search not whether a privacy interest
Speaker 1: is objectively. Reasonable, second as, discussed a privacy interest can
Speaker 1: be lost by sharing information with even a single entity
Speaker 1: under the third party. Doctrine even though the relatives may
Speaker 1: not have consented to law enforcements searching their genetic, information
Speaker 1: it was nevertheless shared with other members of the, public
Speaker 1: which is all that is required to remove Any Fourth amendment. Protections.
Speaker 1: Cats three eighty NINE us at three fifty. One in
Speaker 1: some even if defendant could vicariously assert constitutional rights of,
Speaker 1: others a dubious claim at, Best he has not shown
Speaker 1: that any subjective privacy right he may have had in
Speaker 1: his relatives SHARED dna was. Reasonable, Therefore defendant lack standing
Speaker 1: to challenge aw enforcement search of the genetic genealogy. Databases,
Speaker 1: Two defendant has no basis to challenge law enforcements alleged
Speaker 1: violation of its own policies and those of the genealogy
Speaker 1: databases in conducting the. Search defendant next argues that even
Speaker 1: if the court were to Find SHARED dna falls within
Speaker 1: Traditional Fourth amendment, rules as it, has law, enforcement alleged
Speaker 1: search of databases and violation of both the database's terms
Speaker 1: and inn own policy cries out for judicial. Intervention defendant
Speaker 1: has provided no authority that these alleged violations of policy
Speaker 1: or user agreements bear on The Fourth. Amendment, again because
Speaker 1: defendant has not demonstrated reasonable privacy interest in his RELATIVES,
Speaker 1: dna defendant has no basis to challenge the propriety of the. Search,
Speaker 1: second even if he could establish a reasonable privacy, interest
Speaker 1: these alleged violations are of no significance with regard to
Speaker 1: the violation of the database user. Policies while this may
Speaker 1: give rise to a civil action between THE fbi and
Speaker 1: the particular, database or perhaps the individuals WHOSE dna profiles were,
Speaker 1: used defendant is not explained how this implicates The Fourth.
Speaker 1: Amendment at least one state district court is found that
Speaker 1: it does. Not See state Versus westrom twenty twenty ONE
Speaker 1: wl one two two nine eight eight six y', One
Speaker 1: Minnesota District, Court october, fourth twenty twenty. One law enforcement's
Speaker 1: possible violation Of My Heritage Service agreement may subject them
Speaker 1: to action From My, heritage but the court does not
Speaker 1: see any reason why this violation of a private company's
Speaker 1: terms would implicate constitutional. Protections with regard to the FBI's
Speaker 1: alleged violation of its own policies or, guidelines the state
Speaker 1: correctly points out that non compliance with law enforcement policy
Speaker 1: does not provide a basis for A Fourth amendment challenge
Speaker 1: See ren VERSUS us ninety. Six police enforcement, practices even
Speaker 1: if they could practiceably assessed by a, judge vary from
Speaker 1: place to place and from time to. Time we cannot
Speaker 1: accept that the search and seizure protections of The Fourth
Speaker 1: amendment are so. Variable in, addition the interim policy at
Speaker 1: issue here expressly states it's intended to provide internal guidance
Speaker 1: only and does not create a substantative or procedural rights or,
Speaker 1: benefits or impose any legal limitations on otherwise lawful investigative. Techniques,
Speaker 1: therefore violation of its terms can not alone give rise
Speaker 1: to A Fourth amendment. Challenge Where as The court has
Speaker 1: already found the search of the databases was otherwise, lawful
Speaker 1: suppression therefore is not warranted with regard to the database search.
Speaker 1: Conclusion based on the, foregoing The court Denies defendant's motion
Speaker 1: to suppress genetic. Information this document was Dated february nineteenth
Speaker 1: and it was signed By Judge. Hitler if you'd like
Speaker 1: to contact, me you can do that At Bobby kapuci
Speaker 1: at ProtonMail dot. Com that's Bobbycapu cci at ProtonMail dot,
Speaker 1: com or if you, prefer you can find me on
Speaker 1: x At Bobby underscore bap U. Cci all of the
Speaker 1: links that go with this episode can be found in
Speaker 1: the description. Box