Speaker 1: Welcome to the deep dive, where we unpack a stack
Speaker 1: of information to deliver the most important nuggets of knowledge,
Speaker 1: making you well informed fast. Today we're diving into a
Speaker 1: topic that's quickly become well pretty much make or break
Speaker 1: for businesses everywhere. Cybersecurity architecture. I mean, we all see
Speaker 1: the headlines vulnerable software users getting scammed, accidental misconfigurations. The
Speaker 1: potential for disaster is just massive. So how do organizations
Speaker 1: actually go about building defiles that are resilient.
Speaker 2: Well, what's really fascinating here, I think is that every
Speaker 2: single organization, whether they consciously plan for it or not,
Speaker 2: will have a cybersecurity architecture. It just exists. So our
Speaker 2: mission in this deep dive is to unpack the practical steps.
Speaker 2: You know, how do you define, document, validate, and actually
Speaker 2: deliver a security vision that works in the real world.
Speaker 2: And we'll be drawing from a really insightful guide on
Speaker 2: cybersecurity architecture to help shed some light on this pretty
Speaker 2: complex field for you.
Speaker 1: Okay, so let's maybe start with an analogy. The source
Speaker 1: uses a good one. Think about an architect in the
Speaker 1: physical world, like would you feel comfortable writing an elevator
Speaker 1: up to the fiftieth floor of some skyscraper if the
Speaker 1: builders just decided to, I don't know, build it and see.
Speaker 2: If it works exactly No way, Right, A physical architect
Speaker 2: ensures not just safety, but also what the source calls
Speaker 2: fitness of purpose. Imagine building a skyscraper but forgetting the elevators.
Speaker 2: That's a massive oversight. Occupants would be outrage and think
Speaker 2: of the expense to fix it later. Yeah, if we
Speaker 2: connect this to the bigger picture, you know, in enterprise computing,
Speaker 2: the role of an architect is really directly analogous. You've
Speaker 2: got system architects, network architects, software architects, cloud architects, loads more.
Speaker 2: They're all keepers of a vision for their specific area.
Speaker 1: Right, And the source material really drives home that point.
Speaker 1: Even if an organization completely ignores sound design principles, yeah,
Speaker 1: they'll still have a cybersecurity architecture. It's just, like you said,
Speaker 1: an unplanned ad hoc one that sort of evolves organically.
Speaker 1: So what does this actually mean for someone who wants
Speaker 1: a planned, efficient approach? What are the risks of just
Speaker 1: letting it happen?
Speaker 2: Well, that organic approach, the unplanned one, it almost always
Speaker 2: leads to redundant security controls, you know, spending money on
Speaker 2: the same thing twice, plus wasted resources and these glaring
Speaker 2: gaps that frankly often only get discovered during a breach out. Yeah,
Speaker 2: so the real purpose of planning the architecture isn't just
Speaker 2: making it look neat. It's about proactively avoiding those really
Speaker 2: costly reactive fixes later on. It's about having a strategy.
Speaker 1: Okay, So having that strategy is the main goal just
Speaker 1: about stopping the bad guys, keeping attackers out or is
Speaker 1: there a bigger picture here?
Speaker 2: It's definitely broader than just stopping attacks. The core purpose
Speaker 2: really is to create a coherent arrangement of security controls. Yes,
Speaker 2: but controls it specifically support the information systems.
Speaker 1: The one is doing the actual business work.
Speaker 2: Exactly, the systems delivering capabilities to the business. It's about
Speaker 2: making sure the security approach is well planned, that resources
Speaker 2: are used optimally efficiently, and crucially, that the organizational goals
Speaker 2: are actually being met. Security is only really useful if
Speaker 2: it's attached to the organization's mission, right.
Speaker 1: Like increasing market share or enabling a remote workforce, things
Speaker 1: like that.
Speaker 2: Precisely security needs to enable those things, not hinder them.
Speaker 1: Okay, So to protect that mission. We often hear about
Speaker 1: the CIA triad confidentiality, integrity, availability, Could you just quickly
Speaker 1: refresh us on those.
Speaker 2: Absolutely, they're the bedrock. Confidentiality basically making sure information is
Speaker 2: only disclosed to authorize people, simple enough. Integrity meaning the
Speaker 2: information is reliable, trustworthy and can only be changed by
Speaker 2: authorized folks, no unauthorized fiddling. And availability meaning the services,
Speaker 2: the systems, they're actually there and working when you need them,
Speaker 2: even if there's a disaster or an attack ongoing.
Speaker 1: Right, the fundamentals, but the source. It goes beyond just CIA,
Speaker 1: doesn't it. It adds some other dimensions that maybe aren't
Speaker 1: as commonly discussed it does.
Speaker 2: This is where it gets really interesting. I think it
Speaker 2: adds effectiveness, resiliency, and depth.
Speaker 1: Okay.
Speaker 2: Effectiveness is pretty straightforward. Does the control actually reduce risk?
Speaker 2: Does it work? Resiliency is fascinating. It's not just about
Speaker 2: the network staying up, but the security mechanisms themselves being resilient.
Speaker 2: Think of a bane vault. You wouldn't want it to
Speaker 2: just unlock if someone pulls the fire alarm nearby. The
Speaker 2: security itself needs to withstand disruption.
Speaker 1: Uh, okay, that makes sense.
Speaker 2: And depth Depth means applying security across all the layers,
Speaker 2: you know, the whole network stack, from the physical hardware,
Speaker 2: the cables and service or the way up, all the
Speaker 2: way up to the application code itself. Security at every level,
Speaker 2: not just at the perimeter.
Speaker 1: It definitely sounds like a more structured, planned approach. So
Speaker 1: how does the guide suggest an architect actually starts this journey?
Speaker 1: Where do you begin?
Speaker 2: Well, it all starts with establishing context. You absolutely have
Speaker 2: to understand the organization's sort of universal laws, universal laws,
Speaker 2: what things like, it's core goals, was it trying to achieve,
Speaker 2: it's culture, how does it operate? It's risk tolerance, how
Speaker 2: much risk is acceptable? Of course, all the compliance requirements.
Speaker 2: It's subject to regulation standards. The text emphasizes using this
Speaker 2: technique called the seven whys Seven Why get a trace backatolicy?
Speaker 2: Like say we're requiring background screening for new hires. Why
Speaker 2: to ensure staff are trustworthy? Why to protect sensitive data? Why?
Speaker 2: Because that's critical to the business goal of whatever it is.
Speaker 2: You keep asking why until you hit that fundamental goal.
Speaker 2: Because what works in one company culturally or financially might
Speaker 2: be a quote total non starter in another. That context
Speaker 2: is everything that makes a.
Speaker 1: Lot of sense. And once you have that context, how
Speaker 1: do you measure if the architecture you're designing is actually
Speaker 1: any good?
Speaker 2: The source mentioned some key dimensions it does.
Speaker 1: And they seem obvious at first, but the guide adds
Speaker 1: a crucial layer. It's not just about technical effectiveness. So
Speaker 1: the dimensions are effectiveness, does it reduce risk? Maturity? Is
Speaker 1: the process reliable and repeatable, you know like CMMI for
Speaker 1: process improvement efficiency?
Speaker 2: Is it cost effective? Are we getting value? And importantly,
Speaker 2: alignment does it actually fit the organization's skills and culture?
Speaker 1: Ah? Okay, so alignment is key.
Speaker 2: Hugely key. The source points out. You could have a
Speaker 2: security measure that requires say, super specialized digital forensic skills,
Speaker 2: but if your organization always outsources that kind of work,
Speaker 2: then that control isn't really aligned. Even if it's technically
Speaker 2: effective on paper, it won't work well in practice for
Speaker 2: your team.
Speaker 1: Gotcha, So context established dimensions understirred. Then you build the blueprint,
Speaker 1: the actual plan. What's the main goal there? Just writing
Speaker 1: it all down?
Speaker 2: Well? Yes, but the goal of the documentation is critical.
Speaker 2: It's to minimize what the source calls shelfware.
Speaker 1: Shelfware like documents that just sit on a shelf exactly.
Speaker 2: Digital or physical documents that get created may be approved,
Speaker 2: and then nobody looks at them again. They gather dust.
Speaker 2: The documentation must be practical, it must be used, and
Speaker 2: it must be useful to be a living thing. This
Speaker 2: allows others to pick up where you left off, sure,
Speaker 2: but it's also absolutely vital for getting buy in from executives,
Speaker 2: from the tech teams, from the operations folks who have
Speaker 2: to live with it day to day.
Speaker 1: Right, buy in seems crucial, and to build that useful
Speaker 1: d print, the source says you need to understand three
Speaker 1: key things, assets, threats, and risks. What counts as an asset?
Speaker 1: Is it just servers and laptops?
Speaker 2: No, much Broader assets aren't just the technical kit. They
Speaker 2: can be data, customer lists, intellectual property. They can be personnel,
Speaker 2: key staff, information itself, or even just money. Basically anything
Speaker 2: of value that the organization needs to protect. Understanding those assets,
Speaker 2: then figuring out the threats, what bad things could happen
Speaker 2: to them, and the resulting risk that forms the core
Speaker 2: of your blueprint.
Speaker 1: Okay, this sounds methodical, which is good, but the real world,
Speaker 1: especially in tech, moves incredibly fast. Doesn't it.
Speaker 2: The source really hammers this point about software release cycles
Speaker 2: accelerating to this breakneck pace. I mean the stats are
Speaker 2: why Amazon deploying new code every second, Google doing over
Speaker 2: four million builds a day. How does traditional security planning
Speaker 2: keep up?
Speaker 1: It often doesn't, which is the problem. That's precisely where
Speaker 1: something called system security engineering comes in. There are established
Speaker 1: approaches like the one in nisted SP eight hundred and
Speaker 1: one sixty one, which is a well respected guide for this, okay,
Speaker 1: and the core idea is tailoring your processes so security
Speaker 1: gets baked in from the absolute start of development, not
Speaker 1: just bolted on the end when it's often too late
Speaker 1: or too expensive to fix things.
Speaker 2: Probably baked in, not bolted on. I like that.
Speaker 1: Yeah. The guide highlights how security needs to be woven
Speaker 1: through the entire software development life cycle the SDLC, right
Speaker 1: from requirements gathering through the design phase, maybe using threat
Speaker 1: modeling tools there to proactively look.
Speaker 2: For issues, all the way through testing, verification, and that
Speaker 2: continuous quality assurance, often using automated testing.
Speaker 1: So security becomes part of the development rhythm, not a
Speaker 1: separate hurdle.
Speaker 2: That's the goal. Now, what does this look like when
Speaker 2: you actually implement and specific things. That's where you create
Speaker 2: what the Source calls technical implementation strategies. It's about translating
Speaker 2: those high level goals like protect customer data into specific.
Speaker 1: Mechanisms, like choosing a specific encryption product.
Speaker 2: Exactly, or deciding strategically where to place your VPN concentrators
Speaker 2: on the network for remote access. It's making concrete choices,
Speaker 2: and it's iterative. You make a choice, you see how
Speaker 2: it works, you adjust. The Source uses a great analogy
Speaker 2: correcting a one gree error in spaceflight. It's way cheaper
Speaker 2: and easier to do it early in the journey than
Speaker 2: later on when you're way off course.
Speaker 1: Makes sense. So you've made these choices, these technical strategies,
Speaker 1: how do you check if they're actually going to hold
Speaker 1: up against real attackers? How do you validate them?
Speaker 2: This is where some really useful tools come into play.
Speaker 2: The source specifically suggests using things like the mi era
Speaker 2: AT and TK.
Speaker 1: Matrix, AH, yes, ATT and CK. That's pretty well known now.
Speaker 2: It is, and for good reason. It's essentially this huge
Speaker 2: globally accessed sable knowledge basic catalog really of adversarial tactics
Speaker 2: and techniques, all based on real world observations of attackers.
Speaker 2: So it helps architects think through how an attacker might
Speaker 2: try to achieve their objectives against the specific solutions you've chosen.
Speaker 2: It gives you this really high resolution view for evaluating
Speaker 2: threats before an attack happens, so.
Speaker 1: You can sort of red team your own design using
Speaker 1: known attacker methods in a way.
Speaker 2: Yes, it provides a structured way to think like an
Speaker 2: attacker and find potential weaknesses in your plan.
Speaker 1: Okay, great, so planning, implementing, validating. Now how do you
Speaker 1: know over time if it's all actually working, if it's
Speaker 1: staying effective.
Speaker 2: Right, because the job's never really done. That's where telemetry
Speaker 2: and strategic metrics become absolutely key.
Speaker 1: Telemetry meaning collecting data from the system.
Speaker 2: Yeah, collecting operational data. But it's not just about raw numbers.
Speaker 2: The source makes a good point just counting, say, the
Speaker 2: total number of vulnerabilities, isn't that helpful on its own?
Speaker 1: Why not? It seems like a useful.
Speaker 2: Number Because your environment changes, Right, you might add hundreds
Speaker 2: of new devices, Your total vulnerability count might go up.
Speaker 2: But is that because you're doing worse or just because
Speaker 2: you have more stuff? So the recommendation is to normalize
Speaker 2: your key performance indicators your KPIs instead of total vulnerabilities,
Speaker 2: track vulnerabilities per device for instance.
Speaker 1: Ah okay, so that gives you a consistent score regardless
Speaker 1: of whether your network grows or strengths.
Speaker 2: Exactly, it gives you a meaningful way to track if
Speaker 2: you're actually improving your security posture over time.
Speaker 1: Okay, but let's be real. In any complex project, things
Speaker 1: go wrong, stuff happens. What are some of the common
Speaker 1: pitfalls or gotchas that architects run into? According to the source.
Speaker 2: Oh yeah, the guy definitely addresses the messy reality, and
Speaker 2: it highlights several common gotchas, things like scope failures, the
Speaker 2: project balloons, out of control requirements, misunderstandings, building the wrong
Speaker 2: thing because the needs weren't clear, lack of buy in
Speaker 2: we talked about that, super critical communication breakdowns between teams,
Speaker 2: and of course just plain old technical issues. Something doesn't
Speaker 2: work as expected. And again the source stresses how crucial
Speaker 2: good documentation is here not just to prevent problems, but
Speaker 2: as a tool to help diagnose and resolve them when
Speaker 2: they inevitably pop up.
Speaker 1: So the blueprint isn't just for building, it's for troubleshooting too.
Speaker 2: Absolutely.
Speaker 1: The book also gives some practical tips and tricks from
Speaker 1: experienced architects right for navigating these choppy waters. Any that
Speaker 1: particularly stood out, Yeah, there were.
Speaker 2: Some really good ones. Cultivating empathy was a big one.
Speaker 2: Understanding the pressures and perspectives of other teams you need.
Speaker 1: To work with mmm important but often overlooked.
Speaker 2: Definitely. Another was the idea of having just enough process.
Speaker 2: Too little is chaos, sure, but too much process creates drag,
Speaker 2: bureaucracy and slows everything down. It's about finding that sweet.
Speaker 1: Spot, making security an enabler, not.
Speaker 2: A roadblock exactly. And the importance of over communicating was
Speaker 2: stressed too, especially when you're implementing changes. You really can't
Speaker 2: communicate too much to make sure everyone's on board and
Speaker 2: understand why.
Speaker 1: That idea of just enough process seems related to another
Speaker 1: concept mentioned, Kerkhoff's principle, the idea about designing systems assuming
Speaker 1: the details.
Speaker 2: Will get out precisely. Kirkhoff's principle basically says, design your
Speaker 2: security systems as if all the details about how they work,
Speaker 2: except for the secret keys, will eventually become public knowledge.
Speaker 1: Anyway, that sounds counterintuitive for security. Don't you want to
Speaker 1: keep the design secret.
Speaker 2: You'd think so, but the principle argues against security through obscurity.
Speaker 2: If your security relies only on keeping the design secret,
Speaker 2: it's fragile. More importantly, designing with his openness in mind
Speaker 2: actually fosters collaboration. It means others, colleagues, maybe even external
Speaker 2: experts can systematically examine the design, poke holes in it,
Speaker 2: provide feedback. Ah.
Speaker 1: So it makes the design itself stronger because more eyes
Speaker 1: have looked at it critically.
Speaker 2: Exactly, It encourages rigorous thinking right from the start, rather
Speaker 2: than relying on secrecy as a crutch. Ultimately, it leads
Speaker 2: to more bless security.
Speaker 1: Okay, so all these pieces context blueprint baking it in validating, handling,
Speaker 1: Gotcha's communication openness. It sounds like it leads towards a
Speaker 1: continuous cycle.
Speaker 2: It does. The ultimate goal is future proofing through what
Speaker 2: the source calls a virtuous cycle of continuous improvement. It
Speaker 2: uses the analogy of a batter and baseball constantly refining
Speaker 2: their swing. It's never perfect, you always keep working on it.
Speaker 1: So the plan doh, check act cycle PDCA.
Speaker 2: Exactly that, planning what you need to do, doing it,
Speaker 2: checking the results using those metrics we talk about, and
Speaker 2: then acting on those results to adjust and improve the plan.
Speaker 2: It's about constantly optimizing your security processes and adapting because
Speaker 2: the threats are always evolving and the organization itself changes
Speaker 2: over time too.
Speaker 1: Wow. Okay, we've definitely covered a lot of ground today,
Speaker 1: from figuring out what a cybersecurity architect actually does to
Speaker 1: the really critical components of designing secure systems, thinking about
Speaker 1: resiliency and depth, and even how to handle the inevitable
Speaker 1: challenges along the way. It really underscore or is that
Speaker 1: building a robust cybersecurity architecture isn't a one off project.
Speaker 1: It's continuous. It requires constant practice, learning and real adaptability.
Speaker 2: Absolutely, and remember maybe the most important thing isn't mastering
Speaker 2: every single tool or technique right away, it's understanding the
Speaker 2: why behind each step. Why are we establishing context, Why
Speaker 2: are we documenting this way? Why are we using this metric?
Speaker 2: Understanding the why allows you to adapt and innovate as
Speaker 2: things change. The ultimate goal is always to make sure
Speaker 2: security helps enable the organization's mission, continuously reducing risk while
Speaker 2: maximizing opportunity.
Speaker 1: Ah that's a great summary. We hope this deep dive
Speaker 1: has given you, our listener, a powerful shortcut to being
Speaker 1: well informed about cybersecurity architecture. So for you, the learner
Speaker 1: listening in, maybe the key takeaway is this, how could
Speaker 1: you apply some of these principles, like just enough process
Speaker 1: or maybe designing for public knowledge in your own work
Speaker 1: or learning, even if it's completely outside cybersecurity. What's maybe
Speaker 1: one small iterative change you could make to a process
Speaker 1: you care about to start your own little virtuous cycle
Speaker 1: of improvement. Something to think about. We've really only scratched
Speaker 1: the surface here, of course, There's always so much more
Speaker 1: to learn in this field. Keep digging, keep exploring, and
Speaker 1: we'll catch you next time on the deep dive