Speaker 1: Hey, everybody, welcome to another episode of Eyes on Geopolitics,
Speaker 1: especially on today. I'm joined by Andy Milburn. Of course
Speaker 1: you know him. All his links are in the description.
Speaker 1: Check him out there. Of course he's got a great
Speaker 1: new article that he put out on War on the Rocks.
Speaker 1: That link is also in the descriptions to check it out,
Speaker 1: and basically, I want to do it justice. You know,
Speaker 1: it's called Gaza and the conduct of Urban war, Civilian harm,
Speaker 1: risk and responsibility. The first line pops out to me.
Speaker 1: You know, urban warfare is often invoked as an alibi,
Speaker 1: dench terrain and embedded enemy, human shields and perfect intelligence.
Speaker 1: You guys, we're gonna talk about the article, but please
Speaker 1: go check it out. That link is in the description. Andy.
Speaker 1: What's up man, It's good to see you.
Speaker 2: Yeah, good to see you too. Thanks very much for
Speaker 2: having me on.
Speaker 1: Please, this is your shiltern down.
Speaker 2: So I think you know, probably the best way of
Speaker 2: doing this, of course you're the producer, is I can
Speaker 2: give you just an overview of the article for those
Speaker 2: of our audience it can save please do read it
Speaker 2: save you that troup. By the way, so the article
Speaker 2: came out in War on the Rocks yesterday. And you
Speaker 2: know I've written I'm not I'm not a prolific article writer,
Speaker 2: but I've had a number of articles published, and I
Speaker 2: would say just as far as direct feedback, this is
Speaker 2: this is solicited, more direct feedback than any other article
Speaker 2: that I have written, just in the you know, the
Speaker 2: first twenty four hours it was out. It was published
Speaker 2: in the Early Bird, which is kind of the circular
Speaker 2: that goes out every day. It's not sent out by
Speaker 2: d O D, but it goes out throughout d O D.
Speaker 2: It's produced by I think it's the Military Times, and
Speaker 2: it's a compilation of top you know, defense use over
Speaker 2: the previous twenty four hour period. And it was on
Speaker 2: that this morning, and yeah, I didn't. You know, honestly,
Speaker 2: this is a topic, as you know, that I've been
Speaker 2: looking at researching for a while. It plays to my background.
Speaker 2: I'll talk about that in a little bit, and it's
Speaker 2: part of the research for my book. I do want
Speaker 2: to say before I started talking about this that you know,
Speaker 2: the research, a lot of it came from personal interviews.
Speaker 2: Over fifty interviews conducted with members of the IDF, most
Speaker 2: of whom were involved in the targeting process. At some stage.
Speaker 2: A lot of them were commanders, some of them were
Speaker 2: intelligence officers, Target tears, and even even the ones who
Speaker 2: defended the methodology were open and honest about how it
Speaker 2: is done. So I was able to get beneath the
Speaker 2: surface of you know, hey, we have these procedures, and
Speaker 2: look at how exactly they those procedures were implemented. So yeah,
Speaker 2: so you know, to to your point, the urban warfare
Speaker 2: is often treated as an alibi. You know, the dense
Speaker 2: terrain and embedded enemy human shields, just the uncertainty of war,
Speaker 2: imperfect intelligence, you know, all of those that kind of
Speaker 2: use to to justify harmed to civilians or to explain
Speaker 2: civilian casualties. You know, they're just my article is well,
Speaker 2: no that by themselves, they are not. You know, all
Speaker 2: of those things are real, but they don't explain outcomes
Speaker 2: by themselves. Because every modern military that has fought in
Speaker 2: cities in recent years faces uncertainty and civilian presence. And
Speaker 2: what distinguishes campaigns it isn't how commanders respond to that uncertainty.
Speaker 2: It is I mean it is it's how commanders respond
Speaker 2: to that uncertainty. It isn't the uncertainty itself it's you know,
Speaker 2: how do they prioritize risk, what levels of civilian harm,
Speaker 2: the civilian death are treated as as acceptable. And that's
Speaker 2: the core argument of my article. And I you know,
Speaker 2: I begin I point out the scale of civilian and
Speaker 2: death in Gaza is exceptional in terms in total numbers,
Speaker 2: and I talk about the fact that you know, we're
Speaker 2: in the seventies of thousands, and that the Lancet British
Speaker 2: paper points out that indeed the actual numbers may be
Speaker 2: as high as forty percent higher than that when you
Speaker 2: factor in indirect deaths from starvation, from lack of medical care,
Speaker 2: you know, polluted water, whatever it may be. And so
Speaker 2: you're probably talking about civilian death hole of over one
Speaker 2: hundred thousand, which is staggering. But then you know, you
Speaker 2: have to ask, so what percentage of of those tens
Speaker 2: of thousands are combatants? That's really the question. And you know,
Speaker 2: even when you look at just the demographics, the undisputed figures, right,
Speaker 2: two thirds of those figures are women and children. Now, Hamas,
Speaker 2: aside from using them as suicide bombers, Hamas doesn't use
Speaker 2: women as fighters. And by children I mean sixteen or
Speaker 2: below generally, you know, too low to be to below
Speaker 2: the military age males. Right, So two thirds of women
Speaker 2: and children obviously not combatants. Now, that already puts Gas's
Speaker 2: death toll of civilians ratio civilians combatants on a different
Speaker 2: level than, for instance, and mos All, where combatants were
Speaker 2: around fifty. You know, people can challenge my numbers, you
Speaker 2: can look these up. But between forty five and sixty
Speaker 2: percent of total deaths right, and Fallujah around the same.
Speaker 2: You'd have to go all the way back to Grosny
Speaker 2: right in the nineties, Grosney one and two, which Grosny
Speaker 2: is commonly regarded as the most the most civilian death
Speaker 2: intensive battle since the Secondorld War. You'd have to go
Speaker 2: back to that find comparable numbers, and even then they're
Speaker 2: not quite at the level. The ratios aren't quite the
Speaker 2: same Grosney it was about it was two thirds, it
Speaker 2: was around seventy percent. But recently this is coming from
Speaker 2: the Israelis, uncovered by Investigator for Reporting, and again you
Speaker 2: can look this up. The Israelis themselves have have come
Speaker 2: up with figures that show that eighty three percent of
Speaker 2: those killed were civilians, which is an extraordinary, extraordinarily high toll.
Speaker 2: And When I say extraordinary, I'm not just shooting from
Speaker 2: the hip. I mean compared to h it's great. To
Speaker 2: other battles and one afare right?
Speaker 1: Was that leaked?
Speaker 2: What was that?
Speaker 1: Was that?
Speaker 2: Yeah? It was leaked. Yeah, it was leaked, and I
Speaker 2: was picked up by the Guardian and Israeli. I can't
Speaker 2: remember the name of the outlet, it's it's a strange name.
Speaker 2: It's plus nine seven two or something, but it's a
Speaker 2: well known Israeli media outlet and they have published those reports.
Speaker 2: So that's irrefutable that Israeli intelligence came up with those figures.
Speaker 2: Those aren't produced by the Health Ministry or anything else
Speaker 2: that coming from the Israelis themselves. So when you know,
Speaker 2: my point is this, when civilian death reaches that scale
Speaker 2: and shows that level of demographic graphic consistency, something's going on,
Speaker 2: all right, Something's going on beyond terrain density or enemy tactics,
Speaker 2: because we had all of that shit and Mozar and
Speaker 2: flu Ja I was involved in both battles, and so
Speaker 2: that's you know, that that invites a closer analysis of
Speaker 2: how force was applied because they're in lies the answer
Speaker 2: to why those figures are so high, and this is
Speaker 2: an argument about intent. Okay, I'm not I'm not going
Speaker 2: launching down the genocide route. It's an argument about process.
Speaker 2: Civilian deaths and war are not random accidents, that the
Speaker 2: predictable outcome of how targets are, how targets are defined,
Speaker 2: how intelligence uncertainty is handled, what what weapons are chosen,
Speaker 2: and how much risk commanders are willing to accept or
Speaker 2: for them for their own forces or to transfer. At
Speaker 2: what point do they transfer that risk? What's the threshold
Speaker 2: for them transferring that risk onto this fullian population? And look,
Speaker 2: I've commanded as un D and this isn't me chest
Speaker 2: beating here, but I've commanded US forces in urban combat,
Speaker 2: including in Fallujah and mos All. I've you know, I've
Speaker 2: with the moral weight of approving strikes where civilians might
Speaker 2: be present, where you're balancing that against your obligation to
Speaker 2: support the forces in the fight themselves, knowing that delays
Speaker 2: may result in more casualties for them. You know, I
Speaker 2: get it's those are not easy decisions, but I've had
Speaker 2: to make those decisions scores for be hundreds of times.
Speaker 2: And you know the other piece is that I know
Speaker 2: as well as anyone that uncertainty never disappears and more.
Speaker 2: But in professional militaries it's supposed to tighten restraint, not
Speaker 2: loosen it. So when intelligence is ambiguous, when you don't
Speaker 2: have a good handle on civilian patterns of life, or
Speaker 2: when you lose custody of a target, and you know,
Speaker 2: I can get into that moment. What that means, The
Speaker 2: expectation is that strikes either slow down or they stop.
Speaker 2: You know, you pause precisely because the risk of killing
Speaker 2: civilians increases. And you may ask, well, why do you care? Well,
Speaker 2: you care because you know, as I've said before, we fight.
Speaker 2: We fight with the values that we represent in Western militaries, right,
Speaker 2: we don't adopt those at the enemy. But even if
Speaker 2: you don't give a shit, right, even if you don't
Speaker 2: give a shit about the civilian population, there are good
Speaker 2: pragmatic reasons not to slaughter them in mass, because you
Speaker 2: are you may be solving the immediate problem, but you're
Speaker 2: going to generate far greater problems for yourself down the line.
Speaker 2: And again I'm not shooting from the hippie. You can
Speaker 2: look at studies. There's a very good one done by
Speaker 2: rand on insurgent regeneration in Afghanistan and Iraq and the
Speaker 2: link between that and civilian casualties, and there is definitely
Speaker 2: a strong link. In other words, you start killing civilians
Speaker 2: willy nilly, you're creating anger, resentment that simmers and feeds
Speaker 2: right into that insurgent narrative. I mean, that's not rocket
Speaker 2: sciences that you can you can understand that. And in Gaza,
Speaker 2: I can only imagine where something like seventy five percent
Speaker 2: of families have lost people I mean close, you know,
Speaker 2: the families, close relatives. I can't imagine the level of
Speaker 2: resembling an anger that is simmering. And if you and
Speaker 2: I were in that position, we would want to get revenge,
Speaker 2: even though we're not vengeful people, be at least you're not.
Speaker 2: But in Gaza, I think that's.
Speaker 1: I mean, that's just human nature, right like you know,
Speaker 1: of course your mom dies.
Speaker 2: Why why would you imagine otherwise? Why would you imagine
Speaker 2: that a population that is that has incurred that number
Speaker 2: of casualties, whether it's seventy thousand or one hundred thousand
Speaker 2: in a in a two million, two million a total population,
Speaker 2: why would you assume that life would return to normal
Speaker 2: after that and there would be no sense of resentment
Speaker 2: with that. I mean, imagine that happening in the United
Speaker 2: States city. I mean all these casualties too have occurred
Speaker 2: in an area roughly the size of Philadelphia. So can
Speaker 2: you imagine one hundred thousand deaths and solicitious everywhere you
Speaker 2: turn right at any single building. So anyway, that that
Speaker 2: you know, for those of who accuse me of being
Speaker 2: a bleeding heart and who cares, and there are pragmatic reasons.
Speaker 2: I personally care about the legal reasons, and I care
Speaker 2: about the ethical reasons because I represent I did represent
Speaker 2: the United States military, and I believe in the values
Speaker 2: that we that that we represent, right, but there are
Speaker 2: those who don't give a shit about those values. And
Speaker 2: I would say, well, there's good pragmatic reasons, and you're
Speaker 2: gonna undermine your cause. It's a you're gonna tactical success
Speaker 2: will lead to strategic fail if you're simply slaughtering civilians anyway,
Speaker 2: So you know I talked about, Hey, when when the
Speaker 2: level of uncertainty goes up and you know you're not
Speaker 2: getting good intelligence, you're not getting good patterns of life,
Speaker 2: then then then you have to or you know, for
Speaker 2: us in the US, that means we show more restraint.
Speaker 2: That doesn't mean we see strikes altogether, we don't support
Speaker 2: our forces. We find, you know, other ways of doing it.
Speaker 2: Perhaps you know, we late, we we have a greater
Speaker 2: alliance on direct fire, or we move more cautiously, and
Speaker 2: sometimes that means incurring greater risks your own troops. And
Speaker 2: that's just the nature of the game, that is, that's
Speaker 2: what we're in. I don't mean to say suggest, right,
Speaker 2: And you know I was in Fallujah and and I
Speaker 2: can tell you in absolute contrast to the way the
Speaker 2: IDF operated in Gaza. We went in and cleared every
Speaker 2: single building. We weren't allowed to blow buildings away. We
Speaker 2: could under certain circumstances we were taking fire, but the
Speaker 2: level of authorization for that was relatively high as a
Speaker 2: customary battalion level. And yes, that was frustrating at times,
Speaker 2: and it was terrifying. Yeah, absolutely. I mean I can
Speaker 2: tell you too as an advisor, where every time we
Speaker 2: went in we cleared buildings that had to be an
Speaker 2: American leading the way into you know, knocking down the door,
Speaker 2: going down, going through the fatal funnel, down that hallway
Speaker 2: in the dark, just waiting for someone with a PKAM
Speaker 2: to let rip. It was a terrifying, bloody experience. And
Speaker 2: when you were inside those buildings, and remember our mvgs
Speaker 2: and no especially in the Marine Corps then were pieces
Speaker 2: of crap. And so you were at a disadvantage to
Speaker 2: your enemy. I don't mean to digress here, but absolutely
Speaker 2: you were at a disadvantage. Doesn't matter that you represented
Speaker 2: the most powerful military in the world with all the
Speaker 2: resources we have. When you went in that door and
Speaker 2: it was you leading the way with one guy you know,
Speaker 2: just stay staggered behind you, it was you too against
Speaker 2: whomever was in that house, and you were and because
Speaker 2: you were moving and you were you were silhouetted. You
Speaker 2: were at a disadvantage. But we did that time and
Speaker 2: time again. Now, of course I would hope that now,
Speaker 2: if we had to do it, we'd do a lot
Speaker 2: more with unmanned systems. But but my point is this
Speaker 2: that no one can accuse me again of not understanding
Speaker 2: the problem. Oh yeah, I understand the problem, and I've
Speaker 2: been at at at the kind of the dog's body
Speaker 2: end of this, so anyway, but uh, in in Gaza,
Speaker 2: uncertainty functioned in the opposite direction. It created license rather
Speaker 2: than restraint. That's you know, and in my article I
Speaker 2: show examples of this intelligence gaps were treated permissively.
Speaker 1: So I was like, essentially like, oh, we don't know exactly,
Speaker 1: but like let's just drop whatever.
Speaker 2: But what the hell, yeah, because otherwise our guys are
Speaker 2: going to have to go in there, you know. And
Speaker 2: by the way, it's just one of the last analogy
Speaker 2: with Flujah we had. We didn't have as many tanks
Speaker 2: as Israeli's had, certainly not I mean I'm talking about
Speaker 2: it on the marine side, not at all, but we
Speaker 2: had the ones we had to use the good effect
Speaker 2: and the h and they were great. They are actually
Speaker 2: the Marine Corps doesn't have tanks anymore, but they were
Speaker 2: an extraordinary, extraordinarily useful asset. And believe it or not,
Speaker 2: tanks actually help rather than indirect fire. Tanks help you
Speaker 2: cut down on colateral damage. Yes, I know that you
Speaker 2: know the velocity of the tank shell, but I'm but
Speaker 2: I'm talking about being able to pinpoint targets, to use
Speaker 2: thermals and all these other things to not not just shooting,
Speaker 2: but to establish where the thread is and to cover
Speaker 2: yourself as you cross danger areas. Anyway, remember what I'm saying,
Speaker 2: and I use examples here in Gaza. The IDF define
Speaker 2: target defined targets very very broadly. And if you you know,
Speaker 2: as I have done, and examine this and looked at okay,
Speaker 2: why is this building being targeted? Well, we had a
Speaker 2: report from such and such that it was being used
Speaker 2: as a weapons storage place. How old is that? Report's
Speaker 2: three or four weeks? Okay, what exactly you know is
Speaker 2: being stored there? Well, you know, we think it's this
Speaker 2: or that. It's very vague stuff. And of course things
Speaker 2: and people get moved around all the time in an
Speaker 2: urban environment.
Speaker 1: So let's say that'd be something if they had a
Speaker 1: report like that, Right, there's a weapons store at a
Speaker 1: certain building that's three or four weeks older. Report, they
Speaker 1: wouldn't send like a drone or some try to get
Speaker 1: some eyes on on it and see like confirming maybe no.
Speaker 2: And that's the other thing. They had more drones and
Speaker 2: we had we didn't have any drones in Fluijah. We
Speaker 2: had drones and mosol, but there's no shortage of assets.
Speaker 2: And where I'm heading on this is so yes, you
Speaker 2: confirm and then we've you know, we've got a termine.
Speaker 2: In the US military, it's been overused, but the unblinking
Speaker 2: I right. So you lock on to the target, whether
Speaker 2: it's a human or it's its infrastructure, and you hold
Speaker 2: on to that to determine that you're getting the right
Speaker 2: person if it's a person, and to ensure that there
Speaker 2: is you know that there aren't civilians wandering in and
Speaker 2: out of the target area the area you're going to head.
Speaker 2: The Israelis don't do that as a practice at all,
Speaker 2: and you know you're familiar with just as an example,
Speaker 2: the only strike they really investigated was the time when
Speaker 2: seven do you remember when seven World Central Kitchen Aid
Speaker 2: workers were killed in a convoy well marked, coordinated through
Speaker 2: the IDF and and there's you know, horrific I've seen
Speaker 2: horrific video with that, where each vehicle was destroyed in succession,
Speaker 2: right and everyone inside killed. Well, they lost They didn't.
Speaker 2: First of all, they didn't. They didn't track that convoy.
Speaker 2: And having been on the other other side of the coin,
Speaker 2: I think, as you know, being in Ukraine running humanitarian
Speaker 2: convoys under fire and coordinating with the Ukrainian military being
Speaker 2: tracked all the time by friendly force is very important.
Speaker 2: They didn't do that, and they didn't, you know, they
Speaker 2: they weren't tracking what they thought was her mass target.
Speaker 2: They lost custody and then they picked it up and
Speaker 2: assumed it was the Weld Central kitchen convoy. But there's
Speaker 2: no verification and so they blew it away. Now got
Speaker 2: that case was investigated because the Australian government launched a
Speaker 2: I mean, it was terrible publicity for them. The Austrian
Speaker 2: government launched i mean an official complaint. But there are
Speaker 2: many other cases of that happening. That was kind of
Speaker 2: the norm. It was just that one that was the
Speaker 2: one time they investigated it. And so you know, civilian
Speaker 2: presence was frequently just assumed away rather than actively assessed.
Speaker 2: And you can look at my articles for you know,
Speaker 2: backing evidence backing this up. And so the result isn't
Speaker 2: just incidental civilian but it's repeated death. Okay, it's not
Speaker 2: mistakes happen. You hear that, Well, you know this shit happens. Yeah,
Speaker 2: it does. Sadly, of course it does, even when you
Speaker 2: take taking all the precautions in the world. But repeated
Speaker 2: civilian death at scale that reflects the pattern with how
Speaker 2: decidents were being made. It's not the difficulty in the environment.
Speaker 2: And you know, you've You've probably read John Spencer's article
Speaker 2: saying that the you know, the IDF shows unparalleled restraint.
Speaker 2: That's the term that he uses that no Other's kind.
Speaker 1: Of scary that he could, like you, talk in absolutes
Speaker 1: like that, that they use unparalleled restraint. I mean, that's
Speaker 1: I feel like that's a bit of a stretch.
Speaker 2: But yeah, I mean, what's your author, doesn't it he unparalleled?
Speaker 2: Never before he uses a lot of absolutes in the
Speaker 2: first few paragraphs as an article on Newsweek magazine. It
Speaker 2: was republished elsewhere. He's appeared on CNN, major networks, and
Speaker 2: he's cited by This isn't about being pro or counter IDF.
Speaker 2: By the way, I do want to say this, and
Speaker 2: again no one can. They can't. But you know, I've
Speaker 2: been involved in in efforts to support and do things
Speaker 2: for the IDF in the past. There's very probably, i
Speaker 2: would say very few people of my pier group within
Speaker 2: the military special operations community who are more closely involved
Speaker 2: with activities and efforts in support of Israel. So my
Speaker 2: credentials there are solid. I'm not jumping on the anti
Speaker 2: Israeli bandwagon here by any means, but I'm talking here.
Speaker 2: Remember about process. This is not an emotional argument, and
Speaker 2: so Spencer's arguments have been picked up by those defending
Speaker 2: Israeli methodology as hey, look we've got this expert. Spencer
Speaker 2: calls himself an expert on his website. That's his choice.
Speaker 2: I personally avoid that term expert. I use the term student.
Speaker 2: I'm a student of modern war, an unwilling student at times,
Speaker 2: not an expert. And why does that matter? I think
Speaker 2: when you start calling yourself an expert, I think there's
Speaker 2: a danger that subconsciously you're going to cut yourself off
Speaker 2: from ultimate points of view. Right anyway, So, you know,
Speaker 2: for instance, Spencer's article, and I do urge people to
Speaker 2: read it, he talks about he you know, he says that, hey, listen,
Speaker 2: the Israeli is used this process. It's just the same
Speaker 2: process as we use. But actually they're even more restrictive
Speaker 2: on how they exercise restraint.
Speaker 1: Well, so his articles, his article is essentially like the
Speaker 1: not defending IDEF in terms of like saying that they'd
Speaker 1: done more to show restraint than the American forces did
Speaker 1: in Fallujah or Massoul or any urban urban warfare.
Speaker 2: Yeah, yeah, exactly. So it's not the existence of the process.
Speaker 2: The process ostensibly is there, you know, targeting cells, legal advisors,
Speaker 2: precision guided with munitions, warning procedures. It's how they are applied, Okay,
Speaker 2: it's how they function under pressure that is the real
Speaker 2: truth teller. And I can't imagine from what Spencer has
Speaker 2: written that he really took a close look at how
Speaker 2: these processes functioned under pressure. I think I don't know
Speaker 2: how he wrote his article, but it looks as though
Speaker 2: he just took it as face value. So all these things,
Speaker 2: you know, precision guide ammunitions, targeting cells, warning procedures are
Speaker 2: often cited as evidence that everything that's done to protect civilians.
Speaker 2: But let's, you know, let's take some examples I've already
Speaker 2: talked about. I've already talked about the how intelligence was interpreted,
Speaker 2: how the Israelis dealt with intelligence uncertainty. Right, they accepted
Speaker 2: a very high level of intelligence and then for us,
Speaker 2: what would be an unacceptable level of then intelligence uncertainty.
Speaker 2: They didn't follow through, they did double sauce it, they
Speaker 2: didn't employ a blinking eye approach, they didn't track civilian
Speaker 2: patterns of life. So a lot of what they they
Speaker 2: said was assumed. Plus you've got the fact that in Gaza,
Speaker 2: the density of the population was magnified many times by
Speaker 2: evacuation orders and and many times civilians were evacuated or
Speaker 2: told to move, they weren't aided and doing so from
Speaker 2: one area into another, and that area was subsequently bombed.
Speaker 1: Also, the interesting thing about your article two that you mentioned,
Speaker 1: like like the what they do with like the roof knocking,
Speaker 1: or even like sending out messages to a phone network
Speaker 1: that is essentially degraded to the I'm purpose purposely degraded
Speaker 1: to a point where it doesn't work. But they let
Speaker 1: people know, hey, we're gonna bomb this shit out of
Speaker 1: this area, so get out of the way. They send
Speaker 1: it on text or wherever phone calls, and people don't
Speaker 1: get the messages because their cell phone network is fucked up.
Speaker 2: Are internet is Yeah in the battle space where you know, electricity,
Speaker 2: cell you in a networks intended access have all been
Speaker 2: deliberately degraded. You can't assume warnings, warnings have reached civilians
Speaker 2: and you And the time allowed for people to move
Speaker 2: wasn't it wasn't realistic, you know, especially when you're talking
Speaker 2: about elderly or disabled people. And uh, and this this
Speaker 2: discussion about roof knocking. So roof knocking is an idea
Speaker 2: of practice of firing a a smaller munition into the
Speaker 2: roof of a say a multi story apartment building, to
Speaker 2: warn the inhabitants that you're going to strike that building
Speaker 2: and to give them a chance to get out. Right.
Speaker 2: While there's all kinds of problems with using an explosive
Speaker 2: munition to warn people that you're going to use explosive munitions, right,
Speaker 2: And I can tell you, having been under air attack
Speaker 2: and artillery bombardo myself, it's not intuitive, all right, or
Speaker 2: reliable like oh.
Speaker 1: That one was, that was a warning we better get
Speaker 1: out of here.
Speaker 2: Yeah, to distinguish between a bomb ammunition that's intended to
Speaker 2: kill you and the one that's intended to warn you.
Speaker 2: But you know, the bottom line is this, I mean
Speaker 2: warnings that do not reliably remove civilians from danger. They
Speaker 2: don't they don't meaningfully reduce civilian deaths. You know, in practice,
Speaker 2: they often function as a as a procedural step that
Speaker 2: allows us strike to proceed, rather than than to you know,
Speaker 2: rather than than than to really warn civilians to to
Speaker 2: get themselves out of the way.
Speaker 1: Let me ask you this about you know, they were
Speaker 1: to issue evacuation or is any mood folks to you know,
Speaker 1: different areas, as they were clean, as they were bombing
Speaker 1: specific areas, why do they let people leave Gaza? Right?
Speaker 1: We saw with Ukraine, right when Russia take you know, Ukraine.
Speaker 2: I mean, it's a great question, so you know, for
Speaker 2: and I'm not an IDF spokesman, but of course the
Speaker 2: IDEF would argue that was a security concern. There was
Speaker 2: nowhere to go, You couldn't Egypt wouldn't take them, and
Speaker 2: you're not going to let them onto Israeli soil because
Speaker 2: now you've got that security concern on your own soil. Right. However,
Speaker 2: I would argue that the problem was this, there were
Speaker 2: all kinds of problems with communicating with the local population,
Speaker 2: as we pointed out, but there was no there's no clear,
Speaker 2: reliable way to ensure an effort made to ensure that
Speaker 2: they were safe evacuation zones. And what I'm saying here
Speaker 2: is that you don't you didn't have to evacuate the
Speaker 2: matter of Gaza if you really didn't believe that was
Speaker 2: a security concern. I mean, in Gaza, I know everyone
Speaker 2: keeps saying how densely populated it Is, but there were
Speaker 2: there are far less than they within that. Within the strip,
Speaker 2: all right, it's like a twenty something kilometer mile strip.
Speaker 2: There are areas, for instance, the beach area by the
Speaker 2: coast there and and areas between the major population centers
Speaker 2: that could have been evacuation zones, evacuation corridors could have
Speaker 2: been set up and lit. And the Israelis are very
Speaker 2: advanced when it comes to biometrics and combining biometrics with
Speaker 2: AI facial recognition. They're always already using this technology in
Speaker 2: the West Bank to to screen civilians moving from one
Speaker 2: way one place to another. And it's very effective. If
Speaker 2: anyone who's gone from Israel into onto the West Bank knows,
Speaker 2: you don't see a human being when you go through
Speaker 2: all these turnstiles, but you are being screened, your faces
Speaker 2: being identified by H and match against you know, known
Speaker 2: bad actors. So they've got this technology, they could have
Speaker 2: set it up to ensure that they were evacuation and
Speaker 2: they had organizations, relief organizations within the strip. And I
Speaker 2: spoke to South African who worked for the UN there
Speaker 2: and who explained how they you know that the UN
Speaker 2: was willing to assist the Israelis and setting up evacuation
Speaker 2: plans and to do much of the planning for them.
Speaker 2: All they needed was certain things from the Israelis to
Speaker 2: include forbearance and places, you know, where they would set
Speaker 2: up and assist in directing civilians, but they made no
Speaker 2: effort to do so. Instead just drop leaflets or sent
Speaker 2: text messages saying, hey, you've got by noon to move
Speaker 2: from here to there, and this area is going to
Speaker 2: be rubbled. And then there was poor coordination within the
Speaker 2: IDF right. So again you can this up as a
Speaker 2: result of investigations. Often Israelis were heard. I mean it
Speaker 2: was Raeli's gardens were herded into areas which were then struck.
Speaker 2: And that wasn't purposeful necessary. I mean, it wasn't purposeful,
Speaker 2: but it was. It was just poor coordination within the
Speaker 2: Israeli military.
Speaker 1: I mean, one thing that does happen more than once, Andy.
Speaker 2: Oh yeah, yeah, cubtinly, I mean, how is that.
Speaker 1: Poor coordination if it's happening multiple times.
Speaker 2: Again, I'm getting a little bit off track here, but
Speaker 2: one of the characteristics of the Israeli military that some
Speaker 2: people may find surprising, because you know, you always think
Speaker 2: of the Israeli military as as being representative as being
Speaker 2: forerunner and pushing mission command and initiative down to the
Speaker 2: lowest levels. That is not the IDF today. That was
Speaker 2: the IDF of maybe nineteen seven three, nineteen sixty seven,
Speaker 2: nineteen fifty six. But it's not the idea of today.
Speaker 2: Decisions are made. It's a very hierarchical organization. It's very
Speaker 2: Middle Eastern organization in that respect. Information is not well
Speaker 2: shared between units, between organizations, and I think that resulted
Speaker 2: in a lot of these mistakes. And I call them
Speaker 2: mistakes because I'm not for a moment suggesting that these
Speaker 2: were purposeful, you know when this happened, but it's negligent.
Speaker 2: And they happened because not enough again, you know, risk
Speaker 2: was pushed on the civilian population, which was an undercurrent
Speaker 2: of everything that I'm talking about, and I haven't even discussed,
Speaker 2: you know, the idef's attempts at population control during Operation
Speaker 2: Gideon's Chariots in twenty twenty five. But the goal is
Speaker 2: again to separate hamas from the local population and to
Speaker 2: move the population and into it's like a form of villageization.
Speaker 2: The British use the Malaya, we attempted, the United States
Speaker 2: tended to use in Vietnam. You move the population into
Speaker 2: secure areas and you separate them from harmas. But you
Speaker 2: know that the concept wasn't bad, but the implementation was
Speaker 2: so so poorly done that it resulted, as you know,
Speaker 2: in widespread starvation. And whether you want to call it
Speaker 2: famine or not, that is what the UN ended up
Speaker 2: calling it. Certainly a number of I mean, the significant
Speaker 2: number of Gazans died of from lack of food, lack
Speaker 2: of water.
Speaker 1: What about the argument about like hamas using human shields.
Speaker 2: Yeah, great, great arguments. So human shields arguments also frequently
Speaker 2: invoked to explain civilian deaths in Gaza. Now by you
Speaker 2: you've got to differentiate between harmas using civilians coercing them
Speaker 2: into position two shield fighters and harmas just simply operating
Speaker 2: from civilian areas. Okay, there's the distinction is important because
Speaker 2: international humanitarian law requires for the human shield argument to
Speaker 2: work that there'd be some element of coercion. There's been
Speaker 2: no proof of that. In fact, although the Israelis commonly
Speaker 2: and there's no doubt about it, they listen harmas used
Speaker 2: civilian infrastructure, I mean, Thesuslamic state use embedded themselves in
Speaker 2: civilian infrastructure and mozor. It's a common feature of urban war.
Speaker 2: But the Middle East Institute, reputable DC based think tankd
Speaker 2: an investigation into Israeli claims of human shield arguments and
Speaker 2: came out of the fact that although that argument was
Speaker 2: frequently cited, there was actually no proof of it actually occurring,
Speaker 2: and in cases where they said, you know, Shifa hospital
Speaker 2: is being used for this or that, they could produce
Speaker 2: no evidence. But regardless, you know, international law is very
Speaker 2: clear enemy violations don't erase the attacking forces obligations, and
Speaker 2: civilian presence is still supposed to be a constraint or
Speaker 2: not an excuse. It's it's like the comedian what's his name,
Speaker 2: Bill Barr. Yeah, like he says, you know, if you
Speaker 2: want to beat the shit out of your neighbor and
Speaker 2: he's holding a baby, you don't punch him through the baby, right.
Speaker 2: I mean, that was essentially the ideas argument that reference.
Speaker 1: That was very nice in the area.
Speaker 2: When civilians can't be separated from the battlefield. International laws
Speaker 2: places the obligation on the attacking force to exercise greater restraint,
Speaker 2: not not acceptance about.
Speaker 1: How let's just wipe everybody out. Yeah, at that point,
Speaker 1: let's just new Gaza. If that's the look.
Speaker 2: I mean, we've seen this before in mos All where
Speaker 2: I offerne strikes. The Islamic State was deeply embedded in
Speaker 2: the civilian population. They use protected science to include mosques,
Speaker 2: They constrained civilian movements. So there is proof, you can
Speaker 2: look this up, absolute proof that they did use humans
Speaker 2: civilians as shields in Mosul and and yet civilian to
Speaker 2: combat and death ratios are significantly lower than in Gaza.
Speaker 2: And when you factor in the number of civilians killed
Speaker 2: by the Islamic State, that ratio becomes even more dramatic
Speaker 2: that that that contrast.
Speaker 1: So so, like I read Spenser's stuff and one of
Speaker 1: the things he said about like you can't really judge
Speaker 1: proportionality if you're not if you don't have access to
Speaker 1: classified intel. That was like one of like the you know,
Speaker 1: like you don't really know what's going on and why
Speaker 1: they're doing this because you don't have access to the
Speaker 1: to the classified stuff.
Speaker 2: Yeah, I mean he kind of dodges the he kind
Speaker 2: of misses the point there. So that's exactly right. He said, Well,
Speaker 2: he talks about using a small you know, how do
Speaker 2: you know what munition should be used, you know, expert,
Speaker 2: that's not the point. Commanders are commanders because they are
Speaker 2: judged competent to make those calls. Right of proportionality, That's
Speaker 2: really what he's talking about. You know, how how do
Speaker 2: I deal with this threat and cause the minimum number
Speaker 2: of minimum number of casualties? As far as the intelligence argument,
Speaker 2: it's irrelevant. What I'm arguing is it doesn't matter. You know.
Speaker 2: The whole point is not what an outsider knows. It's
Speaker 2: what that commander knows for sure, and what he's assuming.
Speaker 2: And my point is that for us in the US military,
Speaker 2: the honest on you to verify that intelligence, all right,
Speaker 2: And so this is rather a convent opaque argument. And
Speaker 2: then Spencer says, well, they use precision guided munitions. They do.
Speaker 2: But the point is a precision guided munition can cause
Speaker 2: just as many civilian casualties to fit if you know,
Speaker 2: if it hits a target that hasn't been assessed for
Speaker 2: civilian presence, right. Precision and delivery is not the same
Speaker 2: as precision and targeting. So a bomb can strike exactly
Speaker 2: where you intended to and still kill civilians in large
Speaker 2: numbers if the target itself was poorly defined or your
Speaker 2: intelligence was stale and you hadn't verified civilian presence orthough
Speaker 2: you know civilian pattern of life.
Speaker 1: Andy, let me ask you. You mentioned about the unblinking eye,
Speaker 1: like what the US would do, like we would have
Speaker 1: eyes on a target or a potential target.
Speaker 2: I like the way you said that. See what you
Speaker 2: did that? Yeah?
Speaker 1: Thank you? Uh like a subscribe. Why would in Israel
Speaker 1: do that? You know they're technologically advanced, they're using drones
Speaker 1: that you know, they're modern military. Why not do that
Speaker 1: at up for a particular target?
Speaker 2: Well, I you know, I'm speculating here because it wasn't Look,
Speaker 2: you've got the rules right, You've got the law of
Speaker 2: armed conflict, and then you have your procedures. But the
Speaker 2: culture within an organization matters a lot. You know. I
Speaker 2: can tell you having served in Iraq and Afghanistan that
Speaker 2: overwhelmingly the institutional impetus was on sparing civilian life, on
Speaker 2: minimizing heroic restraint, right was the term that we would use.
Speaker 2: What that meant is someone has to bear risk in war,
Speaker 2: either soldiers accepted or civilians do all those of them
Speaker 2: they don't willingly accept it. Right In the US military,
Speaker 2: it's a much more balanced discussion. We can't routinely shift
Speaker 2: risk onto civilian forces. Sometimes we have to bear a
Speaker 2: portion of that risk if we're uncertain about civilian presence
Speaker 2: and so, or there is a significant civilian presence and
Speaker 2: so we can't use the munitions that we require before
Speaker 2: an attack. We have to accept that it's going to
Speaker 2: be a little more dangerous to attack that objective. And
Speaker 2: making this sound quite simplistic, these are hard goals, but
Speaker 2: that's the bottom line. But we hear that from our commanders,
Speaker 2: and we had tactical directives all the time in Afghanistan
Speaker 2: outlining that as a policy. It is very clear that
Speaker 2: that was institutionalized in the IDF. That is not the case.
Speaker 2: You have civilian leaders. You know, you've got the head
Speaker 2: of military intelligence, Halivi, saying, I mean it was leaked.
Speaker 2: You know, he didn't tend to say this publicly, but
Speaker 2: you know the fact is he was head of military
Speaker 2: intelligence and he said, hey, we're going to kill fifty
Speaker 2: Palestinians for every Israeli we lost some seven October and
Speaker 2: then says it doesn't matter if their children, that's just
Speaker 2: the that's the way it's going to be. All Right,
Speaker 2: You've got that you've got Gallant talking about we're going
Speaker 2: to cut off that food, We're going to cut off
Speaker 2: the water. They're just animals. You've got the.
Speaker 1: What's interesting is Gallant's been, you know, ever since he
Speaker 1: resigned or got fired, was like touted as like the
Speaker 1: sane one in that well that that wut.
Speaker 2: I guess it's all relative, isn't it. You've got Hurtzel,
Speaker 2: you know, who is the supposedly liberal president saying, hey,
Speaker 2: the whole population is responsible for seven October, all right,
Speaker 2: And so you've got this institutional messaging. Do you really
Speaker 2: think that commanders? Then? And then you've got this you know,
Speaker 2: as they said, only one investigation was ever canted and
Speaker 2: to a strike gone wrong, and that was the World's
Speaker 2: Central Kitchen strike, and that was after Australia objected. So
Speaker 2: Commander's no, you know, the messaging isn't Hey, you've got
Speaker 2: these procedures. There's a law of armed conflict, that is
Speaker 2: who gets fired when shit goes wrong? All right? And
Speaker 2: when that isn't happening, when you're hearing your own leaders
Speaker 2: going their animals they're responsible, Hey, fifty of them should
Speaker 2: die for everyone. Do you really think you're going to
Speaker 2: exercise heroic restraint. I mean, you know, so I mean
Speaker 2: that that and and then you get this these investigative
Speaker 2: reports coming out about how AI was integrated into targeting. Well,
Speaker 2: that's not necessarily a bad thing. It's if you're using
Speaker 2: it to support decisions. But if you're using it as
Speaker 2: a robber stamp, and and the and the human and
Speaker 2: the luke is simply going okay, okay, okay, then then
Speaker 2: that becomes problematic. You have Lamont's investigative arm report that
Speaker 2: shows that, you know, for every hamass fighter, it's really
Speaker 2: idea of constructions were, hey, you know, you can kill
Speaker 2: twenty or twenty civilians Jesus Christ, you know, and that's
Speaker 2: just for lower level guys. I mean, that's a pretty
Speaker 2: significant threshold. We wouldn't have that, we wouldn't word things
Speaker 2: that way. And the point is you're going to tell
Speaker 2: people you can kill twenty civilians. Do you think they're
Speaker 2: going to stop there? Oh hey it was fifty? Or is?
Speaker 2: I mean? So this is these are what I'm saying
Speaker 2: is that the institutional messaging was such that it really
Speaker 2: it it suggested restraint was a bad thing. Now, if
Speaker 2: you challenge all of those things, well, you know, these
Speaker 2: are far I'll go revert to Oakham's razor, the fact
Speaker 2: that these are far more plausible explanations for why one
Speaker 2: hundred thousand or seventy thousand, which of a number you
Speaker 2: believe or people were killed. Then unparalleled restraint, which is
Speaker 2: what Spencer says.
Speaker 1: Yeah, I don't know how you can eat.
Speaker 2: That's a tough Yeah, tough. So anyway, I mean, you know,
Speaker 2: and what happened, what's happening was civilian death was treated
Speaker 2: as an acceptable cost of doing business, an acceptable price
Speaker 2: to pay for the speed, the tempo, force protection that
Speaker 2: you needed in order to execute the campaign. All right, And.
Speaker 1: What's interesting, like you mentioned, not the harp on it,
Speaker 1: but like you mentioned, it's just going to regenerate, insure insurgents.
Speaker 2: Yeah.
Speaker 1: I hate like that too, because these are human beings
Speaker 1: that have lost lives and lost loved ones, right, Like
Speaker 1: it's a terrible thing that's going on. But the fact
Speaker 1: is human nature's human nature, and people are gonna want
Speaker 1: aya after they see a family member get killed and
Speaker 1: you know, lose their lives.
Speaker 2: Yeah, And you know, as we said, I mean, this
Speaker 2: matters beyond legal debates or moral outrage. It becomes a
Speaker 2: strategic liability, and we learned how in an Iraq and Afghanistan.
Speaker 2: When when the bottom line is this, I mean you
Speaker 2: can you can refute, try and refute this, but it's
Speaker 2: very difficult when you look at the studies that have
Speaker 2: been being conducted and this. When civilians are killed in
Speaker 2: large numbers, it fuels recruitment, it hardens opposition, It undermines
Speaker 2: your legitimacy, which is an important point, and it prolongs conflict.
Speaker 2: And so you know, tactical gains achieved through through civilian
Speaker 2: destruction almost always generate long term insecurity.
Speaker 3: OK.
Speaker 2: So the I know we a community end here, but
Speaker 2: I mean, I look, you know, civilians, you're not going
Speaker 2: to make war clean. You can't afford. I mean, you're
Speaker 2: just not. It's never going to be a point where
Speaker 2: we can avoid civilian casualties, most certainly in urban warfare.
Speaker 2: Civilians are killed at this scale as they were and
Speaker 2: killed in Gaza. It's not because urban warfare makes restraint impossible.
Speaker 2: They're killed when civilian protection is not treated as a
Speaker 2: governing requirement of how force is applied. I mean, urban
Speaker 2: warfare's brutal civilian death. As they said, you can't ever
Speaker 2: eliminate it entirely, But how much death occurs and who
Speaker 2: bears the risk, that's a matter of choice. It's a
Speaker 2: matter of institutional choice, and in Gaza, the evidence suggests
Speaker 2: that those choices were pushed onto the civilians and with
Speaker 2: profound human and I would argue strategic strategic costs.
Speaker 1: Yeah, yeah, it's it's a fucking it's just sad. One
Speaker 1: more tactical question. I remember we've talked about this many
Speaker 1: times on Eyes On How you mentioned like the IDF
Speaker 1: doesn't do clear and hold. Yeah, I mean, was that
Speaker 1: like me, they wouldn't clear and hold, They would just
Speaker 1: take out a place and then leave. Would that cause.
Speaker 2: That added to that's certainly added to the confusion. Now,
Speaker 2: I will say I'll qualify that statement a little bit
Speaker 2: by saying during Gideon's Chariots in twenty twenty five, they
Speaker 2: seem to have learned their lesson a little bit more.
Speaker 2: The bulk of units still pulled back into an improvised
Speaker 2: farb's combat outposts they call mcnun's, which are you know,
Speaker 2: kind of little fortified at hop fortified positions within the city.
Speaker 2: But this causes problems because you're clear during the day.
Speaker 2: They don't. They the conventional infantry unit. It's we're not
Speaker 2: operating at night. I don't know why not. I think
Speaker 2: it may have come down to training. They had night
Speaker 2: vision goggles, but they just weren't operating at night. So
Speaker 2: they would clear an area, they would move back into
Speaker 2: their mcnone at nights was the pattern. Now during the
Speaker 2: during the night, no that you know, Yes, her mass
Speaker 2: would have some freedom of movement, but the civilians would
Speaker 2: move back into the areas because they would hear the
Speaker 2: sounds of fighting gone, and so they would move back
Speaker 2: in the area. And then you get the look wide
Speaker 2: e F unit coming out and clearing that area again
Speaker 2: assuming everything there is her maas. And look, I haven't
Speaker 2: talked about the fact that you know, I just talked
Speaker 2: about indirect fire, but there are a lot of problems
Speaker 2: with how the Israelis exercise fire control, fire discipline or
Speaker 2: lack thereof. In fact, they had free fire zones. You know,
Speaker 2: you've the significant amount of evidence to show that. My
Speaker 2: own interviews with people showed that areas where anything, you know,
Speaker 2: they could shoot anything or anyone. And and and in
Speaker 2: a in an urban environment densely packed, you're going to
Speaker 2: get civilians wandering into those.
Speaker 1: Area didn't have to be armed either.
Speaker 2: Look, I mean, I'm this is where you can get into, well,
Speaker 2: our rules of engagement say this. I'm talking about practice though,
Speaker 2: intractice and and yes you can look at you can
Speaker 2: look at all the evidence on online and I'm talking
Speaker 2: about investigation. If that doesn't you know, if that doesn't
Speaker 2: swear you, I mean I've I've me convinced, yes, absolutely
Speaker 2: it was a it was people were shot when very
Speaker 2: clearly they didn't have weapons consistently at scale. I a
Speaker 2: friend of mine who I interviewed for the book but
Speaker 2: by no means uh, left wing leading hard liberal, former
Speaker 2: South African Special Operations guy and another guy former Royal
Speaker 2: Marine Okay operating with the u N told me that,
Speaker 2: you know, part of their job was just to gather
Speaker 2: bodies in the morning every morning, because of course it
Speaker 2: was a health has it and you know they would
Speaker 2: they'll tell you elderly disabled and all their time, all
Speaker 2: their time operating in Gaza, they never never came across
Speaker 2: a single body with a weapon. And you could say, well,
Speaker 2: you know the weapons were removed really, you know, consistently
Speaker 2: all the time from all those bodies come on. So anyway,
Speaker 2: I mean I'm getting off track here. A little bit
Speaker 2: in my article is not even based on that. But
Speaker 2: I'm saying again this gets back to an institutional culture.
Speaker 2: I mean, the Israeli shot three of their own hostages,
Speaker 2: even after their hostages came out waving white flags. I mean,
Speaker 2: this is all in covered in the Israeli media, covering
Speaker 2: white flags accompanied by an Israeli officer. All right, they
Speaker 2: still shot them.
Speaker 1: Swimming they were signed with an Israeli officer as well.
Speaker 2: Yeah, yeah, I mean it wasn't You can look at
Speaker 2: look up the account of how it happened.
Speaker 1: I remember when it when it went.
Speaker 2: No one was burned for that, no one got in
Speaker 2: trouble for that. I mean that, and yet there was
Speaker 2: all kinds.
Speaker 1: Of nothing was like. And it was relatively early on too,
Speaker 1: I believe, right it wasn't like and you know they
Speaker 1: were not saying.
Speaker 2: I want to say it was in like April twenty
Speaker 2: twenty four. But anyway, so d that's pretty much it.
Speaker 1: Yeah, I don't want the credible article. I want everyone
Speaker 1: to check it out.
Speaker 2: You know, why didn't you invide John Spencer on to
Speaker 2: uh To to offer a counter argument. I think that
Speaker 2: would be a great idea.
Speaker 1: Against that game. John, if you're listening, Yeah, immate baby,
Speaker 1: let's get you on and we'll hash this out. Mud Wrestle.
Speaker 1: Check out. I want everyone to check out Andy's article.
Speaker 1: The link is in the description. It's for One on
Speaker 1: the Rocks. It's an incredibly it's a really good article.
Speaker 1: And of course Andy's book, When the Tempest Gathers incredible book.
Speaker 1: We're looking forward to the new books that are coming out,
Speaker 1: so stay tuned for that your sub stack. All those
Speaker 1: links are in the description or in the show notes
Speaker 1: if you're listening, so check them out. Andy.
Speaker 2: I love you, aways, great time, Tee, all the best.
Speaker 1: Thanks everybody.
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