WEBVTT 1 00:00:01.040 --> 00:00:05.320 It's night with Dan Ray. I'm telling you Feazy Boston's 2 00:00:05.400 --> 00:00:06.000 new radio. 3 00:00:07.519 --> 00:00:10.679 All right, welcome back everybody. Thank you very much, Dan Watkins. 4 00:00:10.839 --> 00:00:15.919 As as you may know, it's a week or so ago, 5 00:00:16.120 --> 00:00:19.839 maybe a little longer. Then there was what's been characterized 6 00:00:19.879 --> 00:00:24.839 as the National Public Data breach, in which I'm told 7 00:00:24.960 --> 00:00:30.359 two point nine billion records were stolen from National Public Data, 8 00:00:30.719 --> 00:00:35.399 which is a Florida based credit and criminal background check company. 9 00:00:37.840 --> 00:00:42.920 The records reportedly include a large amount of sensitive information, 10 00:00:43.039 --> 00:00:48.679 including social security numbers. There's a hacking group called us 11 00:00:49.000 --> 00:00:53.200 DoD doesn't stay it for. The Defense Department has taken 12 00:00:53.280 --> 00:00:57.640 responsibility for the massive data breach. So I heard about this, 13 00:00:58.600 --> 00:01:01.920 and I read about it, and I couldn't find straight 14 00:01:02.079 --> 00:01:08.719 answers anywhere. And today I asked our producer Marita to 15 00:01:08.760 --> 00:01:11.680 see what she could do, and she introduced me to 16 00:01:11.959 --> 00:01:16.760 Professor Sheldon Jacobson, who's PhD and director of the Institute 17 00:01:16.840 --> 00:01:22.760 for Computational Redistricting. He is also the founder of the 18 00:01:22.840 --> 00:01:27.120 computer science program at the University of Illinois. So, Professor 19 00:01:27.400 --> 00:01:31.280 Sheldon Jacobson, I'm hoping you're going to have some answers 20 00:01:31.280 --> 00:01:36.120 as to what happened and how we can prevent it 21 00:01:36.159 --> 00:01:39.560 from happening anything worse happening to us. How are you tonight, 22 00:01:39.599 --> 00:01:40.280 good evening, sir. 23 00:01:41.239 --> 00:01:42.760 Well, it's a pleasure to be with you. Thank you 24 00:01:42.799 --> 00:01:43.280 for having me. 25 00:01:43.640 --> 00:01:45.959 Well, thanks very much. First of all, what is the 26 00:01:46.079 --> 00:01:51.879 National Public Data Is that the organization that was hacked. 27 00:01:53.239 --> 00:01:56.840 Yeah, this is an organization that basically provide data for 28 00:01:56.959 --> 00:02:00.680 people who want background checks on people. Do is They 29 00:02:00.840 --> 00:02:05.079 scrape data from the Internet and other sources. Some of 30 00:02:05.120 --> 00:02:08.319 it is publicly available, some of it is not, and 31 00:02:08.360 --> 00:02:11.280 they have that in a repository which they then sell 32 00:02:11.319 --> 00:02:13.360 it for people who want to do a background check. 33 00:02:13.599 --> 00:02:15.759 So if someone is going to apply for employment and 34 00:02:15.800 --> 00:02:18.319 you want to get some background information on them, you 35 00:02:18.400 --> 00:02:20.919 pay a fee and you're able to get information. Or 36 00:02:20.960 --> 00:02:23.439 if someone's just curious about their neighbor and they want 37 00:02:23.479 --> 00:02:25.919 to get some background information, they can pay the fee 38 00:02:25.919 --> 00:02:30.280 and also get information. So there's so much data out 39 00:02:30.319 --> 00:02:34.439 there on the Internet, in our digital economy, in a 40 00:02:34.599 --> 00:02:38.479 technical society that in essence, so much is known about 41 00:02:38.520 --> 00:02:40.479 so much of us. Some people just want to know, 42 00:02:40.560 --> 00:02:42.479 some people need to know, but some people just want 43 00:02:42.479 --> 00:02:45.840 to know. And an organization like the National Public Data 44 00:02:45.879 --> 00:02:49.599 Company isn't an entity that sells this information and makes 45 00:02:49.599 --> 00:02:50.159 it available. 46 00:02:50.879 --> 00:02:59.360 Okay, Now what troubles me most is that I always 47 00:02:59.439 --> 00:03:03.840 thought call me naive, I'll be happy to respond to 48 00:03:03.879 --> 00:03:09.240 that appellation. I always thought that your social Security number 49 00:03:09.319 --> 00:03:11.840 was something that you were supposed to protect with your life, 50 00:03:12.919 --> 00:03:15.680 that even when people asked you for the last four 51 00:03:15.759 --> 00:03:18.240 digits of your so scurity dumban, you should be careful 52 00:03:18.280 --> 00:03:20.759 who you're talking to. And I also thought that that 53 00:03:20.919 --> 00:03:24.199 was our identification number, almost like our fingerprints. That was 54 00:03:24.240 --> 00:03:27.719 what I've always thought it was. And my understanding is 55 00:03:27.759 --> 00:03:33.199 that amongst these two point billion pieces of information, they 56 00:03:33.199 --> 00:03:36.240 may have your social Security number or my social Security number. 57 00:03:36.479 --> 00:03:39.719 What's the likelihood of that or can you even begin 58 00:03:39.840 --> 00:03:41.360 to estimate that likelihood? 59 00:03:42.439 --> 00:03:45.639 Well, a better way to frame that question is, what's 60 00:03:45.639 --> 00:03:49.639 the likelihood that someone out there has your social Security 61 00:03:49.719 --> 00:03:53.960 number that you did not give permission to have? And 62 00:03:54.000 --> 00:03:57.919 the probability the likelihood is extremely high. I always tell 63 00:03:57.960 --> 00:04:01.960 people that don't assume that your information is being protected. 64 00:04:02.360 --> 00:04:05.560 Assume the worst, which is that all of your information, 65 00:04:05.680 --> 00:04:10.280 your social Security number, your address, your phone numbers, everything 66 00:04:10.319 --> 00:04:14.360 about you, your family members is a known entity. Because 67 00:04:14.400 --> 00:04:18.639 this is valuable information for bad actors who want to 68 00:04:18.680 --> 00:04:23.360 do something which is take your money in an instance, Yeah. 69 00:04:23.199 --> 00:04:27.240 That I understand. But for example, when you sign up 70 00:04:28.120 --> 00:04:31.399 for the draft or when you're conscripted in the military, 71 00:04:31.800 --> 00:04:34.240 they do want your SOB scurity number, but you're giving 72 00:04:34.279 --> 00:04:36.959 that to someone who represents the Department of Defense. And 73 00:04:37.040 --> 00:04:40.040 you assume when you file your income tax returns you 74 00:04:40.079 --> 00:04:42.600 have to include your sole security number when you pay 75 00:04:42.639 --> 00:04:45.680 your estimated taxes every quarter. There's a lot of interaction 76 00:04:45.759 --> 00:04:52.319 with government agencies. When when I'm opening a bank account, 77 00:04:52.399 --> 00:04:55.079 I think I have to provide my SO security number, 78 00:04:56.240 --> 00:04:58.600 But I'm not giving my SO screuty number to someone 79 00:04:58.600 --> 00:05:01.720 who calls up and says to me, Hi, I'm the 80 00:05:01.759 --> 00:05:04.079 prince from Nigeria and I want to put money in 81 00:05:04.120 --> 00:05:06.079 your bank, But can you give them my SO scurity umber. 82 00:05:06.399 --> 00:05:09.639 I always assume that anyone who who would ask me 83 00:05:10.120 --> 00:05:12.279 and I'm going to be naive now, anyone who would 84 00:05:12.319 --> 00:05:16.240 ask me by my SO security number, I ARAUS Defense 85 00:05:16.279 --> 00:05:23.639 Department on whomever would guard that? Or am I just horrible? 86 00:05:23.720 --> 00:05:25.000 You naive? Professor? 87 00:05:26.360 --> 00:05:30.560 Well, people will give their Social Security number if it's requested, 88 00:05:30.600 --> 00:05:32.480 and they often even don't think about it. So if 89 00:05:32.480 --> 00:05:36.160 you apply for a department store credit card, you will 90 00:05:36.160 --> 00:05:38.800 have to give your Social Security number. You are entrusting 91 00:05:39.040 --> 00:05:44.160 them to maintain the confidential of it. The challenge is 92 00:05:44.199 --> 00:05:47.600 that we've had so many security breaches over the last 93 00:05:47.600 --> 00:05:51.639 several years. Just think back to twenty seventeen when Equifax 94 00:05:51.680 --> 00:05:55.480 had their security breach that involved over one half of 95 00:05:55.560 --> 00:05:59.120 all adults in the United States had their personal information 96 00:05:59.519 --> 00:06:04.399 basically be breached. That information is valuable to bad actors. 97 00:06:04.639 --> 00:06:08.600 In fact, for this particular security breach, they found that 98 00:06:08.680 --> 00:06:11.519 someone is trying to sell these records for over three 99 00:06:11.959 --> 00:06:16.480 million dollars. Three million dollars, and someone is going to 100 00:06:16.519 --> 00:06:18.759 buy it because they will have access to all this 101 00:06:18.839 --> 00:06:22.759 personal information that ultimately can then be resold, redistributed, and 102 00:06:22.839 --> 00:06:28.920 ultimately an attempt to get financial gain. Sounds our information 103 00:06:29.040 --> 00:06:29.600 is all out there. 104 00:06:29.720 --> 00:06:33.040 Yeah, sounds to be professor. Let that if they are 105 00:06:33.079 --> 00:06:37.199 going to provide someone with two point nine billion pieces 106 00:06:37.240 --> 00:06:40.480 of information three million dollars almost sounds like chump change. 107 00:06:40.519 --> 00:06:42.040 That there will be a bunch of people are going 108 00:06:42.079 --> 00:06:43.759 to step forward and say, hey, I'll give you four 109 00:06:43.800 --> 00:06:46.279 millions for that. I mean, so this now is going 110 00:06:46.319 --> 00:06:50.120 to be out there, which of course leads us to 111 00:06:50.160 --> 00:06:54.399 the question, what should all of us do. You mentioned 112 00:06:54.399 --> 00:07:02.600 prior breaches of security. Can we assume that somehow we're 113 00:07:02.639 --> 00:07:05.240 I mean, I can't change my Social Security number. I 114 00:07:05.279 --> 00:07:13.319 know I can't do that. What defense mechanism do I 115 00:07:13.399 --> 00:07:17.600 have left in my arsenal of defense mechanisms to utilize? 116 00:07:18.639 --> 00:07:20.920 Well, there's a tremendous number of things you can do. 117 00:07:21.439 --> 00:07:24.759 The first thing is you want to freeze your credit, 118 00:07:24.920 --> 00:07:27.879 which means that if someone has your social Security number 119 00:07:28.160 --> 00:07:30.920 and they attempt to get a credit card, take out 120 00:07:30.920 --> 00:07:34.839 a loan, purchase a car, do anything like that, they're 121 00:07:34.879 --> 00:07:38.319 going to require a background check, and that background check 122 00:07:38.360 --> 00:07:41.000 will involve knowing their social Security number. If someone has it, 123 00:07:41.120 --> 00:07:44.040 that's wonderful. They can say, oh, yes, I am you 124 00:07:44.079 --> 00:07:48.160 know Mary Smith or John Jackson, and here's my social 125 00:07:48.199 --> 00:07:50.720 Security number, and then they put it through. But if 126 00:07:50.759 --> 00:07:54.519 you have a security freeze in place, the organization who 127 00:07:54.560 --> 00:07:56.279 wants to give you credit will say, I'm sorry, you 128 00:07:56.319 --> 00:07:58.399 have a freeze. You're going to have to unfreeze it, 129 00:07:58.759 --> 00:08:01.519 at which point the person, oh I forgot I'll be 130 00:08:01.639 --> 00:08:03.439 back and they never see them again. 131 00:08:03.800 --> 00:08:07.839 Okay, So how does one for my listeners? How and 132 00:08:07.920 --> 00:08:12.000 my listeners rings the gamut in terms of age and experience? 133 00:08:12.720 --> 00:08:14.879 How do they freeze their credit? And what are the 134 00:08:14.920 --> 00:08:16.079 implications they're off? 135 00:08:17.000 --> 00:08:20.519 Well, it's very simple, but it's not necessarily easy. It's 136 00:08:20.560 --> 00:08:23.399 simple because if you go to the three agencies that 137 00:08:23.519 --> 00:08:27.759 basically oversee credit in this country, which is Experience, Equifax, 138 00:08:27.800 --> 00:08:31.319 and TransUnion, you can set up an account online no cost, 139 00:08:31.800 --> 00:08:34.320 or you can call them and say I want to 140 00:08:34.399 --> 00:08:37.720 freeze my credit. They'll know exactly what that means, and 141 00:08:37.759 --> 00:08:41.080 then they will require some paperwork or some information about you, 142 00:08:41.440 --> 00:08:45.320 but ultimately it will get frozen. And once it's frozen, 143 00:08:45.440 --> 00:08:49.919 you have locked down the ability for these bad actors 144 00:08:50.240 --> 00:08:54.159 to use the information they have about you to in essence, 145 00:08:55.360 --> 00:08:58.960 takeout loans, buy cars, you know, set up a cell 146 00:08:59.000 --> 00:09:03.600 phone service, whatever they're trying to do. Many any many 147 00:09:03.720 --> 00:09:07.919 financial interactions will require Social Security number. The fact that 148 00:09:07.960 --> 00:09:10.919 they have it isn't the problem. It's the question of 149 00:09:10.960 --> 00:09:14.480 whether they can use it to gain financially and you 150 00:09:14.519 --> 00:09:17.519 can stop that with a credit freeze. 151 00:09:17.600 --> 00:09:20.039 Okay, and what if? What then? The implications? 152 00:09:20.080 --> 00:09:20.919 What is it? 153 00:09:21.120 --> 00:09:25.159 What's the downside? You freeze your credit? You can still 154 00:09:25.279 --> 00:09:27.919 use your credit card, you just can't go. You could 155 00:09:28.000 --> 00:09:29.240 cure a new credit. 156 00:09:29.039 --> 00:09:32.759 Card exactly, and you can still use your credit card. 157 00:09:32.840 --> 00:09:34.720 But if you want it to for example, take out 158 00:09:34.720 --> 00:09:37.399 a loan, a mortgage, you know, buy a car with 159 00:09:37.480 --> 00:09:41.080 an auto loan, you're going to have to temporarily unfreeze 160 00:09:41.120 --> 00:09:45.080 it to allow the legitimate agency who wants to give 161 00:09:45.080 --> 00:09:47.320 you credit to check your credit. But once you do that, 162 00:09:47.360 --> 00:09:50.120 you just refreeze it right away. So literally this can 163 00:09:50.200 --> 00:09:51.879 almost beat that in five or ten minutes. 164 00:09:52.039 --> 00:09:54.480 How difficult is it to unfreeze it? So in other words, 165 00:09:54.559 --> 00:09:57.639 what do you have to do to prove to TransUnion 166 00:09:57.759 --> 00:10:02.360 or Equifax or Experience that you know and again, you 167 00:10:02.399 --> 00:10:03.919 do it with one, you don't have to do with 168 00:10:03.960 --> 00:10:06.000 all three. I assume if you freeze it with one, 169 00:10:06.039 --> 00:10:07.799 you also can unfreeze it with all three. 170 00:10:08.799 --> 00:10:11.200 Yeah, well you have to freeze them all individually, and 171 00:10:11.240 --> 00:10:14.120 you'd have to unfreeze them individually. But most entities who 172 00:10:14.159 --> 00:10:16.440 want to give you credit, they'll say we're going to 173 00:10:16.519 --> 00:10:19.360 use TransUnion or Ecofax or Experience. They won't use all 174 00:10:19.399 --> 00:10:22.440 of the typically and they'll tell you which one. The 175 00:10:22.519 --> 00:10:24.879 easiest way is to set up an account with these 176 00:10:25.159 --> 00:10:27.879 and then you can go in and to freeze or unfreeze, 177 00:10:27.919 --> 00:10:31.519 you're literally pressing a button. You're clicking on one little 178 00:10:31.720 --> 00:10:35.000 icon and it's done. It's so simple, okay, and it's 179 00:10:35.080 --> 00:10:38.279 amazing that people don't do that because it is the 180 00:10:38.480 --> 00:10:42.639 single most important thing to do, given the fact that 181 00:10:42.720 --> 00:10:44.039 your information is already out there. 182 00:10:44.200 --> 00:10:47.879 Okay, So assuming the information is out there, you have 183 00:10:47.960 --> 00:10:53.840 to go to each of these credit agencies, is that 184 00:10:53.879 --> 00:10:57.159 the correct term? Or no credit monitoring suce that's. 185 00:10:57.000 --> 00:10:59.679 Right, Yeah, that's fine. 186 00:11:00.159 --> 00:11:00.399 Okay. 187 00:11:01.440 --> 00:11:02.399 Three companies, that's. 188 00:11:02.279 --> 00:11:06.519 Right, TransUnion, Experience, Equifax, So there's those. If you freeze 189 00:11:06.559 --> 00:11:10.120 it with each of those big three, you have provided 190 00:11:10.200 --> 00:11:14.120 a layer of protection that is that's important, okay. And 191 00:11:14.159 --> 00:11:17.000 then in order to unfreeze it, you you can move, 192 00:11:17.480 --> 00:11:19.759 you can do it. Okay, let me do this. I'd 193 00:11:19.840 --> 00:11:22.080 like to pause, if you would. I got to take 194 00:11:22.080 --> 00:11:24.480 a commercial break. I also would like to invite some 195 00:11:24.559 --> 00:11:28.039 of my listeners to join us and ask you questions, 196 00:11:28.080 --> 00:11:31.759 because frankly, I know a little bit about this, but 197 00:11:31.960 --> 00:11:35.120 I'm smart enough to know that I don't know all 198 00:11:35.200 --> 00:11:37.360 that that my listeners know, and so there may be 199 00:11:37.440 --> 00:11:39.440 some questions that my listeners have. Would you be willing 200 00:11:39.440 --> 00:11:40.879 to take a few questions. 201 00:11:41.360 --> 00:11:42.200 Be happy to help? 202 00:11:42.519 --> 00:11:46.240 Excellent, excellent. My guest is doctor Sheldon Jacobson. He's with 203 00:11:46.360 --> 00:11:49.960 the University of Illinois. He's the founder of the computer 204 00:11:50.159 --> 00:11:53.559 science program there. He's also the director of the Institute 205 00:11:53.600 --> 00:11:59.919 for Computational Redistricting. We'll explain well, I'll get an explanation 206 00:12:00.039 --> 00:12:02.240 of what that is. If you would like to ask 207 00:12:02.720 --> 00:12:07.320 doctor Jacobson a question, offer a thought, I'd love to 208 00:12:07.360 --> 00:12:09.799 have you joined the conversation. This is one of those 209 00:12:09.879 --> 00:12:14.039 programs that I think is really important. We can talk politics, 210 00:12:14.080 --> 00:12:16.919 we can talk you know, Trump, Harris, we can talk 211 00:12:17.000 --> 00:12:19.360 all of that sort of stuff any night, but this 212 00:12:19.519 --> 00:12:24.320 is we've found a great resource. Uh. He's very forthcoming 213 00:12:24.360 --> 00:12:27.080 and very clear. Give us a call six one seven 214 00:12:27.320 --> 00:12:30.440 four ten thirty or six one seven nine ten thirty 215 00:12:30.519 --> 00:12:33.159 back on knights I would Professor Sheldon Jacobson at the 216 00:12:33.200 --> 00:12:36.120 University of Illinois. Right after a few messages. 217 00:12:37.399 --> 00:12:40.360 Now back to Dan Ray live from the Window World 218 00:12:40.519 --> 00:12:43.600 Nights Side Studios on WBZ News Radio. 219 00:12:44.879 --> 00:12:50.159 My guest is Professor Sheldon Jacobson. Uh, And as I expected, 220 00:12:50.519 --> 00:12:53.919 we have a bunch of phone calls. So without any 221 00:12:53.960 --> 00:12:58.600 further ado, is there anything that I have not asked 222 00:12:58.639 --> 00:13:03.120 you that you think is narrative for you to share 223 00:13:03.159 --> 00:13:05.519 with my audience before we go to phone calls. I 224 00:13:05.559 --> 00:13:08.600 love the idea of freezing the credit account, and I 225 00:13:08.639 --> 00:13:14.279 have seen that mentioned earlier in other venues. But you 226 00:13:14.360 --> 00:13:17.320 explained and have convinced me that it one should be done, 227 00:13:17.639 --> 00:13:19.360 and that it can be done simply, and it can 228 00:13:19.399 --> 00:13:22.559 be undone simply. Anything else that people can do on 229 00:13:22.600 --> 00:13:27.559 a short term basis. 230 00:13:26.039 --> 00:13:30.080 The thing that you can also purchase identification theft protection, 231 00:13:30.440 --> 00:13:32.679 which would be the next layer, which in fact they'll 232 00:13:32.679 --> 00:13:35.080 do the freezing and unfreezing for you if it's because 233 00:13:35.080 --> 00:13:37.960 you pay for that service. That's another thing which makes 234 00:13:37.960 --> 00:13:40.840 it a little easier for people. Does cost money obviously 235 00:13:40.919 --> 00:13:43.879 to do this well, just freezing does not cost anything. 236 00:13:43.960 --> 00:13:46.840 So there's different layers of protections you can put in, 237 00:13:46.879 --> 00:13:49.320 and you have to ask yourself how much layers do 238 00:13:49.399 --> 00:13:53.480 I want to pay forward and provide? Because think of 239 00:13:53.480 --> 00:13:55.320 it this way. If you're in a group of people 240 00:13:55.360 --> 00:13:59.279 and you're being attacked by a bear, you don't have 241 00:13:59.320 --> 00:14:01.320 to run fast than the bear. You just have to 242 00:14:01.399 --> 00:14:03.080 can't be the slowest person running. 243 00:14:03.360 --> 00:14:06.840 Yes, I was about to say that, Yes. 244 00:14:07.639 --> 00:14:10.200 You just want to stay ahead of people so that 245 00:14:10.240 --> 00:14:13.679 when they go through many, many social security numbers, if 246 00:14:13.759 --> 00:14:18.639 you've provided some headwinds to them accessing cure credit, then 247 00:14:18.639 --> 00:14:20.919 they're going to go to someone else. And that's the 248 00:14:21.000 --> 00:14:23.320 way it works. Keep that in mind. You're not going 249 00:14:23.399 --> 00:14:27.399 to be able to be completely risk free, but you 250 00:14:27.480 --> 00:14:32.519 want to be more protected than everybody else. And freezing 251 00:14:32.679 --> 00:14:33.799 is a really an important thing. 252 00:14:34.039 --> 00:14:36.639 Okay, who are the companies because I think I hear 253 00:14:36.679 --> 00:14:40.440 them advertised that we have a million dollars worth of protection. 254 00:14:40.679 --> 00:14:42.840 Is there a company that you feel is the gold 255 00:14:42.879 --> 00:14:46.759 standard in terms of again this unlimited threat protection. 256 00:14:47.840 --> 00:14:50.440 Well, I prefer not to mention the name of a company. 257 00:14:50.600 --> 00:14:54.120 What I would suggest people to is simply Google IDs 258 00:14:54.159 --> 00:14:57.720 have protection. And there are so many surveys out there, 259 00:14:57.840 --> 00:14:59.799 and they're all a little different, but they're providing some 260 00:15:00.039 --> 00:15:02.519 moller services. I'll let each person to choose. But I 261 00:15:03.039 --> 00:15:05.279 don't want to get into an endorsement in this particular case. 262 00:15:05.320 --> 00:15:07.799 No, No, I understand that, and I respect that, I 263 00:15:07.840 --> 00:15:12.240 really do, you know, but I I also I know 264 00:15:12.320 --> 00:15:14.879 that there are probably some companies out there that might 265 00:15:14.960 --> 00:15:19.000 promise you the world, but in the event of a problem, 266 00:15:20.120 --> 00:15:22.279 you know what, what what can you do to make 267 00:15:22.320 --> 00:15:24.919 sure that they beg back back up their problem? You 268 00:15:24.919 --> 00:15:28.159 know their promise? I meaning you know you you hire 269 00:15:28.159 --> 00:15:31.879 a lawyer to uh TO to do some estate planning 270 00:15:31.879 --> 00:15:33.799 for you. If he doesn't do the estate planning, then 271 00:15:33.799 --> 00:15:36.200 you don't pay the lawyer. That's I just but but 272 00:15:36.240 --> 00:15:38.840 I'm not going to pressure pressure you on that, that's 273 00:15:38.840 --> 00:15:42.759 for sure. So other other than freezing the accounts on 274 00:15:42.799 --> 00:15:46.759 your own Google I D threat protection and do your 275 00:15:46.759 --> 00:15:50.000 own research. But find a company who you would pay. 276 00:15:50.200 --> 00:15:52.279 Is that a one time only fee or is that 277 00:15:52.320 --> 00:15:54.679 sort of you pay so much every year and if 278 00:15:54.679 --> 00:15:59.080 you don't pay, the threat protection vanishes? Does these type 279 00:15:59.159 --> 00:16:00.440 actually do it differ? Linked? 280 00:16:01.639 --> 00:16:03.840 It's a service you pay on an ongoing basis, much 281 00:16:03.919 --> 00:16:06.200 like your cell phone service and others. You just pay 282 00:16:06.200 --> 00:16:09.480 it regularly, either in a yearly or on a monthly basis, 283 00:16:09.799 --> 00:16:12.559 and it provides the kind of prediction that you know, 284 00:16:12.679 --> 00:16:15.000 it's peace of mind, what you want to pay for 285 00:16:15.399 --> 00:16:16.399 and what you're comfortable with. 286 00:16:16.679 --> 00:16:18.679 Yeah, it's like having an alarm system on your home. 287 00:16:18.759 --> 00:16:20.840 I get it. It's it's peace of mind. So let 288 00:16:20.840 --> 00:16:24.120 me ask you this question. What is a reasonable amount 289 00:16:24.120 --> 00:16:27.200 of money? Do they charge you based upon what your 290 00:16:27.320 --> 00:16:32.519 assets are? Or does every person who would who would 291 00:16:32.600 --> 00:16:38.159 present themselves as a potential customer they treated the same way? Uh? 292 00:16:38.240 --> 00:16:41.519 You know, obviously life insurance, the the fee for life 293 00:16:41.559 --> 00:16:45.320 insurance is correlated to your age. And maybe if you 294 00:16:45.360 --> 00:16:48.720 have to take a medical exam, what is the what's 295 00:16:48.759 --> 00:16:51.360 the standard? If you know and I get them I 296 00:16:52.440 --> 00:16:54.679 learned in law school. The only dumb question of the 297 00:16:54.759 --> 00:16:57.159 questions you don't you're afraid to answer to ask so 298 00:16:57.840 --> 00:17:00.000 uh is do you have any idea what the standard 299 00:17:00.200 --> 00:17:02.279 sort of range of fees would be on an annual 300 00:17:02.320 --> 00:17:04.359 basis for something like that thread protection? 301 00:17:05.559 --> 00:17:08.000 It depends on the level of protection that you want. 302 00:17:08.319 --> 00:17:10.920 There's minimal amounts that you can have, which is a 303 00:17:10.960 --> 00:17:13.400 more modest monthly fee or an annual fee, and then 304 00:17:13.440 --> 00:17:17.160 they have, you know, higher levels of protection which also 305 00:17:17.359 --> 00:17:20.200 increase the coverage. So it's not so much based on 306 00:17:20.720 --> 00:17:23.799 your assets, it's what you want to purchase in terms 307 00:17:23.839 --> 00:17:24.400 of protection. 308 00:17:24.880 --> 00:17:27.759 Okay, So so almost as if you were going to, 309 00:17:28.599 --> 00:17:32.279 you know, get protection for a home that's worth of 310 00:17:32.440 --> 00:17:34.559 two hundred or three hundred thousand dollars worth. It is 311 00:17:34.720 --> 00:17:38.480 worth a home that's worth two or three million dollars. Okay, perfectly, 312 00:17:38.920 --> 00:17:42.400 perfectly clear examples which I love. My guest is Professor 313 00:17:42.440 --> 00:17:45.920 Sheldon Jacobson. We're right at the bottom of the hour, 314 00:17:46.039 --> 00:17:47.920 virtually within a minute, and I don't want to short 315 00:17:48.039 --> 00:17:50.319 change anyone, so I will tell you the only lines 316 00:17:50.359 --> 00:17:52.799 that the only line open right now is six one seven, 317 00:17:52.960 --> 00:17:55.319 nine three, one ten thirty. If you're dialing two five, 318 00:17:55.359 --> 00:17:57.920 four to ten thirty, the lines are full, try six 319 00:17:57.960 --> 00:18:01.119 one seven, nine three one ten thirty. Hoping doctor Jacobson 320 00:18:01.119 --> 00:18:02.799 will be kind enough to stay with us for another 321 00:18:02.839 --> 00:18:06.400 half hour and take as many questions as possible. We 322 00:18:06.480 --> 00:18:09.480 will be back with doctor Sheldon Jacobson, who is a 323 00:18:09.519 --> 00:18:13.920 fabulous guest, and I very really describe my guest as fabulous, 324 00:18:13.960 --> 00:18:19.000 Doctor Jacobson. Your answers are thorough, comprehensive and clear, which 325 00:18:19.039 --> 00:18:23.039 is exactly you must make a terrific expert witness in 326 00:18:23.079 --> 00:18:26.319 a quote of law. Because you really are very, very good, 327 00:18:26.440 --> 00:18:28.319 and I just want us to thank you for your 328 00:18:28.359 --> 00:18:32.279 time tonight. This You're exactly the type of guests I've 329 00:18:32.279 --> 00:18:34.599 been looking for, and my producer has been seeking for 330 00:18:34.640 --> 00:18:36.759 about a week. So she did a great job finding you. 331 00:18:37.039 --> 00:18:39.279 I thank you for your time tonight. Stay right there. 332 00:18:39.400 --> 00:18:41.400 We got a news break. It's about three or four minutes. 333 00:18:41.400 --> 00:18:42.759 If you need to get up and get a glass 334 00:18:42.799 --> 00:18:45.359 of water. Now is the time back with doctor Sheldon 335 00:18:45.440 --> 00:18:49.119 Jacobson and the University of Illinois. Fighting a Line A 336 00:18:49.119 --> 00:18:53.720 Line Knight. I believe is the name of the correct 337 00:18:53.839 --> 00:18:55.599 is that you're a fighting a line night? Correct Or 338 00:18:55.680 --> 00:18:58.440 have they changed that? All right? Just as look, please 339 00:18:58.480 --> 00:19:00.440 don't change that name. I love that name. Improve me 340 00:19:00.519 --> 00:19:03.240 back on night Side right after this with your phone calls. 341 00:19:04.519 --> 00:19:08.519 It's night Side with Dan Ray on w BSS, Boston's 342 00:19:08.559 --> 00:19:09.200 news radio. 343 00:19:09.440 --> 00:19:11.920 That I did have pizza and ice cream. I just 344 00:19:11.960 --> 00:19:14.519 felt like pizza and ice cream. Not gonna eat pizza 345 00:19:14.519 --> 00:19:16.160 and ice cream every night, but I don't waking when 346 00:19:16.200 --> 00:19:18.680 any you could splurge and I felt like it tonight. 347 00:19:19.039 --> 00:19:22.240 Let's go to the call for the phones, my guest, 348 00:19:22.759 --> 00:19:24.519 uh see, I had ice cream on my mind. I 349 00:19:24.559 --> 00:19:27.480 was thinking of ice cream cones. Professor Sheldon Jacobson at 350 00:19:27.480 --> 00:19:32.440 the University of Illinois. Let's go to Bill and Danvers, Massachusetts. Hey, Bill, 351 00:19:32.480 --> 00:19:33.920 welcome back, how are you sir. 352 00:19:34.880 --> 00:19:38.960 Good good, yes, doctor that I am experient and you 353 00:19:38.960 --> 00:19:41.480 can go on. Of course I wanted there's your credit, 354 00:19:41.680 --> 00:19:43.319 you know, and you can go on and get all 355 00:19:43.359 --> 00:19:44.799 three credit reports. 356 00:19:45.200 --> 00:19:45.400 You know. 357 00:19:45.519 --> 00:19:47.519 Maybe if I'm going for col Loo, and sometimes I'll 358 00:19:47.519 --> 00:19:50.279 do it, I'll look at my overall, but that auction 359 00:19:50.440 --> 00:19:51.599 to lock it is on there. 360 00:19:52.319 --> 00:19:52.680 Also. 361 00:19:53.160 --> 00:19:56.319 I have love luck. If I were to fill an 362 00:19:56.319 --> 00:20:00.759 application out right now for a credit card, probably as 363 00:20:00.839 --> 00:20:04.200 soon as I hit click that button, probably within one 364 00:20:04.200 --> 00:20:06.960 to two minutes, I would get a notification, a text 365 00:20:07.000 --> 00:20:09.759 message and email, and if I didn't answer it was 366 00:20:09.880 --> 00:20:14.200 me or not, then the phone rings. They also alert 367 00:20:14.240 --> 00:20:17.119 you if you find anything on the doc web. They 368 00:20:17.200 --> 00:20:21.279 monitor that because some stuff you said. 369 00:20:22.319 --> 00:20:24.519 I know that doctor Jacobson is not here to endorse 370 00:20:24.559 --> 00:20:26.839 any company. You said that you have LifeLock. I think 371 00:20:26.880 --> 00:20:31.000 you said yeah, yeah, and they advertised that heavily. Are 372 00:20:31.000 --> 00:20:32.200 you Are you happy with them? 373 00:20:32.240 --> 00:20:33.880 Bill? Yeah? 374 00:20:34.079 --> 00:20:36.240 I mean I want to say, it's been years I've 375 00:20:36.279 --> 00:20:39.480 had them, and but they you know, they let you know. 376 00:20:39.599 --> 00:20:41.920 Also they had a thing because I went on one 377 00:20:42.000 --> 00:20:43.799 day and you know, the look and I don't know 378 00:20:43.839 --> 00:20:45.640 what the doctor field. They have this thing called the 379 00:20:45.680 --> 00:20:49.319 privacy scan. I don't know if you know it was 380 00:20:49.359 --> 00:20:52.920 it wasn't that much more a month. And you know, 381 00:20:52.960 --> 00:20:54.599 if you go punch in your name on some of 382 00:20:54.640 --> 00:20:55.920 the side, you know, if you kind of see who 383 00:20:55.920 --> 00:20:57.440 you're related to this, I mean, there's a lot of 384 00:20:57.480 --> 00:21:00.559 information on the computer. You spend ten minutes look around, 385 00:21:00.640 --> 00:21:02.960 and he roughly knew somebody's age and stuff and where 386 00:21:03.000 --> 00:21:05.640 they live. You could actually find out. So this privacy 387 00:21:05.680 --> 00:21:08.160 scan kind of goes on and it tells you what 388 00:21:08.200 --> 00:21:10.480 it's complete. They notified to pull stuff down and they 389 00:21:10.519 --> 00:21:12.680 scan every month. So in the beginning there was like 390 00:21:12.720 --> 00:21:15.880 two hundred and something sits. I mean now it's like 391 00:21:15.960 --> 00:21:18.240 five sticks, eight sites. They'll tell you if they found, 392 00:21:18.240 --> 00:21:22.240 what they removed and everything else. So I don't know 393 00:21:22.240 --> 00:21:24.359 how accurate it is, but I assume anything that kind 394 00:21:24.359 --> 00:21:27.200 of keeps stuff under control and maybe keeps less information 395 00:21:27.279 --> 00:21:29.880 out there for eight ninety nine a month on top 396 00:21:29.920 --> 00:21:32.759 of whatever, probably isn't the worst thing. So I don't 397 00:21:32.759 --> 00:21:34.839 know if the doctor knows anything about that. 398 00:21:35.480 --> 00:21:39.400 Say let's say he does. Doctor Jacobson. Bill is a again, 399 00:21:39.480 --> 00:21:41.759 he's with one of these agencies, and I guess there 400 00:21:41.839 --> 00:21:44.000 was an add on which you would expect. It's like 401 00:21:44.039 --> 00:21:46.559