Hey, everybody, to anyone debating trinity versus talie. And we were starting
right now with Jake Muslim metaphysician's opening statement. Thanks so much for being with
us. Jake, the floor is all yours, all right, Are you
able to see my screen there? Yes? Okay, ready, all right?
Bis mile Roman raheem alhamdhi, So i'm abad arakatu. Welcome everyone.
So the debate before us tonight is the Orthodox Trinity versus ethity Creed. To
be clear, this is a debate over polytheism and the belief in three gods
on the one hand, and monotheism, or the belief in one God,
on the other hand. In the first half of my opening statement, I
will explain and offer a defensive ethnity creed. In the second half of my
statement, I will explain what the Orthodox concept that the Trinity is and offer
arguments against this position. First and foremost, unlike Orthodox Christians, we Muslims
believe in one God, ahed Allah who summoned le Ahed say he a law
is one Allah, the eternal, the self sufficient. He neither begets,
nor is he begotten, nor is there to him any equivalent. Allah is
one God, does not rely on anything other than himself, and everything in
creation relies upon him. He does not beget, nor is he begotten or
cause to exist, and there is nothing equal to him. The great ethity
scholar Ibn Koseima summarizes ethity creed, saying, and I quote our doctrine or
Medheb, as well as that of all of our teachers, is as follows.
We ascribe to God everything that he ascribes to himself. We acknowledge it
verbally and hold it to be true through innerconviction within ourselves, though without thereby
comparing God's face to the face of any creature or created entity. For our
Lord is above being like onto creatures. So we affirm real attributes for Allah
based on the apparent meaning of the texts, and ascribe to him what he
ascribes to himself. We know the meaning of his attributes, but we do
not know the hakika or the kathia, or the precise reality of the attributes.
Keep in mind that when we say we affirm the apparent meaning of the
text, this takes into account the surrounding context of the verses mentioned, as
well as the entire corpus of revelation. We do not deny his attributes,
nor do we liken his attributes to the creation. We reject divine simplicity or
the notion that God does not have any real distinct attributes. However, his
attributes are inseparable from his essence. He is not composed or caused to exist
by something outside of himself. We also affirm that a law is an active,
dynamic creator that is genuinely capable of acting in succession. He creates different
things at different times and speaks to his creation whatever he wills by his will
and power. We believe his actions can have a beginning in time, and
yet are o created. The legendary scholar of hadith Imame Albuchharti states, and
I quote fulfit little Lahi syphithal Lahi well merolu rero hum Menelchalki. So a
Llaw's action is his attribute, and that which is acted upon is distinct from
him, being part of his creation. He also says his occurrences exalted be
He are not similar to the occurrences of creatures. According to the saying of
a Law, most high lesa commit hiche, there is nothing like him,
and he is the hearing the scene. Lastly, Albukharti states that a law's
command, which has a beginning in time, is uncreated. So as we
can see, Albuharti affirms that Allaw's actions are his attributes, and they are
distinct from creation. His actions also can have a beginning in time, and
yet they are uncreated. Some may argue that we ethites affirm that a law
has a hand and thereby liken him to creation. They may claim that we
cannot attribute the same name to God in creation without ascribing the same ontology for
God and Creation. This principle is falsified if one affirms God and humans can
possess an essence without being similar ontologically. The same bears true for every other
predicate given to God. Also looming behind the charge of Teeshbee is an assumed
realism regarding universals. For example, God and humans both have knowledge. This
universal knowledge must be partially identical in God and man, the objector assumes.
However, if we reject the realist notion, this argument assumes we cannot affirm
the conclusion of Teeshbe. There is no ontological sharing between God and Creation.
Because ontological sharing does not exist. Every object, including its essence and attributes
is particular and not universal. Universals merely exist as concepts in the mind.
The claim that Ethity traditionalists represent an overtly anthropomorphic theology has been refuted countless times,
and most recently by Farid suli Man when he states, and I quote
Wesley Williams attempted in a two thousand and two article to show that Ibin Hanbel's
conception of God was blatantly anthropomorphic, an untenable claim in my opinion close quote.
Suleiman also cites numerous other academics who have refuted this falsehood and goes into
more detail substantiating his claim. We should also keep in mind that Jay and
the Eastern Orthodox have no problem with Teeshbe. In fact, they consider it
necessary given their concept of theosis described by maximistic Confessor as in I quote,
A sure warrant for looking forward with hope to deification of human nature is provided
by the incarnation of God, which makes God, hence God, which makes
man God to the same degree as God himself became Man. Let us become
the image of the whole one God, bearing nothing earthly in ourselves, so
that we may consort with God and become God's receiving from God our existence as
gods. Close quote. So, as we can see, Orthodox Christians do
not have a problem likening God to Creation or Creation to God. I now
turn to my opponent's theology of the trinity. I will argue that Jay believes
in three gods based on what is known in the literature as the logical problem
of the Trinity. To put it simply, the Father, the Son,
and the Holy Spirit are each God, but are distinct from one another.
The normal method by which we would count would mean that there are three gods.
Eastern Orthodox scholar Bo Branson states, and I quote, the doctrine of
the trinity is central to mainstream Christianity, but in so far as it posits
three persons, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit who are one God,
it appears as inconsistent as the claim that one plus one plus one equals one.
So the common so called Muslim meme of one plus one plus one is
right on target. I expect Jay to attempt to reply to this argument,
but as we will see later, his responses will not help him and will
only create further difficulties. My second argument is that the Father, Son,
and Holy Spirit cannot be one God because they do not possess the same power
and knowledge. Orthodox Christians claim the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are
one God because they possess the same energies. However, power and knowledge are
energies, and they do not possess the same power and knowledge. For any
power or knowledge that they do not share. They make an exception to this
so called rule in an unprincipled manner. For example, the Father alone has
the power or ability to produce or cause another divine person to exist. According
to Jay, the Father alone causes the Son and Spirit. They cannot have
the same power if one divine person has a power that the other two lack.
Therefore they cannot be the same God. If they do not have the
same power. The Father, Son, and Holy Spirit also do not have
the same knowledge. The Father alone knows that he has the power to cause
the Sun and Spirit to exist. The Son alone knows from a first person
perspective that he is the Word who became flesh, was born, and died
on the cross. Therefore, they cannot have the same knowledge. If they
do not have the same knowledge, then they must be three gods according to
Jay's own standards. My third argument is called the epistemological schizophrenia of Orthodoxy.
Jay and the so called Orthobros make a transcendental argument claiming that orthodox theology is
a necessary precondition for knowledge logic, argumentation, etc. What exactly is the
argument or justification for this claim. Now here's where the epistemological schizophrenia of Orthodoxy
comes into focus. Jay's good friend Anoniosaurum states, and I quote, obtaining
the necessary conditions for the possibility of knowledge cannot be logically or epistemically contingent upon
logic or epistemological arguments, since this would result than question begging an amount to
epistemic bootstrapping. Neither would the veracity of the claim that such and such conditions
are necessary for the possibility of knowledge. The necessary conditions that would provide justification
for our knowledge must be both metaphysically and epistemically prior to epistemology and arguments close
quote. It seems the response that is that there is no argument or justification
for the claim that orthodox theology is a necessary precondition. However, in the
same article, Anoniosaurum contradicts himself, stating, and I quote, therefore,
the only condition that will satisfy the possibility of knowledge and bridged a gulf between
man and truth is the unique idea of God coherently articulated in the theology of
the Eastern Orthodox Church, who has preserved the correct doctrine of God received in
divine revelation from the Holy Trinity. For only in the Orthodox doctrine of God
will we see that God the necessary condition is rational, omniscient, transcendent,
non contingent, or necessary, intentional in his creation, as opposed to creation
being accidental. A personal and communal being having paracereesis within his trinity close quote.
And he continues on listing all of the reasons why the Eastern Orthodox Church
alone can serve as the necessary precondition. He contradicts himself again just a few
sentences later, saying, and I quote. In presupposing God as the necessary
condition for the possibility of knowledge, man surrenders his autonomy to the revelation of
God, not as a conclusion that has met the standards of his epistemological criterion
itself close quote. So which one is it? Does Jay and have an
argument and justification for the claim that Orthodox theology is the necessary precondition for knowledge
and argumentation And if so, then what exactly is the argument? If not,
then the claim is equivalent to stay eating that a banana is the necessary
precondition for knowledge and argumentation. And when you ask me to justify that,
I can simply say that you are missing the whole point, as this argument
is beyond justification. Let's see which direction Jay goes and if he can remove
himself from this state of epistemic schizophrenia. My final argument is what I call
the problem of orthodoxy in Orthodoxy. By this, I mean that early church
Fathers and saints and Jay's tradition rejected the doctrine of the Trinity. Jay denies
this and claims that not only were the early church Father's trinitarians, but so
were ancient Jews. He cites authors like Alan Siegel, Daniel Boyoran, and
others to support his claim. However, he does so either out of complete
ignorance or does so dishonestly. These scholars simply point out that there were intra
Jewish theological disputes regarding how one should interpret certain texts. Some Jews interpreted passages
in the Old Testament and support of a theology similar to logos theology, where
the logos is a divine or semi divine figure that serves as an intermediary between
the Most High God and creation. Boy or In quotes Daniel Abrams saying,
and I quote, no one view dominated the spectrum of Jewish interpretations, since
the Biblical text is the only common frame for the wide variety of speculations close
quote. So logos theology was not the only view, or even the dominant
view in early Judaism. Also, these same sources Jay loves to quote represent
Justin Martyr as a proponent of logos theology and not trinitarianism. Boy Orin against
states, and I quote many of these passages served as the origin and proof
text for logos theology, as manifested in Justin Martyr's Dialogue on nearly every page.
Close quote. Alan Siegel states, and I quote both Christianity and Gnosticism
arose out of Hellenistic and apocalyptic Judaism by sharing heretical traditions of scripture interpretation,
which speculated on a principal angelic mediator of God. Close quote. This is
exactly what I've always claimed, Leslie. Boy Orin acknowledges the stark difference between
logos theology and trinitarianism. Saying, and I quote. Nicene Orthodoxy also effectively
crucifies the logos, while not ceasing to be to speak of the logos.
In the move to a Trinitarian theology, within which the entire Trinity is both
self contained and fully transcendent, Athanasius and his fellows insist that God alone,
without a mediator, without an angel, without a logos, is the creator.
Logos theology is ultimately as thoroughly rejected within Nicene Christianity as within Orthodox Ribbinism.
Quotes quote so logos theology. So some Jews were Logosterists and others were
not. However none of them were Trinitarians. Also, some early Christians were
Logosterists and some were not. Justin Martyr and other church fathers were logos theorists,
but logos theory is deemed heretical by Orthodox Trinitarians. Jay and his Orthodox
friends pray to dead saints who held heretical positions and did not believe Jesus was
the most high God. It seems like Orthodoxy has a problem with Orthodoxy.
In conclusion, Ethitic creed is the belief in one God who is the creator
of all. As for Jay and the Orthodox Christians, who suffer from epistemic
schizophrenia. I argue that they believe in three gods, the fathers, the
Father, Son and Spirit do not have the same power or knowledge, rendering
them three gods. And lastly, they have a problem with Orthodoxy, as
their early church fathers held to a heretical theology by their own standards. Be
nakailht wellmulwelutosifun. Thank you very much, and I look forward to Jay's presentation.
Thank you very much for that opening. And folks, if it's your
first time here at Modern Day Debate, want to let you know we're thrilled
to have you here. We hope you feel welcome, and don't forget to
hit that subscribe button as we have many debates coming up. You don't want
to miss them, so hit subscribe right now. We're gonna kick it over
to j for his opening as well. Thanks for being with us. Jay,
the floors all yours for your opening statement. All right, can we
see the screen? Yes, all right, let's get into it. So
I I'm glad for Jake. They're basically doing everything I wanted him to do
in his opening statement. So he's handing me a lot of gems, and
it's going to jie perfectly with what I put in my opening statement as to
exactly where I knew he would go. So let's talk about Salafi Islamic absurdity.
And that's of course the position that Jake represents here. And uh,
we're going to look first at how one of his representative theologians that he said
represents the powers of Islam. Even to me, particularly in his book on
the Oneness of God, we're going to know that it's a massive Christian fail
and we're going to see the similar fails that even to mea makes an understanding
Christian theology basics the Jake himself made when it came to the triad, by
example, for example, by reducing the idea of begetting to being an energy.
Begetting is not an energy. So for Jake's argument to hold that he
made earlier about the Triad, begetting would have to be a common energy.
And it's not, first of all, even to me a pousitis at the
outset of his book an eternal world existing eternally separate from God based on an
infinite regress of worlds now, Jake has made many critiques of this view and
others. So it'd be interesting to see if he rejects a basic idea in
one of his basic palamas like theologians of the Islami tradition. Second is,
even to mea pauses the Trinity as contradicting natural reason. This is a problem
they're going to notice later on in even to me as well as Jake,
given the that he doesn't understand the transcental argument, as he made clear in
his opening statement, that's going to be very relevant for where we go here
in a minute. Arguing that the Trinity makes energies and attributes persons is a
move that Ibantimia makes, which is false. He attributes to us the Nestorian
view of christ Us to Hypostaces, which is false. And he attributes to
us an Arian motalist view of the Trinity collapsing person and nature and God on
pages twenty two to twenty four. Now, he may not believe those things,
and you may not believe those things, but that's not our position as
Orthodox. So if we're going to be arguing against the Orthodox position, you
can't set up a strong man and say that you're knocking down the Orthodox position
when it's the Aryan or historian position no s if Antonia, Clint and Islam
in general fail to understand, typically speaking, the Orthodox trinitarian dogma, and
they create a strong man as a formula as formulating in our councils, which
reject arianism and Nestorianism. This would be like me basically calling Jacob sufi,
and then we're proceeding to refute that position Jakes failed to ca out of unity
and multiplicity in Allah. This has come up in a few debates now with
Jake. But what is being debated here between us is not actually a pure
unitarian position of Jake versus the freeness position that I have, but rather two
different ways of accounting for unity and distinction in God. Jake would like to
give the impression that his position is free from all issues that relate to multiplicity,
but in passion debates we will see that this fails. Jake believes that
the attributes of God are according to even to me, as two principles really
distinct amongst themselves from God's essence. What applies to one attribute also applies to
all the others, and equally to God's essence. This includes affirmation and negation
true whether we know the meaning or not accept the plain meaning. As Jake
said in his opening statement, attributes are comparable to creatures in terms of perfections,
which creatures partially have, while God maximally has this perfection in a way
befitting him. Thus likeness in these cases is quote in name only. According
to Eman, to me Ergo, it tells us nothing, especially with Jake's
nominalist Imperis's position, which he admitted. We will look at this in a
second, so keep that in mind. True for thee, not for me
the Jake brand. Jake believes that the attributes are really distinct and inseparable.
Did you hear him say that in his opening statement? That means counting by
division, But he also distinctly identifies the attributes is really distinct from each other
and from the essence that's counting by identity, which in the same boat places
him in the same boat as trinitarians when accounting for the distinction of hypostaces counted
by identity and the divine essence counted by division. No, I did not
say that Jake thinks that allahs attributes are persons, or that we think attributes
our persons. That is Jake's strong man that he often uses in many discussions
and live streams when he attempts to rebut this argument. But rather Jake makes
the same move when accounting for unity and distinction in God that we yet he
calls us out on it. This is in fact Jake's guilty double standard.
Furthermore, Jake and even to me are allowed to engage in affirmation claims about
Allah, which we call catafatic theology that he would call idolatry in Christianity.
Jake often states the trinity incarnation's pagan we look at examples in a moment.
But this illustrates another double center, where all of his body parts are considered
real but not created, foot, hand, eyes, et cetera. What
is an uncreated foot that is nothing like a human foot? What, by
the way, is a more perfect foot? Does the godfoot have toenails?
Isn't a foot with toenails more perfect than a toenail deficient foot? In other
words, it tells us absolutely nothing, and it reduces to absurdity. Also,
even to me, it argues that God laughing is somehow more perfect than
him not laughing. I'm interested to see how Jake accounts for this. It
would then follow the eternally laughing is better than laughing once. So God is
eternally lolling, In other words, a clown God. Remember what applies to
an attribute to me, as rules applies to all the others. If there's
an infinite series of created worlds and causes, then why would we ever need
a single being? Also a position of even to meum contingent means dependent upon
something else. But it's begging the question to say that it's a single necessary
being. So even to me, I might catch this out or jake in
two different ways. If it's a causal relation, then he's engaged in the
quantifier shift fallacy that every event has a cause, and so that every event
has one cause. If every event is contingent such that there's a transference to
the whole, that's the part's whole fallacy, because if everything is contingent,
therefore the whole is contingent is a non sequitor. For example, my room
is made up of atoms. Atoms are invisible, therefore my room is invisible.
This is a non sequitor. And this relates to the two types of
argumentation that even to me thinks is rational argumentation for the existence of God created
acts in God's essence. Jake is quick to claim idolatry in our position,
but holds actual idolatrists used by positing actions in the essence of God unless he
again departs from the guy that he says is his palamox. So in Suleiman
two forty one, they have been to me in the attributes of God.
We have this pointed out that, in other words, temporal acts are contrasted
with eternal acts. Jake makes this argument himself and Jake make a character that
creator acts are now eternal. That is a contradiction and also creates an attribute
that contradicts even to me as principal number one of what is applied to one
attribute that applies to all, meaning that all the attributes are now created and
temporal or timborrel acts are eternal. It also violates it in principle having his
principle number two, which applies to the attributes in God's which applies which applies
to the attributes applicable to God's essence, meaning that God's essence is now temporal.
Idolatry will remind you of ascribing to creatures of divine nature or worshiping creatures
as God. This may also be why Jake thinks God's knowledge has had through
discursive propositions, and that's precisely why he thinks the indexical's argument in debate from
modern philosophy applies to his ideas of God. I can simply reply that God's
mode of knowledge is not equivalent to creaturly modes of knowledge. And since Jake
at will invoke the idea of we don't know the modality, well, we
don't know the modality of God's knowledge. But I also might just simply deny
that God's knowledge is discursive or indexical. More problems for Jake, perfectly laughing.
The attributes of all law considered in themselves possess a sayety. This has
been asked to Jake in the past, and of course Jake has not had
an answer to it. Is one answer, one attribute considered in itself less
perfect than all of them compiled together, or all of them plus the essence.
Remember, a lot of this theology going to be built on perfect and
less perfect metaphysical assumptions, and we're going to see in a moment that he
doesn't even have the ability to get to predicating metaphysical claims at all. Why
is laughing and turning his face quote more perfect than not? And this is
it's actually argued by ibn to Mea in the book the Suliman Book. We
might ask what is a more perfect laugh? Was it a perfect laugh?
Was it merely a snicker? Why must we arbitrarily stop and inquiring about this
meaning? If it's a they will typically say, well, it's a laugh
that befits the majesty of all law. This again tells us absolutely nothing,
and in fact it's circular because it's not telling us anything. It's just another
supposed attribute that tells us that a law is more perfect. So that's a
circular claim, which even I to me rejects circularity. If being is part
of what it is seen, what it is to be perfect, then God
must be seen to be perfect. Yet Tama says that God cannot be seen.
Even Suleiman notes in the book on even to Mea, page two fifty
two, this is a flat out contradiction. And again we're going to see
tons and tons of contradictions when it comes to basic ideas about predicating about God.
What is the priori idea, by the way, a metaphysical perfection?
Here? Where does Jake derive it. How do we know this? Well?
It turns out it gets even worse because Jake, even to me,
is epistemology, as he noted, is an empiricist nominalist epistemology. Jake's position
cannot get off the ground terms of predication at all, and if this argument
holds, all of his argumentation about how he will then fail. This is
because Jake has put his metaphysical cart before his epistemic course and is engaging in
a host of unjustified, arbitrary, and contradictory claims. Empiricism is the view
that knowledge arises from sense data or relations of ideas. Nominalism is the view
that universals have no real existence, and for even to me and for Jake,
they're purely mental and solely particular. I Committed nominalists, however, must
grapple with the following problems. There is no empirical perception of quote necessity being
caused, or any other metaphysical claim. This then undercuts all histeology and theology
claims. There's no empirical perception of the parapeticut axiom, the idea that what's
in the mind derives from sense data. This is a position, and they've
been to me a hold. There's no empirical perception of quote reason or quote
self evident truth. We note that even to me affirms self evident truth as
most as soon you do as well, and I assume Jake knows as well.
There's no empirical perception of the universal that is abstracted by the intellect through
the phantasm. Some of the crib from Aristotle also present in it. To
me, the universal is thus not a universal if it's only merely particulars.
I forgot to put the footnote there, but I can add it. There's
no empirical perception of quote perfection any All the arguments that Hinge alice perfection on
maximally creature like perfections also then fail. There's no empirical perception of identity over
time. If you're an empiricist, these arguments are arguing, and by extension,
no perception then of meaning over time. In other words, I can
just take human's critiques of identity over time and apply them to Jake's position,
which is a not consistent empiricism. It turns out, actually David Hume's empiricism
is way more consistent, and that's why we can use these arguments. In
fact, Jake might think this isn't fair since this is a debate about talet
and trinity. But again he brought up a transcend augumentation, so I don't
feel unfair now. But if all this about predicating by the attributes is based
on a faulty epistemology of not eve empiricism and a faulty metaphysic of nominalism,
then every sentagent Jake makes fails to be justifiable or even coherent, as all
predication itself is now impossible, much less divine predication. Indeed, the Oxford
hand Book of Islam even notes that even to me is a Hume and a
Locke before human luck. Thus, as such he will be subjected to the
exact same critiques that we make of human lack. Even to me, a
principles of reason are self evident. On page one ninety six we're told it's
even to me his view, and I assume Jake's as well. It's a
form of classical foundationalism, where the first principles in terms of reasoning are self
evident, of course evid to me, they require no justification. If this
is the basis of his reasoning in general and by extension of the theological reason
of Quranic explanations. Then we see no basis for this assertion. If Jake
can be arbitrary, so can I. Jake. I can just claim that
the transcendental argument requires no justification. It just is the case. Now,
I don't actually think that, and I'm going to address your misunderstanding of the
category error that you made between logical and metalllogical argumentation, but that'll come later.
What is the non self referential, non circular basis for you, as
a kind of foundationalist for thinking that the principles of reasoning are self evident?
What determines self evidence? If it's based on something else else, then it's
no longer self evident. If it's not based on something else, then there's
the problem of arbitrariness. Furthermore, there's the criteria problem. What is the
more fundamental principle by which you classify self evidence from non self evident truth example,
For example, it admits so many passages that are disputed in the Koran
in terms of their meaning. Yet we're told that the plain simple meaning is
accessible to all and becomes extremely complex. However, when we see even Temia
layout four rules for knowing when it's figured versus the plain meaning. Now,
this you can see, was a huge source of dispute between him and doctor
Khalil in their debate where they were trying to figure out between various chronic texts
the pen, the tablet, this that, the hand, the foot,
what's literal, what's figurative? And well, Jake says, look, we're
going to go to the rules laid out by my scholars. How do we
know that those rules are the correct rules? In other words, it's just
moving the problem back a step. Given that Jake rejects the incarnation as a
pagan contradiction, we can return to the body parts, which are clin clearly
anthropomorphic attributes are claimed to have a practical teaching of value that would be useful
for seventh century Arabs and Jews, or even Christians hearing the text. Yet
the plain meaning is championed by Imantemia and the Salafi. It's based on analogy
or likeness. It's immediately divested of all the meaning, making the statement empty
and contradictor handfoot, face, laughter, above the throne, descent to lowis
heavens are all quote affirmed and then stated to be unknown in modality. In
other words, the godfoot is a foot that befits a llah, but it's
nothing like a human foot. Even Suleiman notes of even to me that he
plainly contradicts himself here on body parts on page three thirty one, as well
as on the notion of creaturely and divine perfections on page two fifty two.
It is a hand that's unlike empirically known hands, is basically what we're saying
here. Yet we're expecting every person in this century to just simply know that.
Well, clearly it's not talking about a creaturely hand, even though we
are inmpiricists. So lastly, I would note that the trinity is a doctrine
that is not far fetched. Basil and Letter two thirty four says the energies
come down to us, and then monarchicalternatarianism, which I think we'll get into.
My time is running out, is a combination of counting unity by division
and identity. With that, I want to say first thank you to both
of our guests for those opening statements. Folks, you can find our guests
link below. I have encourage even if you don't agree with them. This
is a great opportunity you can learn their positions firsthand by checking out their links
in the description box. Also, I want to let you know for tonight
we have a limited Q and A as this debate is gonna be a pretty
long one, so I want to let you know for the Q and A,
we won't get to every single question. We do want to ask one
if you do a super chat, we're going to read superchests that are five
dollars or more. And if you submit a question where it's not a superchat,
just to standard question, we're gonna try to get to those. But
no promises because we do want to let these guys out by a decent time
tonight. But with that we're gonna jump right into the rebuttals. Thank you
very much for those openings, gentlemen, and Jake, the floor is all
yours for your first ten minute rebuttal okay, thank you very much. I
just want to say at the outset, you know, Jay's opening statement was
very interesting. He spent the entire fifteen minutes attempting to attack my position,
which I'm going to show in just a second that he did a very poor
job because he's so ignorant of our position. He doesn't understand what we actually
believe. Nevertheless, he barely went through any detail during the fifteen minutes of
explaining what orthodox theology is and what that actually teaches. So the audience in
myself, if I don't didn't have these, you know, about fifty books
of Orthodox theology, I wouldn't know what the hell Jay's position actually is because
he didn't go into any significant detail to talk about his own position, whereas
I did. I try to manage my time to speak about half the time
about my own position and half the time about my opponents and critiquing his position.
So I wish Jay would have spent more time on his own position,
but of course, as we'll see, it's very difficult to do so because
he can't defend his own position. And I just want to point out that
Jay made make so many mistakes about what he thinks Ivantamia's position is, what
he thinks Ethity or Celefie Alqueda or Creed is, And I'm going to try
to point that at out as we go along and when we get to cross
examination section one by one, and I just want to explain this to the
audience. It should really be of no surprise because Jay himself and people were
wondering why did he delay this debate? Well, he delayed the debate because
he told me that he was incapable of having the debate unless he was able
to read one text that was an unreleased text in English. Okay, So
this is a guy who just started reading about Infantamia and Ethity Creed two weeks
ago, and he thinks he's now an expert. Isn't going to tell the
audience all about it. It's honestly a complete joke. Okay. So now
let's get to some of what Jay actually had to say here. He says
that Ivantamia doesn't understand Orthodox trinitarianism. Well, nobody would at this point because
you didn't really explain it. But nevertheless, what Mea says about Orthodox trinitarianism
is irrelevant to this debate. I didn't cite Itbenttainedia as an argument against Orthodox
trinitarianism. I gave arguments in which I've made numerous times, and you haven't
responded to any of them, in which you should have been able to preempt
in your opening statement, because I've been repeating them for five plus years.
So that's the first thing. The second thing is Jay makes a big to
do about nominalism. Now I actually appreciate that, Jay, and that's why
I spent a significant portion of my time speaking about our position of nominalism,
because I think it's a clear difference between the two views. If nominalism is
true, then orthodox trinitarianism is necessarily false. And I think even Jay Dyer
would have to agree with this. Why because they conceive of the universal that
the three persons share, or the essence as a universal that the three persons
share. Well, if there are no such things as emine universals, then
quite literally, the trinity cannot exist. Now, Jay makes it seem so
obvious as if these things such as universals, these entities, and so if
people don't know what they are, right, you know, you can see
this piece of paper here, this white piece of paper. The idea that
Jay Dyer wants us to believe, that he thinks is so obvious, is
that there is something can you picture, people, there's something in this piece
of paper that is actually identical to the white stripes and the whiteness in my
color and my skin complexion. That's what Jay Dyer wants us to believe is
that there's this thing, there's this thing that's universal whiteness which exists that is
partially at least identical in the paper and also in Jay's forehead. Well,
if he thinks that that's so obvious, I'd like him to give an argument
for that, because, based upon Accham's razor, we should not be postulating
entities beyond necessity. Jay Dyer has given no argument for the existence of these
so called Aristotelian imminent universals, and this is going to be a big difference
between us going up. So I at least appreciate Jay having enough sense to
know and understand that. Now he makes a big to do about nominalist predication.
I don't know if Jay has done any reading on nominalism. I assume
that he has, with all those books behind him, But I'd like him
to show me an argument from an actually scholarly source that says that nominalist predication
is meaningless, that unless there is this weird thing, which is a universal
that is partially identical in this white piece of paper and in Jay's beautiful forehead
over there, at least there is something partially identical in them. It makes
no sense to say that Jay's forehead is white and this paper is white.
Now does the public and the people watching think that that's a convincing argument.
No, Jay needs to give an argus for his position. He has not
given any argument for his position. So until he can give an argument for
the necessity of these types of universals, we can simply dismiss it. Now
that ties into everything that he was saying about a luss of Panothala, and
he's mocking about God having so called body parts pule if he's actually read the
Fared Suliman source that he desperately needed to delay the debate in order to read
that, he would actually see that. Fared Suleiman explicitly says, as I
quoted in my opening statement, that the idea that Ivantamia's conception of God is
overtly anthropomorphic is completely untenable, and he cites numerous sources and gives arguments for
that throughout the book. So Jake can say he disagrees with that, and
it's fine. But on the one hand, you can't claim that Jake and
the ethity saying that a loss of Panotala has a hand is completely meaningless and
on the other hand, say that it's tesh or it's likening God to creation
and having body parts. So you cannot have it both ways. Jay,
is the nominalist predication completely meaningless and devoid of any content, or is it
meaningful? And therefore we're likening God to creation? And if you do think
we're likening God to creation, then what is your problem with that? Because
you believe in the necessity of likening God to creation in your concept of theosis,
which I quoted from Saint Maximus to Confessor in my opening statement. So
even if let's say, for the sake of argument, oh my god,
this is terrible anthropomorphic, Jake is likening God to creation. Okay, what
is your problem with that? You can't. You don't have an argument about
that. You have no argument about that whatsoever. So Jay needs to deal
with those points. He mentions about indexicals and God's knowledge. Well, actually,
before I get to this, since there's another important point here, let
me see, there's so much nonsense he mentioned, he said, Oh,
he said, even Jake believes in two ways of counting. He believes in
accounting by identity, and then he also believes in counting by division. When
it comes to a law, and he said, you see, he mentioned
that a law's attributes are inseparable from each other. I mean, honestly,
Jay, where did you get this from. This is the most ridiculous thing
I've ever heard. That we're counting by division. No, in fact,
by the fact that they're inseparable from one another and inseparable from the essence,
means that we are counting them by identity. Because if we were counting them
by division, then we would say that a loss of panal data only has
one attribute. But we say that he has many attributes, and yet they
are not divided by time and space. So how do we say that there
are many attributes and yet they're not divided by time and space are separable because
we're counting them by identity. Wow, I don't know how you made such
a big blunt there. So you need to show how I'm counting by a
division or separability when it comes to attributes or the essence. That was a
big blunder. Okay, So here we go the next part. Here where
Jay mentioned about the indexicles, I want to read a quote from one of
his authors that he appeals to. Let me just bring it up here.
Okay, So on indexicals, he says, well, Jake has a strange
understanding of God's knowledge. Well, that's let's see if that's the case when
it comes to these indexicles or the eye. Well, I'm going to show
you in a source here from Jay's own people, that that is exactly the
case. If I can ever find a damn quote, let me see here.
Okay, fifteen seconds. Okay, I'll get to that quote in my
next rebuttal, but I'll show you that Jay his own church writers explicitly use
the indexical eye and appealing to God's knowledge. With that, we'll kick it
over to Jay for his ten minute rebuttal as well. If you haven't yet,
folks, hit that like button, not for me, but for you
so that YouTube knows what to serve you more of where that things? Very
much, Jay, The floor is all yours. Yeah again. I think
Jake missed a lot of the classes that dealt with basics of epistemology and metaphysics
because Jake misunderstood a lot of points that I made made some pretty rooky mistakes.
For example, he appealed to my argumentation about realist notions of universals on
the basis of saying that, well, because we know this because of Okham's
razor, Well, how do we know Aukham's razor is true in all cases
are true? In this case, that's just an arbitrary appeal. It's just
an appeal to some other thing that we don't actually know really grounds and disproves
the reality of universals. He says, I didn't give arguments about universals.
I gave multiple arguments about how there's no empirical verification or observation of metaphysical objects
that Jake believes in. That is itself the undercutting and the disproof of his
nominalism. Jake doesn't appear to be aware of classic critiques and reputations and questions
for the nominalist empiricist tradition which he's aligned himself with. Further, I would
add to I didn't delay the debate just because I needed to read one book.
I asked him if he was willing to delay debate because it's relevant for
the debate that we're having, and it's a newly published book about the school
of theology that he believes in, So that was the real reason for that.
He knows that, but he just is looking for anything to grasp that
at this point. So again, let's get back to this point about what
empiricism anomalism says. Empiricism says that we begin our theology from sense data.
I made the argument that we can't even know that the peripatetic axiom is true
on the basis of s there's nothing in sense data that tells you that knowledge
comes from sense data. And if that's the case, then all of the
arguments that David Hume makes about identity over time meaning over time, those are
all arguments. And you notice that if you paid attention to my slides and
my talk, I did give arguments. I listed many many arguments, And
it's true I did focus on Jake's position because I knew we would get to
the trinity in later discussions in the debate. I'm happy to defend any of
the arguments that Jake has against the trinity, but I want to know that
how he'd actually makes sense. And you know, Jake said that he made
all of these arguments that I didn't address. I didn't actually hear an argument.
I heard a bunch of assertions as to what his position is about the
creed, what his position is about unity. I didn't actually hear an argument,
so I don't think Jake understands the difference between asserting something and actually claiming
something. I actually went into multiple texts, multiple scholars. I didn't just
rely on one. And by the way, I want to address that he's
wrong about what he says about First of all, Boyarin, I didn't claim
that those Jewish theologians taught the Trinity. That's false, so Jake's incorrect.
I didn't say that they taught the Trinity. I said that they talked about
the reality of multiple hypostases. That could be Minitarianism, that could be a
form of Trinitarianism, and certain cabalists, it could be the other schools that
were strictly unitarian. I just simply pointed out that early Judaism was not monolithic,
and that was enough to demonstrate that you couldn't use the argument that Daniel
Hikikichu used that the Old Testament was quote unitarian, or that the prophets taught
Unitarianism and that this is a corruption. It was just simply demonstrating that there
were Jews in the first first two centuries that were not believers in strict Unitarianism,
and beyond that, there were actually Jews who were Trinitarians, and they
were called Christians. And that's why Barren says that Christianity is a conservative form
of Judaism. So all all I was doing was demonstrating that Daniel's arguments that
Judaism is somehow inherently unitarian are not true. That's all I needed to demonstrate.
So he's setting up a strong man about something I didn't argue. Next,
I'll address the fact that the logos theology that he talked about, there's
not one logos theology that one guy had, and everybody got this from Filo
or someone else and then it got rejected. Jake is completely ignorant of Athanasius,
who engages in consistent logos theology argumentation, is the foremost theologian at the
Council of Nicea. So this idea that logos theology is not used post nice
or whatever dumb argument he made, is totally not true. Clement of Alexandria,
all the Alexandrian fathers in tradition often used this logos argumentation. Some of
the logos apologists of the first and second century eventually did go into weird deviations.
But that doesn't mean that all logos theology is false. Logos theology is
in John one, and it's in the Wisdom text of the Old Testament.
It didn't come out of Plato. There's a plenty of scholarship that will note,
as even some of these Jewish scholars do, that it goes back to
the Wisdom, dex Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and so forth. How that's cashed
out by different theologians is a different question. So Jake doesn't understand what logos
theology is, and he doesn't understand uh, the first three centuries of Christianity.
I would add as well that Jake doesn't understand what an internal critique is.
He thinks that when I make an internal critique that I have to then
agree with the thing that I'm critiquing. So if I say that his position
is anthropomorphic, I shouldn't have a problem with it because I'm a well I
believe in But dude, I'm not saying that I'm I'm critiquing your position.
So Jake doesn't literally doesn't grasp what an internal critique is. That's also why
he doesn't understand what tag is. Jake, as we said, is a
foundationalist. He's a very one dimensional, one layer thinker, so he doesn't
understand meta level questions, even though ironically he's called the Muslim meta position.
So he ought to be at least aware of what metallogical issues are. That's
what the transcendental argument is. You ought to be aware of metaphysical issues.
I don't think he actually is. I think he copies and paste out of
various scholars that fit his need. For example, he uses us when he's
arguing with Anthony Rodgers, he uses you know, analytical you know, William
Lane Craig. So he's just picking and choosing when it fits the case.
And he also seems to sort of move his positions in the midst of various
debates. He has a history of that, so I'm interested to see where
he's going to go. When we ask him about the attributes, whether they
possess a saiety considered in themselves or not, he said that inseparability is not
counting by division, is counting by identity, and then he proceeded to say
that because we identify Allah's essence as one, he totally missed the point that
I said. I said that he does both that was the argument I made.
I didn't say that he only counts by division by using the word inseparability.
But he doesn't even seem to realize that. In the ancient medieval world,
whether it's al Gazali, whether it's aristotl in category six, whether it's
the Cappadocians, whether it's Maximus, whether it's the Nice in Creed, the
ancient world consistently and commonly thought about counting by division. We use this argument
all the time, especially when we refer to Maximus in the Ambiguous. I
think it's question one where Maximus talks about unity being a single monad, and
then division being the separability that gives us two, and then another form of
separability which gives us the triad or gives us three. I'm not talking about
the trinity. I'm just talking about counting. That's how they thought, That's
how they counted, right in moderation and belief. This is how al Ghazali
counts, for example. So it was common in the ancient world. Jake
doesn't even know this. He thinks that it's something that was made up,
and then he thinks that everybody just quote counts by identity. He says in
one of his debates. This is just how he count today, like we
count today like this, Hakoma, Oh, don't even count like that,
not even aware that this is how people counted in his own Islamic schools.
Maybe not his school per se, because this wasn't an issue of debate.
But al Gazali counts this way. I can show you in moderation and believe
where he counts this way. For example, it's the tenth proposition. Here
we go, Oh, he ain't gotten no Islamic books, he ain't gonna
no reading. Oh really, how about this right here where Algazoli in the
tenth proposition is counting by the de jen So Jake doesn't know what he's talking
about. When we came to the body parts, however, I didn't say
that even to me, what gave no catafatic meaning? I said he contradicted.
So Jake said, well, there's a place in the Soul Mom book
where he says that that it's perfectly fine to speak this way. I didn't
say that. I never claimed that. I claimed that he contradicts by saying
two different things. So again Jake didn't even understand the argument, or it
went over his head, or he just didn't want to address it. And
Jake, again has a notorious history of in debates not addressing any actual arguments.
He blows past them, and he literally thinks that asserting something is an
argument, And you can see that when he came to the treatment of tag.
Tag is a metal level argument about arguing in logic itself, and Jake
says, well, what's the argument of the logic for that? Yeah,
exactly, it's a preconceptual, preconditioned type of argument. Now, Jake is
in the tradition of the empiricists, so I would think he would be pretty
familiar with the ideas of analytic and synthetic truths and law priori truths how much
one minute left one minute, But he doesn't seem to be aware of those
things at all, because his treatment of empiricism is naive empiricism. And again,
when we get into cross examination, we're gonna see that does he believe
in self evident truths like his masters and his teachers do? And he says
that even to me, a book's not even relevant for this for this debate.
Yeah, you said it is, because you said that he's your palamos,
So why would he not be relevant, relevant for the debate when he's
for us, he's a Palomas, is a pillar of Orthodoxy. You know
that I have the DM where you told me that he represents the Palamas for
your tradition. So is so the pillar of your tradition isn't relevant for this
debate? No, you just don't want to go to that because you know
I did read it, and you want to stick to some other things,
some other text when you know good and well that he's perfectly a representative of
your tradition, if he's the palaboss of your tradition. Time this one I
just realized. So on, So thank you very much, gentlemen, for
those rebuttals. Jake, I am sorry. I accidentally are you. When
you guys ask for the one minute warnings, I screwed up mentally and when
I was supposed to give you your one minute warning, I accidentally gave it
to you, where basically I accidentally gave you one less minute. So what
I'm going to do is for these next rebuttals, which are supposed to be
five and five minutes, I'm going to tack on that minute back on to
yours, Jake, just to keep it fair. I'm sorry about that,
my mistake, and so we'll have these second rebuttals. Uh, just to
understand what you're saying. So I only spoke, I spoke for nine minutes
instead of ten, so I'll be getting six minutes instead of five this time.
Is that it exactly basically moving the because there was my mistake. I
cut you off a minute early. So taking that to keep it equal,
so you have equal time in the debate, I'm gonna take that missed minute.
I'll let you. I'll let you, I'll let you slide. But
it's gonna come out of your pay. But that's fine, you got it.
I'll still give you six if you want it. You don't have to.
If you want to use five, that's fine. But with that,
thank you very much, gentlemen. The floor is all yours. Jake.
I've got it set for six minutes. I'll give you the warning at one
minute until that's done. Okay, here we go six minutes. So Jay,
you know, it's so funny to me that you say that I didn't
that I'm just making assertions the whole time. Jake is only making assertions.
He didn't hear any arguments. Well, I'll just repeat my argument because Jay,
maybe he honestly didn't hear them. I have no idea, because you
didn't respond to a single argument that I gave. I actually engaged with your
fifteen minutes of nonsense. To the best of my ability. You didn't engage
with a single one of my arguments. You didn't respond to my arguments asserting
that you guys are polytheists based on the LPT. You didn't respond to my
argument about them not having the same power or knowledge other than assuming that I
said that these must be energies. No, my entire critique is that the
Orthodox say that they're not energies. They make an exception between the begetting and
the spir rating and God's knowledge and these other things when they're not shared.
And that's the whole problem with your universalist perspective, is that you don't have
the necessary and sufficient conditions for what an essence is. You make exceptions,
And maybe you're not familiar with the classical critique of the Aristotelian position regarding universals,
which you basically hold to. That we can come up with all sorts
of exception cases that you don't have answers to, And that's the point.
You make an exception. You say, oh, they still have the same
power, even though the Father alone has the power to beget the son in
a holy spirit. And by the way, the Catholics actually disagree on this
point, and they make that very same argument that the Orthodox are guilty of,
saying that the Father alone has the power to cause another divine person and
because of that, they don't have equal power. So don't act like I
just pulled this argument out of my backside. I didn't. Let's go further
here again, he keeps saying, I'm just making assertions. No, I've
made arguments. I gave my argument on the LPT, whether you think it's
ridiculous or not. I made the argument that they can't be the same God
because they don't have the same power and knowledge. Now let's get to this
point that you made about knowledge. Okay. I have the quote here ready,
all right, which is from Dimitri stan Eloy, and he says in
the Experience of God Value one, page one fifty two, I'd love to
see what you think of this, Jay. He says that, I quote,
the life of the eternal subjectivity must be a fullness, which in all
respects is not a transitory one. It must consist in a love for another
subjectivity, and in the perfect union between itself and that subjectivity, which has
the same fullness, so as to be simultaneously unfailing life. The life of
the eternal subjectivity is an infinite reference to its subjectivity, contemplated within another eye,
within another quote unquote I, so as to be true love, eternal
unfailing love. It is reference to another I, who is himself also the
bearer of his own infinite subjectivity, and responds within that same eternal, unfailing
love, a divine I love with an eternal, inexhaustible love, a thing
proper to the divine or with its fullness which is like that of another eye.
And this occurs in reciprocity. This is divine life, this divine love.
Sorry, this is divine life, and it exists together with immutable fullness.
It is the same infinite existence of love, the love of an infinite
person directed towards another person worthy of infinite love, and vice versa, but
within the inferiority interiority of the same subjectivity. In other circumstances, eternally would
either be an unbearable boredom if it were the prerogative of a single consciousness.
Thereby he's saying there are three consciousnesses within the trinity or three minds. Well,
if three consciousness or three minds in the Trinity isn't polytheism, then I
don't know what the hell is? What is the standard? And he's saying
that that is the contemplation of another consciousness or else an absurdity. If it
were prerogative of a substance of law that was aimless. He's basically saying,
oh, my god, God would be bored if he didn't have another God
to sit there and talk to. Okay, So don't make it seem like,
oh, Jake has no idea. The Orthodox don't have this concept of
knowledge. Well, what is he talking about here? In the subjectivity of
the different divine persons, they have a self referential eye which accounts for the
mutual love. Otherwise they would all be bored. And he says that if
it were the prerogative of a single consciousness, meaning there are three consciousnesses in
the trinity, Jay, So how do you defend that three consciousnesses in the
trinity is not polytheism? One minute left? Now back to the whole issue
of epistemology. Jay thinks that I don't understand. I do understand the criticisms,
and I knew that he was going to bring this critique because he doesn't
want to talk about Trinity versus Taalheed. He wants to talk about epistemology because
he knows that he can't respond to my actual arguments. So he's spending the
the entire time trying to criticize my position without a defense of his own position
in response to my arguments, And he wants to make the debate about epistemology.
But I knew he was gonna do that. That's why I included that
in my opening statement. But I'd be happy to have an entirely separate debate
about epistemology. But Jay wants to make it only about that in this debate
because you know he can't defend his actual position. But I'd be happy to
go through that. And if you want to talk about self evident truth,
I'd be happy to talk about that. But whatever your critiques are of them,
as you've already admitted, you can't give a justification to something that is
metallogical, and therefore I can tell you the same exact thing. And we're
at an intellectual stalemate and times. With that, we're gonna kick it over
to Jay for his five minute REBUTTAL want to let you know, folks,
at the very end, they'll have their closing statements, or I should say
second to the end, which will be flipped in other words, different from
usual. It'll actually be instead of Jake going first and then Jay, it'll
be flipped where it'll instead we'll explain when we get there with that. Hold
on a second, I didn't understand what you just said. I'll like,
I'm putting the cart before the horse. I'll explain that once we get there.
But you had mentioned it earlier in our discussion on how you guys wanted
it, so I'll bring it up later though. But Jay, thank you
very much. The floor it's all yours. Yeah. So I just wanted
to point out here that one of the things that would definitely help Jake in
the future if he wants to understand the history of Christian metaphysics and the distinctions
that he's not able to actually make, is this great book here, Christian
Theology in the End of Ancient Metaphysics. And this is a new recent book
in the scholarship. It's by Johann zach Kuber, and it's really good for
pointing out that we don't, for example, think that the essence of God
is a universal. This is a fundamental mistake. I don't know where you
got this. I think he misunderstood the idea of the comparison between the capped
Doocians, saying that the essence of God is common and therefore it's like the
relationship between a universal in a particular. But the essence of God itself is
not actually a universal in the sense of the way that we understand universal.
Same Maximus, So the Confessor famously that teaches, as does John Mascus,
that universals are created. God is not created, and so universals cannot be
the essence of God. So Jake misunderstood in an analogy comparing the universal relationship
between creatures and the participation that they have in the one in regard to the
many versus the relationship of the one and the many in God. It's just
an analogy that cappedditions make, and so Jake misunderstood. They're very fundamental misunderstanding.
Jake equivocated on the term power. So I'm gonna quit screensharing there So
what I said was is that for that arguments a whole, which is actually
a Uno Meann argument, the notion of begetting would have to be an energy.
And this is the argument that you know makes against Nissa against Eunomias,
and the argument is that begetting is not a power. So Jakeson's equivocating on
the distinction between hypothetic properties and powers, and the fact that Roman Catholics claim
this really has nothing to do with our debate. Romancallics claim all kinds of
things. Jake doesn't believe in Roman Catholicism, so he wants to try to
use an argument as if that would have any weight in this debate. Really
doesn't matter what Roman Catholics say, he says, I didn't reply to the
LPT. I did reply to the LPT. I pointed out that his argument
and his use of it relies on counting in one way, counting by identity.
I specifically addressed twice now that both of us count by identity and both
of us count by division. I gave multiple people in the past who count
this way. Jake ignored. All that Jake acts like this is all made
up. In recent livestreams of talks, He's actually acted like, why don't
Joe count the way everybody does today, not even aware of the basic fact
that ancient medieval world counted also this way. I mentioned in my opening statement
first order and second order in position, that certain things can be counted by
identity and certain things can be counted by division. Even back in the ancient
medieval world. This became a medieval distinction first order second order in position.
If we want to go back to my opening statement, I said that you
could think of things like, let's see where I put this. You could
let me see. You could think of things like first order in position would
be things like mundane objects of cats, cows, dogs, so they would
be concrete objects in the world. And then you could think about abstract objects
like sets or laws of logic. Those would be counted by identity, because
it doesn't really make sense to think of, for example, one third of
a law of logic or one third of a set of things. Right,
So abstract things in this case created abstract things and would be counted by identity.
But things that might be part of or are divisible have to be counted
by division. And this is actually in even today's literature. So Jake's acting
like, we don't count his way today, Dog, we don't count his
way today? Oh really? Well, I mean, I've got academic scholars
here talking about the theory of mathematics and countings, like like the David Leibsman
paper where he goes into great detail arguing that no, actually we do still
count by division. You just have to be more nuanced about it. I
specifically argued again that Jake, in his own accounting for the attributes in the
Essence, also counts by identity and by division. And he used the very
terminology that relates to county by division, and he got upset by that.
He got a little rattled, and they had to say, that's not what
it means. Bro, that's not what it means. Dog. Now he
mentioned the idea of unitarianism in modes. Jake doesn't understand the difference between in
person nature and mode. It's very important for Trinitarian theology to make a distinction
between hypostasis nature person nature and mode or trope boasts. Mode is the way
that a thing exists. Islamic theology is kind of all over the place,
and they use modality in a lot of different ways. It's kind of unclear
and contradictory between different Islamic fingers as to what exactly they think modality means.
Sometimes it relates to parts whole relationships, sometimes it means relation to other objects,
and sometimes it means the actual way that the mode in which it exists,
the way a thing exists, or how it exists. So in Orthodox
theology, we're using it in that sense of how a thing exists. Hardly
missed the reminder today so much. We're going to kick it over to or
changing it up in the format. We're now going to the three sets of
seven minute cross examinations. This is going to be more formal for a cross
examinations, folks. So we are looking for just questions on one side and
just question or just answers on the other side. With that, Jake,
the floor is yours to interrogate Jay right now. Okay, just give me
one second because I'm starting my timer here. Okay, I'm ready, Jay.
So you said that you're wondering where did I get this idea that the
divine essence is a universal So let me read you from your good friend doctor
Bo Branson and his PhD dissertation on page one sixty eight on the section four
point two point one USSII and Hypothesis in Gregory of Nissa on Universals, Richard
Cross argues persuasively in my view, that Saint Gregory and Saint Basil both used
the term usia synonymously with nature, and they conceive of this as a universal.
And then in the rest of the section he goes on to explain just
that that the divine essence is conceived of as a universal by the Cappadocians.
So what do you have to say in response to your buddy saying that,
yeah, the zach Kuber book actually treats this, that the notion of universal
evolves over time between the way the cabin Doosians use it in the way that
the post Chalcedonian Fathers use it up in the John Damascus, in Saint Maximus.
So what's relevant for our debate in terms of human universals is not whether
or not God's essence is common, but whether or not there are created universals.
So that's what I was talking. But my question, my question is
does bo Branson believe in this passage and what he argues for in his dissertation
that the divine essence is a universal? Yes or no? You're equivocating on
the term universal. Does he say that the divine essence is a universal?
You're equivocating on the term universal. Okay, so you want to you want
to move on, I'm going to move universe only has one. I'm going
to move on because it's it only has one sc It's clear to the audience
that you can't say that. Now let's move on to the LPT. You
claim that I am counting by division within God. Explain how I'm counting by
division within God? When you use the term insufarable, I use the term
inseparable means that I'm separation. Well am I using that to count? Well?
You said that the attributes are inseparable exactly, But how many attributes are
there? Are there one or money? Well? Is God's essence one?
How many attributes are there? One or many? According to my position?
You have believe many? Okay, there are many, and yet they're inseparable.
So if they're inseparable from each other and there's many, how am I
counting by division? Genius? No, in terms of the essence, you
count by division by saying that it's one. Oh, there's one essence.
That's where where is it? Where is there accounting by division? There is
none? Okay, exactly. It doesn't mean that you're It doesn't mean that
you're saying huge. It doesn't mean you don't even understand the basics of this
conversation. Let's do about let's let's let's move on. You don't understand the
now, let's get to some other issues. What is the difference between tefweed
and manna and tea. I don't know your terms. You don't know,
so you have no idea what that means. Okay, and yet you think
you're able to critique our position when these are basic terms. Exactly. No,
But even when I'm critiquing the trinity, I'm aware of the basic terms
of what a hypostasis is. That is, I'm under I understand the basics.
This is a debate about the fact that you're ignorant of our tradition.
Thank you very much. Now let's move on to next And let's move on
to the next question. Why is it problematic to believe that the persons are
identical to the essence as Thomas aquinas in many Catholics hold. Why is that
problematic because it basically ends up in reducing person to nature, and it would
be modalism. Okay, So would you consider that position heretical, Yeah,
if you mean identity in the sense of reductionist identity. Okay. So the
trinity, if you conceive of when you say the Father is God, that
the Father is identical to God, would you agree that that's logically problematic because
then it would follow that the Father is identical to the Son. Well,
identity can be the sense of is an identity or a predication? Yeah,
I'm saying, and the Catholics make it explicit. There's there's no difference between
the person and the nature in terms of the Tonists, So they say the
Father is identical to the nature or essence, and so are the Son in
the Holy Spirit, which, by the logic of identity, would follow that
the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are identical to each other. Do
you agree with that critique that you could make that argument. That's why I
said modalism. You know, yes, I do know. You're just asking
no because I want to. I want you to be more explicit, but
I'm supposed to ask questions, not you. Thank you very much. Now,
how many persons are there in the trinity three? Are they separated by
time or space? No, So you count the persons by identity and not
division, right? Correct? Okay? Does God have one eternal attribute or
energy or more than one? More than one? Are his eternal attributes separated
from each other by time or space? No? Okay, so you count
the attributes by identity and not division, right? Correct? Okay, So
if we count gods in the trinity by the same method of identity, how
many gods would we count depends on what God picks out. If we're talking
about the persons three, So there would be three gods if we counted by
identity and the same method that we count the attributes are eternal energies and the
person's correct, right, Okay, your friend Bo Banson said, Okay,
so your friend, so there would be three little g gods. Thank you.
Your friend Bo Branson says that today we count by identity, So that
would mean by the standard way in which we count today, there would be
three gods in the trinity. Correct. The way that we count today is
talking about post frago. Okay, So I'm gonna quo what he says.
I'm gonna quote what So today we count want to answer it the day we
count No, I'm answering. I'm going to give you more you're answering.
You're answering today as the question, we count f's by one logical subjects that
are discernible from or at least not identical to one another, and our F
that is X and y orff. If X and Y are different in any
way and are both fish, we count them as two f's. So that's
in his explanation that we count today by identity. Yet you're quoting these other
sources, which is not even my argument. My argument is that you're inconsistent
in your methodology. So do you have if you think no, no,
no, it's not about one counting what is already I got to I've got
to see if you can ask a question, Jake, just to keep it
as strict as well, I'm gonna ask you a question, what is the
justification or argument for why we must count persons and attributes in God by identity
but count God's by another method other than simply trying to avoid that you're a
polytheist. By the example that I gave from first order and second order in
position in the way that all of the ancient world counted, So there is
no justification. You're not asking why we count the attributes and the persons by
identity, but we count because different things, because what you can't understand is
a different I'll give you exactly I got you. I'll give you a chance
to answer the question, j and then I've got to wrap us up.
Can I answer what he asked? He just talked the all time, and
then let me answer. You can answer, You can answer the last question
he asked. Yeah, so different things are counted in different ways. That's
what I argued. And I argue that from my opening statement, your argument
hinges on only counting in one way, and you're taken out of context the
fact that doctor Branson said that most people today post Frega think of counting in
one way, when this is a dispute about the way the people in the
ancient medieval world counted, which is not by strictly by identity. We'll jump
into the seven minutes of Jay interrogating Jake. The floor is all yours,
Jay, Jake, you said that you do have you're happy to affirm this
sort of empiricist nominalist position, and that seems to necessitate the idea that all
of the knowledge that we have comes from either sense data or relations of ideas.
I'm just curious if you think that the peripatetic axiom itself is found in
sense data. That's not my position. When did I ever say that I'm
an empiricist. Well, if you're a nominalist, you're an empiricist. How
does that follow? Well, so you disagree with what most people in your
tradition. No, so you're not an impurist. I'm not an empiricist by
the standard you just laid out. Well, so you don't think the knowledge
comes from sense data. I do, but I don't think it's limited to
sense data. I didn't limit it to that, I said. Also,
I said relations of ideas. Yeah, I don't think it's limited to those
two. Okay, where else do we? Where else does knowledge come from?
And that is what do you know what it is? No? I
don't. That's why I asked you. Okay, well, similar kind of
similar to your concept of the news. So direct perception of God? Yes,
how do you directly perceive God? As given to me? It says
God cannot be seen? What do you mean he says God cannot be seen?
Of course God can be seen. How can God be seen? How
can God be seen? I guess Jay, you're not familiar with That's why
we're asking you. We're asking you that I'm asking you, and yes,
he is. It's showing that your ignorance, that you don't even know.
I think I'm ignorant. So that's why you get. You get the chance
to enlighten us. I'm trying to soldier. If you slow down, Soldier,
I will yes the eyes. If you allow me to talk, I'll
tell you by the beatific vision. We believe in the afterlife that we do
see God with the eyes? Correct, has anybody in this life seen God?
No? Does God have a physical with the eyes? Not with the
eyes? Does God have a physical form? Define what you mean by physical
the body parts that are listed. We don't believe God has body parts?
Now, well, you believe he has a foot, right, we believe,
Yes, we do believe he has a foot. We believe his hand.
What is a foot that's nothing like a created foot? What is a
foot that's nothing like a created foot? The same thing, the same thing
that an essence is, that's nothing like a created essence. Yeah, but
our argument is not based on analogy for essence, I'm saying that any predicate
that we ascribe to God in creation, there is a similarity in meaning.
But it doesn't follow from that that there what's that? What's that similarity meaning?
Let me finish, does not follow from that that there is a similarity
in ontology, which I completely I understand. No, I understand that that's
the to me a position. So I'm asking, what is this, what's
the problem with it? What is the similarity? What is the similarity in
terms of the meaning, and what is that you're just saying? Meaning?
What is so? We know it based on the text. So if you
go to the example, if you go to the example, is all that
empirical derived? If you if you allow me to finish, if you go
to the text that describe the yed or the foot, for example, the
hands are described as being responsible for directly creating Adam. So this is how
we understand the meanings of the text attributes in context. So you reference another
created object, right, what's the creative object the text? Now, the
text is not created. The text that you read is created. Right,
the papers and the ink is yeah, exactly, that's the papers. The
papers in the ink. But the words are called the text. I know
you're talking about the eternal Krean. That's not what I'm talking I'm not talking
about. I don't even believe in an eternal Koran. What are you talking
about? So the text that you derived that knowledge from is empirical, right,
the text that I derived I don't understand that. Yeah, you don't
understand the question exactly, No, I don't. It doesn't make any sense.
Yeah, you think I believe you don't empirically read the You don't empirically
read the Krin? Yes we do. That was the question I asked you.
So you do we read? You did understand it. You just didn't
want to ask You didn't want to answer. You understood them. No,
you're to ask you appropriate questions. I asked you that, Yeah, you
think I believe in an eternal Kuran? Where does it say that in the
book you read? I'm asking you about your empiricism what you don't want to
talk about? And you said that very What is a created foot? What
is that? What is a foot that's nothing like a created foot? And
I explained it to you? Did I explained it to you? I said,
I said no to these texts. I said, known through the text
right, which is a circle of empirical sense data, which is what I'm
asking you. What's what's the circle? How do we know? How do
we know to another empirical piece of data, to another empirical piece of data.
You can never get out of this loop. That's why that's a problem
for empiricism. No, it's not, because it's the same thing when it
comes to divine revelation according to the Orthodox how do you know about it's do
you know about trinity? You know about the moderator, he doesn't answer the
questions you're complaining to the one second hold on, I asked, I can
answer the questions. However, James, I'm asking. I asked about his
position, and he said your view of divine revelation. That's a two quot
way. I'm asking about his position, which he won't explain, Okay,
James, whether or not my response as a fallacy is for the audience to
decide. Moderators are I can? I can, and I can answer,
and I can say you're not answering, I can, I can. I
can give any answer I want. Yeah, exactly minutes left in the section
I can give, which is what you're doing exactly. I'm answering your question.
You just don't like the answer, saying anything, Just one last,
one last, just to be sure I understand the question, Jay, if
you can ask you more time for me? Right? So I asked for
his basis for knowing what the Koran teaches, which is empirical sense data.
And I'm trying to get at the point that he can never get out of
the domain, the veil of empirical sense data to ever actually know anything about
a law himself, because much like the Tomas position, he's stuck in only
seeing and interacting with creative effects. So I'm trying to figure out He says,
well, in the future there will be this direct perception of Allah in
the beativic vision, and I'm asking about the here and the now, how
do you ever get out of the box of the challenge of human skepticism.
Yeah, and I'm saying that we have a direct possession, a direct experience
of God right now through the concept of the fit thraw, which I explained.
But since you don't even know what it is, it's no surprise that
you don't explain what it is. So you're just I did I gave you
a corollary within orthodox theology, where I explained that it's similar to the concept
of news, where there is a direct experience direct no no, no no
no, yes you did no no no. You're confusing a scene God with
a direct experience of God. Those are not the same thing. Yes,
there's a direct experience of God right now. That is not through some inferential
process. It's not based on argumentation. But we are at the end of
the seven minutes for that section. We might have to come back to this
and the next set, but sure, I have the clock set for seven
minutes for you, Jake to interpret j Okay, give me one second interrogate,
interpret it. Well, I got to interpret what he's saying. But
hold on a second. Let me just get my thing here. Okay,
all right, I'm ready whenever you are. James ready, Okay, all
right, Jay, we're back at it again. Let's go to the next
issue. All right, How many men are on this stage right now between
Jake, James and Jay. None, because we're not on a stage.
Okay, on this platform, three there's three men? Okay, how come
you don't count the same way in which Gregory of this accounts Peter James and
John three men in his work on not three Gods when he says that there's
only one man, because I already explained different things are counted different ways,
and you're counting three men as saying there three men, but Gregory of Nisa
accounts them as one man. Well, they're one in terms of nature,
and Gregory says that it's more appropriate to call them one man, and that
actually our way of calling them three men is incorrect, so it's better to
change that than to call the persons of the Trinity three gods. That's his
entire argument. So by you saying that there's three men here, you're actually
disagreeing. No, it's just two different senses of the same word, which
you constantly equivocate on. Okay. Richard Cartwright says on this passage, it
seems to have been left to Gregory of Nissa, Basil's younger brother, to
notice that thus understood consumstantiality of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit appears to
license saying that there are three gods. Gregory himself rather desperately suggested that strictly
speaking, there is only one man. So do you agree that there's three
men on this platform or one. There's one man, there's one human nature.
In that sense, man can be pick out nature, which is a
common thing, and there's three men as individuated. Okay, Gregory says about
the logical problem of the Trinity, He says, this question, which was
asked to him by another bishop, is very difficult to deal with. If
we should be able to find anything that may give support to the uncertainty of
our mind, so that it may longer totter and waver in this monstrous dilemma,
it would be well. On the other hand, even if our reasoning
found unequal to the problem, we must keep forever firm and unmoved the tradition
with which we received by succession from the fathers. So Gregory is saying that
the problem is difficult. Do you agree with that? Depending upon how you
cash it out. If you think that the logical problem of trinity is identical
to the Aryan disputes, then you're engaging in anacronism. This isn't about an
Aryan dispute. This is specifically where he sets up the problem in his work
on not Three Gods and responding to a blabbyist, where he's asking him,
well, we say to your Father's son, holy Spirit or each god forbid.
We forbid men to say that there are three gods. So this is
the very problem of tritheism. No, we forget, we forbid three gods?
If you mean three natures? Okay, so here we go. Next
question, do you understand you? According to you, the Father has the
power to cause another divine person and alone causes the Son and the Holy spir
already answer this, or the son? Do the Son and Holy Spirit have
the power to cause another divine person? You're equivocating on power. Power is
not an energy? Do the son? I didn't ask about energy? Do
the Son? And Holism is saying that, do the Son and Holy Spirit
have the ability to cause another divine person? Causing a divine person is not
an energy. Do they have the ability to cause another divine person? No?
Okay, they don't. Thank you. If no, then do they
have the same power? That's only if power is viewed as an energy.
And I just argue that the power that we're talking about here is not really
correctly called power. It's called begetting. Okay, But it has to do
with an action, doesn't it. Well, it's act in a different sense
than energy, and that's what athens. Yeah, I'm not asking about energy.
I'm asking about the argument. What power is what an agent is able
to do? Do you agree powers? No, there's multiple senses to the
word power. Okay, so when I say that God is all powerful,
I mean that he can do whatever is medical first, actuality, second actuality.
And there's a let me finish. I didn't ask you a question yet,
I'm explaining to explaining to you what the understanding of power is I'm giving.
Don't you don't know that. You don't know my definition of power.
I don't my definition. My definition of power is whatever whatever a being can
possibly do. Now I'm asking does the son have the same ability to do
whatever the father can do? Yes? Or no? It's it's equivocating on
the word power. I just gave you the definition of power. That's your
definition. I don't exactly definition. So you understand that every argument that you
make where you reduce words to having a single definition, just restate your position.
So that's why it doesn't. It doesn't. Oh, it doesn't because
the capsule you're not interested in our This might be a good opportunity to it
could be that, h Jay, if you want to answer it according to
your own definition of power, and you can share that definition and then if
you're willing to humor Jake's question using Jake's definition of power. Right, So
Jake wants a single definition of what power is according to what he says it
is, and if he's going to critique our position, then it needs to
be our understanding of first actuality, second actuality, which we ascribe to God.
And there's different senses to power. I can have power as a potentiality
that I possess that I don't actualize. I could also have power as an
actualized energy that I'm engaging in or sometimes in the sense of Athanasians talking about
the Father begetting. He says, you could call this an act, but
it's not acting the same way that God has a triad act in terms of
the energies. So Jake's argument hinges on reducing the word act to having one
sense in God, and we simply don't have that view. Okay, that's
not my argument, but let's move on. That's what you argue. Let's
move on to the next question here. You're moving on because it doesn't work,
does the Father No, because you've already been refuted, does the does
the Father have the ability to become incarnate? We're not told that, so
you don't know. You're agnostic on the proposition. Well, there's nothing about
that, so there's no one I'm asking you, do you know about it
or not? Can the Father become a garnet? So you're not even letting
me answer, you're just immediately putting off. I just simply said, there's
not any information about that. And the way that Jesus speaks is that no
one has seen the Father at any time, so there's no incarnation of them.
Okay, So people have interpreted. John of Damascus is arguing that the
Father cannot be incarnate when he says in his Exposition of Orthodox Faith Book four,
the Father is the Father and not the Son. The Son is son
and not father. The Holy Spirit is spirit and not father or son or
father or son. For the individuality is unchangeable. How indeed could the individuality
continue to exist at all if it were ever changing and altering? Wherefore,
the Son of God became son of man in order that his individuality might endure.
So he's arguing that this must include that the Son only can become incarnate
in order for the individuality of the distinctions between the persons. So do you
agree with that interpretation the individual? Jay? And then we've actually just hit
the seven minutes. I'm just asking do you agree with that interpretation? That's
all? It's the individuality of the persons as known by us, So has
not the incarnation? Is not what lets us know or what conditions the distinctions
and the triad. We'll kick it over to Jay for his seven minutes to
interrogate Jake before is yours? Jake? Earlier when you were talking about your
view of epistemology and whatnot, do you agree with the position of even to
me as related on page one ninety six of the Seleman book, that the
principles of reasoning are self evident truths. I would have to look at the
reference, but define self evident, not relying on anything else to be the
case, I believe that they are known directly through the fitthron And that is
what what I explained before, similar to the what is what I said I
explained it before? Similar to the noose Okay, So every individual in an
inner sense just knows self evidently that what the law of logic is true,
The laws of logic are truth. He knows that certain principles, like that
half is less than a whole. He knows these things directly, not through
some type of inference. So are they self evident? Self evident only in
the sense that he knows them directly through the fittra. Okay, so they
don't. They're not from an inference, so they don't rely So they don't
rely on anything else to be true. They rely on God to exist to
create us with that faith. I don't know that that's the case yet,
So you do you do believe they're self evident? I know, I said,
they're not self evident in the sense that you're to human perception. They're
not dependent on human perception. There prior to the didn't say are they dependent?
I said, are they self evident to human perception? Self evident in
the sense that they are known directly through the fra as an apparatus. Okay,
So how do we adjudicate between the things that are self evident and the
things that aren't. By the fact of our existence, we know that,
for example, a half is greater than a whole, and so that's a
fallacy. I mean, sorry, a whole is greater than a half they're
appealing to. Existence doesn't justify the truths. I explain to you how it's
because we know them directly through the fit throw. So that's no, it
isn't. I explained how we know them. You just said we know them
because we exist and experience them. I said, I said that we experienced
them through the apparatus of the fit throw, which God has created human beings
upon. Yeah, but how do we know the difference between those and the
non self evident truth? Is what I asked you? He said, by
existence, because they're self evident, as you just said. Oh, so
now you do believe in self evidence self evident in the sense that they're not
based upon inference. And how do we know those distinct from the ones that
aren't, Because you know when you make an inference and when you don't,
and if you don't, then know reality is reality. So if you get
do you know the difference between when you're making an inference? And I'm asking
you questions, not you exactly. So I'm telling you we know the difference
between when we make an inference and when we don't make an inference. Yeah,
but that's not answering the question. I'm asked for the justification for the
division between the self referential and the non self referential. What's the justification?
The justification is that the self referential, which you're talking about, the self
evident ones, do not rely upon inference, where others they're self evident because
they're self evident. That's their self evident, because they don't reply on inference.
And because when I make an argument, when I make an argument and
I appeal to an inference rule, I know that I'm appealing to an inference
rule. So there's so that's a circle. Jake, this is a basic
epistemology problem for your cicism. Do you have a question, sir? Exactly,
you have a question. You're ready for me to move on. I
know, I'm asking you if you have a question, how do we know
the difference between the self referential? Already answers already answered your question. You
just restated that we know. No, you said, how do we know
that their self? How do we know the difference? How do we know
called the criteria problem? No, how do we know it's called the criteria?
Are you familiar with the answering? I'm not answering that I know what
the criterion problem is. That's my point. I'm saying to you, that's
my question. I'm saying to you that you're asking me, how do I
know the difference between what's self evident and what is known? An inference between
what's not self evident, right, and the opposite of not being self evident
is something that is known to So you're in the criterion problem. It's it.
I've explained it three times. It's very you explained it, but it's
not answering the criterion from you. We don't know if you don't know the
difference. Do you know what the criteria? I already answered that question.
Do you know what the problem is? I? Do you just explain the
problem? Moderator. He won't answer. Uh, do you know who's associated
with it? Who's associated with what? The criteria problem? It's a problem
in epistemology. Who's associated with it? I don't know who the So it's
David Chisholm. So how do you answer their criteria problem? I'm giving you
an answer. I've been doing it for the past five minutes, so you'll
notice. And he doesn't answer the self evident because it's self evident. No,
I never said that, Never did say that. Everybody heard him say
it's self evident because it exists. And he said, how do we know?
And I said, we know it through a divinely created apparatus. That's
how we know it. You don't know this is your starting point. What
do you mean we're talking about starting points. You're appealing to divine apparatuses.
I'm talking about the starting point. No, I'm saying that that, according
to our epistemology, the fit thraw is how we know these things, and
we know that because it's we're created upon it. Yeah, but the question
is about do you know that you're created that way? And you're just saying,
well, we're made that way. That's my question. I'm saying we
know we're created because we have a direct experience. No, I'm asking about
the principles of reason themselves. And you said you believe in self evidence,
and then I said okay, And then I asked you the criterion problem,
and you haven't answered the criterion problem. You keep talking around it. I've
answered your question, you have several times. Your answer was circular. Explain
the circle because you said that, well, I know it's self evident because
it's self evident. And when I'm not doing something that's an inference, that's
not answering the criterion. Now you asked, how how do I know it?
What's the justification? I asked, you don't even understand the question question?
What is the justification for the for the belief that you know the difference
between the self evident ones and the non self evident ones. So the criteria
problem is saying that you have a more fundamental criteria by which you cash out
these two different things and put them into different classes. How do you know
that more fundamental Chisholm issue is what I'm asking. Yeah, and I'm repeating
the same exact answer. We know it based on the fact that we are
created by God with I experience circle. That doesn't That doesn't tell us,
Jake, that doesn't tell us we know the fundamental criteria is the case.
We were out of time. We've got to kick it over to Jake to
interrogate ja and this is our final set. So we'll have one seven minute
section of Jake interrogating j and then one last interrogation of j on Jake.
With that, Jake, the floor is all yours. OK, sorry about
that. Just get my notes up here. No, problem. Folks,
if you haven't yet, check out our guests linked below. There's a value
in hearing their positions firsthand from them. This debate is a great introduction to
their views. But check out their channels that includes the podcast. We've linked
both of our guests below. Okay, I'm ready, ready, Okay,
Jay? Do you have an argument or justification for the claim that the Trinity
and Orthodox theology or the Orthodox Church specifically is a precondition for rationality, intelligibility
and all the other transcendental categories? Do you have an argument justification for that?
Yes? What is it? It's a two parter or can I?
Can I explain it? Yeah? Go ahead. So the first part is
that it's a reductio at absurdim argument. When you deny it, this is
called retortion and Aristotilian argumentation. And the second part of the argument is to
posit the Christian worldview as the way to ground the transcendental categories that are the
preconditions for all possible knowledge. Yeah, you're saying to posit them. Well,
what's the justification for the claim that it is the only system that can
account for those things? Is there? You provide arguments or not retortion?
Correct the first. Okay, explain what retortion is? Do you know,
you're Jake the Muslim metaphysician, know what it is. But I've actually seen
in your I've actually seen in your videos. You're not asking me questions.
I'm asking you questions. You've explained in your videos that you critique the tomists
when they bring up the issue of retortion. So can you explain it and
explain how when they use it? They're not justified in doing so, but
you are because they're classical foundationalists like you, And it's a REDUCTI organ I'm
not a classical foundational list. Now, it's a reduction. You are.
You are. I'm not a classical foundationalist. You are, So you're gonna
tell me my own epistemology common I'm not a classical foundationalist the way you just
argue. Again, I'm gonna ask you. I'm going to ask you again,
Doden. I'm asking because you are. I'm asking. I'm asking you
questions. Yeah, I'm supposed to be asking him questions. Just to be
clear. Okay, Jay, again, I'm going to ask you. When
you critique the tonist, you're saying the only reason is because they're a classical
foundationalist and you're not. How does that affect the legitimacy of them making the
same move that you are, Because, like you, they don't understand a
meta level argument. Okay, So why don't you explain it to us other
than making a claim? I didn't make a claim. I said that the
first part of the argument is reductio or retortion argument, showing the absurdity of
that worldview. And then the second part of the argument is to show and
argue that only the Orthodox Christian metaphysic, epistemology, and ethic can ground the
transcendental categories that are the preconditions for any possible knowledge. Okay, so there's
two parts to it, Jay, let's deal with the first part. Does
the first part alone give justification for the claim that the orthodox theological positions are
the only justification for the preconditions of intelligibility and all the other transcendental categories?
Now allrators and shows is that the other position is absurd. Okay, So
it only shows that that position is absurd, So that doesn't justify it.
So the second part is is positing the Orthodox position. But that's the very
thing that we're asking for what is the justification for the claim that the Orthodox
position alone justifies the preconditions of intelligibility? Correct? So what is it?
You're just restating the claim. You're not giving an argument. No, it's
you're confusing a first order argument with a metal level argument. It's a category.
Err. You keep saying, I'm confusing and you're making claims, but
then you're never giving any content to your claim. I just stated the content.
You just don't understand it. No, I know, I do understand
what you're saying. You just said, you just said, you just said.
It's a meta level argument. And I see here from your good friend
Annius, right, father deacon and Nius, which I've read his paper and
was very interesting. Actually didn't understand it too bad. I didn't understand it.
I mean, it was so terrible. He contradicts himself up and down
on the same page, and he explicitly says that the tag argument to ask
for a justification for positing Orthodox view is wrongheaded because it's prior to epistemology in
argument long headed in the first order of reasoning. Okay, so then there
is that. That's my point. There is no justification by the criterion by
first order reasoning, by the criterion problem you were as by the criterion problem
you were asking me about, do you have a justification for the claim that
the Eastern Orthodox position alone suffices for the grounding transcendentals? Do you have a
justification that meets the criterion of justiification that the first part is the absurdity of
your worldview in our case, in this today, and the second part is
the coherence and the grounding work that the Orthodox Christian world view does for things
like universals, laws of logic, objective ethics, identity over time, All
those metaphysical principles make sense in a world that's where God is the creator?
Okay, Jay, Which is exactly what I said. So, Jay,
And the problem of orthodoxy in orthodoxy argument, does Alan Siegel from your reading
of his Two Powers in Heaven? Does he say that the two powers in
heaven view is heretical? Yeah? Okay? Do Siegel and boy or in
consider the two powers in heaven view akin to logos theology they relate I don't
know if they'd be a kin Okay, they relate it. So is logos
is? Yeah? Is logos theology heretical? According to Orthodox Christianity, meaning
the theology of Philo is that heretical? Yeah, A Filo's position would be
banetarian. Okay. According to Boyor and John Behar and the Catholic Encycopedia,
was Justin Martyr a proponent of logos theology or Orthodox trinitarianism. I think that
Justin had a form of logos theology and trinitarianism. Okay? Is Justin Martyr
a saint in the Orthodox Church? He is? And I we address this
in the Inspiring Philosophy stream in all of your arguments. Is it permissible to
pray to him? We asked for his intercession? Okay? So when he
declares that Jesus is another God and says that the son is a product of
the Father's will? Are those heretical positions? There might be a lack of
clarity there, but we already addressed this in the Inspiring Philosophy stream. Is
it heretical to believe that the son is a product of the Father's will?
There's probably some lack of clarity there. If that's an authentic text, yeah,
Is it heretical to believe that the son is a product of the Father's
will? Yeah? If he means it in that sense, we would say
it's wrong. Okay, is it heretical? It could be, Okay,
so it's permissible to pray to heretical saints. Correct. Well, we don't
automatically think that if somebody got something wrong, they're necessarily a heretic. I
mean, Augustine made any mistakes many Harris, Well, a heresy has decided
to believe in the Philiokue, right, Augustine believed in a philio Okay,
right? Correct? Is that heresy when it becomes known as a heresy?
Yes, okay, so now it would be heretical to believe in that.
That's what counsels are for. Correct, Okay, thank you very much.
So do ethities believe in divine simplicity? Jake? I don't remember. You
don't know. If you don't know if we believe in divine simplicity? Well
you say that not in the sense of absolutely divine simplicity. Are we occasionalists?
Some? Is it been to me? An occasionalist? It been to
me. His position seems to be that created causes actually happen, but God
can also reverse them. But he doesn't seem to affirm as strict occasionalism.
Okay, So is he an occasionalist or not? You don't know. I
just answered that, does he believe in secondary causality? He says that they're
not necessary, but God can change them. Does he believe in secondary causality?
It's a basic term. I just answered that, yes or no?
Does he believe in secondary cause out? I just answered it. Dude,
you didn't answer it. I did. Does he believe in secondary calls out?
You want me to read you his position from the book? I just
asked you, does he believe in secondary causality? It's a yes or no
question. I'll give you a chance to respond. Jay, we've run out
of that seven minutes. Okay, no problem. Yeah. The best of
my understanding of his position is that he thinks that there's, uh, there
is real causality in the world. It's not it doesn't operate apart from God's
will, and that if God wills to, he can do a miracle or
do something differently. So I'm I mean, I couldn't figure out what exactly
his position is because I think it's a bunch of contradictions. So what's up
next? Are we doing? Be seven minutes of you interrogating Jake, and
then we'll go into the closings before the Q and A. All right,
so you seem to have a problem with the idea of reductios and internal critiques
and uh, meta logic. I'm not sure why this would be a problem
for you, given that you're named the Muslim metaphysician. You know, do
you know what metalogic is? I don't have a problem with the critique.
You don't have a problem with the Transton argument. No, I have a
problem with your use of it. If you've seen my if you've seen my
debate on this channel. I don't watch all your debates. I can't listen
to I've used a format I put you on four times to listen to it,
and it's still unbearable. So what I'm trying to figure out, you
know what metallogic is? No, tell me what's metallogical? You have no
idea what it is? Well, answer that condescending answer is like, you
do know? I have no idea what metalogic is. Yeah, tell me,
I have no idea. So it's the questioning of how logic itself works?
Right, Okay, good? So is it invalid to speak of metalogical
argumentation. No, okay, But your critique, for example, of the
way that Father Deacon A Andaius argued in that paper was that he was contradicting
himself because he argued that there's no justification for transcenal arguments in an orthodox sense
of not the first order or first order argumentation, first order logic. He's
talking about meta level ugmentation. Was that a question? So what I'm asking
you is that why do you have a problem with it? If it's too
if you if you understood that it's a meta level argument, okay. My
problem with father Deacon Annius, when problem with what he said in the paper
is that he makes the claim, and he seems to make the claim that
it's a metallogical problem or a metalogical arguments are right, and therefore it would
make no sense to ask for justification or argumentation because it's prior to argumentation.
That's what I'm not still a form of there's still you can still justify it.
It just becomes a paradigm level justification. Yeah, stand that, but
that's not what my criticism is. My criticism is that then later in the
paper he seemingly does try to justify it when he says, and he talks
about which I gave the quote I don't want to waste your time, where
he says, for only in the Orthodox doctrine of God, we will see
that God is the necessary condition, is rational, omniscient, transcendent, and
so on and so forth. That was what I was giving. He starts
giving all of those reasons, which is the exact same thing that I would
do. So what's the problem. Well, you have a different metaphysic,
as I pointed out in my opening statement and in the critiques about your ideas
of self evident truths, So you have a different metaphysics. I agree with
that, But then it comes down to don't you agree that? Then it
comes down to the difference in our metaphysics, which are the debates. That's
what we're supposed to be. Your starting point was self evident truths or reason,
and I know that you claim that you also start with the direct perception
or intuitive whatever sense that you have of all long line about that. Huh
you think I'm no, But I'm saying that it bypasses and it ignores the
question of the first principles of natural theology or reasoning, which you're committed to
Yeah, but I thought that you, as an orthodox, believe that the
news in the same manner is a legitimate thing to appeal to. That's a
two que it's a too quickly No, No, it's not. It's saying
that, No, it's not. It's saying that because of the same fact
that we are debating metaphysics. Yeah, but I have a similar position with
the difference though. But the difference is that in letter two thirty four at
Basil, which was my closing statement which I had to rush through. If
people want to go back, they can screenshot it, I noted the argument
that the energies come down to us, and that's why we have a basis
for affirmation, or what we call cataphatic affirmation. I believe in the same
thing. Yeah, but that's why my whole argument this time was that when
you try to do the naming, when even to me, for example,
explains in what sense there is similarity or likeness or resemblance, he says that
it is not like the created motive of beings, so it actually tells us
nothing. So you're naming tells us nothing because you don't have an energy doctrine
that comes down to us. That was the argument, I do we do
have the same doctrine in terms of you don't, Yes, we do in
terms of the energies coming down. When an energy comes down, does it
attach to a human being. There's nothing to do with attaching. It has
to do with how we predicate. That's the argument here. So what does
it mean? That's why I asked you about the foot, and I asked
you if a godfoot is nothing like a human foot, what does it tell
us? What's the meaning that that's given us there? In the same way
that when I say that this paper has whiteness that is nothing like the whiteness
in your forehead. So you're still using the papers are created thing, you
understand it. And these are creatures. These are creatures. Yeah, they're
creatures, and we believe that. So another creature, which is totally unlike
Allah, tells us nothing about all. So these names and these predicates aren't
telling us anything as Wetter. No, you're saying, no, I'm giving
you an argument to show you how they are. Argument refers to another creature.
Now you're I'm giving you an argument to show it refers to another reachure
that not refers to another creature. That predication is exactly. It's not meaningless.
Nominalist predication is not meaningless. It's circular. That's the point. It's
arbitrary because you're just using another created object to try to explain what is beyond
the creative. That's the whole point of the argu That's what I've been arguing
this whole time. And that's why your position contradicts. Because on the one
hand, the uncreated foot is nothing like the human created foots. But you
say, oh, but it actually kind of is. But we don't know
the meaning of that. So it's we do know the meaning of anything.
We do know the meaning. Again, you're misrepresentative even to me. Assessed
both both that we don't He says that it's like it we don't know the
meaning. He doesn't say that, Yes, he does, doesn't say we
don't know the meaning. Yes, he does give give the evidence that we
don't know the meaning of what Because when you know that the godfoot, you
know what I mean, show that he says we don't know the meaning.
Where does he say we don't know that? Okay? What he says is
that what it means is that it exists in a manner befitting a lot that
tells us nothing. Oh it does. So when your Orthodox Church says the
exact same thing, what does that mean. We don't say that. We
don't say that God doesn't have an uncreative I mean he doesn't say in a
God be Your Orthodox Church doesn't talk about it, God befitting manner, not
a god be fitting foot. Does it talk about a God? Talk about
a God? I'm asking you? Does it talk about I'm asking you the
same way that it's described in the text. That's so no answer the same
way, in the same way. In this revelation doesn't tell us anything when
we read it. Of course, revelation means things when we read the word,
you're telling me nothing. God described God describes what his hand and feet
actually do. And so you have no idea. You haven't even read.
You said, it's creating Adam. But that's another created thing. I'll give
you a chance to Adam is not a created thing. I'll give you a
chance to answer. His hands, his hands are not created. Neither is
his foot is created hand. He said He's gonna give me a chance.
Time is up. Cat me respond, and then you we can move on.
An uncreated hand in like manner, an uncreated essence has nothing in common.
You have not shown that simply using the same word entails that there is
similarity. And I've explained what an uncreated hand is. It is that by
which a loss of panetality can grasp things that he can create. Adam with
his own two hands. That's created exactly, no creatures. Those are creatures,
hands creatures, and so is God's knowledge. God's knowledge is created.
Knowledge is a creature. Yeah, doesn't you believe? Right? We'll go
to the closing. Your position seven. I don't even understand basic arguments.
Seven minute closing? So what I you got? All right, gentlemen,
we've gotta we've this one. I earlier I got the order wrong. So
it's actually that the closings will be just as you expected. Namely, jac
will go first, then Jay will go for his closing, and then we'll
go into the Q and A. So we have seven minutes. The clock
is set for you, Jake. The floor is all yours for your seven
minute closing statement. Okay, okay, ready here we go. All right,
I'm about well, it's been an interesting debate. I can say that.
But Jay, as we've seen, he doesn't understand basic ethity alpda.
He couldn't answer whether clearly Ibanitaia is an occasional list. I've got a book
over here which I can can I don't mind actually sending it to Jay for
free, where he completely refutes occasionalism. We do believe in secondary causation.
Jay, So I guess you don't know that he didn't know the basic difference,
didn't say that you're not allowed to speak. But I do want to
just to. I'll give you a chance to in your closing as well to
rebut Jake, but I do want to just for the closing statements, I
want to keep it. Yeah, I know it's hard, Jay, you're
getting refused to chill out. Just chill out, all right, We're ready,
James to restart. Let's see. I'll give you six minutes and twenty
seconds. Okay, good, here we go. So Jay can't keep quiet
because he knows that he's being made a fool, and he did it to
himself. He doesn't know the basic difference between tef Weed and Nana and tef
weeded Kfia. This is basic. And he says, oh, well,
your god is just a god of the Arabs. No, but if you
read our literature in the same way that I know the difference between usia and
which is essence, and I understand the term homo ussion. I don't speak
Greek, I don't speak Latin, but I understand these terms because I've read
several dozen books on the subject to be acquainted with the terms. But you
haven't. And that's why you look like an ignorant buffoon, because you don't
know the basic difference. And that's why you're mocking right now because it's hard
on you. Everybody can see how this debate went for you, Jay,
it looked really pathetic. Now, going back to the point, he didn't
understand that we believe in secondary causation, that Ibantamia wasn't occasionalist. Yeah,
he didn't give a clear option. He said, Oh, he's contradictory.
He doesn't understand. And also he doesn't, as I said, understand a
basic difference between Tefweeda Nana and tefweed Kfi, which is very basic. Okay,
there are many things. He didn't even know what the petra was.
It's is very basic to our epistemology. How are you gonna critique our epistemology,
and you don't even know what the fifthra is. It's a complete joke.
Now in terms of my arguments, he didn't respond really to any of
them. On my first argument, the LPT, the Father is God,
the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit's God. And they're not each
other. They're distinct from each other the same way that we count. Jay,
let me help you out. One plus one plus one does not equal
one, sir, It equals three. So the muscle mean has been vindicated,
Thank you very much, Jay. And his only response is, oh,
we count different things in different ways. And I asked you for an
objective criteria of why we count attributes or energies and persons by identity and we
count God's by division other than an ad hoc unprincipled assertion, And you had
no answer to that whatsoever, Sir. You'd had no answer, Yeah,
keep shaking your head. And then you claimed, oh, you claimed,
Jake, actually counts by division. And then when I questioned you about how
I count by divis in the cross examination section, you flopped so hard.
I don't count by division. We count the attributes by identity, by the
fact, even though they're inseparable and not divided. They still count as more
than one. That means we're counting them by identity, not by division.
So you haven't shown that I've counted by division within God whatsoever. The only
thing you have is an unprincipled way of avoiding saying that there are three gods
because you just don't want to admit that you're a polytheist, which everybody knows
that you are, including the Roman Orthodox. The Sorry we're Roman Catholics.
Now here we go to Jay's point here where he's refuted by the Roman Catholics.
Right here we go Branson again refuted him on the claim that Branson himself
says, the Gregory of Nissa believes that the essence of God to divine essences
universal Jayan is one of his videos. He says, apply that same idea
to the Trinity, which is that each of the hypostheses instantiates the divine nature.
So they are instantiations of the divine nature. Now, Jay, don't
get a wrestled out of your seat. Now, I know they're not merely
instantiations, but they do instantiate the divine essence. Nevertheless, Timothy Paul Catholic
philosopher says about the instantiation view, there are at least two problems with Jay
Dyer's Eastern Orthodox instantiation view. This is a critique from the Catholics who believe
they're polytheists that the instantiation view has to face an answer to why the person
nature question, both having to do with the conciliar claim that there is only
one God. First, consider a problem often raised against social trinitarianism, a
type of instantiation view that builds into the unity of God much more than mere
instantiation. The problem goes as follows. The instantiation view gives up monotheism when
we count human people, Jay, just like I ask you how many people
are on the screen, which your own church father would have said one,
which is ridiculous. We count by individual instances of humanity. When my daughters
Mary, Beatrice Edith Agnes, each instantiate the universal humanity, and each has
a proper characteristic such that we don't confuse them what we have. There are
four humans, not a single human, like Gregory of Nissis says. So
likewise on the instantiation count, we ought to invert the line from the afthinacious
creed saying instead that there is not one God but three gods. Think about
it another way, Christians wanted to safeguard the monotheism that they inherited from Judaism.
Whether they succeeded as a separate question. Now suppose a Jewish Man were
accused of polytheism. Here's the defense he could give on this instantiation view of
the divine nature. He could say, yes, it is true. I
worship the God of Israel, Ball of the Canaanites, Dagon of the Philistines,
and countless others. But fear not, I only countenance a single universal
divinity, which each of my many gods instantiates. As such, I'm still
a monotheist. I don't think Moses would be impressed. Jay. This is
what Timothy Paul is saying, that you're clearly just a polytheist. Now,
what does Jay say about the Catholic view? He rightly points out that it
reduces to modalism. And I agree. That's why the Catholic view is modalism.
The Eastern Orthodox view is polytheism. They say that the truth is in
between, but they're never able to explain that properly. Jay says, I
equivocated on power, but he doesn't believe that the Father, Son and Holy
Spirit have the same abilities. He couldn't give an even answer if the Father
has the ability or power to become incarnate, because he knew that would result
in them not having the same powers, in which they wouldn't be the same
God. Thomas Aquinas criticizes that view in the Summa in part three and less
but not least, Jay was not able to actually do with the ethy Alkida,
and it's because he hasn't even read our texts before the debate. He
needed to delay it. So people were wondering what the delay was. It
was because of him. He wasn't able to read an English translation of an
unreleased book, and that's why he doesn't understand our position. Thank you very
much. That will could it over to Jay for his ten minute closing as
well. Want to get it. I want to say, folks, if
you haven't yet, check out the poll in the live chat you can vote
on where you stand on this question. Tonight already has two seven hundred and
fifty four votes, so log in right now in the live chat you can
put your vote in the poll or that Jay, the floor is all yours.
I hope Jake's okay, because the whole debate, he's basically been Spergin
and the squirming like something's wrong over there, he's got Parkinson's or what's going
on. But I hope he's okay. I didn't mean to hurt him so
bad or hurt his feelings. I love you, Jake Man. Yeah,
I think that. First of all, as I pointed out when he asked
me about Iven, to me, I was clearly trying to remember exactly what
his position was from the Suleman book, and I specifically said that he allows
for created causation. Jake then tried to make me sound like I was saying
that he was an occasionalist. I never said that, so that was a
complete dishonest lie. I said that he believes that there's real causation in the
world, but he also thinks that God can intervene and do miracles. So
that was a straight up lie, just looking for anything grasping at straws.
Because he performed so badly, it's probably why he had to or take off
his camera. I don't know if he's running the bathroom to take a comfort
break or what's going on, But yeah, I think if we review this
debate, we'll notice that the central issues that were in question two ways of
accounting for unity of multiplicity, as I pointed out in my opening statement,
not a question of who's the true monotheis versus the polytheist the way that Jake
wanted to characterize the debate, because if you go watch, for example,
Jake's debate with doctor bo Branson or his debate with doctor Khalil, you'll notice
that Jake consistently had no real way to answer for the actual questions of how
we account for multiplicity and unity in his conception of the attributes in the Essence.
I specifically gave numerous arguments in the opening statement that Jake never got anywhere
near touching. He says, I didn't make any arguments I did. I
made countless arguments throughout that opening statement. I specifically pointed out that not that
Jake only counts in one way. I said that when he uses the terminology
of inseparability, that he's using the idea of counting by division, and it's
simply saying that if you say, for example, that the attributes are undivided,
or that the essence is one and undivided, that's also counting by division.
That's how the ancient and medieval world typically thought, unless they were dealing
with objects of first order imposition or objects of second order imposition. Again,
I addressed those disputes when I covered that topic. So most of the stuff
that Jacobs pointed to I did address. He just then came on and said
he never addressed nothing. I said, No, I did address everything that
you said. Just most of what I addressed you just weren't familiar with or
you didn't know what these topics were. Now again in the topic of the
universal for us, as universals get discussed amongst the Cappadocians and then post Chalcidon,
it becomes more and more specified and more and more clarified. So if
you just asked me something like, as God's essence a universal, it really
depends on what timeframe we're talking about. But Cappadocians, post Calcidon and so
forth, we don't usually see the idea of a universal itself in the platonic
sense being attributed to the divine essence. It's simply said to be something common.
So we can say that, yeah, the divine essence is common,
But universals take on a specific category of a created thing, especially in same
Maximus. Maximus, for example, argues that universals can perish, and this
is in the Tolusen dissertation. Universals aren't the divine essence because the divine essence
can't perish, and if universals comparison, then universals are created things. Now
universals are patterned on things in the divine mind, we would call those the
divine ideas. But that's a different topic. Let's advise to say it's again
another kind of equivocation with how the Cappadocians use the term common or universal versus
the way that it's used by the time of Saint John Damascus in a more
precise way about created realities. So the universal's dispute, however, is very
important for this debate because, as we saw, Jake's denial of universals results
in a lot of problems for accounting for things like meaning and identity over time.
That's why I kept stressing, how would Jake understand various texts of the
Qur'an. And you'll notice when we got into the nitty gritty of the epistemology,
Jake completely collapsed Jake went in circles. He was lost, he didn't
know what was going on where he was. Even at he thought that you
could say that, well, some things are self evident, which you noticed
when I first asked him, he didn't want to say it was self evident.
About a minute or two later, yeah, these are self evident truths.
But then he's when I asked him about the criterion problem, which is
how do we know the self evident versus the non self evident, he began
appealed to a self referential thing because we know because of the way that we
go about doing it. Yeah, but that doesn't justify the claim, and
he knows that it doesn't, and that's why he went deeper into deflecting over
into transcendental argumentation and justification. And he didn't know what a metalogical argument was,
even though he admits that the FDA was making a metalogical argumentation in the
paper. The paper's just arguing that the transcendental argument isn't justified in the exact
same way that first order types of beliefs are justified. So, and this
is just to say that different things are argued for in different ways. If
you watch my Matt Dill Hunty debate. This becomes a very central point of
dispute between us, where Matt thinks that everything is argued for in one way.
Likewise that very low tier quality of debate that Jake shares with at dyla
Monkey. They both just seem to think that words mean one thing. All
arguments are argued in the same way. Justification happens in one way. Different
types of things are proven and argued for in different ways. Different types of
things are counted in different ways. So I made this very clear. Again,
Jake didn't get any of that, and everything had to be smushed down
and reduced into one simple, one dimensional ways of understanding everything throughout this debate.
So I think that if people paid attention, especially when we got to
the notion of handfoot, the bodily properties that are ascribed to a lot in
his school. In his tradition, Jake couldn't tell us what an uncreated foot
is that doesn't bear similarity to foot, except that it's similar in the case
of functionality of creating. Okay, but the creating that you talked about,
or the piece of paper that you referred to, or this or that those
are other created things. And so the creative things that you keep appealing to
never match up or touch upon the uncreated thing, which the Quran says is
unlike right Allah is absolutely unlike creatures. What's that fifty seconds. So the
argument is not that Jake believes, or even to mea believes that there's no
way to have positive predication. The argument is that they contradict, and Suleyman
points out numerous places where actually he contradicts. So Jake says, oh,
he didn't read it. I was just waiting for a good book on this
topic to have a good debate. So Jake's trying to make it like I
was, you know, avoiding something or whatever. No, no, no,
I just wanted to have a good debate, and I went to the
trouble of reading this four hundred page book for you to have a good discussion
and a good debate. And again Suleyman, pages three thirty one, notes
that he absolutely contradicts himself on this point. He also contradicts on this notion
of what the divine perfections are, right, and so when we're told that,
yeah, we are supposed to know what a hand is. Every Jew
are Christian in the seventh or eighth century would know what a hand is my
empirically based end time. With that, we're gonna go into the Q and
A. I want to say, folks, we're going to try to move
through this as fast as humanly possible. A couple of quick things. One
is the goal is what we have written down here is thirty minutes. As
well as we will not read super chats that are just attacks on people,
we do want actual sincere questions. Also, as we had mentioned earlier in
the debate, and as you can probably see at the bottom right of your
screen, we're only going to read super chats that are five dollars or more.
We're gonna try to get to standard questions, namely when you just tag
me in the chat with a question. But I just can't make any promises
because we do we agree to a thirty minute Q and I. So I
want to go through this as fast as humanly possible. Thanks for your patience,
and here we go. First up, Thanks very much, Jean Michael
b says. Jake says that we are polytheists. You know, he follows
a pagan god named La. Give you a chance to respond to that,
Jake. I have a feeling you disagree. Yeah, I don't know where
he's getting this pagan god concept of law. In fact, even Orthodox Christians,
I think Jay, maybe this is something that we could agree on.
Orthodox Christians that are actually Arabs call God Allah. So if you think that
that's the case, then Jay is just as much of a pagan and Orthodox
are for using the term Allah. So it's completely ridiculous question for Jake.
They say, how does Allah, who is above the seven heavens, descend
to the lowest heaven? Does he have temporal space? I don't know what
temporal space means because that time and space are two different things, at least
in my under standing, unless you take a modern physical understanding where time and
space are the same thing. So I don't even really understand the question.
But when you ask how, that shows that the questioner doesn't understand because we
don't say that we know the how or the kfea. We don't know the
kfea of the attribute. So, and it's not only for descent or nozoul,
it's the same for Yed or Hua or any of the attributes. We
don't talk about the howness of the attribute. That's disclaimer, folks. We
have so many questions. Please don't submit any more questions. We're going to
try to move fast. Joshua to King says, believe whatever you want.
Allah has eternal attributes that require a recipient. Therefore he's dependent upon other than
himself to express himself. Who's that for. Yeah, that's just a statement.
But I mean, okay, we don't believe that. We don't believe
that a loss of pantata. How is he if he's dependent upon his attributes,
Let's say, for the sake of argument, he's dependent upon his attributes.
How is he dependent upon somebody else? They're his attributes. So,
I mean, that just makes no sense. It's the same. It would
be a similar concept in Orthodoxy to say, oh, God has attributes,
so he's dependent upon somebody else. Well, the attributes are his. It's
just such a low level critique. This one from gould see Taburn says Allah
and Yahweh are both the that's they're just crawlling. This one coming in from
do appreciate your question? This one is from screens reloading. I mean,
Yashay King says, why does the Koran say it's clear, detailed and explains
everything, Yet Muslims differ on Allah in the Koran doesn't detail the hyphia slash
howness. Let me know if I it wrong. Yeah, no, no,
it's okay. So he's saying, why does the Kuran say it's a
detailed explanation of all things? That's in chapter twelve, verse one eleven when
it says tefsi la couliche. But if you see this phrase used, it's
obviously used in a hyperbolic manner because it's used in the same sense when it
talks about what was revealed to Moses. Uh he was also revealed a detailed
explanation of all things. And yet we believe that put An came afterwards and
revealed things that were not given to Moses. So it's just a misunderstanding of
the phrase. This one coming in from doctor Chillin, says, hey,
j two part question, is LGBT allowed in Islam? Because in Suna Son
and Nabi Dawood five two two four, Mohammad was kissing. Oh, let's
see, they say, allegedly Muhammad was kissing another man on the chest.
They say, should we stone him? I would have to look at the
headith. I don't know what he's referring to. But LGBTQ, I don't.
I mean, I don't want to get the stream banned or anything,
but no, we believe it's a We believe it's a sin uh similar to
Orthodox So we're actually in agreement on that perspective that LGB is a sin.
This one from Famo says, Jay, your entire open was a failed attempt
at trying to challenge Taheed. Get once, not once did you attempt to
prove the blatant paradox known as the Trinity. Well again, in my last
statement, I addressed the chief argument that Jake relies on the LPT, and
I just simply pointed out that there's two different ways that counting happens for different
things. Different things are counted in different ways, and that's why, you
know, if you want a fuller presentation of explaining and arguing the Trinitarian doctrine
itself, you know, I gave a lot of those passages in the beginning
part of the Daniel debate, but I was just trying to squeeze as much
in as possible. But I would also add that I would say that if
Jake, you know, as he pointed out, wants to just count by
identity, if he thinks God is necessary, and he counts by identity,
and if we follow the rules of Tamia that each of the what's true of
one of the attributes is also true of the essence and so forth, then
he's got multiple necessary beings. If he's got multiple attributes, you got it.
There's one coming in from Do appreciate it. Even Lord says j are
Mormons basically Muslims and Jake as a Muslim. Well we'll first, we'll give
you a chance to respond, Jay are Mormons basically Muslims. Then there's some
interesting parallels between the supposed prophet status of Muhammad and the supposed prophet status of
you know, Joseph Smith in terms of you know, polygamy or direct new
revelations that sort of contradict previous revelation. See my argument with Danielikikachu. But
I also I would argue that you know, Islam is mainly focused on trying
to explain through thousands of pages of debates, what Allah's unity and singleness actually
is, whereas Mormons are actually tritheis and believe in three distinct, discrete gods.
I believe in a lot more than three gods. But yeah, they
say, for Jake as a Muslim, what are your thoughts of Mormons compared
to other Christians and Protestant groups. Yeah, Mormons. I agree with Jay's
part about Mormonism. I don't think it's anything similar to Islam. But Mormons
are actually some of the biggest polytheists in the world because they believe Father,
Son, and Holy Spirit. At least, I say they're a bit more
honest than Jay because they admit their three gods, but then they go much
further than that by saying that man can become God one day and not in
the sense that Jay talks about with theosis. They go much further than that
because they believe Father, Son and Holy Spirit used to not be gods and
they elevated to that station of God. So they're actually one of the biggest
polytheists in the world as a religion. You got it. This one from
Bo Branson says, Jake quotes me saying trinitarianism quote unquote, seems like saying
one plus one plus one equals one, not that it is. He admits
that. I next put Gregory of Nyssa's response in standard predicate logic, giving
a formal consistency proof Yeah. So to be clear, I wouldn't be so
stupid to claim that Bo Branson actually explicitly says that the trinity is like one
plus one plus one equals one. That's not the point. The point is
that the original problem. I was using the quote to explain how he understands
what the LPT is and we can agree, I think Jay and I if
we agree about anything, the difference in terms of why I say the trinity
results in three gods is about counting. So that's the only point of the
quote. It's not to say that Branson believes that the LPT is successful or
he believes in three gods. That would be ridiculous. It's just to show
that he's explaining what the problem is supposed to be. And then, of
course in his dissertation he attempts to, you know, respond to the problem.
This one coming in from even Lord says, JA, we got that
one xxwlzxss question for Jake, do you believe the eyes are that's weird?
This Bo Branson says, if there should turn out to be any problem with
the doctrine of the trinity at all, it will not be one of mere
logical inconsistency In saying that quote these three are one. I mean, that's
just a claim. But I've given an argument for the LPT, and the
same argument that I gave to Branson is the same one I gave to Jay
and Branson even in his new book, because I've spoke to other contributors to
the new book, which has been not been published yet, he never responds
to my critique of the unprincipled ad hoc manner in which they count persons and
attributes their energies by identity. But the count got it's by division. He
has no explanation for them. Of course, that was explained multiple times tonight.
It's explained by doctor Branson in many places, and I addressed it by
first and second order in position argumentation, as well as showing that multiple theologians,
even algaz Ali, count by a division. I don't mind Jay responding,
but if he's going to respond, then I'd like to respond to other
questions. I mean, ja, no, no, I'm not saying.
I'm not saying to respond now to what he said. I'm just saying Jay
has answered other questions that I would have wanted to respond to. But I
was quiet, so well, let me ask a question about that in terms
of the moderator, like, so does the other person get to respond to
like if a question goes to Jake, does it just to Jake? Or
how's this going to work? I don't know. That's what I'm trying to
call. I'm asking the moderator what what normally? We normally? This is
something that I I'm happy to have your guys creative and put on tonight.
I would. I think it's best just because we want to get through as
many questions as possible. This one from ma Here eighty four says the Messiah
in parentheses whose name wasn't Jesus didn't know the hour? When did the Holy
Spirit relinquish power to not have the same knowledge as the father? Emphasis on
father? I think that's for you, Jay? Is that to me?
Yeah? If you read Basil letter two thirty five and six, I think
two thirty four five and six therefore is the energies. And then five to
six addresses this topic where it's just the use of rhetorical exaggerative language, which
Jesus does quite a bit. For example, he says there's none good but
God. But then we have other places where he says, of course,
this person is the good man. You know, the bottle calls Jesus good,
Holy Spirit good. So it's a rhetorical device to say that not even
I know, right, or not even the sun knows. It doesn't literally
mean that he doesn't know, because we're also told that Jesus knows all things.
This one from Seur says, is the trinity a necessary truth or contingent
truth? If the former, what is the contradiction of rejecting it? If
a contradiction isn't shown from denial, it's a contingent truth. Therefore trinity false.
And assuming that's to me right, yeah, I think that this is
if this is like the atheist TikTok people that ask this question, this is
again kind of making the mistake of thinking that the argument, the transcendal argument,
is a first order argument. It's a meta level argument. So that's
not really relevant to how we are we argue tagged. This one from f
c LA News says a Lah, I know I'm going to say this wrong,
so help me alu akbar. Yeah, I say this right. This
one from LH says Jake the meta Central Dawa says Jay Dyer saying, quote
Jake doesn't understand. Unquote is not an argument against Jake. Make an actual
argue. Give you a chance to Jade respond to that. Well, I
mean I might have used that phrase at a couple points in the debate,
but I didn't rely only on saying Jake doesn't understand. I think I used
that phrase two or three times, but I gave many arguments. You got
it. Let's see this one from LH says, so there's one Allah with
multiple body parts, i e. The hands are distinct from the shin complete
partiality of Allah they put in all caps. No, we don't believe that
a laws Yed is a body part. We don't believe that he has any
body parts. And Jay should know this. I'm not saying he's claiming that,
but from reading the text, we don't believe that their body parts.
So by people keep asserting this same falsehood, which Farid Suliman refutes directly in
the book, just shows their own ignorance. But they can do it as
long as they like this. So coming in from dal Eel says Jake,
why do you worship ninety nine gods? I'll give you a chance respond to
that. I don't worship ninety nine gods, because I don't say that the
sufat or the Siphah, which is an attribute, is a god, just
as Jayder does not say that the energy of God's will or power or knowledge
are gods. We don't call them gods. They're attributes of God. Famo
says jay If the Son wanted a tree to be yellow, the Holy Spirit
wanted it to be orange, and at the same time the Father wanted it
to be blue, what color would the tree be? Yeah, we don't
believe in that will and intentionality and action are themselves personal properties. So the
Trinity shares a common will, a common nature, and common operations, and
so there wouldn't be conflicting contrary wills within God. That's the traits or properties
of nature. And then when we talk about the mode in which that nature
exists, it exists in the mode of three per since it habits, so
it's both particularized and it's common at the same time. So I'm coming in
from L two A says, did a natural theist really just try to hijack
the anthropology of the noose without an energy essence distinction? I think that's to
me, and I would say that I mean I understand. I guess the
apologetic use of trying to utilize the notion of the news, but I don't
think that translates into the talhat theology that he has in any coherent way.
You got it, Thank you very much for this question. Ecclesiastes says,
Jake, why would you debate? Let's see this one from Punk Giver says,
for Jake, if the sun cannot cause another person, can Allah's foot
cause another Alah's hand? I mean, it's just a ridiculous questions. Responding
to Ecclesiastes says, great job, Jay Dyer, they say Ja or they
say Jake? Would you debate? David Wood depends on the topic. Listen
from Domain says, is the son a s? If yes, how is
that possible since he's begotten? And if no, how is he God?
Because it's greater to be a a s E and God is maximally great.
I think he means, I'll say, but I'm sure Jay got that sayity
is for us a property that picks up the father, and so as you.
If you can go watch the debate between Jake and doctor bo Branson,
that whole debate settles this question, because we could say, for example,
that all fathers are human beings, but anything that's not a father is not
a human right. This ends up in certain fallacies like the nine the antecedent,
and if you watch that debate, Jake's guilty of the nine the antecedent.
You got it. This one from the Chelskian says, Jake does your
back hurt? Okay, that's weird. Abrahams Sorry, guys, I don't
get to vet all these these such a dozen. I'm sitting quite comfortably.
But yeah, you say, what is the point in Allah using the created
term hand or foot, et cetera. Yet is nothing like a created hand,
foot, et cetera. It's It's something very basic that I've explained numerous
times, and it seemed that Jay himself didn't get it when you say that
these are created things, all of the predicates that we use in the English
language or in Arabic, when we say essence or we say power, or
we say hand, there is no difference in terms of predicating those things of
God and predicating those things of creation. Our position is that there's a similarity
in meaning and that there's no similarity in ontology. You got it. This
one coming in from and each nurse says, did Muhammad destroy Allah's idol with
balls? I don't know what that's talking about. Neither my Zabibo's trajectory says
if I text you the way, see that's weird. Mjasons. Can Jay
give an example of anything else that is counted differently, as in the case
of Trinity, we have three persons, one nature, but yet one God.
I don't understand the question is is there something that we are there things
that we count in different ways, or can I give examples the way that
we count God in different ways? Because what I argue was that if you
look at medieval philosophy, there's first order in position, second order in position.
First order position is counting things that are mundane like cows and dogs,
and then second order in position is counting abstract things like walls of logic or
sets. And so, for example, concrete things we would count by division,
and abstract things we would count by identity. So even in the Middle
Eight people counted in different ways. So it's odd to me that the whole
argument tonight was premised on we only count in one way, and that's counting
by identity, which is why I said that if Jake counts by identity,
then he has missed many necessary beings in his account of the attributes. Got
it? This one from the Chelsekian says, when Alla comes down the third
part of the night to answer prayers, that means that either Allah is like
a yo yo because Earth is a globe, or that Muhammad thought that the
Earth was flat. I think this is for you, Jake. No,
that's incorrect, because again they're going into the kafia or the howness of the
descent, which we don't and we don't actually make the claim that it is
a movement necessarily from one spatial location to the another. In a similar manner
that Jay Dyer believes that the attributes or energies descend upon creation, and he
doesn't imagine that they're like ripping off a piece of and and and somehow coming
into creation and a landing on a human being. So this is just a
misunderstanding of our position. You got it? This one coming in from Do
you appreciate it? Ahmed, says Jake alu Akbar. Great job, MJ
says, Can Jay give an example of anything else that is counted differently as
in the case of trinity. We have three persons, one nature, but
yet one God. I think that's like the last question, the question sorry
about that Matt Belcher's is Michael loft And dressed as a Muslim? I don't
understand this one from buddy, who's your friend? Michael? Okay, GBT
zero point one two says, let's see, I don't think Michael Lofton has
any friends on this stream. This one coming in from do appreciate it?
Famos, says Jay. Answer without they say, how can an unlimited infinite
being I E. God be finite e I E. Jesus and infinite I
E. God at the same time. Yeah, well, this is what
we talked about earlier with mode. And so the mode that Jesus entered into
is a new mode of being, which the Book of Philippians describes as a
willful non exercising of every one of his attributes. I think that Jake himself
has argued in the past that God doesn't have to exercise every power and every
attribute of creating at all times. And so in the same way, we
just simply say that the second person of the God had stepped into the mode
of human nature while still having the divine nature. So he didn't lose his
deity, he didn't undergo any change, he didn't become the opposite of himself.
We believe a both and rather than either or. You got it.
This one coming in from just want to remind you folks, we are looking
for sincere questions, not statements that. I don't know why these guys would
pay a lot of money just to not a question up there. It's just
silly. I don't either they're asking, they're saying all sorts of things.
But this one from John, this is one. We got this on money.
Basia says Jay, how do you worship Jesus without worshiping his human nature?
Don't you have to worship the created human nature when you worship the person
of Jesus, which even Christians would consider idolatry. Well, this is addressed
in St. Cyril and the Council of Ephesus, because it's an argument that
Nestorius makes, And interestingly, the Islamic or Oxtrad Handbook of Islam notes that
there is in fact a historian influence on Islam. So I don't fault him
for making that mistake or thinking that way, But the answer is just simply
that. Cyril says that we don't worship the creature per creature. We direct
all of our worship to the divine hypostasis, and we give him a holistic
worship as the whole being, because it's the body of the word. Don't
worship the body of Christ or the human nature of Christ in any divided or
separate way, but we worship the god Man who is also incarnate. You
got it this one. I'll read the appropriate part. They say, guys,
it's read Go join Gigi slash Soony. By the way, I'm six
foot seven. Okay, then I don't know, sir this, susse says.
Discord dot gg slash Soony says, join the Debate Review. So if
yeah, we're happy to share about debate reviews, folks, if you want
to go check that out, go have a conversation there, uh, sussep
says. They say, okay, John Michael b says. Jake says,
we are polytheist because you know we follow Pigan. We got that one,
maneeb Zia says, Jay got that. Ab just shook her, says Jay,
how have you actually read authority position? Because when Jake asked you simple
questions yes or no, you have hard time answering yes or no. Well,
for example, when he asked about whether even to me believes in occasionalism
or secondary causes, I was trying to remember the specific page in the Foreigner
page book which I did read, which says he doesn't believe in occasionalism.
So I was trying to accurately give the position. And so the answer is
no, he doesn't believe in occasionalism. That's why I said specifically that he
does allow for creative causes. You got it this one from Giant Media,
or says Jake. If Alan's foot, I think you mean all his foot
and hands and other attributes quote unquote are not divisions of Allah, but each
one is an identity? Is I think? Now, No, there wasn't
a mistake. They're saying Alan on purpose. I think they say if Allan's
foot, in, hands and other attributes are not divisions of Allen, but
each one is an identity? Is each one the whole of Allen? Yeah,
so obviously he's talking about Allah. I don't know what's his Alan business,
but we believe that the attributes, all of the attributes, And I
repeat it again we don't believe their body parts. So you can keep saying
that we believe their body parts, but we don't believe that. This is
explicit in all of our texts, so it's just misrepresentation. But they are.
We believe they're inseparable from the essence, right, just as God's power
and knowledge. They're all inseparable from the essence. It's not like God's knowledge
starts floating around and comes and drifts down to earth and we don't believe that.
So just a misunderstanding of the position. I'muel, says Jake, I
love you, remember Jesus King and Joe, You're weird? And Derek,
let's play fortnite. Susep says Justin in his dialogue, makes it clear that
the Father can incarnate. This is clear subordinationism, showing he believed the Father
had a level of greatness in his personhood where he can't incarnate. Do you
pray to a heretic? Is that a question to me? I guess I
think I know you don't pray to just well, it was it was it
was phrased odd. Yeah, So, like I said, I mean the
the Father. The reason I said that we don't know is that. I'm
not aware of any statement where we're told by divine revelation that the Father could
not incarnate. But there are the alphantic manifestations where we have the Father,
you know, speaking to the son, but that's an energetic manifestation. But
like I said, Jesus says that, you know, no one sees the
Father at any time. So just like the divine essence is not perceived or
seen, we don't think that the Father is directly seen or perceived, except
as Jesus says, in the Son. So I don't see what that's a
problem really for our theology. I mean, it's not if Justin Martin makes
a mistake like that, I would class it as the same type of mistake,
but Augustine makes can I just asked Jay a quick question about that.
Are there disputes and orthodoxy amongst the scholars about whether or not the Father can
become incarnate? No, just a genuine question. I'm just asking. No,
I'm just was thinking about first Ofvine revelation. I'm aware of what you're
talking about in terms of what John Damascus talks about, but I was just
trying to think about what they might be referring to which is like we have
stories or we have a case like where when Jesus baptized, right, the
father says, this is my beloved son. So somebody might think that that's
the Father entering into creation. But in our theology, we don't think the
Father enters into creation in that way other than it's an energetic manifestation that tells
us about the Father, but it's not the person of the Father. Okay,
this one from Jack Hoggs says Allah is completely unlike created things. But
yes, created things can etiquette of Allah. Yeah, as I've explained numerous
times, this hinges on our and Jay's right to point out. I'm happy
that we that was actually part of the conversation nominalism, but they keep focusing
on God. What the But what these people don't understand if they actually study
nominalism. I believe that there is no shared reality between my hand and Jay's
hand. I don't believe that there is this thing called handness which is partially
or fully identical in my hand and Jay's hand, or my knowledge and Jay's
knowledge. Everything that exists is a particular So there's nothing unique about this.
When it comes to a law or human beings. So people understand that this
is a debatable point, but it seems like they're not even aware of what
anomalism even is. So from Beyond Doubt theology says, Jay, you have
a problem with God having a foot, But if you can say God died
in parentheses Council of Ephesus, can't you say that God or Jesus in particular
had feet. Yeah. So the internal critique was the first part about how
when Jake gives an account or when even to me it gives an account of
the semantic content that's supposed to be similar in terms of quote meaning, that
actually ends up telling us nothing about what that actually is. That was the
force of my argument in terms of an internal critique of his position. But
it is true that in our theology you could say that by appropriation or by
what Cyril calls the communication communicatio idio modern or the communication of properties, that
God the Son died. It doesn't mean that he died in his divine nature
or the underwent change, or that the divinity became passable. It just simply
means that the subject to the divine person, the son, experienced the seventh
bring of his human soul. From his human body. You got it?
This one coming in from Jack Hoggs says, got that one imagination, says
Jake. You cannot have your own definitions and tell Jay to respond by using
them. It's utterly ridiculous. Allah means a fake by my definition. Could
you please prove Allah is real? I mean, that's a strange question their
or statement. But obviously, my theory of a language and theory of meaning
is entirely different. I believe that the meaning of a word, or a
sentence or a phrase is based on the intention of the speaker. Okay,
So when I ask about what power is or what this is, and then
I explain my intention of what the meaning is, you can answer according to
that, and you can say, oh, but I don't use the word
that way, and given another answer. So there's no problem with that whatsoever.
Well, except that you tried to say that I have to accept that
meaning. I mean, got it? This one coming in from appreciate it
all, mass see, he says to Jake. Even Kamia brings Sahi in
his book that Mohammad sits with Allah, where rsh Percy trembles. Since you
pray to Allah, how are you not polytheists. Since I pray to Allah,
how am I not a polytheist? I mean, how is that even
connected to the first part of what he said? I have no idea.
And since Jay is making comments on the backhand of my statements, then I
would make a comment on the backhand of his questions. And just as the
questioner was asking before about predications and the communication of idioms or attributes, likewise,
Jay can appropriately say that God has a penis. There's no problem with
that whatsoever. This one from i'mule says I was low key having doubts.
Then I remember Jesus as God. Now I'm gonna give doubts. Hi,
Derek, I love you and you as well. Joe Matt Schneider said,
Jake, if you were on the north pole and Jay was on the cell
pole, could you both point toward Allah. Yes, we don't believe space
is an actual thing. It's relative. But he believes that you can point
up to Allah. And we believe that God is on the present. He's
not in a spatial location. Up is a spatial location. This depends what
you mean by spatial location. But we can go back up. No,
like space, you believe you do believe is a space space in an Aristatilian
sense of encompassing. In your sense, you believe that you can point up
to Allah. You said it to Khalil. I already I already just said
that right here in my answer. Right that's spatially direct. You don't think
app is a spatial direction. We believe in a jiha or a direction.
But when you use space, when you use when you use spatial, it
depends on what you mean by space. Yeah, so a new definition of
space, that's too. We have an Aristotelian definition of space. Oh interesting,
So it's okay to use the medieval things here, But what about counting
has to be post fraga? I never said that. What are you talking
about? My critique was that you're inconsistent in your counting method, but you
don't have a you're a consistent because you count, you count the attributes.
By then I already showed you that you look like a fool because you have
so now you have to you have to go to ad home and then when
I pin you down again, when you did what when I pin you down,
you have to go to at home and you will pin me down.
You because you count by identity I hate to do this. Necessary do count
by identity? Awesome? You have multiple necessary beings? No, we don't.
We must move, they say, question for Jake, Please ask this.
James, does Islam teach that Jesus is the nephew of Aaron and Moses?
Sorry, say that again? Is he does Islam teach that Jesus is
the nephew of Aaron and Moses? No? This one from James, says,
can Jake quote unquote tell us why Allah being called quote the one the
absolute is not blatant mimicry of bhutone plotinus karan through two. Thank you.
We don't believe that a loss of panotada is the one or absolute in the
way that Platinas said, Platinus believed in a complete uh, in divine simplicity
in a radical sense. We don't believe in that whatsoever. So it's a
complete uh misunderstanding of our actual position. This one coming from so, says
says Jake. Does Allah act in time or is he timeless? How does
the doctrine affect immutability? The full falsapha adhere to true tahed uh if you
mean by the philosopher's ibn sina, we believe that he was a Kaffre.
Uh So, I'm sorry to tell you for for for the questioner. We
don't believe he was a Muslim in that sense, unless you take the theory
that he repented later in life. But nevertheless, I forgot what the first
part of that question was. Besides the philosophers to oh, yeah, I'm
surprised that Jay didn't actually that. I wish we would have had a chance
to go through this more. If you mean by does a loss of panet
out to act in time, then yes, we believe that he acts in
succession that he has and this was actually and I mentioned this. Jay and
I don't agree on any things, but in my debate review of his debate
with us Rah Rashid, I think this is a serious problem that he highlighted
very effectively in pointing out that the Ashatas don't believe that the attributes of action
are actually divine attributes. They say that Allah's actions simply refer to his created
effects. We think this is complete nonsense. No, we believe that his
actions are actual attributes or in a language of Eastern Orthodoxy, our energies,
and they can have a beginning in time and yet are uncreated. And I
gave support from that from Imam Bucati in my opening presentation. This one from
Alexander says, why does Allah have two right hands? Why does he have
two right hands? I mean, it's just a silly question if you actually
read the text and understand why the term right is used. Wright is used
in terms of blessing. So we believe that the blessings pour forth from a
loss of pano Ada's hands. That's the meaning of the term, which I
have videos on my channel explaining that this is a standard tough sier or explanation
of those ahadith. I'm yul says, I'm currently tking. Matt Belcher says,
Jake. If Allah is the only eternal, then why is the Kuran
also said to be eternal? Again, this is something I corrected Jay on
them prized when he thought that I believe that the put Ann is eternal.
I didn't believe that. I just said, I wasn't talking about that.
You did, no, I said, I wasn't talking about it. You
can go back. You can go back to the tape and look at it
yourself. I said, I don't know what your position is there. I
didn't say you believed that. Okay, you don't know what my position is.
What's explained in the text. We don't say that the put An is
eternal in terms of a speech act. We believe that it was spoken in
time to the angel Jabrilani, he said, i'm and then to the prophet
muhammad Ad he said said, I'm so. We don't believe that it is
eternal in that sense, only eternal in the sense of within God's knowledge that
he knew what he would speak. But the act of speech itself happens at
a particular moment in time. You got it this one coming in from do
appreciate it? Sojournon, says jacob Alla. His hand is something that grabs
what is all of shin God. This is just ridiculous questions. And anyway,
thirty mon he thinks they're ridiculous because they don't want to deal with these.
No, I've answered how many times have I answered questions about a lot's
hand a lost foot? Every single time it does it does. I've explained
the meaning several times over and over. Everybody focuses on this because your explanations
are terrible. That's why they focus on it. Jake. No, it's
because you guys don't understand the basics of what I'm talking about. When I
say that it's a nominalist predictor that you can have you can have a shared
meaning, which I gave the meaning, and I said the meaning is known
through the text, and I gave examples of that. And then you say,
and I buried that. Yeah, because of your you didn't You didn't
nail me. But Jay, you don't even know the basic critics. I
do know the basic critics. You don't know the basic critiques of your So
you don't have logical laws. Don't you don't have logical laws. But just
to go, Yeah, Jake can't control himself. He has to interrupt it
every moment, said Jake. If all his hand is on thing that grabs,
what is all his shi? Yeah, I just already respond to this
question. You got responded to it five times already, Moose says j Do
you support all gbt Q plus and you should believe in progressive Christianity? What
I think this person is a troll, But I'll give you a chance.
It's just the way they spelt progressive. But I could be wrong. Ja,
do you support well it was a statement that I should or what was
it? A question? Do I know? Don't we think? That's this
one from Habik Mohammed says, okay, nothing about spanking giant meteor, says
Jake. You didn't answer my question. I didn't say that all his hands
and foot are body parts. I asked if they are counted by division?
But our identities are each one of them, the whole of Allah. They're
not counted by division. I already explained that they're inseparable, and yet we
count them. They're inseparable, and yet we count them as more than one.
That means we are counting them by identity, which I so multiple necessary.
They're not most of the multiple necessary beings? Are they? Are they
necessary? You continually? You continually can't control yourself. You have to answer
so then so then if I do that on every time you answer the question,
it's okay, right, I don't care. Okay, Well, then
stick to the rules. We already establish the rules, and you keep going
off the rules. I do want to I I sympathize with you, Jay,
because I know that there are way more questions for Jake, and it's
I would like you, but so many things Jay says, don't you think
I would love to respect? Oh? I know, don't worry. I'm
getting there. What I was saying. I sympathize Jay. I understand that
we have to have consistent rules. Either Jay's gonna abide by them or you
allow me to Jake. I'm I'm agreeing. I'm trying to basically give a
like a rebuke to Jay right now. I'm just saying, Jay, I
know that it's kind of boring when they're like a million questions for Jake,
But to be fair, I do want to keep it so that we're not
having any sort of teaming up on Jake. This one from Cataclysm says to
Jake, does Salafism hold normative authority to dogmatize an anathemize theology? I e.
Ashari occasionalism Allah creates absolutely everything, making all of the worst being with
prayer under an ashari a mom be valid. Okay, So you're mixing two
things. You're asking about prayer behind in a Shadi imam, which is a
question of fit, not merely a Kaida, and when you talk about the
Shadi position on occasionalism, we believe that they're completely wrong and that it's a
deviant position because it goes against the clear text of the put On and Sun,
and it also goes against reason, which again, and I don't think
Jay and I are very much friends here, but I have to point out
that he hammered as Rabashid on the same point in the debate when he made
the point which is a similar point that I would make, and which I
don't know why they can't understand that they make an argument based on causation or
causal chains to prove that God exists, and then when you get there,
they say, oh, by the way, all of those causal chains are
not real, so it's just a complete falsehood. From Christ to four,
oh says, why did Mohammad get married the mother of Jesus and married the
sister of Moses? And Aaron confused? Say repeat the question, say why
did Mohammad get married the mother of Jesus and marry the sister of Moses?
And Aaron confused? I'm not aware of him getting them confused. I mean,
you have to go into more detail about the This one from habitc Aboo,
Mahammad says one hundred dollars of j can name more than five books on
Jake's position. Jake what they technically said Jack's position, which I don't understand.
Yeah, it's all right. My Italian family still calls me Jack.
They can't pronounce Jake for some reason. So is what it is. But
anyway, what's the question, what are we doing? They said, one
hundred dollars of j can name more than five books on Jack's position. Oh,
so that's for Jake, that's for me. So I have let's see
one, two, three, four, So I have four books here with
me. So that would be the critique critique of the Palmerian Creed, which
is not his position, but on his position. I have the even to
me a book one ess of God. I have the soule Mond book what
we're talking about today with the quotes. So, and then I've got all
of the unbelief chapters in the Oxford Handbook. So I'm sure that doesn't meet
the five criterion, but I don't think I need five. Actually, good,
do we count the Kuran too? This is the credit. So if
I count the Koran, that's five? Is that does that count? Lenland
said, Is Jake open to having a debate with Sam Chamou? No?
Guy is out of his mind. You got it. Let's see this one
from has this been thirty? I thought it was thirty minutes of Q and
A. Yeah, we're going on longer than that. But I'm just,
uh, I'm being patient for James because I know that some of these are
probably super chats. But we're eventually gonna have to wrap it up. I
mean, that's we are. We'read the three hour mark, so we're gonna
wrap it up. I want to say, folks, thank you for tuning
in. Check out both Jake's and Jay's links in the description box that includes
if you're listening to you the podcast later. All of the debates end up
on the podcast within about twenty four hours of the debate being live, So
if you're listening via Spotify, Apple Podcasts, you name it, Both Jay
and Jake are linked in the description box there. Check out their links.
Now, there's a value in getting to hear a person's point of view straight
from them, such as going to their own videos at their own channels,
So I hindh they encourage you folks check out their channels with that one to
say, thank you so much. It's been a true pleasure to have you.
Both Jay and Jake, Thank you guys, have a lot of fun.
Thank you my pleasure. Folks, stick around. I'll be back in
just a moment with a post credit scene letting you know about upcoming debates.
So thanks for being with us, and I'll be back in just a moment.
Thanks so much for coming by, folks. Thrilled to have you here
and excited. I've got to tell you right now what I'm excited about.
I'm gonna show you a few things here because you might be thinking, like,
huh, what are you so excited about, James, like, tell
me I have to know. Well, a couple of things first is here
I am bottom laugh. I want to say thanks so much for being with
us. If you have not already voted in that poll, it is still
there waiting for you in the live chat. You can do that right now.
Want to encourage you as there's been about thirty five hundred, three thousand,
five hundred if I remember right last time I chat that many votes.
Yeah, about that three four and eighty two, which is huge. Do
you want to encourage you to check that out? We are trying out some
new things here at Modern Databate. As you see at the bottom right of
your screen. Let me just try to top left, top right. There
you go feeing that up a little bit. As you see at the bottom
right of your screen. Is that some nights when we have a ton of
questions and when we have limited time for the Q and A, we're gonna
do something where we're gonna try to get to the standard questions still, namely
those that you just tag me and chat with and then ask the question.
We're gonna still try to get to those, but with limited time, we
can't guarantee it. And then those nights we're gonna have five dollars minimum superchats.
So it's just a way of trying to keep the if we especially if
you have two dollars super chests for insulting people. But we also don't want
super chats that are frankly any amount that insult people. But we notice that,
you know, not surprisingly a two dollars super chat, you only need
so many characters to type in, you know, so it's a jerk.
So that's one thing is we want you could say more authentic questions, but
want to say we appreciate you being here with us. I've got a lot
of other things to mention in particular, we actually have this Tuesday. The
MC tune debate last Tuesday on flat Earth actually got nicked for the night,
so I do want to let you know that is being rescheduled for this Tuesday.
So that's one big one. And then the following Tuesday, Globe Face
will be taking on a flat Earth or a new button in fact, so
you don't want to miss out on those debates if you haven't yet hit that
subscribe button, as we have many more debates. But also you might be
thinking, like, James, tell me what else is going on? If
you didn't notice on the screen before we started, is that right now?
Modern day debate is also trying something else out in particular, folks, as
you can see the bottom right of your screen, Visible Wireless as a sponsor
for this debate. If you are paying more than you should if you're a
mobile service, this is the time to switch over to Visible. And you're
like, well, James, well how much is too much? With Visible?
You can get it for just twenty dollars a month for unlimited talk,
unlimited text, and unlimited data for just twenty bucks a month if you use
the link in the description box below. Folks, what are you waiting for
Save your hard earned money. Don't let it go for thirty five dollars a
month for the same thing over at Mint Mobile. Save that fifteen dollars a
month. Use it to go to Chipotle. I use it to get yourself
some coffee, whatever it is that you like to do instead of spending it
on your mobile service. So that Visible link, if you use our link
below, I can tell you it is awesome. I use Visible myself.
I will never promote something unless I actually use it, and I'm a fan
of it, so I gotta tell you I use it and it's amazing.
I'm gonna throw that link in the old live chat and I'm gonna pin it
and I'm gonna wrap up that poll with thirty five hundred votes. That is
huge. But want to say we are excited about Visible being a sponsor for
Modern Day Debate. And I just realized, I don't think I have that
link. Yeah, I don't even have that in the description box. I'm
gonna grab that right now, and I want to say thank you guys for
all of your support. Thanks to your patience. Is a there's a slacken
on that one, but I'm gonna grab that link now, and want to
say, folks, the cool thing about visible wireless is you also have unlimited
hotspot data. Now. The reason that's cool is because you could just cancel
your internet at home because here's the thing. Why why have internet at home
when you could just say, Hey, why don't I just use my hotspot
on my phone and then I can completely take out my internet bill. Let's
say it's sixty bucks a month, and let's say you're paying thirty five for
mobile, so you could say fifteen from your mobile bill, plus you could
save sixty from no longer Wi Fi. That's seventy five dollars a month,
which over the course of a year, that would mean nine hundred dollars of
savings over the course of a year. So I got to tell you,
folks, check out that Visible link right now. You won't regret it.
You have the potential to save nine hundred dollars over the course of a year.
So I just put that link for the modern databa Visible affiliate link.
So for the first year, you get twenty dollars a month. That's it.
It's just twenty bucks a month for unlimited talk, unlimited text, unlimited
high speed data, including unlimited thanks Shane for sharing that in the old live
chat, including unlimited hotspot data. So I'm just for me. I gotta
tell you. I know everybody talks about Hey, you know things are getting
really expensive. There are some things, it is true, there are some
things that are more expensive. But mobile service is actually cheaper for me.
I remember when I first got on a plan with data independently, So like
when I got off my parents' cell service WiFi or not WiFi mobile service is
it was twenty five bucks a month and I got unlimited talk, unlimited text,
and two gigs per month of high speed data. That's it just too
so in other words, like you'd blow through that. You could blow through
that in like a few days, and then the rest of the month you'd
have just like super slow WiFi or I should say super slow data for using
your phone. But now for twenty bucks a month, so cheaper, like
you can get it compared to like six years ago. That actually that wasn't
six years ago, that was more like ten years ago. For ten years
compared to ten years ago, you can get a better deal, and it's
actually cheaper than what I was paying ten years ago. So you can stick
that in the face of inflation and tell them to, you know, stick
that in or pipe and smoke it. Got to tell you it's huge savings.
I Anathema says. They switched to Visible a few weeks ago, and
I am loving the savings. That's awesome, and I love it too.
Actually I use Visible, I don't get the same deal you do. Now
I am past that one year mark. I pay twenty five dollars a month.
But even then, for me, I'm like twenty five dollars. It's
still better than when I was using Mint. It's better than when I was
using Boost. It's better than when I was using I think there was another
one I tried, like Tether or something. I can't remember, Tello thing.
It is Tello, But highly encourage you check out Visible's link if you
were looking for saving a few bucks each month on your mobile service, and
potentially, like I said, you could use your phone as a hotspot all
the time, Like whenever you get home, just turn on the hotspot,
connect to your computer, to it or whatever device you might be using,
and you don't even have a Wi Fi bill anymore. Oh myn so pretty
cool. I gotta tell you, I'm excited about that. I think it's
a great deal. I want to encourage you to check that out. Thank
you guys for your support. Where at seven hundred and fifty two likes.
Seriously, it means more than you know. I'm gonna I'm gonna get some
rest. It's been three hours a little over, so thank you guys for
coming by. I want to say hi to you though, because I just
I really do enjoy this and I do just appreciate you being here. So
dead alive Maniac. I see they're in the live chat. Thanks for being
with us, Chica. Is it cheek? Ammy? Let me know if
it's pronounced that way. Glad to have you here, Sonya, thanks for
coming by. I see they're in the old live chat. Sin Klon,
thanks for coming by. I see you there, Booty Killer one two three,
thanks for dropping in. That's interesting. I am he thanks for coming
in, and Athama good to see you as usual, as well as NYC.
Tom oh wait, thanks for coming by. Norak Happy to have you
here, says what wow, how could they possibly do this? That's right,
Visible is giving the deal of a lifetime, and uh, you know
what else is cheap Netflix? Cheap but phx five seven six, Thanks for
coming by, and let's see they say modern day debate. My super chat
was genuine, but you skipped it. I did mention earlier if it wasn't
a five dollars super chat or higher. It was both on screen, and
I did mention it verbally throughout the debate. So I gotta tell you you
got to pay a little bit closer attention. Man Houston Euler, thanks for
coming by. Happy to have you, Moss Hallo, Halo Low, thanks
for coming by, Struggling Protestant, Glad you're here, Sweet Bubbles, happy
to have you here at Karzan. Happy you're here, Gambit, Glad to
have you with us, Alonzo Harris, happy here with us, win Fire,
thanks for coming by, Manuel Palia, Palayo Logos, thanks for coming
by, Caribou, thanks for dropping in, Awesome loss and clips and mister
Anderson, Glad you're here, Abiel, thanks for coming by, Solid Ground.
Glad to have you here. A Catholic data, am I saying all
right, glad that you were with us. Jay Samurai seventy nine, thanks
for dropping in Krzan, Happy to have you here, Brook Adam, thanks
for coming by. Chicami says is visible any good? Yes, visible is
good. It's actually they use the satellites for Verizon, so you have good
coverage. That's one thing I love too, is that, like it's rare
that I ever get to a spot where it's not good. So free Sean,
thanks for coming by. See you there in the old live chat,
sim Claw, thanks for coming by, Role says your channel is growing.
Nice to see. Thank you so much for your support. That means more
than you know. Also, I have to tell you I am so excited
you guys. Thank you guys for making modern day debate row as you have.
We owe it all to the debaters and to you. Thank you for
sharing our debates things like that, and thank you so much for just all
of your support. Let's see. Nathamas says, good to have you back
to this huge debate. Brother, I replied to your email. Was in
the hospital for a week. Wow. I hope you're doing okay, and
man, glad to have you here. Shane. I'm glad you're okay.
You know if you're here, We're glad you're here. So but I'll get
back to your email and I appreciate you. Appreciate you, man. Buika,
thanks for thanks for coming by. Say they're in the old live chat
and yeah, I want to say you guys do appreciate you. Thanks so
much. Good a live menix is love it Debates, Please step in more.
Jake wisconstantly Okay, let's see Moel. Thanks for coming by, so
free and free. Thanks for coming by, seither, John Ve glad to
have you with us. Golden Victory Lighthouse, thanks for coming by. Debate
already wrapped up, just so you know, Thanks so much. Davidson Trailer.
Happy to have you here, Houston. You are good to have you.
And I want to say, though, thank you guys for all your
support. Hawaiian cc it says feet picks, I'm working on it. Check
your email. Thanks for coming by. I want to say, love you
guys, Thanks for all your support. Join us while we were small.
This is modern day debates, early stages. Believe me, join us while
we are young. Our story is just beginning. Modern a Debate is going
to do huge things in the coming years, and someday we're gonna look back
and say, wow, you remember you're so small. We had one hundred
and seventy seven thousand subs. That's how big we're going to be. In
the future, we're going to host bigger and badder debates, more epic debates,
things that are going to knock your socks off. Believe me, they're
going to be tremendous. People will be saying, Wow, I can't believe
modern a debate. How they pull that. That's amazing. We're excited.
We are continually improving ourselves, continually developing things, improving, tinkering, learning
and figuring out how we can improve more and more. And want to say
thank you guys so much for all of your support. We're excited about the
future as we strive provide a neutral platform so that everybody can make their case
on a level playing field. We believe that's important, and we know you
believe that's important. We believe in letting a thousand flowers bloom, letting the
chips fall where they may, giving people a chance to make their case on
a level playing field. So I want to say thanks for all your support.
I love you guys. Keep sifting out the reasonable from the unreasonable,
and we will see you at the next debate.