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Then the the the the the the
the the the the people, the the

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the the the the the the the
the the the the the the the the

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the the the the the the the
do them all right, all right?

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Welcome back, Father Deacon Antonius,
Father Deacon doctor Anonius, joins me.

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Excuse me, I'm depriving you of
your proper titles, uh and uh we

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what CP A c I A c
CP should those all be on there?

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As well all of your uh alphabet
acronyms that I'll leave any out. S

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sp X, I fel like bond. I need Russian passport here? What's

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your Russian code name? Dugan?
Are your your Russian code name Dugan?

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When you're that's your your Dugan pass
can pass right there, so that when

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you when you come to Russia,
Dugan sits there at the check in gate

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and he literally checks every person in
and he looks at you and says,

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you have good beat or you can
post. You look at Russian who can

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post? There's only one guy check
to Russia. When I go into Russia,

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Dugans, the dude with the sign
that says f d A you know

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what, like the guy that picks
you up in the limo he picks you

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up in the limo and takes you
to McDonald's. Is the Russian McDonald's.

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When I was in Russia, I
did take a picture of They had all

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these ads for like billboard ads for
Papa John's pizza, and it was like

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this hockey hockey player with like a
missing tooth and like, so I took

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a bunch of pictures of Michael hilarious. Did you taste the vodka in Russia?

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Does it taste different or is it
all the same everywhere? I made

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the mistake of like we were at
a hotel, so you ordered wine cooler

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and you ordered Arnolds and James all, what's the Russian zema? You ordered?

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The Russians they had like this really
nice spread for at this one of

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these hotels for breakfast, and then
they had like bottles of vodkas kind of

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like set up like cannons and stuff. And I asked my spiritual father and

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I'm I'm like vodka for breakfast,
And He's like, well the Russians and

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blah blah blah, said well,
can I get your blessing to try vodka

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for breakfast in the morning. It
was the worst mistake I've ever made because

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of course, Like I was just
like, I want to go back to

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bed. Are you being serious?
Like there's actually an option for vodka breakfast.

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They drink vodka for breakfast. Wow. And my father was telling me

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like, well, you got to
see, like a lot of these guys

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are just like out manual labor and
so they like, you know, you're

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just burning through and working it off
and stuff like that. I'm like,

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yeah, because I mean, I
don't want to drink alcohol for breakfast,

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man, I was. It's yeah, so terrible, and it reminds me

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of in Italy, like the odd
choices they have for breakfast. In Italy.

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There's there's always like a million like
crumpets and cakes, super soggy bacon

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which doesn't even look cooked, which
is weird, and then like cold ham

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and cold eggs, like the eggs
are never hot, they're cold. It's

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just just a weird breakfast idea.
I don't know anyway, Anyways, Yeah,

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I was on a pilgrimage, so
I wasn't actually searching for like distilleries

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and Russian tasting Russian vodka and stuff
like that. But when I go back,

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I'll make a habit of finding it'll
be like an Indiana Jones the Search

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for the Holy Vodka. All right, So tonight we're gonna discuss the the

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new paper that father Deacon Doctor Anonius
has written, which is I thought he

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mentioned this idea a few months ago. That was a great idea for a

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paper to address some of the specific
challenges that we've heard in recent years to

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the transcendental argument for God's existence,
and a lot of these revolve around higher

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level argumentation, and really a basic
kind of idea that I think you had

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said Russ Manion pointed out to you
a while back, which is that it's

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really just asking the question of,
like, what's the reason for reasoning itself?

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And when we think about it in
that way, it's actually prior to

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any of the atheistic argumentation that they
might even engage in, because you're not

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even allowing them to sort of make
the first move, which any first move

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is going to assume again reasoning.
So if we're asking questions about reasoning itself,

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that's a perfect kind of segue into
the domain of tag. So do

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you wanna how do you want to
kick it off? And uh, and

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maybe maybe was there certain discussions you
had that prompted you to have this as

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your paper topic. Yeah, so
I'm really indebted to russ man Into and

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just let everybody know he did pass
away last week, So keep him and

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his family and your prayers. My
godson who is dear friends with Russ and

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did the dialogue group with They were
working on a book, and so I've

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been in correspondence with them and reading
some other articles that most people haven't seen.

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Because what I was trying to think
about is what was really good about

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russ Mannion is his psychology. The
ability to grasp the kind of psychological component

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of the other person, kind of
get to the question behind the question and

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stuff like that, and then reduce
it what would seemingly be really complicated to

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a really kind of basic way of
like explaining stuff. Yeah, I like

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this intro. This this intro sentence
at the top. The hardest problem is

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convincing people the problem is not hard
at all, but simple. That's a

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good Yeah, that's me. Yeah, I'm saying that's a perfect introductory sentence.

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But that's kind of like channeling the
you know, russ Mannion. Let

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me give you an example of where
he could take something that apparently would be

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really complex and then boil. And
it relates to this opening kind of quote

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that you you gave. There's no
purely rationalistic rational argument for the existence of

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God. Hold on, let me
find it. So Butcher the where is

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it goes something to the effect that
there's no purely rational argument for the existence

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of God or for theism. There's
only a theistic account of rationality. And

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when I heard that, I was
like, Oh, that's perfect. And

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then I started so I really started
kind of trying to get into the psychology

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of the other, like what's going
on? Why is this so difficult?

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Because once you get it right,
once you get tagged, don't you feel

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that it's like this is so obvious, Like in fact, there's nothing more

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obvious. Yeah, it's almost like
a hidden in plain sight type of thing,

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like this is should have been obvious
the whole time. So let me

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give you another conversation that I had
that kind of illustrates the same point.

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I was talking with my chair of
philosophy, really great guy. He graduated

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from Thomas Quantas College like myself.
Of course he's older. But so I

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stopped by his office maybe like a
month ago to ask him a question if

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because I was dealing with arguing with
some people about nominalism, and I said,

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well, I'm just kind of interesting
what his thoughts where I said,

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do you have any good arguments against
nominalisms? And said he says, well,

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what do you mean? And I
said, well, that nominalism's false

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and he says, well, isn't
it obvious? And I'm like, yeah,

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it's like this story of my life. I'm sitting here. The hardest

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problem is arguing like, isn't it
obvious? The hardest problem is convincing people

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the problem isn't hard at all,
but simple. And I really it's kind

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of the frustrating part about philosophy.
And it illustrates too that what's really going

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on is not an intellectual issue.
Yeah, it's a spiritual issue that people

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want to attempt to kind of justified
their their idols, as they put out

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a talk about in the paper and
so and Saint Paul talks about this too.

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All men know that God exists,
but they suppress that knowledge. And

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so there's different ways you can suppress
that. But the philosophers build systems,

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don't they, And they make it
super complicated and they're really smart. And

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then it puts the burden on us
that it's like, well, now I've

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got to learn all this stuff.
I've got to learn logic, modal logic

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and all this analytic philosophy and epistemology
just to cut through all the bs and

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show you that the problem is not
hard at all but simple, and that's

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the hardest problem. Would you agree? Yeah? I mean that the there's

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this illusion that's cast that makes people
think that it's all very you know,

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profound and deep and sophisticated, and
really the only sophisticated part is when where

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a direct asking this supposed sophisticated arguments
of the opponents, but are really just

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kind of like, you know,
smoke and mirrors to cover up total bankruptcy

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and absolutely no foundations for anything.
And I'm not even sure that most people

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are aware that they're doing this.
And we also talked about two is that

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once the systems are constructed for you, and when I'm talking about the systems,

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because we're going to get into the
paper of and what I mean by

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autonomous epistemology, but it's system building. Once these systems are kind of built,

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you're brought up in that right,
and a good way to kind of

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think about it is, or you
adopt it, you work within it.

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It's an operating system, and they're
operating systems that can make you dumb.

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I had one of the interesting enough
he was a Jesuit priest, but that

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was one of my master's advisors,
and he would always criticize different like schools

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of thought like Marxism, and he
was like, oh, it's stupid.

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He's like, but it's sort of
stupid that you have to go to school

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to learn it. Yeah. Yeah, it's a stupidity that only intellectuals could

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believe. That's right. So we
have this kind of naive view that it's

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like, well, the enlightened you
see there in college, and that's there's

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the stupid, and then there's the
educated. And it's like, no,

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you go to school to educate yourself
in stupidity. And so part of the

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problem is not being able to see
the obvious. Is that and we've talked

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about this too. You've got yourself
into a bad program and a bad operating

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system that doesn't allow you to see
kind of clearly and think through stuff.

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So, you know, the natural
theologian at I'll think that what would just

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give people arguments and they'll just see
it. But the problem is in an

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argument, how are you going to
see the proof or the argument when you're

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operating system doesn't allow you to and
you also have you also have an inner

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partial motivation to suppress that truth.
Right. This is that point about virtue

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epistemology, virtue knowledge, or of
virtue ethics that is often ignored by the

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natural theology proponents, where they which
is ironic because I've asked a lot of

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them if they think that, you
know, choose a person who is an

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unbeliever and prefers vice, would that
in any way maybe affect the evidences that

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they see and how they interpret the
evidences, And most of them will say

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yes. But then when you really
drill drill down into their approach, they're

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still acting like, but all I
have to do is like pile up evidences

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and eventually they'll kind of tip over
and convince the person to maybe believe.

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Now, all that being said,
it doesn't prevent me from trying to figure

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out better ways again, kind of
in the spirit of russ mannion of cutting

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through all of that. And one
of the ways that motivated this paper was

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if I was the other person,
how would I be seeing this why if.

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I mean, it's really hard to
kind of do to get yourself out

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of your own paradigm and think in
terms of the other person so that I

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can come back into the paradigm and
then work some of that into my paper.

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So one of the things that I
did was just kind of put an

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ad out on all the socials,
give me your best objections, like,

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let me see it from your point
of view, so that I can go

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back and kind of think through,
like what is that people are struggling with,

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how can I answer it? And
then again how to boil down a

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lot of this really kind of complicated
stuff and make it a lot more presentable.

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So hopefully, you know, I
have different kind of reactions to the

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paper. Obviously, some people are
really confused. I see that there,

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and when we get into this second
and first order statements and knowledge that people

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get really confused about that. And
I think one of the difficult things about

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this too is I was just talking
to my brother on the phone and he

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was like, I just found out
that like over fifty percent of people don't

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have an inner monologue, and I'm
like, oh, yeah, we just

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I just did a stream on that
too the other day. And that this

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kind of inabilit this cognitive inability and
would also relate to I think kind of

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paradigm analysis. So there's we've talked
about this, well, this is just

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the way you think, right.
So I find that people have had it

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really difficult kind of stepping out at
kind of higher meta levels to kind of

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ask kind of metaological, meta epistemological
questions. And there's something tied to kind

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of introspection, I think, because
introspection kind of questions and doubts our own

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thoughts, right, I mean,
when I would this would an example be

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something for the audience, something simple
like if I said the dog is brown,

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right, that would be a basic
knowledge claim. If I said I

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have knowledge that the dog is brown
would be a higher level order of questions.

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And a lot of people get this
confused too about what we're arguing.

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I've never actually posited that an atheist
or anybody else who doesn't embrace the orthodox

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worldview can't have knowledge. I think
it's possible, But the state that you

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have knowledge to claim that you do, or to know that I'm in a

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state of knowledge and I know the
dogs there, that's a second order.

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Yeah. The first time I came
to one of those conferences in Texas with

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you. There was a bit of
a disagreement with an individual over this very

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question where he thought that I was
saying that an unbeliever literally has no knowledge,

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when the point was that they can't
justify the knowledge that they have,

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but they know things, they just
don't have an account for the knowledge.

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Yeah. And again, because orthodox
provides, as we'll see through the theonymous

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epistemology of revelatory theism and epistemically privileged
position, we can actually say, of

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course the atheist knows. Remember we
discussed this too, and I'm trying to

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00:20:03,880 --> 00:20:11,119
remember if it was Stanny Loy,
I think it was that said Orthodoxy is

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not married to any particular philosophy.
It's not wedded like Tony's wedded to a

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restituianism. Why, because it transcends
all these man made systems. Yeah,

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there's a great an epistemic kind of
privileged position to look and be like,

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sure, right, here's a there's
a Fluorovsky I say, I think that's

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really good where he talks about how
the Batristic era didn't just adopt Plato or

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adopt Aristotle, that they would pull
from any of these and the terminology and

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the ideas are really revelatory in the
sense of the nature person distinction, for

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example, is not an Aristotle.
It's a unique revelation to the Christian position.

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Even though it might utilize terminology from
Aristotle or Plato, the meanings that

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fronema behind the terms that are used
is intended to be revelatory revelation, not

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not just sort of one to one
Greek borrowing cribbing from Greek philosophy. So

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I'm trying to set up like the
kind of whole prolegemina to my paper,

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and I'll explained what the motivation was, why this is kind of a different

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style that I was trying to also
get the objections and then answer and kind

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of think through these things and articulate
it, which I was. You know,

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of course I didn't get all the
objections, but I thought kind of

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the more serious or more common objections. And the other thing too, If

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you remember I had this phone call
with you, that first and second order

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argument that I developed in there came
to it came to me in a dream.

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It wasn't a fewer dream. And
I remember in the dream I was

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arguing with this atheist because I don't
know what your dreams are like, but

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this is all I do in my
serious or joking. Did you really have

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a dream about it? I'm not
pretty serious. I was debating this atheist

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in my dream and I developed this
argument, and I remember thinking of the

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dream, I'm like, I think
I'm onto something here. Now. I've

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had all those kinds of thoughts and
dreams before, in the totally nonsensical right

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when you wake up, oftentimes you're
like, what was I thinking? That

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didn't that didn't make any sense.
But in this dream, I thought about

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I think, I'm on, you
got to remember this and pull it outside

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of your dream and write it into
your paper. And I just kept reminding

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myself that I pull this out,
don't forget, because it's easy to forget

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something from a dream. And of
course I wake up and I forget,

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and I'm driving down to leturgy with
my subdeacon and I'm telling him, I'm

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like, I think I just stumbled
upon this really cool argument, and I

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can't remember it. After the liturgy, after partaking of the Eucharist, I

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remembered it, and I'm like,
I got it, And I tell him,

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my subdeacon, and he was just
like probably thought I was like super

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nerdy, and I'm like, so
if you remember I called you because I

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don't know, like this is part
of my introspection. I'm like, what

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if this is totally nonsense, and
I think, oh, this is so

235
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great. I got it from a
dream and this totally makes sense. So

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i'd called you and some other people
and I told you about this argument between

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this kind of circularity between first and
second order knowledge in terms of autonomous epistemology,

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and both you and other people said, I think it's a really good

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argument, and so that I kind
of put it in there and refined it

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in the paper. So that was
another motivation behind the paper too, which

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is really interesting. All right,
so's le's get into the paper, like

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what's so you lay out the introductory
paragraph where you're talking about how you want

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to present a theonomous epistemology or revelatory
theism account for knowledge versus autonomous epistemology,

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utilizing this first order second order tiered
approach, and then you argue that the

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giving account for second order statements in
terms of the existence of knowledge reveals a

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unique epistemic problem that requires justification for
the second order. And then the conclusion

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is that of your argument is that
only really theism is capable of grounding a

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solution or giving a solution to the
necessary conditions for the possibility of knowledge.

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Yeah, so what I want to
do, there's two things that I did

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in this paper is to put in
onto a two disjunct And what that means

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is in a bunch of Malpass's asses, I call them these alkoli asses that

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kind of pseudo intellectuals that just kind
of parrot these arguments that they get from

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Malpass, and I put this in
my paper. They're presenting an argument from

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Malpass that basically when I present the
orthodox version of tag and one of the

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arguments that I used to kind of
pedagogically illustrate what's kind of behind all of

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this is the disjunctive argument. And
so Malpass had this argument that you know,

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either it's not a true just junk, meaning there could be other options

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like for example, you're iding or
eating a peanut butter and Joe sandwich or

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a steak. Well, that means
a true just junk. It's not either

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a arb but a or not a
And then we'll get into this later.

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They have their own criticism of that, but I really do want to put

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it into a true dichotomy within the
disjunt, and so it's going to be

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either autonomous or theonomous. There can't
be any third option. And then what

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I do is I take the autonomous
project and I look, okay, what

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is epistemically more than just epistemically problematic
but devastating self refuting. And in this

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section I think I had titled it
the failure of autonomous pistemology. There's two

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main arguments that I develop in here. That's the putting your epistemological horse before

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your metaphysical cart argument, which you
know that I had already kind of developed

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that before the writing the paper,
and then the first and second order,

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which I had kind of a version
of that I actually did something. I

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refined it and did something different here, partly in base two, not only

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on my dream, but objections that
I heard that where people thought that I

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was simply just kind of recashing,
rehashing the Chisholm problem, and so I

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had to kind of make it more
clear that it's like, it's similar,

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you know, in so far as
a dialectical kind of tension and circularity,

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but it's it's fundamentally different, so
that no answers to Chisholm's criterion problem are

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going to transfer over and answer the
argument that I'm making. But just let

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00:27:48,480 --> 00:27:53,440
me restate. Those are the two
main arguments of the failure of the autonomous

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epistemology, putting your epistemic course before
your metaphysical cart and circularity epistemic bootstrapping that

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arises from the dialectical tension but between
the first and second order knowledge. And

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we can go over those, but
if you well, one question before that

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is why are you Why are you
saying a dialectical tension between first and second

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order? Excuse me? I meant
the dialectical tension was between the the metaphysics

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and epistemology. I guess the first
I'm not calling it into question, I'm

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00:28:45,480 --> 00:28:49,519
just could you flesh that out for
me and the audience. So the dialectical

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tension between and I guess there is
a dialectical tension between the first and second

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00:28:56,839 --> 00:29:03,319
and it's something similar to the the
epistemological and metaphysical. Right, So die

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two Right, I have two categories. And with the epistemological metaphysical again,

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the metaphysics, we would say the
way the universe is in the ontology determines

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what if we know anything at all
and how. But then I have all

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these different metaphysical accounts. So then
what I have to do is what's contingent

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upon metaphysics has to be placed prior
to metaphysics so that I can actually determine

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I know, before I could even
know what metaphysical account is, so that

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I can then justify my my epistemology. So what I'm doing is an unjustified

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move. I'm going, let's just
pretend that's not the case, and like,

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let's put this over here and just
remember what I always say, grant

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00:29:57,039 --> 00:30:03,920
me all my assumptions so that I
can and then pretend to justify my pistemologics.

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So what we see is I can't
get to this without this, but

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I have to put this to figure
out this. Right. So there's there's

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two things that are kind of the
intension that can't kind of resolve each other.

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They both seem to kind of be
dependent on each other. But because

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they're divided in this kind of dialectical
tension, I can't actually solve the problem

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00:30:33,039 --> 00:30:37,759
or accomplish a task that I set
out to actually do in any of the

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philosophy or epistemology that I'm trying to
do. Likewise, with the first and

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00:30:44,000 --> 00:30:52,039
second order, I have what two
categories. With the first order, John

306
00:30:52,200 --> 00:30:59,880
knows the dog's brown, right,
and then our claims that John knows that

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00:31:00,039 --> 00:31:04,160
a dog is brown, or that
knowledge exists. Now, clearly I couldn't

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00:31:04,160 --> 00:31:11,559
make the second claim order claim unless
the first order were true. But what's

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00:31:11,599 --> 00:31:18,559
the problem. I'm always making second
order claims about the first so it's well,

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yeah, obviously I've got to provide
justification. So what grant me all

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00:31:22,799 --> 00:31:30,799
my assumptions about first order, so
that can make all my statements about my

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second order that John knows knowledge exists. Basically everything everybody would ever put in

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00:31:36,640 --> 00:31:40,920
a chat. All the objections that
we're getting are all second order. They're

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00:31:40,920 --> 00:31:45,200
all making epistemic claims, which is
different than a person being in the state

315
00:31:45,240 --> 00:31:51,440
of knowledge. Is very different than
somebody actually making claims. So again we

316
00:31:51,519 --> 00:31:56,759
have this kind of tension between two
categories. I can't get number two without

317
00:31:56,880 --> 00:32:02,119
number one, but I'm always in
number two, so I assume and bootstrap

318
00:32:04,119 --> 00:32:13,480
unjustifiably, so category one to arbitrarily
and unjustifiably try to justify, and that

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00:32:13,599 --> 00:32:20,440
and that's similar to the criterion problem. Move right, it's similar to yeah,

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00:32:20,720 --> 00:32:23,720
but it's not identical because the criterion
problem, he'll be like, people

321
00:32:23,720 --> 00:32:28,119
will be like, well, you
start off with a methodology and blah blah

322
00:32:28,160 --> 00:32:34,440
blah. But this is more of
a fundamental problem. I'm sure once you

323
00:32:34,599 --> 00:32:42,559
grasp the the circularity, the vicious
circularity, and dialectical tension between the first

324
00:32:42,559 --> 00:32:49,400
and second order, and realize I'm
always in second order from an autonomous position

325
00:32:50,079 --> 00:32:58,799
starting point, I can never I
can never get the one, and so

326
00:32:59,440 --> 00:33:06,039
thus have to get to one in
order to established to level Yeah, and

327
00:33:06,119 --> 00:33:12,599
so the conditions for the possibility of
knowledge are a level two type of statement.

328
00:33:13,079 --> 00:33:16,599
But but they're also a level one
statement, and so that thus the

329
00:33:16,640 --> 00:33:24,599
dilemma. Yeah, so I have
this. I tried to put it into

330
00:33:24,640 --> 00:33:29,720
some easy premises. If it's true
that knowledge exists first order, then our

331
00:33:29,759 --> 00:33:38,400
beliefs are statements that knowledge exists is
also true? Why because one is constitutive

332
00:33:38,880 --> 00:33:44,960
for two. So there's some people
in the audience still before you go to

333
00:33:44,960 --> 00:33:47,440
this hold on, people are still
kind of wanting to understand. Again,

334
00:33:47,519 --> 00:33:52,880
First we don't get this point.
Then we're talking past everybody so again,

335
00:33:52,920 --> 00:34:00,480
help help me with some examples.
Yeah, let's assume a kind of standard

336
00:34:00,519 --> 00:34:05,039
with the possibility given gettier that there
could be a fourth condition, but at

337
00:34:05,119 --> 00:34:15,639
least knowledge requires a belief, a
believer who believes as a true belief that's

338
00:34:16,039 --> 00:34:19,920
for the right reasons, i e. Justified. So a true, justified

339
00:34:19,920 --> 00:34:23,280
belief, with the caveat that perhaps
there could be a fourth condition or something.

340
00:34:24,239 --> 00:34:36,840
All right, So that means,
let's say John is believe something about

341
00:34:36,960 --> 00:34:43,039
an apple. The apple is there's
two apples in front of me, or

342
00:34:43,039 --> 00:34:50,519
something like that. Now he doesn't
guess he actually has a reliable let's say,

343
00:34:50,679 --> 00:34:55,039
mechanism, his faculties, whatever.
I'll give it whatever you guys want.

344
00:34:55,920 --> 00:35:01,320
Let's say we agree it's possible that
John not only has a true belief,

345
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but he arrives at it for the
right reasons. Okay. Anybody can

346
00:35:07,559 --> 00:35:10,639
do that, regardless of whether they're
an atheist or not. We would say

347
00:35:10,639 --> 00:35:15,440
that's possible. Okay, So that
would be a first order. John knows

348
00:35:15,519 --> 00:35:23,199
there's two apples in front of him. Okay, it's different to say,

349
00:35:24,639 --> 00:35:35,559
it's a different claim to say that
John knows that he knows. John might

350
00:35:35,599 --> 00:35:39,639
have knowledge. There's two apples.
This came up when I was an undergraduate.

351
00:35:44,280 --> 00:35:51,039
We were doing the Pythagorean proof in
Euclid, and a professor asked me,

352
00:35:53,880 --> 00:35:57,440
almost kind of a second order question, what do you think of a

353
00:35:57,480 --> 00:36:05,639
student doesn't actually know the proof right
or know that they know. Do you

354
00:36:05,679 --> 00:36:08,360
think that they don't know the A
square plus B squared equals C square.

355
00:36:10,199 --> 00:36:15,440
So what I would say now is
that, well, if they came to

356
00:36:15,559 --> 00:36:23,800
the the belief that A squared basically
the sides the area on the sides of

357
00:36:23,840 --> 00:36:30,159
a right angled triangle is equal to
the area on the hypot news for the

358
00:36:30,239 --> 00:36:36,519
right reasons, I don't think they
would have to know that they know that

359
00:36:36,639 --> 00:36:43,199
as long as they were justified.
So again, on all the literature on

360
00:36:43,239 --> 00:36:47,840
epistemology, everybody says you could know
something without knowing that you know it.

361
00:36:49,239 --> 00:36:57,840
Does that make sense? That's the
first thing we have to grasp something,

362
00:36:57,920 --> 00:37:00,840
or stated knowledge doesn't mean that you
know that you're in a state of knowledge.

363
00:37:00,920 --> 00:37:05,480
Yeah. So basically, imagine audience, I'm looking at the pen and

364
00:37:05,519 --> 00:37:09,920
it's just the pen is blue.
That's level one. Then the higher order

365
00:37:09,960 --> 00:37:15,639
thinking is it's an abstracted, higher
level way of viewing it, Jay knows

366
00:37:15,679 --> 00:37:22,360
that the pen is blue. Is
that good? Yeah? Yeah, exactly,

367
00:37:24,159 --> 00:37:30,960
because otherwise it would be way too
stringent if we said that knowledge is

368
00:37:30,960 --> 00:37:39,679
a sufficient condition for second order knowledge. I mean, it's just obviously not

369
00:37:39,719 --> 00:37:45,159
true. I think there's many cases
where we make that people probably know stuff

370
00:37:45,400 --> 00:37:49,760
and they don't know why that they
know it. But yeah, as father

371
00:37:49,840 --> 00:37:53,559
Degan pointed out, like the second
statement here, the higher order statement is

372
00:37:53,599 --> 00:37:58,679
also a statement of knowledge, right, But it's a higher order statement of

373
00:37:58,719 --> 00:38:00,400
knowledge, and so this is what
you're saying. They're sort of reciprocal,

374
00:38:01,159 --> 00:38:07,199
right in that this one might also
lead to this one, but this one

375
00:38:07,280 --> 00:38:12,480
rests on also being a level one
type of statement. So the point is

376
00:38:12,519 --> 00:38:15,920
that a person who recognizes this is
then in a kind of a dilemma.

377
00:38:16,039 --> 00:38:19,920
And this is the dilemma that we're
pointing out that pretty much all the atheists

378
00:38:20,079 --> 00:38:25,119
end up in when encountering TAG.
They typically respond to TAG as if every

379
00:38:25,199 --> 00:38:30,079
proposition, every argument, every statement
is just a level one statement and never

380
00:38:30,199 --> 00:38:37,000
addressing the meta or the second order
type of reasoning, and thus they never

381
00:38:37,400 --> 00:38:39,639
typically get the argument until we really, you know, flesh it out or

382
00:38:39,639 --> 00:38:44,719
hash it out after a while,
so anyway, and that's why that's what

383
00:38:44,760 --> 00:38:47,880
happened in my dream is that,
Yeah, I'm reading through all this literature

384
00:38:47,880 --> 00:38:52,119
where it's like, this is first
order logic, this is second order logic

385
00:38:52,320 --> 00:38:58,679
and epistemology, this is a first
order knowledge. John knows there's a blue

386
00:38:58,679 --> 00:39:01,880
pen in front him, and John
knowing that he knows as a blue pant

387
00:39:02,039 --> 00:39:07,440
is. They're making all these distinctions. And then in the dream it dawned

388
00:39:07,480 --> 00:39:14,679
on me that I'm like, yeah, but you're talking about you're making claims

389
00:39:14,679 --> 00:39:19,400
about all this stuff, like what
order do I put that in? And

390
00:39:19,400 --> 00:39:23,639
I'm like, that's always second order. You're always at the second level,

391
00:39:23,639 --> 00:39:29,920
at the higher level. You're making
claims about knowledge about John, about first

392
00:39:30,119 --> 00:39:32,400
order. And then in my dream
it started around like, I don't think

393
00:39:32,400 --> 00:39:37,119
you can ever get out of the
second order. We're always at this kind

394
00:39:37,119 --> 00:39:42,800
of meta level making claims about assuming
what we want to prove that knowledge exists,

395
00:39:42,840 --> 00:39:47,960
because that could only make those claims
if knowledge actually exist, which is

396
00:39:49,000 --> 00:39:52,719
the heart of the paper and the
heart of the matter. Right, how

397
00:39:52,760 --> 00:39:58,320
do we determine how do we know
that knowledge exists? And let's just run

398
00:39:58,360 --> 00:40:01,079
through in our heads, right,
Now that's not a level one statement.

399
00:40:01,119 --> 00:40:04,760
I mean, or it is a
level one statement, but it's also it's

400
00:40:04,760 --> 00:40:07,400
a both, and it's a level
one and a level two statement. Right

401
00:40:07,440 --> 00:40:12,719
that there that knowledge exists, I
would say it's a level it's a second

402
00:40:12,840 --> 00:40:15,199
order. That's my point about the
first order. Well, but I'm but

403
00:40:15,639 --> 00:40:20,960
you were making the point that every
second order statement is also a first order

404
00:40:21,000 --> 00:40:25,960
statement, right at the same time, No, no, that's not the

405
00:40:27,119 --> 00:40:31,599
argument is all of our statements are
second order, and concerning epistemology, there's

406
00:40:31,639 --> 00:40:37,079
second order about the first order.
But I can't have my second order be

407
00:40:37,199 --> 00:40:43,280
true or justified unless my first order. That's what That's what I mean to

408
00:40:43,360 --> 00:40:46,519
say. So how do I So
here's the question to everybody in the audience

409
00:40:46,559 --> 00:40:54,639
and every atheist, how do I
justify first order claims? I mean first

410
00:40:54,760 --> 00:41:04,320
order knowledge? Another word? How
do I justify that knowledge exists or reason?

411
00:41:06,480 --> 00:41:08,800
And what are like let's go over
what would the possible answers people could

412
00:41:08,800 --> 00:41:15,000
give. Well, and I'm not
trying to be ob to, but I'm

413
00:41:15,039 --> 00:41:20,760
trying to understand because how is it
not the case that the second order statement

414
00:41:20,840 --> 00:41:25,400
isn't also a knowledge claim? Isn't
it. Yes, So that's the whole

415
00:41:25,400 --> 00:41:30,559
point, right. It's a knowledge
claim only, and it can only be

416
00:41:30,719 --> 00:41:37,039
true if knowledge exists. So it
gets us back to number one, how

417
00:41:37,079 --> 00:41:40,639
do we know knowledge exists? And
guess what they're going to say, Well,

418
00:41:40,639 --> 00:41:45,920
if knowledge exists, then knowledge exists, right, I know, I

419
00:41:45,960 --> 00:41:52,840
understand, But but isn't the second
order statement also still just a knowledge claim?

420
00:41:52,519 --> 00:41:58,519
Yes, but it's a knowledge claim
about the it's self referential about the

421
00:41:58,599 --> 00:42:01,400
subject itself, and it's having of
the knowledge. Okay, but it's still

422
00:42:01,440 --> 00:42:07,039
a knowledge plant. Yeah, that's
a good way to put it. The

423
00:42:07,159 --> 00:42:15,079
content and subjects not different. It's
in both cases first order and second order,

424
00:42:15,239 --> 00:42:24,079
the content subjects the same. It's
knowledge. Yes. So if somebody

425
00:42:24,119 --> 00:42:29,199
had brought up an objection that,
well, I don't need to justify the

426
00:42:29,239 --> 00:42:32,119
two because it's the same content as
the second order because it's the same content.

427
00:42:35,199 --> 00:42:38,280
But like, you're missing the point
entirely. My questions about how do

428
00:42:38,320 --> 00:42:43,679
we justify number one? I know
it's the same content, we're talking about

429
00:42:43,719 --> 00:42:49,199
the same subject knowledge. I'm trying
to figure out how from autonomous reasoning you're

430
00:42:49,239 --> 00:42:58,079
ever going to be able to establish
without vicious circularity or bootstrapping that knowledge exists,

431
00:42:58,239 --> 00:43:01,800
especially when you're always assuming what you
want to prove. So basically,

432
00:43:01,880 --> 00:43:06,760
second order statements are that while making
a knowledge claim, and I'm assuming that

433
00:43:06,840 --> 00:43:08,960
knowledge exists because I'm talking, Yeah
that's what I'm That's what I was getting

434
00:43:08,960 --> 00:43:12,039
at. Yeah, that's what I
meant. So in other words, it's

435
00:43:12,039 --> 00:43:15,760
still it's not answering the question to
say that, well, it's a higher

436
00:43:15,880 --> 00:43:22,239
order statement, but it's still just
a claim about you know, the subject

437
00:43:22,239 --> 00:43:25,880
of knowledge or the subject in the
sense of the agent having the knowledge.

438
00:43:27,480 --> 00:43:31,280
So but that doesn't get you to
justification, is your point. It's that's

439
00:43:31,360 --> 00:43:36,760
just that's just kicking the can down
the road exactly. And somebody said,

440
00:43:37,280 --> 00:43:43,079
well, because it's the same content, right, the second order statements don't

441
00:43:43,159 --> 00:43:47,239
need a different sort of justification,
and I grant that, I'd be like,

442
00:43:47,400 --> 00:43:53,199
that's fine, I'm just looking for
a justification for knowledge. Like So,

443
00:43:53,679 --> 00:44:00,000
what they don't realize is this was
a really sophisticated kind of amological way

444
00:44:00,039 --> 00:44:06,400
of basically saying what we always say, just grant me all my assumptions so

445
00:44:06,440 --> 00:44:09,199
I can make my case and prove
to you that my made up story is

446
00:44:09,239 --> 00:44:12,559
true. Okay, So I have
a question here, and this is something

447
00:44:12,800 --> 00:44:19,800
I don't understand. So are you
saying that there's this inherent problem in epistemology

448
00:44:20,159 --> 00:44:24,719
just from first and second order statements
about justification, or are you saying that

449
00:44:25,239 --> 00:44:32,639
TAG is like this move from one
to two. I'm saying epistemology has the

450
00:44:32,679 --> 00:44:39,519
problem that's illustrated between one and two
that nobody seems okay, So you're not

451
00:44:39,800 --> 00:44:45,920
likening the transnal categoriess the possibility knowledge
to the level too. I thought that's

452
00:44:45,920 --> 00:44:50,119
what you were doing. Oh that
is that certainly is so? For example,

453
00:44:52,079 --> 00:45:00,679
because the orthodox tag admits the possibility
that people can have first story knowledge

454
00:45:00,800 --> 00:45:07,960
without preposing and the question is how
do you ground or count it? What

455
00:45:08,079 --> 00:45:15,239
world views or positions, possible positions
could actually account or justify that knowledge exists.

456
00:45:15,599 --> 00:45:17,400
Now that's a second order. And
what I'm going to show in this

457
00:45:17,440 --> 00:45:22,239
paper is that, yeah, tag's
dealing with the second order. So because

458
00:45:22,280 --> 00:45:28,199
it's admitting, sure, you could
know stuff, but you can never actually,

459
00:45:28,920 --> 00:45:34,079
from your position make a statement,
an epistemic statement, the claim that

460
00:45:34,159 --> 00:45:37,320
you that knowledge exists or that you're
in a state of knowledge. Why,

461
00:45:37,360 --> 00:45:44,599
because you'll assume the exact thing that
you want to prove. So put in

462
00:45:44,639 --> 00:45:51,599
the dichotomy, then we see one
who is in a radically different kind of

463
00:45:51,639 --> 00:45:53,360
category. Because what I started thinking
through is like, well, why is

464
00:45:53,400 --> 00:46:00,079
this even happening? Why is it
the autonomous man can't get out of this

465
00:46:00,119 --> 00:46:08,800
epistemic quagmire? And again, the
very notion of dialectical tension seems to be

466
00:46:08,840 --> 00:46:15,679
something to do with finitude, right, Finite means abounded, and so you

467
00:46:15,719 --> 00:46:21,400
have these categories of well I would
say I would say it deals more so

468
00:46:21,480 --> 00:46:30,480
with the fall rather than than natural
nature infinitude, because the way Maximus talks

469
00:46:30,519 --> 00:46:37,320
about the I mean, I wouldn't
say there's any dialectical tension that's natural or

470
00:46:37,440 --> 00:46:43,760
in terms of the world. It's
just you're probably right because it's just a

471
00:46:43,760 --> 00:46:51,440
result of a division. In fact, you have division and time. This

472
00:46:51,519 --> 00:46:57,039
is where you get chronology. I
would have to disagree there, but we

473
00:46:57,079 --> 00:47:00,719
don't have to go into that.
But that's a whole lot of meta metaphysical

474
00:47:00,719 --> 00:47:05,719
topic. But I mean, do
you think that there's a question here in

475
00:47:05,719 --> 00:47:08,599
then I don't mean like kind of
like absolute unity or anything like this,

476
00:47:08,719 --> 00:47:14,800
but there's kind of thing where things
are broken and they're not tied together.

477
00:47:15,000 --> 00:47:19,880
Do you see what I'm saying.
Yeah, dialectical tension as a result of

478
00:47:19,920 --> 00:47:24,239
the fall is the you know,
the result of like the way things are

479
00:47:24,239 --> 00:47:30,400
structured now in terms of all the
problems in the world are a result of

480
00:47:30,440 --> 00:47:34,599
the fall, but they're not anything
to do with like nature. They're the

481
00:47:34,639 --> 00:47:39,920
corruption of nature anyway, there's a
question that is but I still think there's

482
00:47:39,920 --> 00:47:49,119
something to do with that, both
the fall and probably the finitude. So

483
00:47:49,159 --> 00:47:54,719
that if you took if you took
finite categories, you can't absoluteize them,

484
00:47:54,840 --> 00:48:02,119
right Why Because they're created. They're
not all encompassing. In other words,

485
00:48:02,639 --> 00:48:06,960
none of the things that we take
right, all of which may be true,

486
00:48:07,079 --> 00:48:14,679
good and beautiful, we can't take
those of the created things and absoluteize

487
00:48:14,719 --> 00:48:19,480
them, which is basically what philosophy
is actually doing. Right. It's taking

488
00:48:19,519 --> 00:48:23,159
something good, just like every heresy, something true, and it's taken out

489
00:48:23,199 --> 00:48:29,480
of its proper context, right,
And it's elevating this to the level of

490
00:48:30,320 --> 00:48:37,159
being an absolute rather than something that's
contingent upon. And I think this is

491
00:48:37,199 --> 00:48:40,519
the problem of why these problems can't
be resolved. Yeah, but time is

492
00:48:40,519 --> 00:48:45,360
a creation, so I just wouldn't
locate dialectical tensions within time or the created

493
00:48:45,480 --> 00:48:50,559
order itself. It's a result of
the fault because time is a is a

494
00:48:51,280 --> 00:48:53,400
there's the aon, which is the
eternal, timeless creation of God. So

495
00:48:53,480 --> 00:48:59,920
time itself is good and it's as
Stenylis has taken up into the divine.

496
00:49:00,159 --> 00:49:02,840
I just wouldn't equate that with thing
to do with with dialectics because I was

497
00:49:04,119 --> 00:49:10,480
thin and there's a total different topic. I was actually thinking about chronos,

498
00:49:10,639 --> 00:49:17,039
not aon or Cairos like possibly could
be a product of the fall. I

499
00:49:17,360 --> 00:49:24,679
don't think chronological time being lifted up
and healed. Yeah, but that's because

500
00:49:24,719 --> 00:49:29,639
of the like, it's not time
itself. That's that's fallen, like the

501
00:49:29,679 --> 00:49:38,079
fall into time. Something specifically about
chronology that might be that might be fallen,

502
00:49:38,159 --> 00:49:43,719
but not time itself. Yeah,
I don't think time itself. Well,

503
00:49:43,760 --> 00:49:45,280
this is this is This is a
different discussion. I don't mean to

504
00:49:45,280 --> 00:49:49,119
get off the try, but there
is a great question by a person in

505
00:49:49,159 --> 00:49:53,679
the audience I would like you to
address. Chroderick says, is what you're

506
00:49:53,719 --> 00:49:59,880
saying. Father Deacon Germane to the
discussion with Malpass, where Malpass objected to

507
00:50:00,159 --> 00:50:07,119
necessary preconditions of intelligibility by saying that
he lacks a belief in them, yet

508
00:50:07,159 --> 00:50:15,840
his sense of intelligibility is still held. Well, I think this is why

509
00:50:15,920 --> 00:50:20,159
the first and second order comes in, because one of the things that I

510
00:50:20,280 --> 00:50:22,920
noticed that atheists we're saying, was
well, I don't have a worldview.

511
00:50:25,280 --> 00:50:30,960
Have you noticed this? A yeah, they'll they'll oftentimes say, oh,

512
00:50:30,000 --> 00:50:32,719
I have actually no position, and
that allows them to sort of slip and

513
00:50:32,760 --> 00:50:37,880
slide into different positions. And so
what I realized, I'm like, well,

514
00:50:37,880 --> 00:50:43,159
those are second order claims about your
position, right, Like you never

515
00:50:43,239 --> 00:50:45,199
get out of the problem, you
just move it up to a higher order.

516
00:50:45,239 --> 00:50:49,920
But yeah, this guy says his
next statement is is a malpass,

517
00:50:49,960 --> 00:50:54,280
perhaps conflating whether or not he has
sense to a proposition with it being true

518
00:50:54,400 --> 00:50:59,920
or not right, like a kind
of like fallacy of incredulity, Like well,

519
00:51:00,079 --> 00:51:01,280
I just don't see how it could
be, so you know, I

520
00:51:01,280 --> 00:51:08,679
don't believe in it. So yeah, exactly, But again, there's no

521
00:51:08,760 --> 00:51:15,599
way out of it in two senses. I point this out in my paper.

522
00:51:15,599 --> 00:51:21,280
There's nobody that's positionless, right or
presuppositionless, So we can just move

523
00:51:21,280 --> 00:51:27,400
it up to higher orders. You're
making a whole bunch of epistemic claims about

524
00:51:27,840 --> 00:51:30,320
that. You're understanding my paper,
you understanding what the argument is that,

525
00:51:30,320 --> 00:51:39,960
you're understanding what your agnostic position,
that I'm not taking a position, all

526
00:51:40,039 --> 00:51:44,719
the various things that even go into
that, right. I mean it's almost

527
00:51:44,760 --> 00:51:49,639
kind of reminiscent of like Descartes,
right where they think they actually get to

528
00:51:49,960 --> 00:51:57,960
this kind of foundational like what can
make this agnostic claim and you see this

529
00:51:58,039 --> 00:52:01,480
doesn't depend on making any other commitments
to anything. It's like all you have

530
00:52:01,519 --> 00:52:07,400
to show them it is that It's
like that's impossible. Like the cojito assumes

531
00:52:07,440 --> 00:52:12,760
a whole host of different things.
So I'd say there's a similarity there that

532
00:52:13,679 --> 00:52:22,559
with this kind of incredulity agnostic position, Right, they don't get out of

533
00:52:22,559 --> 00:52:25,159
the problem because it's like, yeah, but you just you have a whole

534
00:52:25,159 --> 00:52:32,480
host of epistemic presuppositions and commitments just
even with that. Yeah, it's almost

535
00:52:32,480 --> 00:52:36,719
just a way of it. It's
like another way of saying, I choose

536
00:52:36,760 --> 00:52:40,119
not to address this problem and so
it's not there basically. Yeah, Second

537
00:52:40,119 --> 00:52:45,440
of all, it doesn't matter because
as soon as I put it into the

538
00:52:45,559 --> 00:52:53,119
dialectical tension. If you don't assume
the necessary condition for the possibility of knowledge

539
00:52:53,280 --> 00:53:05,559
is truly put into the disjunct between
if you don't accept purposeful intentionalism theistic revelation.

540
00:53:06,000 --> 00:53:14,239
If you don't accept that, then
whether you assent to atheism or accidentalism,

541
00:53:14,320 --> 00:53:17,880
you're or saying it's possible. Because
notice that's the way that I define

542
00:53:17,920 --> 00:53:25,199
autonomous epistemology. Autonomous pistemology is the
thumistic system too. Why even though he

543
00:53:25,280 --> 00:53:30,960
believes in God and then ultimately God
grounds everything, including knowledge, does a

544
00:53:31,079 --> 00:53:44,159
quitness not start with the assumption that
it's possible to account for reasoning deduction inferences

545
00:53:44,760 --> 00:53:46,960
even if God might not exist,
and then it just turns out we find

546
00:53:46,960 --> 00:53:53,400
out he exists later. No,
there's an element of irrationality in the tonistic

547
00:53:53,480 --> 00:54:00,639
scheme for sure, which is ironic
because it's a highly rational That's what natural

548
00:54:00,679 --> 00:54:04,800
theology is, what the mind,
by the natural light of reason, can

549
00:54:06,400 --> 00:54:13,079
know, apart from divine revelation,
which is insane. It's totally blasphemous from

550
00:54:13,079 --> 00:54:17,119
our position. So anyways, regardless
of whether you're an atheist or not,

551
00:54:17,400 --> 00:54:22,039
if you do not assent because it's
in the radical disjunk. It's almost kind

552
00:54:22,039 --> 00:54:27,480
of like Pascal's wager right in the
sense that you must wager to not wager

553
00:54:27,559 --> 00:54:35,480
is to wager right. The radical
disjunk is actually like that. If you

554
00:54:35,800 --> 00:54:39,639
even think that's a possibility, which
is what a gnosticism would suggest, you're

555
00:54:39,679 --> 00:54:45,840
an accidentalism. Yeah, so it
doesn't matter what Malpass's arguments are. He's

556
00:54:45,920 --> 00:54:50,760
in the accidentalism and accidental as a
defeat for the possibility of knowledge. Hold

557
00:54:50,800 --> 00:54:55,079
On and I agree that accidentalism destroys
the possibility of knowledge. But there is

558
00:54:55,119 --> 00:55:00,400
a question by Colby who says,
the deacon, it appears that you are

559
00:55:00,400 --> 00:55:06,199
presupposing the thing that you want to
demonstrate. You're positing that there's a realist

560
00:55:06,280 --> 00:55:10,760
account for knowledge, realist towards knowledge, he says, but the atheist or

561
00:55:10,760 --> 00:55:15,719
the pragmatist does not grant any kind
of realist position. I assume he means

562
00:55:15,880 --> 00:55:22,519
realism in the sense of h No. I think he means like in this

563
00:55:22,599 --> 00:55:30,519
sense of like I just went blank
on the account of objects external to you,

564
00:55:31,400 --> 00:55:36,480
uh, in terms of ontology,
like you're like, you're really not

565
00:55:36,519 --> 00:55:40,400
necessarily essences, but there are there's
a there's real objects that you're apprehending through

566
00:55:40,480 --> 00:55:46,039
your sense data. Colby, do
you want to qualify in what's because real

567
00:55:46,480 --> 00:55:50,960
realist is used in different senses and
history philosophy, so you want to qualify

568
00:55:51,000 --> 00:55:53,480
in what sense you're using it?
Go ahead, a realist account of like

569
00:55:54,159 --> 00:55:59,760
indirect realism and direct realism in the
sense of of of Enlightenment debates. As

570
00:55:59,760 --> 00:56:04,079
I think what he's talking about,
I don't think so, I think I

571
00:56:04,079 --> 00:56:08,199
get what he's saying. Why because
this is a more fundamental that's getting into

572
00:56:08,440 --> 00:56:16,239
the kind of details I feel like
i'm the c I do. So let

573
00:56:16,280 --> 00:56:20,639
me let me ask Colby, do
you mean realism in the sense of essence

574
00:56:20,639 --> 00:56:22,800
as being real ontological metaphysical things,
or do you mean realism the sense of

575
00:56:22,800 --> 00:56:29,440
the Enlightenment debate about whether we apprehend
things directly or indirectly in the external world.

576
00:56:30,880 --> 00:56:34,480
So I see what he's saying.
He's a scriment ontology to knowledge.

577
00:56:34,760 --> 00:56:39,800
The atheist defines knowledge simply as a
system of thoughts. That yeah, well,

578
00:56:39,840 --> 00:56:46,159
first of all, that doesn't make
any sense. Nobody's we're all saying

579
00:56:46,199 --> 00:56:53,920
that knowledge is a property of the
mind, right, So in other words,

580
00:56:53,920 --> 00:56:58,480
you could make the same arguments with
a metaphysically quiet approach, right,

581
00:56:58,599 --> 00:57:04,559
like your approach here is not necessitating
epistemal This is prior to any of the

582
00:57:04,639 --> 00:57:08,119
details of those kinds exactly, So
it doesn't any of this is a great

583
00:57:08,159 --> 00:57:12,400
point we got we got to address, and I thank you for a pointing

584
00:57:12,440 --> 00:57:15,679
that out, Father Deacon, which
is this was your point you made earlier

585
00:57:15,719 --> 00:57:17,760
in than we got sidetrack to apologized
for that. That was probably my fault.

586
00:57:19,039 --> 00:57:24,039
You made the point that what we're
addressing here is the Enlightenment objection to

587
00:57:24,119 --> 00:57:30,480
metaphysics, which is that you can't
put your metaphysical cart before your epistemic horse.

588
00:57:30,559 --> 00:57:34,719
And that's what Father Diagon's pointing out. So Father Deagan's argument is not

589
00:57:34,880 --> 00:57:40,320
relying on any grandiose metaphysics. He's
actually critiquing the ancient and medieval idea like

590
00:57:40,400 --> 00:57:47,719
natural theology and Aquinas has that metaphysics
is somehow self evident and epistemology is secondary

591
00:57:47,760 --> 00:57:52,039
to that. No, Rather,
we're agreeing in saying, yes, how

592
00:57:52,039 --> 00:57:54,880
do you know that you know before
you start telling me about all these metaphysical

593
00:57:54,880 --> 00:58:00,360
claims. Yeah, exactly. And
in fact, the way that I usually

594
00:58:00,400 --> 00:58:07,400
do my arguments is I grant take
whatever definition of knowledge and justification you want.

595
00:58:07,559 --> 00:58:15,760
Why because it's such a general and
what's the term I want? These

596
00:58:15,760 --> 00:58:23,199
are such general and more fundamental questions. They proceed the kind of more detailed

597
00:58:23,320 --> 00:58:28,679
questions about like how to cash all
this stuff out. So all of these

598
00:58:28,840 --> 00:58:35,000
arguments actually designed to I'll give you
everything you want as far as what you

599
00:58:35,119 --> 00:58:40,679
think knowledge is, how that works, it doesn't really matter because issues and

600
00:58:40,840 --> 00:58:46,559
problems about the way that how we
would just how we would justify that whatever

601
00:58:46,599 --> 00:58:53,239
you think. Yeah, so this
is prior to This is an argument about

602
00:58:53,400 --> 00:58:59,719
arguments. It's an argument about reason
itself. Is it even possible? And

603
00:58:59,760 --> 00:59:04,559
now that's why it's prior to any
first order claim about what exists, what

604
00:59:04,599 --> 00:59:07,519
doesn't exist, what's out there,
what's not out there? Do I know

605
00:59:07,599 --> 00:59:10,519
this? Do I know? No? Redefining it to any ad hoc redefine

606
00:59:10,599 --> 00:59:14,960
is going to escape the problem.
And that's one of the things I noticed

607
00:59:14,960 --> 00:59:17,639
with all the objections, is there
a saying, well, the atheist isn't

608
00:59:17,639 --> 00:59:21,440
going to do that, Well we'll
just suit and there are all these kind

609
00:59:21,440 --> 00:59:23,880
of ad hoc rediffins. Now I'm
assuming you're going to say that the ad

610
00:59:23,920 --> 00:59:29,599
hoc redefinings don't work because they're missing
the very point, which is that that's

611
00:59:29,679 --> 00:59:34,400
just another type of knowledge claim.
And what's in question is the possibility of

612
00:59:34,480 --> 00:59:38,440
knowledge, right, yes, so
really easy. If I just say,

613
00:59:38,519 --> 00:59:45,440
I'll grant you whatever you think knowledge
is, the issue still stands. Redefine

614
00:59:45,440 --> 00:59:50,800
it however you want. The issue
is so fundamental and prior to all of

615
00:59:50,840 --> 00:59:54,519
that that it doesn't really matter.
Then there's no kind of way out of

616
00:59:54,559 --> 00:59:58,599
it. And I think that's one
of the issues too that I've noticed,

617
00:59:58,599 --> 01:00:07,239
and I put in h the final
section of the paper, missing the epistemological

618
01:00:07,280 --> 01:00:10,760
force for the epistemic trees that I'm
like, why are these people getting so

619
01:00:10,920 --> 01:00:15,280
bogged down on and being like that
it's not a true disjunctive. Well that's

620
01:00:15,360 --> 01:00:19,760
not how knowledge. What if they
just define it this way? And I'm

621
01:00:19,800 --> 01:00:24,360
like, what's going on here?
Like why are they saying this? And

622
01:00:24,400 --> 01:00:30,360
I realized they're looking at the details
and they don't see the bigger question that

623
01:00:30,599 --> 01:00:37,440
the kind of meta question that's being
asked exactly. Let's see, this is

624
01:00:37,480 --> 01:00:39,599
one of the this is one of
the great points of kant. I mean,

625
01:00:39,880 --> 01:00:43,519
I have a lot of disagreements with
Kant. But one of the great

626
01:00:43,559 --> 01:00:52,440
points of Kant is to really go
into kind of the possibilities of philosophy with

627
01:00:52,559 --> 01:00:57,360
transcendental categories. And you have this, you had it kind of positive in

628
01:00:57,400 --> 01:01:02,280
aerosols categories what the category worries are. And I disagree with Kant's move to

629
01:01:02,480 --> 01:01:08,239
ultimately make them not metaphysical. But
regardless of all that, what he's doing,

630
01:01:08,360 --> 01:01:13,000
the types of thinking that he's doing
about these types of arguments really are

631
01:01:13,079 --> 01:01:19,599
revolutionary and they're they're they're worthy of
note. And so people that do understand

632
01:01:19,679 --> 01:01:23,000
like the content, not the content
system, but the type of questions Kant

633
01:01:23,159 --> 01:01:30,239
is asking with what he has and
what he proposes with a transcendental category.

634
01:01:30,239 --> 01:01:35,519
And again we're not saying that we
agree with the content position that they're all

635
01:01:35,599 --> 01:01:39,119
psychologized or they're all just in the
mind or whatever. We're setting that question

636
01:01:39,159 --> 01:01:43,840
aside. So let's let's say we
don't have any metaphysical commitments. We're just

637
01:01:43,880 --> 01:01:47,800
taking the type of argument that a
transcen argument is about the possibilities or the

638
01:01:47,840 --> 01:01:54,039
preconditions for knowledge, and we're saying
that that is very useful here because it

639
01:01:54,159 --> 01:02:00,480
shows us that any knowledge claim that
an atheist might have the move. Very

640
01:02:00,880 --> 01:02:05,800
first move they make is assuming the
knowledge is possible. That's why the question

641
01:02:05,880 --> 01:02:08,760
is prior to the doing of any
argument or logic at all. I just

642
01:02:08,800 --> 01:02:14,840
don't understand why this guy colled me
the great thinks I'm assuming the type of

643
01:02:14,880 --> 01:02:20,360
exists. The I haven't assumed anything. I've granted. I've literally given everything

644
01:02:20,440 --> 01:02:22,880
over to the atheist. Yeah,
we could say that, Let's say let's

645
01:02:22,880 --> 01:02:27,719
say there is no metaphysics that's noble
at all. Let's just grant that there's

646
01:02:27,719 --> 01:02:31,599
no realism at all, no essences, no essentialism at all. The question

647
01:02:31,719 --> 01:02:38,559
that then is what is the account
for knowing? How is knowledge possible?

648
01:02:39,119 --> 01:02:46,840
Right? I just brought up the
metaphysical and epistemological tension because there are people

649
01:02:47,519 --> 01:02:55,039
that would admit and I still think
that the pragmatist gives a metaphysical I don't

650
01:02:55,039 --> 01:03:00,760
think there's any kind of way out
of making metaphysical claim. I mean,

651
01:03:00,800 --> 01:03:07,480
even if you think you're a metaphysical
quietess. I'm just showing that those who

652
01:03:07,519 --> 01:03:14,679
accept that would have this problem.
Now, the first and second order issue

653
01:03:15,000 --> 01:03:21,960
has nothing to do with the dialectical
tension between metaphysics and epistemology, So any

654
01:03:22,079 --> 01:03:27,760
one of those are sufficient to basically
show the flaw of I was just developing

655
01:03:27,800 --> 01:03:37,239
two sufficient arguments together, and I
wasn't making any metaphysical claims about or assuming

656
01:03:37,360 --> 01:03:40,320
or anything like that. I was
just basically taking other people's positions and be

657
01:03:40,519 --> 01:03:45,440
like, you admit, and this
is what people always get wrong about tag

658
01:03:45,239 --> 01:03:52,079
is Oh, so I have to
just arbitrarily just assume all of your presuppositions

659
01:03:52,119 --> 01:03:59,360
in order for knowledge to work.
No, that's not what we said.

660
01:03:59,760 --> 01:04:05,280
I take as far as the impossibility
of the contrary, and i'd show that

661
01:04:05,360 --> 01:04:14,199
people on their own grounds are engaged
in performative contradictions and things that might you

662
01:04:14,199 --> 01:04:21,079
yourself the rules that you arbitrarily establish. You say I require this, and

663
01:04:21,119 --> 01:04:26,039
then you do just the opposite.
So it's it's not my like, oh,

664
01:04:26,079 --> 01:04:30,559
it's my arbitrary rules of the game
here. And if it's like on

665
01:04:30,639 --> 01:04:36,760
your own account, you violate your
own principles, like your system doesn't do

666
01:04:36,920 --> 01:04:42,599
what you want it to do.
And guess what on your own admittance,

667
01:04:44,559 --> 01:04:48,519
orthodoxy does everything that you want your
paradigm or epistemology, philosophy or religion to

668
01:04:48,559 --> 01:04:55,199
do. But it doesn't do.
And I find that people really get that

669
01:04:56,280 --> 01:05:00,559
confusion. Yeah, I mean that's
that's misunderstanding that even though what we're talking

670
01:05:00,559 --> 01:05:04,960
about focuses on a couple examples,
it's still a comparison of paradigms. Right,

671
01:05:05,000 --> 01:05:10,000
If we're going to compare paradigms,
we still have to pick something within

672
01:05:10,079 --> 01:05:14,480
the paradigms, Right, the orthodox
paradigm, you have an atheist paradigm.

673
01:05:14,559 --> 01:05:17,679
The argument is just simply pointing out
that it doesn't matter which thing we pick,

674
01:05:18,280 --> 01:05:23,880
Like, if you have a belief
in if you believe that you have

675
01:05:24,480 --> 01:05:28,760
true knowledge about some object or whatever, it doesn't matter. It doesn't matter

676
01:05:28,800 --> 01:05:32,280
which object or thing we choose.
Within the worldviews, the question that Father

677
01:05:32,320 --> 01:05:38,920
Deacon is raising is always automatically there, because this is a question prior to

678
01:05:38,960 --> 01:05:43,880
any knowledge claim. And they seem
to have a really hard problem grasping that.

679
01:05:44,840 --> 01:05:47,440
And because they think that, yeah, they think that when you say

680
01:05:47,599 --> 01:05:54,159
it's a higher order type of argument, they assume that means you're importing a

681
01:05:54,159 --> 01:05:58,880
bunch of metaphysical baggage to this.
Oh, you're trying to say that the

682
01:05:58,960 --> 01:06:02,840
higher order is like universals, and
like, no, no, it doesn't

683
01:06:02,880 --> 01:06:09,920
matter what you think about metaphysics or
what I think about metaphysics is like this

684
01:06:10,079 --> 01:06:14,519
is prior to any any of those
types of claims. That's what they have

685
01:06:15,719 --> 01:06:19,800
real quick because this illustrates it too. So what was the gentleman we were

686
01:06:19,840 --> 01:06:27,360
just referring to? Colbally the great? I've heard this a million times.

687
01:06:28,000 --> 01:06:32,559
Well, the anominalists will just say
this, or the atheists won't accept right,

688
01:06:32,639 --> 01:06:40,079
they'll say this, and so your
argument doesn't work. And what they're

689
01:06:40,119 --> 01:06:45,639
missing again, they're missing epistemologic for
us, for the epistemic trees. Guess

690
01:06:45,639 --> 01:06:54,000
what those are second order claims about
pragmatism, about how they're defining truth and

691
01:06:54,079 --> 01:07:02,079
falsity and stuff like that. So
it doesn't matter. It's irrelevant to the

692
01:07:02,199 --> 01:07:11,079
question of how do you justify that? How would we possibly justify that the

693
01:07:11,199 --> 01:07:15,199
pragmatist is justified in that move to
actually say that? And I don't know

694
01:07:15,239 --> 01:07:18,320
why, Like to me, it
seems like I said, the hardest problem

695
01:07:18,679 --> 01:07:23,840
is convincing people the problems not hard
at all, but simple to me,

696
01:07:23,920 --> 01:07:29,079
that seems really simple. You're making
a bunch of epistemic claims about what counts

697
01:07:29,960 --> 01:07:33,280
as knowledge. How they'll redefine it, and I want to know how you

698
01:07:33,480 --> 01:07:40,280
justify that, and nobody can seem
to like pick up on like what that

699
01:07:40,400 --> 01:07:46,039
question even is, and like why
that's so detrimental. Well, you see

700
01:07:46,199 --> 01:07:49,840
what eventually is going to happen is
they're going to say, well, gramting

701
01:07:49,880 --> 01:07:55,599
my assumptions about pragmatism, that I
can actually redefine knowledge and all this stuff,

702
01:07:56,159 --> 01:07:59,840
and then that's what would justify my
position. So that's exactly what I'm

703
01:07:59,840 --> 01:08:04,000
trying to show in all these arguments
is that you're epistemically bootstrapping. You have

704
01:08:04,079 --> 01:08:09,800
no justification for your justification criteria.
Yeah, so let's look at look at

705
01:08:09,800 --> 01:08:13,239
this on a diagram, and this
illustrates what you're talking about. The tree

706
01:08:13,320 --> 01:08:16,399
is green. Bob knows the tree
is green. First order, second order.

707
01:08:16,720 --> 01:08:20,760
The atheist response, like Father Deacon
says, is almost always well,

708
01:08:20,800 --> 01:08:26,880
a pragmatist will just say this and
then interject whatever the pragmatist account is.

709
01:08:27,079 --> 01:08:30,960
Oh, well, a relatives will
just say this, Oh, an epistemic

710
01:08:30,039 --> 01:08:34,279
nihilist would just say this, Oh, matirosts would just say this. These

711
01:08:34,399 --> 01:08:41,520
answers are missing what the argument actually
is, because none of this is addressing

712
01:08:41,600 --> 01:08:45,199
what the challenge is it doesn't matter
what all types of things you try to

713
01:08:45,239 --> 01:08:49,039
put in there, because every time
you try to make a knowledge claim with

714
01:08:49,239 --> 01:08:54,920
one of these failed systems, pragmatist
relatives, nihilist materials, it's not going

715
01:08:55,000 --> 01:08:58,840
to give an account for how you
ground the knowledge. That's the point.

716
01:08:59,079 --> 01:09:02,920
Then watch what the they'll say that
they think this is an objection, because

717
01:09:02,960 --> 01:09:06,520
then it's the burden of proof game. Right, Well, you're seeing the

718
01:09:06,600 --> 01:09:11,920
wrong, so you're gonna have to
prove that those are all wrong. Well,

719
01:09:11,960 --> 01:09:15,840
wait a minute, on what terms? If we haven't even been able

720
01:09:15,840 --> 01:09:20,000
to get a justification for proof itself, do you see what the issue is?

721
01:09:20,880 --> 01:09:27,479
Like? Who's proof of proofs?
Do we use? Yeah? Just

722
01:09:27,560 --> 01:09:31,479
saying that, well, you can't
answer a pragmatis has an account of this,

723
01:09:32,159 --> 01:09:38,520
that's not showing that that is a
justification for knowledge. Do you know

724
01:09:38,520 --> 01:09:41,880
what it reminds me of? You
know, these weirdo creepers that you get

725
01:09:41,920 --> 01:09:45,399
calling on your Twitter space and stuff
like that, and they start toning these

726
01:09:46,319 --> 01:09:51,720
like long, weird, wild stories
about you don't understand man. Back in

727
01:09:51,880 --> 01:09:58,640
like five thousand BC, the Mesopotamians
were visited by a space force of aliens

728
01:09:58,640 --> 01:10:05,720
that set up and they tell this
whole story, and you see what the

729
01:10:05,760 --> 01:10:13,239
Tower of Babbel really was was gamatry
and confusing the people. That's why we

730
01:10:13,399 --> 01:10:17,399
have to actually any word that sounds
like another word really is that word.

731
01:10:17,760 --> 01:10:21,680
It's not a genetic fallacy that was
created. The genetic fallacy was a fallacy

732
01:10:21,760 --> 01:10:26,560
created by the elites trying to right. They have this whole story, right,

733
01:10:28,159 --> 01:10:31,560
and you're like, that's great,
wonderful storyteller. I want to know

734
01:10:31,600 --> 01:10:35,520
if it's true, and how we
determine. Isn't this exactly the question that

735
01:10:35,560 --> 01:10:43,039
Plato says, I don't. I'm
not concerned with doxa. I want so

736
01:10:43,199 --> 01:10:53,079
you opinion versus knowledge. And so
all that's happening is with a progmant will

737
01:10:53,119 --> 01:11:00,960
take like congratulation. Pragmas wrote a
non fictional progmance history. It never gets

738
01:11:00,000 --> 01:11:03,680
into the category. I'm still wondering, right, telling a story isn't what

739
01:11:03,720 --> 01:11:10,800
it means to give justification? And
right, well, what if it's possible

740
01:11:11,680 --> 01:11:17,800
that that's true? Like again,
even that it is already assuming epistemic categories.

741
01:11:18,119 --> 01:11:24,479
Yeah, so sudden suddenly the atheists
are like these creative writers where everything's

742
01:11:24,520 --> 01:11:28,720
possible. Right, if you're a
theist, nothing is possible. That's suddenly

743
01:11:28,760 --> 01:11:32,239
like when this question comes up,
anything's possible. We live in a universe

744
01:11:32,279 --> 01:11:38,640
where like metaverse multiverse were like there's
a universe where there's dragons and I'm the

745
01:11:38,720 --> 01:11:41,880
king of it, and it's like
everything. So it's like suddenly everything is

746
01:11:41,920 --> 01:11:44,840
possible, even though like nine to
nine percent of the time when the atheist

747
01:11:44,920 --> 01:11:48,079
is arguing there's nothing that's possible except
for material causation, right, like causing

748
01:11:48,119 --> 01:11:56,159
effect, like a determined scheme,
And then they think they get out of

749
01:11:56,199 --> 01:12:02,439
this, but it's like you're making
second higher order claim about possibility and about

750
01:12:02,479 --> 01:12:05,560
sentences and all this stuff. That's
why I'm like, I can't get them

751
01:12:05,600 --> 01:12:13,439
to realize they're committing and presupposing stuff
that are unjustified before they provide any justification

752
01:12:13,600 --> 01:12:17,560
for that. So if you remember
that guy am Deer came on to your

753
01:12:17,840 --> 01:12:23,600
stream and did the same thing and
then with me, and he had some

754
01:12:23,720 --> 01:12:26,520
like ideas. Oh, he was
saying something like, well, if it

755
01:12:26,560 --> 01:12:31,279
doesn't plug into the equation right into
the modal you know, structure perfectly,

756
01:12:31,359 --> 01:12:36,319
then the whole thing collapses and you
can't actually put it into a modal argument.

757
01:12:36,760 --> 01:12:40,079
Well he was saying that with you, but when he was when I

758
01:12:40,119 --> 01:12:45,359
was debating him on Patrick's stream,
he had like this kind of mystereingism possibly

759
01:12:45,520 --> 01:12:47,880
in word, what is that?
I don't know what that is. I

760
01:12:47,920 --> 01:12:54,880
don't it's I don't know. It's
an ad hoc word that like everything made

761
01:12:54,960 --> 01:13:00,520
up. No, he came up
with it was like mysterious. Yeah,

762
01:13:00,600 --> 01:13:03,760
he was like, my epistemology is
like I have to look what exactly said.

763
01:13:03,760 --> 01:13:05,439
But it was like, I mean, was he using this as like

764
01:13:05,439 --> 01:13:10,760
a hypothetical, Like well, what
if I just say my epistemology is mysteriumism

765
01:13:10,880 --> 01:13:15,279
or something. Yeah, that like
you know, we may not know what

766
01:13:15,319 --> 01:13:24,680
the justification is, but you know
it's there. And started going through all

767
01:13:24,720 --> 01:13:30,560
these like well, it's possible that
you missed, and if it's logically possible,

768
01:13:30,680 --> 01:13:36,039
then your position cannot be that it's
necessary. And again it misses the

769
01:13:36,079 --> 01:13:43,000
whole thing that it's like, now, guess what you're making third order claims

770
01:13:43,239 --> 01:13:48,399
about possibility and assassin and logic and
all this stuff. And I'm like I

771
01:13:48,520 --> 01:13:53,760
just can't get people to actually see
what the actual issue is. And that's

772
01:13:53,800 --> 01:13:58,439
the most frustrating thing. It's like, I mean, maybe I could appreciate

773
01:13:58,479 --> 01:14:01,520
this being a d D, but
it's like there's a squirrel right, hey,

774
01:14:01,520 --> 01:14:05,319
look at that over and it's like
you're just trying to direct people to

775
01:14:05,479 --> 01:14:09,479
It's like, do you not see
what I'm saying? You're making all these

776
01:14:09,520 --> 01:14:14,199
epistemic claims. How are we ever
going to justify that? And they get

777
01:14:14,199 --> 01:14:18,439
distracted down another route and another route
and it's just like I can't holmee people

778
01:14:18,479 --> 01:14:24,479
in to actually see what the problem
is. Second issue to so, in

779
01:14:24,520 --> 01:14:29,680
other words, how is any knowledge
at all possible? Is prior to any

780
01:14:29,720 --> 01:14:33,159
knowledge claim? And every time you
try to answer it you don't get out

781
01:14:33,199 --> 01:14:38,880
of the box because it's a knowledge
claim? Right too? That is that

782
01:14:38,960 --> 01:14:44,399
right? Or? Am I miscons? The second issue too that we always

783
01:14:44,439 --> 01:14:47,720
get with this too, is this, well how do we know? I

784
01:14:47,760 --> 01:14:51,520
mean it could be or this person
could just say like yeah, it's like,

785
01:14:51,560 --> 01:14:57,119
well there's there's some other justification and
uh, you know over in China

786
01:14:57,199 --> 01:15:01,439
that we don't know about that philosopher
you know, Ching Dong has developed and

787
01:15:01,479 --> 01:15:06,199
you just don't know about it.
But so how does your position, Jim

788
01:15:06,239 --> 01:15:14,439
Bob, this guy in Jim Bob's
YouTube today basically saying, what if there

789
01:15:14,479 --> 01:15:24,399
was an alien race that developed the
exact same theology is orthodox? I mean,

790
01:15:24,399 --> 01:15:26,640
would that serve as a necessary condition? And I was like, well,

791
01:15:26,680 --> 01:15:31,399
this is ridiculous. Of all,
it's just ad hoc. Number two

792
01:15:32,600 --> 01:15:39,000
logical, I mean, uh,
conceivability is not a good guide to logical

793
01:15:39,039 --> 01:15:45,199
possibility. And number three, part
of the orthodox revealed paradigm is the exclusivity

794
01:15:45,239 --> 01:15:51,159
of the paradigm. In other words, paradigm a orthodoxy says not B.

795
01:15:53,079 --> 01:15:59,600
So an alien race creates theology B
that's identically orthodoxy. You know what that

796
01:15:59,680 --> 01:16:02,640
means, be and not be.
It would also be obvious that it would

797
01:16:02,680 --> 01:16:06,720
also be obvious that the newer one
is totally cribbed from the previous too,

798
01:16:06,840 --> 01:16:12,840
So it would be it was be
an obvious fraudulent copy. Because we have

799
01:16:13,119 --> 01:16:15,680
people in the discord making this argument, like five years ago, they so

800
01:16:15,800 --> 01:16:20,560
well, I believe in the new
revelation given to me as a Viking of

801
01:16:20,600 --> 01:16:25,640
a Viking trinity that does all the
same grounding and justification of your trinity,

802
01:16:25,960 --> 01:16:28,479
except it's my Viking. And I'm
like, but that would not be the

803
01:16:28,640 --> 01:16:33,520
historic Christian Church and so evidentialism would
come into play here as well. So

804
01:16:33,800 --> 01:16:38,880
that goes back to my uh,
excuse me, evidences would come into play,

805
01:16:38,920 --> 01:16:44,720
not evidentialism. Excuse me, Yes, that's right. So anyways,

806
01:16:45,119 --> 01:16:50,279
this goes back to the disjunctive is
that, well, obviously, what is

807
01:16:50,319 --> 01:16:54,279
it that they're doing when when they're
like, well, I'm thinking of a

808
01:16:54,359 --> 01:17:00,920
possibility, I mean, what if
there's this other religion that revealed what they're

809
01:17:00,960 --> 01:17:05,079
doing is system building. Yeah,
it's like it's the it's the same thing

810
01:17:05,079 --> 01:17:10,399
when JF said, what if there
is a planet I can conceive of whether

811
01:17:10,399 --> 01:17:14,199
there's a robot and no people and
the robot runs the planet, then it's

812
01:17:14,239 --> 01:17:19,239
like suddenly creative writing is cool and
any kind of metaphysics goes right, which

813
01:17:19,319 --> 01:17:24,399
again the Christian no, no,
no, no metaphysics for you. However,

814
01:17:24,640 --> 01:17:29,600
when I do my creative writing hypotheticals, I get to imagine all possibilities.

815
01:17:30,600 --> 01:17:40,079
So they're missing again the epistemological forest
for the metal of the pistemological trees,

816
01:17:41,119 --> 01:17:47,199
because guess what they're doing. They
don't realize the radical disjunct. That's

817
01:17:47,239 --> 01:17:56,199
autonomous epistemology, and the only other
option is theonymous So all of your hypotheticals,

818
01:17:56,359 --> 01:18:02,199
all your objections will always fit into
autonomous epistemology because it's not revealed.

819
01:18:02,760 --> 01:18:11,199
I think they're just gonna go ahead
as soon as I show the failure of

820
01:18:11,840 --> 01:18:16,479
autonomous epistemology, and it will always
fail. That's why there are no objections.

821
01:18:16,800 --> 01:18:19,960
Well, at this point, they're
just gonna say, well, you're

822
01:18:20,199 --> 01:18:24,399
that is a mean that yours is
revealed. That's your claim. You just

823
01:18:24,439 --> 01:18:29,840
have another elaborately built system, and
you engaged in a system building project through

824
01:18:29,920 --> 01:18:34,079
the system of Christianity over many centuries
and millennia, and so your system building

825
01:18:34,159 --> 01:18:38,239
and you're not doing anything different than
I am. It's just that mine's more

826
01:18:38,319 --> 01:18:46,199
updated with science code or something science
was reviewed by science. Well that's why

827
01:18:46,199 --> 01:18:48,840
I look. I put a footnote
in there, and I'm like, well,

828
01:18:48,920 --> 01:18:54,479
let's just look at what the ones
that are claimed to be revealed,

829
01:18:55,920 --> 01:18:58,520
because that's the next one, right, is that, well, how does

830
01:18:58,960 --> 01:19:01,520
tag prove the Orthodox God? I'm
like, all right, so if we

831
01:19:01,640 --> 01:19:09,760
move past the okay, it couldn't
be system building autonomous epistemology, but I've

832
01:19:09,760 --> 01:19:13,600
got all these other competitors of religions
that are claiming to be revealed. I'm

833
01:19:13,640 --> 01:19:18,439
like, we could look at those. How many are there six, seven,

834
01:19:18,520 --> 01:19:30,399
eight religions that claim to be revealed
from God? And remember this is

835
01:19:30,439 --> 01:19:33,079
part of the objection to that,
Well, there could be an infinite amount

836
01:19:33,119 --> 01:19:38,960
of you know, possibilities you have
to eliminate. Well, first we could

837
01:19:38,960 --> 01:19:44,439
show that most worldviews boil down to
a few options. Ultimately with this paper

838
01:19:44,439 --> 01:19:48,319
I do is that it boils down
between accidentalism and intention. This is a

839
01:19:48,960 --> 01:19:56,159
example or of something it boiled down
to, or theonymous or autonomous. So

840
01:19:56,239 --> 01:19:59,760
let's look at theonymous autonomous. Okay, so there's a few more options that

841
01:19:59,800 --> 01:20:09,199
can consider. Telmutic, Judaism,
Islam. I don't think Buddhism claims to

842
01:20:09,239 --> 01:20:14,920
have special revelation, right, like
it's not nothing. Hinduism, yes,

843
01:20:15,800 --> 01:20:20,279
Mormonism. I mean really, guys, how many think you think there are

844
01:20:20,279 --> 01:20:27,119
ten? And then I can we
can go through and then look at their

845
01:20:27,159 --> 01:20:33,199
paradigms, right, and if they
have principles that are would make knowledge impossible,

846
01:20:33,359 --> 01:20:40,600
we can eliminate those. So again, even on other people's grounds,

847
01:20:41,119 --> 01:20:45,840
like they're kind of litimus tasks and
their standards, we'd say we fulfill it.

848
01:20:45,960 --> 01:20:47,720
We're not creating our own Hey,
in our own game, we have

849
01:20:47,840 --> 01:20:51,560
this, but you don't have it. We'd say everything that you want we

850
01:20:51,760 --> 01:20:56,479
just fulfilled, and your system none
of these systems can do. And what

851
01:20:56,680 --> 01:21:00,239
is that, Well, you certainly
want to have historical continuity, right,

852
01:21:01,000 --> 01:21:09,680
that's kind of fits the like your
paradigm or theory should describe reality to come

853
01:21:09,760 --> 01:21:15,199
up with some physics theory that like
doesn't describe anything. So it's a historic

854
01:21:15,399 --> 01:21:23,159
matches historical continuity. It has descriptive
power, right, it's describing. It's

855
01:21:23,920 --> 01:21:30,319
uh, not only lacks contradictions,
but it's coherent. What does that mean?

856
01:21:30,920 --> 01:21:42,439
That means that, for example,
I could hold two different true propositions

857
01:21:42,439 --> 01:21:48,680
that have nothing logically connected with each
other. The tree is green and the

858
01:21:48,760 --> 01:21:56,279
apple and the I don't know the
MIC's working or something like that. Okay,

859
01:21:56,399 --> 01:22:00,880
they're not contradictory, but I can't
derive or infer one to the other.

860
01:22:00,000 --> 01:22:03,359
Now, what's really nice about when
we talk about a coherence, Right,

861
01:22:03,720 --> 01:22:11,439
we're not just talking about propositions don't
contradict each other. We're saying they

862
01:22:11,520 --> 01:22:16,600
cohere together, that there's inferences from
one to the other. So I could

863
01:22:16,760 --> 01:22:25,399
list all these kind of attributes that
yes, from your paradigm. You want

864
01:22:25,439 --> 01:22:30,279
all this and you can't pull it
off. Orthodoxy does claim to be the

865
01:22:30,720 --> 01:22:35,720
revealed religion, and it can pull
it off by your own standards. Where

866
01:22:35,760 --> 01:22:41,680
are you gonna go? Like?
What better proof do you want? Do

867
01:22:41,680 --> 01:22:47,560
you know what I mean? Yeah? The next thing I would ask is

868
01:22:47,760 --> 01:22:55,920
could you flash out a little more
about the contrast between like a teleological worldview

869
01:22:55,920 --> 01:23:00,279
and a disteleological worldview, or theism
versus accidentalism and how they is a great

870
01:23:00,319 --> 01:23:06,039
way to kind of suss out a
large portion of worldviews with one question and

871
01:23:06,079 --> 01:23:13,640
a couple other a couple other fundamental
types of questions like this would also cancel

872
01:23:13,680 --> 01:23:17,319
out a lot of world views,
like is knowledge objective or relative? I

873
01:23:17,319 --> 01:23:21,640
mean, there's if you put together
a few disjunctives, you could pretty quickly

874
01:23:23,039 --> 01:23:29,600
cancel out most worldviews. It's not
hard at all. So one of the

875
01:23:29,600 --> 01:23:32,560
things I want to qualify, and
I qualified in my footnote when I use

876
01:23:32,600 --> 01:23:39,640
the word intentionality. I realized when
I was arguing with am dear they were

877
01:23:39,680 --> 01:23:46,880
taking the technical philosophical sense of intentionality
and philosophy of mind and philosophy and philosophy

878
01:23:46,880 --> 01:23:51,760
of language. Is our propositions or
mental states are about or directed towards something.

879
01:23:53,119 --> 01:23:58,479
No, you mean it in the
sense of will and tilo's correct intention,

880
01:23:58,840 --> 01:24:06,319
Yeah, and more kind of a
common colloquial sense. This real quick.

881
01:24:06,439 --> 01:24:15,880
So the reason I'm saying that is
it oftentimes the argument about I mean

882
01:24:15,880 --> 01:24:20,159
you put God purposefully and intentionally creates
the world. So uh, you know

883
01:24:20,199 --> 01:24:25,960
there's a book about this that that
it's an Oxford Press book. The name

884
01:24:26,000 --> 01:24:30,000
of it escapes me, but basically
it's arguing that there's only two options on

885
01:24:30,039 --> 01:24:31,960
this, and you might just come
up with a third where there's maybe some

886
01:24:32,159 --> 01:24:39,520
mix between a God who creates a
world with uh, with purpose, purposiveness,

887
01:24:40,079 --> 01:24:44,920
intentionality telos versus a world that has
no direction, no guidance, no

888
01:24:45,119 --> 01:24:48,920
end, no no, no purposiveness, or this teleological universe. But to

889
01:24:48,960 --> 01:24:51,399
be clear, the only reason I'm
bringing this up is that when we start

890
01:24:51,479 --> 01:24:55,359
saying this, I'll immediately say,
oh, you're making the teleological argument.

891
01:24:55,520 --> 01:25:00,720
It's not the teleological Yeah. I
think that's what happened with a is He

892
01:25:00,800 --> 01:25:08,039
thought I was making the teleological argument. So he was saying, well,

893
01:25:08,079 --> 01:25:13,520
I can think of things that are
His objection was it doesn't have to be

894
01:25:13,520 --> 01:25:15,279
intentional, is it? Because I
can if that's what you mean by directed,

895
01:25:15,359 --> 01:25:27,960
because I can think of directedness without
intention or a person behind it.

896
01:25:28,119 --> 01:25:31,960
Like now, I don't think that's
possible. I think it's plenty of literature,

897
01:25:32,760 --> 01:25:39,640
especially in philosophy of mind, about
intentionality as a mental property. We

898
01:25:39,680 --> 01:25:47,760
don't attributed kind of directedness and intentionality
in the technical philosophical sense to material objects.

899
01:25:48,279 --> 01:25:54,520
But let's say I grant that,
and you're missing the point that but

900
01:25:54,640 --> 01:26:02,279
by intentionality, I mean purpose There's
a being who's putting things and directing them.

901
01:26:02,359 --> 01:26:06,439
So, in other words, suppose
I grant the argument. Sure,

902
01:26:06,560 --> 01:26:16,560
maybe not every directedness implies a purposeful
agent. However, every purposeful agent acting

903
01:26:18,039 --> 01:26:21,920
applies directedness. Do you see that? Yeah? And also to consider the

904
01:26:21,960 --> 01:26:29,560
totality of reality or the entiret universe, Right, it's either purposive and intentional

905
01:26:29,760 --> 01:26:33,600
and has a t los or it
doesn't. Yes, so if there is

906
01:26:33,920 --> 01:26:42,119
exactly so, it's really a red
herring to get caught up on directedness.

907
01:26:42,600 --> 01:26:48,199
I mean, look, there's either
an agent who does things and creates the

908
01:26:48,319 --> 01:26:57,720
laws allows for the possibility of knowledge
because he has the intention and chooses it.

909
01:26:57,880 --> 01:27:02,960
So there's purpose behind everything, holliology
in that sense, or what's the

910
01:27:03,159 --> 01:27:13,279
opposite, It would be accident.
Yeah, So then I think about what

911
01:27:13,560 --> 01:27:16,680
accident like that would be your ultimate
principle that you'd have to appeal to.

912
01:27:17,920 --> 01:27:23,359
And at that point you'd have to
say, what standing behind everything is the

913
01:27:23,399 --> 01:27:30,840
antithesis, the true dichotomy of a
purposeful, intentional action, which is an

914
01:27:30,880 --> 01:27:35,880
accident. So that means I have
to explain ultimately everything in terms of like

915
01:27:36,039 --> 01:27:44,079
knowledge, accidental knowledge, yes,
accident morality, accidental laws of physics,

916
01:27:44,640 --> 01:27:49,600
right would become non justifiable? Right, well, not only Yeah, it's

917
01:27:49,880 --> 01:27:57,640
self refuting. For example, in
when you're reading epistemology and they have these

918
01:27:57,680 --> 01:28:06,359
examples of John on is asked how
many jelly beans he believes in the jar?

919
01:28:06,399 --> 01:28:12,039
And he says fifty four. John
has a true belief. Somebody says,

920
01:28:12,119 --> 01:28:15,560
well, how did you How did
you get that true belief? John?

921
01:28:16,159 --> 01:28:19,920
It matches reality. There's actually fifty
four jelly beans in the jar.

922
01:28:20,439 --> 01:28:26,199
And John says it was an accident. I guessed there was no reason for

923
01:28:26,239 --> 01:28:30,279
rhym a reason. I just kind
of guessed. When we say that's not

924
01:28:30,439 --> 01:28:36,000
knowledge, you have to have the
right reason. So knowledge itself precludes accident.

925
01:28:36,479 --> 01:28:43,199
If you study philosophy of science or
even science itself, not only are

926
01:28:43,359 --> 01:28:50,359
laws not simply correlation, they preclude
accident as well. There's a causal relationship

927
01:28:50,520 --> 01:28:59,000
beyond just two things being correlated that
has a sort of kind of necessity that

928
01:28:59,199 --> 01:29:04,920
precludes accident. So now you have
an oxymoron with the accidental laws of physics,

929
01:29:05,000 --> 01:29:08,439
and so on and so on.
I can keep going to yeah,

930
01:29:08,439 --> 01:29:11,520
and I want I want to address
that. One of the objections is that

931
01:29:11,600 --> 01:29:15,119
the transcenal argument for God does not
allow you to come to the particular.

932
01:29:15,159 --> 01:29:18,079
I mean, this is really a
fundamental misunderstanding of what the argument's about,

933
01:29:18,239 --> 01:29:23,800
because you could theoretically pick anything in
the worldview to make an argument about.

934
01:29:24,039 --> 01:29:28,039
I could start with particulars and make
a transitional argument on the basis of the

935
01:29:28,079 --> 01:29:30,720
need for the particular, and so
I can make an argument on the basis

936
01:29:30,760 --> 01:29:34,159
of the one and the many that
would be relating to the particular. And

937
01:29:34,239 --> 01:29:41,800
also he notes that he claims that
tag is inherently self contradictory anytime you come

938
01:29:41,840 --> 01:29:45,560
down to a specific particular. Just
because it's a paradigm level argument doesn't mean

939
01:29:45,560 --> 01:29:49,359
that it doesn't account for or belief
have a belief in particulars. I mean

940
01:29:49,439 --> 01:29:57,880
paradigms include particulars. So I don't
understand even what that objection means. Guess

941
01:29:57,920 --> 01:30:02,640
what. It's another example of missing
the Oh it's missing the objection the objection

942
01:30:02,760 --> 01:30:10,520
or so, how do you know
that? How do you know? Well,

943
01:30:10,560 --> 01:30:13,239
he would just say here that he
would just say here the tag.

944
01:30:15,159 --> 01:30:17,640
I'm not making a claim about paradigms. I'm just telling you a flaw on

945
01:30:17,720 --> 01:30:23,560
tag is probably what he would say. Well, then why is it a

946
01:30:23,560 --> 01:30:28,760
flaw? How do you know it's
a flaw? He was He's saying it's

947
01:30:28,760 --> 01:30:32,720
an internal contradiction and tag. I
think, okay, But that's an epistemic

948
01:30:32,760 --> 01:30:39,439
claim of correct. What the So
that's why I point out on my paper

949
01:30:40,159 --> 01:30:46,079
even if even if the details of
my argument are incorrect, let's say I'm

950
01:30:46,079 --> 01:30:53,880
messed up somewhere, I still win. We still win why because of that

951
01:30:54,119 --> 01:31:00,479
exact issue right there is you're saying
it doesn't work, the just jump doesn't

952
01:31:00,520 --> 01:31:03,760
work, or it's flawed. This
it's a tautology, it's a Those are

953
01:31:03,800 --> 01:31:10,319
all epistemic claims. So even if
I mess up somewhere, the question still

954
01:31:10,359 --> 01:31:14,359
stands, how do you know that? How do you know? And you

955
01:31:14,359 --> 01:31:16,399
could say, well, it's an
internal critique, Well, then you're putting

956
01:31:16,560 --> 01:31:24,800
yourself in a position to know what
the paradigm is. Why all kinds of

957
01:31:24,800 --> 01:31:29,760
stuff right within the assessment of that, and why that would be? Why

958
01:31:29,800 --> 01:31:32,680
is that a list? What?
Why not critique? And could we just

959
01:31:32,720 --> 01:31:35,760
frame the question and make it really
quick, simple and easy and to the

960
01:31:35,800 --> 01:31:40,399
point, how do we know knowledge
as possible? What if we ask the

961
01:31:40,439 --> 01:31:45,159
atheist that, how do we know
knowledge as possible? Not can you give

962
01:31:45,199 --> 01:31:49,159
me your list of knowledge claims and
beliefs, but how do we know knowledge

963
01:31:49,159 --> 01:31:53,720
as possible? Yeah, that's all
I'm trying to do. That's all I'm

964
01:31:53,760 --> 01:31:59,520
trying to ask, and they won't
answer it. So let's ask the atheist

965
01:31:59,520 --> 01:32:02,680
that In this so we've got several
skeptics and kind of people who are disagreeing,

966
01:32:02,680 --> 01:32:06,119
which is fine. The question is
how do we know knowledge as possible?

967
01:32:06,159 --> 01:32:12,439
And every attempt at answering that you
give clearly presupposes that you have knowledge,

968
01:32:12,520 --> 01:32:16,000
so it's missing the point. So
we want an account for knowledge itself,

969
01:32:16,079 --> 01:32:19,359
not your knowledge claims, but an
account for knowledge. That's what you

970
01:32:19,399 --> 01:32:24,600
have to address. That's the point. Yeah, that's the excellent way to

971
01:32:24,640 --> 01:32:30,520
put it. And so you know
these are kind of more sophisticated details that

972
01:32:30,720 --> 01:32:34,159
go into in the paper. Oh
wait, one more question on that?

973
01:32:35,000 --> 01:32:38,560
Is that a good way to phrase
it? Two? Because of like,

974
01:32:38,880 --> 01:32:40,760
because at this point, a lot
of times people are going to say,

975
01:32:40,800 --> 01:32:43,640
well, look, I don't know
about all this episode. Why can't we

976
01:32:43,720 --> 01:32:46,399
just look to science and like the
pragmatic conclusions that we get from the doing

977
01:32:46,479 --> 01:32:51,119
of science. Maybe that's a more
reliable pragmatic approach. Why do we even

978
01:32:51,199 --> 01:32:57,319
have to busy ourselves with these kind
of abstract kind of questions that you're asking

979
01:32:57,359 --> 01:33:00,439
so that they'll oftentimes defer to saying
that you're just doing a lot of word

980
01:33:00,600 --> 01:33:04,399
solid and like fancy tap dancing and
and well, why do we even have

981
01:33:04,479 --> 01:33:12,479
to I guess here, rage quit, We're done, So I'm just joking,

982
01:33:11,840 --> 01:33:16,880
I'm out of here. Why can't
we just go to science and like

983
01:33:16,920 --> 01:33:21,920
the pragmatic value of the data that
we get from science. That's a typical

984
01:33:23,000 --> 01:33:26,800
kind of move I hear at this
point. I mean, just it's the

985
01:33:26,840 --> 01:33:31,479
same question, like why a tai
to take that? I hear, what

986
01:33:31,520 --> 01:33:36,520
you're saying, I hear you're making
claims about that. Now justify why that's

987
01:33:38,079 --> 01:33:45,199
justifiable move like I should take.
And what you'll find is they'll assume exactly

988
01:33:45,199 --> 01:33:50,720
what they're proving attempting to prove number
two and I even get into this,

989
01:33:53,960 --> 01:33:59,600
So that's the question of like why
should I even accept a sort of kind

990
01:33:59,600 --> 01:34:02,119
of pragmatism of science, Like why
would that even be a good move for

991
01:34:02,159 --> 01:34:06,800
me to do? And how would
that be a justification. The second problem

992
01:34:08,079 --> 01:34:16,359
is science in pragmatics never even get
to truth or knowledge far from for you

993
01:34:16,399 --> 01:34:19,279
know, you've seen in the other
papers that I've written for a couple of

994
01:34:19,319 --> 01:34:25,319
different issues too. One is the
KWin Donheim's indeterminacy of data, Like you

995
01:34:25,359 --> 01:34:30,680
can construct multiple contradictory theories as all
were, Yeah, the data doesn't tell

996
01:34:30,680 --> 01:34:35,279
you which paradigm is correct because you
never get to truth, knowledge or justification

997
01:34:35,520 --> 01:34:42,880
from science and because it works and
number two, all of those are going

998
01:34:42,960 --> 01:34:47,520
to be making universal claims from particulars. And you have the problem of induction

999
01:34:47,800 --> 01:34:54,920
and the problem of circularity with induction
too, So you're back epistemic bootstrapping again,

1000
01:34:55,399 --> 01:34:58,960
and you don't even get to the
Cattrall. I mean basically that move

1001
01:34:59,000 --> 01:35:02,600
that we just mentioned, let's just
do a pragmatic move to scientific data,

1002
01:35:03,000 --> 01:35:09,720
that's really just surrendering epistemology and justification. That's essentially saying we can't do it.

1003
01:35:09,720 --> 01:35:12,279
It's not possible, there is no
answer, there's no such thing as

1004
01:35:12,359 --> 01:35:15,800
justification. That's basically throwing up your
hands in giving out. At that point,

1005
01:35:15,840 --> 01:35:20,119
then that okay, Then argumentation is
not is no longer possible? Right,

1006
01:35:21,119 --> 01:35:29,439
And the other the number three is
pragmatism is arbitrary because you just pick

1007
01:35:29,760 --> 01:35:33,199
arbitrarily the goals that you want to
work without any justication. Yeah, like

1008
01:35:33,239 --> 01:35:35,840
how do we know what does it
mean to work? Right? And that

1009
01:35:35,920 --> 01:35:40,840
assumes that you've chosen a criteria,
some sort of you know, benchmark of

1010
01:35:40,880 --> 01:35:44,960
value judgments to judge the good the
thing that works versus the one that doesn't

1011
01:35:44,960 --> 01:35:48,279
work, which again makes it arbitrary. Now the same Yeah, all the

1012
01:35:48,279 --> 01:35:50,800
same issues that I'm bringing up,
But I really like the way that you

1013
01:35:50,920 --> 01:35:56,800
put it is, how do we
know or justify anything that you're saying?

1014
01:35:58,520 --> 01:36:01,520
How do we know knowledge is even
possible? Like what's the because that's prior

1015
01:36:01,640 --> 01:36:06,520
to all of your first order claims, and the atheists just never understand that

1016
01:36:06,600 --> 01:36:17,840
the transfer argument is about second order
questions and justification. Now, now Phillips

1017
01:36:17,840 --> 01:36:23,439
said, where was his last statement? Yeah, but let's see he had

1018
01:36:23,479 --> 01:36:28,279
a comment about Socrates as an example
that we could address. Where is it,

1019
01:36:28,399 --> 01:36:31,600
I've already lost it. Socrates does
the same thing where he goes out

1020
01:36:31,640 --> 01:36:36,279
and questions worldviews and he doesn't assert
his own Well, Socrates therefore justified in

1021
01:36:36,319 --> 01:36:41,560
doing internal internal critiques. Well,
my response to this, I'll let further

1022
01:36:41,640 --> 01:36:45,760
you can give response is that,
now, maybe in the apology he didn't

1023
01:36:45,880 --> 01:36:51,359
prefer a worldview, but in the
rest of the dialogues he does actually assert

1024
01:36:51,359 --> 01:36:56,880
a worldview. It's called platonism.
So Platonism does assert quite a bit.

1025
01:36:56,960 --> 01:37:00,479
It's very metaphysical and in fact,
I mean some of the same types of

1026
01:37:00,479 --> 01:37:06,119
transcendental presubsisitional argumentation. You can find
that in Plato Platonic dialogues asked some of

1027
01:37:06,119 --> 01:37:12,720
the types of questions that we're asking. Aristotle also does transcendental type moves in

1028
01:37:12,840 --> 01:37:18,760
argumentation. However, the fact that
Socrates is questioning worldviews does not make his

1029
01:37:18,880 --> 01:37:23,640
own position justified, and that's also
not what we're doing. We're not saying

1030
01:37:23,640 --> 01:37:30,039
that just because we question worldviews,
they're not justified or excuse me, ours

1031
01:37:30,079 --> 01:37:34,039
is therefore justified. Let me read
you what he says, Father Deacon Socrates

1032
01:37:34,039 --> 01:37:39,119
did the same thing and question world
views without asserting his own. Was Socrates

1033
01:37:39,239 --> 01:37:48,000
justified in doing an internal critique?
Was his question? Well, why would

1034
01:37:48,000 --> 01:37:56,000
this gentleman think that we haven't asserted
our worldview? That's a good point.

1035
01:37:56,079 --> 01:38:00,079
Yeah, he says, why ought
we have competing worldview? A competing world

1036
01:38:00,119 --> 01:38:04,159
view in order to do an internal
critique of another worldview? Oh so he's

1037
01:38:04,199 --> 01:38:08,279
saying that you're doing an ought move. Now that we're not saying that you

1038
01:38:08,359 --> 01:38:14,800
ought. We're saying that everybody necessarily
has a worldview, even if they recognize

1039
01:38:14,840 --> 01:38:18,960
it or not. It's impossible to
have no worldview, even if you're a

1040
01:38:19,000 --> 01:38:26,840
oh I'm a total agnostic. Well
that's still a position on epistemology exactly because

1041
01:38:26,880 --> 01:38:30,640
you just moved it to a higher
order and assume a whole bunch of epistemic

1042
01:38:30,720 --> 01:38:35,119
things to even make those statements.
So, I mean, the skeptic and

1043
01:38:35,920 --> 01:38:41,159
they don't get out of this problem. Now this is a very common objection.

1044
01:38:41,199 --> 01:38:44,640
I'm glad we're hitting on this because
a lot of times the atheists will

1045
01:38:44,640 --> 01:38:46,039
then say, oh, well,
actually I don't have any worldview, and

1046
01:38:46,079 --> 01:38:49,479
no, I have no commitments.
I'm totally neutral. I'm totally agnostic on

1047
01:38:49,640 --> 01:38:54,039
everything, so you can't critique me. There's nothing that you can give me

1048
01:38:54,079 --> 01:39:00,199
on. Then watch what they do. You make an argument right right,

1049
01:39:00,880 --> 01:39:02,840
and it's a slide of hands.
So they told you I'm not going to

1050
01:39:02,960 --> 01:39:08,359
do this right while they slip in
their other hand right and start making a

1051
01:39:08,399 --> 01:39:11,359
bunch of that doesn't work. You
can't do that. See the tag doesn't

1052
01:39:11,479 --> 01:39:15,720
I'm doing an internal critique right.
Well, women, you're doing the exact

1053
01:39:15,800 --> 01:39:21,319
thing that you said that you're not
committed to doing. So again, all

1054
01:39:21,359 --> 01:39:25,520
of these things are slides of hands
and cons and stuff like that. You

1055
01:39:25,640 --> 01:39:29,479
just got. Well, i'll address
that more specifically. Why is it a

1056
01:39:29,479 --> 01:39:34,159
slide of hand con move? If
I'm a total agnostic and then I start

1057
01:39:34,399 --> 01:39:39,119
critiquing your position and saying, oh, you're you're, you're, you're contradicting

1058
01:39:39,119 --> 01:39:45,039
yourselfiest why am I violating my agnostic
stance by using these logical arguments to call

1059
01:39:45,039 --> 01:39:50,039
you out on confortas Because they just
assume or they just said I don't have

1060
01:39:50,199 --> 01:40:01,880
any commitment on logic, contradiction,
semantics, reservation experience, right, because

1061
01:40:02,079 --> 01:40:08,239
right they're saying that. Because of
the next move, they'll come in and

1062
01:40:08,279 --> 01:40:11,960
be like, I hear what you're
saying, and it's wrong. You're contradicting

1063
01:40:12,039 --> 01:40:16,680
to Oh wow, now you're slipping
in. All of those are observational statements

1064
01:40:16,720 --> 01:40:24,399
and epistemic statements that you said,
I've bracketed and I'm non committal with that.

1065
01:40:24,920 --> 01:40:27,479
Yeah, And well, I mean
just to say, if you know,

1066
01:40:27,760 --> 01:40:30,720
the same type of person is always
saying something like Christianity contradicts itself.

1067
01:40:30,960 --> 01:40:35,319
Then they turn around and say I
have no logical commitments to or philosophical commitments

1068
01:40:35,359 --> 01:40:40,680
to anything. Well, you just
invoked the law of non contradiction, so

1069
01:40:40,840 --> 01:40:45,479
you do. And I really think
it's a character flaw two you, because

1070
01:40:45,479 --> 01:40:53,960
think about the person who can't actually
commit to anything like any dates or meetings

1071
01:40:54,079 --> 01:41:00,199
or anything like that. Well,
what if they're a genuine sort of skeptic

1072
01:41:00,319 --> 01:41:05,800
or a genuine person who says I
just don't know which you know, I've

1073
01:41:05,800 --> 01:41:11,119
had a lot of philosophy classes and
I don't know which one's true. Like

1074
01:41:11,319 --> 01:41:15,000
there's a lot of positions out there
start telling you that you're arguing it's wrong.

1075
01:41:15,439 --> 01:41:19,159
That's usually what a genuine person who's
well, what if they said,

1076
01:41:19,239 --> 01:41:24,199
well, I'm just arguing the positions
to see who's got the better case,

1077
01:41:24,920 --> 01:41:30,319
right, Well, yeah they might
not. That might not be a disingenuous

1078
01:41:30,319 --> 01:41:34,760
person or a character flaw. But
then they're just confused. We'd have to

1079
01:41:34,800 --> 01:41:41,119
just kind of show them. But
do you see that you're you're committing to

1080
01:41:41,239 --> 01:41:46,640
something a methodology or access to a
methodology, or some sort of standard lenses

1081
01:41:46,840 --> 01:41:54,720
or anything by which you think that
you could actually assess and figure this stuff

1082
01:41:54,720 --> 01:42:02,399
out. Right now, we have
some questions here in the super Chats Commentsnome's

1083
01:42:02,439 --> 01:42:12,439
body noses I'll go ahead and read
this and then comment on it, reading

1084
01:42:12,439 --> 01:42:16,199
it for him nomes body ten dollars. Can perception of information be relative to

1085
01:42:16,239 --> 01:42:24,439
the human mind. There might be
a subjective element to the incoming data which

1086
01:42:25,000 --> 01:42:32,720
the human mind misinterprets or distorts or
doesn't want to see or know that they

1087
01:42:32,800 --> 01:42:38,159
might suppress or misinterpret the data or
something like that. But I wouldn't say

1088
01:42:38,199 --> 01:42:44,800
that the perception of information is therefore
completely relative, just because there can be

1089
01:42:44,920 --> 01:42:51,439
instances of misinterpretation. I am not
entirely convinced that knowledge is transcendent. Well,

1090
01:42:51,720 --> 01:42:56,880
knowledge can be had by human beings
that is not transcendent. There is

1091
01:42:57,000 --> 01:43:01,079
knowledge of the transcendent. So if
you mean it's a little ambiguous what you

1092
01:43:01,159 --> 01:43:05,960
mean by that? So I wouldn't
say that knowledge is like necessarily always transcendent.

1093
01:43:06,000 --> 01:43:12,640
We're saying that knowledge it self requires
the transcendent to be grounded. Thank

1094
01:43:12,680 --> 01:43:15,680
you for being better than a lot
of the other online apologists. What you

1095
01:43:15,720 --> 01:43:17,520
say makes me think, well,
I appreciate that. Numbs body a good

1096
01:43:17,600 --> 01:43:23,159
question. Do you want to comment
on that? Can perception of information be

1097
01:43:23,199 --> 01:43:30,159
purely relative to the human mind?
Can, let's say, can perception of

1098
01:43:30,199 --> 01:43:35,720
information be relative to the human mind? In other words, is it possible

1099
01:43:35,800 --> 01:43:45,039
for the incoming information or data to
be relative to each person getting the data?

1100
01:43:46,000 --> 01:43:54,159
Um? I don't think so,
because this is kind of similar to

1101
01:43:54,239 --> 01:44:00,000
like Fickenstein's there's no private language.
Yes, so that's a great point.

1102
01:44:00,760 --> 01:44:05,880
Yeah, the fact is there's commensurability, and there's clues to that. If

1103
01:44:05,920 --> 01:44:10,319
that were actually the case, we
could never talk to each other, right,

1104
01:44:10,800 --> 01:44:14,520
we could never actually talk to each
other. So if everything was completely

1105
01:44:14,560 --> 01:44:18,520
subjective, we wouldn't be able to
relate with one another, we wouldn't be

1106
01:44:18,560 --> 01:44:25,800
able to develop language. And so
although like you said, well, certainly

1107
01:44:26,319 --> 01:44:31,159
the mind can kind of contaminate the
sense data that kind of comes in,

1108
01:44:31,439 --> 01:44:34,800
skew it and stuff like that,
it can't, you know, And there's

1109
01:44:34,800 --> 01:44:40,800
this kind of subjective element and kind
of imposing and stuff that could happen.

1110
01:44:40,880 --> 01:44:45,199
It couldn't be absolute. Otherwise we
wouldn't be understand each other or developing a

1111
01:44:45,279 --> 01:44:50,479
language. Yeah, there's a lot
of fascinating transmit argumentation that that is just

1112
01:44:50,560 --> 01:44:54,000
kind of sitting out there, ready
to be the depths of it, ready

1113
01:44:54,000 --> 01:44:58,479
to be plumbed. Some philosophers like
Carlotto Apple have done this where they look

1114
01:44:58,520 --> 01:45:03,279
at the logical structure of languages,
and even though languages differ, there's actually

1115
01:45:03,439 --> 01:45:12,319
fundamental necessary things going on in every
language everywhere. So for the possibility of

1116
01:45:12,399 --> 01:45:17,039
language at all, you've got to
have certain structures in place to make which

1117
01:45:17,079 --> 01:45:23,159
makes that meaning possible. Yeah.
Transcendental categories absolutely, yeah, And I

1118
01:45:23,239 --> 01:45:26,920
mean they're necessary for language. That's
why I mean, like five or six

1119
01:45:27,000 --> 01:45:30,439
years ago, every time I was
doing TAG, I was just going back

1120
01:45:30,439 --> 01:45:34,199
into like language meaning arguments, because
every time an atheist makes it's it's similar

1121
01:45:34,239 --> 01:45:39,000
to what you're doing with like knowledge
claims. I can just say that every

1122
01:45:39,039 --> 01:45:42,920
time an atheist makes a sentence,
he's assuming all kinds of linguistic structures that

1123
01:45:42,960 --> 01:45:46,800
he hasn't proven yet. Homicidal,
self conscious cake one dollar? What do

1124
01:45:46,840 --> 01:45:54,079
you think of this claim? Epistemology
is the expression of a reductionist ontology that

1125
01:45:54,199 --> 01:45:59,880
infuses the entire Western tradition. Thus, epistemology reduces all being to some mere

1126
01:46:00,079 --> 01:46:05,119
presence. It forces all knowledge to
conform to some single standard. My response

1127
01:46:05,119 --> 01:46:09,199
would be, I'm assuming that that's
a like a Heighigger quote. I think

1128
01:46:09,239 --> 01:46:13,079
you were saying, unless I'm mixing
out with somebody else that you were interested

1129
01:46:13,079 --> 01:46:19,560
in a response to this Highiger objection. Sometimes the German idealists would and people

1130
01:46:19,600 --> 01:46:29,600
after them would be very critical of
certain schools of epistemology that would reduce ontology

1131
01:46:29,800 --> 01:46:38,079
to some minimalist, like hyper rationalist
type of uh not rationalists, because German

1132
01:46:38,079 --> 01:46:40,680
idealists rationalist. What am I trying
to say? Like a reductionist like a

1133
01:46:42,000 --> 01:46:45,479
like a materialist type of move right. So let's say epistemology in the modern

1134
01:46:45,520 --> 01:46:51,920
sense develops in this anti metaphysical stance
of like Kant and Hume. So it's

1135
01:46:51,960 --> 01:46:58,159
probably a critique. But maybe he's
going back to Plato and saying that all

1136
01:46:58,760 --> 01:47:03,640
epistemic search for truth is somehow reductionist
against being I mean, this has toy

1137
01:47:03,720 --> 01:47:09,640
from Heidiger, but I don't I'm
not well studied in Hidigger to know if

1138
01:47:09,920 --> 01:47:13,520
if this is the case, I
mean in terms of his views, But

1139
01:47:14,119 --> 01:47:16,359
I would just say that, I
mean, it shouldn't be odd to think

1140
01:47:16,399 --> 01:47:23,000
of epistemology as a discipline itself somehow
being like necessarily flawed. And we were

1141
01:47:23,039 --> 01:47:27,079
just asking the question of what is
knowledge? Is knowledge possible? How do

1142
01:47:27,119 --> 01:47:29,720
we know? What does it mean
to know? You know, I don't

1143
01:47:29,720 --> 01:47:32,880
see why that would be inherently problematic, but I'm sure Heideger has some take

1144
01:47:33,079 --> 01:47:36,960
that, you know, like back
to Plato it was a problem or something.

1145
01:47:39,560 --> 01:47:42,560
Yeah, again, it just kind
of goes back to my paper too.

1146
01:47:44,039 --> 01:47:49,119
I'm staying general enough in these considerations
that I'm not wetting myself to any

1147
01:47:49,239 --> 01:47:58,479
kind of particular view, particular metaphysics, particular epistemology. There was a guy

1148
01:47:58,520 --> 01:48:00,000
that was saying, well, you're
to redefine, and I'm like, I'm

1149
01:48:00,039 --> 01:48:06,640
not redefining knowledge that I'm giving you
because again, these are such fundamental and

1150
01:48:06,720 --> 01:48:13,399
prior questions. I'm giving you everything
that you want. Whatever you would say,

1151
01:48:13,520 --> 01:48:17,039
right, it still stands that there's
these kinds of questions exactly like you

1152
01:48:17,079 --> 01:48:21,399
said, how do we know that
knowledge exists? Oh? Anybody can't?

1153
01:48:21,479 --> 01:48:25,239
Like, like, it's really I
think I think if if you so,

1154
01:48:25,479 --> 01:48:30,399
if Heidegger said to you, father
Deacon, uh, epistemology is the expression

1155
01:48:30,399 --> 01:48:34,920
of a reductions ontology that infuses the
entire Western tradition, and you've missed being

1156
01:48:35,520 --> 01:48:41,079
right. I mean, it's kind
of like his system building project to dismiss

1157
01:48:41,520 --> 01:48:45,560
any sort of epistemology argument that you're
making. So how would you respond to

1158
01:48:45,680 --> 01:48:50,479
like a Heidigger man that is sort
of dismissing epistemology arguments as some sort of

1159
01:48:51,159 --> 01:48:59,399
reductionist expression. I would just tell
him, you're your president hand bestond standing

1160
01:48:59,520 --> 01:49:09,720
reserve and its projectedness has confused the
antic and antist relationship on your own metaphysical

1161
01:49:09,720 --> 01:49:15,479
and epistemological grounds bracketing, and I
just throw out a bunch of Hidiger words

1162
01:49:15,520 --> 01:49:17,960
to him back and watch and see
what he does, and I'm kidding,

1163
01:49:19,720 --> 01:49:25,760
yeah, I would. I would
basically try to work through with him and

1164
01:49:25,840 --> 01:49:31,039
say, can we get past that, like, I'm not going to make

1165
01:49:31,079 --> 01:49:36,800
any commitments? Help me? And
again, phenomenologists can be good with the

1166
01:49:36,880 --> 01:49:43,000
kind of language. One of the
things that Heiderger was trying to do is

1167
01:49:43,119 --> 01:49:48,800
the exact task that I'm doing.
Is this kind of deconstruction project, right

1168
01:49:48,840 --> 01:49:54,560
that there's like all these layers of
paradigms and language and stuff like that,

1169
01:49:54,840 --> 01:50:01,199
and he's trying to get down to
primordial being, right, and so that

1170
01:50:01,319 --> 01:50:06,840
he doesn't have to kind of think
through incorrect categories, So he's stripping off

1171
01:50:06,880 --> 01:50:11,319
the layers. I'd basically say that
to Hidiger, why don't you help me?

1172
01:50:12,239 --> 01:50:16,319
Maybe I'm not good at my words
and arguments, so why don't you

1173
01:50:16,359 --> 01:50:19,880
help me? Because he's obviously much
smarter than me. I know what you're

1174
01:50:19,920 --> 01:50:25,079
doing, though. You want to
get in more kind of primordial basic kind

1175
01:50:25,119 --> 01:50:29,119
of questions, and that's what I
want to do. How would you,

1176
01:50:29,439 --> 01:50:34,199
Hidiger, help me phrase this question? How do we know that we know?

1177
01:50:36,760 --> 01:50:41,800
Yeah? I think that just responding
with things like oh, we have

1178
01:50:41,840 --> 01:50:45,960
to plunge into being or find find
being he's really missing the point, right,

1179
01:50:48,000 --> 01:50:50,520
because I mean, first of all, what does it even mean to

1180
01:50:50,560 --> 01:50:55,279
say? I mean being This is
like the most generic term in the history

1181
01:50:55,279 --> 01:50:57,720
of philosophy, right, I mean
it has all kinds of different meanings in

1182
01:50:57,760 --> 01:51:01,960
different philosophy, and you always know
it's about philosophers. They have these wonderful

1183
01:51:02,000 --> 01:51:05,119
proposals, well, I'm going to
get rid of all this stuff, and

1184
01:51:05,359 --> 01:51:11,000
then their answer is something dumb.
Right, Well, not only that they

1185
01:51:11,039 --> 01:51:14,000
bring in the exact stuff. They're
trying to get the same problem, the

1186
01:51:14,039 --> 01:51:23,680
same problems for me. Look at
this, Who's roles? Who's roles?

1187
01:51:23,920 --> 01:51:30,119
Uh? Discovery of reduction? So
I bet that's what did you notice?

1188
01:51:30,159 --> 01:51:39,119
This was Dermott Morn's phenomenology here?
But I find that funny. I keep

1189
01:51:39,199 --> 01:51:45,840
noticing this throughout philosophy. You know, Descartes brings in the stuff that he's

1190
01:51:45,880 --> 01:51:49,680
trying to get rid of. The
people like responding to Descartes like, we

1191
01:51:49,760 --> 01:51:53,960
got to get rid of this stuff, right, and this dualism, right,

1192
01:51:55,000 --> 01:51:59,920
We're going to materialism and identity theory, and then they bring in conceptual

1193
01:52:00,359 --> 01:52:03,399
like yeah, I think a lot
of people misunderstand that what we're saying is

1194
01:52:03,439 --> 01:52:10,039
that philosophy is a failed project.
So from the pre Socratics to today,

1195
01:52:10,600 --> 01:52:15,319
philosophy is a giant failed enterprise.
And I think that when they hear us

1196
01:52:15,359 --> 01:52:17,399
saying that, they're like, what, because aren't you talking a bunch of

1197
01:52:17,399 --> 01:52:23,560
philosophy jargon and baggage and word salad
and are you going back to Plato unprestocratics

1198
01:52:23,560 --> 01:52:27,720
and using these terms correct? Because
yeah, sometimes they say things that are

1199
01:52:27,760 --> 01:52:31,640
correct and true. But our whole
point is that all of these secular and

1200
01:52:31,800 --> 01:52:38,399
man made autonomous system building projects are
always doomed to fail, and that's why

1201
01:52:38,479 --> 01:52:44,239
they always have these fundamental problems in
their systems. John seven point fifty.

1202
01:52:44,319 --> 01:52:47,640
I've encountered many atheists that claim that
atheism is not a paradigm, it is

1203
01:52:47,680 --> 01:52:53,439
simply a non belief based on the
fact that there's no evidence for God.

1204
01:52:53,800 --> 01:52:58,479
Can you please explain why atheism is
actually a paradigm and why there's no such

1205
01:52:58,520 --> 01:53:03,760
thing as a quote non belief for
theism? Thank you? Yeah, so,

1206
01:53:05,319 --> 01:53:08,119
I mean I'll grant you it and
be like, all right, it's

1207
01:53:08,159 --> 01:53:12,840
not a paradigm. My position is, well, well, hold on,

1208
01:53:12,840 --> 01:53:17,479
but wouldn't it be the case that
even though the claim of atheism itself is

1209
01:53:17,520 --> 01:53:24,840
not equivalent to a paradigm. That
person still has paradigm level commitments. Yes,

1210
01:53:25,119 --> 01:53:28,920
that's true, paradigm level commitments.
In other words, in my paper,

1211
01:53:29,399 --> 01:53:34,039
there's nobody that's not presuppositionless. Right, in order for you to make

1212
01:53:34,119 --> 01:53:39,720
a statement about that, again,
it goes all the way back to everything

1213
01:53:39,760 --> 01:53:45,880
I was saying about the second order. You're taking positions, you have a

1214
01:53:45,920 --> 01:53:51,479
paradigm in which you make that,
whether you realize it or not. And

1215
01:53:51,600 --> 01:53:59,279
so I just feel like it's again
it's it's a dishonest and ad hoc move.

1216
01:53:59,399 --> 01:54:01,279
I don't have it. It's like, well, then you deceived yourself,

1217
01:54:01,479 --> 01:54:06,880
Like, I mean, it's clear
you have a set of like what

1218
01:54:08,039 --> 01:54:12,920
is a paradigm. Yeah, it's
basic beliefs about knowledge, ethics, and

1219
01:54:13,079 --> 01:54:15,439
metaphysics. Right, So that's all
it is. Well, you can't open

1220
01:54:15,479 --> 01:54:20,199
your mouth and make any claims and
be like that just came out of nowhere,

1221
01:54:20,399 --> 01:54:26,359
Right, I literally have no beliefs. Correct, Yeah, everybody has

1222
01:54:26,399 --> 01:54:31,680
some commitments, even if you're a
complete like skeptic slash agnostic. Those are

1223
01:54:31,840 --> 01:54:36,720
beliefs, those are positions, right, You're basically saying that I and pretty

1224
01:54:36,760 --> 01:54:41,560
much no one else can know,
or we just don't know, or I

1225
01:54:41,600 --> 01:54:44,840
don't know. I mean, that's
still a commitment to all kinds of different

1226
01:54:44,840 --> 01:54:46,640
things. And you may not think
that it is, but it is.

1227
01:54:48,079 --> 01:54:50,920
And I think what they'll say to
you, Okay, I'll grant that,

1228
01:54:51,079 --> 01:55:00,079
But there's no common denominator of which
you can categorize atheism is a worldview or

1229
01:55:00,159 --> 01:55:04,319
position. It's like, absolutely,
that's what the whole papers about your accidentalists

1230
01:55:05,239 --> 01:55:09,439
exactly. Yeah, they didn't even
realize that they already have a commitment to

1231
01:55:09,479 --> 01:55:12,760
accidentalism by just saying that. That's
the point. So, in other words,

1232
01:55:12,800 --> 01:55:16,439
saying that is already a commitment.
It entails all these positions, whether

1233
01:55:16,479 --> 01:55:20,760
you've recognized it or not. So
the fact that you haven't recognized it doesn't

1234
01:55:20,800 --> 01:55:27,199
mean that you don't have all of
these commitments to John Bollerman. Ten dollars.

1235
01:55:27,199 --> 01:55:30,119
Thank you, gentlemen. I'm from
Vancouver aka the News Autumn. Thank

1236
01:55:30,159 --> 01:55:33,199
you so much, anonymous. Five
dollars. I've been listening to this for

1237
01:55:33,199 --> 01:55:36,119
a long time, only just now
I have the courage to pipe up.

1238
01:55:36,479 --> 01:55:39,960
Jay, You've been very edifying.
Thank you for being a nerd who does

1239
01:55:40,000 --> 01:55:42,720
my homework for me. Glory to
Jesus. Thank you so much, Kristen

1240
01:55:42,800 --> 01:55:45,000
five dollars, Thank you, Thank
you, Kristin, Sir. From Craig

1241
01:55:45,039 --> 01:55:50,880
ten dollars. If we can't accurately, if we can't reason accurately from a

1242
01:55:51,000 --> 01:55:57,479
fallen nature to God because of death, couldn't tag fall into the same error.

1243
01:55:59,760 --> 01:56:02,840
No, I mean we're not saying
that you can't reason accurately because of

1244
01:56:02,880 --> 01:56:08,399
the fall per se. You can't. I mean an atheist can write a

1245
01:56:08,439 --> 01:56:14,199
paper about mathematics, can write papers
about earthworms that are correct and make new

1246
01:56:14,239 --> 01:56:18,359
discoveries. Rather, the point is
that they can't justify how knowledge is possible.

1247
01:56:18,399 --> 01:56:21,600
So those are two different That's another
example of the second order. Right,

1248
01:56:21,640 --> 01:56:28,000
So let's give an example of an
atheist writes a science paper some breakthrough

1249
01:56:28,000 --> 01:56:30,359
discovery about earthworms because he's been studying
for the twenty years and it turns out

1250
01:56:30,399 --> 01:56:34,880
that it's all true. His theories
on earthworms are correct. Okay, nobody's

1251
01:56:34,920 --> 01:56:41,199
saying that he doesn't have the first
order knowledge about the earthworms and his research

1252
01:56:41,239 --> 01:56:45,399
and data. What we're saying is
that he's not able to give an account

1253
01:56:45,439 --> 01:56:48,520
for how that knowledge is possible.
That's the higher order claim. Should this

1254
01:56:48,520 --> 01:56:53,119
should be obvious that people think about
it, that these are two different things,

1255
01:56:53,600 --> 01:56:59,880
two different claims. Somebody, Yeah, I'm still confused with this.

1256
01:57:00,079 --> 01:57:06,359
Guys saying that TAG can't differentiate particulars. Have you figured that what that means?

1257
01:57:06,520 --> 01:57:10,199
I mean, I addressed that earlier. That. I mean, you

1258
01:57:10,199 --> 01:57:14,119
could make a transcendental argument with anything
within the paradigm. Could I could start

1259
01:57:14,119 --> 01:57:17,800
with pencils and make the argument up
to God? It wouldn't matter what object

1260
01:57:17,840 --> 01:57:21,720
you pick, because ultimately everything it's
the same question of how do we ground

1261
01:57:21,760 --> 01:57:26,359
the knowledge of those objects? Right? So that's the question he was asking.

1262
01:57:27,279 --> 01:57:30,560
He seems to think that somehow TAG
is only dealing with universals. It's

1263
01:57:30,600 --> 01:57:35,119
not a question of universal particulars.
So he thinks that it's a universal type

1264
01:57:35,199 --> 01:57:39,720
argument, I think, and therefore
there's not a basis for particulars. Seems

1265
01:57:39,760 --> 01:57:43,000
to be what he thinks it is. TAG is not the equivalent of universals.

1266
01:57:43,079 --> 01:57:49,479
Okay, remember too that it's always
misunderstanding everything. Yeah. People get

1267
01:57:49,520 --> 01:57:55,279
confused because they hear the word transcendental
in yeah, and they think that's reasoning

1268
01:57:55,279 --> 01:58:01,119
about universals or something like yeah,
or the all presidential category must transit arguments

1269
01:58:01,199 --> 01:58:09,000
must be about the reasoning about our
grounding transcendental categories, and that's not the

1270
01:58:09,039 --> 01:58:17,079
case. So transcendental comes from the
transcendental deduction of Kant, and it basically

1271
01:58:17,119 --> 01:58:26,960
a transcendental is simply just what's prior, right, transcendare what's over and above

1272
01:58:27,000 --> 01:58:31,920
and prior that makes the stuff below
p Yeah, well, maybe preconditions is

1273
01:58:31,960 --> 01:58:36,680
better, because if we talk about
preconditions for knowledge, then that really doesn't

1274
01:58:36,680 --> 01:58:42,800
anything to do with the question of
universals per se. You might ask other

1275
01:58:43,000 --> 01:58:47,159
universals and can you give an argument
for universals in your worldview? But preconditions

1276
01:58:47,199 --> 01:58:50,359
for knowledge, though it might relate
to that, is not the same thing

1277
01:58:50,399 --> 01:58:54,760
as the question of universals. So
hopefully that clears it up. Because remember,

1278
01:58:55,439 --> 01:59:00,640
in just general methodology, the transcendental
deduction Kant is actually trying to answer

1279
01:59:00,680 --> 01:59:10,000
that exact question of what makes it
possible to make predicates of particular sense data

1280
01:59:10,279 --> 01:59:15,560
right right, and and entities and
stuff like that. So that's exactly what

1281
01:59:15,640 --> 01:59:19,680
a transcendental argument generally speak. I'm
not saying Kant pulls it off, but

1282
01:59:19,840 --> 01:59:28,600
like the type of inference or transiental
deduction that's an argument that that's making is

1283
01:59:28,640 --> 01:59:33,199
specifically attempting to ground and distinguish between
particulars. Yeah, I mean all of

1284
01:59:33,239 --> 01:59:42,079
Aristotle's categories at the beginning is dealing
with how to pick out and know objects

1285
01:59:42,119 --> 01:59:45,800
and to give them, give the
relations that make them what they are.

1286
01:59:45,520 --> 01:59:54,359
Right, So quantity, position,
substance. Right, these are all different

1287
01:59:54,399 --> 01:59:57,760
things that are listed in the category. And then cont takes that and then

1288
01:59:57,800 --> 02:00:03,359
tries to make his structure of the
categories, and rather than than being metaphysics,

1289
02:00:03,359 --> 02:00:06,159
they're just in the mind. So
it's it's but it's the same basic

1290
02:00:06,239 --> 02:00:15,279
idea of what categories are to make
knowledge of objects possible. That's so,

1291
02:00:15,279 --> 02:00:16,479
in other words, to have knowledge
of an object, right, if we

1292
02:00:16,520 --> 02:00:20,560
looked at Aerosol's categories, I would
need to know that it is one of

1293
02:00:20,600 --> 02:00:24,079
the things the categories that we need
to know is that is over there,

1294
02:00:24,640 --> 02:00:28,720
and over there is five free feet
from that thing, and it's ten feet

1295
02:00:28,760 --> 02:00:32,920
from this thing. Right, that's
the position and relation is one of the

1296
02:00:32,960 --> 02:00:40,880
things he lists in those categories.
Then he says, what about the fact

1297
02:00:40,920 --> 02:00:46,279
that our relationship to transf categories seems
contingent on fallen nature? I would not

1298
02:00:46,560 --> 02:00:50,359
say that at all has nothing to
do with transpo categories. I have nothing

1299
02:00:50,399 --> 02:00:53,520
to do with being contingent on fallen
nature. So I don't know what you

1300
02:00:53,720 --> 02:00:56,800
said that you say, look up
the laws of physics. I don't know

1301
02:00:56,840 --> 02:01:00,000
how that relates. Thank you for
everything that you're doing. First Corinthians one

1302
02:01:00,079 --> 02:01:04,960
twenty three. Frankie d five dollars. My brother and me, Austin came

1303
02:01:05,039 --> 02:01:11,600
up with a new way form of
calculating how far away a different location is.

1304
02:01:12,399 --> 02:01:14,600
For example, if you look at
a place, we might say it

1305
02:01:14,720 --> 02:01:17,199
is one jay dire stream away,
and if they say it's two day dire

1306
02:01:17,199 --> 02:01:21,840
streams away, you know it's very
far. That's creating. Do you have

1307
02:01:21,880 --> 02:01:25,760
five dollars? Father deagon ad a
nice question for you. Can there be

1308
02:01:25,800 --> 02:01:30,279
a contradiction between first order and second
order thinking? For example, let's say

1309
02:01:30,279 --> 02:01:35,119
somebody says, in the first order
statement the law of identity does not exist.

1310
02:01:35,319 --> 02:01:39,960
Would that result in a contradiction with
a second order statement that they know

1311
02:01:40,079 --> 02:01:47,600
that the law of order latinity doesn't
exist. Yeah? And then what's really

1312
02:01:47,640 --> 02:01:55,039
interesting too that I mean, this
gets really met a level, but it's

1313
02:01:55,079 --> 02:02:00,560
something I developed with my argument from
the immateriality of the intellect and with like

1314
02:02:00,640 --> 02:02:09,560
Bullian logic, you can't have existential
import with universal propositions. So that means

1315
02:02:09,760 --> 02:02:17,039
if you derive a particular for I'll
give you an example, all dogs are

1316
02:02:17,079 --> 02:02:24,319
animals on the Bullion interpretation, that
has no existential import. But if you

1317
02:02:24,399 --> 02:02:30,199
say some dogs are animals, it
does. It implies dogs exist all right,

1318
02:02:31,760 --> 02:02:40,760
So then comes al for Tarski and
al for Tarski. Uh makes this

1319
02:02:41,239 --> 02:02:46,880
distinction between language, optic language,
and meta language. So this is when

1320
02:02:46,880 --> 02:02:50,920
we first start getting into this kind
of first and second order and eventually this

1321
02:02:51,000 --> 02:02:58,600
is going to develop into first and
second order logic. So I started thinking

1322
02:02:58,600 --> 02:03:01,479
about a statement. Now, the
reason why Tarski developed that was because of

1323
02:03:01,520 --> 02:03:08,960
the liar paradox. This sentence is
false and he was able to make Do

1324
02:03:09,000 --> 02:03:12,840
you see how the second and first
order is relevant. He's able to make

1325
02:03:12,840 --> 02:03:17,000
a distinction between the language that talks
about objejects versus language that talks about the

1326
02:03:17,119 --> 02:03:21,279
language, and so something could be
both true and false depending on the distinction.

1327
02:03:21,520 --> 02:03:28,239
Anyways, So then I was thinking
about because I'm doing all this work

1328
02:03:28,279 --> 02:03:30,680
with second order statements. Yeah,
but by the way, that doesn't exist,

1329
02:03:30,840 --> 02:03:34,239
right, because j Mike and some
of the other atheists said there was

1330
02:03:34,279 --> 02:03:41,000
no such thing as that question.
So okay, So even though the philosophers

1331
02:03:41,039 --> 02:03:44,399
are out here talking about it,
it's famous discussion, it doesn't exist because

1332
02:03:44,399 --> 02:03:49,479
there's no such thing. It's a
nonsense thing that you've made up that you

1333
02:03:49,520 --> 02:03:56,960
could talk about the language of objects. So there's knowledge of objects, and

1334
02:03:57,000 --> 02:04:00,439
then there's discussions of the language of
the knowledge of objects. That doesn't exist.

1335
02:04:00,640 --> 02:04:02,800
It's a thing that's made up by
you. Well, I'll make sure

1336
02:04:02,840 --> 02:04:09,680
to go into I put my time
machine in every bean of Patristic faith right

1337
02:04:09,680 --> 02:04:14,319
here, so I'll make sure to
actually go into my bag with Partrific Faith

1338
02:04:14,359 --> 02:04:19,520
coffee, which you can purchase on
in the bio from Jays. Yeah,

1339
02:04:19,520 --> 02:04:23,000
I'll put the link in the chat. This is real coffee too. By

1340
02:04:23,000 --> 02:04:30,960
the way, organic Orthodox based company. Every link is a second order being

1341
02:04:30,159 --> 02:04:36,359
that actually talks about lower order beans, and I think you really appreciate the

1342
02:04:36,399 --> 02:04:44,159
meta level roast of this particular blend. But I've also put a time machine

1343
02:04:44,239 --> 02:04:47,199
here, so I'll make sure to
actually go into my bag a pacific faith

1344
02:04:47,600 --> 02:04:54,760
go back in time and tell Tarski
I'm sorry to tell you Tarski, the

1345
02:04:54,760 --> 02:05:00,520
Internet atheist keyboard Wizard. By the
way, isn't this the whole Douglas Hofstetter

1346
02:05:00,560 --> 02:05:06,000
book that was a Pulitzer Prize winner
gourdell Asherbach, Right, do you know

1347
02:05:06,039 --> 02:05:12,119
what I'm talking about? Yes?
Yeah, where he talks about strange loops

1348
02:05:12,159 --> 02:05:15,600
and the whole point is that there's
there's language, and then there's a language

1349
02:05:15,600 --> 02:05:20,319
about language. And then he talks
about how m c ass artwork displays the

1350
02:05:21,439 --> 02:05:27,880
like geometric patterns that that evidence this
strange loop principle that if you you're just

1351
02:05:28,000 --> 02:05:32,800
raising the question one one step above
one higher order, he says, answer

1352
02:05:32,800 --> 02:05:35,920
that question real quick. I'm sorry
for going on tangent on that. So

1353
02:05:36,079 --> 02:05:48,359
anyways, think about this second order
claim. All propositions are all sentences contain

1354
02:05:48,520 --> 02:05:56,079
words. That's a metaw language,
right, Why because I'm using language to

1355
02:05:56,159 --> 02:06:02,520
talk about the object, right,
Okay, So what happens that's an universal

1356
02:06:02,560 --> 02:06:09,800
proposition, and therefore I conclude to
a particular therefore some words, some sentences

1357
02:06:09,840 --> 02:06:15,199
containing words have I committed on the
bully interpretation an existential's fallacy, And it

1358
02:06:15,239 --> 02:06:19,319
came to this discovery. I actually
wrote mathematicians and logicians and nobody's even thought

1359
02:06:19,319 --> 02:06:24,920
about this, which is weird stuff
that seems so basic that I'm like,

1360
02:06:24,920 --> 02:06:29,960
why has nobody ever thought about this? It can't apply to second order.

1361
02:06:30,840 --> 02:06:35,960
The Boolean existential import rules can't apply
to second order. Why because to answer

1362
02:06:35,960 --> 02:06:42,920
your friend's question in the chat,
I would be making a second order claim.

1363
02:06:43,039 --> 02:06:50,560
That's basically contradictory. Right, I'm
speaking about words and concepts and universals,

1364
02:06:51,680 --> 02:06:57,319
but they don't exist. Do you
see the problem? So to answer

1365
02:06:57,399 --> 02:07:00,359
yeah, because the sentence is engaging
in it. So the sentence itself,

1366
02:07:00,640 --> 02:07:04,880
absolutely you could make second order claims
about first order of things in which you're

1367
02:07:04,880 --> 02:07:10,359
engaged in contradiction. And it's something
I just actually worked out in recently.

1368
02:07:15,960 --> 02:07:19,359
Yeah, I brought when I was
talking to and Deer, I brought up

1369
02:07:19,520 --> 02:07:26,000
the Gardell the move that Gardell makes, and he was like, that's not

1370
02:07:26,119 --> 02:07:30,199
a transcendental argument. I wasn't arguing
that Gardell was making a transfer argument.

1371
02:07:30,199 --> 02:07:34,960
I was saying that the move that
he makes from in the in the argument

1372
02:07:35,000 --> 02:07:39,359
against Russell, when he makes the
set argument, he says that every set

1373
02:07:39,479 --> 02:07:45,079
eventually appeals outside of the set,
And that's an example of the strange loop

1374
02:07:45,520 --> 02:07:53,239
stuff. In the Hofstetter book illustrates
illustrates the point that you're making about the

1375
02:07:53,279 --> 02:08:00,640
move up to second order and the
Tarsky point. It's really difficult. He's

1376
02:08:00,640 --> 02:08:05,000
got his other books really difficult to
metamagical themos but I mean hop setters,

1377
02:08:05,039 --> 02:08:09,920
I mean he's not engaged in a
lot of metaphysical Actually kind of is because

1378
02:08:09,920 --> 02:08:15,279
he says, maybe we can reconcile
some of these things with like Zen philosophy,

1379
02:08:15,319 --> 02:08:20,479
and he talks about zen cones and
how Zen's philosophy sometimes makes the same

1380
02:08:20,560 --> 02:08:26,199
move to first order second order,
but the move is the same. That's

1381
02:08:26,239 --> 02:08:30,239
the point. It's not saying that
that is the transcendental argument. Not saying

1382
02:08:30,239 --> 02:08:35,840
that mc esher's artwork exemplifying this move
is the transcendental argument is really stupid.

1383
02:08:35,960 --> 02:08:41,520
But anyway, Yeah, if anybody
just watches, uh, there's actually some

1384
02:08:43,319 --> 02:08:48,720
lectures that explain the Goerdell lescherback book
to you. It's a really difficult book,

1385
02:08:48,800 --> 02:08:50,079
but if you watch some of those
lectures, you'll see the point that

1386
02:08:50,079 --> 02:08:56,199
we're making here about how whether it's
box the beginning chapters, he gives an

1387
02:08:56,239 --> 02:09:01,319
example of box fugue. One of
his is like fugues, and it's actually

1388
02:09:01,359 --> 02:09:07,560
the musical structure repeats, so it's
a never ending loop. If you play

1389
02:09:07,560 --> 02:09:11,319
it on those old timey pianos or
whatever, that it would just play in

1390
02:09:11,359 --> 02:09:15,159
a loop and it would be the
same structure over and over and over,

1391
02:09:16,560 --> 02:09:20,720
and you can by the way,
Yeah, I actually did want to.

1392
02:09:20,760 --> 02:09:28,239
There's a much better argument than the
tag. It's completely an irrefutable proof.

1393
02:09:30,079 --> 02:09:37,359
But the problem is it's it's such
advanced logic that none of the atheists would

1394
02:09:37,359 --> 02:09:39,680
be able to understand it. So
I never actually used that one. But

1395
02:09:41,800 --> 02:09:45,359
if you come up to Montanica,
I might. I might actually pull it

1396
02:09:45,399 --> 02:09:48,239
out just so we could actually look
at it, and nobody's going to challenges

1397
02:09:48,279 --> 02:09:54,159
in trust me. It's an infallible
proof because I'm much smarter than all of

1398
02:09:54,199 --> 02:09:56,720
you on logic, and so you're
gonna have to just trust me on this.

1399
02:09:58,920 --> 02:10:01,000
I actually was thinking about, like, what if I came up on

1400
02:10:01,039 --> 02:10:03,239
an argument like that. Well,
I do have a proof, but it's

1401
02:10:03,279 --> 02:10:07,800
just far too complicated for you to
understand what the atheist would actually say.

1402
02:10:07,800 --> 02:10:13,439
Yeah, there is a hopstarter.
Giving a lecture in twenty thirteen explaining the

1403
02:10:13,479 --> 02:10:18,800
book and explaining the principle of strange
loops. So if you want to watch

1404
02:10:18,800 --> 02:10:22,479
that lecture, you'll get an idea
about what we're talking about. Yeah,

1405
02:10:22,600 --> 02:10:24,159
I wish he had used some graphics, but it's kind of like just him

1406
02:10:24,199 --> 02:10:28,279
talking. He should have used some
imagery because his book is actually full of

1407
02:10:28,319 --> 02:10:35,840
a lot of images. But anyway, so the next question is Frankie die.

1408
02:10:37,000 --> 02:10:39,399
On a serious note, I've been
struggling with Nietzsche. There's a guy

1409
02:10:39,439 --> 02:10:46,039
whose name is Kosten Alamaru. He
argues that Plato and Nietzsche were arguing for

1410
02:10:46,560 --> 02:10:52,159
an aristocracy and that philosophy is therefore
not real, it's only a tool of

1411
02:10:52,239 --> 02:10:58,479
stake craft. Well, I mean
that would be a theory, but the

1412
02:10:58,560 --> 02:11:01,560
fact that he has this theory that
mean that it's true. So I'll throw

1413
02:11:01,600 --> 02:11:05,279
this one to Father Deacon. What
would you say to somebody who said,

1414
02:11:05,319 --> 02:11:07,960
look, Plato, Nietzsche, they've
shown us. Ultimately the real meaning of

1415
02:11:07,960 --> 02:11:13,439
their philosophy is that there's an ari
aristocratic elite. There's not a real philosophy.

1416
02:11:13,560 --> 02:11:22,359
It's just a tool of control.
Man. Well, suppose I grant

1417
02:11:22,399 --> 02:11:33,239
that there's a certain element of they're
using. Suppose I grant that they're still

1418
02:11:33,279 --> 02:11:39,680
telling me if that's really who Nietzsche, Nichtsche, and Plato are, there's

1419
02:11:39,720 --> 02:11:48,279
still something viable about philosophy because it
exposes the con And I would agree somewhat

1420
02:11:48,279 --> 02:11:52,600
with that, right, I think
all the philosophers are basically con artists.

1421
02:11:52,399 --> 02:12:00,279
Yet I engage in philosophy, in
other words, philosophy and the general sense

1422
02:12:00,600 --> 02:12:09,479
of thinking correctly and with excellence that
you could train yourself in that that.

1423
02:12:11,439 --> 02:12:16,199
How would you fight bad philosophy of
the elites or something like that with good

1424
02:12:16,199 --> 02:12:20,720
philosophy, right, good thinking skills? So even fight granted that, that's

1425
02:12:20,760 --> 02:12:22,000
kind of the move that I've taking. Well, I mean, what did

1426
02:12:22,000 --> 02:12:26,560
those arguments still be some kind of
philosophy and therefore self refuting, because it's

1427
02:12:26,880 --> 02:12:33,039
that's what I'm saying, either self
refuting or they're still saying there's some advantage

1428
02:12:33,960 --> 02:12:39,079
to use this to expose the con
So, and what what would you say

1429
02:12:39,119 --> 02:12:41,760
this like a like a Nietzsche and
it says something like, your quest for

1430
02:12:41,880 --> 02:12:46,159
absolute truth is silly. Everything is
just sort of uh, you know,

1431
02:12:46,600 --> 02:12:50,920
will to power power dynamics, and
you're just duped into thinking that you're finding

1432
02:12:50,920 --> 02:12:54,840
this absolutely true. Absolutely it's an
ass claim so it's the same problem with

1433
02:12:54,880 --> 02:13:00,720
you. It's like, oh,
I'm gonna pretend I'm not making second order

1434
02:13:00,800 --> 02:13:07,640
claims. They are contingent upon the
first order. So just grant me my

1435
02:13:07,680 --> 02:13:11,119
assumption. Right, there are no
absolutes, so I can make an absolute

1436
02:13:11,159 --> 02:13:16,119
statement about it. There are no
absolutes. It's like mind hacked. Five

1437
02:13:16,199 --> 02:13:20,079
dollars, Thank you so much.
Robi ten dollars. Do you think that

1438
02:13:20,159 --> 02:13:26,880
something deeper concerning knowledge was distorted in
the confusion of the languages at the Tower

1439
02:13:26,920 --> 02:13:33,680
of Babbel. I don't know.
I mean, maybe it's possible that humanity's

1440
02:13:33,720 --> 02:13:37,560
knowledge was damaged in some weird way
at that time, But I mean it

1441
02:13:37,560 --> 02:13:41,960
looks like, as per Daniel what
eleven or twelve, knowledge is increasing as

1442
02:13:43,000 --> 02:13:48,479
we get towards the end, So
good question. I don't know. Prodrick

1443
02:13:48,600 --> 02:13:54,920
five dollars. Do you have any
thoughts on Mila Sue's necessity of contingency,

1444
02:13:56,680 --> 02:14:01,319
appearing like he accidentally stumbled across Saint
Maximus is where God exists, I do

1445
02:14:01,479 --> 02:14:07,159
not. Where I exist, God
does not. I don't know what that

1446
02:14:07,199 --> 02:14:09,119
means, honestly. So, I
mean, I've read a lot of Saint

1447
02:14:09,119 --> 02:14:20,439
Maximus, but I don't know what
that means. Maximus is probably just trying

1448
02:14:20,479 --> 02:14:28,119
to express apathetic theology that the inner
being of God in terms of his essence,

1449
02:14:28,039 --> 02:14:33,000
will never know that. I'll never
be there, I'll never perceive it,

1450
02:14:35,199 --> 02:14:39,640
And it might be a statement of
humility to like, where I exist,

1451
02:14:39,680 --> 02:14:43,439
God does not exist, just in
the sense of like, because I'm

1452
02:14:43,520 --> 02:14:48,640
sinful, I don't feel close to
God. But Maximus isn't literally saying that

1453
02:14:48,720 --> 02:14:52,520
God is not omnipresent. So but
I mean, I'm discussing because I don't

1454
02:14:52,560 --> 02:14:56,760
know who. I don't know who
Melisu is or what this had five dollars?

1455
02:14:56,840 --> 02:15:01,560
Is there any atheists that you could
think of who does a decent account

1456
02:15:03,199 --> 02:15:15,560
giving a justification for knowledge? Claims
father Deacon, my PhD advisors and atheists

1457
02:15:15,600 --> 02:15:26,840
at that's freaking He's a Contian scholar, He's a Soilarisian scholar, and it's

1458
02:15:26,840 --> 02:15:33,039
a sophisticated account of It's people like
that that I think of. I would

1459
02:15:33,079 --> 02:15:35,600
say Malpass, but he, as
far as he knows, Malpass kind of

1460
02:15:35,640 --> 02:15:43,960
takes more of like an agnostic like
I don't know kind of position, but

1461
02:15:43,079 --> 02:15:50,840
typically like at the level of like
a good academic professor or something like that

1462
02:15:50,960 --> 02:15:56,239
they could give you a good run
for your money, if that's what I

1463
02:15:56,239 --> 02:16:01,520
mean. I think again it misses
the kind of greater points of missing the

1464
02:16:01,520 --> 02:16:07,800
epistemological forest for the epistemic trees and
getting bogged down on I would just saw

1465
02:16:07,840 --> 02:16:13,079
this in like one of the comments
too, like the tag doesn't work because

1466
02:16:13,119 --> 02:16:20,199
it fits into one of CONT's categories
and probably referring back to Stroud's argument of

1467
02:16:20,279 --> 02:16:26,520
the lack of verification principle and transcendental
deductions that it can never establish an object

1468
02:16:26,640 --> 02:16:35,319
to which it and two problems here, and it's again it's this I hate

1469
02:16:35,360 --> 02:16:39,760
to say it, this pretended autonomy
and kind of holding on to your idols

1470
02:16:41,360 --> 02:16:45,680
so you can't actually see the question. It's like, why is anything that

1471
02:16:45,760 --> 02:16:52,200
cont said even true or dressed?
And we're just granting Kant like his arguments

1472
02:16:52,239 --> 02:16:58,399
work and everything that he said let
me get my cat by the way actually

1473
02:16:58,440 --> 02:17:07,680
works. And again it's just missing
the kind of the more fundamental kind of

1474
02:17:07,760 --> 02:17:13,559
question of even if my argument doesn't
work, tag, it still works.

1475
02:17:13,719 --> 02:17:20,559
Right. Let me put it this
way to you, what comes first the

1476
02:17:20,600 --> 02:17:26,600
necessary condition for all arguments, including
transcendental arguments, or the transcendental arguments,

1477
02:17:26,600 --> 02:17:35,159
which one comes first? Epistemically speaking, what would you say? I was

1478
02:17:35,159 --> 02:17:39,239
reading Phillip's comment, I missed what
you're saying. Apologize. So I want

1479
02:17:39,280 --> 02:17:43,520
to one way to kind of illustrate
why none of these people's objections will ever

1480
02:17:43,600 --> 02:17:48,200
work. I want to ask them, epistemically speaking, what comes first?

1481
02:17:48,680 --> 02:18:00,719
The necessary conditions for arguments, including
transcendental arguments or the transcendental argument. The

1482
02:18:00,959 --> 02:18:07,079
condition the conditions that have to come
first. Yeah, the necessary conditions.

1483
02:18:07,120 --> 02:18:13,079
So what that means is, even
if my transcendental argument fails, the question

1484
02:18:13,200 --> 02:18:15,879
still stands. Do you see what
I mean? Why? Because yeah,

1485
02:18:16,360 --> 02:18:20,920
yeah, right, I mean,
let's let's say that somebody was engaged,

1486
02:18:20,959 --> 02:18:26,040
like was arguing very poorly. Right, Let's say they argue TAG very poorly,

1487
02:18:26,200 --> 02:18:28,239
like I don't know a lot of
the Matt Slick or one of these

1488
02:18:28,280 --> 02:18:31,680
people. Right, Let's say they
argued it very poorly, like, the

1489
02:18:31,799 --> 02:18:37,520
question is still there, right,
Yes, And that's what I'm saying,

1490
02:18:37,600 --> 02:18:41,360
even if I granted it to you
that like the tag is open to these

1491
02:18:41,399 --> 02:18:48,120
continent critiques of Stroud and blah blah
blah, all this different stuff, or

1492
02:18:48,120 --> 02:18:54,799
I made a mistake or something like
that. The question all it means is

1493
02:18:54,920 --> 02:19:00,360
I wasn't that great with my language. The argument prior to argument still stands,

1494
02:19:00,399 --> 02:19:03,159
doesn't it. Yeah, and this
was my point to am Deer or

1495
02:19:03,239 --> 02:19:05,440
J Mike. I forget which one, but yeah, this was the point

1496
02:19:05,440 --> 02:19:09,520
I was making of them. BMX
nineteen six six ten dollars. Thank you

1497
02:19:09,559 --> 02:19:13,399
so much for that, Big Boss, twenty dollars. Dang. The FDA

1498
02:19:13,600 --> 02:19:18,680
Food and Drug Administration is against people
playing tag win will to Tyranny end,

1499
02:19:20,280 --> 02:19:26,639
so he's doing a little bit of
pun with your name and other things like

1500
02:19:26,840 --> 02:19:30,440
tag attack. Thank you so much, Big Boss. Appreciate attack Dog five

1501
02:19:30,520 --> 02:19:33,520
hundred and five dollars. Jay,
I'm just starting to understand get into presop.

1502
02:19:33,639 --> 02:19:37,959
I'm slow boy. What are the
top five books or papers or essays

1503
02:19:37,959 --> 02:19:43,120
for a nube that doesn't have a
philosophy background. I would say watch the

1504
02:19:43,159 --> 02:19:48,280
Bonsenstein Debate about two or three times
and take notes. I would say,

1505
02:19:48,559 --> 02:19:56,399
read the very easy introduction book Ultimate
Proof by doctor Jason Lyle. Then I

1506
02:19:56,399 --> 02:20:00,520
would read something like Always Ready by
Greg Bnson, and then I would read

1507
02:20:01,000 --> 02:20:07,360
Father Deacon Ananias's papers, and I
would read then Contingency of Knowledge by russ

1508
02:20:07,399 --> 02:20:13,920
Manyon. All right, guys,
I want to remind you that we do

1509
02:20:13,000 --> 02:20:16,479
have a show sponsor. Who is
Chalk dot com. Now is your paper

1510
02:20:18,159 --> 02:20:24,959
public or not yet? Yes?
Here, I'm just because a lot of

1511
02:20:24,959 --> 02:20:26,440
people were saying, hey, we
want to read this, and we we

1512
02:20:26,879 --> 02:20:31,159
got through several key points, but
we didn't get through every single thing because

1513
02:20:31,200 --> 02:20:35,879
it's uh, I mean, it's
not super long. It's a twelve page

1514
02:20:35,879 --> 02:20:39,000
paper. But so if you guys
want to read the paper, father deacon

1515
02:20:39,040 --> 02:20:52,159
and will give you the link right
somewhere there is somebody told me that unless

1516
02:20:52,159 --> 02:20:58,360
you subscribe to Academy dot e d
U can't download the You have to log

1517
02:20:58,399 --> 02:21:01,760
in with like your face book or
your Google is how you do that?

1518
02:21:03,000 --> 02:21:07,079
Okay, you can read it though
it's yeah, you can read it,

1519
02:21:07,120 --> 02:21:11,079
but to download you have to be
logged in through Facebook or Google. Okay,

1520
02:21:11,239 --> 02:21:15,280
thanks for yeah, and I guys
almost all my papers are on there.

1521
02:21:16,639 --> 02:21:20,879
Remember to head on over to chalk
dot com for the best in supplementation.

1522
02:21:20,040 --> 02:21:24,079
You can get the Male Vitality Stack, which will include there on the

1523
02:21:24,200 --> 02:21:28,959
front page of chalk dot com,
c choq dot com both the Action two

1524
02:21:30,000 --> 02:21:35,520
point zero, the ton Cattle ee
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1525
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1526
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any toxic material. It doesn't have
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of a GMO hybrid Frankenstein underground base. It's all better than organic, stringently

1528
02:21:56,159 --> 02:22:01,920
purified to the max. They're extremists
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1529
02:22:01,920 --> 02:22:03,399
com, so head on over there
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1530
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fifty percent off. And uh,
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1532
02:22:11,600 --> 02:22:16,159
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1533
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benefit from chalk dot com by using
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1534
02:22:20,520 --> 02:22:24,399
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1535
02:22:24,399 --> 02:22:30,280
you can use the promo code j
Y five three life JAY five three l

1536
02:22:30,440 --> 02:22:33,520
f E. Uh. And good
news, guys, we will be doing

1537
02:22:33,079 --> 02:22:37,559
an event in Vegas in June,
so look for the Vegas June event.

1538
02:22:39,239 --> 02:22:41,799
Father Diggon, I don't know if
you've sold your tickets to your event.

1539
02:22:41,840 --> 02:22:48,639
If you want to plug that you
can. Yeah, So the twenty first

1540
02:22:48,879 --> 02:23:00,680
ends the Orthodox Montanica discount UH tickets, the early bird tickets, so get

1541
02:23:00,719 --> 02:23:07,600
those. We are expected to sell
out. We're way ahead of where we

1542
02:23:07,600 --> 02:23:13,000
were ticket sales last year, and
we're going to get a lot more.

1543
02:23:13,200 --> 02:23:20,000
And also we've if many of you
don't know, in Missoula, there's a

1544
02:23:20,040 --> 02:23:24,600
mega church, evangelical church about two
thousand people that are converting to Orthodoxy,

1545
02:23:26,159 --> 02:23:31,879
so we'll probably get a lot of
them too, So don't procrastinate, get

1546
02:23:31,879 --> 02:23:39,280
your tickets to put it in the
chat right there for the conference and what

1547
02:23:39,280 --> 02:23:43,799
what what's going on at at your
conference? This year? It's themed around

1548
02:23:43,000 --> 02:23:48,239
is it film or icons? Theology
to icon So we're gonna have film famous

1549
02:23:48,239 --> 02:23:56,399
film directors like Nathan Jacobs who's also
a doctor of philosophy and uh, I

1550
02:23:56,520 --> 02:24:03,520
think he was a student doctor David
Bradsha at one point and uh father Turbo

1551
02:24:03,680 --> 02:24:11,760
Qualls who's an iconography also father Matthew
Garrett from Boise who's an iconographer and WI

1552
02:24:11,959 --> 02:24:18,600
Corps. And Shane Swinson who is
our resident iconographer paying the temple. Yeah,

1553
02:24:18,719 --> 02:24:22,840
shout out to Shane, longtime buddy
of ours. So and then it

1554
02:24:22,840 --> 02:24:26,719
looks like we might get some other
film directors and some other famous guests that

1555
02:24:26,840 --> 02:24:37,360
I Stanley Kuberg's coming, Mel Gibson
is coming. Uh, that's a jokes.

1556
02:24:37,399 --> 02:24:43,719
Burgs, that's a joke. Yeah, Martin Heideger probably will show up,

1557
02:24:46,159 --> 02:24:56,600
Lenny Lenny rievanshaul will be there.
Yeah, who's it's a joke.

1558
02:24:58,520 --> 02:25:01,479
People. Yeah, Now they're going
to be like you, I demand my

1559
02:25:01,559 --> 02:25:07,399
ticket refunded because you lied and told
me that Stanley Kuber would be there and

1560
02:25:07,440 --> 02:25:13,879
he's not here. You're a liar. Whatether if if I had to get

1561
02:25:13,920 --> 02:25:20,760
any film director who would be your
favorite film director to bring in, they

1562
02:25:20,760 --> 02:25:28,399
don't have to be orthodox. Well, I think everybody would prefer Mel Gibson

1563
02:25:28,479 --> 02:25:33,680
probably like as the most like based
film director. I mean, somebody said,

1564
02:25:33,760 --> 02:25:35,600
is Tom Cruise coming? No,
but Tom kom is coming, and

1565
02:25:35,639 --> 02:25:41,079
that's even better, So I don't. I mean, you would probably be

1566
02:25:41,959 --> 02:25:46,719
better situated to know orthodox directors.
I'm trying to think of the only ones

1567
02:25:46,760 --> 02:25:50,280
I've heard of are the ones that
you know about. I think I don't.

1568
02:25:50,319 --> 02:25:52,360
I can't think of any any other
ones that are. We could get

1569
02:25:52,479 --> 02:26:00,399
Nick caged because you know that I've
met him and had some conversations with down

1570
02:26:00,399 --> 02:26:07,159
at the Lava Lounge and Angeles.
Oh you know who should get Speaking of

1571
02:26:07,200 --> 02:26:18,000
Tom's Tom waits, he has nothing
to do with it, so I said

1572
02:26:18,000 --> 02:26:22,719
get so, I said, get
quit, and Tarantino to go. Yeah,

1573
02:26:22,719 --> 02:26:28,760
I don't think that's gonna happen.
But anyway, thank you for coming

1574
02:26:28,799 --> 02:26:35,280
back. My mind is much I'm
so tired from traveling, so thank you

1575
02:26:35,319 --> 02:26:39,799
for coming on. And everybody should
read the paper and anything you want to

1576
02:26:39,840 --> 02:26:50,360
leave us with all of you have
at we're halfway through Lent. Have a

1577
02:26:50,399 --> 02:26:54,479
great rest of lent. My God
give you the grace necessary for that.

1578
02:26:54,959 --> 02:27:01,760
Again, you've got our patristic faith. Coffee, Jay, I know that

1579
02:27:01,799 --> 02:27:07,200
you're starting up some I think I'm
going to be releasing some courses after PASCA.

1580
02:27:07,239 --> 02:27:11,840
I'm going to start releasing some new
courses, canvas courses, so stay

1581
02:27:11,879 --> 02:27:20,239
tuned. Also, we're bringing on
other PhD philosophy Orthodox philosophy professors onto particular

1582
02:27:20,280 --> 02:27:24,959
Faith to deliver courses, so stay
tuned. We're really excited about that.

1583
02:27:26,719 --> 02:27:33,239
And just like you, Ja,
we want to provide quality university education that

1584
02:27:33,399 --> 02:27:37,840
isn't woke, it isn't broke,
and it won't cause you to go broke

1585
02:27:37,879 --> 02:27:39,799
to for an affordable price. Yeah, I think that's the model. I

1586
02:27:39,799 --> 02:27:43,520
mean, the future will be this. People are not going to care about

1587
02:27:43,719 --> 02:27:50,520
these mind control brainwashing universities and they're
going to be moving to learning what they

1588
02:27:50,520 --> 02:27:52,680
want to learn on their own initiative. And that's a much better model anyway.

1589
02:27:52,840 --> 02:27:56,319
So that's what I think the future
is. So yeah, it's good

1590
02:27:56,319 --> 02:28:01,000
to hear that. Big Boston's another
five dollars and says if you don't subscribe

1591
02:28:01,040 --> 02:28:03,719
to Jason Elysis, you're sigh opping
yourself. That's a good selling point.

1592
02:28:03,760 --> 02:28:07,760
I like it. So, yeah, you can also subscribe to my website

1593
02:28:07,760 --> 02:28:13,040
get access to the archives. I
forgot to mention that I did finish this,

1594
02:28:13,479 --> 02:28:16,239
so if you guys didn't see the
really deep dive that we did on

1595
02:28:16,319 --> 02:28:20,280
Through the Looking Glass, I highly
recommend it. Actually we touched on some

1596
02:28:20,360 --> 02:28:22,639
of the strange loops stuff because Lewis
Carroll, if he didn't know it,

1597
02:28:22,760 --> 02:28:28,520
was a mathematician and a lot of
the word games and word play is highly

1598
02:28:28,559 --> 02:28:31,520
philosophical. In fact, Father Deacon, you might find this interesting. There's

1599
02:28:31,600 --> 02:28:37,520
elements of the later chapters Through the
Looking Glass that not only deal with the

1600
02:28:37,600 --> 02:28:45,319
question of identity, but questions of
like substance and accident and Arisitilian questions.

1601
02:28:45,360 --> 02:28:46,920
There's a lot of weird stuff in
this book that you wouldn't think about.

1602
02:28:46,959 --> 02:28:52,159
Perhaps even counting by identity versus accounting
by division, I think comes up.

1603
02:28:52,440 --> 02:28:56,680
And again Lewis Carroll was a weirdo
for sure, and we covered that in

1604
02:28:56,680 --> 02:29:00,040
Part one, but he does include
a lot of interest. Seriously, he

1605
02:29:00,120 --> 02:29:03,719
was accused of being a ped oh
because of well, odd things that happen.

1606
02:29:05,719 --> 02:29:09,040
He was in the circles of a
lot of the Golden Dawn ritual magic

1607
02:29:09,079 --> 02:29:13,319
weirdos. So there's a lot of
bizarre stuff with this book and with him,

1608
02:29:13,399 --> 02:29:18,159
And I'll be doing the part two
very soon because I just finished it

1609
02:29:18,479 --> 02:29:24,239
on the plane. And if you
don't know, it also has questions relating

1610
02:29:24,280 --> 02:29:28,079
to like word concept fallacies. So
a lot of the stuff that yeah,

1611
02:29:28,159 --> 02:29:31,920
actually like when she goes into Wonderland
or when she goes through the looking glass

1612
02:29:33,040 --> 02:29:37,920
into the opposite world, the mirror
world, everything functions like fallacies are the

1613
02:29:37,959 --> 02:29:45,120
case. So there's contradictions happening.
Words are misunderstood in two different references to

1614
02:29:45,159 --> 02:29:52,000
different senses, and so Part of
the magic of Wonderland is identifying and picking

1615
02:29:52,040 --> 02:29:58,040
out things like fallacies and work concept
fallacies, et cetera. So Part two

1616
02:29:58,120 --> 02:30:00,920
will be up in the next few
days. And thank you for your patience

1617
02:30:01,319 --> 02:30:07,040
while I was gone hanging out with
Sam Hyde. That would a super awesome,

1618
02:30:07,440 --> 02:30:09,159
very very thankful. It was a
blessing to be able to go do

1619
02:30:09,239 --> 02:30:13,840
that. Very thankful to them for
hosting me up there and putting me up

1620
02:30:13,840 --> 02:30:18,040
and having me get beat up by
the Olympic trainer dude. So I got

1621
02:30:18,040 --> 02:30:22,280
to do some boxing. It was
intense. It was an asthetic endeavor.

1622
02:30:22,360 --> 02:30:26,280
I really enjoyed it. So anyway, it's gonna be a fun PGL when

1623
02:30:26,280 --> 02:30:28,559
it comes out. And thank you
guys so much, and we'll be back

1624
02:30:28,680 --> 02:30:31,440
very soon. Everybody, have a
good night. God bless