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As we're starting to see increased attacks
affecting mining companies, you're starting to get

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boardrooms and senior leadership team going to
their you know those cybersecurit leads or CSOs

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and going hey are we good?
Welcome everyone to the Industrial Security Podcast.

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My name is Nate Nelson. I'm
here as usual with Andrew Ginter, the

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vice president of Industrial Security at Waterfall
Security Solutions, who will introduce the subject

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and guest of our show today.
Andrew, how's it gone? I'm very

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well, Thank you, Nate.
Our guest today is Rob Lebay. He

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is the chair of the Mining and
Metals ISAAC, which is information sharing at

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Analysis Center, and he's going to
be looking at industrial cybersecurity from you know,

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almost from an IT perspective. He's
going to be taking us through SIXT

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to integrating it and ot you know
networks, people processes everything. All Right,

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Then, without further ado, let's
get into your interview. Hello Rob,

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and thank you for joining us on
the podcast. Before we get started,

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can I ask you to say a
few words about yourself for our listeners,

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and you know a few words about
the good work that you're doing at

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the Metals and Mining IAC. Sure, absolutely. I'm Raphael Bay. I've

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been working in cybersecurity for just over
twenty years, the last ten or so

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of them focused on securing in the
mining industry, in particular operational technology.

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Through that process, we started the
Mining Metals ISSAC to have a place where

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mining companies can work together and collaborate
not just some intelligence, but also best

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practices and processes to secure or the
operational technology in our plants and the autonomous

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systems in our minds. Thanks for
that. Our topic is cybersecurity in in

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mining. We're talking about, you
know, six steps to to integrate it

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and OT in the mining space.
Before we dive into those details, though,

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you know, it's been a long
time since we've had anyone on the

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show from the mining industry, and
you're with the Metals and Mining Isaac.

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You know, I'm not sure we've
ever had anyone on from metals. I'm

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not even sure what that is.
So before we dive into security, can

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you can you give us sort of
a big picture of the physical process.

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What is metals? What is mining? Um? You know, how are

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these systems automated? What are the
kinds of cybersecurity concerns that you see in

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this industry. Metals and mining are
two separate but very highly integrated and interdependent

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industries. So if we think about
what this world needs as our economies change,

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as we work forward, move forward
with de carbonization, with you know,

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clean energy, the reality is everything
we have on this planet as a

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building block is either grown like our
food or trees or lumber or its mind.

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So all the material we need to
support this transition, whether it be

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you know, copper for electric cars
or electric infrastructure, and you know cadmium

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and lithium for batteries, as steel
for wind turbines, all of those commodities

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have to be mine. It's the
only place we know how to get them

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today. And so when we think
about you know, the metals industry,

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that's the next step in that process. As that or gets dug up and

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mine from the earth, then it's
the process of refining that and turning it

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into usable metal UM that can be
used to build UM you know, your

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tesla or your your wind turbine,
UM or your power grid. So those

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those industries, as global industries are
critical to to where we need to get

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to UM as a society, as
a planet. And so if you think

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about what a mine might look like
um. You know, at its core,

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it's a simple process, right,
it's you know, taking big rocks,

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turning them into little rocks, and
extracting the metals from those. But

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the process to do that is huge
from a scale perspective. UM, when

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you look at open pit mining,
which is commonly used in things like um,

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you know, copper and gold and
zinc and other basement commodities. These

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are minds you can see from space. They are you know, several kilometers

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you know wide, some of them
are several kilometers deep, and in those

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environments you've got you know, fleets
of huge trucks. You know, these

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are trucks with seven hundred gun capacities
of rocks. And while traditionally those are

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maintained and operated by drivers, we're
at the point now we're very quickly those

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are being passed over to autonomous systems, and so those vehicles are becoming autonomous,

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you know, combined with the processes
required to drill into the earth blast

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the rock away, though again traditionally
done by people, but because we have

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a knee to de risk and make
that safer and more efficient, those tasks

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are being turned over very rapidly.
To autonomous automated systems. And then at

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the mind, you know, other
minds are underground, and these are minds

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that have shafts running in a lot
of cases dozens of kilometers deep into the

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earth. And then we've got you
know, automated systems again for drilling,

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blasting, and hauling rock. But
then we also have systems that are providing

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ventilation and fume control for the people
that are working there. You know a

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lot of battery electric vehicles underground,
and so we have charging infrastructure and electric

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infrastructure, and so you know the
scale and the complexity of these well,

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they vary widely from mind to mind. In all cases, there's a significant

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safety safety risk component. There's a
significant environmental component to ensure that we protect

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the environment while we do this and
have left us in a position to reclaim

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that area of earth once we're done
and return that to nature when the work

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is finished. So huge challenges from
a safety from obviously from a production from

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an environmental sustainability perspective that goes into
into mining. And then you know on

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the plant side, we have all
the control systems you had seen any other

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manufacturing electric environment, so you know, data systems process control systems, you

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know, PLCs, motor control units, all of these systems are there.

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And then you remember these mines are
typically not located in urban centers, you

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know, you don't put a mine
in the middle of a major city.

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Are located in remote areas difficult to
get two areas, which requires a lot

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of remote control and remote access to
enable remote support in those places. So

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you take that complexity and you layer
on an industry that's rapidly changing. UM

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it's an industry that's that's discovered the
power of machine learning and artificial intelligence to

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optimize and make their their minds and
their operation from safer, more sustainable,

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and to allow the mining of the
posits that might not have been economically feasible

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using older methods. And so we've
got these control systems and operational technology systems,

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you know, based on old technology
in a lot of cases that was

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you know, designed several years ago
or decades ago, and we're layering on

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top of that modern remote control,
modern cloud based AI and machine learning on

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top of systems that whenever architectured were
designed for that. You know, we're

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taking um autonomy and looking for ways
to automated equipment that maybe wasn't originally architected

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for that, and so a lot
of the challenges how do we do that

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in a safe way? You know, how do we protect an environment that's

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rapidly commoditizing and you know, specialist
dual consentric ring mode bus and you know,

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specialists dedicated systems have been replaced by
PC infrastructure, Windows networks and um,

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you know commodity, Cisco switches on
top of that, you know,

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legacy OT environment. So there's a
lot of challenges in the space to I'm

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sure we can keep production, but
more importantly, to make sure that the

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teams at that site go home to
the families every day, to be sure

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that the environment's protected so that those
areas are there for us to us in

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nature, to use and live in
and enjoy for the next hundred years.

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So, you know, it's a
challenging space, makes an exciting space as

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we go forward. All Right,
So Rob covered a lot there, but

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there's been something that he said early
on that's been sitting with me, which

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is he was talking about automation and
how automation is increasingly taking over for jobs

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in mining that we're historically done by
people. Now Andrew, you and I

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talk a lot about safety on this
show. How does the industrial security calculus

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change though, if in one of
the most safety critical safety risk industries in

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industrial security, namely mining, you
start to find fewer people at these actual

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sites, maybe then safety becomes a
lower wrong of the totem pole because all

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the jobs being done by machines.
That's a very good observation. And you

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know, the short answer is yes, you know, to me, it's

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a very good thing that jobs that
were you know, historically putting human lives

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at risk if there was any kind
of malfunction are being automated to the point

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where robots are taking the risk,
not people anymore. But you know,

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all of this increased automation is sort
of being coupled with remote operation, and

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remote means you know, you're communicating
through the Internet, you've got software that's

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protecting you, not hardware. It's
you know, you're increasing the risk,

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the cyber risk. Rather, you're
increasing the opportunities for attack by operating everything

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remotely and by automating everything. But
you're taking the safety consequence off the table,

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and in a sense this makes the
the the cybersecurity calculus easier. Um,

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you still have very consequential potential outcomes, but they tend to be dollar

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outcomes, you know, large dollar
outcomes, rather than human life outcomes.

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And so that does it does simplify
your your your cybersecurity equations. Um,

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it's still a very big deal though. We're talking multi billion dollar investments in

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one of these big minds, so
you're still talking about potentially you know,

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very serious consequences dollar wise and in
a sense reliability wise, m if if

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you if you compromise these systems.
But in a sense, it's easier to

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design security mechanisms for very large dollar
losses than it is to design them for

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you know, large you know,
human casualty losses. If you have a

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whole crew that's you know, underground
and is at risk because you've met you

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know, somebody is messed with the
ventilation, that's very very bad. Whereas

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you know, you know, a
couple of these seven hundred times trucks colliding

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and you know, suffering massive damages
with no human operators inside of them is

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very bad. It's not very very
bad. So it does help. Now

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when you talk about it being easier
to design security around money problems rather than

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human life problems, are you talking
about just the sheer severity of the consequences,

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like the risks involved, Like it's
so much more important to protect human

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lives, and so it's easier to
just be talking about machines. Or is

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it that the nature of protecting against
financial losses against machines is characteristically different,

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like the kinds of security you might
otherwise be investing in talking about putting in

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place is easier to implement. It's
it's a little both. But you know,

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let me give you some concrete examples
on the safety side. If my

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life depended on an air fol system
working, I would need to be confident

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that the computers controlling it are really
secure. I would prefer that they were

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air gapped, that you could not
reach them from remotely. I would prefer

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that there were mechanical fail safes,
that there would be two and three sets

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of pumps to get the air down
there and get the toxic fumes if any

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out. You know, there's extra
redundancy, there's extra isolation requirements, there's

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you know, I would want detectors
that are mechanical, not computer controlled.

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In addition to the computer controlled.
There's just when you've got safety that you

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have entire layers or you know,
two extra layers sometimes of protection in place.

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And so if you can eliminate a
couple of those most expensive layers,

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it does simplify everything. And you
know, if if everything's being operated remotely,

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I really don't want my safety system
being operated remotely. Um. So

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again, you can operate equipment protection
systems remotely sort of more confidently than operating

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human safety systems remotely because nobody's there
at the plant. So yeah, it's

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it's it's a lillaboth. Wow,
there's you know, there's a lot going

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on there. Um, it's a
complicated space and you know we're going to

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be speaking to uh, you know, six steps to integrating it and OT

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uh you know, security wise and
otherwise in the medals and mining industry,

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you know ITOT integration is a phrase
that was coined in like I think two

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thousand and five or so by an
analyst at the Gardner Group. Um,

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you know, it can mean integrating
networks, you know, connecting up networks.

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It can mean integrating technology stacks.
It can mean integrating teams and business

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processes. And like I said,
this this kind of all started almost twenty

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years ago. So what does ITOT
integration mean to you and to the industry,

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and you know, sort of what's
the state of that process twenty years

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after it was kind of invented.
Yeah, I think when I look at

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mining, and I think the same
is true in a lot of the resource

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based operational technology spaces. When I
look at mining even ten years ago,

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or even when looking five years ago, at most miners, you had your

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corporate network, corporate systems, and
they've looked very much like any other business.

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And then you had at each mine
an individual operational technology system, unique

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technology, unique design, unique architecture
that is really driven by that site,

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that plant, that general manager owning
that I'm really in a lot of ways,

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each mind, each operation being its
own thief too. And what we've

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seen over the last ten years rapidly
accelerating I would say for the last five

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years, is as technology changes and
we have the ability to commoditize a lot

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of those systems that can drive down
costs, which is wonderful, but it

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also opens up the door now to
you know, using things like AI,

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machine learning to UM help optimize.
So I mean that makes sense, you

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know, business wise, every every
you know, industrial automation operation wants to

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improve their efficiencies. They want to
use, you know, cheaper stuff.

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They want to use the standard stuff
to reduce training costs. But you know,

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the more it in my books,
you know, the more that OT

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systems look like IT systems, the
more you can attack the OT systems the

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same way you attack the IT systems. And you know there's thousands of ransomware

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incidents on IT systems every year.
We really can't afford that on the OT

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side. I mean, what do
you do about I don't know, risk?

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Sort of, Yes, you're migrating
technology, are you not also migrating

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risk? You are, and you're
introducing new risks to the operations that maybe,

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you know, somebody who's been mining
for twenty years hasn't had to think

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of before at the site level.
You know, we're seeing now if you

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open up the news, you know
almost quarterly, if not more often,

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a mining company needing to shut down
operations because of a ransomware incident or the

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ransomware incident shutting it down for them. You know, there was one in

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Canada in January, for example.
You know, another one in Germany in

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March, and so those are becoming
exceedingly common. The other challenge risk wise

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is with the geopolitical situation globally,
which you know, I've got no idea

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where it's going, but it's certainly
not going to get less complicated. Mining

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and the metals industries sit at the
beginning of every single global supply chain.

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So if we have adversaries that want
to disrupt those supply chains, targeting mining

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in the metals industry is a great
opportunity to interfere with international, national,

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international supply chains at a macro level
very efficiently, because yeah, that's the

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commonplace they'll start. And so the
risk is going up and the accessibility of

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the systems is going up, and
so because of that, we're starting to

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see last face three years, the
corporate IT teams being asked to step into

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operational technology to you know, sort
to manage that risk, to secure those

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systems, to secure those plans,
and quite frankly will last few years.

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Those teams are struggling, and so
one of the focuses for me and for

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the I FACT is to come up
with a plan or a cycle or a

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model that those teams can apply and
use in order to secure operational technology from

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the I T side and secure that
shared technology and our you know, our

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topic is six steps to integrating itnot
This was a an article you wrote recently

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sort of summarizing your your experience in
the field. These six steps that you're

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talking about, what what are they? So really it starts with key So

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the steps, the first stages really
are learning and building relationships with the people

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of sight and establishing trust. The
next the next two are really a bit

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understanding the technology. It's understanding the
assets and understanding the risks and quantifying those

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risks. And then the last you
know, then we get into deploying tools

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and TTPs and practices to that environment, followed by testing invalidation of what you've

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done to be short, actually working, and so you know those are those

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are those six steps going through?
Okay, and it all starts with relationships.

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Can you can you take a little
deeper? What what is building relationships

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mean? So when I started pushing
or deploying, you know, into operational

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technology, you know a lot of
teams make the mistake of thinking that the

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technology is the same Windows as Windows, active directors, active directory at Cisco,

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switches at Cisco switch. But really
in the environment of mining, where

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safety is such an issue, reliance
and such an issue. The environment that

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you run in is very different.
It's not a it's a it's an environment

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where availability and safetyre king, not
data integrity. For example. You need

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to take the time to learn the
process, to learn the business, to

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build relationships with people, to understand
what's going on. Really, that phase

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is really about learning that operation,
how it works, and earning your right

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to be at the table upsite.
Building the relationships you know from the top

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down. So if you're sitting in
a senior Mind managers meeting the GM,

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you at least understand all the words
that are being spoken at that meeting that

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it's no longer a foreign language to
you. That you know all the people

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that are there, You understand what
their priorities are, what keeps them up

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at night. So that's that first
step, and really I consider that earning

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your right to be at the table. So once you've earned that right to

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be at that table, it then
becomes an exercise of establishing trust in your

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abilities and your team's abilities not just
to secure stuff, but to deliver on

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and protect what's important to that site. And it's in these conversations that a

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lot of security people make mistakes because
they'll go in and say, well,

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here's the right way to do something. The right way to patch is to

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patch monthly, you know, right
after patch shoose day. We have to

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get rid of these legacy you know
Windows ninety eight or Windows XP systems that

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are kicking around. We just we
have to do that. But the reality

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is in operational technology, the right
thing to do is not often correct.

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It's not always correct, and so
by building trust and understanding how you can

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adjust security posture to what you learned
in the previous step, you start to

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be seen as somebody who has the
priorities of that operation as your priorities,

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not trying to just push security best
practices from the IT side. In the

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beginning of the industrial security revolution,
engineers were told to use IT security principles,

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protect the information. We were told. We knew this was a poor

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fit, but it was all we
had. Today. The top security priority

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at industrial sites is safety. Don't
kill anyone, don't cause an environmental disaster.

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And the second priority is reliability.
Do not shut down our factory or

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infrastructure. Today, safe and reliable
operations use unhackable protections from cyber risks,

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not just cybersecurity. For a deeper
look at the evolution of the revolution.

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We invite you to download Waterfall's report
on the Emerging Consensus for Industrial Security Engineering.

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You can access the report at the
Waterfall website Waterfall dash Security dot com,

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00:25:37,920 --> 00:25:42,000
slash Engineering dash Consensus, or just
go to the resources menu and click

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on white papers and ebooks. So, Nate, let me, you know,

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let me chime in here and just
sort of remind you and our listeners

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of something I mentioned in the introduction. You heard Rob give his sort of,

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you know, description of his background. He came from the IT space

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into cybersecurity and mining, which is
sort of a bit of an unusual perspective

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on the space. I'm thinking the
last one hundred episodes of the show here,

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most of our guests have been from
the engineering side talking about cybersecurity.

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You know, in the first fifteen
years of the industrial security discipline, it

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was mostly engineers who were responsible and
stayed responsible for the you know, the

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industrial automation for the physical process.
And you know, we're sort of pulled

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into the cybersecurity because they had to. It was a new risk. They

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had to deal with it. This
is what engineers do. They took advice

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from the IT people, what we're
seeing in the last about five years is

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that increasingly enterprise security teams are being
told you're now responsible for industrial cybersecurity,

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go fix that problem. This is
something that you did not really see,

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you know, in the first ten
fifteen years of the discipline. We are

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seeing it very recently. And so
you know, Rob's perspective here really is

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he's giving advice to IT teams,
to enterprise security teams who are sort of

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going through the same life cycle heated, which is here, you're responsible.

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Now, you figure out how to
work with the engineers. You figure out

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how to make this happen, because
you're the ones that you know are going

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to be held accountable if if there's
an incident at the MIND And so you

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know Rob's perspective here's a little unusual
because he's giving advice to IT people sort

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of as an IT person who's made
the transition, not as an engineer saying

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here's what I wish you would do. You know, here's Rob's is telling

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us what actually worked for him.
That's the first two steps. Build relationships,

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established trust. They both those those
both sound like sort of people focused

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tasks and goals. You know,
you've got four more steps are we you

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know, do you dive into the
technology next? What comes next? So

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you know, once you've taken the
time to build relationships and trust, the

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next piece is to really understand the
technology landscape and the assets of that site.

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And it's a bit different the IT
world where IT land. We often

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have a CMDB that lists all of
our systems, or we can run a

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scanner to discover all the systems on
the network. Can get us started on

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that process. Those don't work in
the operation. We can't use scanners to

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find things. Oftentimes assets are listed
in maintenance systems or on spreadsheets or SharePoint

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lists, very non traditional places.
So you've got a process to go through

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to not only find and identify all
the assets, but also have a great

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sense of what they do. What
part of the plant do they drive?

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Are they safety sensitive? What happens
as we go down is something we're to

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fail? What's the worst thing that
could happen? Does the protest stoppers?

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Somebody get hurt? And that process
will take a while as you dig through

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not only the maintenance systems, but
a lot of things you're not going to

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find. You may have to walk
the site and identify and find assets yourself.

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You might have to use passive network
monitoring pulling data off switches and logs

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off switches to find assets. And
you know, you might have to do

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a search on showdown and find those
assets that might not even be connected to

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00:29:45,519 --> 00:29:51,359
your network but might have se SIM
cards in them and actually be connected to

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the public cell network in those environments. And so you can't underestimate the challenge

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of identify those assets. And then
the final piece of the context is actually

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quantifying the risk. So that's where
we take the assets to be found.

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The process, we've learned the actual
threat information in mining that would come from

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the mining a metal's IAC or other
sources, and actually begin to use a

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model to quantify that risk and communicate
it. I once spent two months shadowing

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a MIND general manager, and everybody
going into his office told him how the

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sky was falling, the world was
going to come to an end. They

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become very quickly immune to the chicken
little sky is falling. Five. So

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you have to take the risks,
quantify them into dollars with some model,

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whether you use fare or some other
quantification model, and and actually quantify the

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risks so you can prioritize where you've
got to focus and where you've got to

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work based on actual risk numbers.
Okay, so understand the assets, quantify

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the risks so that your your business
decision makers can make you informed decisions.

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What's next in this process? So
the next thing you're going to do is

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for the risks and the controls you
identify, you identified as things you're going

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00:31:30,240 --> 00:31:37,000
to help mitigate with cybersecurity controls.
Anyways, then you're going to start to

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look at extending your security measures from
it in COOT space, So you're going

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00:31:45,920 --> 00:31:51,240
to do things again starting from looking
at your existing run books and playbooks for

335
00:31:51,359 --> 00:31:56,279
things like into response. How do
you have to update and modify them to

336
00:31:56,480 --> 00:32:01,960
work well at site? See in
the operational technology space, what about the

337
00:32:02,119 --> 00:32:08,559
security technology that you have, your
endpoint solutions, your network solutions. Can

338
00:32:08,599 --> 00:32:15,319
they be safely extended into operational technology
or do you have to procure something different?

339
00:32:15,920 --> 00:32:20,000
You know, I'm a big fan
of finding an endpoint edr or I

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00:32:20,039 --> 00:32:23,920
guess the buzzword these days is XDR
solution that can work across it and OT.

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00:32:25,240 --> 00:32:28,359
You may be able to do that, you maybe not. You're going

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00:32:28,400 --> 00:32:34,200
to look at things like extending logging
coverage and log aggregation there. So then

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00:32:34,240 --> 00:32:37,720
you're going to start to look at
extending your base controls so that you can

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00:32:37,759 --> 00:32:43,839
start to mitigate that risk and you
start training the team. And that brings

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00:32:43,960 --> 00:32:47,200
us to the last step of the
cycle, which is testing invalidation. Once

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you've worked through that process and you've
done the testing, you've done the validation,

347
00:32:55,920 --> 00:33:00,079
and that might look like some automated
control testing, but it should also

348
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involve an incident tabletop at that site
to be sure that your plans are working,

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00:33:07,920 --> 00:33:13,000
that it integrates with the site emergency
procedures and processes, that all those

350
00:33:13,000 --> 00:33:15,880
things are working. You know,
before you can kind of hang the mission

351
00:33:15,880 --> 00:33:22,039
accomplished banner and you know have the
team barbecue, make sure you take that

352
00:33:22,200 --> 00:33:28,880
time to test and validate that what
you're doing is actually working and that well,

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that's the last step in my article
identifies it's a cycle. And it's

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a cycle because as the site introduces
new technology, same machine learning or AI,

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00:33:42,480 --> 00:33:45,319
as the people change, a new
general manager gets appointed, a new

356
00:33:45,319 --> 00:33:52,279
plant manager comes in, you have
to start back with the building relationships,

357
00:33:53,279 --> 00:33:58,920
building trust. All of that cycle
starts again. So it's not a one

358
00:33:58,920 --> 00:34:02,759
and done. Um, you don't
get to finish and go, oh,

359
00:34:02,799 --> 00:34:06,359
that was really hard and I got
that done. I don't have to worry

360
00:34:06,400 --> 00:34:08,480
about this again. Um, as
soon as you get there, you're you're

361
00:34:08,519 --> 00:34:15,440
starting it again with the new people, the new technology at sight you started

362
00:34:15,519 --> 00:34:19,880
personally in the IT space. This
this whole discussion has been it you know,

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00:34:20,239 --> 00:34:22,880
is or at least you know,
enterprise security is coming in and saying,

364
00:34:22,920 --> 00:34:24,920
you know, guys, we have
to do something and you know,

365
00:34:24,960 --> 00:34:30,639
here's advice to to to the security
team to uh, you know, make

366
00:34:30,719 --> 00:34:37,519
that process more effective. Um.
Is this sort of unique to your experience

367
00:34:37,639 --> 00:34:40,760
or is this sort of a more
common experience in the mining industry who's leading

368
00:34:42,360 --> 00:34:46,360
uh, you know, the the
the charge in terms of driving security into

369
00:34:46,360 --> 00:34:51,440
OT. Is this something that tends
to be happening from the the IT side

370
00:34:51,440 --> 00:34:57,679
in mining more so than not.
It's interesting in mining, um, you

371
00:34:57,719 --> 00:35:00,800
know, because if you look at
a mining company, this is an organization

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that will derive ninety plus percent of
their revenue and carry most of and all

373
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of their safety environmental risk at sight. Yet traditionally, up until I would

374
00:35:14,519 --> 00:35:19,920
say, you know, five years
ago, at most mining companies, the

375
00:35:19,960 --> 00:35:29,159
cybersecurity information security function only impacted it. The whole OT stuff was at a

376
00:35:29,239 --> 00:35:32,519
scope and it's you know, it's
almost comical to think that, you know,

377
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you're in charge of securing an organization
get you're out of scoping ninety percent

378
00:35:37,559 --> 00:35:43,159
of the revenue generation and one hundred
percent of the safety environmental risk. You

379
00:35:43,199 --> 00:35:45,519
know, when you think about it, it seems a little bit nonsensical,

380
00:35:45,840 --> 00:35:52,320
because it is. And so now
as we're starting to see increased attacks affecting

381
00:35:52,360 --> 00:36:01,119
mining companies, you're starting to get
boardrooms and senior leadership teams going to their

382
00:36:01,920 --> 00:36:06,800
you know, those type of secure
leads or CSOs and going hey, are

383
00:36:06,800 --> 00:36:13,000
we good, and they're The answer
they've been getting back is a very unsatisfactory

384
00:36:13,079 --> 00:36:19,239
version of I don't know, which
is typically followed by some kind of a

385
00:36:19,400 --> 00:36:23,760
direction to go figure it out.
And where this process comes from is now

386
00:36:23,800 --> 00:36:30,280
we have these IT security teams being
chartered, instructed however you want to call

387
00:36:30,320 --> 00:36:36,159
it, to go take care of
this OT thing so we don't become like,

388
00:36:36,920 --> 00:36:39,760
you know, pick your company in
the news. And they've been getting

389
00:36:39,760 --> 00:36:45,920
a lot of pushback and a lot
of struggle um overall. And so really

390
00:36:45,920 --> 00:36:52,840
what this process is designed to do
is to overcome that that pushback and struggle

391
00:36:52,920 --> 00:36:55,519
that they're they're they're hitting at sight
with the engineering teams, with the mind

392
00:36:55,559 --> 00:37:04,199
management teams who may be at the
beginning don't see, didn't see cybersecurity as

393
00:37:04,280 --> 00:37:07,760
critical to their world. Um,
you know, I've got bigger issues.

394
00:37:07,880 --> 00:37:10,000
Life would be great if you know, the biggest issue I got down to

395
00:37:10,360 --> 00:37:15,079
was, you know, cybersecurity.
I've got you know, union contracts and

396
00:37:15,320 --> 00:37:20,280
communities, and I've got you know, supply chain issues on fuel and parts

397
00:37:20,320 --> 00:37:24,440
and all kinds of issues in my
world that are potentially going to get in

398
00:37:24,480 --> 00:37:29,880
the way of my success. You
know, they didn't see cyber They don't

399
00:37:30,000 --> 00:37:35,440
see at that site level always cybersecurity
being one of those things that can get

400
00:37:35,440 --> 00:37:38,119
in their way of their success until
it is. And so the drive is

401
00:37:38,159 --> 00:37:44,559
coming from the boardrooms in a lot
of cases, and the senior management teams

402
00:37:45,760 --> 00:37:50,360
to the CSOs and to the security
teams to you know, go figure this

403
00:37:50,400 --> 00:37:55,559
thing out. Is the drive I'm
seeing in mining. You know that sounds

404
00:37:55,679 --> 00:38:00,880
relatively opposite to how we usually conceive
of things, At least on this show.

405
00:38:00,920 --> 00:38:06,840
We've spent plenty of conversation talking about
how to convince boards of the necessity

406
00:38:06,840 --> 00:38:12,079
of cybersecurity, how to shake loose
budget. But here he's saying that the

407
00:38:12,239 --> 00:38:16,280
initiative comes down from the board to
the cybersecurity people. Yes, and that

408
00:38:16,280 --> 00:38:20,840
that is unusual. But you know, I have to wonder, is this

409
00:38:20,960 --> 00:38:25,800
another example of scale because when we're
dealing with, you know, the oil

410
00:38:25,840 --> 00:38:30,679
and gas majors, they've been leaders
in cybersecurity from the beginning. It was

411
00:38:30,920 --> 00:38:34,079
you know, it was always understood
that they had to do cybersecurity. Right.

412
00:38:34,440 --> 00:38:37,559
When we're talking smaller operators that are
much more cash constrained, you have

413
00:38:37,599 --> 00:38:42,840
to worry about shaking shaking budget loose. You know. To me, what

414
00:38:42,920 --> 00:38:45,880
I see in the industry is more
awareness, awareness across the board in the

415
00:38:45,880 --> 00:38:51,320
board sorry, you know board level, you know, feet on the street

416
00:38:51,400 --> 00:38:55,719
level, every and everything in between. Um, it sounds like you know

417
00:38:55,719 --> 00:39:00,519
what I've observed in the rail industry. I know, rail will sort of

418
00:39:00,519 --> 00:39:05,519
head down for a century safety safety, safety, safety, And it's like

419
00:39:05,599 --> 00:39:09,960
they looked up recently and said,
oh, shoot, cyber we have to

420
00:39:10,000 --> 00:39:15,000
do that too. You know,
without without cybersecurity, we don't have safety.

421
00:39:15,519 --> 00:39:20,199
And they've embraced cybersecurity. There's standards
coming out this progress. It sounds

422
00:39:20,239 --> 00:39:23,039
almost like that might be what's happening
in mining, but I don't have enough

423
00:39:23,119 --> 00:39:25,800
data points to be to be confident
to that. Well. I do have

424
00:39:25,880 --> 00:39:31,639
one data point in addition to you
know, the information Rob's giving us.

425
00:39:31,800 --> 00:39:38,559
I was talking recently to a the
CSO of a large mining operation, and

426
00:39:39,480 --> 00:39:45,119
he said, Andrew, you know, the investment in minds is in a

427
00:39:45,159 --> 00:39:51,039
sense cyclic. You have a big, massive upfront capital investment, and then

428
00:39:51,159 --> 00:39:54,360
once you've built the mind at a
cost of you know, two billion dollars,

429
00:39:54,400 --> 00:39:59,760
it starts producing and then there's a
cash crunch and you need to p

430
00:40:00,119 --> 00:40:04,880
douce extremely efficiently to be competitive in
the marketplace. And so you know,

431
00:40:05,800 --> 00:40:08,960
the place to put, you know, the opportunity, the easy opportunity to

432
00:40:08,960 --> 00:40:15,280
get cybersecurity or anything into your mind
is during the capital phase of the project,

433
00:40:15,639 --> 00:40:20,400
not the you know, stretch every
dollar operations phase. But um,

434
00:40:20,440 --> 00:40:22,760
you know, a if there's a
new awareness of risk at the board level,

435
00:40:22,800 --> 00:40:27,159
that's a that's a factor. And
be what he said was, look,

436
00:40:27,239 --> 00:40:30,480
Andrew, I've been in the industry
a long time. He said,

437
00:40:30,719 --> 00:40:34,280
Um, the you know, after
you've operated a mind for ten, twelve,

438
00:40:34,360 --> 00:40:37,480
fifteen years, Um, there comes
a point where you say, you

439
00:40:37,519 --> 00:40:42,599
know, we have to modernize because
we can become more efficient as a result,

440
00:40:42,679 --> 00:40:45,199
because we can exploit another part of
the of the resource. Uh,

441
00:40:45,280 --> 00:40:49,719
you know, if we modernize,
and so there's you know, after after

442
00:40:49,760 --> 00:40:52,800
a period of running there, you
know, ten twelve years, there tends

443
00:40:52,840 --> 00:40:57,719
to be another massive capital injection.
I gained. It's an opportunity to get

444
00:40:57,800 --> 00:41:01,800
your new automation, new security,
new every thing what he said was and

445
00:41:01,920 --> 00:41:06,039
what he's observed in the industry is
that from time to time there's sort of

446
00:41:06,239 --> 00:41:10,880
episodes where almost every mine on the
planet looks around and says, there's new

447
00:41:10,920 --> 00:41:14,599
stuff out there, we have to
do it. And there's over a period

448
00:41:14,639 --> 00:41:19,719
of three and four years, there's
an episode where most of the mining operations

449
00:41:19,719 --> 00:41:22,840
on the planet upgrade, and he
says, in his estimation, one of

450
00:41:22,880 --> 00:41:28,320
these is coming up. There's AI, there's cloud based systems, there's new

451
00:41:28,480 --> 00:41:32,039
kinds of automation, there's new kinds
of efficiencies that everybody needs to leverage in

452
00:41:32,079 --> 00:41:36,440
their mining operation. And so it
looks like, you know, the these

453
00:41:36,679 --> 00:41:39,360
uh, you know, these these
stars might be aligning. The boards have

454
00:41:39,480 --> 00:41:44,360
become aware of cybersecurity and they want
to fix it. And you know,

455
00:41:44,440 --> 00:41:47,320
if if the gentleman I was talking
to is right, there's an opportunity where

456
00:41:47,360 --> 00:41:52,079
almost everybody is going to be investing
a large number of hundreds of millions of

457
00:41:52,039 --> 00:41:58,639
dollars or more into their mining operations
to take advantage of modern automation. And

458
00:41:58,719 --> 00:42:01,800
you know, we can we can
do the automation and this cybersecurity at once.

459
00:42:01,880 --> 00:42:05,639
If if this is what's coming out, so that's in a sense good

460
00:42:05,679 --> 00:42:09,880
news we can look forward to.
This has been great, Rob. Thank

461
00:42:09,880 --> 00:42:14,360
you for joining us. Before we
let you go, can you sum up

462
00:42:14,360 --> 00:42:15,760
for us? What should we take
away? What's the you know, the

463
00:42:16,039 --> 00:42:21,400
number one thing to remember about this
this advice you're giving us. For me,

464
00:42:21,559 --> 00:42:28,840
especially as a security professional, the
opportunity to reach into the operation technology

465
00:42:29,559 --> 00:42:32,039
you know when I started working like
ten years ago, is a golden opportunity

466
00:42:32,159 --> 00:42:37,000
you shouldn't pass up. It's a
chance to really work on securing what matters,

467
00:42:37,400 --> 00:42:42,119
to really work on helping protect people's
safety, helping protect the environment,

468
00:42:42,239 --> 00:42:47,480
helping protect sustainability. It's a great
opportunity when you get you know, asked

469
00:42:47,559 --> 00:42:52,679
to go do that. But unlike
a lot of other areas, you can

470
00:42:52,760 --> 00:43:00,800
only move as fast as you build
trust operational technology. Security is the most

471
00:43:00,000 --> 00:43:07,639
human of all security disciplines because you're
affecting people's safety, you're affecting people's sense

472
00:43:07,679 --> 00:43:14,719
of well being. Unlike almost any
other discipline of security, you have to

473
00:43:14,800 --> 00:43:21,119
go slow. Take the time to
build the trust. Those first two steps

474
00:43:21,159 --> 00:43:27,559
could take a year, sometimes more. Take the time that those need to

475
00:43:27,599 --> 00:43:34,039
get right, and you'll get it
done safely. You'll get it done efficiently,

476
00:43:34,159 --> 00:43:38,079
and you'll end up with something that
gives you a secure, sustainable,

477
00:43:38,239 --> 00:43:43,639
reliable operation going forward. If this
is something you've sort of been charged with,

478
00:43:43,880 --> 00:43:49,719
I do encourage you to pop onto
the minumental Iacs website or LinkedIn you

479
00:43:49,760 --> 00:43:52,639
can. You can find the article
that we reference here today. And you

480
00:43:52,679 --> 00:43:57,360
know, I spend an hour in
a webcast digging into this a bit deeper.

481
00:43:57,400 --> 00:44:00,719
So you're you're more than welcome to
download and to watch that webcasts as

482
00:44:00,719 --> 00:44:07,639
well. So, Andrew, that
was your conversation with Rob Leabay, Do

483
00:44:07,679 --> 00:44:12,360
you have any final insights to take
us out with today. I've been learning

484
00:44:12,400 --> 00:44:15,320
a lot about the mining industry.
I'm very grateful that Rob was able to

485
00:44:15,400 --> 00:44:19,519
join us. You know, he's
the CEO of the Mining and Metals ISAAC.

486
00:44:20,199 --> 00:44:24,920
UM. You know, the the
ISAAC is comparatively new. They're you

487
00:44:24,920 --> 00:44:29,559
know, they're looking for new members. UM. I think there's like two

488
00:44:29,639 --> 00:44:32,000
years old. UM. Some other
information about the ISAAC. If if you

489
00:44:32,039 --> 00:44:36,480
want to get involved in the metals
and mining industry, UM, you know,

490
00:44:36,519 --> 00:44:42,039
Waterfall is getting involved. This is
how I know rob Um. Rob

491
00:44:42,079 --> 00:44:47,639
didn't mention it, but he is
also hosting a podcast for the ISAAC.

492
00:44:47,800 --> 00:44:53,599
The first episode is up on the
ISAAC. It's h mmisac dot org and

493
00:44:53,880 --> 00:44:57,320
the first episode is up there.
So I'm going to be listening to to

494
00:44:57,840 --> 00:45:01,639
his podcast as well. M There's
other opportunities to get involved in cybersecurity at

495
00:45:01,639 --> 00:45:07,280
the ISAAC. The one that I'm
thinking of that I'm looking to become involved

496
00:45:07,280 --> 00:45:12,360
with. They have a committee that
is working out how to interact with cloud

497
00:45:12,440 --> 00:45:20,400
based AI programs. The concrete example
was, look, every shovel of ore

498
00:45:20,519 --> 00:45:22,880
that comes out of a mine,
you know, is a sort of a

499
00:45:22,960 --> 00:45:27,039
quantum of seven or eight hundred tons
of ore. Every shovel is different,

500
00:45:27,559 --> 00:45:29,920
and so they take the shovel of
ore, they dump it on the truck

501
00:45:30,000 --> 00:45:34,480
they're driving it to the primary processing
facility and they're analyzing this stuff, you

502
00:45:34,480 --> 00:45:37,000
know, in the course of filling
the shovel and dumping it on the truck

503
00:45:37,000 --> 00:45:40,280
and driving it away, and they're
sending all the analysis into the cloud,

504
00:45:40,360 --> 00:45:45,719
and the cloud based AI figures out
how to process that shovel of ore optimally

505
00:45:45,800 --> 00:45:50,679
and sends the optimal processing instructions back
into the mind. So, in a

506
00:45:50,719 --> 00:45:54,519
real sense, you've got cloud based
AI controlling part of the mining process,

507
00:45:54,559 --> 00:45:58,960
part of the primary processing system,
and you know, how do you do

508
00:45:59,000 --> 00:46:00,639
that safely? This is how thing
I'm keenly interested in, and you know,

509
00:46:00,679 --> 00:46:04,960
I hope to be working with the
committee. So if you're interested in

510
00:46:05,039 --> 00:46:07,920
the medals of mining ISAC. Again, it's comparatively new, it's a couple

511
00:46:07,920 --> 00:46:12,599
of years old, and there's opportunities
to get involved, to learn more about

512
00:46:12,599 --> 00:46:16,800
it on Rob's podcast, and to
contribute to the process MMISAC dot org.

513
00:46:17,480 --> 00:46:21,559
All right, Well, with that, thanks to Rob Lebey for speaking with

514
00:46:21,599 --> 00:46:23,800
you, Andrew, and Andrew,
as always, thanks for speaking with me.

515
00:46:24,480 --> 00:46:28,280
It's always a pleasure. Thank you, Nate. This has been the

516
00:46:28,320 --> 00:46:31,719
Industrial Security podcast from Waterfall. Thanks
to everybody out there listening.
