Chapter nine, imagination. The imagination belongs to the general class of mental processes called the representative faculties, by which is meant the processes in which there are represented, or presented again to consciousness impressions previously presented to it. As we have indicated elsewhere, the imagination is dependent upon memory for its materials, its records of previous impressions. But imagination is more than mere memory or recollection of these previously experienced and recorded impressions. There is, in addition to the representation and recollection, a process of arranging the recalled impressions into new forms and new combinations. The imagination not only gathers together the old impressions, but also creates new combinations and forms from the materials so gathered. Psychology gives us many hair splitting definitions and distinctions between simple reproductive imagination and memory, but these distinctions are technical and as a real perplexing to the average student. In truth, there is very little, if any difference between simple reproductive imagination and memory, although when imagination indulges in constructive activity, a new feature enters into the process which is absent in pure memory operations. In simple reproductive imagination, there are simply the formation of the mental image of some previous experience the reproduction of a previous mental image. This differs very little from memory, except that the recalled image is clearer and stronger in the same way in ordinary memory. In a manifestation of recollection, there is often the same clear, strong, mental image that is produced in reproductive imagination. The two mental processes blend into each other so closely that it is practically impossible to draw the line between them, in spite of the technical differences urged by the psychologists. Of course, the mere remembrance of a person who presents himself to one is nearer to pure memory than to imagination, for the process is that of recognition, but the memory or remembrance of the same person when he is absent from sight is practically that of reproductive imagination. Memory, in its stage of recognition, exists in the child mind before reproductive imagination is manifested. The latter therefore is regarded as a higher mental process. But still higher in the scale is that which is known as constructive imagination. This form of imagination appears at a later period of child mentation and is regarded as a later evolution of mental processes of the race. Gordy makes the following distinction between the two phases of imagination. The difference between reproduct active imagination and constructive imagination is that the images resulting from reproductive imagination are copies of past experience, while those resulting from constructive imagination are not. To learn whether any particular image or combination of images is a product of reproductive or constructive imagination, all we have to do is to learn whether or not it is a copy of a past experience. Our memories, of course, are defective, and we may be uncertain on that account, But apart from that, we need be in no doubt. Whatever. Many persons hearing for the first time the statement of psychologists that the imaginative faculties can represent and reproduce or recombine only the images which have previously been impressed upon the mind, are apt to object that they can, and frequently do, image things which they have not previously experienced. But can they and do they? Is it not true that what they believe to be original creations of the imagination are merely new combinations of original impressions. For instance, no one ever saw a unicorn, yet someone originally imagined its form. But a little thought will show that the image of the unicorn is merely that of an animal, having the head, neck, and body of a horse, with the beard of a goat, the legs of a buck, the tail of a lion, and a long, tapering horn spirally twisted in the middle of the forehead. Each of the several parts of the unicorn exists in some living animal, although the unicorn composed of all these parts is non existent outside of fable. In the same way, the centaur is composed of the body, legs, and tail of the horse and the trunk, head, and arms of a man. The satter has the head, body and arms of a man, with the horns, legs, and hoofs of a goat. The mermaid has the head, arms, and trunk of a woman, joined at the waist to the body and tail of a fish. The mythological devil has the head, body and arms of a man, with the horns, legs, and cloven foot of the lower animal, and a peculiar tail composed of that of some animal, but tipped with a spear head. Each of these characteristics is composed of familiar images of experience. The imagination may occupy itself for a lifetime, turning out impossible animals of this kind, but every part thereof will be found to correspond to something existent in nature and experienced by the mind of the person creating the strange beast. In the same way, the imagination may picture a familiar person or thing acting in an unaccustomed manner, the latter having no basis in fact so far as the individual person or thing is concerned, but being warranted by some experience concerning other persons or things. For instance, one may easily form the image of a dog swimming underwater like a fish, or climbing a tree like a cat. Likewise, one may form a mental image of a learned or wigged high chancellor or a venerable archbishop for Canterbury, dressed like a clown, standing on his head, balancing a colored football on his feet, sticking his tongue in his cheek, and winking at the audience. In the same way, one may imagine a railroad running across a barren desert or a steep mountain upon which there is not as yet a rail laid. The bridge across a river may be imaged in the same way. In fact, this is the way that everything is mentally created, constructed, or invented, the old materials being combined in a new way and arranged in a new fashion. Some psychologists go so far to say that no mental image of memory is an exact repas production of the original impression, that there are always changes due to the unconscious operation of the constructive imagination. The constructive imagination is able to tear things to pieces in search for material, as well as to join things together in its work of building. The importance of the imagination in all the processes of intellectual thought is great. Without imagination, man could not reason or manifest any intellectual process. It is impossible to consider the subject of thought without first regarding the processes of imagination. And yet it is common to hear persons speak of the imagination as if it were a faculty of mere fancy, useless and without place in the practical world of thought. Developing the imagination, the imagination is capable of development and training. The general rules for development of the imagination are practically those which we have stated in connection with the development of the memory. There is the same necessity for plenty of material for the formation of clear and deep impressions, and clear cut mental images, the same necessity for repeated impression, and the frequent use and employment of the faculty. The practice of visualization, of course, strengthens the power of the imagination, as it does that of the memory, the two powers being intimately related. The imagination may be strengthened and trained by deliberately recalling previous impressions and in combining them into new relations. The materials of memory may be torn apart and then recombined and regrouped. In the same way, one may enter into the feelings and thoughts of other persons by imagining one's self in their place, and endeavoring to act out in imagination the life of such persons. In this way, one may build up a much fuller and broader conception of human nature and human motives. In this place, also we should caution the student against the common waste of the powers of the imagination and the dissipation of its powers in idle fancies and day dreams. Many persons misuse their imagination in this way, and not only weaken its power for effective work, but also waste their time and energy. Day Dreamers are notoriously unfit for the real practical work of life. Imagination and ideals. And finally, the student should remember that in the category of the imaginative powers must be placed that phase of mental activity which has so much to do with the making or marring of one's life. The formation of ideals. Our ideals are the patterns after which we shape our life. According to the nature of our ideals is the character of the life we lead. Our ideals are the supports of that which we call character. It is a truth old as the race are now being perceived most clearly by thinkers. That indeed, as a man thinketh in his heart, so is he. The influence of our ideals is perceived to effect not only our character, but also our place and degree of success in life. We grow to be that of which we have held ideals. If we create an ideal, either of general qualities or else these qualities as manifested by some person living or dead, and keep that ideal ever before us, we cannot help developing trays and qualities corresponding to those of our ideal. Careful thought will show that character depends greatly upon the nature of our ideals. Therefore we see the effect of the imagination in character building. Moreover, our imagination has an important bearing on our actions. Many a man has committed an imprudent or immoral act which he would not have done had he been possessed of an imagination which showed him the probable results of the action. In the same way, many men have been inspired to great deeds and achievements by reason of their imagination picturing to them the possible results of certain action. The big things in all walks of life have been performed by men who had sufficient imagination to picture the possibilities of certain courses or plans. The railroads, bridges, telegraph lines, cable lines, and other works of man are the results of the imagination of some men. The good fairy Godmother always provides a vivid and lively imagination among the gifts she bestows upon her beloved god children. Worl did the old philosopher pray to the gods and withal given to me a clear and active imagination. The dramatic values of life depend upon the quality of the imagination. Life without imagination is mechanical and dreary. Imagination may increase the susceptibility to pain, but it pays for this by increasing the capacity for joy and happiness. The pig has but little imagination, little pain, a little joy. But who envies the pig? The man with a clear and active imagination is, in a measure a creator of his world, or at least a re creator. He takes an active part in the creative activities of the universe, instead of being a mere pawn pushed here and there in the game of life. Again, the divine gift of sympathy and understanding depends materially upon the possession of a good imagination. One can never understand the pain or problems of another unless he first can imagine himself in the place of the other. Imagination is at the very heart of sympathy. One may be possessed of great capacity for feeling, but owing to his lack of imagination, may never have this feeling called into action. The person who would sympathize with others must first learn to understand them and feel their emotions. This he can do only if he has the proper degree of imagination. Those who reach the heart of the people must first be reached by the feelings of the people, and this is possible only to him whose imagination enables him to picture himself in the same condition as others, and thus awaken his latent feelings and sympathies and understanding. Thus it is seen that the imagination touches not only our intellectual life, but also our emotional nature. Imagination is the very life of the soul. In of chapter nine, Chapter ten, the feelings. In thinking of the mind and its activities, we are accustomed to the general idea that the mental processes are chiefly those of intellect, reason, thought. But as a fact, the greater part of the mental activities are those concerned with feeling and emotion. The intellect is the youngest child of the mind, and while making its presence strenuously known in the manner of all youngest children, so that one is perhaps justified in regarding it as the whole thing in the family, nevertheless he plays but a comparatively small part in the general work of the mental family. The activities of the feeling side of life greatly outnumber those of the thinking side, are far stronger in their influence and effect. As a rule, and in fact so colour the intellectual processes unconsciously, so as to constitute their distinctive quality, except in the case of a very few advanced thinkers. But there is a difference between feeling and emotion. As the terms are employed in psychology, the former is the simple phase, the latter the complex. Generally speaking, the resemblance or difference is akin to that existing between sensation and perception, as explained in a previous chapter. Beginning with the simple, in order later on to reach the complex, we shall now consider that which is known as simple feeling. The term feeling, as used in this connection in psychology, has been defined as the simple, agreeable or disagreeable side of any mental state. These agreeable or disagreeable sides of mental states are quite distinct from the act of knowing, which accompanies them. One may perceive and thus know that another is speaking to him, and be fully aware of the words being used of their meaning. Ordinarily, and so far as pure thought processes are concerned, this would complete the mental state. But we must reckon on the feeling side as well as on the thinking side of the mental state. Accordingly, we find that the knowledge of the words of the other person and the meaning thereof results in a mental state agreeable or disagreeable, in the same way the reading of the words of a book, the hearing of a song or a sight, or scene perceived may result in a more or less strong feeling, agreeable or disagreeable. This sense of agreeable or disagreeable consciousness is the essential characteristic of what we call feeling. It is very difficult to explain feeling except in its own terms. We know very well what we mean or what another means when it is said that we or he feel sad or has a joyous feeling or a feeling of interest. And yet we shall find it very hard to explain the mental state except in terms of feeling itself. Our knowledge depends entirely upon our previous experience of the feeling. As an authority says, if we have never felt pleasure, pain, fear, or sorrow, a quarter of volume cannot make us understand what such a mental state is. Every mental state is not distinguished by strong feeling. There are certain mental states which are concerned chiefly with intellectual effort, and in which all trace of feeling seems to be absent, unless, as some have claimed, the feeling of interest or the lack of same, is a faint form of the feeling of pleasure or pain. Habit may dull the feeling of a mental state until it is apparently neutral, but there is generally a faint feeling of like or dislike still left. The elementary forms of feeling are closely allied with those of simple sensation, but experiments have revealed that there is a distinction in consciousness. It has been discovered that one is often conscious of the touch of a heated object before he is of the feeling or pain resulting from it. Psychologists have pointed out another distinction, namely, when we experience a sensation, we are accustomed to refer it to the outside thing, which is the object of it, as when we touch the heated object, But when we experience a feeling, we instinctively refer it to ourselves, as when the heated object gives us pain. As an authority has said, my feelings belong to me, but my sensation seems to belong to the object which caused them. Another proof of the difference and distinction between sensation and feeling is the fact that the same sensation will produce different feelings in different persons experiencing the former even at the same time. For instance, the same sight will cause one person to feel elated and the other depressed. The same words will produce a feeling of joy in one and a feeling of sorrow in another. The same sensation will produce different feelings in the same person at different times. An authority Well says, you drop your purse and you see it lying on the ground as you stoop to pick it up, with no feeling either a pleasure or pain. But if you see it after you have lost it and have hunted for it a long time in vain, you have a pronounced feeling of pleasure. There is a vast range of degree and kind in feeling. God, he says, all forms of pleasure and pain are called feelings. Between the pleasure which comes from eating a peach and that which results from solving a difficult problem, of learning good news of a friend, or thinking of the progress of civilization, Between the pain that results from a cut in the hand and that which results from the failure of a long cherished plan or the death of a friend, there is a long distance. But the one group are all pleasures, the other all pains. And whatever the source of the pleasure or pain, it is alike feeling. There are many different kinds of feelings. Some arise from sensations of physical comfort or discomfort, some from purely physiological conditions, others from a satisfaction of accustomed tastes or the dissatisfaction arising from the stimulation of unaccustomed tastes, Others from the presence or absence of comfort, Others from the presence or absence of things or persons for whom we have an affection or liking. Over indulgence often transforms the feeling of pleasure into that of pain, and likewise, habit and practice may cause us to experience a pleasurable feeling from that which formerly inspired feeling of an opposite kind. Feelings also differ in degree. That is to say, some thing's causes to experience pleasurable feelings of a greater intensity than do others, and some causes to experience painful feelings of a greater intensity than do others. These degrees of intensity depend more or less upon the habit or experience of the individual. As a general rule, feeling may be classified into one those arising from physical sensations, and two those arising from ideas. The feelings, depending upon physical sensations, arise either from inherited tendencies and inclinations or from acquired habits and experience. It is an axiom of the evolutionary school that any physical activity that has been a habit of the race long continued becomes an instinctive pleasure giving activity in the individual. For instance, the race for many generations was compelled to hunt, fish, travel, swim, et cetera, in order to maintain existence. The result is that we, the descendants, are apt to find pleasure in the same activities as sport, games, exercise, et cetera. Many of our tendencies and feelings are inherited in this way. To these we have added many acquired habits of physical activity which follow the same rule, that is that habit and practice impart more or less pleasurable feeling. We find more pleasure in doing those things which we can do easily or quite well than in the opposite kind of things. The feelings, depending upon ideas, may also arise from inheritance. Many of our mental tendencies and inclinations have come down to us from the past. There are certain feelings that are borne in one without a doubt. That is to say, there is a great capacity for such feelings, which will be transformed in a manner infestation upon a presentation of the proper stimulus. Other mental feelings depend upon our individual past experience, association or suggestions from others upon our past environment. In fact, the ideals of those around us will cause us to experience pleasure or pain, as the case may be. Under certain circumstances. The force of suggestion along these lines is very strong. Indeed, not only do we experience feelings in response to present sensations, but the recollection of some previous experience will also arouse feeling. In fact, feelings of this kind are closely bound up with memory and imagination. Persons of vivid imagination are apt to feel far more than others. They suffer more and enjoy more. Our sympathies, which depend largely upon our imaginative power, are the cause of many of our feelings of this kind. The facts which we generally ascribe to feeling are really part of the phenomena of emotion, the latter being the more complex phase of feeling. For purposes of this consideration, we have regarded simple feeling as the raw material of emotion, the relation being compared to that existing between sensation and perception. In our consideration of emotion, we shall see the fuller manifestation of feeling and its more complex expressions,