New Eastern Europe podcasts. What about Russia? This question is often asked in
connection with the social protests in Belarus that started on August ninth, twenty twenty.
After all, Moscow and Minsk are linked by economic, military, and
social ties. They even form a union of Russia and Belarus. Dysfunctional but
still. The journalist Hanna Lubakova drew attention to the changing way of presenting the
events in Belarus by the Russian media, but also to the ambiguous perception of
these events by the Russians Uska. Immediately after the elections, the Russian media,
also outlets controlled by the Kremlin, reported on the protests in such a
neutral way. I'd say they at least talked about rape by the police,
So, of course, at least for the first week, this was such
a strong sign that the coverage was pretty okay. However, when Lukashenka turned
to Putin and asked him for help, the story changed and the Russian media
became less subjective. I think it's quite tough for the Russian media to show
that the people protesting are brutal, because after all, they're not. People
are attacking, attacking policemen because they don't do it, and so for me,
the materials I saw retain little objectivity. However, let's remember that RT
Russia today works almost completely without any obstacles, such as the journalists were detained,
because both Belarusian and foreign journalists were detained all the time. Russia today,
on the other hand, simply weren't interfered with and they were able to
work completely out in the open. So they showed protesters attacking that something was
happening there, that there weren't any peaceful demonstrations. They showed that when someone
just walked out on the road, obviously this is a sign of radicalization.
From the other side, there's a different take on things, and Russian society
has different views on these protests, but there are a lot of positive ones,
at least regarding opinion about the protests in Belarus. I heard that many
Russians support the protesters, not Lukashenka and not this narrative, not the narrative
of Russia today Russia. As the protests continue, the question of Russia's role
in shaping Belarusian politics becomes increasingly important, as underlined by Alexandra, a journalist
from Bielsat's television Rosa. Russia, which was feared to be the decisive factor
in Belarus and continued to be a very important factor, turned out to be
limited. One could expect Vladimir Putin to support Alexander Lukashenka in this situation.
He is sending a team of his journalists to fix the propaganda apparatus after dozens
of journalists were fired from Belarusian state television. He talks about granting alone,
although only a third of these funds have been paid so far, and all
these funds are to be used to pay off debts to Russia. When it
comes to military aid for Lukashenka, thank god, we haven't seen it.
Vladimir Putin only said that in the events of protests he would send policemen from
Russia to Belarus. We do not see firm declarations of support for Lukashenka.
But Putin did not speak out and did not say that there was a Western
conspiracy in Belarus and we will do anything to help our greatest friend. It
is the case that other people of secondary importance have spoken about helping Lukashenka.
The second thing is that Putin did not pay out much money to stabilize the
Belarussian economy. Thirdly, that Prutin did not send the army and military aid
or help with his policemen for now. It can be seen that Russia is
also tired of Alexander Lukashenka, but would like him to be replaced by a
person who would be led by Russia. Russia wants to keep control of a
Belarus and Lukashenka is not the right person for it. The main thing is
control of a Belarus. Whether it will take place through Lukashenka or without him
is not so important. As I said, Russia is tired of Lukashenka.
He is very problematic, is not much under control and toxic. He is
not liked SoC On the other hand, the Russians are not able, thank
God, to create a pro Russian force in Belarus. Russia's plan is more
or less defined as can be from the statements of Russian politicians. Even from
the statements, they want Lukashenka to quick so that it does not look like
a revolution in the bust, which is one They require to reform the constitution,
which would change the political system in Belarus towards a greater role of the
parliament and party and the Russians probably want to create several pro Russian parties that
govern Belarus and carry out the credits interest. On the other hi, you
can see Kashenka does not want to yield and is trying to turn this constitution
the form required question should his advantage is. The second thing is that Belarussian
society the former does not like, also does not want to create pro Russian
party and we are not seeing Russian just yet. What chest what? Russian
scientist Darya's Faina emphasizes that there is a big discrepancy between the impression of Kremlin's
support for Alexander Lukashenko and real help. At first glance, Russia's position and
relation to the situation in Belarus is simple and categorical opposition to the protesters support
for Lukashenka. This is true, but not everything is so clear cut.
The first thing that influenced the formulation of the Kremlin's attitude towards the protesters in
Belarus was the Russian internal situation. Let us recall the protests have been taking
place in Kabarovsk, Russia since July eleventh this year. The outbreak of protests
resulted in the arrest of the governor of the Kabarovsk Region Serge Fertigol. However,
it quickly became clear that the protests were anti government in nature. People
are tired of corruption and uneven allocation of state budget funds between regions. Against
this background, the protests in Belarus were seen as a threat to power in
Russia, and the Kremlin's afraid of the solidarity of Russian and Belarusian protesters and
afraid that the idea of changing the political elite will be supported in Russia too.
Let us remind ourselves that Putin has been in power for twenty years.
He plans to carry it on after the recent constitutional reform. Secondly, Russia
is very uninterested in the implementation of the Ukrainian scenario in Belarus. For the
past twenty years, the total value of Russian investments is four point two six
million dollars. Let's not forget about the Russian military facilities and cooperation in the
military industrial complex. The Kremlin, on the other hand, sees the advantages
of the situation. In recent years, Lukashenka has no longer acted as a
trusted ally of the Kremlin. He constantly tried to intensify the dialogue with the
West, and he gave a vase of answers during negotiations on strengthening integration within
the Federal State of Russian and Belarus, which the Kremlin thinks, although it's
not a Soviet Union two point out, is similar to it. Thus,
the Kremlin saw the possibility of replacing Lukashenka with a loyal and compliant persona.
That is why Putin has such calm rhetoric and such a tragic situation. During
the meeting with Lukashenka in Sochi on September fourteenth this year, the Russian President
said, we are in favor of the Belarusians to calmly and through dialogue resolved
the situation in their country and make a joint decision on how to continue working
Later. He also added that Moscow will fulfill all the obligations toward Belarus,
because obligations must be fulfilled regardless of who's in charge of the country. The
one point five billion dollars loan that Russia has granted the Belarus is not just
an act of support for Lukashenka. There are almost two thousand, five hundred
companies with Russian capital in Belarus, and in a sense, Russia supports its
own capital and be aware of the level of corruption in Russia and the patterns
by which money returns to the source. Despite the fact the Putin has the
image of a man who does not leave his own people in politics, everyone
thinks only about themselves. Gretzky from Saint peter's Burg State University says, it's
all about business, not about sympathy nor sentiment. First, I would like
to point out that relations between the Kremlin and Lukashenka have always been difficult and
proceeded in an atmosphere of mutual distrust. The Belarussian dictator often officially supported Putin,
but he never made any concessions on matters that were delicate for Moscow,
such as participation in integration projects, the creation of a Russian military based on
the territory of Belarus, and the question of Crimea and other such matters.
When the Russian authorities tried to put pressure on Lukashenka, he either managed to
find alternative sources of financial support or to reach a compromise that was favorable to
him. After the presidential elections in August, the protests spread to most strata
of Belarussian society, even employees of enterprises that are wholly state owned, such
as Grodna Azot, the municipal tractor factory and many others, took part in
the weekly strikes. It is obvious that tension in society will not go away
until the political system is changed. Lukashenka's rule is coming to an end,
and it can even be said that in August the countdown to the end of
his term in office began. A nightmare scenario for the Kremlin in this situation
is the further development of the protest when even more people take to the streets
than Lukashenka leaves the presidential palace under pressure from the community. Russia, however,
has always been interested in weakening Lukashenka, but to such an extent that
it retains full control over what is happening in Belarus. The protests after the
August elections weakened him greatly. Currently, Lukashenka is slowly losing control of the
situation in the country. Under these conditions, the main priority is to carry
out a soft and controlled transformation of the Belarussian regime closed to influence from the
West. An ideal situation for Moscow would be such constitutional reforms that would slightly
strengthen the opposition's influence on the decision making process in Minsk, but would leave
Lukashenka in power. In this situation, the position will simply become an additional
tool of putting pressure on Lukashenka in conflict situations. This is also confirmed by
the fact that despite mister Putin's political support for Lukashenka, because he recognized the
elections in Belarus and promised to send Russian policeman there if necessary, the Russian
President supported the idea of constitutional reform, which ultimately does not benefit Lukashenka.
According to Pyotr Rutkowski, the director of the Belarussian Institute of Strategic Studies,
a key factor for the Kremlin is to maintain control over the situation, with
or without Luko. The Kremlin wants this to be under control. It is
fed up with Lukashenka. While the worst option for them is the uncontrolled a
sentence to power by anyone else, They would prefer Lukashenka to leave, but
that would be under control, so they can either push their candidate through or
at least have time to prepare to develop a new strategy. How they are
to deal with this new power whatever it may be, there is almost no
chance that pro Western power will come to power in Belarus. So here it
is not a serious risk for the Kremlin. On the other hand, the
Kremlin would like to prepare for various other eventualities in the eventual Diplomat and one
of the leaders of the Opposition Coordination Council emphasizes that the protests are not directed
against Russia, but the mold and attitude devots must be in jo If we
look at it from a pragmatic point of view, Russia takes fifty percent of
Belarus's trade. It is the main supplier of energy in Belarus. We are
bound very tightly. On the other hand, the European Union, which is
the second most important economic partner, is a particularly important partner from the point
of view of investments in technologies and further development in Belarus. Belarus is in
the middle and you have to understand that these protests and demonstrations are not anti
Russian, they are not anti Western, they are pro Belarussian. Belarussians are
fighting for their rights to be implemented on the territory of their own country.
As of today, Russia takes a position that is incomprehensible to us that it
supports a leader who has not been elected, who breaks the laws drastically.
There were so many examples that it makes no sense to even talk about them,
because every day something happens that evokes a critical reaction in Belarussian society.
But Russia continued to support him. Although we have recently heard voices in the
Russian state press and from various officials that the violence that has been going on
against people did not correspond to the real situation. This is also maybe a
little voice. It is important to us to have good relations with the EU
and Russia. We come out of pragmatism in these relations. Certainly Belarussians want
it all. Sociological research shows it. On the other hand, it should
be noted that the number of Belarussians who opt for a closer relationship with Russia
has recently significantly decreased. At the beginning of the year, it was sixty
percent of Belarussians who stood for close ties with Russia while maintaining the country's independence.
As of today, even yesterday they released a data of minus twenty five
percent. Also, from the strategic point of view, Russia is making a
mistake. I think that Kremlin analysts who give such information that is worth betting
on Lukashenka and now making a mistake. A division is taking place. We
are in the middle when Belarussians start criticizing the Russian authorities very sharply that they
do not really see that something is black, but say, no, it
is white. Maybe a little tiny parts are black, but it's actually white.
Every normal person sees that there are no intermediate colors anymore. It's black,
It's definitely black. Such violence against people. Also from Russia's point of
view, In my opinion, the mistake is being made and it is important
that the Russians understand it now so as not to repeat the scenarios that unfortunately
have recently occurred in Russia's relations with other countries. But this is Russia's decision,
It is the choice of the Russian authorities. We are simply signaling what
processes are starting in Belorussian society. Also, these two curves were a closer
relationship with the EU for a closer relationship with Russia. They have crossed each
other. It will also depend on further steps from the EU and Russia.
But I am sure it is in the Belarian interest. There is no division,
There is no backward facing or returning facing someone else. It is about
being a Belarussian state and having pipulations with ward look as a former British media
correspondent in Eastern Europe perceives the situation in a similar way, the Union state
exists more on paper than in reality, and it's not really comfortable with sort
of Beneluck's arrangement or anything like that. The main interest the Kremlin has in
not having a disorderly transfer of power in Beelrous. They don't want a national
uprising in Lukashenka escaping the country in a helicopter, because that would set a
very bad example to Russians from the Kremlin's point of view of how to get
rid of a regime that's run out of steam and run out of ideas.
But nor do they want to see the opposition in Belarus crystallize into an anti
Russian movement. At the moment, this is a pre democracy movement, not
a particularly pro European or pro Western or anti Russian movement, but that could
change, and if the Kremlin is seen as propping up Lukashenka too much,
then they will begin to be the subject of the opposition's ayre, and so
there's a dilemma there. And what Putin is trying to do at the moment
is to buy time. He wants, i think, to bog the opposition
down in constitutional discussions and at some point, not now, but perhaps early
next year, move Lukashenka side and replace him with someone less toxic, but
who will basically preserve the security political economic arrangements that see Russiamy. The ongoing
political crisis is increasingly affecting the economy of Belarus est Otsovistia's who designative Belsberge.
Of course, these events had an impact on the Belarusian economy. The most
immediate effect of the repression by the authorities was the cutoff from foreign financing.
Belarus needs to spend around three billion dollars annually on foreign debt repayments, and
Russia promises to pay out borrow one and a half billion, according to media
reports, but so far Russia has granted a loan of five hundred million.
This is very little for the economy of Belarus. All this results in a
reduction in the reserves of foreign exchange, which in the medium and even short
term may threaten the stability of the Belarusian ruble. This is the first effect.
The government has no legitimacy. The government has a very bad international opinion,
so it was deprived of foreign loans, and Russia is also not very
keen on giving these loans. The second thing war postponed is silent sabotage.
Due to public dissatisfaction plus government repression, the authorities fire as citizens the most
active workers who are hard to replace. This significantly lowers the quality of enterprise
management and secondly increases the risk of failure, that is, loss making.
Stato and enterprises will not be even more loss making and make various failures such
as those we see Gorodna Azot, but not only that, this will all
become more frequent. Thirdly, silent sabotaged by the private sector will deprive the
economy of tax revenue. The most important effect will be the reduction of payments
social payments so called schools, hospitals, infrastructure, and also the payment of
foreign debt. For now, I do not see that the authorities, for
example, limit the payment of salaries and datained enterprises. While the usual practice
for the last twenty years there has been to fire up the printing press,
so issuing money. This is most likely to happen in the coming months.
Nabilations economic dies between Belarus and Russia are particularly important. As Alexandra Pabo states
Larosi politician and egos production. It is very important for Russia that Larus always
follows the political and economic directions set by Russia, that it would be dependent
on Russia politically and economically. And the second thing which is important, so
that Belarus is never pro Western, does not join pro Western structures. And
the third thing which is important for Russia is that it is never richer than
Russia, that it does not constitute an alternative competition for the economic and political
model of Vladimir Putin, and in more useful and in utilitarian way, so
that the workforce from Belarus travels and replenishes the labor force shortages on the Russian
market. If these three interest groups are guaranteed by Alexander Lukashenka, well,
if there is a political structure or another politician who will ensure these Russian interests
in Belarus, all the better. Lukashenka is not yet a priority. The
game that has been presented by Russian politicians for the time being as to force
Lukashenka to depart gradually through constitutional reform and reformatting of the political system in Belarus,
opening up more opportunities for Russian influence. When it comes to some more
elaborate strategies, we always think Putin has a plan, But from the last
few months we can see that Putin is also sitting by the river and waiting
for the enemy's corps to flow down that river. As the Chinese proverb goes,
how long can Russia calmly observe the events in Belarus? After all,
ordinary people, especially young Russians, follow events that may foreshadow future changes in
their country to President put Missions attack. Can President Putin be concerned about Russia
being infected with the Belarussian Revolution? I think so, because after the success
of the Ukraine Orange Revolution, the Russian elita terrified that something like this could
happen in Russia. Immediately after the revolution in Ukraine, Russia introduced restrictions on
the activities of foreign and geos and the organization of mass assemblies. The Russian
authorities believe that it is not much The Russian authorities believe that it is not
so much color revolutions which dangerous as the way the media informs the public about.
This is why, in my opinion, Putin has repeatedly strengthened state control
over the media. Meanwhile, they advised television and the number of programs that
portrayed the Color Revolution in a negative light only grew rapidly, and the protesters
were often referred to as puppets. Here, in my opinion, Putin is
repeating the mistake of his Belarussian colleague and calling the protesting workers and doctors terrorists,
which has dramatically increased the irritation and dissatisfaction in the public. As for
Russian society, it is strongly divided. In the assessment of the political crisis
in Belarust, thirty nine percent of Russians consider the oppositions protests to be Western
provocations, and almost as many believe that they were caused by fatigue from the
prolonged rule of Lukashenka. As a rule, the former include representatives of the
older generation of Russians whose worldview was shaped during the Soviet era. They regularly
vote for Bhutin or the Communists, so it's no wonder that their sympathies turned
out to beyond Lukashenka's side, because throughout the entire period after the collapse of
the Soviet Union, Belarus was the embodiment of their dreams of an ideal socialist
state, low prices, state guaranteed employment, clean streets and so on.
But in August this year, for the first time they saw the wrong side
of the Lukashenka regime, the brutality of the police, the beatings of people,
of censorship in the media. Russian fans of Lukashenka were deeply confused by
this. The younger generation of Russians has a different view of these events.
They treat Belarussians and representatives of the opposition who suffer from state violence with great
affection. Interestingly, young people get information from the Internet, and the older
generation of Russians from television. While the number of users of social networks in
Russia is actively growing and the number of people watching TV is gradually and decline.
In addition, it catches an audience of people over fifty five years old.
There is no doubt that what we are dealing with here is an intergenerational
conflict. On one side, there are people who are shaped by the Soviet
Union, who sympathize with the Belarussian dictator value stability in all its manifestations and
treats changes only as a source of problems. On the other side, there
are young people with smartphones in their hands who have no idea about life in
the Soviet Union. For them, changes are primarily new opportunities. But I
have left out the older generation, which is gradually leaving Putin in his regime
one on one with a new generation that has different values and which will enter
the political scene at some point, as is happening now in Belarusitic podcasts are
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