WEBVTT 1 00:00:00.160 --> 00:00:38.439 They don't they the the the the the the the the the the the the 2 00:00:39.920 --> 00:01:38.159 the the the the people the the the people them to the people, the 3 00:01:53.640 --> 00:02:49.919 the the bum all right, all right, welcome back, Father Deacon Antonius, 4 00:02:50.560 --> 00:02:54.120 Father Deacon doctor Anonius, joins me. Excuse me, I'm depriving you 5 00:02:54.240 --> 00:03:02.039 of your proper titles. Uh and uh we what CP A C I A 6 00:03:02.039 --> 00:03:07.800 c CP should those all be on there as well all of your uh alphabet 7 00:03:07.840 --> 00:03:13.280 acronyms that I'll leave any out s sp X, I like bond. I 8 00:03:13.319 --> 00:03:24.000 need Russian passport here? What's your Russian code name? Dugan? Are your 9 00:03:24.280 --> 00:03:32.639 your Russian code name Dugan? When you're that's your your Dugan pass can pass 10 00:03:32.759 --> 00:03:38.240 right there, so that when you when you come to Russia, Dugan sits 11 00:03:38.280 --> 00:03:42.520 there at the check in gate and he literally checks every person in and he 12 00:03:42.560 --> 00:03:45.800 looks at you and says, you have good beat or you can posts. 13 00:03:46.759 --> 00:03:52.240 You look at Russian who can post? There's only one guy check to Russia. 14 00:03:54.000 --> 00:03:58.840 When I go into Russia, Dugans, the dude with the sign that 15 00:03:58.879 --> 00:04:01.800 says f d A. You know what, like the guy that picks you 16 00:04:01.879 --> 00:04:08.280 up in the limo. He picks you up in the limo and takes you 17 00:04:08.360 --> 00:04:14.759 to McDonald's. Is the Russian McDonald's. When I was in Russia, I 18 00:04:14.759 --> 00:04:21.319 did take a picture of they had all these ads for like billboard ads for 19 00:04:21.480 --> 00:04:26.720 Papa John's pizza, and it was like this hockey hockey player with like a 20 00:04:26.759 --> 00:04:32.800 missing tooth and like, so I took a bunch of pictures of Michael hilarious. 21 00:04:33.560 --> 00:04:36.680 Did you taste the vodka in Russia? Does it taste different or is 22 00:04:36.720 --> 00:04:44.199 it all the same everywhere? I made the mistake of like we were at 23 00:04:44.199 --> 00:04:53.240 a hotel, so you ordered wine cooler and you ordered Arnolds and James all, 24 00:04:58.560 --> 00:05:03.519 what's the Russian zema? You ordered? The Russians they had like this 25 00:05:03.680 --> 00:05:08.480 really nice spread for at this one of these hotels for breakfast, and then 26 00:05:08.519 --> 00:05:12.360 they had like bottles of vodkas kind of like set up like cannons and stuff. 27 00:05:13.319 --> 00:05:16.160 And I asked my spiritual father and I'm I'm like vodka for breakfast, 28 00:05:16.199 --> 00:05:19.839 And he's like, well the Russians and blah blah blah, said well, 29 00:05:19.879 --> 00:05:24.920 can I get your blessing to try vodka for breakfast in the morning. It 30 00:05:25.000 --> 00:05:30.399 was the worst mistake I've ever made, because of course, like I was 31 00:05:30.439 --> 00:05:32.439 just like I want to go back to bed. Are you being serious? 32 00:05:32.439 --> 00:05:41.079 Like there's actually an option for vodka breakfast. They drink vodka for breakfast. 33 00:05:41.319 --> 00:05:44.199 Wow. And my father was telling me like, well, you got to 34 00:05:44.240 --> 00:05:46.199 see, like a lot of these guys are just like out manual labor and 35 00:05:46.279 --> 00:05:50.160 so they like, you know, you're just burning through and working it off 36 00:05:50.199 --> 00:05:54.959 and stuff like that. I'm like, yeah, because I mean, I 37 00:05:55.000 --> 00:06:00.600 don't want to drink alcohol for breakfast, man, I was. It's yeah, 38 00:06:00.680 --> 00:06:02.879 so terrible, and it reminds me of in Italy, like the odd 39 00:06:03.000 --> 00:06:08.240 choices they have for breakfast. In Italy. There's there's always like a million 40 00:06:08.879 --> 00:06:15.040 like crumpets and cakes, super soggy bacon which doesn't even look cooked, which 41 00:06:15.079 --> 00:06:20.959 is weird, and then like cold ham and cold eggs, like the eggs 42 00:06:21.000 --> 00:06:25.720 are never hot, they're cold. It's just just a weird breakfast idea. 43 00:06:25.759 --> 00:06:33.600 I don't know anyway. Anyways, Yeah, I was on a pilgrimage, 44 00:06:33.600 --> 00:06:42.560 so I wasn't actually searching for like distilleries and Russian tasting Russian vodka and stuff 45 00:06:42.600 --> 00:06:46.759 like that. But when I go back, I'll make a habit of finding 46 00:06:47.160 --> 00:06:56.240 It'll be like an Indiana Jones the Search for the Holy Vodka. All right, 47 00:06:56.319 --> 00:07:00.680 So tonight we're gonna discuss the the new paper that Father deaconductor Anonius has 48 00:07:00.720 --> 00:07:06.000 written, which is I thought he mentioned this idea a few months ago, 49 00:07:06.079 --> 00:07:12.800 that was a great idea for a paper to address some of the specific challenges 50 00:07:12.839 --> 00:07:17.199 that we've heard in recent years to the transcendental argument for God's existence, and 51 00:07:17.639 --> 00:07:26.360 a lot of these revolve around higher level argumentation, and really a basic kind 52 00:07:26.360 --> 00:07:30.959 of idea that I think you had said Russ Manion pointed out to you a 53 00:07:30.959 --> 00:07:34.360 while back, which is that it's really just asking the question of, like, 54 00:07:34.399 --> 00:07:39.639 what's the reason for reasoning itself? And when we think about it in 55 00:07:39.680 --> 00:07:46.160 that way, it's actually prior to any of the atheistic argumentation that they might 56 00:07:46.199 --> 00:07:49.120 even engage in, because you're not even allowing them to sort of make the 57 00:07:49.160 --> 00:07:55.680 first move, which any first move is going to assume again reasoning. So 58 00:07:56.160 --> 00:08:01.399 if we're asking questions about reasoning itself, that's a perfect kind of segue into 59 00:08:01.399 --> 00:08:03.920 the domain of tag. So do you wanna how do you want to kick 60 00:08:03.920 --> 00:08:07.519 it off? And uh, and maybe maybe was there certain discussions you had 61 00:08:07.519 --> 00:08:15.240 that prompted you to have this as your paper topic. Yeah, so I'm 62 00:08:15.279 --> 00:08:20.439 really indebted to russ man Into and just let everybody know he did pass away 63 00:08:20.800 --> 00:08:26.639 last week, So keep him and his family and your prayers. My godson 64 00:08:28.160 --> 00:08:35.279 who is dear friends with Russ and did the dialogue group with They were working 65 00:08:35.360 --> 00:08:39.799 on a book, and so I've been in correspondence with them and reading some 66 00:08:39.919 --> 00:08:48.360 other articles that most people haven't seen. Because what I was trying to think 67 00:08:48.360 --> 00:08:56.720 about is what was really good about russ Mannion is his psychology. The ability 68 00:08:56.759 --> 00:09:03.720 to grasp the kind of psychological component of the other person, kind of get 69 00:09:03.720 --> 00:09:07.200 to the question behind the question and stuff like that, and then reduce it 70 00:09:09.200 --> 00:09:16.080 what would seemingly be really complicated to a really kind of basic way of like 71 00:09:16.159 --> 00:09:20.200 explaining stuff. Yeah, I like this intro. This this intro sentence at 72 00:09:20.240 --> 00:09:24.639 the top. The hardest problem is convincing people the problem is not hard at 73 00:09:24.639 --> 00:09:30.039 all, but simple. That's a good Yeah, that's me. Yeah, 74 00:09:30.080 --> 00:09:35.200 I'm saying that's a perfect introductory sentence. But that's kind of like channeling the 75 00:09:35.519 --> 00:09:39.080 you know, russ Mannion. Let me give you an example of where he 76 00:09:39.080 --> 00:09:45.639 could take something that apparently would be really complex and then boil and it relates 77 00:09:45.679 --> 00:09:50.480 to this opening kind of quote that you you gave. There's no purely rationalistic 78 00:09:52.039 --> 00:09:56.840 rational argument for the existence of God. Hold on, let me find it. 79 00:09:56.879 --> 00:10:09.799 So Butcher the where is it goes something to the effect that there's no 80 00:10:11.000 --> 00:10:16.159 purely rational argument for the existence of God or for theism. There's only a 81 00:10:16.159 --> 00:10:20.519 theistic account of rationality. And when I heard that, I was like, 82 00:10:20.559 --> 00:10:24.440 Oh, that's perfect. And then I started so I really started kind of 83 00:10:24.440 --> 00:10:28.720 trying to get into the psychology of the other, like what's going on? 84 00:10:28.879 --> 00:10:33.960 Why is this so difficult? Because once you get it right, once you 85 00:10:35.080 --> 00:10:39.200 get tagged, don't you feel that it's like this is so obvious, Like 86 00:10:39.320 --> 00:10:43.600 in fact, there's nothing more obvious. Yeah, it's almost like a hidden 87 00:10:43.600 --> 00:10:46.879 in plain sight type of thing, like this is should have been obvious the 88 00:10:46.879 --> 00:10:52.799 whole time. So let me give you another conversation that I had that kind 89 00:10:52.799 --> 00:10:58.960 of illustrates the same point. I was talking with my chair of philosophy, 90 00:11:00.600 --> 00:11:05.320 really great guy. He graduated from Thomas Quantas College like myself. Of course 91 00:11:05.360 --> 00:11:11.240 he's older. But so I stopped by his office maybe like a month ago 92 00:11:11.039 --> 00:11:18.240 to ask him a question if because I was dealing with arguing with some people 93 00:11:18.240 --> 00:11:20.919 about nominalism, and I said, well, I'm just kind of interesting what 94 00:11:22.039 --> 00:11:26.080 his thoughts where I said, do you have any good arguments against nominalisms? 95 00:11:26.279 --> 00:11:28.559 And said he says, well, what do you mean? And I said, 96 00:11:28.879 --> 00:11:31.720 well, that nominalism's false and he says, well, isn't it obvious? 97 00:11:31.720 --> 00:11:35.240 And I'm like, yeah, it's like this story of my life. 98 00:11:35.000 --> 00:11:39.879 I'm sitting here. The hardest problem is arguing like, isn't it obvious? 99 00:11:41.639 --> 00:11:45.960 The hardest problem is convincing people the problem isn't hard at all but simple. 100 00:11:45.960 --> 00:11:50.200 And I really it's kind of the frustrating part about philosophy. And it illustrates 101 00:11:50.240 --> 00:11:54.399 too that what's really going on is not an intellectual issue. Yeah, it's 102 00:11:54.960 --> 00:12:01.159 a spiritual issue that people want to attempt to kind of justified their their idols 103 00:12:01.159 --> 00:12:07.559 as they put out a talk about in the paper and so and Saint Paul 104 00:12:07.600 --> 00:12:11.799 talks about this too. All men know that God exists, but they suppress 105 00:12:11.840 --> 00:12:15.960 that knowledge. And so there's different ways you can suppress that. But the 106 00:12:16.000 --> 00:12:20.840 philosophers build systems, don't they, And they make it super complicated and they're 107 00:12:20.879 --> 00:12:26.600 really smart, and then it puts the burden on us that it's like, 108 00:12:26.639 --> 00:12:28.919 well, now I've got to learn all this stuff. I've got to learn 109 00:12:30.159 --> 00:12:37.159 logic, modal logic and all this analytic philosophy and epistemology just to cut through 110 00:12:37.440 --> 00:12:41.639 all the bs and show you that the problem is not hard at all but 111 00:12:41.759 --> 00:12:46.240 simple. And that's the hardest problem. Would you agree? Yeah? I 112 00:12:46.279 --> 00:12:52.759 mean that the there's this illusion that's cast that makes people think that it's all 113 00:12:52.919 --> 00:12:58.840 very you know, profound and deep and sophisticated, and really the only sophisticated 114 00:12:58.879 --> 00:13:03.559 part is when where a direct asking this supposed sophisticated arguments of the opponents, 115 00:13:03.600 --> 00:13:07.080 but are really just kind of like, you know, smoke and mirrors to 116 00:13:07.120 --> 00:13:15.519 cover up total bankruptcy and absolutely no foundations for anything. And I'm not even 117 00:13:15.519 --> 00:13:18.840 sure that most people are aware that they're doing this. And we also talked 118 00:13:18.840 --> 00:13:24.960 about two is that once the systems are constructed for you, and when I'm 119 00:13:26.000 --> 00:13:28.720 talking about the systems, because we're going to get into the paper of and 120 00:13:28.799 --> 00:13:35.639 what I mean by autonomous epistemology, but it's system building. Once these systems 121 00:13:35.679 --> 00:13:41.159 are kind of built, you're brought up in that right, and a good 122 00:13:41.159 --> 00:13:46.639 way to kind of think about it is or you adopt it, you work 123 00:13:46.720 --> 00:13:52.519 within it. It's an operating system, and they're operating systems that can make 124 00:13:52.559 --> 00:14:01.960 you dumb. I had one of the interesting enough, he was a Jesuit 125 00:14:01.000 --> 00:14:07.000 priest, but that was one of my master's advisors, and he would always 126 00:14:07.039 --> 00:14:11.200 criticize different like schools of thought like Marxism, and he was like, oh, 127 00:14:11.200 --> 00:14:15.759 it's stupid. He's like, but it's sort of stupid that you have 128 00:14:15.799 --> 00:14:18.759 to go to school to learn it. Yeah. Yeah, it's a stupidity 129 00:14:18.759 --> 00:14:22.759 that only intellectuals could believe. That's right. So we have this kind of 130 00:14:22.840 --> 00:14:26.000 naive view that it's like, well, the enlightened you see there in college, 131 00:14:26.000 --> 00:14:31.159 and that's there's the stupid, and then there's the educated. And it's 132 00:14:31.200 --> 00:14:37.440 like, no, you go to school to educate yourself in stupidity. And 133 00:14:37.519 --> 00:14:41.279 so part of the problem is not being able to see the obvious. Is 134 00:14:41.440 --> 00:14:46.440 that, and we've talked about this too. You've got yourself into a bad 135 00:14:46.519 --> 00:14:50.840 program and a bad operating system that doesn't allow you to see kind of clearly 136 00:14:50.879 --> 00:15:00.240 and think through stuff. So, you know, the natural theologian at I'll 137 00:15:00.799 --> 00:15:05.720 think that what would just give people arguments and they'll just see it. But 138 00:15:05.759 --> 00:15:09.399 the problem is in an argument how are you going to see the proof or 139 00:15:09.399 --> 00:15:15.279 the argument when you're operating system doesn't allow you to and you also have you 140 00:15:15.320 --> 00:15:18.639 also have an inner partial motivation to suppress that truth. Right. This is 141 00:15:18.639 --> 00:15:24.919 that point about virtue epistemology, virtue knowledge, or of virtue ethics that is 142 00:15:24.960 --> 00:15:31.799 often ignored by the natural theology proponents where they which is ironic because I've asked 143 00:15:31.840 --> 00:15:35.279 a lot of them if they think that, you know, choose a person 144 00:15:35.279 --> 00:15:39.759 who is an unbeliever and prefers vice, would that in any way maybe affect 145 00:15:41.120 --> 00:15:43.759 the evidences that they see and how they interpret the evidences. And most of 146 00:15:43.759 --> 00:15:48.039 them will say yes. But then when you really drill drill down into their 147 00:15:48.080 --> 00:15:52.000 approach, they're still acting like, but all I have to do is like 148 00:15:52.120 --> 00:15:56.840 pile up evidences and eventually they'll kind of tip over and convince the person to 149 00:15:56.000 --> 00:16:06.559 maybe believe. Now, all that being said, it doesn't prevent me from 150 00:16:06.600 --> 00:16:11.799 trying to figure out better ways again, kind of in the spirit of russ 151 00:16:11.799 --> 00:16:18.000 mannion of cutting through all of that. And one of the ways that motivated 152 00:16:18.039 --> 00:16:25.399 this paper was if I was the other person, how would I be seeing 153 00:16:25.480 --> 00:16:30.679 this? Why? If? I mean, it's really hard to kind of 154 00:16:30.679 --> 00:16:34.519 do to get yourself out of your own paradigm and think in terms of the 155 00:16:34.559 --> 00:16:41.279 other person so that I can come back into the paradigm and then work some 156 00:16:41.399 --> 00:16:45.840 of that into my paper. So one of the things that I did was 157 00:16:45.159 --> 00:16:51.320 just kind of put an ad out on all the socials, give me your 158 00:16:51.320 --> 00:16:56.600 best objections, like, let me see it from your point of view, 159 00:16:56.639 --> 00:17:00.120 so that I can go back and kind of think through like what is that 160 00:17:00.159 --> 00:17:03.319 people are struggling with, how can I answer it? And then again how 161 00:17:03.359 --> 00:17:10.079 to boil down a lot of this really kind of complicated stuff and make it 162 00:17:10.119 --> 00:17:15.839 a lot more presentable. So hopefully, you know, I have different kind 163 00:17:15.839 --> 00:17:21.200 of reactions to the paper. Obviously, some people are really confused. I 164 00:17:21.279 --> 00:17:26.640 see that there, and when we get into this second and first order statements 165 00:17:26.640 --> 00:17:30.359 and knowledge that people get really confused about that. And I think one of 166 00:17:30.359 --> 00:17:34.920 the difficult things about this too is I was just talking to my brother on 167 00:17:36.000 --> 00:17:40.720 the phone and he was like, I just found out that like over fifty 168 00:17:40.759 --> 00:17:42.680 percent of people don't have an inner monologue, and I'm like, oh, 169 00:17:45.119 --> 00:17:49.839 yeah, we just I just did a stream on that too the other day, 170 00:17:49.880 --> 00:17:59.279 and that this kind of inabilit this cognitive inability and would also relate to 171 00:18:00.240 --> 00:18:07.119 I think kind of paradigm analysis. So there's we've talked about this, well, 172 00:18:07.119 --> 00:18:10.559 this is just the way you think, right. So I find that 173 00:18:10.599 --> 00:18:15.759 people have had it really difficult kind of stepping out at kind of higher meta 174 00:18:15.839 --> 00:18:22.880 levels to kind of ask kind of metaological, meta epistemological questions. And there's 175 00:18:22.920 --> 00:18:30.119 something tied to kind of introspection, I think, because introspection kind of questions 176 00:18:30.160 --> 00:18:34.319 and doubts our own thoughts, right, I mean, when I would this 177 00:18:34.400 --> 00:18:38.960 would an example be something for the audience, something simple like if I said 178 00:18:40.000 --> 00:18:44.160 the dog is brown, right, that would be a basic knowledge claim. 179 00:18:44.640 --> 00:18:48.759 If I said I have knowledge that the dog is brown would be a higher 180 00:18:48.880 --> 00:18:56.680 level order of questions. And a lot of people get this confused too about 181 00:18:56.319 --> 00:19:06.200 what we're arguing. I've never actually posited that an atheist or anybody else who 182 00:19:06.240 --> 00:19:12.119 doesn't embrace the orthodox worldview can't have knowledge. I it's possible, but the 183 00:19:12.160 --> 00:19:15.559 state that you have knowledge to claim that you do, or to know that 184 00:19:17.480 --> 00:19:21.680 I'm in a state of knowledge and I know the dogs there, that's a 185 00:19:21.799 --> 00:19:26.480 second order. Yeah. The first time I came to one of those conferences 186 00:19:26.519 --> 00:19:30.799 in Texas with you. There was a bit of a disagreement with an individual 187 00:19:30.960 --> 00:19:34.480 over this very question where he thought that I was saying that an unbeliever literally 188 00:19:34.519 --> 00:19:38.680 has no knowledge, when the point was that they can't justify the knowledge that 189 00:19:38.720 --> 00:19:41.960 they have, but they know things, they just don't have an account for 190 00:19:41.000 --> 00:19:48.839 the knowledge. Yeah. And again, because orthodox provides, as we'll see 191 00:19:48.839 --> 00:19:56.400 through the theonymous epistemology of revelatory theism and epistemically privileged position, we can actually 192 00:19:56.480 --> 00:20:03.440 say, of course the atheist knows. Remember we discussed this too, and 193 00:20:03.480 --> 00:20:07.880 I'm trying to remember if it was Stanny Loy, I think it was that 194 00:20:08.039 --> 00:20:15.559 said Orthodoxy is not married to any particular philosophy. It's not wedded like Tony's 195 00:20:17.640 --> 00:20:22.799 wedded to a restituianism. Why, because it transcends all these man made systems. 196 00:20:23.119 --> 00:20:26.920 Yeah, there's a great an epistemic kind of privileged position to look and 197 00:20:26.960 --> 00:20:32.559 be like, sure, right, here's a there's a Fluorovsky I say, 198 00:20:32.599 --> 00:20:37.279 I think that's really good where he talks about how the Batristic era didn't just 199 00:20:37.359 --> 00:20:41.759 adopt Plato or adopt Aristotle, that they would pull from any of these and 200 00:20:41.240 --> 00:20:48.279 the terminology and the ideas are really revelatory in the sense of the nature person 201 00:20:48.680 --> 00:20:52.200 distinction, for example, is not an Aristotle. It's a unique revelation to 202 00:20:52.400 --> 00:20:57.039 the Christian position. Even though it might utilize terminology from Aristotle or Plato, 203 00:20:57.519 --> 00:21:03.759 the meanings that fronema behind the terms that are used is intended to be revelatory 204 00:21:03.880 --> 00:21:11.160 revelation, not not just sort of one to one Greek borrowing cribbing from Greek 205 00:21:11.160 --> 00:21:18.519 philosophy. So I'm trying to set up like the kind of whole prolegemina to 206 00:21:18.680 --> 00:21:26.000 my paper, and I've explained what the motivation was, why this is kind 207 00:21:26.039 --> 00:21:33.519 of a different style that I was trying to also get the objections and then 208 00:21:33.559 --> 00:21:37.119 answer and kind of think through these things and articulate it, which I was. 209 00:21:37.319 --> 00:21:40.640 You know, of course I didn't get all the objections, but I 210 00:21:40.680 --> 00:21:45.359 thought kind of the more serious or more common objections. And the other thing 211 00:21:45.400 --> 00:21:52.039 too, If you remember I had this phone call with you, that first 212 00:21:52.079 --> 00:21:57.440 and second order argument that I developed in there came to It came to me 213 00:21:57.440 --> 00:22:00.880 in a dream. It wasn't a fewer dream. And I remember in the 214 00:22:02.000 --> 00:22:06.400 dream I was arguing with this atheist because I don't know what your dreams are 215 00:22:06.519 --> 00:22:10.039 like, but this is all I do in my serious or joking? Did 216 00:22:10.039 --> 00:22:14.200 you really have a dream about it? I'm not pretty serious. I was 217 00:22:14.200 --> 00:22:21.440 debating this atheist in my dream and I developed this argument, and I remember 218 00:22:21.440 --> 00:22:22.720 thinking of the dream. I'm like, I think I'm onto something here. 219 00:22:25.200 --> 00:22:27.599 Now. I've had all those kinds of thoughts and dreams before, and the 220 00:22:27.680 --> 00:22:32.559 totally nonsensical right when you wake up, oftentimes you're like, what was I 221 00:22:32.559 --> 00:22:37.160 thinking? That didn't that didn't make any sense. But in this dream, 222 00:22:37.480 --> 00:22:41.079 I thought about I think I'm on, you got to remember this and pull 223 00:22:41.119 --> 00:22:45.799 it outside of your dream and write it into your paper. And I just 224 00:22:45.880 --> 00:22:51.200 kept reminding myself that I pull this out, don't forget, because it's easy 225 00:22:51.240 --> 00:22:55.000 to forget something from a dream. And of course I wake up and I 226 00:22:55.119 --> 00:23:00.720 forget, and I'm driving down to leturgy with my subdeacon and I'm telling him, 227 00:23:00.759 --> 00:23:04.359 I'm like, I think I just stumbled upon this really cool argument, 228 00:23:06.119 --> 00:23:11.519 and I can't remember it. After the liturgy, after partaking of the Eucharist, 229 00:23:11.599 --> 00:23:15.319 I remembered it and I'm like, I got it, And I tell 230 00:23:15.400 --> 00:23:17.960 him, my subdeacon, and he was just like, probably thought I was 231 00:23:17.960 --> 00:23:21.480 like super nerdy, and I'm like, so if you remember I called you 232 00:23:22.359 --> 00:23:26.680 because I don't know, like this is part of my introspection. I'm like, 233 00:23:26.680 --> 00:23:29.079 what if this is totally nonsense, And I think, oh, this 234 00:23:29.240 --> 00:23:32.480 is so great. I got it from a dream and this totally makes sense. 235 00:23:33.440 --> 00:23:36.440 So i'd called you and some other people and I told you about this 236 00:23:36.680 --> 00:23:44.720 argument between this kind of circularity between first and second order knowledge in terms of 237 00:23:44.880 --> 00:23:48.519 autonomous epistemology, and both you and other people said, I think it's a 238 00:23:48.519 --> 00:23:52.000 really good argument, and so that I kind of put it in there and 239 00:23:52.039 --> 00:23:56.680 refined it in the paper, So that was another motivation behind the paper too, 240 00:23:56.680 --> 00:24:00.920 which is really interesting. All right, so'slet's get into the paper, 241 00:24:00.000 --> 00:24:07.240 Like what's so. You lay out the introductory paragraph where you're talking about how 242 00:24:07.160 --> 00:24:15.839 you want to present a theonomous epistemology or revelatory theism account for knowledge versus autonomous 243 00:24:15.839 --> 00:24:22.880 epistemology, utilizing this first order second order tiered approach, and then you argue 244 00:24:22.880 --> 00:24:29.400 that the give an account for second order statements in terms of the existence of 245 00:24:29.440 --> 00:24:33.519 knowledge reveals a unique epistemic problem that requires justification for the second order. And 246 00:24:33.559 --> 00:24:41.039 then the conclusion is that of your argument is that only really theism is capable 247 00:24:41.119 --> 00:24:47.799 of grounding a solution or giving a solution to the necessary conditions for the possibility 248 00:24:47.799 --> 00:24:51.559 of knowledge. Yeah, so what I want to do, there's two things 249 00:24:51.559 --> 00:24:56.480 that I did in this paper is to put in onto a two disjunct. 250 00:24:57.160 --> 00:25:03.039 And what that means is in a bunch of Malpass's asses, I call them 251 00:25:03.720 --> 00:25:10.160 these alkoli asses that kind of pseudo intellectuals that just kind of parrot these arguments 252 00:25:10.519 --> 00:25:17.119 that they get from Malpass, and I put this in my paper. They're 253 00:25:17.119 --> 00:25:25.119 presenting an argument from Malpass that basically when I present the orthodox version of tag 254 00:25:25.839 --> 00:25:30.440 and one of the arguments that I used to kind of pedagogically illustrate what's kind 255 00:25:30.440 --> 00:25:37.039 of behind all of this is the disjunctive argument. And so Malpass had this 256 00:25:37.240 --> 00:25:41.799 argument that you know, either it's not a true just junk, meaning there 257 00:25:41.839 --> 00:25:47.240 could be other options like for example, you're iding or eating a peanut butter 258 00:25:47.279 --> 00:25:51.559 and Joe sandwich or a steak. Well that means a true just junk. 259 00:25:51.599 --> 00:25:56.559 It's not either a arb but a or not a And then we'll get into 260 00:25:56.559 --> 00:26:00.039 this later. They have their own criticism of that, but I really do 261 00:26:00.160 --> 00:26:07.880 want to put it into a true dichotomy within the disjunt, and so it's 262 00:26:07.960 --> 00:26:11.880 going to be either autonomous or theonomous. There can't be any third option. 263 00:26:12.559 --> 00:26:17.279 And then what I do is I take the autonomous project and I look, 264 00:26:17.400 --> 00:26:27.799 okay, what is epistemically more than just epistemically problematic but devastating self refuting. 265 00:26:29.559 --> 00:26:40.599 And in this section I think I had titled it the failure of autonomous pistemology. 266 00:26:40.640 --> 00:26:45.599 There's two main arguments that I develop in here. That's the putting your 267 00:26:45.599 --> 00:26:51.160 epistemological horse before your metaphysical cart argument, which you know that I had already 268 00:26:51.200 --> 00:26:56.160 kind of developed that before the writing the paper, and then the first and 269 00:26:56.319 --> 00:27:02.519 second order, which I had kind of a version of that I actually did 270 00:27:02.519 --> 00:27:07.920 something. I refined it and did something different here, partly in base two, 271 00:27:07.160 --> 00:27:12.599 not only on my dream, but objections that I heard that where people 272 00:27:12.680 --> 00:27:19.079 thought that I was simply just kind of recashing, rehashing the Chisholm problem, 273 00:27:21.079 --> 00:27:23.079 and so I had to kind of make it more clear that it's like, 274 00:27:23.480 --> 00:27:27.920 it's similar, you know, in so far as a dialectical kind of tension 275 00:27:32.480 --> 00:27:40.640 and circularity, but it's it's fundamentally different, so that no answers to Chisholm's 276 00:27:40.720 --> 00:27:47.440 criterion problem. Are going to transfer over and answer the argument that I'm making, 277 00:27:48.000 --> 00:27:51.640 but just let me restate. Those are the two main arguments of the 278 00:27:51.680 --> 00:27:59.759 failure of the autonomous epistemology, putting your epistemic course before your metaphysical cart and 279 00:28:00.559 --> 00:28:07.160 circularity epistemic bootstrapping that arises from the dialectical tension but between the first and second 280 00:28:07.319 --> 00:28:17.480 order knowledge. And we can go over those, but if you well, 281 00:28:17.519 --> 00:28:23.640 one question before that is why are you Why are you saying a dialectical tension 282 00:28:23.680 --> 00:28:33.440 between first and second order? Excuse me? I meant the dialectical tension was 283 00:28:33.480 --> 00:28:44.720 between the the metaphysics and epistemology. I guess the first I'm not calling it 284 00:28:44.759 --> 00:28:48.039 into question, I'm just could you flesh that out for me and the audience. 285 00:28:48.519 --> 00:28:55.759 So the dialectical tension between and I guess there is a dialectical tension between 286 00:28:55.759 --> 00:29:00.200 the first and second and it's something similar to the the epistemological and metaphysical. 287 00:29:00.319 --> 00:29:08.920 Right, So die two Right, I have two categories. And with the 288 00:29:08.960 --> 00:29:15.119 epistemological metaphysical again, the metaphysics we would say the way the universe is and 289 00:29:15.160 --> 00:29:22.880 the ontology determines what if we know anything at all and how But then I 290 00:29:22.920 --> 00:29:27.240 have all these different metaphysical accounts. So then what I have to do is 291 00:29:27.359 --> 00:29:36.359 what's contingent upon metaphysics has to be placed prior to metaphysics so that I can 292 00:29:36.440 --> 00:29:41.880 actually determine, I know, before I could even know what metaphysical account is, 293 00:29:41.960 --> 00:29:48.880 so that I can then justify my my epistemology. So what I'm doing 294 00:29:49.000 --> 00:29:53.400 is an unjustified move. I'm going, let's just pretend that's not the case, 295 00:29:53.440 --> 00:29:56.279 and like, let's put this over here and just remember what I always 296 00:29:56.279 --> 00:30:02.440 say, Grant me all my assumptions so that I can and then pretend to 297 00:30:02.680 --> 00:30:07.440 justify my pistemologics. So what we see is I can't get to this without 298 00:30:07.559 --> 00:30:12.240 this, but I have to put this to figure out this. Right, 299 00:30:12.279 --> 00:30:18.799 So there's there's two things that are kind of the intension that can't kind of 300 00:30:18.799 --> 00:30:23.119 resolve each other. They both seem to kind of be dependent on each other, 301 00:30:23.160 --> 00:30:30.079 but because they're divided in this kind of dialectical tension, I can't actually 302 00:30:30.839 --> 00:30:36.519 solve the problem or accomplish a task that I set out to actually do in 303 00:30:36.599 --> 00:30:42.440 any of the philosophy or e pistemology that I'm trying to do likewise with the 304 00:30:42.440 --> 00:30:49.440 first and second order. I have what two categories. With the first order, 305 00:30:51.720 --> 00:30:59.279 John knows the dog's brown, right, and then our claims that John 306 00:30:59.440 --> 00:31:03.519 knows that a dog is brown, or that knowledge exists. Now, clearly 307 00:31:03.680 --> 00:31:08.440 I couldn't make the second claim order claim unless the first order were true. 308 00:31:11.160 --> 00:31:18.680 But what's the problem. I'm always making second order claims about the first So 309 00:31:18.759 --> 00:31:22.359 it's well, yeah, obviously I've got to provide justification. So what grant 310 00:31:22.440 --> 00:31:30.400 me all my assumptions about first order, so that can make all my statements 311 00:31:30.440 --> 00:31:36.319 about my second order that John knows knowledge exists. Basically everything everybody would ever 312 00:31:36.359 --> 00:31:40.680 put in a chat. All the objections that we're getting are all second order. 313 00:31:40.720 --> 00:31:44.720 They're all making epistemic claims, which is different than a person being in 314 00:31:44.799 --> 00:31:49.720 the state of knowledge. Is very different than somebody actually making claims. So 315 00:31:49.880 --> 00:31:55.880 again we have this kind of tension between two categories. I can't get number 316 00:31:55.880 --> 00:32:00.920 two without number one, but I'm always in number two, so I assume 317 00:32:01.079 --> 00:32:13.400 and bootstrap unjustifiably, so category one to arbitrarily and unjustifiably try to justify and 318 00:32:13.440 --> 00:32:17.160 that, and that's similar to the criterion problem. Move right. It's similar 319 00:32:17.200 --> 00:32:23.359 to yeah, but it's not identical because the criterion problem. He'll be like, 320 00:32:23.440 --> 00:32:27.640 people will be like, well, you start off with a methodology and 321 00:32:27.640 --> 00:32:31.960 blah blah blah. But this is more of a fundamental problem. I'm sure 322 00:32:34.039 --> 00:32:42.119 once you grasp the the circularity, the vicious circularity, and dialectical tension between 323 00:32:42.160 --> 00:32:47.319 the first and second order, and realize I'm always in second order from an 324 00:32:47.319 --> 00:32:58.000 autonomous position starting point, I can never I can never get the one, 325 00:32:58.519 --> 00:33:05.880 and so thus have to get to one in order to established to level Yeah, 326 00:33:05.920 --> 00:33:10.960 and so the conditions for the possibility of knowledge are a level two type 327 00:33:10.960 --> 00:33:16.039 of statement. But but they're also a level one statement, and so that 328 00:33:16.200 --> 00:33:24.240 thus the dilemma. Yeah, so I have this. I tried to put 329 00:33:24.240 --> 00:33:29.440 it into some easy premises. If it's true that knowledge exists first order, 330 00:33:29.440 --> 00:33:37.000 then our beliefs are statements that knowledge exists is also true? Why because one 331 00:33:37.079 --> 00:33:44.720 is constitutive for two. So there's some people in the audience still before you 332 00:33:44.759 --> 00:33:47.119 go to those, hold on, people are still kind of wanting to understand. 333 00:33:47.160 --> 00:33:51.519 Again, first we don't get this point. Then we're talking past everybody. 334 00:33:51.559 --> 00:33:59.319 So again, help help me with some examples. Yeah, let's assume 335 00:34:00.559 --> 00:34:02.920 a kind of standard with the possibility given. Gettier that there could be a 336 00:34:02.960 --> 00:34:13.000 fourth condition, but at least knowledge requires a belief, a believer who believes 337 00:34:13.079 --> 00:34:17.920 as a true belief that's for the right reasons, i e. Justified. 338 00:34:17.960 --> 00:34:22.559 So a true, justified belief, with the caveat that perhaps there could be 339 00:34:22.599 --> 00:34:30.960 a fourth condition or something. All right, So that means, let's say 340 00:34:30.079 --> 00:34:42.440 John is believe something about an apple. The apple is there's two apples in 341 00:34:42.440 --> 00:34:49.159 front of me, or something like that. Now he doesn't guess he actually 342 00:34:49.239 --> 00:34:52.880 has a reliable let's say, mechanism, his faculties, whatever. I'll give 343 00:34:52.920 --> 00:35:00.039 it, whatever you guys want. Let's say we agree it's possible that John 344 00:35:00.079 --> 00:35:02.840 not only has a true belief, but he arrives at it for the right 345 00:35:02.880 --> 00:35:09.800 reasons. Okay. Anybody can do that, regardless of whether they're an atheist 346 00:35:09.880 --> 00:35:14.039 or not. We would say that's possible. Okay, So that would be 347 00:35:14.039 --> 00:35:20.400 a first order. John knows there's two apples in front of him. Okay, 348 00:35:22.719 --> 00:35:30.559 it's different to say. It's a different claim to say that John knows 349 00:35:30.599 --> 00:35:38.239 that he knows. John might have knowledge there's two apples. This came up 350 00:35:38.280 --> 00:35:46.840 when I was an undergraduate. We were doing the Pythagorean proof in Euclid, 351 00:35:49.239 --> 00:35:55.719 and a professor asked me, almost kind of a second order question, what 352 00:35:55.760 --> 00:36:04.480 do you think of a student doesn't actually know the proof right or know that 353 00:36:04.559 --> 00:36:07.840 they know? Do you think that they don't know the A square plus B 354 00:36:07.920 --> 00:36:14.719 squared equal C square. So what I would say now is that, well, 355 00:36:14.760 --> 00:36:22.960 if they came to the the belief that A squared basically the sides the 356 00:36:22.000 --> 00:36:28.239 area on the sides of a right angled triangle is equal to the area on 357 00:36:28.360 --> 00:36:34.559 the hypot news for the right reasons, I don't think they would have to 358 00:36:35.440 --> 00:36:40.119 know that they know that as long as they were justified. So again, 359 00:36:40.800 --> 00:36:47.079 on all the literature on epistemology, everybody says you could know something without knowing 360 00:36:47.119 --> 00:36:52.000 that you know it. Does that make sense? That's the first thing we 361 00:36:52.079 --> 00:37:00.000 have to grasp something, or stated knowledge doesn't mean that you know that you're 362 00:37:00.039 --> 00:37:04.599 in a state of knowledge. Yeah. So basically, imagine audience, I'm 363 00:37:04.599 --> 00:37:07.920 looking at the pen and it's just the pen is blue. That's level one. 364 00:37:08.559 --> 00:37:15.199 Then the higher order thinking is it's an abstracted, higher level way of 365 00:37:15.280 --> 00:37:20.639 viewing it. Jay knows that the pen is blue is that good? Yeah, 366 00:37:21.639 --> 00:37:27.920 yeah, exactly, because otherwise it would be way too stringent if we 367 00:37:28.039 --> 00:37:38.199 said that knowledge is a sufficient condition for second order knowledge. I mean, 368 00:37:38.239 --> 00:37:43.719 it's just obviously not true. I think there's many cases where we make that 369 00:37:43.800 --> 00:37:47.679 people probably know stuff and they don't know why that they know it. But 370 00:37:49.079 --> 00:37:52.719 yeah, as father Degan pointed out, like the second statement here, the 371 00:37:52.760 --> 00:37:57.639 higher order statement is also a statement of knowledge, right, but it's a 372 00:37:57.679 --> 00:38:00.440 higher order statement of knowledge. And so this is what you're saying. They're 373 00:38:00.440 --> 00:38:06.199 sort of reciprocal, right in that this one might also lead to this one, 374 00:38:06.400 --> 00:38:10.760 but this one rests on also being a level one type of statement. 375 00:38:10.840 --> 00:38:15.239 So the point is that a person who recognizes this is then in a kind 376 00:38:15.239 --> 00:38:17.960 of a dilemma. And this is the dilemma that we're pointing out that pretty 377 00:38:19.039 --> 00:38:23.639 much all the atheists end up in when encountering TAG. They typically respond to 378 00:38:23.719 --> 00:38:29.519 TAG as if every proposition, every argument, every statement is just a level 379 00:38:29.559 --> 00:38:35.400 one statement and never addressing the meta or the second order type of reasoning, 380 00:38:36.119 --> 00:38:39.199 and thus they never typically get the argument until we really you know, flesh 381 00:38:39.239 --> 00:38:43.400 it out or hash it out after a while. So anyway, and that's 382 00:38:43.440 --> 00:38:46.880 why that's What happened in my dream is that, Yeah, I'm reading through 383 00:38:46.920 --> 00:38:51.119 all this literature where it's like, this is first order logic, this is 384 00:38:51.159 --> 00:38:58.079 second order logic and epistemology, this is a first order knowledge. John knows 385 00:38:58.119 --> 00:39:01.280 there's a blue pen in front him, and John knowing that he knows as 386 00:39:01.320 --> 00:39:07.400 a blue pant is. They're making all these distinctions. And then in the 387 00:39:07.519 --> 00:39:12.480 dream it dawned on me that I'm like, yeah, but you're talking about 388 00:39:13.719 --> 00:39:16.199 you're making claims about all this stuff like what order do I put that in? 389 00:39:19.320 --> 00:39:23.239 And I'm like, that's always second order. You're always at the second 390 00:39:23.320 --> 00:39:28.920 level, at the higher level. You're making claims about knowledge about John, 391 00:39:29.079 --> 00:39:32.239 about first order. And then in my dream it started around like I don't 392 00:39:32.239 --> 00:39:36.840 think you can ever get out of the second order. We're always at this 393 00:39:36.960 --> 00:39:42.280 kind of meta level making claims about assuming what we want to prove that knowledge 394 00:39:42.320 --> 00:39:47.840 exists, because that could only make those claims if knowledge actually exist, which 395 00:39:47.880 --> 00:39:51.599 is the heart of the paper and the heart of the matter, right, 396 00:39:52.480 --> 00:39:58.039 how do we determine how do we know that knowledge exists? And let's just 397 00:39:58.119 --> 00:40:01.079 run through in our heads right now, that's not a level one statement. 398 00:40:01.119 --> 00:40:04.800 I mean or it is a level one statement, but it's also it's a 399 00:40:04.840 --> 00:40:07.639 both, and it's a level one and a level two statement. Right that 400 00:40:07.360 --> 00:40:13.039 there that knowledge exists, I would say it's a level it's a second order. 401 00:40:13.079 --> 00:40:15.760 That's my point about the first order. Well, but I'm but you 402 00:40:15.760 --> 00:40:21.360 were making the point that every second order statement is also a first order statement, 403 00:40:21.480 --> 00:40:27.480 right at the same time, No, No, that's not the argument 404 00:40:27.639 --> 00:40:31.960 is all of our statements are second order, and concerning epistemology, there's second 405 00:40:32.039 --> 00:40:37.440 order about the first order. But I can't have my second order be true 406 00:40:37.480 --> 00:40:43.599 or justified unless my first order. That's what That's what I mean to say. 407 00:40:44.000 --> 00:40:46.639 So how do I So here's the question to everybody in the audience and 408 00:40:46.719 --> 00:40:55.000 every atheist, how do I justify first order claims? I mean first order 409 00:40:58.440 --> 00:41:04.320 knowledge? Another word? How do I justify that knowledge exists or reason? 410 00:41:06.480 --> 00:41:09.000 And what are like let's go over what would the possible answers people could give. 411 00:41:12.519 --> 00:41:15.239 Well, and I'm not trying to be ob to, but I'm trying 412 00:41:15.280 --> 00:41:21.079 to understand because how is it not the case that the second order statement isn't 413 00:41:21.119 --> 00:41:25.679 also a knowledge claim? Isn't it? Yes? So that's the whole point, 414 00:41:25.840 --> 00:41:30.039 right, it's a knowledge claim only, and it can only be true 415 00:41:30.920 --> 00:41:37.159 if knowledge exists. So it gets us back to number one, how do 416 00:41:37.239 --> 00:41:40.639 we know knowledge exists? And guess what they're going to say, Well, 417 00:41:40.639 --> 00:41:45.440 if knowledge exists, then knowledge exists, right, I know, I understand, 418 00:41:45.480 --> 00:41:52.840 But but isn't the second order statement also still just a knowledge claim? 419 00:41:52.519 --> 00:41:59.119 Yes, but it's a knowledge claim about the it's self referential about the subject 420 00:41:59.119 --> 00:42:01.519 itself, and it's having of the knowledge. Okay, but it's still a 421 00:42:01.599 --> 00:42:07.719 knowledge plan. Yeah, that's a good way to put it. The content 422 00:42:07.760 --> 00:42:15.079 and subjects not different. It's in both cases first order and second order, 423 00:42:15.239 --> 00:42:24.239 the content subjects the same. It's knowledge. Yes. So if somebody had 424 00:42:24.239 --> 00:42:29.440 brought up an objection that, well, I don't need to justify the two 425 00:42:29.559 --> 00:42:32.119 because it's the same content as the second order because it's the same content. 426 00:42:35.199 --> 00:42:38.920 But like, you're missing the point entirely my questions about how do we justify 427 00:42:39.000 --> 00:42:43.960 number one? I know it's the same content, we're talking about the same 428 00:42:44.000 --> 00:42:49.760 subject knowledge. I'm trying to figure out how from autonomous reasoning you're ever going 429 00:42:49.800 --> 00:42:58.760 to be able to establish without vicious circularity or bootstrapping that knowledge exists, especially 430 00:42:58.760 --> 00:43:02.360 when you're always assuming what you want to prove. So basically, second order 431 00:43:02.400 --> 00:43:07.719 statements are that while making a knowledge claim and I'm assuming that knowledge exists because 432 00:43:07.719 --> 00:43:09.119 i'm talking to Yeah, that's what i'man That's what I was getting at. 433 00:43:09.199 --> 00:43:12.880 Yeah, that's what I meant. So in other words, it's still it's 434 00:43:12.880 --> 00:43:16.599 not answering the question to say that, well, it's a higher order statement, 435 00:43:16.719 --> 00:43:22.880 but it's still just a claim about you know, the subject of knowledge 436 00:43:22.000 --> 00:43:29.360 or the subject in the sense of the agent having the knowledge. So but 437 00:43:29.440 --> 00:43:32.119 that doesn't get you to justification, is your point. It's that's just that's 438 00:43:32.159 --> 00:43:37.440 just kicking the can down the road exactly. And somebody said, well, 439 00:43:37.480 --> 00:43:43.519 because it's the same content, right, the second order statements don't need a 440 00:43:43.519 --> 00:43:47.599 different sort of justification. And I grant that, I'd be like, that's 441 00:43:47.639 --> 00:43:53.760 fine, I'm just looking for a justification for knowledge. Like So, what 442 00:43:53.840 --> 00:44:00.920 they don't realize is this was a really sophisticated kind of amological way of basically 443 00:44:00.960 --> 00:44:06.679 saying what we always say, just grant me all my assumptions so I can 444 00:44:06.760 --> 00:44:09.440 make my case and prove to you that my made up story is true. 445 00:44:09.480 --> 00:44:13.119 Okay, So I have a question here, and this is something I don't 446 00:44:13.199 --> 00:44:20.679 understand. So are you saying that there's this inherent problem in epistemology just from 447 00:44:20.719 --> 00:44:27.000 first and second order statements about justification? Or are you saying that TAG is 448 00:44:27.239 --> 00:44:36.000 like this move from one to two. I'm saying epistemology has the problem that's 449 00:44:36.039 --> 00:44:40.559 illustrated between one and two that nobody seems okay, So you're not likening the 450 00:44:42.920 --> 00:44:45.159 transcendental categoriess the possibility knowledge to the level too. I thought that's what you 451 00:44:45.199 --> 00:44:52.480 were doing. Oh that is that certainly is so? For example, because 452 00:44:52.519 --> 00:45:00.800 the orthodox tag admits the possibility that people can have first story knowledge without preposing 453 00:45:02.400 --> 00:45:08.920 and the question is how do you ground or count it. What world views 454 00:45:09.239 --> 00:45:15.760 or positions, possible positions could actually account or justify that knowledge exists. Now 455 00:45:15.760 --> 00:45:19.039 that's a second order. And what I'm going to show in this paper is 456 00:45:19.079 --> 00:45:22.960 that, yeah, tag's dealing with the second order. So because it's admitting, 457 00:45:23.239 --> 00:45:29.119 sure, you could know stuff, but you can never actually, from 458 00:45:29.239 --> 00:45:34.239 your position, make a statement, an epistemic statement, the claim that you 459 00:45:34.440 --> 00:45:37.800 that knowledge exists or that you're in a state of knowledge. Why, because 460 00:45:39.400 --> 00:45:44.719 you'll assume the exact thing that you want to prove. So put in the 461 00:45:44.800 --> 00:45:52.159 dichotomy, then we see one who is in a radically different kind of category. 462 00:45:52.239 --> 00:45:53.480 Because what I started thinking through is like, well, why is this 463 00:45:53.559 --> 00:46:00.679 even happening? Why is it the autonomous man can't get out of this epistemic 464 00:46:00.760 --> 00:46:09.159 quagmire? And again, the very notion of dialectical tension seems to be something 465 00:46:09.159 --> 00:46:15.800 to do with finitude, right, Finite means abounded, and so you have 466 00:46:15.880 --> 00:46:21.559 these categories of well I would say I would say it deals more so with 467 00:46:21.679 --> 00:46:30.840 the fall rather than than natural nature infinitude, because the way Maximus talks about 468 00:46:31.679 --> 00:46:37.480 the I mean, I wouldn't say there's any dialectical tension that's natural or in 469 00:46:37.800 --> 00:46:44.039 terms of the world. It's just you're probably right because it's just a result 470 00:46:44.119 --> 00:46:51.559 of a division. In fact, you have division and time. This is 471 00:46:51.599 --> 00:46:57.280 where you get chronology. I would have to disagree there, but we don't 472 00:46:57.320 --> 00:47:00.119 have to go into that. But that's a whole lot of men metaphysical topic. 473 00:47:00.239 --> 00:47:05.840 But I mean, do you think that there's a question here in then 474 00:47:06.079 --> 00:47:08.840 I don't mean like kind of like absolute unity or anything like this, but 475 00:47:10.639 --> 00:47:15.639 there's where are broken and they're not tied together. Do you see what I'm 476 00:47:15.639 --> 00:47:21.519 saying, yeah, dialectical tensions as a result of the fall is the you 477 00:47:21.559 --> 00:47:25.960 know, the result of like the way things are structured now in terms of 478 00:47:27.719 --> 00:47:30.280 all the problems in the world are a result of the fall. But they're 479 00:47:30.320 --> 00:47:36.159 not anything to do with like nature. They're the corruption of nature anyway, 480 00:47:36.280 --> 00:47:43.000 there's a question that is but I still think there's something to do with that, 481 00:47:43.159 --> 00:47:52.199 both the fall and probably the finitude. So that if you took if 482 00:47:52.199 --> 00:47:58.119 you took finite categories, you can't absoluteize them, right why Because they're created. 483 00:48:00.079 --> 00:48:04.679 They're not all encompassing. In other words, none of the things that 484 00:48:04.719 --> 00:48:07.119 we take right, all of which may be true, good and beautiful, 485 00:48:08.840 --> 00:48:15.159 we can't take those of the created things and absoluteize them, which is basically 486 00:48:15.199 --> 00:48:20.360 what philosophy is actually doing. Right. It's taking something good, just like 487 00:48:20.400 --> 00:48:24.679 every heresy, something true, and it's taken out of its proper context, 488 00:48:24.840 --> 00:48:32.840 right, And it's elevating this to the level of being an absolute rather than 489 00:48:32.880 --> 00:48:37.440 something that's contingent upon. And I think this is the problem of why these 490 00:48:37.480 --> 00:48:42.599 problems can't be resolved. Yeah, but time is a creation, so I 491 00:48:42.639 --> 00:48:46.519 just wouldn't locate dialectical tensions within time or the created order itself. It's a 492 00:48:46.559 --> 00:48:52.360 result of the fault because time is a is a there's the aon, which 493 00:48:52.400 --> 00:48:55.920 is the eternal, timeless creation of God. So time itself is good and 494 00:48:55.960 --> 00:49:00.079 it's as any las has taken up into the divine. I just wouldn't equate 495 00:49:00.119 --> 00:49:06.639 that with thing to do with with dialectics because I was just and there's a 496 00:49:06.639 --> 00:49:13.239 total different topic. I was actually thinking about chronos, not aon or Cairos 497 00:49:13.519 --> 00:49:20.519 like possibly could be a product of the fall. I don't think chronological time 498 00:49:20.679 --> 00:49:25.159 being lifted up and healed. Yeah, but that's because of the like, 499 00:49:25.199 --> 00:49:30.559 it's not time itself that's that's fallen, like the fall into time. Something 500 00:49:30.719 --> 00:49:39.239 specifically about chronology that might be that might be fallen, but not time itself. 501 00:49:39.320 --> 00:49:44.519 Yeah, I don't think time itself. Well, this is this is 502 00:49:44.679 --> 00:49:46.079 This is a different discussion. I don't mean to get off the try, 503 00:49:46.159 --> 00:49:50.000 but there is a great question by a person in the audience I would like 504 00:49:50.039 --> 00:49:55.719 you to address. Chroderick says, is what you're saying, Father Deacon germane 505 00:49:55.719 --> 00:50:02.760 to the discussion with Malpass, where Malpass objected to necessary preconditions of intelligibility by 506 00:50:02.840 --> 00:50:08.360 saying that he lacks a belief in them, yet his sense of intelligibility is 507 00:50:08.400 --> 00:50:16.159 still held. Well, I think this is why the first and second order 508 00:50:16.199 --> 00:50:21.840 comes in, because one of the things that I noticed that atheists we're saying, 509 00:50:22.000 --> 00:50:25.960 was well, I don't have a worldview. Have you noticed this? 510 00:50:28.000 --> 00:50:31.199 A yeah, they'll they'll oftentimes say, oh, I have actually no position, 511 00:50:31.280 --> 00:50:35.039 and that allows them to sort of slip and slide into different positions. 512 00:50:36.400 --> 00:50:37.679 And so what I realized, I'm like, well, those are second order 513 00:50:37.719 --> 00:50:44.320 claims about your position, right, Like you never get out of the problem, 514 00:50:44.400 --> 00:50:45.840 you just move it up to a higher order. But yeah, this 515 00:50:45.920 --> 00:50:52.039 guy says his next statement is is a malpass, perhaps conflating whether or not 516 00:50:52.079 --> 00:50:55.199 he has sense to a proposition with it being true or not right, like 517 00:50:55.239 --> 00:51:00.440 a kind of like fallacy of incredulity, Like, well, I just don't 518 00:51:00.440 --> 00:51:02.079 see how it could be, so you know, I don't believe in it. 519 00:51:02.159 --> 00:51:09.360 So yeah, exactly, But again, there's no way out of it 520 00:51:09.440 --> 00:51:15.480 in two senses. I point this out in my paper. There's nobody that's 521 00:51:15.519 --> 00:51:21.960 positionless, right or presuppositionless, so we can just move it up to higher 522 00:51:22.079 --> 00:51:28.880 orders. You're making a whole bunch of epistemic claims about that you're understanding my 523 00:51:28.960 --> 00:51:34.360 paper, you understanding what the argument is, that you're understanding what your h 524 00:51:37.480 --> 00:51:40.920 agnostic position, that I'm not taking a position, all the various things that 525 00:51:40.960 --> 00:51:45.679 even go into that, right. I mean it's almost kind of reminiscent of 526 00:51:45.760 --> 00:51:54.159 like Descartes, right where they think they actually get to this kind of foundational 527 00:51:54.400 --> 00:51:59.440 like why can make this agnostic claim and you see this doesn't depend on making 528 00:51:59.519 --> 00:52:02.000 any other commitments to anything. It's like all you have to show them it 529 00:52:02.079 --> 00:52:08.079 is that It's like that's impossible. Like the cojito assumes a whole host of 530 00:52:08.159 --> 00:52:15.039 different things. So I'd say there's a similarity there that with this kind of 531 00:52:16.360 --> 00:52:22.559 incredulity agnostic position, Right, they don't get out of the problem because it's 532 00:52:22.599 --> 00:52:28.440 like, yeah, but you just you have a whole host of epistemic presuppositions 533 00:52:28.440 --> 00:52:34.000 and commitments just even with that. Yeah, it's almost just a way. 534 00:52:34.119 --> 00:52:37.079 It's like another way of saying, I choose not to address this problem and 535 00:52:37.119 --> 00:52:42.079 so it's not there basically. Yeah. Second of all, it doesn't matter 536 00:52:43.440 --> 00:52:50.000 because as soon as I put it into the dialectical tension, if you don't 537 00:52:50.039 --> 00:52:55.360 assume the necessary condition for the possibility of knowledge is truly put into the disjunct 538 00:52:55.440 --> 00:53:07.280 between if you don't accept purposeful intentionalism theistic revelation. If you don't accept that, 539 00:53:08.239 --> 00:53:15.880 then whether you assent to atheism or accidentalism, you're or saying it's possible. 540 00:53:15.960 --> 00:53:22.039 Because notice that's the way that I define autonomous epistemology. Autonomous pistemology is 541 00:53:22.039 --> 00:53:28.280 the Thumistic system too. Why even though he believes in God and then ultimately 542 00:53:28.400 --> 00:53:35.280 God grounds everything, including knowledge, does a quitness not start with the assumption 543 00:53:37.079 --> 00:53:45.519 that it's possible to account for reasoning deduction inferences even if God might not exist, 544 00:53:45.559 --> 00:53:50.639 and then it just turns out we find out he exists later. No, 545 00:53:50.760 --> 00:53:55.199 there's an element of irrationality in the tonistic scheme for sure, which is 546 00:53:55.199 --> 00:54:01.360 ironic because it's a highly rational That's what natural theology is, what the mind, 547 00:54:01.559 --> 00:54:08.639 by the natural light of reason, can know, apart from divine revelation, 548 00:54:08.800 --> 00:54:14.880 which is insane. It's totally blasphemous from our position. So anyways, 549 00:54:15.639 --> 00:54:19.880 regardless of whether you're an atheist or not, if you do not assent, 550 00:54:20.119 --> 00:54:23.559 because it's in the radical disjunk, it's almost kind of like Pascal's wager. 551 00:54:23.679 --> 00:54:28.159 Right in the sense that you must wager. To not wager is to wager 552 00:54:28.320 --> 00:54:36.559 right. The radical disjunk is actually like that, if you even think that's 553 00:54:36.559 --> 00:54:40.920 a possibility, which is what a gnosticism would suggest, you're an accidentalism. 554 00:54:42.199 --> 00:54:46.039 Yeah, so it doesn't matter what Malpass's arguments are. He's in the accidentalism 555 00:54:46.039 --> 00:54:51.719 and accidental as a defeat for the possibility of knowledge. Hold On and I 556 00:54:51.760 --> 00:54:57.960 agree that accidentalism destroys the possibility of knowledge. But there is a question by 557 00:54:58.039 --> 00:55:01.639 Colby who says, the deacon, it appears that you are presupposing the thing 558 00:55:01.679 --> 00:55:07.440 that you want to demonstrate. You're positing that there's a realist account for knowledge, 559 00:55:07.920 --> 00:55:12.760 realist towards knowledge. He says, but the atheist or the pragmatist does 560 00:55:12.800 --> 00:55:15.480 not grant any kind of realist position. I assume you means realism in the 561 00:55:15.519 --> 00:55:22.239 sense of h No. I think he means like in this sense of like 562 00:55:27.199 --> 00:55:31.519 I just went blank on the account of objects external to you, uh, 563 00:55:31.679 --> 00:55:37.559 in terms of ontology, like you're like, you're really not necessarily essences, 564 00:55:37.599 --> 00:55:42.199 but there are there's a there's real objects that you're apprehending through your sense data. 565 00:55:44.960 --> 00:55:47.400 Colby, do you want to qualify in what's because real realist is used 566 00:55:47.400 --> 00:55:51.480 in different senses and history philosophy, so you want to qualify in what sense 567 00:55:51.480 --> 00:55:55.199 you're using it, Go ahead, a realist account of like indirect realism and 568 00:55:55.199 --> 00:56:00.239 direct realism in the sense of of of enlightenment debates. As I think what 569 00:56:00.280 --> 00:56:04.559 he's talking about, I don't think so, I think I get what he's 570 00:56:04.599 --> 00:56:08.920 saying. Why because this is a more fundamental that's getting into the kind of 571 00:56:09.000 --> 00:56:16.519 details. I feel like i'm the c I do. So let me let 572 00:56:16.559 --> 00:56:21.079 me ask Colby, do you mean realism in the sense of essence as being 573 00:56:21.119 --> 00:56:23.400 real ontological metaphysical things, or do you mean realism the sense of the Enlightenment 574 00:56:23.400 --> 00:56:30.000 debate about whether we apprehend things directly or indirectly in the external world. So 575 00:56:30.119 --> 00:56:35.360 I see what he's saying. He's a scriment ontology to knowledge. The atheist 576 00:56:35.360 --> 00:56:39.800 defines knowledge simply as a system of thoughts. That. Yeah, well, 577 00:56:39.840 --> 00:56:46.320 first of all, that doesn't make any sense. Nobody's we're all saying that 578 00:56:46.519 --> 00:56:53.920 knowledge is a property of the mind. Right, So, in other words, 579 00:56:53.920 --> 00:56:58.719 you could make the same arguments with a metaphysically quiet approach, right like 580 00:56:58.760 --> 00:57:05.119 your approach here is not necessitating epistem this is prior to any of the details 581 00:57:05.119 --> 00:57:08.400 of those kinds exactly. So it does. This is a great point we 582 00:57:08.480 --> 00:57:12.480 got we got to address, and I thank you for a point of that 583 00:57:12.559 --> 00:57:15.760 out, Father Deacon, which is this was your point you made earlier in 584 00:57:15.760 --> 00:57:17.760 than we got sidetrack to apologized for that. That was probably my fault. 585 00:57:19.039 --> 00:57:24.960 You made the point that what we're addressing here is the Enlightenment objection to metaphysics, 586 00:57:25.360 --> 00:57:30.480 which is that you can't put your metaphysical cart before your epistemic horse. 587 00:57:30.559 --> 00:57:35.360 And that's what Father Diggin's pointing out. So Father Diagan's argument is not relying 588 00:57:35.400 --> 00:57:40.719 on any grandiose metaphysics. He's actually critiquing the ancient and medieval idea like natural 589 00:57:40.760 --> 00:57:47.880 theology and Aquinas has that metaphysics is somehow self evident and epistemology is secondary to 590 00:57:49.000 --> 00:57:52.119 that. No, Rather, we're agreeing in saying, yes, how do 591 00:57:52.199 --> 00:57:55.719 you know that you know before you start telling me about all these metaphysical claims. 592 00:57:58.480 --> 00:58:00.519 Yeah, exactly. And in fact, the way that I usually do 593 00:58:00.599 --> 00:58:07.400 my arguments is I grant take whatever definition of knowledge and justification you want. 594 00:58:07.559 --> 00:58:15.920 Why because it's such a general and what's the term I want? These are 595 00:58:15.000 --> 00:58:23.920 such general and more fundamental questions. They proceed the kind of more detailed questions 596 00:58:24.000 --> 00:58:29.280 about like how to cash all this stuff out. So all of these arguments 597 00:58:29.280 --> 00:58:35.000 actually designed to I'll give you everything you want. As far as what you 598 00:58:35.119 --> 00:58:40.679 think knowledge is, how that works, it doesn't really matter because issues and 599 00:58:40.840 --> 00:58:46.559 problems about the way that how we would just how we would justify that whatever 600 00:58:46.599 --> 00:58:53.239 you think. Yeah, so this is prior to This is an argument about 601 00:58:53.400 --> 00:58:59.719 arguments. It's an argument about reason itself. Is it even possible? And 602 00:58:59.760 --> 00:59:04.559 now that's why it's prior to any first order claim about what exists, what 603 00:59:04.599 --> 00:59:07.519 doesn't exist, what's out there, what's not out there? Do I know 604 00:59:07.599 --> 00:59:10.519 this? Do I know? No? Redefining it to any ad hoc redefine 605 00:59:10.599 --> 00:59:14.960 is going to escape the problem. And that's one of the things I noticed 606 00:59:14.960 --> 00:59:17.639 with all the objections, is there a saying, well, the atheist isn't 607 00:59:17.639 --> 00:59:21.199 going to do that, Well, we'll just suit and there are all these 608 00:59:21.280 --> 00:59:23.639 kind of ad hoc rediffins. Now I'm assuming you're going to say that the 609 00:59:23.679 --> 00:59:29.360 ad hoc redefinings don't work because they're missing the very point, which is that 610 00:59:29.360 --> 00:59:34.280 that's just another type of knowledge claim. And what's in question is the possibility 611 00:59:34.320 --> 00:59:38.679 of knowledge, right, yes, so really easy if I just say I'll 612 00:59:38.719 --> 00:59:45.519 grant you whatever you think knowledge is, the issue still stands. Redefine it 613 00:59:45.519 --> 00:59:52.320 however you want. The issue is so fundamental and prior to all of that 614 00:59:52.320 --> 00:59:54.719 that it doesn't really matter. Then there's no kind of way out of it. 615 00:59:54.960 --> 00:59:58.679 And I think that's one of the issues too that I've noticed, and 616 00:59:58.719 --> 01:00:07.719 I put in h the final section of the paper missing the epistemological force for 617 01:00:07.760 --> 01:00:12.559 the epistemic trees that I'm like, why are these people getting so bogged down 618 01:00:12.599 --> 01:00:15.440 on and being like that it's not a true disjunctive. Well, that's not 619 01:00:15.559 --> 01:00:19.880 how knowledge. What if they just define it this way? And I'm like, 620 01:00:21.039 --> 01:00:24.480 what's going on here? Like why are they saying this? And I 621 01:00:24.559 --> 01:00:30.639 realized they're looking at the details and they don't see the bigger question that the 622 01:00:30.760 --> 01:00:37.639 kind of meta question that's being asked exactly. Let's see, this is one 623 01:00:37.639 --> 01:00:39.599 of the This is one of the great points of Kant. I mean, 624 01:00:39.880 --> 01:00:43.920 I have a lot of disagreements with Kant, but one of the great points 625 01:00:44.000 --> 01:00:52.199 of Kant is to really go into kind of the possibilities of philosophy with transcendental 626 01:00:52.239 --> 01:00:57.960 categories, and you have this, you had it kind of positive in aerosols 627 01:00:58.000 --> 01:01:04.039 categories what the category worries are, and I disagree with Kant's move to ultimately 628 01:01:04.320 --> 01:01:08.239 make them not metaphysical. But regardless of all that, what he's doing, 629 01:01:08.360 --> 01:01:13.719 the types of thinking that he's doing about these types of arguments really are revolutionary 630 01:01:13.760 --> 01:01:19.760 and they're they're they're worthy of note. And so people that do understand like 631 01:01:19.760 --> 01:01:23.280 the content, not the content system, but the type of questions Kant is 632 01:01:23.400 --> 01:01:30.320 asking with what he has and what he proposes with a transcendental category. And 633 01:01:30.320 --> 01:01:36.599 again we're not saying that we agree with the content position that they're all psychologized 634 01:01:36.960 --> 01:01:39.559 or they're all just in the mind or whatever. We're setting that question aside. 635 01:01:39.559 --> 01:01:44.239 So let's let's say we don't have any metaphysical commitments. We're just taking 636 01:01:44.400 --> 01:01:49.679 the type of argument that a transcendent argument is about the possibilities or the preconditions 637 01:01:49.679 --> 01:01:54.480 for knowledge. And we're saying that that is very useful here because it shows 638 01:01:54.559 --> 01:02:00.159 us that any knowledge claim that an atheist might have, the move very first 639 01:02:00.199 --> 01:02:06.320 move they make is assuming the knowledge is possible That's why the question is prior 640 01:02:06.400 --> 01:02:09.480 to the doing of any argument or logic at all. I just don't understand 641 01:02:09.480 --> 01:02:15.320 why this guy called me the great thinks I'm assuming the type of exists. 642 01:02:15.800 --> 01:02:21.079 I haven't assumed anything. I've granted. I've literally given everything over to the 643 01:02:21.159 --> 01:02:23.559 atheist. Yeah, we could say that, Let's say let's say there is 644 01:02:23.599 --> 01:02:28.639 no metaphysics that's noble at all. Let's just grant that there's no realism at 645 01:02:28.639 --> 01:02:32.519 all, no essences, no essentialism at all. The question that then is 646 01:02:34.039 --> 01:02:42.719 what is the account for knowing? How is knowledge possible? Right? I 647 01:02:42.880 --> 01:02:49.719 just brought up the metaphysical and epistemological tension because there are people that would admit 648 01:02:51.440 --> 01:02:55.519 and I still think that the pragmatist gives a metaphysical I don't think there's any 649 01:02:55.599 --> 01:03:01.199 kind of way out of making metaphysical claim. I mean, even if you 650 01:03:01.199 --> 01:03:09.159 think you're a metaphysical quietess. I'm just showing that those who accept that would 651 01:03:09.239 --> 01:03:15.840 have this problem. Now, the first and second order issue has nothing to 652 01:03:15.920 --> 01:03:22.639 do with the dialectical tension between metaphysics and epistemology, So any one of those 653 01:03:22.639 --> 01:03:29.639 are sufficient to basically show the flaw of I was just developing two sufficient arguments 654 01:03:30.440 --> 01:03:37.000 together. And I wasn't making any metaphysical claims about or assuming or anything like 655 01:03:37.039 --> 01:03:42.000 that. I was just basically taking other people's positions and be like, you 656 01:03:42.079 --> 01:03:45.760 admit, And this is what people always get wrong about tag is, Oh, 657 01:03:45.840 --> 01:03:52.480 so I have to just arbitrarily just assume all of your presuppositions in order 658 01:03:52.519 --> 01:04:00.360 for knowledge to work. No, that's not what we said. I take 659 01:04:00.599 --> 01:04:05.920 as far as the impossibility of the contrary, and I show that people on 660 01:04:05.960 --> 01:04:15.039 their own grounds are engaged in performative contradictions and things that might you yourself the 661 01:04:15.119 --> 01:04:21.360 rules that you arbitrarily establish. You say I require this, and then you 662 01:04:21.400 --> 01:04:26.280 do just the opposite. So it's it's not my like, oh, it's 663 01:04:27.119 --> 01:04:31.039 my arbitrary rules of the game here. And if it's like on your own 664 01:04:31.079 --> 01:04:38.239 account, you violate your own principles, like your system doesn't do what you 665 01:04:38.320 --> 01:04:45.480 want it to do. And guess what on your own admittance, orthodoxy does 666 01:04:45.519 --> 01:04:48.599 everything that you want your paradigm or epistemology, philosophy or religion to do, 667 01:04:48.719 --> 01:04:56.760 but it doesn't do. And I find that people really get that confusion. 668 01:04:56.840 --> 01:05:00.840 Yeah, I mean, that's that's misunderstanding that even though what we're talking about 669 01:05:00.880 --> 01:05:04.960 focuses on a couple examples, it's still a comparison of paradigms. Right, 670 01:05:05.000 --> 01:05:10.159 If we're going to compare paradigms, we still have to pick something within the 671 01:05:10.199 --> 01:05:14.639 paradigms. Right, the orthodox paradigm, you have an atheist paradigm. The 672 01:05:14.760 --> 01:05:17.679 argument is just simply pointing out that it doesn't matter which thing we pick, 673 01:05:18.280 --> 01:05:25.159 Like if you have a belief in if you believe that you have true knowledge 674 01:05:25.159 --> 01:05:29.400 about some object or whatever, it doesn't matter. It doesn't matter which object 675 01:05:29.480 --> 01:05:32.840 or thing we choose. Within the worldviews. The question that Father Deacon is 676 01:05:32.920 --> 01:05:40.159 raising is always automatically there because this is a question prior to any knowledge claim, 677 01:05:40.239 --> 01:05:45.320 and they seem to have a really hard problem grasping that. And because 678 01:05:45.360 --> 01:05:48.320 they think that, yeah, they think that when you say it's a higher 679 01:05:48.440 --> 01:05:55.400 order type of argument, they assume that means you're importing a bunch of metaphysical 680 01:05:56.239 --> 01:06:00.719 baggage to this. Oh, you're trying to say that the higher order is 681 01:06:00.840 --> 01:06:03.880 like universals, And like, no, no, it doesn't matter what you 682 01:06:05.480 --> 01:06:10.199 think about metaphysics or what I think about metaphysics. Is like, this is 683 01:06:10.360 --> 01:06:15.920 prior to any any of those types of claims. That's what they have real 684 01:06:15.000 --> 01:06:19.960 quick because this illustrates it too. So what was the gentleman we were just 685 01:06:20.239 --> 01:06:28.119 referring to Colbally the great? I've heard this a million times. Well, 686 01:06:28.159 --> 01:06:32.960 the anominalists will just say this, or the atheists won't accept right, they'll 687 01:06:33.000 --> 01:06:40.760 say this, and so your argument doesn't work. And what they're missing again, 688 01:06:40.880 --> 01:06:45.039 they're missing epistemologic for us, for the epistemic trees. Guess what those 689 01:06:45.039 --> 01:06:54.920 are second order claims about pragmatism, about how they're defining truth and falsity and 690 01:06:54.960 --> 01:07:03.199 stuff like that. So it doesn't matter, it's irrelevant to the question of 691 01:07:04.039 --> 01:07:12.239 how do you justify that? How would we possibly justify that the pragmatist is 692 01:07:12.360 --> 01:07:15.519 justified in that move to actually say that? And I don't know why, 693 01:07:15.559 --> 01:07:19.280 Like to me, it seems like I said, the hardest problem is convincing 694 01:07:19.320 --> 01:07:24.000 people the problems not hard at all, but simple. To me, that 695 01:07:24.079 --> 01:07:30.119 seems really simple. You're making a bunch of epistemic claims about what counts as 696 01:07:30.280 --> 01:07:33.880 knowledge, how they'll redefine it, and I want to know how you justify 697 01:07:33.960 --> 01:07:40.679 that, And nobody can seem to like pick up on like what that question 698 01:07:40.800 --> 01:07:46.280 even is, and like why that's so detrimental. Well, you see what 699 01:07:46.480 --> 01:07:49.840 eventually is going to happen is they're going to say, well, if gramting 700 01:07:49.880 --> 01:07:55.599 my assumptions about pragmatism, that I can actually redefine knowledge and all this stuff, 701 01:07:56.159 --> 01:07:59.840 and then that's what would justify my position. So that's exactly what I'm 702 01:07:59.840 --> 01:08:04.000 trying to show in all these arguments is that you're epistemically bootstrapping. You have 703 01:08:04.079 --> 01:08:09.800 no justification for your justification criteria. Yeah, so let's look at look at 704 01:08:09.800 --> 01:08:13.239 this on a diagram, and this illustrates what you're talking about. The tree 705 01:08:13.320 --> 01:08:16.399 is green. Bob knows the tree is green. First order, second order. 706 01:08:16.720 --> 01:08:20.760 The atheist response, like Father Deacon says, is almost always well, 707 01:08:20.800 --> 01:08:26.880 a pragmatist will just say this and then interject whatever the pragmatist account is, 708 01:08:27.079 --> 01:08:30.439 Oh, well a relatives will just say this, Oh, an epistemic nihilist 709 01:08:30.439 --> 01:08:34.920 would just say this, Oh, matirosts would just say this. These answers 710 01:08:34.920 --> 01:08:41.880 are missing what the argument actually is because none of this is addressing what the 711 01:08:42.000 --> 01:08:45.439 challenge is. It doesn't matter what all types of things you try to put 712 01:08:45.439 --> 01:08:49.439 in there, because every time you try to make a knowledge claim with one 713 01:08:49.439 --> 01:08:55.039 of these failed systems, pragmatist relatives, nihilist materials. It's not going to 714 01:08:55.119 --> 01:08:59.279 give an account for how you ground the knowledge. That's the point. Then 715 01:08:59.319 --> 01:09:03.079 watch what the they'll say that they think this is an objection, because then 716 01:09:03.199 --> 01:09:06.880 it's the burden of proof game. Right, Well, you're seeing the wrong, 717 01:09:08.039 --> 01:09:12.119 so you're gonna have to prove that those are all wrong. Well wait 718 01:09:12.159 --> 01:09:16.680 a minute, on what terms? If we haven't even been able to get 719 01:09:16.680 --> 01:09:20.960 a justification for proof itself, do you see what the issue is? Like? 720 01:09:21.439 --> 01:09:28.279 Who's proof of proofs do we use? Yeah? Just saying that, 721 01:09:28.359 --> 01:09:32.600 well, you can't answer a primati has an account of this, that's not 722 01:09:32.680 --> 01:09:39.199 showing that that is a justification for knowledge. Do you know what it reminds 723 01:09:39.199 --> 01:09:42.600 me of? You know, these weirdo creepers that you get calling on your 724 01:09:42.600 --> 01:09:47.000 Twitter space and stuff like that, and they start toning these like long, 725 01:09:47.239 --> 01:09:54.000 weird, wild stories about you don't understand man. Back in like five thousand 726 01:09:54.119 --> 01:09:59.159 BC, the Mesopotamians were visited by a space force of aliens that set up 727 01:10:01.159 --> 01:10:06.640 and they tell this whole story, and you see what the Tower of Babbel 728 01:10:06.720 --> 01:10:14.359 really was was gamatry and confusing the people. That's why we have to actually 729 01:10:14.840 --> 01:10:18.239 any word that sounds like another word really is that word. It's not a 730 01:10:18.239 --> 01:10:23.520 genetic fallacy that was created. The genetic fallacy was a fallacy created by the 731 01:10:23.560 --> 01:10:28.520 elites trying to right. They have this whole story, right, and you're 732 01:10:28.520 --> 01:10:32.359 like, that's great, wonderful storyteller. I want to know if it's true 733 01:10:32.560 --> 01:10:36.640 and how we determine. Isn't this exactly the question that Plato says, I 734 01:10:36.640 --> 01:10:48.000 don't. I'm not concerned with doxa. I want so you opinion versus knowledge, 735 01:10:48.520 --> 01:10:54.359 And so all that's happening is with a progmant will take like congratulation. 736 01:10:54.880 --> 01:11:00.840 Pragmas wrote a non fictional progmance history. It never gets into the category. 737 01:11:00.880 --> 01:11:04.560 I'm still wondering, Right, telling a story isn't what it means to give 738 01:11:04.640 --> 01:11:12.720 justification? And right, well, what if it's possible that that's true? 739 01:11:12.800 --> 01:11:18.880 Like again, even that it is already assuming epistemic categories. Yeah, so 740 01:11:18.920 --> 01:11:25.279 sudden, suddenly the atheists are like these creative writers where everything's possible. Right, 741 01:11:25.560 --> 01:11:29.359 if you're a theist, nothing is possible. That's suddenly like when this 742 01:11:29.479 --> 01:11:33.640 question comes up, anything's possible. We live in a universe where like metaverse 743 01:11:34.399 --> 01:11:38.880 multiverse, were like, there's a universe where there's dragons and I'm the king 744 01:11:38.960 --> 01:11:42.399 of it, and it's like everything. So it's like suddenly everything is possible, 745 01:11:42.640 --> 01:11:45.000 even though like nine to nine percent of the time when the atheist is 746 01:11:45.079 --> 01:11:48.079 arguing, there's nothing that's possible except for material causation, right, like causing 747 01:11:48.119 --> 01:11:56.159 effect, like a determined scheme, And then they think they get out of 748 01:11:56.199 --> 01:12:02.439 this, but it's like you're making second higher order claim about possibility and about 749 01:12:02.479 --> 01:12:05.560 sentences and all this stuff. That's why I'm like, I can't get them 750 01:12:05.600 --> 01:12:13.439 to realize they're committing and presupposing stuff that are unjustified before they provide any justification 751 01:12:13.600 --> 01:12:17.560 for that. So if you remember that guy am Deer came on to your 752 01:12:17.840 --> 01:12:23.600 stream and did the same thing and then with me, and he had some 753 01:12:23.720 --> 01:12:26.520 like ideas. Oh, he was saying something like, well, if it 754 01:12:26.560 --> 01:12:31.279 doesn't plug into the equation, into the modal you know, structure perfectly, 755 01:12:31.359 --> 01:12:36.319 then the whole thing collapses and you can't actually put it into a modal argument. 756 01:12:36.760 --> 01:12:39.960 Well, he was saying that with you, but when he was when 757 01:12:39.960 --> 01:12:44.640 I was debating him on Patrick's stream, he had like this kind of mystereingism 758 01:12:44.840 --> 01:12:48.479 possibly what is that? I don't know what that is. I don't it's 759 01:12:48.520 --> 01:12:55.119 I don't know. It's an ad hoc word that like everything made up. 760 01:12:55.880 --> 01:13:00.840 No, he came up with it was like mysterious. Yeah, he was 761 01:13:00.920 --> 01:13:03.840 like, my epistemology is like I have to look what exactly said. But 762 01:13:03.840 --> 01:13:06.319 it was like, I mean, was he using this as like a hypothetical, 763 01:13:06.399 --> 01:13:11.279 Like well, what if I just say my epistemology is mysteriumism or something. 764 01:13:13.000 --> 01:13:16.119 Yeah, that like you know, we may not know what the justification 765 01:13:16.439 --> 01:13:25.439 is, but you know it's there, and started going through all these like 766 01:13:25.520 --> 01:13:30.880 well, it's possible that you missed, and if it's logically possible, then 767 01:13:30.920 --> 01:13:36.720 your position cannot be that it's necessary. And again it misses the whole thing 768 01:13:36.800 --> 01:13:44.399 that it's like, now, guess what you're making third order claims about possibility 769 01:13:44.439 --> 01:13:48.600 and assassin and logic and all this stuff. And I'm like, I just 770 01:13:48.680 --> 01:13:53.880 can't get people to actually see what the actual issue is. And that's the 771 01:13:53.920 --> 01:13:58.560 most frustrating thing. It's like, I mean, maybe I could appreciate this 772 01:13:58.640 --> 01:14:01.520 being a d D, but it's like there's a squirrel, right, hey, 773 01:14:01.520 --> 01:14:05.319 look at that over and it's like you're just trying to direct people to 774 01:14:05.479 --> 01:14:09.479 It's like, do you not see what I'm saying? You're making all these 775 01:14:09.520 --> 01:14:14.199 epistemic claims. How are we ever going to justify that? And they get 776 01:14:14.199 --> 01:14:18.439 distracted down another route and another route and it's just like I can't holmee people 777 01:14:18.479 --> 01:14:24.479 in to actually see what the problem is. Second issue to so, in 778 01:14:24.520 --> 01:14:29.680 other words, how is any knowledge at all possible? Is prior to any 779 01:14:29.720 --> 01:14:33.000 knowledge claim? And every time you try to answer it, you don't get 780 01:14:33.000 --> 01:14:38.560 out of the box because it's a knowledge claim, right too? That is 781 01:14:38.720 --> 01:14:44.119 that right? Or? Am I miscons? The second issue too that we 782 01:14:44.119 --> 01:14:47.720 always get with this too is this, well how do we know? I 783 01:14:47.760 --> 01:14:51.520 mean it could be or this person could just say like yeah, it's like, 784 01:14:51.560 --> 01:14:57.119 well there's there's some other justification and uh, you know over in China 785 01:14:57.199 --> 01:15:01.439 that we don't know about that philosopher. You know ching Dong has developed and 786 01:15:01.479 --> 01:15:06.439 you just don't know about it. But so how does your position Jim Bob 787 01:15:06.479 --> 01:15:14.760 and this guy in Jim Bob's YouTube today basically saying what if there was an 788 01:15:14.800 --> 01:15:24.640 alien race that developed the exact same theology is orthodox? I mean, would 789 01:15:24.640 --> 01:15:26.720 that serve as a necessary condition, and I was like, well, this 790 01:15:26.760 --> 01:15:33.159 is ridiculous, of all, it's just ad hot. Number two logical, 791 01:15:33.479 --> 01:15:39.840 I mean, uh, conceivability is not a good guide to logical possibility. 792 01:15:40.439 --> 01:15:45.439 And number three, part of the orthodox revealed paradigm is the exclusivity of the 793 01:15:45.479 --> 01:15:53.399 paradigm. In other words, paradigm a orthodoxy says not B. So an 794 01:15:53.439 --> 01:15:59.920 alien race creates theology B that's identically orthodoxy. You know what that means, 795 01:16:00.520 --> 01:16:03.000 be and not be. It would also be obvious that it would also be 796 01:16:03.039 --> 01:16:08.000 obvious that the newer one is totally cribbed from the previous too, so it 797 01:16:08.000 --> 01:16:13.399 would be it was be an obvious fraudulent copy. Because we have people in 798 01:16:13.439 --> 01:16:15.319 the discord making this argument like five years ago, they so, well, 799 01:16:15.439 --> 01:16:21.119 I believe in the new revelation given to me as a Viking of a Viking 800 01:16:21.199 --> 01:16:26.520 trinity that does all the same grounding and justification of your trinity, except it's 801 01:16:26.560 --> 01:16:30.079 my Viking. And I'm like, but that would not be the historic Christian 802 01:16:30.199 --> 01:16:33.960 Church. And so evidentialism would come into play here as well. So that 803 01:16:34.000 --> 01:16:38.880 goes back to my uh, excuse me. Evidences would come into play, 804 01:16:38.920 --> 01:16:45.640 not evidentialism excuse me, Yes, that's right. So anyways, this goes 805 01:16:45.720 --> 01:16:50.520 back to the disjunctive is that, well, obviously, what is it that 806 01:16:50.560 --> 01:16:55.359 they're doing when when they're like, well, I'm thinking of a possibility, 807 01:16:55.640 --> 01:17:00.359 I mean, what if there's this other religion that revealed what they're doing is 808 01:17:00.439 --> 01:17:06.199 system building. Yeah, it's like it's it's the same thing when JF said, 809 01:17:06.439 --> 01:17:11.279 what if there is a planet I can conceive of whether there's a robot 810 01:17:11.319 --> 01:17:15.720 and no people and the robot runs the planet. Then it's like suddenly creative 811 01:17:15.720 --> 01:17:20.479 writing is cool and any kind of metaphysics goes right, which again the Christian 812 01:17:20.920 --> 01:17:24.920 no, no, no, no metaphysics for you. However, when I 813 01:17:24.960 --> 01:17:31.000 do my creative writing hypotheticals, I get to imagine all possibilities. So they're 814 01:17:31.000 --> 01:17:44.920 missing again the epistemological forest fort of the pistemological trees, because guess what they're 815 01:17:44.920 --> 01:17:50.079 doing. They don't realize the radical disjunct. That's autonomous epistemology, and the 816 01:17:50.119 --> 01:17:57.720 only other option is theonymous. So all of your hypotheticals, all your objections 817 01:17:57.760 --> 01:18:03.479 will always fit into autonomous epistemology because it's not revealed. I think they're just 818 01:18:03.479 --> 01:18:13.399 gonna go ahead as soon as I show the failure of autonomous epistemology, and 819 01:18:13.439 --> 01:18:17.119 it will always fail. That's why there are no objections. Well, at 820 01:18:17.119 --> 01:18:21.000 this point they're just gonna say, well, you're that is a mean that 821 01:18:21.039 --> 01:18:26.800 yours is revealed. That's your claim. You just have another elaborately built system, 822 01:18:27.279 --> 01:18:30.600 and you engaged in a system building project through the system of Christianity over 823 01:18:30.640 --> 01:18:35.079 many centuries and millennia, and so your system building and you're not doing anything 824 01:18:35.079 --> 01:18:41.560 different than I am. It's just that mine's more updated with science code or 825 01:18:41.560 --> 01:18:47.039 something science was reviewed by science. Well that's why I look. I put 826 01:18:47.039 --> 01:18:49.880 a footnote in there, and I'm like, well, let's just look at 827 01:18:50.000 --> 01:18:57.159 what the ones that are claimed to be revealed because that's the next one, 828 01:18:57.279 --> 01:19:00.119 right, is that, Well, how does tag prove the Orthodox God? 829 01:19:00.479 --> 01:19:04.640 I'm like, all right, so if we move past the okay, it 830 01:19:04.680 --> 01:19:11.560 couldn't be system building autonomous epistemology. But I've got all these other competitors of 831 01:19:11.640 --> 01:19:14.279 religions that are claiming to be revealed. I'm like, we could look at 832 01:19:14.279 --> 01:19:23.520 those. How many are there? Six, seven, eight religions that claim 833 01:19:23.600 --> 01:19:30.319 to be revealed from God? And remember this is part of the objection to 834 01:19:30.560 --> 01:19:35.840 that. Well, there could be an infinite amount of you know, possibilities 835 01:19:35.920 --> 01:19:40.800 you have to eliminate. Well, first we could show that most worldviews boil 836 01:19:40.920 --> 01:19:45.199 down to a few options. Ultimately with this paper I do is that it 837 01:19:45.239 --> 01:19:50.399 boils down between accidentalism and intention. This is a example or of something it 838 01:19:50.479 --> 01:19:57.720 boiled down to or theonymous or autonomous. So let's look at theonymous autonomous. 839 01:19:57.800 --> 01:20:02.560 Okay, so there's a few more options that can consider. Telmutic, Judaism, 840 01:20:03.600 --> 01:20:10.760 Islam. I don't think Buddhism claims to have special revelation, right, 841 01:20:10.840 --> 01:20:18.640 like it's not nothing. Hinduism, yes, Mormonism. I mean really, 842 01:20:18.800 --> 01:20:23.520 guys, how many think you think there are ten? And then I can 843 01:20:23.600 --> 01:20:29.119 we can go through and then look at their paradigms, right, and if 844 01:20:29.119 --> 01:20:34.760 they have principles that are would make knowledge impossible, we can eliminate those. 845 01:20:35.520 --> 01:20:43.600 So again, even on other people's grounds, like they're kind of litimus tasks 846 01:20:43.600 --> 01:20:46.279 and their standards, we'd say we fulfill it. We're not creating our own 847 01:20:46.520 --> 01:20:48.760 hey, in our own game. We have this, but you don't have 848 01:20:48.840 --> 01:20:54.319 it. We'd say everything that you want we just fulfilled. And your system. 849 01:20:54.439 --> 01:20:57.600 None of these systems can do and what is that. Well, you 850 01:20:57.800 --> 01:21:02.760 certainly want to have historical continuity, right, that's kind of fits the like 851 01:21:03.680 --> 01:21:11.159 your paradigm or theory should describe reality to come up with some physics theory that 852 01:21:11.359 --> 01:21:16.880 like doesn't describe anything. So it's a historic matches historical continuity. It has 853 01:21:16.960 --> 01:21:29.359 descriptive power, right, it's describing. It's uh, not only lacks contradictions, 854 01:21:29.680 --> 01:21:34.920 but it's coherent. What does that mean? That means that, for 855 01:21:34.960 --> 01:21:45.359 example, I could hold two different true propositions that have nothing logically connected with 856 01:21:45.479 --> 01:21:50.920 each other. The tree is green and the apple and the I don't know 857 01:21:50.960 --> 01:21:58.359 the MIC's working or something like that. Okay, they're not contradictory, but 858 01:21:58.439 --> 01:22:00.920 I can't derive or infer one to the other. Now, what's really nice 859 01:22:00.960 --> 01:22:05.119 about when we talk about a coherence, Right, we're not just talking about 860 01:22:06.000 --> 01:22:13.720 propositions don't contradict each other. We're saying they cohere together, that there's inferences 861 01:22:13.760 --> 01:22:18.960 from one to the other. So I could list all these kind of attributes 862 01:22:20.039 --> 01:22:26.079 that, yes, from your paradigm, you want all this, and you 863 01:22:26.119 --> 01:22:32.479 can't pull it off. Orthodoxy does claim to be the revealed religion, and 864 01:22:32.520 --> 01:22:36.439 it can pull it off by your own standards, where are you gonna go? 865 01:22:38.039 --> 01:22:42.039 Like, what better proof do you want? Do you know what I 866 01:22:42.079 --> 01:22:48.560 mean? Yeah? The next thing I would ask is could you flash out 867 01:22:48.560 --> 01:22:57.560 a little more about the contrast between like a teleological worldview and a disteleological worldview, 868 01:22:57.640 --> 01:23:00.880 or theism versus accidentalism, and how this is a great way to kind 869 01:23:00.880 --> 01:23:06.680 of suss out a large portion of worldviews with one question and a couple other 870 01:23:10.039 --> 01:23:14.000 a couple other fundamental types of questions like this would also cancel out a lot 871 01:23:14.000 --> 01:23:17.720 of world views, like is knowledge objective or relative? I mean, there's 872 01:23:18.439 --> 01:23:24.119 if you put together a few disjunctives, you could pretty quickly cancel out most 873 01:23:24.159 --> 01:23:30.039 worldviews. It's not hard at all. So one of the things I want 874 01:23:30.079 --> 01:23:33.840 to qualify, and I qualified in my footnote when I use the word intentionality. 875 01:23:33.880 --> 01:23:40.760 I realized when I was arguing with am dear they were taking the technical 876 01:23:41.000 --> 01:23:47.479 philosophical sense of intentionality and philosophy of mind and philosophy and philosophy of language. 877 01:23:47.600 --> 01:23:53.199 Is our propositions or mental states are about or directed towards something. No, 878 01:23:53.319 --> 01:23:59.079 you mean it in the sense of will and Tilo's correct intention. Yeah, 879 01:23:59.119 --> 01:24:10.319 and more kind of a common colloquial sense. This real quick. So the 880 01:24:10.359 --> 01:24:16.279 reason I'm saying that is it oftentimes the argument about I mean, you put 881 01:24:16.399 --> 01:24:20.479 God purposefully and intentionally creates the world. So uh, you know there's a 882 01:24:20.479 --> 01:24:26.159 book about this that that it's an Oxford Press book. The name of it 883 01:24:26.279 --> 01:24:30.239 escapes me, but basically it's arguing that there's only two options on this, 884 01:24:30.520 --> 01:24:33.079 and you might just come up with a third where there's maybe some mix between 885 01:24:33.720 --> 01:24:40.920 a God who creates a world with uh, with purpose, purposiveness, intentionality 886 01:24:41.000 --> 01:24:45.279 telos versus a world that has no direction, no guidance, no end, 887 01:24:45.359 --> 01:24:49.399 no no, no purposiveness, or this teleological universe. But to be clear, 888 01:24:49.439 --> 01:24:51.840 the only reason I'm bringing this up is that when we start saying this, 889 01:24:51.880 --> 01:24:55.840 I'll immediately say, oh, you're making the teleological argument. It's not 890 01:24:55.880 --> 01:25:01.000 the teleological Yeah. I think that's what happened with a is. He thought 891 01:25:01.000 --> 01:25:08.199 I was making the teleological argument. So he was saying, well, I 892 01:25:08.199 --> 01:25:13.960 can think of things that are His objection was it doesn't have to be intentional, 893 01:25:13.960 --> 01:25:15.279 is it? Because I can if that's what you mean by directed, 894 01:25:15.359 --> 01:25:28.199 because I can think of directedness without intention or a person behind it. Like 895 01:25:29.319 --> 01:25:33.119 now I don't think that's possible. I think it's plenty of literature, especially 896 01:25:33.159 --> 01:25:41.239 in philosophy of mind, about intentionality as a mental property. We don't attributed 897 01:25:41.960 --> 01:25:48.359 kind of directedness and intentionality in the technical philosophical sense to material objects. But 898 01:25:48.439 --> 01:25:55.640 let's say I grant that, and you're missing the point that but by intentionality 899 01:25:55.840 --> 01:26:02.439 I mean purpose there's a being who's putting things and directing them. So, 900 01:26:02.880 --> 01:26:08.359 in other words, suppose I grant the argument. Sure, maybe not every 901 01:26:08.479 --> 01:26:19.439 directedness implies a purposeful agent. However, every purposeful agent acting applies directedness. 902 01:26:19.439 --> 01:26:24.199 Do you see that? Yeah? And also to consider the totality of reality 903 01:26:24.279 --> 01:26:30.520 or the entiret universe, Right, it's either purposive and intentional and has a 904 01:26:30.640 --> 01:26:35.079 t los or it doesn't. Yes, so if there is exactly so, 905 01:26:35.800 --> 01:26:42.960 it's really a red herring to get caught up on directedness. I mean, 906 01:26:43.199 --> 01:26:50.800 look, there's either an agent who does things and creates the laws allows for 907 01:26:50.880 --> 01:26:58.359 the possibility of knowledge because he has the intention and chooses it. So there's 908 01:26:58.439 --> 01:27:06.079 purpose behind everything holliology in that sense, or what's the opposite, It would 909 01:27:06.159 --> 01:27:14.840 be accident. Yeah, So then I think about what accident like that would 910 01:27:14.840 --> 01:27:18.760 be your ultimate principle that you'd have to appeal to, and at that point 911 01:27:18.840 --> 01:27:25.119 you'd have to say, with standing behind everything is the antithesis, the true 912 01:27:25.279 --> 01:27:31.000 dichotomy of a purposeful, intentional action, which is an accident. So that 913 01:27:31.079 --> 01:27:38.920 means I have to explain ultimately everything in terms of like knowledge, accidental knowledge, 914 01:27:39.319 --> 01:27:45.800 yes, accident morality, accidental laws of physics, right would become non 915 01:27:45.920 --> 01:27:51.920 justifiable? Right well, not only yeah, it's self refuting. For example, 916 01:27:53.199 --> 01:28:00.159 in when you're reading epistemology and they have these examples of John. One 917 01:28:03.119 --> 01:28:06.880 is asked how many jelly beans he believes in the jar? And he says 918 01:28:06.920 --> 01:28:12.479 fifty four. John has a true belief. Somebody says, well, how 919 01:28:12.479 --> 01:28:17.479 did you How did you get that true belief? John? It matches reality. 920 01:28:17.960 --> 01:28:21.840 There's actually fifty four jelly beans in the jar. And John says it 921 01:28:21.920 --> 01:28:26.800 was an accident. I guessed there was no reason for rhym a reason. 922 01:28:27.000 --> 01:28:32.279 I just kind of guessed. When we say that's not knowledge, you have 923 01:28:32.319 --> 01:28:38.239 to have the right reason. So knowledge itself precludes accident. If you study 924 01:28:39.479 --> 01:28:45.199 philosophy of science or even science itself, not only are laws not simply correlation, 925 01:28:45.600 --> 01:28:53.600 they preclude accident as well. There's a causal relationship beyond just two things 926 01:28:53.640 --> 01:29:00.960 being correlated that has a sort of kind of necessity that precludes accident. So 927 01:29:00.279 --> 01:29:05.399 now you have an oxymoron with the accidental laws of physics, and so on 928 01:29:05.439 --> 01:29:08.960 and so on. I can keep going to yeah, and I want to 929 01:29:09.119 --> 01:29:12.600 I want to address that. One of the objections is that the transcenal argument 930 01:29:12.640 --> 01:29:15.359 for God does not allow you to come to the particular. I mean, 931 01:29:15.359 --> 01:29:19.119 this is really a fundamental misunderstanding of what the argument's about, because you could 932 01:29:19.159 --> 01:29:24.640 theoretically pick anything in the worldview to make an argument about. I could start 933 01:29:24.680 --> 01:29:28.640 with particulars and make a transitional argument on the basis of the need for the 934 01:29:28.680 --> 01:29:31.119 particular, and so I can make an argument on the basis of the one 935 01:29:31.119 --> 01:29:35.239 and the many that would be relating to the particular. And also he notes 936 01:29:35.319 --> 01:29:42.359 that he claims that tag is inherently self contradictory anytime you come down to a 937 01:29:42.439 --> 01:29:46.119 specific particular. Just because it's a paradigm level argument doesn't mean that it doesn't 938 01:29:46.159 --> 01:29:50.840 account for or belief have a belief in particulars. I mean, paradigms include 939 01:29:50.880 --> 01:29:58.960 particulars. So I don't understand even what that objection means guess what, it's 940 01:29:58.960 --> 01:30:05.399 another example of missing the Oh, it's missing the objection the objection or so, 941 01:30:05.439 --> 01:30:10.600 how do you know that? How do you know? Well, he 942 01:30:10.640 --> 01:30:15.359 would just say here that, he would just say here the tag. I'm 943 01:30:15.399 --> 01:30:18.039 not making a claim about paradigms. I'm just telling you a flaw on tag 944 01:30:18.159 --> 01:30:23.880 is probably what he would say. Well, then why is it a flaw? 945 01:30:24.239 --> 01:30:28.760 How do you know it's a flaw? He was, He's saying it's 946 01:30:28.760 --> 01:30:32.720 an internal contradiction and tag. I think, okay, but that's an epistemic 947 01:30:32.760 --> 01:30:39.439 claim of correct. What the So that's why I point out on my paper 948 01:30:40.159 --> 01:30:46.079 even if even if the details of my argument are incorrect, let's say I'm 949 01:30:46.079 --> 01:30:53.760 messed up somewhere, I still win. We still win. Why because of 950 01:30:53.800 --> 01:30:59.960 that exact issue right there is you're saying it doesn't work, the just jump 951 01:31:00.119 --> 01:31:03.760 doesn't work, or it's flawed this it's a tautology, it's a Those are 952 01:31:03.800 --> 01:31:10.319 all epistemic claims. So even if I mess up somewhere, the question still 953 01:31:10.359 --> 01:31:14.359 stands, how do you know that? How do you know? And you 954 01:31:14.359 --> 01:31:16.399 could say, well, it's an internal critique, Well, then you're putting 955 01:31:16.560 --> 01:31:24.800 yourself in a position to know what the paradigm is, why all kinds of 956 01:31:24.800 --> 01:31:29.760 stuff right within the assessment of that, and why that would be? Why 957 01:31:29.800 --> 01:31:33.079 is that as what? Why not critique? And could we just frame the 958 01:31:33.159 --> 01:31:36.199 question and make it really quick, simple and easy and to the point, 959 01:31:36.880 --> 01:31:41.000 how do we know knowledge as possible? What if we ask the atheist that 960 01:31:41.199 --> 01:31:45.600 how do we know knowledge as possible? Not can you give me your list 961 01:31:45.640 --> 01:31:49.800 of knowledge claims and beliefs, but how do we know knowledge as possible? 962 01:31:50.760 --> 01:31:54.399 Yeah, that's all I'm trying to do. That's all I'm trying to ask, 963 01:31:55.720 --> 01:31:59.800 and they won't answer it. So let's ask the atheist that in this 964 01:32:00.199 --> 01:32:02.960 so we've got several skeptics and kind of people who are disagreeing, which is 965 01:32:03.000 --> 01:32:06.720 fine. The question is how do we know knowledge as possible? And every 966 01:32:06.960 --> 01:32:13.079 attempt at answering that you give clearly presupposes that you have knowledge, so it's 967 01:32:13.479 --> 01:32:16.439 missing the point. So we want an account for knowledge itself, not your 968 01:32:16.479 --> 01:32:20.000 knowledge claims, but an account for knowledge. That's what you have to address. 969 01:32:20.039 --> 01:32:25.000 That's the point. Yeah, that's the excellent way to put it. 970 01:32:25.560 --> 01:32:30.199 And so you know, these are kind of more sophisticated details that go into 971 01:32:30.279 --> 01:32:35.159 in the paper. Oh wait, one more question on that? Is that 972 01:32:35.239 --> 01:32:39.239 a good way to phrase it? Two? Because of like, because at 973 01:32:39.239 --> 01:32:40.920 this point, a lot of times people are going to say, well, 974 01:32:40.960 --> 01:32:44.039 look, I don't know about all this episode. Why can't we just look 975 01:32:44.079 --> 01:32:47.039 to science and like the pragmatic conclusions that we get from the doing of science. 976 01:32:47.079 --> 01:32:51.479 Maybe that's a more reliable pragmatic approach. Why do we even have to 977 01:32:51.840 --> 01:32:57.560 busy ourselves with these kind of abstract kind of questions that you're asking so that 978 01:32:57.600 --> 01:33:01.119 they'll oftentimes defer to saying that you're just doing a lot of word solid and 979 01:33:01.159 --> 01:33:04.520 like fancy tap dancing, and and well, why do we even have to 980 01:33:05.560 --> 01:33:12.479 I guess here, rage quit, We're done, So I'm just joking, 981 01:33:11.840 --> 01:33:17.000 I'm out of here. Why can't we just go to science and like the 982 01:33:17.079 --> 01:33:23.159 pragmatic value of the data that we get from science. That's a typical kind 983 01:33:23.159 --> 01:33:27.079 of move I hear at this point. I mean, just it's the same 984 01:33:27.159 --> 01:33:31.720 question, like, why our tai to take that. I hear what you're 985 01:33:31.760 --> 01:33:38.720 saying. I hear you're making claims about that. Now justify why that's justifiable 986 01:33:38.800 --> 01:33:45.319 move like I should take. And what you'll find is they'll assume exactly what 987 01:33:45.319 --> 01:33:54.039 they're proving attempting to prove number two and I even get into this, So 988 01:33:54.159 --> 01:33:59.680 that's the question of like why should I even accept a sort of kind of 989 01:33:59.720 --> 01:34:02.239 pragmatism of science, Like why would that even be a good move for me 990 01:34:02.319 --> 01:34:08.199 to do, and how would that be a justification. The second problem is 991 01:34:09.520 --> 01:34:16.479 science in pragmatics never even get to truth or knowledge far from for you know, 992 01:34:16.600 --> 01:34:19.640 you've seen in the other papers that I've written for a couple of different 993 01:34:19.640 --> 01:34:25.520 issues too. One is the KWin Donheim's indeterminacy of data, Like you can 994 01:34:25.560 --> 01:34:30.920 construct multiple contradictory theories that all were Yeah, the data doesn't tell you which 995 01:34:30.960 --> 01:34:35.720 paradigm is correct because you never get the truth, knowledge, or justification from 996 01:34:35.800 --> 01:34:43.000 science and because it works and number two, all of those are going to 997 01:34:43.079 --> 01:34:48.039 be making universal claims from particulars. And you have the problem of induction and 998 01:34:48.720 --> 01:34:54.920 the problem of circularity with induction too, So you're back epistemic bootstrapping again, 999 01:34:55.399 --> 01:34:58.960 and you don't even get to the cattrall. I mean, basically that move 1000 01:34:59.000 --> 01:35:02.600 that we just mentioned, let's just do a pragmatic move to scientific data. 1001 01:35:03.000 --> 01:35:09.720 That's really just surrendering epistemology and justification. That's essentially saying we can't do it, 1002 01:35:09.720 --> 01:35:12.279 it's not possible, there is no answer, there's no such thing as 1003 01:35:12.359 --> 01:35:15.800 justification. That's basically throwing up your hands and giving out. At that point, 1004 01:35:15.840 --> 01:35:20.119 then that okay, Then argumentation is not is no longer possible? Right? 1005 01:35:21.119 --> 01:35:29.439 And the other the number three is pragmatism is arbitrary because you just pick 1006 01:35:29.760 --> 01:35:33.199 arbitrarily the goals that you want to work without any justication. Yeah, like 1007 01:35:33.239 --> 01:35:35.840 how do we know what does it mean to work? Right? And that 1008 01:35:35.920 --> 01:35:40.840 assumes that you've chosen a criteria, some sort of you know, benchmark of 1009 01:35:40.880 --> 01:35:44.960 value judgments to judge the good the thing that works versus the one that doesn't 1010 01:35:44.960 --> 01:35:48.279 work, which again makes it arbitrary. Now the same Yeah, all the 1011 01:35:48.279 --> 01:35:50.800 same issues that I'm bringing up, But I really like the way that you 1012 01:35:50.920 --> 01:35:56.800 put it is how do we know or justify anything? That you're saying? 1013 01:35:58.520 --> 01:36:01.520 How do we know knowledge is even possible? Like what's the because that's prior 1014 01:36:01.640 --> 01:36:06.520 to all of your first order claims, and the atheist just never understand that 1015 01:36:06.600 --> 01:36:17.199 the transfer argument is about second order questions and justification. Now, now, 1016 01:36:17.359 --> 01:36:21.880 Phillips said, where was his last statement. Yeah, but let's see, 1017 01:36:21.880 --> 01:36:27.960 he had a comment about Socrates as an example that we could address. Where 1018 01:36:28.039 --> 01:36:31.279 is it, I've already lost it. Socrates does the same thing where he 1019 01:36:31.279 --> 01:36:35.479 goes out and questions worldviews and he doesn't assert his own Well, Socrates therefore 1020 01:36:35.640 --> 01:36:41.159 justified in doing internal internal critiques. Well, my response to this, I'll 1021 01:36:41.239 --> 01:36:45.199 let further you can give response is that, now, maybe in the apology 1022 01:36:45.279 --> 01:36:49.359 he didn't prefer a worldview, but in the rest of the dialogues he does 1023 01:36:49.640 --> 01:36:56.680 actually assert a worldview. It's called platonism. So Platonism does assert quite a 1024 01:36:56.680 --> 01:37:00.000 bit. It's very metaphysical and in fact, I mean some of the same 1025 01:37:00.079 --> 01:37:05.920 types of transcendental presubsisitional argumentation. You can find that in Plato Platonic dialogues asked 1026 01:37:05.920 --> 01:37:12.199 some of the types of questions that we're asking. Aristotle also does transcendental type 1027 01:37:12.279 --> 01:37:18.079 moves in argumentation. However, the fact that Socrates is questioning worldviews does not 1028 01:37:18.319 --> 01:37:23.239 make his own position justified. And that's also not what we're doing. We're 1029 01:37:23.279 --> 01:37:29.600 not saying that just because we question worldviews, they're not justified or excuse me, 1030 01:37:29.760 --> 01:37:33.319 ours is therefore justified. Let me read you what he says father Deacon. 1031 01:37:33.439 --> 01:37:38.000 Socrates did the same thing and question world views without asserting his own. 1032 01:37:38.439 --> 01:37:47.039 Was Socrates justified in doing an internal critique? Was his question? Well, 1033 01:37:47.079 --> 01:37:55.760 why would this gentleman think that we haven't asserted our worldview? That's a good 1034 01:37:55.800 --> 01:38:00.399 point. Yeah, he says, why ought we have competing worldview? A 1035 01:38:00.479 --> 01:38:03.600 competing world view in order to do an internal critique of another worldview? Oh 1036 01:38:03.760 --> 01:38:08.039 so he's saying that you're doing an ought move. Now that we're not saying 1037 01:38:08.039 --> 01:38:13.720 that you ought. We're saying that everybody necessarily has a worldview, even if 1038 01:38:13.720 --> 01:38:17.600 they recognize it or not. It's impossible to have no worldview, even if 1039 01:38:17.600 --> 01:38:24.960 you're a oh I'm a total agnostic. Well that's still a position on epistemology 1040 01:38:26.000 --> 01:38:30.439 exactly because you just moved it to a higher order and assume a whole bunch 1041 01:38:30.479 --> 01:38:35.000 of epistemic things to even make those statements. So, I mean the skeptic 1042 01:38:35.079 --> 01:38:40.479 and they don't get out of this problem. Now, this is a very 1043 01:38:40.520 --> 01:38:43.880 common objection. I'm glad we're hitting on this because a lot of times the 1044 01:38:43.920 --> 01:38:45.960 atheists will then say, oh, well, actually I don't have any worldview, 1045 01:38:46.000 --> 01:38:49.279 and no, I have no commitments I'm totally neutral. I'm totally agnostic 1046 01:38:49.359 --> 01:38:53.960 on everything, so you can't critique me. There's nothing that you can give 1047 01:38:53.960 --> 01:39:00.000 me on. Then watch what they do. You make an argument right, 1048 01:39:00.039 --> 01:39:02.600 right, and it's a slide of hands. So they told you I'm not 1049 01:39:02.640 --> 01:39:05.920 going to do this, right while they slip in their other hand right and 1050 01:39:05.960 --> 01:39:10.560 start making a bunch of that doesn't work. You can't do that. See 1051 01:39:10.560 --> 01:39:15.960 the tag doesn't I'm doing an internal critique right. Well, women, you're 1052 01:39:15.960 --> 01:39:20.600 doing the exact thing that you said that you're not committed to doing. So 1053 01:39:20.760 --> 01:39:25.119 again, all of these things are slides of hands and cons and stuff like 1054 01:39:25.159 --> 01:39:29.079 that. You just got. Well, I'll address that more specifically. Why 1055 01:39:29.159 --> 01:39:33.600 is it a slide of hand con move? If I'm a total agnostic and 1056 01:39:33.640 --> 01:39:38.319 then I start critiquing your position and saying, oh, you're you're, you're, 1057 01:39:38.359 --> 01:39:44.359 you're contradicting yourselfiest, why am I violating my agnostic stance by using these 1058 01:39:44.720 --> 01:39:47.159 logical arguments to call you out on conversations? Because they just assume, or 1059 01:39:47.199 --> 01:39:56.079 they just said, I don't have any commitment on logic, contradiction, semantics, 1060 01:40:00.000 --> 01:40:06.239 reservation experience, right, because right they're saying that because of the next 1061 01:40:06.279 --> 01:40:09.840 move, they'll come in and be like, I hear what you're saying, 1062 01:40:09.880 --> 01:40:14.840 and it's wrong. You're contradicting to Oh wow, now you're slipping in. 1063 01:40:15.079 --> 01:40:21.359 All of those are observational statements and epistemic statements that you said, I've bracketed 1064 01:40:21.359 --> 01:40:26.199 and I'm non committal with that. Yeah, And well, I mean just 1065 01:40:26.239 --> 01:40:29.560 to say, if you know, the same type of person is always saying 1066 01:40:29.600 --> 01:40:32.239 something like Christianity contradicts itself. Then they turn around and say, I have 1067 01:40:32.359 --> 01:40:38.079 no logical commitments to or philosophical commitments to anything. Well, you just invoked 1068 01:40:38.399 --> 01:40:44.359 the law of non contradiction, so you do. And I really think it's 1069 01:40:44.359 --> 01:40:47.800 a character flaw two you, because think about the person who can't actually commit 1070 01:40:49.000 --> 01:40:58.960 to anything like any dates or meetings or anything like that. Well, what 1071 01:40:59.119 --> 01:41:03.239 if they're a genuine sort of skeptic or a genuine person who says, I 1072 01:41:03.399 --> 01:41:08.720 just don't know which you know, I've had a lot of philosophy classes and 1073 01:41:08.840 --> 01:41:13.000 I don't know which one's true. Like there's a lot of positions out there. 1074 01:41:13.119 --> 01:41:16.239 Start telling you that you're arguing it's wrong. That's usually what a genuine 1075 01:41:16.279 --> 01:41:20.199 person who's well, what if they said, well, I'm just arguing the 1076 01:41:20.239 --> 01:41:28.920 positions to see who's got the better case. Right, Well, yeah they 1077 01:41:29.000 --> 01:41:31.800 might not, that might not be a disingenuous person or a character flaw. 1078 01:41:32.359 --> 01:41:36.439 But then they're just confused. We'd have to just kind of show them. 1079 01:41:38.039 --> 01:41:44.520 But do you see that you're you're committing to something a methodology or access to 1080 01:41:44.600 --> 01:41:49.000 a methodology, or some sort of standard lenses or anything by which you think 1081 01:41:49.039 --> 01:41:59.680 that you could actually assess and figure this stuff out. Right now, we 1082 01:41:59.720 --> 01:42:10.520 have some questions here in the super Chats comments GNOME's body noses I'll go ahead 1083 01:42:10.560 --> 01:42:14.039 and read this and then comment on it, reading it for him Nomes Body 1084 01:42:14.079 --> 01:42:18.359 ten dollars. Can perception of information be relative to the human mind. There 1085 01:42:18.399 --> 01:42:27.640 might be a subjective element to the incoming data which the human mind misinterprets or 1086 01:42:27.680 --> 01:42:35.079 distorts or doesn't want to see or know that they might suppress or misinterpret the 1087 01:42:35.119 --> 01:42:40.520 data or something like that. But I wouldn't say that the perception of information 1088 01:42:40.720 --> 01:42:46.640 is therefore completely relative just because there can be instances of misinterpretation. I am 1089 01:42:46.640 --> 01:42:53.880 not entirely convinced that knowledge is transcendent. Well, knowledge can be had by 1090 01:42:53.960 --> 01:42:58.199 human beings, that is not transcendent, there is knowledge of the transcendent, 1091 01:42:58.319 --> 01:43:02.159 So if you mean it's a little ambiguous what you mean by that. So 1092 01:43:02.239 --> 01:43:08.439 I wouldn't say that knowledge is like necessarily always transcendent. We're saying that knowledge 1093 01:43:08.479 --> 01:43:13.399 it self requires the transcended to be grounded. Thank you for being better than 1094 01:43:13.399 --> 01:43:15.520 a lot of the other online apologists. What you say makes me think, 1095 01:43:15.560 --> 01:43:19.640 well, I appreciate that. Numbs body a good question. Do you want 1096 01:43:19.680 --> 01:43:24.920 to comment on that? Can perception of information be purely relative to the human 1097 01:43:24.960 --> 01:43:33.399 mind? Can, let's say, can perception of information be relative to the 1098 01:43:33.439 --> 01:43:38.840 human mind? In other words, is it possible for the incoming information or 1099 01:43:38.960 --> 01:43:48.279 data to be relative to each person getting the data? Um? I don't 1100 01:43:48.319 --> 01:43:56.239 think so, because this is kind of similar to like Fickenstein's there's no private 1101 01:43:56.319 --> 01:44:01.640 language. Yes, so that's a great point. Yeah, the fact is 1102 01:44:01.680 --> 01:44:08.319 there's commensurability, and there's clues to that. If that were actually the case, 1103 01:44:08.399 --> 01:44:11.760 we could never talk to each other, right, we could never actually 1104 01:44:11.800 --> 01:44:16.720 talk to each other. So if everything was completely subjective, we wouldn't be 1105 01:44:16.760 --> 01:44:19.720 able to relate with one another, we wouldn't be able to develop language. 1106 01:44:21.560 --> 01:44:27.439 And so although like you said, well, certainly the mind can kind of 1107 01:44:27.479 --> 01:44:32.640 contaminate the sense data that kind of comes in, skew it and stuff like 1108 01:44:32.760 --> 01:44:36.359 that. It can't, you know, And there's this kind of subjective element 1109 01:44:36.520 --> 01:44:42.079 and kind of imposing and stuff that could happen. It couldn't be absolute, 1110 01:44:42.119 --> 01:44:46.840 otherwise we wouldn't be understand each other or developing a language. Yeah, there's 1111 01:44:46.840 --> 01:44:51.479 a lot of fascinating transfl argumentation that that is just kind of sitting out there, 1112 01:44:51.560 --> 01:44:55.560 ready to be the depths of it, ready to be plumbed. Some 1113 01:44:55.600 --> 01:45:00.760 philosophers like Carlotto Apple have done this where they look at the logical structure of 1114 01:45:00.840 --> 01:45:08.640 languages, and even though languages differ, there's actually fundamental necessary things going on 1115 01:45:08.720 --> 01:45:13.800 in every language everywhere. So for the possibility of language at all, you've 1116 01:45:13.840 --> 01:45:18.319 got to have certain structures in place to make which makes that meaning possible. 1117 01:45:18.680 --> 01:45:24.920 Yeah. Transcendental categories absolutely, Yeah, And I mean they're necessary for language. 1118 01:45:24.960 --> 01:45:28.560 That's why I mean, like five or six years ago, every time 1119 01:45:28.600 --> 01:45:31.039 I was doing TAG, I was just going back into like language meaning arguments 1120 01:45:31.079 --> 01:45:35.760 because every time an atheist makes it's it's similar to what you're doing with like 1121 01:45:35.840 --> 01:45:40.399 knowledge claims. I can just say that every time an atheist makes a sentence, 1122 01:45:40.439 --> 01:45:45.560 he's assuming all kinds of linguistic structures that he hasn't proven yet. Homicidal, 1123 01:45:45.600 --> 01:45:47.680 self conscious cake one dollar. What do you think of this claim? 1124 01:45:48.279 --> 01:45:56.159 Epistemology is the expression of a reductionist ontology that infuses the entire Western tradition. 1125 01:45:56.399 --> 01:46:01.359 Thus, epistemology reduces all being to some mere presence. It forces all knowledge 1126 01:46:01.399 --> 01:46:06.279 to conform to some single standard. My response would be, I'm assuming that 1127 01:46:06.279 --> 01:46:10.760 that's a like a Heighigger quote. I think you were saying, unless I'm 1128 01:46:10.800 --> 01:46:15.079 mixing out with somebody else that you were interested in a response to this Highigger 1129 01:46:15.119 --> 01:46:23.720 objection. Sometimes the German idealists would and people after them would be very critical 1130 01:46:23.840 --> 01:46:33.600 of certain schools of epistemology that would reduce ontology to some minimalist, like hyper 1131 01:46:33.680 --> 01:46:39.199 rationalist type of uh not rationalists, because German idealists rationalist. What am I 1132 01:46:39.239 --> 01:46:43.239 trying to say, like a reductionist like a like a materialist type of move 1133 01:46:43.359 --> 01:46:48.439 right. So let's say epistemology in the modern sense develops in this anti metaphysical 1134 01:46:48.479 --> 01:46:55.239 stance of like Kant and Hume. So it's probably a critique, but maybe 1135 01:46:55.279 --> 01:47:00.520 he's going back to Plato and saying that all epistemic search for truth is somehow 1136 01:47:01.199 --> 01:47:06.399 reductionist against being I mean, this sasity from Heidiger, but I don't I'm 1137 01:47:06.439 --> 01:47:11.119 not well studied in Hidigger to know if if this is the case, I 1138 01:47:11.119 --> 01:47:15.119 mean in terms of his views, But I would just say that, I 1139 01:47:15.159 --> 01:47:19.359 mean, it shouldn't be odd to think of epistemology as a discipline itself somehow 1140 01:47:19.399 --> 01:47:25.279 being like necessarily flawed. And we were just asking the question of what is 1141 01:47:25.319 --> 01:47:28.039 knowledge? Is knowledge possible? How do we know? What does it mean 1142 01:47:28.119 --> 01:47:30.920 to know? You know, I don't see why that would be inherently problematic, 1143 01:47:31.000 --> 01:47:35.239 but I'm sure Heideger has some take that, you know, like back 1144 01:47:35.279 --> 01:47:40.920 to Plato it was a problem or something. Yeah, again, it just 1145 01:47:41.000 --> 01:47:45.359 kind of goes back to my paper too. I'm staying general enough in these 1146 01:47:45.399 --> 01:47:55.880 considerations that I'm not wetting myself to any kind of particular view, particular metaphysics, 1147 01:47:55.920 --> 01:47:59.359 particular epistemology. There was a guy that was saying, well, you're 1148 01:47:59.399 --> 01:48:03.000 to redefine, and I'm like, I'm not redefining knowledge that I'm giving you, 1149 01:48:03.079 --> 01:48:10.000 because again, these are such fundamental and prior questions. I'm giving you 1150 01:48:10.119 --> 01:48:15.800 everything that you want, whatever you would say, right, it still stands 1151 01:48:15.840 --> 01:48:18.359 that there's these kinds of questions exactly like you said, how do we know 1152 01:48:18.399 --> 01:48:23.680 that knowledge exists? Oh? Anybody can't? Like, like, it's really 1153 01:48:23.840 --> 01:48:26.560 I think, I think if if you so, if Heidegger said to you, 1154 01:48:26.720 --> 01:48:31.680 father Deacon, uh, epistemology is the expression of a reductions ontology that 1155 01:48:32.159 --> 01:48:36.000 infuses the entire Western tradition, and you've missed being right. I mean, 1156 01:48:36.000 --> 01:48:43.319 it's kind of like his system building project to dismiss any sort of epistemology argument 1157 01:48:43.520 --> 01:48:46.279 that you're making. So how would you respond to like a Heidigger man that 1158 01:48:46.479 --> 01:48:54.800 is sort of dismissing epistemology arguments as some sort of reductionist expression. I would 1159 01:48:54.800 --> 01:49:02.239 just tell him, you're your president hand bestond standing reserve and its projectedness has 1160 01:49:02.359 --> 01:49:12.479 confused the antic and antist relationship on your own metaphysical and epistemological grounds bracketing, 1161 01:49:13.000 --> 01:49:16.680 and I just throw out a bunch of Hidiger words to him back and watch 1162 01:49:16.680 --> 01:49:20.760 and see what he does. And I'm kidding, yeah, I would. 1163 01:49:21.760 --> 01:49:29.960 I would basically try to work through with him and say can we get past 1164 01:49:30.119 --> 01:49:34.520 that? Like I'm not going to make any commitments help me, And again, 1165 01:49:34.640 --> 01:49:40.560 phenomenologists can be good with the kind of language. One of the things 1166 01:49:40.600 --> 01:49:45.840 that Heiderger was trying to do is the exact task that I'm doing. Is 1167 01:49:46.359 --> 01:49:51.840 this kind of deconstruction project, right that there's like all these layers of paradigms 1168 01:49:51.840 --> 01:49:57.960 and language and stuff like that, and he's trying to get down to primordial 1169 01:49:58.119 --> 01:50:03.479 being, right, and so that he doesn't have to kind of think through 1170 01:50:03.560 --> 01:50:09.960 incorrect categories. So he's stripping off the layers. I'd basically say that to 1171 01:50:10.039 --> 01:50:15.119 Hidiger, why don't you help me? Maybe I'm not good at my words 1172 01:50:15.279 --> 01:50:18.039 and arguments, so why don't you help me? Because he's obviously much smarter 1173 01:50:18.039 --> 01:50:20.960 than me. I know what you're doing, though. You want to get 1174 01:50:21.000 --> 01:50:26.880 in more kind of primordial basic kind of questions, and that's what I want 1175 01:50:26.920 --> 01:50:32.880 to do. How would you, Hidiger, help me phrase this question? 1176 01:50:33.119 --> 01:50:39.920 How do we know that we know? Yeah? I think that just responding 1177 01:50:39.920 --> 01:50:45.199 with things like oh, we have to plunge into being or find find being, 1178 01:50:45.399 --> 01:50:49.359 he's really missing the point, right, because I mean, first of 1179 01:50:49.399 --> 01:50:53.479 all, what does it even mean to say I mean being? This is 1180 01:50:53.520 --> 01:50:56.319 like the most generic term in the history of philosophy, right, I mean 1181 01:50:56.319 --> 01:50:59.920 it has all kinds of different meanings in different philosophy, and you always know 1182 01:51:00.039 --> 01:51:03.359 it's about philosophers. They have these wonderful proposals, well, I'm going to 1183 01:51:03.439 --> 01:51:06.560 get rid of all this stuff, and then their answer is something dumb. 1184 01:51:06.680 --> 01:51:12.640 Right. Well, not only that they bring in the exact stuff they're trying 1185 01:51:12.640 --> 01:51:18.279 to get the same problem, the same problems for me. Look at this, 1186 01:51:19.239 --> 01:51:28.399 who's roles? Who's roles? Uh? Discovery of reduction? So I 1187 01:51:28.399 --> 01:51:36.359 bet that's what did you notice? This was Dermott Moron's phenomenology here? But 1188 01:51:36.479 --> 01:51:43.319 I find that funny. I keep noticing this throughout philosophy. You know, 1189 01:51:43.840 --> 01:51:47.039 Descartes brings in the stuff that he's trying to get rid of. The people 1190 01:51:47.640 --> 01:51:51.159 like responding to Descartes, like, we got to get rid of this stuff, 1191 01:51:51.239 --> 01:51:57.840 right, and this dualism, right, We're going to materialism and identity 1192 01:51:57.880 --> 01:52:01.199 theory, and then they bring in conceptual like yeah, I think a lot 1193 01:52:01.199 --> 01:52:06.119 of people misunderstand that what we're saying is that philosophy is a failed project. 1194 01:52:06.640 --> 01:52:13.199 So from the pre Socratics to today, philosophy is a giant failed enterprise. 1195 01:52:13.279 --> 01:52:16.039 And I think that when they hear us saying that they're like, what, 1196 01:52:16.079 --> 01:52:20.359 because aren't you talking a bunch of philosophy jargon and baggage and word salad and 1197 01:52:20.399 --> 01:52:26.319 are you going back to Plato unprestocratics and using these terms correct? Because yeah, 1198 01:52:26.399 --> 01:52:30.239 sometimes they say things that are correct and true. But our whole point 1199 01:52:30.319 --> 01:52:35.640 is that all of these secular and man made autonomous system building projects are always 1200 01:52:35.680 --> 01:52:41.479 doomed to fail, and that's why they always have these fundamental problems in their 1201 01:52:41.520 --> 01:52:45.920 systems. John seven point fifty. I've encountered many atheists that claim that atheism 1202 01:52:46.000 --> 01:52:50.479 is not a paradigm, it is simply a non belief based on the fact 1203 01:52:50.520 --> 01:52:56.479 that there's no evidence for God. Can you please explain why atheism is actually 1204 01:52:56.560 --> 01:53:00.760 a paradigm and why there's no such thing as a quote non belief for theism? 1205 01:53:00.840 --> 01:53:06.199 Thank you? Yeah, So, I mean, I'll grant you it 1206 01:53:06.239 --> 01:53:12.039 and be like, all right, it's not a paradigm. My position is, 1207 01:53:12.119 --> 01:53:14.039 well, well, hold on, but wouldn't it be the case that 1208 01:53:14.119 --> 01:53:19.520 even though the claim of atheism itself is not equivalent to a paradigm, that 1209 01:53:19.560 --> 01:53:27.199 person still has paradigm level commitments. Yes, that's true, paradigm level commitments 1210 01:53:27.600 --> 01:53:32.199 in other words, in my paper, there's nobody that's not presuppositionless, right, 1211 01:53:32.600 --> 01:53:36.560 in order for you to make a statement about that, Again, it 1212 01:53:36.600 --> 01:53:41.319 goes all the way back to everything I was saying about the second order. 1213 01:53:42.199 --> 01:53:47.960 You're taking positions, you have a paradigm in which you make that, whether 1214 01:53:48.000 --> 01:53:57.439 you realize it or not. And so I just feel like it's again it's 1215 01:53:57.640 --> 01:54:00.399 it's a dishonest and ad hoc move. I don't have it. It's like, 1216 01:54:00.880 --> 01:54:03.239 well, then you deced yourself, Like, I mean, it's clear 1217 01:54:05.039 --> 01:54:10.359 you have a set of like what is a paradigm. Yeah, it's basic 1218 01:54:10.439 --> 01:54:15.000 beliefs about knowledge, ethics, and metaphysics. Right, So that's all it 1219 01:54:15.119 --> 01:54:17.520 is. Well, you can't open your mouth and make any claims and be 1220 01:54:17.760 --> 01:54:24.920 like that just came out of nowhere. Right, I literally have no beliefs, 1221 01:54:24.960 --> 01:54:28.880 correct, Yeah, everybody has some commitments, even if you're a complete 1222 01:54:29.239 --> 01:54:33.720 like skeptic slash agnostic. Those are beliefs, those are positions. Right. 1223 01:54:33.840 --> 01:54:40.000 You're basically saying that I and pretty much no one else can know or we 1224 01:54:40.159 --> 01:54:42.960 just don't know, or I don't know. I mean, that's still a 1225 01:54:43.000 --> 01:54:45.880 commitment to all kinds of different things. And you may not think that it 1226 01:54:45.960 --> 01:54:49.520 is. But it is, and I think what they'll say to you, 1227 01:54:49.600 --> 01:54:56.000 Okay, I'll grant that, but there's no common denominator of which you can 1228 01:54:56.039 --> 01:55:02.159 categorize atheism is a worldview or position. It's like, absolutely, that's what 1229 01:55:02.159 --> 01:55:08.239 the whole papers about your accidentalists exactly. Yeah, they didn't even realize that 1230 01:55:08.279 --> 01:55:11.600 they already have a commitment to accidentalism by just saying that. That's the point. 1231 01:55:11.800 --> 01:55:15.600 So, in other words, saying that is already a commitment. It 1232 01:55:15.800 --> 01:55:18.279 entails all of these positions, whether you've recognized it or not. So the 1233 01:55:18.359 --> 01:55:23.079 fact that you haven't recognized it doesn't mean that you don't have all of these 1234 01:55:23.079 --> 01:55:28.560 commitments. To John Bollerman ten dollars, Thank you, gentlemen. I'm from 1235 01:55:28.600 --> 01:55:32.279 Vancouver aka the News Autumn. Thank you so much, Anonymous. Five dollars. 1236 01:55:32.319 --> 01:55:34.840 I've been listening to this for a long time, only just now I 1237 01:55:34.880 --> 01:55:38.960 have the courage to pipe up. Jay, You've been very edifying. Thank 1238 01:55:38.960 --> 01:55:41.640 you for being a nerd who does my homework for me. Glory to Jesus. 1239 01:55:41.680 --> 01:55:44.640 Thank you so much. Kristen five dollars, Thank you, Thank you, 1240 01:55:44.720 --> 01:55:48.560 Kristin, Sir from Craig ten dollars. If we can't accurately, if 1241 01:55:48.600 --> 01:55:55.560 we can't reason accurately from a fallen nature to God because of death, couldn't 1242 01:55:55.600 --> 01:56:00.319 tag fall into the same error. No, I mean we're not saying that 1243 01:56:00.439 --> 01:56:06.000 you can't reason accurately because of the fall per se. You can't. I 1244 01:56:06.000 --> 01:56:12.720 mean an atheist can write a paper about mathematics, can write papers about earthworms 1245 01:56:12.760 --> 01:56:16.159 that are correct and make new discoveries. Rather, the point is that they 1246 01:56:16.199 --> 01:56:20.159 can't justify how knowledge is possible. So those are two different that's another example 1247 01:56:20.199 --> 01:56:24.640 of the second order. Right, So let's give an example of an atheist 1248 01:56:24.640 --> 01:56:30.279 writes a science paper some breakthrough discovery about earthworms because he's been studying for the 1249 01:56:30.319 --> 01:56:32.520 twenty years and it turns out that it's all true. His theories on earthworms 1250 01:56:32.520 --> 01:56:38.399 are correct. Okay, nobody's saying that he doesn't have the first order knowledge 1251 01:56:38.880 --> 01:56:44.319 about the earthworms and his research and data. What we're saying is that he's 1252 01:56:44.359 --> 01:56:46.239 not able to give an account for how that knowledge is possible. That's the 1253 01:56:46.319 --> 01:56:50.560 higher order claim. Should this should be obvious that people think about it, 1254 01:56:50.840 --> 01:56:58.439 that these are two different things, two different claims. Somebody, Yeah, 1255 01:56:58.760 --> 01:57:05.119 I'm still confused with this guys saying that TAG can't differentiate particulars. Have you 1256 01:57:05.159 --> 01:57:08.880 figured that what that means? I mean, I addressed that earlier. That 1257 01:57:09.880 --> 01:57:13.199 I mean, you could make a transcendental argument with anything within the paradigm. 1258 01:57:13.279 --> 01:57:15.800 I I could start with pencils and make the argument up to God. It 1259 01:57:15.840 --> 01:57:20.640 wouldn't matter what object you pick, because ultimately everything it's the same question of 1260 01:57:20.920 --> 01:57:25.279 how do we ground the knowledge of those objects? Right? So that's the 1261 01:57:25.359 --> 01:57:29.720 question he was asking. He seems to think that somehow TAG is only dealing 1262 01:57:29.800 --> 01:57:33.640 with universals. It's not a question of universal particulars. So he thinks that 1263 01:57:33.800 --> 01:57:38.640 it's a universal type argument. I think, and therefore there's not a basis 1264 01:57:38.680 --> 01:57:41.520 for particulars. Seems to be what he thinks it is. TAG is not 1265 01:57:41.600 --> 01:57:46.680 the equivalent of universals. Okay, remember too that it's always misunderstanding everything. 1266 01:57:47.960 --> 01:57:54.199 Yeah. People get confused because they hear the word transcendental in yeah, and 1267 01:57:54.199 --> 01:57:59.439 they think that's reasoning about universals or something like yeah, or the all presidential 1268 01:57:59.520 --> 01:58:05.720 category must transit arguments must be about the reasoning about our grounding transcendental categories. 1269 01:58:08.159 --> 01:58:15.159 And that's not the case. So transcendental comes from the transcendental deduction of Kant, 1270 01:58:15.960 --> 01:58:24.640 and it basically a transcendental is simply just what's prior, right, transcendare 1271 01:58:25.680 --> 01:58:30.039 what's over and above and prior that makes the stuff below p Yeah, well, 1272 01:58:30.319 --> 01:58:35.239 maybe preconditions is better, because if we talk about preconditions for knowledge, 1273 01:58:35.800 --> 01:58:40.960 then that really doesn't anything to do with the question of universals per se. 1274 01:58:41.279 --> 01:58:45.119 You might ask other universals and can you give an argument for universals in your 1275 01:58:45.119 --> 01:58:49.600 worldview? But preconditions for knowledge, though it might relate to that, is 1276 01:58:49.600 --> 01:58:53.880 not the same thing as the question of universals. So hopefully that clears it 1277 01:58:53.960 --> 01:58:59.640 up. Because remember, in just general methodology, the transcendental deduction Kant is 1278 01:58:59.680 --> 01:59:08.119 actually trying to answer that exact question of what makes it possible to make predicates 1279 01:59:08.199 --> 01:59:13.800 of particular sense data right right, and and entities and stuff like that. 1280 01:59:14.399 --> 01:59:18.920 So that's exactly what a transcendental argument generally speak. I'm not saying Kant pulls 1281 01:59:18.960 --> 01:59:27.199 it off, but like the type of inference or transiental deduction that's an argument 1282 01:59:27.239 --> 01:59:32.279 that that's making is specifically attempting to ground and distinguish between particulars. Yeah, 1283 01:59:32.279 --> 01:59:39.199 I mean all of Aristotle's categories at the beginning is dealing with how to pick 1284 01:59:39.239 --> 01:59:45.319 out and know objects and to give them, give the relations that make them 1285 01:59:45.319 --> 01:59:53.520 what they are. Right, So quantity, position, substance. Right, 1286 01:59:53.520 --> 01:59:56.439 these are all different things that are listed in the category. And then cont 1287 01:59:56.479 --> 02:00:02.159 takes that and then tries to make his structure of the categories, and rather 1288 02:00:02.199 --> 02:00:05.119 than than being metaphysics, they're just in the mind. So it's it's but 1289 02:00:05.159 --> 02:00:12.880 it's the same basic idea of what categories are to make knowledge of objects possible. 1290 02:00:13.039 --> 02:00:16.079 That's so, in other words, to have knowledge of an object, 1291 02:00:16.159 --> 02:00:19.079 right, if we looked at Aerosol's categories, I would need to know that 1292 02:00:19.199 --> 02:00:23.279 it is one of the things the categories that we need to know is that 1293 02:00:23.399 --> 02:00:27.479 is over there, and over there is five free feet from that thing, 1294 02:00:27.880 --> 02:00:31.840 and it's ten feet from this thing. Right, that's the position and relation 1295 02:00:32.439 --> 02:00:39.199 is one of the things he lists in those categories. Then he says, 1296 02:00:39.920 --> 02:00:45.279 what about the fact that our relationship to transft categories seems contingent on fallen nature? 1297 02:00:45.840 --> 02:00:49.560 I would not say that at all. Has nothing to do with transpo 1298 02:00:49.640 --> 02:00:53.000 categories. I have nothing to do with being contingent on fallen nature. So 1299 02:00:53.000 --> 02:00:55.840 I don't know what you said that you say, look up the laws of 1300 02:00:55.920 --> 02:00:59.840 physics. I don't know how that relates. Thank you for everything that you're 1301 02:00:59.840 --> 02:01:03.279 doing. First Corinthians one twenty three. Frankie d five dollars. My brother 1302 02:01:03.600 --> 02:01:10.439 and me Austin came up with a new way form of calculating how far away 1303 02:01:10.520 --> 02:01:13.840 a different location is. For example, if you look at a place, 1304 02:01:13.880 --> 02:01:16.439 we might say it is one jay dire stream away, and if they say 1305 02:01:16.439 --> 02:01:20.520 it's two day dire streams away, you know it's very far. That's creating. 1306 02:01:21.439 --> 02:01:25.119 Do you have five dollars? Father? Deaging out a nice question for 1307 02:01:25.159 --> 02:01:29.479 you. Can there be a contradiction between first order and second order thinking? 1308 02:01:29.560 --> 02:01:33.439 For example, let's say somebody says in the first order statement the law of 1309 02:01:33.520 --> 02:01:38.760 identity does not exist. Would that result in a contradiction with a second order 1310 02:01:38.800 --> 02:01:46.800 statement that they know that the law of order latinity doesn't exist. Yeah? 1311 02:01:46.880 --> 02:01:53.720 And then what's really interesting too that I mean, this gets really met a 1312 02:01:53.800 --> 02:01:58.640 level, but it's something I developed with my argument from the immateriality of the 1313 02:01:58.640 --> 02:02:06.880 intellect and with like Bullian logic, you can't have existential import with universal propositions. 1314 02:02:08.760 --> 02:02:14.640 So that means if you derive a particular for I'll give you an example. 1315 02:02:16.239 --> 02:02:21.920 All dogs are animals on the bullion interpretation, that has no existential import 1316 02:02:23.880 --> 02:02:29.560 But if you say some dogs are animals, it does. It implies dogs 1317 02:02:29.600 --> 02:02:36.800 exist, all right. So then comes al for Tarski and al for Tarski. 1318 02:02:39.560 --> 02:02:45.079 Uh makes this distinction between language, optic language, and meta language. 1319 02:02:45.119 --> 02:02:49.720 So this is when we first start getting into this kind of first and second 1320 02:02:49.920 --> 02:02:55.039 order, and eventually this is going to develop into first and second order logic. 1321 02:02:56.520 --> 02:03:00.359 So I started thinking about a statement. Now, the reason why Tarski 1322 02:03:00.479 --> 02:03:06.119 developed that was because of the liar paradox. This sentence is false, and 1323 02:03:06.159 --> 02:03:10.720 he was able to make do you see how the second and first order is 1324 02:03:10.760 --> 02:03:15.319 relevant. He's able to make a distinction between the language that talks about objejects 1325 02:03:15.439 --> 02:03:19.640 versus language that talks about the language, and so something could be both true 1326 02:03:19.680 --> 02:03:25.880 and false depending on the distinction. Anyways, So then I was thinking about 1327 02:03:27.199 --> 02:03:30.520 because I'm doing all this work with second order statements. Yeah, but by 1328 02:03:30.560 --> 02:03:33.359 the way, that doesn't exist, right because J Mike and some of the 1329 02:03:33.359 --> 02:03:39.239 other atheists said there was no such thing as that question. So okay, 1330 02:03:39.399 --> 02:03:43.439 So even though the philosophers are out here talking about it. It's famous discussion. 1331 02:03:43.439 --> 02:03:47.880 It doesn't exist because there's no such thing. It's a nonsense thing that 1332 02:03:47.920 --> 02:03:55.760 you've made up that you could talk about the language of objects. So there's 1333 02:03:55.960 --> 02:03:59.039 knowledge of objects, and then there's discussions of the language of the knowledge of 1334 02:03:59.039 --> 02:04:01.279 objects. That doesn't exist. It's a thing that's made up by you. 1335 02:04:02.159 --> 02:04:06.239 Well, I'll make sure to go into I put my time machine in every 1336 02:04:06.279 --> 02:04:12.760 bean of Patristic faith right here, so I'll make sure to actually go into 1337 02:04:12.880 --> 02:04:17.800 my bag with Partrific Faith coffee, which you can purchase on in the bio 1338 02:04:17.840 --> 02:04:21.079 from Jays. Yeah, I'll put the link in the chat. This is 1339 02:04:21.119 --> 02:04:28.159 real coffee too. By the way, organic Orthodox based company. Every link 1340 02:04:28.279 --> 02:04:35.079 is a second order being that actually talks about lower order beings. And I 1341 02:04:35.079 --> 02:04:42.840 think you really appreciate the meta level roast of this particular blend. But I've 1342 02:04:42.880 --> 02:04:45.279 also put a time machine here, so I'll make sure to actually go into 1343 02:04:45.319 --> 02:04:53.039 my bag a pacific faith go back in time and tell Tarski. I'm sorry 1344 02:04:53.079 --> 02:04:58.920 to tell you Tarski the Internet atheist keyboard wizard. By the way, isn't 1345 02:04:58.920 --> 02:05:03.920 this the whole Douglas Hofstetter book that was a Pulitzer prize winner Gourdell Asherbach. 1346 02:05:04.520 --> 02:05:10.920 Right, do you know what I'm talking about? Yes? Yeah, Where 1347 02:05:10.920 --> 02:05:14.840 he talks about strange loops and the whole point is that there's there's language, 1348 02:05:14.840 --> 02:05:16.359 and then there's a language about language. And then he talks about how m 1349 02:05:17.640 --> 02:05:26.479 c ass artwork displays the like geometric patterns that that evidence this strange loop principle 1350 02:05:26.560 --> 02:05:30.000 that if you you're just raising the question one one step above one higher order, 1351 02:05:30.359 --> 02:05:34.560 he says, answer that question real quick. I'm sorry for going on 1352 02:05:34.640 --> 02:05:45.920 tangent on that. So anyways, think about this second order claim. All 1353 02:05:45.000 --> 02:05:54.560 propositions are all sentences contain words. That's a metaw language, right, Why 1354 02:05:54.600 --> 02:06:00.960 because I'm using language to talk about the object, right, Okay, So 1355 02:06:00.079 --> 02:06:06.319 what happens that's an universal proposition, and therefore I conclude to a particular therefore 1356 02:06:06.840 --> 02:06:12.920 some words, some sentences contain words. Have I committed on the bully interpretation 1357 02:06:13.960 --> 02:06:17.760 an existential's fallacy? And it came to this discovery. I actually wrote mathematicians 1358 02:06:17.800 --> 02:06:23.600 and logicians and nobody's even thought about this, which is weird stuff that seems 1359 02:06:23.760 --> 02:06:27.760 so basic that I'm like, why has nobody ever thought about this? It 1360 02:06:27.880 --> 02:06:33.479 can't apply to second order. The Boolean existential import rules can't apply to second 1361 02:06:33.600 --> 02:06:40.359 order. Why because to answer your friend's question in the chat, I would 1362 02:06:40.399 --> 02:06:46.760 be making a second order claim. That's basically contradictory. Right, I'm speaking 1363 02:06:46.880 --> 02:06:55.920 about words and concepts and universals, but they don't exist. Do you see 1364 02:06:55.960 --> 02:06:59.720 the problem? So to answer yeah, because the sentence is engaging in it. 1365 02:07:00.079 --> 02:07:03.479 So the sentence itself. Absolutely, you could make second order claims about 1366 02:07:03.520 --> 02:07:08.000 first order of things in which you're engaged in contradiction. And it's something I 1367 02:07:08.119 --> 02:07:18.239 just actually worked out in recently. Yeah, I brought when I was talking 1368 02:07:18.239 --> 02:07:24.640 to a deer, I brought up the Gardell the move that Gardell makes, 1369 02:07:25.039 --> 02:07:28.399 and he was like, that's not a transcendental argument. I wasn't arguing that 1370 02:07:28.560 --> 02:07:31.199 Gardell was making a transfer argument. I was saying that the move that he 1371 02:07:31.319 --> 02:07:36.640 makes from in the in the argument against Russell, when he makes the set 1372 02:07:36.720 --> 02:07:43.319 argument, he says that every set eventually appeals outside of the set. And 1373 02:07:43.359 --> 02:07:49.239 that's an example of the strange loop stuff in the Hofstetter book illustrates illustrates the 1374 02:07:49.239 --> 02:07:57.199 point that you're making about the move up to second order and the Tarsky point. 1375 02:07:58.720 --> 02:08:03.640 It's really difficult. He's got his other books really difficult to metamagical themos 1376 02:08:03.680 --> 02:08:07.720 but I mean hop setters, I mean he's not engaged in a lot of 1377 02:08:07.720 --> 02:08:11.960 metaphysical Actually kind of is because he says, maybe we can reconcile some of 1378 02:08:11.960 --> 02:08:16.159 these things with like Zen philosophy, and he talks about Zen cones and how 1379 02:08:16.520 --> 02:08:24.399 Zen's philosophy sometimes makes the same move to first order second order, but the 1380 02:08:24.520 --> 02:08:28.800 move is the same. That's the point. It's not saying that that is 1381 02:08:28.840 --> 02:08:33.239 the transcendental argument. Not saying that mc esher's artwork exemplifying this move is the 1382 02:08:33.279 --> 02:08:39.239 transcendental argument is really stupid. But anyway, Yeah, if anybody just watches, 1383 02:08:39.439 --> 02:08:46.319 uh, there's actually some lectures that explain the Goerdell lecherback book to you. 1384 02:08:46.439 --> 02:08:50.159 It's a really difficult book, but if you watch some of those lectures, 1385 02:08:50.199 --> 02:08:54.880 you'll see the point that we're making here about how whether it's box the 1386 02:08:54.960 --> 02:09:00.239 beginning chapters, he gives an example of box fugue. One of his is 1387 02:09:00.319 --> 02:09:05.640 like fugues, and it's actually the musical structure repeats, so it's a never 1388 02:09:05.840 --> 02:09:09.880 ending loop. If you play it on those old timey pianos or whatever. 1389 02:09:11.520 --> 02:09:13.520 That it would just play in a loop and it would be the same structure 1390 02:09:13.520 --> 02:09:18.239 over and over and over, and you can by the way, Yeah, 1391 02:09:20.760 --> 02:09:24.560 I actually did want to. There's a much better argument than the tag. 1392 02:09:26.119 --> 02:09:33.079 It's completely an irrefutable proof. But the problem is it's it's such advanced logic 1393 02:09:35.359 --> 02:09:37.760 that none of the atheists would be able to understand it. So I never 1394 02:09:37.800 --> 02:09:43.720 actually used that one. But if you come up to Montanica, I might. 1395 02:09:43.319 --> 02:09:46.960 I might actually pull it out just so we could actually look at it, 1396 02:09:46.960 --> 02:09:52.960 and nobody's going to challenges in trust me. It's an infallible proof because 1397 02:09:52.000 --> 02:09:56.039 I'm much smarter than all of you on logic, and so you're gonna have 1398 02:09:56.039 --> 02:10:00.199 to just trust me on this. I actually was thinking about, like, 1399 02:10:00.239 --> 02:10:01.239 what if I came up on an argument like that. Well, I do 1400 02:10:01.319 --> 02:10:05.279 have a proof, but it's just far too complicated for you to understand what 1401 02:10:05.319 --> 02:10:11.199 the atheist would actually say. Yeah, there is a hopstarter giving a lecture 1402 02:10:11.520 --> 02:10:16.680 in twenty thirteen explaining the book and explaining the principle of strange loops. So 1403 02:10:18.000 --> 02:10:20.560 if you want to watch that lecture, you'll get an idea about what we're 1404 02:10:20.600 --> 02:10:24.359 talking about. Yeah, I wish he had used some graphics, but it's 1405 02:10:24.399 --> 02:10:28.239 kind of like just him talking. He should have used some imagery because his 1406 02:10:28.239 --> 02:10:33.760 book is actually full of a lot of images. But anyway, so the 1407 02:10:33.800 --> 02:10:37.600 next question is Frankie die. On a serious note, I've been struggling with 1408 02:10:37.680 --> 02:10:43.399 Nietzsche. There's a guy whose name is Kosten Alamaru. He argues that Plato 1409 02:10:43.439 --> 02:10:50.119 and Nietzsche were arguing for an aristocracy and that philosophy is therefore not real, 1410 02:10:50.199 --> 02:10:54.640 it's only a tool of stake craft. Well, I mean that would be 1411 02:10:54.760 --> 02:11:00.720 a theory, but the fact that he has this theory that mean that it's 1412 02:11:00.800 --> 02:11:03.520 true. So I'll throw this one to Father Deacon. What would you say 1413 02:11:03.520 --> 02:11:07.279 to somebody who said, look, Plato, Nietzsche, they've shown us ultimately 1414 02:11:07.319 --> 02:11:11.680 the real meaning of their philosophy is that there's an ari aristocratic elite. There's 1415 02:11:11.720 --> 02:11:22.439 not a real philosophy. It's just a tool of control. Man. Well, 1416 02:11:22.479 --> 02:11:31.079 suppose I grant that there's a certain element of they're using. Suppose I 1417 02:11:31.119 --> 02:11:37.520 grant that they're still telling me if that's really who Nietzsche, Nichtsche and Plato 1418 02:11:37.600 --> 02:11:46.520 are, there's still something viable about philosophy because it exposes the con And I 1419 02:11:46.560 --> 02:11:50.920 would agree somewhat with that, right, I think all the philosophers are basically 1420 02:11:50.960 --> 02:11:58.279 con artists. Yet I engage in philosophy, in other words, philosophy and 1421 02:11:58.359 --> 02:12:07.479 the general sense of thinking correctly and with excellence that you could train yourself in 1422 02:12:07.640 --> 02:12:16.800 that that How would you fight bad philosophy of the elites or something like that 1423 02:12:16.880 --> 02:12:20.560 with good philosophy, right, good thinking skills? So even fight granted that, 1424 02:12:20.560 --> 02:12:22.399 that's kind of the move that I've taking. Well, I mean, 1425 02:12:22.439 --> 02:12:26.920 what did those argument still be some kind of philosophy and therefore self refuting, 1426 02:12:26.000 --> 02:12:31.880 because it's that's what I'm saying, either self refuting or they're still saying there's 1427 02:12:31.920 --> 02:12:37.880 some advantage to use this to expose the con So and what what would you 1428 02:12:37.920 --> 02:12:41.279 say? This is like a like a Nietzsche and it says something like your 1429 02:12:41.359 --> 02:12:46.000 quest for absolute truth is silly. Everything is just sort of uh, you 1430 02:12:46.039 --> 02:12:50.279 know, will to power power dynamics, and you're just duped into thinking that 1431 02:12:50.399 --> 02:12:54.159 you're finding this absolutely true. Absolutely it's an assual claim. So it's the 1432 02:12:54.159 --> 02:12:58.640 same problem with you. It's like, oh, I'm gonna pretend I'm not 1433 02:12:58.680 --> 02:13:07.000 making second order claims. They are contingent upon the first order. So just 1434 02:13:07.039 --> 02:13:11.239 grant me my assumption. Right, there are no absolutes, so I can 1435 02:13:11.279 --> 02:13:16.600 make an absolute statement about it. There are no absolutes. It's like mind 1436 02:13:16.600 --> 02:13:18.640 hacked. Five dollars, Thank you so much, Robi ten dollars. Do 1437 02:13:18.680 --> 02:13:26.239 you think that something deeper concerning knowledge was distorted in the confusion of the languages 1438 02:13:26.279 --> 02:13:31.239 at the Tower of Babbel. I don't know. I mean, maybe it's 1439 02:13:31.279 --> 02:13:35.560 possible that humanity's knowledge was damaged in some weird way at that time, But 1440 02:13:37.239 --> 02:13:41.239 I mean it looks like, as per Daniel, what eleven or twelve, 1441 02:13:41.399 --> 02:13:46.239 knowledge is increasing as we get towards the end, So good question. I 1442 02:13:46.279 --> 02:13:54.119 don't know. Prodrick five dollars. Do you have any thoughts on Mila Sue's 1443 02:13:54.159 --> 02:14:01.000 necessity of contingency appearing like he accidentally stumbled across Saint Maximus is where God exists? 1444 02:14:01.079 --> 02:14:05.560 I do not. Where I exist, God does not. I don't 1445 02:14:05.600 --> 02:14:09.640 know what that means, honestly, So, I mean, I've read a 1446 02:14:09.640 --> 02:14:20.479 lot of Saint Maximus, but I don't know what that means. Maximus is 1447 02:14:20.520 --> 02:14:26.079 probably just trying to express apathetic theology that the inner being of God, in 1448 02:14:26.159 --> 02:14:31.359 terms of his essence, will never know that I'll never be there, I'll 1449 02:14:31.399 --> 02:14:37.279 never perceive it, and it might be a statement of humility to like, 1450 02:14:37.840 --> 02:14:43.239 where I exist, God does not exist just in the sense of like because 1451 02:14:43.239 --> 02:14:48.520 I'm sinful, I don't feel close to God. But Maximus isn't literally saying 1452 02:14:48.560 --> 02:14:52.319 that God is not imnipresent. So but I mean, I'm discussing because I 1453 02:14:52.319 --> 02:14:56.479 don't know who. I don't know who Melisu is or what this had five 1454 02:14:56.520 --> 02:15:01.000 dollars? Is there any atheists that you could think of who does a decent 1455 02:15:01.079 --> 02:15:15.560 account giving a justification for knowledge claims father Deacon, my PhD advisors and atheists 1456 02:15:15.600 --> 02:15:26.840 at that's freaking He's a Contian scholar, He's a Soilarisian scholar, and it's 1457 02:15:26.840 --> 02:15:33.039 a sophisticated account of it's people like that that I think of. I would 1458 02:15:33.079 --> 02:15:35.600 say Malpass, but he, as far as he knows, Malpass kind of 1459 02:15:35.640 --> 02:15:43.199 takes more of like an agnostic like I don't know, kind of position, 1460 02:15:43.880 --> 02:15:50.479 but typically like at the level of like a good academic professor or something like 1461 02:15:50.560 --> 02:15:54.800 that, they could give you a good run for your money. If that's 1462 02:15:54.880 --> 02:15:58.600 what I mean. I think again, it misses the kind of greater points 1463 02:16:00.079 --> 02:16:07.199 of missing the epistemological forest for the epistemic trees and getting bogged down on I 1464 02:16:07.199 --> 02:16:11.520 would just saw this in like one of the comments too, like the tag 1465 02:16:11.640 --> 02:16:16.760 doesn't work because it fits into one of CONT's categories and probably referring back to 1466 02:16:16.880 --> 02:16:24.319 Stroud's argument of the lack of verification principle and transcendental deductions that it can never 1467 02:16:24.159 --> 02:16:33.440 establish an object to which it and two problems here, and it's again it's 1468 02:16:33.680 --> 02:16:39.520 this, I hate to say it, this pretended autonomy and kind of holding 1469 02:16:39.600 --> 02:16:43.319 on to your idols so you can't actually see the question. It's like, 1470 02:16:43.760 --> 02:16:48.920 why is anything that cont said even true or justified? And we're just granting 1471 02:16:50.079 --> 02:16:56.360 Kant like his arguments work and everything that he said let me get my cat 1472 02:16:56.399 --> 02:17:03.159 by the way actually works. And again it's just missing the kind of the 1473 02:17:03.280 --> 02:17:11.920 more fundamental kind of question of even if my argument doesn't work, tag, 1474 02:17:13.440 --> 02:17:16.319 it still works. Right. Let me put it this way to you, 1475 02:17:18.040 --> 02:17:26.360 what comes first? The necessary condition for all arguments, including transcendental arguments or 1476 02:17:26.360 --> 02:17:33.280 the transcendental arguments, which one comes first? Epistemically speaking? What would you 1477 02:17:33.319 --> 02:17:39.159 say? I was reading Phillip's comment, I missed what you're saying apologize. 1478 02:17:39.760 --> 02:17:43.520 So I want to one way to kind of illustrate why none of these people's 1479 02:17:43.520 --> 02:17:48.319 objections will ever work. I want to ask them, epistemically speaking, what 1480 02:17:48.479 --> 02:17:56.239 comes first the necessary conditions for arguments, including transcendental arguments or the transcendental argument. 1481 02:18:00.680 --> 02:18:05.520 The condition the conditions that have to come first. Yeah, the necessary 1482 02:18:05.559 --> 02:18:09.760 conditions. So what that means is, even if my transcendental argument fails, 1483 02:18:11.600 --> 02:18:15.600 the question still stands. Do you see what I mean? Why? Because? 1484 02:18:15.680 --> 02:18:18.959 Yeah, yeah, right? I mean, Let's let's say that somebody 1485 02:18:20.239 --> 02:18:24.600 was engaged, like, was arguing very poorly. Right, Let's say they 1486 02:18:24.680 --> 02:18:28.559 argue TAG very poorly, like I don't know a lot of the Matt Slick 1487 02:18:28.719 --> 02:18:31.879 or one of these people. Right, Let's say they argued it very poorly, 1488 02:18:31.239 --> 02:18:37.040 like, the question is still there, right, Yes, And that's 1489 02:18:37.040 --> 02:18:39.840 what I'm saying, even if I granted it to you, that like the 1490 02:18:39.959 --> 02:18:48.200 TAG is open to these continent critiques of Stroud and blah blah blah, all 1491 02:18:48.200 --> 02:18:52.479 this different stuff, or I made a mistake or something like that. The 1492 02:18:52.559 --> 02:18:56.959 question all it means is I wasn't that great with my language? The argument 1493 02:18:58.559 --> 02:19:01.200 prior to argument still stands, doesn't it? Yeah? And this was my 1494 02:19:01.319 --> 02:19:05.840 point to am Deer or J Mike. I forget which one, but yeah, 1495 02:19:05.840 --> 02:19:07.639 this was the point I was making of them. BMX nineteen six six 1496 02:19:07.719 --> 02:19:11.440 ten dollars, Thank you so much for that, Big Boss, twenty dollars. 1497 02:19:13.040 --> 02:19:18.360 Dang. The FDA Food and Drug Administration is against people playing tag win 1498 02:19:18.440 --> 02:19:24.360 will to tyranny end, so he's doing a little bit of pun with your 1499 02:19:24.440 --> 02:19:28.200 name and other things like tag attack. Thank you so much, Big Boss. 1500 02:19:28.200 --> 02:19:31.879 Appreciate attack Dog five hundred and five dollars. Jay, I'm just starting 1501 02:19:31.920 --> 02:19:37.280 to understand get into presop. I'm slow boy. What are the top five 1502 02:19:37.319 --> 02:19:41.799 books or papers or essays for a nube that doesn't have a philosophy background. 1503 02:19:43.120 --> 02:19:48.120 I would say watch the Bonsenstein debate about two or three times and take notes. 1504 02:19:48.639 --> 02:19:54.639 I would say, read the very easy introduction book Ultimate Proof by doctor 1505 02:19:54.719 --> 02:19:58.559 Jason Lyle. Then I would read something like Always Ready by Greg Benson, 1506 02:19:58.639 --> 02:20:03.920 and then I would read father Deacon Ananias's papers, and I would read then 1507 02:20:05.360 --> 02:20:13.120 Contingency of Knowledge by russ Manyon. All right, guys, I want to 1508 02:20:13.120 --> 02:20:16.479 remind you that we do have a show sponsor. Who is chalk dot Com? 1509 02:20:16.520 --> 02:20:22.959 Now is your paper public or not yet. Yes here, I'm just 1510 02:20:24.399 --> 02:20:26.360 because a lot of people were saying, hey, we want to read this, 1511 02:20:26.440 --> 02:20:30.920 and we we got through several key points, but we didn't get through 1512 02:20:30.920 --> 02:20:33.799 every single thing because it's uh, I mean, it's not super long. 1513 02:20:35.040 --> 02:20:37.159 It's a twelve page paper. But so if you guys want to read the 1514 02:20:37.200 --> 02:20:43.040 paper, father deacon and will give you the link right somewhere there is. 1515 02:20:46.520 --> 02:20:54.959 Somebody told me that unless you subscribe to Academy dot e D you can't download 1516 02:20:56.040 --> 02:21:01.200 the You have to log in with like your face Book or your Google is 1517 02:21:01.239 --> 02:21:05.319 how you do that? Okay, you can read it though it's yeah, 1518 02:21:05.360 --> 02:21:09.239 you can read it, but to download you have to be logged in through 1519 02:21:09.239 --> 02:21:13.920 Facebook or Google. Okay, thanks for yeah, and I guys almost all 1520 02:21:13.959 --> 02:21:18.559 my papers are on there. Remember to head on over to chalk dot com 1521 02:21:18.040 --> 02:21:22.879 for the best in supplementation. You can get the Male Vitality Stack, which 1522 02:21:22.920 --> 02:21:28.520 will include there on the front page of Chalk dot com c choq dot com 1523 02:21:28.559 --> 02:21:33.799 both the Action two point zero, the ton Cattle EE and the pre workout 1524 02:21:33.959 --> 02:21:39.159 the Chalk chad Mode. Chad Mode is the best for pre workouts that does 1525 02:21:39.319 --> 02:21:46.239 that does not include any toxic material. It doesn't have any any flavor additives 1526 02:21:46.280 --> 02:21:54.559 that are coming out of a GMO hybrid Frankenstein underground base. It's all better 1527 02:21:54.559 --> 02:22:01.200 than organic, stringently purified to the max. They're extremists about their purification over 1528 02:22:01.200 --> 02:22:03.639 there at talk dot com, So head on over there to use promo cod 1529 02:22:03.719 --> 02:22:07.440 J fifty you get fifty percent off. And uh, that's not just for 1530 02:22:07.520 --> 02:22:11.399 dudes. There's also stacks for women. So if you're one of the five 1531 02:22:11.479 --> 02:22:16.239 percent of ladies that watch this channel out of the ninety five percent of dudes, 1532 02:22:16.479 --> 02:22:20.200 you can also benefit from chalk dot com by using the promo code J 1533 02:22:20.319 --> 02:22:24.200 fifty that JAY five zero to get fifty percent off. And also if you 1534 02:22:24.239 --> 02:22:28.200 want recurring subscriptions, you can use the promo code j Y five to three 1535 02:22:28.360 --> 02:22:31.639 life JAY five three l f E uh. And good news, guys, 1536 02:22:31.639 --> 02:22:37.559 we will be doing an event in Vegas in June, so look for the 1537 02:22:37.639 --> 02:22:41.360 Vegas June event. Father Diggon, I don't know if you've sold your tickets 1538 02:22:41.360 --> 02:22:46.360 to your event. If you want to plug that you can. Yeah. 1539 02:22:46.399 --> 02:22:58.600 So the twenty first ends the Orthodox Montanica discount tickets the early bird tickets, 1540 02:23:00.159 --> 02:23:07.479 so get those. We are expected to sell out we're way ahead of where 1541 02:23:07.479 --> 02:23:13.000 we were ticket sales last year, and we're going to get a lot more. 1542 02:23:13.200 --> 02:23:18.840 And also we've if many of you don't know, in Missoula, there's 1543 02:23:18.879 --> 02:23:24.600 a mega church, evangelical church about two thousand people that are converting to Orthodoxy. 1544 02:23:26.159 --> 02:23:31.680 So we'll probably get a lot of them too, So don't procrastinate, 1545 02:23:31.719 --> 02:23:39.040 get your tickets to put it in the chat right there for the conference and 1546 02:23:39.040 --> 02:23:43.440 what what what's going on at at your conference? This year? It's themed 1547 02:23:43.440 --> 02:23:48.680 around is it film or icons? Theology to icon So we're gonna have film 1548 02:23:48.840 --> 02:23:56.760 famous film directors like Nathan Jacobs who's also a doctor of philosophy and uh, 1549 02:23:56.280 --> 02:24:01.559 I think he was a student doctor David Bradsha at one point, and uh, 1550 02:24:01.840 --> 02:24:09.000 father Turbo Qualls who's an iconography Also father Matthew Garrett from Boise who's an 1551 02:24:09.200 --> 02:24:16.760 iconographer and WI Corps. And Shane Swinson who is our resident iconographer paying the 1552 02:24:16.799 --> 02:24:22.159 temple. Yeah, shout out to Shane, longtime buddy of ours. So 1553 02:24:22.479 --> 02:24:26.760 and then it looks like we might get some other film directors and some other 1554 02:24:26.799 --> 02:24:33.040 famous guests that I Stanley Kuberg's coming, Mel Gibson is coming. Uh, 1555 02:24:35.600 --> 02:24:43.040 that's a jokes. Burgs, that's a joke. Yeah, Martin Heideger probably 1556 02:24:43.079 --> 02:24:56.280 will show up, Lenny Lenny Rievanshall will be there. Yeah, it's a 1557 02:24:56.360 --> 02:25:01.600 joke. People. Yeah, now they're going to be like, I demand 1558 02:25:01.399 --> 02:25:07.280 my ticket refunded because you lied and told me that Stanley Kuber would be there 1559 02:25:07.280 --> 02:25:13.639 and he's not here. You're a liar. Whatether if if I had to 1560 02:25:13.680 --> 02:25:18.319 get any film director, who would be your favorite film director to bring in? 1561 02:25:20.639 --> 02:25:26.639 They don't have to be orthodox? Well, I think everybody would prefer 1562 02:25:26.719 --> 02:25:31.440 Mel Gibson probably like as the most like based film director. I mean, 1563 02:25:33.120 --> 02:25:35.319 somebody said, is Tom Cruise coming? No, but Tom kom is coming 1564 02:25:35.440 --> 02:25:41.920 and that's even better, So I don't. I mean, you would probably 1565 02:25:41.959 --> 02:25:46.479 be better situated to know orthodox directors. I'm trying to think of the only 1566 02:25:46.520 --> 02:25:50.040 ones I've heard of are the ones that you know about. I think I 1567 02:25:50.079 --> 02:25:52.360 don't. I can't think of any any other ones that are We could get 1568 02:25:52.479 --> 02:26:00.399 Nick caged because you know that I've met him and had some conversations with down 1569 02:26:00.399 --> 02:26:07.159 at the Lava Lounge and Angeles. Oh you know who should get speaking of 1570 02:26:07.200 --> 02:26:18.000 Tom's Tom Waits, He has nothing to do with it. So I said 1571 02:26:18.000 --> 02:26:22.760 get so, I said get quit and Tarantino to go. Yeah, I 1572 02:26:22.760 --> 02:26:28.000 don't think that's gonna happen, but anyway, thank you for coming back. 1573 02:26:30.520 --> 02:26:35.399 My mind is much. I'm so tired from traveling, so thank you for 1574 02:26:35.440 --> 02:26:39.000 coming on. And everybody should read the paper and anything you want to leave 1575 02:26:39.040 --> 02:26:50.360 us with. All of you have at We're halfway through Lent. Have a 1576 02:26:50.399 --> 02:26:54.479 great rest of lent. My God give you the grace necessary for that. 1577 02:26:54.959 --> 02:27:01.000 Again, you've got our patristic faith. Coffee Jay, I know that you're 1578 02:27:01.079 --> 02:27:07.399 starting up some I think going to be releasing some courses after PASCA. I'm 1579 02:27:07.440 --> 02:27:11.200 going to start releasing some new courses, canvas courses, so stay tuned. 1580 02:27:11.719 --> 02:27:20.319 Also, we're bringing on other PhD philosophy Orthodox philosophy professors onto particular Faith to 1581 02:27:20.600 --> 02:27:26.280 deliver courses, so stay tuned. We're really excited about that. And just 1582 02:27:26.319 --> 02:27:33.000 like you, Ja, we want to provide quality university education that isn't woke, 1583 02:27:33.680 --> 02:27:37.280 it isn't broke, and it won't cause you to go broke to for 1584 02:27:37.319 --> 02:27:39.920 an affordable price. Yeah, I think that's the model. I mean, 1585 02:27:39.920 --> 02:27:45.079 the future will be this. People are not going to care about these mind 1586 02:27:45.120 --> 02:27:50.799 control brainwashing universities and they're going to be moving to learning what they want to 1587 02:27:50.840 --> 02:27:52.959 learn on their own initiative, and that's a much better model anyway. So 1588 02:27:54.040 --> 02:27:56.520 that's what I think the future is. So yeah, it's good to hear 1589 02:27:56.559 --> 02:28:01.360 that. Big Boston's another five dollars and says if you don't subscribe to Jason 1590 02:28:01.399 --> 02:28:05.040 Elysis, you're sigh opping yourself. That's a good selling point. I like 1591 02:28:05.120 --> 02:28:07.360 it. So yeah, you can also subscribe to my website get access to 1592 02:28:07.360 --> 02:28:13.959 the archives. I forgot to mention that I did finish this, so if 1593 02:28:13.959 --> 02:28:16.879 you guys didn't see the really deep dive that we did on Through the Looking 1594 02:28:16.959 --> 02:28:20.840 Glass, I highly recommend it. Actually we touched on some of the strange 1595 02:28:20.879 --> 02:28:24.639 loops stuff because Lewis Carroll, if he didn't know it, was a mathematician, 1596 02:28:24.079 --> 02:28:28.360 and a lot of the word games and word play is highly philosophical. 1597 02:28:28.399 --> 02:28:33.319 In fact, Father Deacon, you might find this interesting. There's elements of 1598 02:28:33.360 --> 02:28:39.040 the later chapters Through the Looking Glass that not only deal with the question of 1599 02:28:39.120 --> 02:28:45.559 identity, but questions of like substance and accident and Arisitilian questions. There's a 1600 02:28:45.559 --> 02:28:48.079 lot of weird stuff in this book that you wouldn't think about perhaps even counting 1601 02:28:48.120 --> 02:28:52.799 by identity versus accounting by division, I think comes up. And again, 1602 02:28:54.319 --> 02:28:56.120 Lewis Carroll was a weirdo for sure, and we covered that in part one. 1603 02:28:56.399 --> 02:29:00.559 But he does include a lot of interest. Seriously, he was accused 1604 02:29:00.559 --> 02:29:05.799 of being a ped oh because of well, odd things that happen. He 1605 02:29:05.920 --> 02:29:09.639 was in the circles of a lot of the Golden Dawn Ritual magic weirdos. 1606 02:29:09.280 --> 02:29:13.479 So there's a lot of bizarre stuff with this book and with him, And 1607 02:29:13.520 --> 02:29:18.719 I'll be doing the part two very soon because I just finished it on the 1608 02:29:18.760 --> 02:29:24.559 plane. And if you don't know, it also has questions relating to like 1609 02:29:24.639 --> 02:29:28.040 word concept fallacies. So a lot of the stuff that yeah, actually like 1610 02:29:28.760 --> 02:29:33.600 when she goes into Wonderland or when she goes through the looking glass into the 1611 02:29:33.680 --> 02:29:39.280 opposite world, the mirror world, everything functions like fallacies are the case. 1612 02:29:39.719 --> 02:29:45.920 So there's contradictions happening. Words are misunderstood in two different references to different senses, 1613 02:29:46.959 --> 02:29:54.040 and so part of the magic of Wonderland is identifying and picking out things 1614 02:29:54.120 --> 02:29:58.319 like fallacies and work concept fallacies, et cetera. So Part two will be 1615 02:29:58.399 --> 02:30:01.840 up in the next few days and thank you for your patience while I was 1616 02:30:01.239 --> 02:30:07.079 gone hanging out with Sam Hyde. That would a super awesome, very very 1617 02:30:07.079 --> 02:30:11.120 thankful. It was a blessing to be able to go do that. Very 1618 02:30:11.120 --> 02:30:15.479 thankful to them for hosting me up there and putting me up and having me 1619 02:30:15.719 --> 02:30:18.440 get beat up by the Olympic trainer dude, so I got to do some 1620 02:30:18.520 --> 02:30:22.040 boxing. It was intense. It was an asthetic endeavor. I really enjoyed 1621 02:30:22.079 --> 02:30:26.920 it. So anyway, it's gonna be a fun PGL when it comes out. 1622 02:30:26.360 --> 02:30:30.040 And thank you guys so much, and we'll be back very soon. 1623 02:30:30.120 --> 02:30:31.440 Everybody, have a good night. God bless