We're building the system for scratch is an option, especially to eliminate any kind
of attack, but it's not practical. Welcome listeners to the Industrial Security Podcast.
My name is Nate Nelson. I'm here with Andrew Ginter, the vice
president of Industrial Security at Waterfall Security Solutions, who's going to be introducing the
subject and guest of our show today. Andrew, how's it going. I'm
very well, Thank you, Niate. Our guest today is Alex yev Tshenko.
He is the CEO and co founder of Salvador Technologies, and Salvador does
resilience. They do rapid recovery after an attack. So you know, we've
been talking a lot about preventing, detecting, responding. This is the recovery
piece of the puzzle. Then, without further Ado, here's your conversation with
Alex. Hello Alex, and welcome to the podcast. Before we get started,
can I ask you to say a few words about your background and about
the good work that you're doing at Salvador Technology. Hello Andrew, and thank
you for inviting me. I'm Alex, CEO and co founder of Salvador Technologies.
I'm coming from electrical engineering background with a lot of experience in software development
more than ten years and more five years in the R and D field,
more technological and a bit of a business part. My goal was to establish
the R and D department and the company I worked for and bring I brought
dozens of product from the Idea to the market. Salvador Technology established three years
ago by me and my co founder Legusiker, who is also a good friend
of mine. Only coming from a national cyber security unit in the Idea with
more than ten years experience in cyber My background was always background to my daily
job, so together we established Salvador. What we are doing in Salvador is
providing fastest and most complete recovery solutions for cyber attacks. We actually redefined the
cyber resilience for ICs and all the organizations you mentioned resilience. Our topic is
resilience for industrial operations. I mean the textbook definition of resilience is like a
spring. You deform something, you put it under pressure, it changes and
then it comes back. That's a x book definition, you know in the
industrial cybersecurity space. To you, what is resilience? What does that mean?
Okay? First of all, I like the definition you mentioned and the
I think the recovery in the real life is a bit similar to what you
determined. It's resilience actually goes beyond definition of preventing bridge resilience. It make
proactive measures to regain the operations once attack a course, and in terms of
recovery, it means have robust recovery solutions to ensure the organizations continue the operations
as it was before. Like you mentioned the spring, the organization should minimize
the impact of the downtime time and swiftly restore all the operations and all the
processes. For example, image a ransomwhare heat manufacturing facilities as it goes down,
all the chmi stopped, the machines are down. It can be days
or even weeks the average time in twenty days of downtime for this sector.
And now imagine you can click a button and go back within seconds to the
stage before the attack. Now downtime, no impact on the organization, exactly
like a spring. Okay, so coming back to you know, the in
a sense, the magic button recovery is something that you know, we have
not had a lot of guests on the show talk about. You know,
the next framework is govern identify, protect, detect, respond, recover.
We've had a lot of people actually talking about detection and to some extent response,
not so much recovery. I mean, in my understanding, there's at
least two ways to recover an industrial system after it's been compromised. You can
rebuild from original known good media, you know, rebuilding the whole system from
scratch if you like, reapplying any changes that you've made over time. You
can restore from backups, but you know that can get tricky as well.
Are your backups synchronized? You have one from three months ago before you made
a bunch of changes, and another system from right now, and you don't
have one on the other system from three months ago. The whole question of
recovery seems complicated, and indeed, rebuilding the system for scratch is an option,
especially to eliminate any kind of attack, but it's not practical, so
let's not discuss this one. But for the second part of the question,
backups are an important part for resilience. The think is the backups used today
are more IT centric centered IT focused. They are focused on the data.
Many required cloud connection or internet connection or always online that are accessible to the
internet, accessible to the attacker that can easily penetrate and destroy the backups.
Another part of backups that are a bit more protected and a bit more better,
let's say, is managing manual backups of the system. Actually taking USB
drive from system to system to take a snapshot, take an image, and
place it to safe location. And this is very long process and not efficient
process. And this is all why their recovery takes so long, an average
of twenty days, about three weeks to recover a facility from ransom or attack.
And this is a probablem we need to solve. Nate, let me
jump in with a couple of concrete examples. I mean, the sort of
textbook high profile case was Colonial. They took something like five and a half
six days to recover their IT network after ransomware hit it. You know,
to my knowledge in the public reports, ransomware did not get into their OT
network, so they didn't have to do anything on the OT side, but
just the IT side took them five six days. I mean, they paid
the ransom, they got the decryption tool. You know, they were hoping
that that decryption tool would solve the problem faster than restoring from backup. It
didn't. They went back to restoring from backup, and this was an IT
infrastructure. You know, I don't know if they had cloud backups. I
don't know if they had what kind of backup systems they had. But you
know, even an IT infrastructure where you have all of the world's technology at
your fingertips, Internet based or not, took you know, five and a
half six days, and I've heard stories on the OT side of things taking
much much longer than that, weeks and sometimes months. So and you know,
he mentioned as well, you know, the possibility of manual backups if
you don't have a lot of infrastructure. You know, what he didn't mention
is what I worry about with manual backups. You know, if you've got
an automated system, you get an alarm if a backup fails. If you're
doing it manually and you forget a system or three, there's no alarms.
It's it's error prone, is what I worry about. Another concern that I
would have, and it's possible that you guys addressed later in the interview,
is that you know, the obvious solution to the most common, at least
the most dramatic attacks today ransomware is extortion, is having those backups ready and
able. But of course attackers know this. And I'm not sure if this
is a relatively new trend or if they've been doing it forever, but I've
heard of cases where ransomware actors specifically target those backups to remove the leverage that
you have over them. Absolutely, And you know, he didn't gloss over
it. He mentioned it only briefly. He said, you know, USB
is a way that you know, USB drives carried around manually is a way
to do that. You know, A disadvantage is that it's manual. An
advantage is that it's offline. When you disconnect the USB, it's gone,
and the bad guys can encrypt the you know what systems they have access to,
they don't have access to the USB anymore. So that's you know,
manual backups in essense have both advantages and disadvantages. That's a lot of problems
with sort of the existing conventional approach to recovery and backups. You know,
again, we're coming back to the magic button. If we want to be
able to recover fast from cyber attacks, how do we do that, Well,
let's divide it to three aspects. One is compatibility to the OT and
it means backup not just the data, but the entire system. Two is
protecting the backup from the attacker and not having them accessible and online. I
mean make offline air gup backups that the attacker cannot penetrate and destroy. And
three is the available ability you need them immediately in the need, the ability
to use them at the moment that you need them. So I would say
the optimal cover strategy would involve make the backups this way that you can have
them clean and available when you need them. You say, you know,
to be maximally compatible with the OT environment, you've got to back up the
entire system. You know, how would you do that? I mean the
vendors, you know, they they I don't know if they don't really like
third party stuff being installed on their machines. You know, sometimes there are
you know, real time databases that are open and are being updated. What
does it mean to take a backup the of the entire system? How do
you deal with this? It's a good it's a good point and good question.
As in the industrial systems, you cannot stop the machine just to make
a backup, and you don't want to wait for the maintenance period to protect
your systems. So actually what we are doing by when you're talking about compatibility
to the out it means first copy the operational system, data configuration and the
licenses and also make it on the fly when the system is running and the
machine is producing. To implement technologies that can take the backups on the flight
without stopping the system and the software. And make the takes the data backup
data when while it's used, and make sure it is still working and competible
for use later than you need it. Making a copy of the whole system
makes sense. But you know you said there were three aspects. You said,
you know, to protect the backups they have to be offline, but
to use the backups they have to be online. That that sounds like a
contradiction. Can you can you explain what's going on there? This is exactly
what we are doing in Savaur technology and we implementing our patent of air gap
technology to protect the backups. We have a concept of hardware and software combination
in our platform. We have the cyber Recovery unit we call it CRU that
is always connected to the system. Inside it includes three and VMI disks,
three full copies of the hard disk, including the operational system, data configuration
and licenses. At every single moment, has only one disc accessible available to
the computer to copy all the data immediately after the backup. The disc is
disconnected. Every day we switch the discs to make it updated. So three
disks, three full copies, different in time, and this means air gap
from one side because it's actually electronically disconnected from the computer. You cannot see
the drive from the other hand, it's always updated every day, full new
copy of the entire computer. And additionally, the software that makes the copy
of the computer is the making a copy in a bootable mode. It means
when you need it, you just restart the computer and click a button on
the device boot from our device instead of the corrupted hard drive. That's way
it takes just thirty seconds to recover using our device, using our device.
Cool. Because I was going to ask you about, you know, the
network impact of doing all these backups over the network, but I guess that's
that's not a question that's worth asking. So that's interesting. Let me ask
you though. You said that inside your unit you've got three hard drives.
You rotate between them daily. They're offline in between backups. That's that's good.
Does daily work? I mean, you know, do we not have
ransomware scenarios? Whether ransomware goes in there and takes several days to you know,
encrypt the entire drive and you don't really notice it until half your drive
is encrypted. You know? Do you have sort of an older rotation for
like a week old, month old? How does that work? Actually?
From our experience, most of our customers do use daily backups on our device,
but we have also backups every two days or even weekly for those organizations
that not change too much in the to too much data in the computer.
However, we do realize the need of older backup and this is why we
have three drives. We call them Current, Previous, and baseline. Current
and previous are rotata daily as you mentioned, and Baseline is older version most
probably without the virus. It's old enough to not contain the malware, but
updated enough to be relevant and not just the ROW system without the configuration and
all the working systems. So this is the last line of defense. When
you run your boot from the current nothing works Previous maybe the virus is still
there, Baseline will be clean. Of course, we also implement additional security
capabilities to try and detect animalys and detect the virus starting to encrease the drive.
And this is additional direction that we are going to with our product to
help customers not just to have a backup, but also protected backup from more
than just air grap So, Andrew, we're talking here about this this three
drive system with the button that you press. What literally are we looking at?
Like? Can you paint a picture of what his solution is? Short
answer is I didn't ask him physically what it looks like. Is there actually
a button? But my understanding is that it is logically a hard drive and
there are you know, physically three he called them envm's you know, non
volatile memory, so it could be hard drive, could be flash, but
three persistent stores that are part of the unit. And my understanding is that
this hardware unit, you know, I'm guessing, looks box like. It
looks like, you know what you expect a hard drive to look like.
It's sort of a metal box with stuff inside, and you stick it into
the computer as if it were another hard drive. It connects to the computer
using the same kind of connection as your hard drives use. I see,
and so with the three drive system, the short term drives for you know,
drive one drive too, and then the longer term that if I recall,
you update like after a month or so. The function of that being
presumably like if if your first two preferred drives are corrupted, then you go
to the third one, But then that one wouldn't be corrupted because you would
have known about it in the time since, because I know there are a
lot of you know, cyber attacks that occur long before any company knows about
it. Actually, let me ask sort of a question that was left over
in my mind from my previous answer here. When you use one of the
backup drives, my understanding is you reboot the machine, and you know,
during the boot sequence, instead of booting from the regular hard drive that's now
corrupted, you boot from one of the backups. How do you select the
backup I didn't ask that. You know, is there a physical button on
the drive that you have to touch, or you know, on the on
the computer that you touch saying use this drive, use that drive. I
don't know. There's different ways you could do it. But once you've rebooted,
now the question becomes, you know, can I use the version that
I've rebooted from. And my question was sometimes ransomware sort of takes a long
time. If you have six hundred gigabytes of stuff on your computer and most
of it's old, you know, old database, old whatever, you might
not notice that. You know it's taking three days to encrypt and if you
do a backup after a day, you've backed up a bunch of encrypted stuff.
After two days you've backed up mostly encrypted stuff. On the third day
you discovered the problem. You try to restore and you discover that your backups
are you know, one third and two thirds encrypted as well. So you
know you might be able to get function out by back, but your old
data is gone. This is where you would want to go back to your
really old backup. And some attacks to your point, you know the volt
typhoon that we heard about recently, you know, living living off the land
attack, Chinese intelligence agencies breaking into critical infrastructure IT networks. They hang around
from months, you know, up to six months was reported, but they're
not encrypting stuff. And so you know, if you're encrypting stuff, if
it takes a couple of days, you're going to notice eventually because your system
malfunctions. If you've got one of these sort of attacks where the bad guys
are just hanging around, you can in a sense recover most of your functionality
even from an old backup, even if that backup is you know, in
theory compromised. By disconnecting those machines from your I network from the Internet.
Now, the bad guys, you know, they they do this stuff by
remote control, you can get, in my understanding, basic functionality back as
long as the remote access trojan, the rat be it you know, software
or you know, built in cannot be accessed by the bad guys anymore.
So, in my understanding, there really isn't a scenario where ransomware starts encrypting
two months ago and your month old backup is partly gone. Ransomware tends to
work reasonably quickly. I mean, I've heard reports of initial contact to completely
encrypt it in forty five minutes. But even if it takes a couple of
days, your old backup would still be good. That was a long complicated
answer. I hope that makes sense. Yeah, and I take your point.
The only thing that I would ask though, is you're right, so
the encryption is quick. The vault typhoon type actor may stay in your system
for a while, but they're not going to corrupt your backups, except you
know, we're taking some things for granted, and your answer there number one,
that you know where their malware is, that it's there, and so
on and so forth. Couldn't it be that, say, you restore from
your older backup in this case scenario, and there's something planted in there that
you don't necessarily find, and then maybe your systems are offline for some period,
but you're going to take them online and then you have a big problem.
Again. You've got to look at the attack scenarios. I think generally
speaking, the ability to come back with a hard drive image that works is
valuable. And with ransomware, which is sort of the pervasive threat, your
hard drive either works or it doesn't. The point of encrypting the hard drive
is to render the system inoperable so that you will pay the ransom. You
knowing, we're mixing metaphors when we talk about ransomware corrupting the system and vol
typhoon sitting there and hanging around, So you know, to me, what
I what I see here is an innovation in the space of backups and rapid
recovery, and you know, is your rapid recovery a little bit more involved
in press the button and you're done. You know, maybe you also want
to press the button and you know, disable internet connectivity on your firewall or
you know disabled I you know, maybe disconnect your firewall so that you can
run you know, air gapped until the forensic teams are done analyzing what just
happened. You know, I think it's valuable having a recovery image that works,
as opposed to recovery images that are completely encrypted and don't work. You
said, press a button, the the unit reboots from the the offline backup
that was not corrupted. That that all sounds good. What do you do
with the corrupted hard drive? Because you know, I imagine in most INCIDET
response teams, they want to take a forensic image, they want to analyze
it later to figure out who were these people who got in? How did
they get in? You know, is there and eventually you know, presumably
clean up the hard drive so that you can go back to sort of normal
operations instead of booting off the backup. What so, what's what's the bigger
picture? What do you do what you know, once you press the button
in your back, what do you do with that corrupted hard drive? So
very good point, and we have more and more questions in field about this
because forensic part is very important for their sponse team and understand why we were
attacked and how to avoid it in the future. So actually, when when
we boot from our device, we make offline the original corrupted hard drive to
avoid the virus to go to the clean system. Now, and more than
this, you can just remove the hard drive from the computer and keep it
for forensic. Because you boot the system from our external hard drive, you
not really need the original hard drive, and you can just bring a new
one, clean one and recover to that one, keeping the corrupted for forensic,
for investigation or any other reason. But by the way, even if
it's not cyber attack and the hard drive is physically broken, you still can
boot from our drive because we replaced logically broken hard drive. Can we go
a little deeper? Does that actually work? I mean, you inside the
unit, you've got three hard drives you switch, you know the day that
the time comes and you say, okay, I'm switching back to you know,
one of my offline drives. It's online. Now I have to update
that drive to make it current. Do I Is there software on the CPU
that says, oh, here here's your your your image? You know?
Update? Do you go somehow directly to the other drive? How do you
you know when you take your backup? How do you do that? So
the hardware unit is part of the solution, and it's absolutely autonomous with its
own micro processes processor to switch between the drives between The attacker even cannot penetrate
and manipulate the unit to make the backups to the currently online drive. And
it's only one such drive that is online. And every moment we use the
software agent that installed on the computer and using the computer's CPU actually access the
original drive and copy the data in the background to our drive. So we
do use the agent software for this. And this may sounds like a problem
for some of out companies using vendors that not allow installing anything on the computer.
And the we're using here interesting approach of agent less version of our software.
It's still using the CPU the computer, but no, not nothing installed
on the computer not impact the system and not impact the warranty of the vendor
of the computer. To do this, we placed the additional small drive inside
our unit. The software runs from this external drive, so, as I
mentioned, nothing installed in the computer, no traces on the systems system.
We use just the CPU power to make the copy from the destination the original
drive to our external unit. And this successful approach that solves a lot of
problems with the customers that cannot use any other backup systems because they just cannot
stall the agent. When I'm backing up my laptop, I've got a terabyte
drive here. The laptop slows down a little when you know, and and
historically, you know, anti virus was always a problem on industrial systems because
a full scan of the hard drive would pull the whole drive in the memory
and would analyze it all with the anti virus and would slow things down so
badly that the often the control system would malfunction. How do you how do
you throttle this? What what do you do to you know, uh,
control the impact on the control system while you're taking a backup. So the
anti virus issue is that it should scan every moment and every movement in the
in the data of the computer. In our case, we can back up
it when the computer is not using full power so the backup can take ten
minutes, it can take two hours, and it not impacts the quality of
the backup. It not impact the computer as well, So we adapt our
usage of the CPU and DRUM to minimum not to harm the resources of the
computer. And as we know in out the computers and are not the strongest.
So unlike antivirus that, as I mentioned, must be a track every
movement, we can slow down when the computer is a bit loaded and adapt
our process to the out world. You've got product in this arena. You
know, we've we've talked about how it works. I assume you've got a
management system as well, so you can reach out and configure these things and
you know, find out if there's I don't know, problems with with backups
on one machine or another. Whenever there's a problem, you know people want
to know about it because backups are important. Can you talk about about what
you've got? It's the management system is part of our platform, and actually
it's maybe the most useful part on the daily basis when the hardware unit always
connected, not touch it on a daily basis, and the software make copy
on the background, so the user even cannot see the backups it's just done
in the background. So to monitor everything and to make sure everything's working,
we build a web portal that is accessible from the cloud if the users have
access to the cloud or on prem the same system on prem to monitor the
backups and the status. It means all the unit. If it's one,
two dozen or one hundreds of units installed, you see all of them in
one centralized system. What you can see is the health of the backups if
they don't correctly start, stopped, correctly, finished correctly, if something happens
with the hardware unit, with the software. Also if we detected some malicious
activity in the system, we want to stop our backup. In the AUTI
you cannot stop the process, you cannot stop the machine, but we can
stop our backups and keep the clean environment. Once we detect an anomaly,
and here comes the management system that alerts the user by email, by SMS
integration to SOCK to seem to show the user a full status, full image
of what's going on in the in the in the production with the backups.
In addition, I want to mention here a corporation, we are not detection
company, so we are not focusing on detect the virus. But we do
have cooperation with other systems or other vendors that do have detection of anomalies of
malverse and we have cooperation with some of this companies to build a mutual product.
When they detect some malicious activity or some anomaly, they can inform us
and we can stop the backups again to protect them from the attacker, to
not copy the virus, not to copies encrypted data and this way destroys the
backups. So we do everything to make sure you have a recovery point and
fast ability to continue the operations. So Andrew Alex has done a pretty thorough
job of explaining this backup system to us. How does it compare with the
rest of the industry, the other kinds of systems that you've come across in
your time. Well, he talked about, you know, manually taking USBs
around. The systems that I recall seeing most frequently are network based. And
you know that was my question backing up. You know, I was going
to ask a question about backing up across the network and then discovered that,
you know, the question made no sense. He's not backing up across the
network. But if you're backing up across the OT network. You're putting load,
you know, communications load on the network and potentially slowing down important communications.
And so in my experience, most people do if they do backups,
they do it over the network. If throughput is a problem, they will,
you know, in my experience, tend to run a parallel network,
call it an a mid network. This is the network they use for security
updates, you know, after they've been tested at nauseum. This is the
network they use for you know, alerts going to their security monitoring system.
This is the network they use for backups. And in a sense, nobody
cares how heavily loaded that admin network is because the real time communication is happening
on a different network. But you know, to Alex's point, let's say
you want You've got I don't know, a thousand machines in a server room,
and you want if you want them backed up to I don't know,
two or three backup servers. You're going to go from one machine to the
other, and it's going to take you an hour or an hour and a
half to back up you know, a half terabyte of data from each of
these machines. Even if you're going across a fast network, which means if
you ever need to recover and you press a button and say restore, you're
going to go around one machine at a time and restore. Because if you're
going to restore a half gigabyte of data or so I have terabyte of data,
it's going to take you some time. And you know, so you
don't have the you know, press a button reboot now here you go.
That's sort of the the the innovation the benefit here. And as I said,
you know, it's probably worse than that. Like I said, the
data point, the public data point from Colonial and they it was an IT
network, they had all of the IT infrastructure behind him. It still took
them five and a half days to recover. So yeah, you know,
having the ability to do this sort of really quickly, to me has real
benefit when you know you have a large investment in a physical process that you
need to bring back online because it's billions of dollars sitting idle there as long
as it's down. Industrial vendors like you know, Honeywell and Siemens and abb
that, these vendors, you know, Schneider Electric, many of their products
already have the option for let's call it high availability, so that, uh,
you know, no single point of hardware failure will cause the system to
becoming pair. They have, you know, systems that are clustered, They
have multiple hard drives, they have rated hard drives. These are all sort
of standard options. It sounds to me like what you've got here is something
that's a logical standard option on lots of different control systems. You know,
you've got the the Instead of saying I've got a rated hard drive so that
if the hard drive fails, the system just keeps going, what you've got
here is multiple hard drives, not configured in a RAID, but configured in
a backup configuration so that if a hard drive fails you can recover, so
that if you're compromised, you can recover. This sounds like, in a
sense, a standard thing that most control system vendors, you know, looking
at at cybersecurity are are I'm guessing they're going to be interested. Are you
talking to these people? You know? Can you can you talk about about,
you know, sort of how this fits into the big picture of control
systems. Absolutely, we are in contact with all of them or most of
them to integrate our solution as a standard est you mentioned the rate systems and
multiple discs. This is what called the the R disaster recovery and more recovery
from functionality and the physical damage. That is great and we compliment this with
the cyber resilience solutions. So our goal is to come to the customer together
with this vendor and provide full solutions with the HTMI or SCADA machine having the
recovery unit built in. We even started to make pocs with some of these
vendors to integrate the cover unit inside the computer to provide the users the computer
with the cyber recovery capabilities inside. This is more strategic and long processes that
we established, but this is part of our strategy to capture the field of
cyber resilience and provide this solution to the out is something that not yet exists
in in the out world. We've talked about computers, We've talked about HMI.
You know, the dominant operating system, the dominant HMI platform in the
industry is Windows. So you know, I'm assuming that we've been talking about
Windows here. Do you have you know, are you looking at a sort
of the bigger picture? Do you have stuff for I don't know, Linux,
you know, Linux is not so popular today in in ot maybe it
will be in the future, so we do have it in our roadmap,
but not not in our focus. Currently. We support most of the Windows
environments, even started to support the Windows XP. Unfortunately it's very popular and
no protection for this, so we decided to support Windows XP. We support
the Windows seven and ten and eleven and Windows servers. But recently we discovered
that the more and more outhy organizations shifts to EXCI and this kind of gap
today. The reason is working on more virtual systems in the manufacturing floor.
We see more and more systems like this in field, so we included it
in our road map to help our customers. It's not an easy task to
boot the XI and run it immediately, so we're working on this and actually
see first results. I would expect it to have some solution for this in
a couple of months as we see growing need for this environment. Cool.
Well, you know, thank you Alex for joining us. This is be
in trementious. I've learned something you know before we let you go, can
you sum up for us what you know? What should we be thinking about
to be to be looking at the problem of recovery the right way. First
of all, thank you for having me to summarize. I would like to
recommend using air gap technology to protect the data, Involve the old people into
the cyber let them understand the risk and be part of the cyber resilience team
the cyber resilience process, and educate them. Win Salvador have a a vast
experience with the cyber attack recovery and I will be happy to answer any questions
or any requirement. You can reach me by LinkedIn, by our web site,
or by email. We're a very responsive team and we'll be happy to
consult on any resilience question. Andrew looks like that does it for your interview?
Do you have any final thoughts that you might want to take us out
with today. Yeah, I mean, you know, reflecting on the episode,
it occurs to me that this is sort of yet another example of sort
of the the difference between security requirements and call it sort of traditional reliability requirements.
I mean, one of the goals of cybersecurity is to you know,
assure you know, reliable operation, keep critical infrastructures and you know, large
investments producing and you know Alex mentioned earlier Raid drives. You know, raids
are examples of sort of continuous online redundancy. If any one of the drives,
there's smoke rises out of any one of the drives in the raid,
the raid just keeps going. I mean, the user doesn't even notice.
They get an alert saying, hey, you should fix this. One of
your drives failed, but it just keeps going. Security is different with sort
of traditional reliability. You assume sort of random equipment failures. You assume random
failures with security. If you corrupt the raid, you've corrupted the entire raid.
There is nothing left and so you know, this is sort of another
example of where security requirements are different from traditional reliability requirements. You have to
take into account that, you know, the failures induced by a cyber attack
are going to be sort of simultaneous across a large swath of infrastructure, and
you need a different system to recover from those. And here's a system I've
never heard of. You know, here's a system or a lot of the
time, you know, you can reboot and you're often running again, which
is tremendous. So, you know, good job to these folks, And
I hope this becomes a standard feature in a lot of the infrastructure that we
rely on going forward. Well, thank you to alex Yev Tushenko for elucidating
all this for us. And Andrew is always thank you for speaking with me.
It's always a pleasure. Thank you, Nane. This has been the
Industrial Security Podcast from Waterfall. Thanks to everyone out there listening.