Book eleven. These are the properties of the rational soul. It sees itself,
analysis it self, and makes itself, such as it chooses the fruit
which it bears itself enjoys for the fruits of plants, and that in animals,
which corresponds to fruits others enjoy. It obtains its own end wherever the
limit of life may be fixed, not as in a dance and in a
play, and in such like things where the whole action is incomplete, if
anything cuts it short, but in every part, and wherever it may be
stopped, it makes what has been set before it full and complete, so
that it can say, I have what is my own. And further,
it traverses the whole universe and the surrounding vacuum, and surveys its form,
And it extends itself into the infinity of time, and embraces and comprehends the
periodical renovation of all things. And it comprehends that those who come after us
will see nothing new, nor have those before us seen anything more. But
in a manner, he who is forty years old, if he has any
understanding at all, has, by virtue of the uniformity that prevails all things,
which have been and all that will be. This too is a property
of the rational soul, love of one's neighbor, and truth and modesty,
and to value nothing more more than itself, which is also the property of
law. Thus, then right reason differs not at all from the reason of
justice. Thou wilt set little value on pleasing song and dancing in the pancreatium.
If thou wilt distribute the melody of the voice into its several sounds,
and ask thyself as to each, if thou art mastered by this, for
thou wilt be prevented by shame from confessing it. And in the matter of
dancing, if at each movement and attitude thou wilt do the same, and
the like also in the matter of the pancratium. In all things, then,
except virtue and the acts of virtue, remember to apply thyself to there
are several parts, and by this division to come to value them little.
And apply this rule also to thy whole life. What a soul that is
which is ready, if at any moment must be separated from the body,
and ready either to be extinguished or dispersed, or continue to exist. But
so that this readiness comes from a man's own judgment, not from mere obstinacy,
as with the Christians, but considerately and with dignity, and in a
way to persuade another without tragic show. Have I done something for the general
interest? Well, then I have had my reward. Let this always be
present to thy mind, and never stop doing such good? And what is
thy art to be good? And how is this accomplished? Well? Except
by general principles, some about the nature of the universe, and others about
the proper constitution of man. At first, tragedies were brought on the stage
as means of reminding men of the things which happened to them, and that
it is according to nature for things to happen so, and that if you
are delighted with what is shown on the stage, you should not be troubled
with that which takes place on the larger stage. For you see that these
things must be a scomplished thus, and that even they bear them who cry
out O sksthyron. And indeed some things are said well by the dramatic writers,
of which kind is the following, especially me and my children. If
the gods neglect this has its reason too. And again we must not chail
and fret at that which happens, and life's harvest reap like the wheat's fruitful
ear, and other things of the same kind. After tragedy, the old
comedy was introduced, which had a magisterial freedom of speech, and by its
very plainness of speaking, was useful in reminding men to beware of insolence.
And for this purpose too, Diogenes used to take from these writers. But
as to the middle comedy which came next, observe what it was, and
again for what object the new comedy was introduced, which gradually sunk down into
a mere mimic artifice. That some good things are said, even by these
writers, everybody knows. But the whole plan of such poetry and dramaturgy,
to what end does it look? And how plain does it appear? That
there is not another condition of life so well suited for philosophizing as them in
which thou now happenest to be a branch cut off from the adjacent branch,
must of necessity be cut off from the whole tree. Also so to a
man, when he is separated from another man, has fallen off from the
whole social community. Now, as to a branch another cuts it off.
But a man by his own act separates himself from his neighbor when he hates
him and turns away from him, and he does not know that he has
at the same time cut himself off from the whole social system. Yet he
has this privilege, certainly from Zeus, who framed society, for it is
in our power to grow again to that which is near to us, and
be to come a part which helps to make up the whole. However,
if it often happens this kind of separation, it makes it difficult for that
which detaches itself to be brought to unity and to be restored to its former
condition. Finally, the branch, which from the first grew together with the
tree and has continued to have one life with it, is not like that
which, after being cut off, is then in graph. For this is
something like what the gardeners and it mean when they say that it grows with
the rest of the tree, but that it has not the same mind with
it as those who try to stand in thy way. When thou art proceeding
according to right reason, will not be able to turn thee aside from thy
proper action. So neither let them drive THEE from thy benevolent feelings towards them,
But be on thy guard equally in both matters, not only in the
matter of steady judgment and action, but also in the matter of gentleness towards
those who try to hinder or otherwise trouble THEE. For this also is a
weakness to be vexed at them, as well as to be diverted from thy
course of action, and to give way through fear. For both are equally
deserters from their post, the man who does it through fear and the man
who is alienated from him, who is by nature a kinsman and a friend.
There is no nature which is inferior to art, for the arts imitate
the nature of things. But if this is so, so, that nature,
which is the most perfect and the most comprehensive of all natures, cannot
fall short of the skill of art. Now all arts do the inferior things
for the sake of the superior. Therefore the universal nature does so too,
And indeed hence is the origin of justice, and injustice the other virtues have
their foundation. For justice will not be observed if we either care for middle
things, things indifferent, or are easily deceived and careless and changeable. If
the things do not come to THEE, the pursuits and avoidances of which disturb
THEE still in a manner, Thou goest to them. Let then thy judgment
about them be at rest, and they will remain quiet, and thou wilt
not be seen either pursuing or avoiding. The spherical form of the soul maintains
its figure when it is neither extended towards any object, nor contracted inwards,
nor dispersed, nor sinks down, but is illuminated by light by which it
sees them truth, the truth of all things, and the truth that is
in itself. Suppose any man shall despise me, let him look to that
himself. But I will look to this, that I be not discovered doing
or saying anything deserving of contempt. Shall any man hate me, let him
look to it. But I will be mild and benevolent towards every man,
and ready to show even him his mistake, not reproachfully, nor yet as
making a display of my endurance, but nobly and honestly, like the great
Phocion, unless indeed he only assumed it. For the interior parts ought to
be such and a man ought to be seen by the gods, neither dissatisfied
with anything, nor complaining, For what evil is it to thee? If
thou art now doing what is agreeable to thy own nature, and art satisfied
with that which, at this moment is suitable to the nature of the universe,
since thou art a human being placed at thy post in order that what
is for the common advantage may be done. In some way, men spies
one another and flatter one another, and men wish to raise themselves above one
another and crouch before one another. How unsound and insincere is he who says,
I have determined to deal with THEE in a fair way? What art
thou doing? Man? There is no occasion to give this notice. It
will soon show itself by acts. The voice ought to be plainly written on
the forehead, such as a man's character is, and he immediately shows it
in his eyes, just as he who is beloved forthwith reads everything in the
eyes of lovers. The man who is honest and good ought to be exactly
like a man who smells strong, so that the bystander, as soon as
he comes near him, must smell, whether he choose or not. But
the affectation of simplicity is like a crooked stick. Nothing is more disgraceful than
a wolfish friendship, false friendship. Avoid this most of all. The good
and simple and benevolent. Show all these things in the eyes, and there
is no mistaking as to living in the best way. This power is in
the soul. If it be indifferent to things which are indifferent, and it
will be indifferent. And if it looks on each of these things separately and
altogether, and if it remembers that not one of them produces in us an
opinion about itself, nor comes to us. But these things remain immovable.
And it is we ourselves who produce the judgments about them, And as we
may say, write them in ourselves, it being in our power not to
write them, and it being in our power if perchance these judgments have imperceptibly
God admission to our minds to wipe them out. And if we remember also
that such attention will only be for a short time, and then life will
be at an end. Besides, what trouble is there at all in doing
this? For if these things are according to nature, rejoice in them,
and they will be easy to thee. But if contrary to nature, seek
what is conformable to thy own nature, and strive towards this, even if
it bring no reputation. For every man is allowed to seek his own good.
Consider whence each thing has come, and of what it consists, and
into what it changes, and what kind of a thing it will be when
it has changed, and that it will sustain no harm. If any have
offended against thee, consider first what is my relation to men? And that
we are made for one another. And in another respect, I was made
to be set over them, as a ram over the flock, or a
bulve over the herd. But examine the matter from first principles. From this,
if all things are not mere atoms, it is nature which orders all
things. If this is so, the inferior things exist for the sake of
the superior, and these for the sake of one another. Second, consider
what kind of men they are at table, in bed and sew forth,
and particularly under what compulsions, in respective opinions they are, And as to
their acts, consider with what pride they do what they do. Third,
that if men do rightly what they do, we ought not to be displeased.
But if they do not write it is plain that they do so involuntarily
and in ignorance. Where As every soul is unwillingly deprived of the truth,
so also is it unwillingly deprived of the power of behaving to each man according
to his deserts. Accordingly, men are pained when they are called unjust,
ungrateful, and greedy, and in a word, wrongdoers to their neighbors.
Fourth, consider that thou also doest many things wrong, and that thou art
a man like others. And even if thou dost abstain from certain faults,
still thou hast the disposition to commit them, though, either through cowardice or
concern about reputation, or some such mean motive, thou dost abstain from such
faults. Fifth, consider that thou dost not even understand whether men are and
doing wrong or not, For many things are done with a certain reference to
circumstances, And in short, a man must learn a great deal to enable
him to pass a correct judgment on another man's acts. Sixth, consider when
thou art much vexed or grieved, that man is only a moment, and
after a short time we are all laid out dead. Seventh, that it
is not men's acts which disturb us, For those acts have their foundation in
men's ruling principles, But it is our own opinions which disturb us. Take
away these opinions, then, and resolve to dismiss thy judgment about an act
as if it were something grievous, and thy anger is gone. How then,
shall I take away these opinions by reflecting that no wrongful act of another
brings shame on THEE. For unless that which is shameful is alone bad,
thou also, must of necessity do many things wrong and become a robber in
everything else. Eighth, consider how much more pain is brought on us by
the anger and vexation caused by such acts than by the acts themselves at which
we are angry and vexed. Ninth, consider that a good disposition is invincible
if it be genuine and not an affected smile and acting apart. For what
will the most violent man do to THEE if thou continuest to be of a
kind disposition towards him, And if, as opportunity offers, thou gently admonishest
him and calmly correctest his errors at the very time when he is trying to
do THEE harm, saying, not so, my child. We are constituted
by nature for something else. I shall certainly not be injured. But thou
art injuring thyself, my child, and show him with gentle tact and by
general principles, that this is so, and that even bees do not do
as he does, nor any animals which are formed by nature to be gregarious.
And thou must do this, neither with any double meaning, nor in
the way of reproach, but affectionately and without any rancor in thy soul.
And not as if thou wert lecturing him, nor yet that any bystander may
admire, but either when he is alone and if others are present. Remember
these nine rules as if thou hadst received them as a gift from the muses,
and begin at last to be a man while thou livest. But thou
must equally avoid flattering men and being vague at them, for both are unsocial
and lead to harm. And let this truth be present to THEE in the
excitement of anger, that to be moved by passion is not manly, but
that mildness and gentleness, as they are more agreeable to human nature, so
also are they more manly, and he who possesses these qualities possesses strength,
nerves, and courage, and not the man who is subject to fits of
passion and discontent. For in the same degree in which a man's mind is
nearer to freedom from all passion, in the same degree also is it nearer
to strength. And as the sense of pain is a characteristic of weakness,
so also is anger. For he who yields to pain and he who yields
to anger, both are wounded, and both submit. But if thou wilt
receive also a tenth present from the leader of the muses, Apollo. And
it is this that to expect bad men not to do wrong is madness.
For he who expects this desires and impossibility. But to allow men to behave
so to others, and to expect them not to do thee any wrong,
is irrational and tyrannical. There are four principal aberrations of the superior faculty,
against which thou shouldst be constantly on thy guard, And when thou hast detected
them, thou shouldst wipe them out, and say, on each occasion,
thus this thought is not necessary. This tends to destroy social union. This
which thou art going to say comes not from the real thoughts, for thou
shouldst consider it among the most absurd of things for a man not to speak
from his real thoughts. But the fourth is when thou shalt reproach thyself for
anything, For this is an evidence of the diviner part within thee being overpowered
and yielding to the less honorable and to the perishable part the body, and
to its gross pleasures. Thy aerial part, and all the fiery parts which
are mingled in THEE, though by nature they have an upward tendency, still
in obedience to the disposition of the universe, they are overpowered here in the
compound mass the body, and also the whole of the earthy part in THEE.
In the watery, though their tendency is downward, still are raised up
and occupy a position which is not their natural one. In this manner,
then the elemental parts obey the Universal. For when they have been fixed in
any place perforce, they remain there until set again the Universal shall sound the
signal for dissolution. Is it not then strange that thy intelligent part only should
be disobedient and discontented with its own place, And yet no force is imposed
on it, but only those things which are conformable to its nature. Still
it does not submit, but is carried in the opposite direction. For the
movement towards injustice and intemperance, and to anger and grief and fear, is
nothing else than the act of one who deviates from nature. And also when
the ruling faculty is discontented with anything that happens, then too it deserts its
post. For it is constituted for piety and reverence towards the gods, no
less than for justice. For these qualities also are comprehended under the generic term
of contentment with the constitution of things, And indeed they are prior to acts
of justice. He who has not one and always the same object in life
cannot be one and the same all through his life. But what I have
said is not enough unless this also has added what this object ought to be.
For as there it is not the same opinion about all the things which,
in some way or other are considered by the majority to be good,
but only about some certain things, that is, things which concern the common
interest. So also ought we to propose to ourselves an object which shall be
of a common kind, social and political. For he who directs all his
own efforts to this object will make all his acts alike, and thus will
always be the same. Think of the country mouse and of the town mouse,
and of the alarm and trepidation of the town mouse. Socrates used to
call the opinions of the many by the name of lamier bugbears to frightened children.
The Lacedaemonians, at their public spectacles, used to set seats in the
shade for strangers, but themselves sat down anywhere. Socrates excused himself to predict
us for not going to him, saying, it is because I would not
perish by the worst of all ends, that is that I would not receive
a favor and then be unable to return it. In the writings of the
Ephesians there was this precept constantly to think of someone of the men of former
times who practiced virtue. The Pythagoreans bid us in the morning, look to
the heavens, that we may be reminded of those bodies which continually do the
same things and in the same manner perform their work, and also be reminded
of their purity and nudity, For there is no veil over a star of
it. Consider what a man's Socrates was when he dressed himself in a skin,
after Xanthipy had taken his cloak and gone out, And what Socrates said
to his friends, who are ashamed of him and drew back from him when
they saw him dressed. Thus, neither in writing nor in reading wilt thou
be able to lay down rules for others, before thou shalt have first learned
to obey rules thyself. Much more is this so in life a slave thou
art. Free speech is not for thee and my heart laughed within, and
virtue they will curse. Speaking harsh words. To look for the fig in
winter is a madman's act, such as he who looks for his child when
it is no longer allowed. When a man kisses his child, said Epictetus,
he should whisper to himself tomorrow perchance thou wilt die. But those are
words of bad omen. No word is a word of bad omen, said
Epictetes, which expresses any work of nature, Or if it is so,
it is also a word of bad omen. To speak of the ears of
corn being reaped, the unripe grape, the ripe bunch, the dried grape.
All are changes not into nothing, but into something which exists. Not
yet, no man can rob us of our free will. Epictetus also said,
a man must discover in art or rules with respect to giving his assent,
and in respect to his movements, he must be careful that they be
made, with regard to circumstances, that they be consistent with social interests that
they have. Regard to the value of the object, And as to sensual
desire, he should altogether keep away from it, and as to avoidance aversion,
he should not show it with respect to any of the things which are
not in our power. The dispute, then, he said, is not
about any common matter, but about being mad or not. And Socrates used
to say, what do you want? Souls of rational men? Are irrational?
Souls of rational men? Of what rational men sound or unsound sound?
Why then do you not seek for them? Because we have them? Why
then do you fight in quarrel