WEBVTT

1
00:00:33.359 --> 00:00:37.200
Welcome to mid Rats with sal from
Commander Salamander, an Eagle one from Eagles

2
00:00:37.240 --> 00:00:41.960
Speak at Sea or Shore your home
for a discussion of national security issues in

3
00:00:42.039 --> 00:00:47.880
all things maritime. And good day
everybody, and thank you very much for

4
00:00:48.000 --> 00:00:53.119
taking time today to join us for
another edition of mid Rats. And for

5
00:00:53.240 --> 00:00:56.840
those that are with us live,
I always like to put forward the Altar

6
00:00:56.880 --> 00:01:00.640
call. If you are so inclined, you can scroll down to the bottom

7
00:01:00.640 --> 00:01:03.959
of the show page. That's where
if you have some observations you'd like to

8
00:01:04.000 --> 00:01:07.239
make during the course of the show, or if there's a question you would

9
00:01:07.239 --> 00:01:11.719
like for us to direct to our
guest over the course of the next hour,

10
00:01:11.120 --> 00:01:15.879
that's the perfect place to go,
and we'll be monitoring during the course

11
00:01:15.879 --> 00:01:18.840
of the show. It would be
glad to bring in your ideas as we

12
00:01:19.000 --> 00:01:23.799
go forward. And as always,
if you need to step out halfway through

13
00:01:23.840 --> 00:01:26.599
the show and you want to catch
up on what you missed, if you

14
00:01:26.640 --> 00:01:33.400
don't already most people already, do
go ahead and subscribe to the podcast over

15
00:01:33.519 --> 00:01:38.680
on iTunes, Spotify, Spreaker,
whichever aggregator you use, and that way

16
00:01:38.840 --> 00:01:42.000
we'll be ready for you at a
time that better meets with your schedule,

17
00:01:42.640 --> 00:01:46.959
and let's go ahead and roll into
the topic of the day today. We're

18
00:01:46.959 --> 00:01:49.359
going to dive in. We're going
to go back to the People's Republic of

19
00:01:49.439 --> 00:01:56.760
China, and we're going to look
at it from if not a different point

20
00:01:56.799 --> 00:02:00.920
of view, but a broader pixel
point of view. Then some of the

21
00:02:00.959 --> 00:02:06.079
real focus shows that go up we've
been having as of recently, and we

22
00:02:06.560 --> 00:02:08.759
definitely have one guest. We might
have two before the show is done,

23
00:02:09.240 --> 00:02:15.439
once we get our it working.
But the baseline of our show today was

24
00:02:15.520 --> 00:02:20.840
co authored by two of our guests, Jeffrey Meiser from the University of Portland

25
00:02:20.879 --> 00:02:27.520
and Oregon and Renny Babars If I
mispronouncing that my apologies from the John Hopkins

26
00:02:27.599 --> 00:02:34.400
University Geospatial Intelligence Program over on the
winter edition of the Naval War College Review.

27
00:02:34.879 --> 00:02:43.560
They co authored along with a third
individual strategy Uncertainty in the China Challenge

28
00:02:44.039 --> 00:02:46.000
and in the abstract. I just
want to go ahead and state this here

29
00:02:46.000 --> 00:02:49.719
because I think it gives a good
outline of what we were talking about for

30
00:02:49.759 --> 00:02:54.719
the next hour. Quote. Despite
China's increasing aggressiveness, if intentions are indeterminate,

31
00:02:55.000 --> 00:03:00.000
even aligning with you as interests in
some areas. Furthermore, China simple,

32
00:03:00.080 --> 00:03:04.840
we may fail in achieving even as
foremost national and foreign policy goals.

33
00:03:05.199 --> 00:03:08.400
Given this uncertainty, the United States
should not base its foreign policy and strategy

34
00:03:08.759 --> 00:03:15.360
on any specific prediction about Chinese attentions
our abilities. And with that note,

35
00:03:15.599 --> 00:03:19.639
Jeff being we got you on board. You might be going solo today,

36
00:03:19.680 --> 00:03:23.199
but I appreciate your flexibility and welcome
to mid rats. Hey, thanks for

37
00:03:23.240 --> 00:03:28.319
having me to be here. Jeff
say, the kickoff is a kind of

38
00:03:28.319 --> 00:03:30.879
a seam setter. I thought,
I'll give you all the room to run

39
00:03:30.879 --> 00:03:35.039
into, to run around that you
want to. But for the listeners,

40
00:03:35.479 --> 00:03:38.439
they can get the link over at
the show page. They haven't read it

41
00:03:38.479 --> 00:03:42.639
already, they can read it as
we talk and go through it. But

42
00:03:42.800 --> 00:03:46.719
talk a bit about your article.
What's your what's the premise of the article

43
00:03:46.919 --> 00:03:51.240
and what brought you to wanting to
go ahead and get together with your co

44
00:03:51.319 --> 00:03:55.680
authors and put it out there.
Yeah, thank you. So, I

45
00:03:55.759 --> 00:04:01.039
think the being of the idea of
the article was what seemed to be,

46
00:04:01.520 --> 00:04:05.319
I'll put this out there that this
is they were will cause reviews the quarterly

47
00:04:05.360 --> 00:04:10.719
publication, so that the publication cycle
is it's a long term thing. So

48
00:04:11.240 --> 00:04:15.600
we started writing this probably two years
ago, and then over that time revised

49
00:04:15.639 --> 00:04:18.639
it and so on as we got
put the publication. But so the Ibua,

50
00:04:18.879 --> 00:04:26.879
it seemed like there were growing consensus
that um, China was intent on

51
00:04:27.040 --> 00:04:32.519
or is intent on dominating the world, that they will use military power to

52
00:04:32.560 --> 00:04:36.879
do so, that there's even an
imminent military threat from China, you know,

53
00:04:38.120 --> 00:04:41.319
any day kind of thing. UM, it's not. There was a

54
00:04:41.319 --> 00:04:44.279
growing insense that this was just the
way it was and there was no other

55
00:04:44.319 --> 00:04:47.120
real possibilities out there. So UM, taking that point of view, we

56
00:04:47.199 --> 00:04:54.399
thought that that seemed a bit overconfident. And then one one big theme of

57
00:04:54.439 --> 00:04:57.759
the article is not that we're saying
China is going to do this, are

58
00:04:57.759 --> 00:05:00.680
going to do that. It's that
we're saying don't know. And yeah,

59
00:05:00.680 --> 00:05:06.439
because of that uncertainty that should shape
you as foreign policy of strategy towards China.

60
00:05:06.600 --> 00:05:11.120
And so just the idea of let's
let's take a step back and think

61
00:05:11.160 --> 00:05:15.279
about what the uncertainty is bailing in
two big categories. One is that what

62
00:05:15.319 --> 00:05:18.360
does China really intend to do?
And then you have to of course,

63
00:05:18.439 --> 00:05:23.120
on that big into you know,
we're talking about really the Chinese leadership and

64
00:05:23.199 --> 00:05:27.879
what they intend to do, what
they're able to do given the domestic constraints

65
00:05:27.959 --> 00:05:30.399
that are happening in China, and
what they're able to do in terms of

66
00:05:30.519 --> 00:05:34.519
international constraints. What are their capabilities
really to go out and do some of

67
00:05:34.560 --> 00:05:38.959
the things that it seems likely some
people think that they kind of want to

68
00:05:39.000 --> 00:05:44.279
do. So, even if China
is dead set on dominating the world,

69
00:05:44.319 --> 00:05:47.199
what are the chances that that could
actually happen on the And so try to

70
00:05:47.199 --> 00:05:53.199
think in those terms and think about, well, if there is considerable uncertainty

71
00:05:53.279 --> 00:05:56.600
here, how should we then handle
that. That's sort of the impetus for

72
00:05:56.759 --> 00:06:01.959
and sort of like the broad outline
of will coming from. One of the

73
00:06:02.000 --> 00:06:06.480
things I liked about the approach you
took in mentioning the over confidence of the

74
00:06:06.519 --> 00:06:12.680
current view towards China was that you
did touch upon the over confidence in the

75
00:06:12.720 --> 00:06:16.720
past where we were the US and
other countries were pretty well sure that if

76
00:06:17.000 --> 00:06:25.959
if we allowed China to develop and
prosper, that they would they would magically

77
00:06:26.079 --> 00:06:32.240
join the the free nations and the
international world order that existed and that allows

78
00:06:32.279 --> 00:06:39.439
for freedom of the seas, and
commerce and all that somewhere along the line,

79
00:06:39.519 --> 00:06:43.800
and I think you addressed this.
Uh, the Chinese leadership changed and

80
00:06:43.879 --> 00:06:47.000
their view of openness may have shifted
a little bit. That over confidence that

81
00:06:47.079 --> 00:06:51.839
we had for all those years seems
to have affected how the US approaches things.

82
00:06:53.399 --> 00:06:57.920
Uh, was that it is your
article in some ways in response to

83
00:06:58.360 --> 00:07:00.920
that over confidence and making sure we'd
all been too far the other direction and

84
00:07:01.519 --> 00:07:09.879
men for training China as a as
a a sure opponent and all things right.

85
00:07:10.959 --> 00:07:14.839
Yeah, that I think was an
interesting moment. We kind of thought

86
00:07:15.040 --> 00:07:17.759
were trying to think about the past
of our policies towards China, and then

87
00:07:18.319 --> 00:07:23.079
there's it was interesting to go back
and find some of those quotes from far

88
00:07:23.120 --> 00:07:29.199
backs, you know, the seventies
and eighties about how China's definitely it was

89
00:07:29.240 --> 00:07:31.480
really funny it was in the early
eighties, even the late seventies, is

90
00:07:31.480 --> 00:07:35.079
that oh, yeah, China is
liberalizing, it's really going this route.

91
00:07:35.240 --> 00:07:40.439
And yeah, that that really did
affect us too, about how people do

92
00:07:40.480 --> 00:07:44.920
it kind of locked in on a
set of ideas and they just they become

93
00:07:45.040 --> 00:07:49.399
entrenched and you go with it,
and um, it's really important to keep

94
00:07:49.399 --> 00:07:53.519
rethinking that and you know at the
time, especially if you go all the

95
00:07:53.519 --> 00:07:57.759
way back to like Nixon going to
China, there will certainly value in doing

96
00:07:57.800 --> 00:08:01.720
engagement with China, and every decades
since there was always some value in having

97
00:08:01.759 --> 00:08:09.519
that engagement with China, but it
became seemingly an unbalanced policy that people weren't

98
00:08:09.560 --> 00:08:13.720
really questioning anymore, and it became
entrenched. And so we yes, definitely,

99
00:08:13.720 --> 00:08:16.319
we're kind of worried that we're going
to shift from being way too far

100
00:08:16.399 --> 00:08:20.920
on the engagement side to way too
far on the like the hostile threat kind

101
00:08:20.920 --> 00:08:26.040
of side. So yeah, I
think that's an important point. And one

102
00:08:26.040 --> 00:08:33.240
thing that I thought really not really
unique but we don't see enough of is

103
00:08:35.080 --> 00:08:37.080
over the aterviews. On the podcast, we've had various guests on to talk

104
00:08:37.120 --> 00:08:41.279
about Russia and China, and one
thing that Mark and I will bring up

105
00:08:41.279 --> 00:08:50.759
on a regular basis is be careful
of projection because the Chinese and the Russians,

106
00:08:50.480 --> 00:08:54.240
it's not that they don't think differently
than we do, but they have

107
00:08:54.360 --> 00:08:58.559
different cultural contexts in addition to having
a different history than we are. The

108
00:09:00.240 --> 00:09:07.200
people that were usually used to working
with the French, the British, the

109
00:09:07.279 --> 00:09:11.080
Italians, the Germans are trying to
be opponents against the Russians, who are

110
00:09:09.759 --> 00:09:16.679
their own little thing. That China
has not only their own distinct and very

111
00:09:16.720 --> 00:09:22.919
long history, but also they have
some philosophical underpinnings on how they see themselves

112
00:09:24.200 --> 00:09:28.279
in their world and how to react
to it. That isn't a significant part

113
00:09:28.639 --> 00:09:35.360
of the intellectuals to here, for
instance, Confucianism and Taoism. Talk for

114
00:09:35.360 --> 00:09:43.080
a little bit about about how why
y'all wanted to bring in these deeper philosophical

115
00:09:43.240 --> 00:09:50.000
and ethical underpinnings of how China views
themselves in their relationship to other nations around

116
00:09:50.039 --> 00:09:56.279
them. Yeah, this would be
a great part for any to jump in,

117
00:09:56.399 --> 00:10:01.759
but I can. I can handle
it this degree with the knowledge that

118
00:10:01.799 --> 00:10:05.720
this is He's the real deep China
expert and studied China for a long time.

119
00:10:07.399 --> 00:10:11.440
But the way so approach. The
article was influenced a lot by a

120
00:10:11.519 --> 00:10:16.440
book I published in twenty fifteen,
I Think, and it was about the

121
00:10:16.559 --> 00:10:20.200
rise of the United States and the
United States is a rise in power,

122
00:10:20.399 --> 00:10:26.120
looking basically from the eighteen nineties up
to World War Two, and so getting

123
00:10:26.120 --> 00:10:33.480
into some depth about how the US
did it and all the cultural and institutional

124
00:10:33.679 --> 00:10:39.039
factors that were going on in shaping
and driving US grant strategy during that time

125
00:10:39.080 --> 00:10:43.919
period really shaped how I view other
countries. And so when I try and

126
00:10:43.960 --> 00:10:48.000
think about, yeah, like Russia
or China or any of these other countries,

127
00:10:48.039 --> 00:10:50.120
what they're what they might do or
not, I always think in terms

128
00:10:50.120 --> 00:10:56.399
of, well, what are the
what's the domestic cultural and institutional context in

129
00:10:56.440 --> 00:11:01.840
which they're working, and that's going
to shape listkin Lee, what what options

130
00:11:01.840 --> 00:11:03.879
are available, what policy options are
even available for them to pursue. So,

131
00:11:05.360 --> 00:11:07.879
you know, going back looking at
the US during that time period,

132
00:11:07.879 --> 00:11:15.440
there was you had people like m
McKinley, Taff Roosevelt who are on the

133
00:11:15.480 --> 00:11:18.960
expansionist side of the equation, and
then you had a whole large set of

134
00:11:20.000 --> 00:11:22.960
a very powerful anti imperialist at that
time. And so the way in the

135
00:11:24.039 --> 00:11:26.519
US it works out is that there's
the Senate, and the Senate can block

136
00:11:26.639 --> 00:11:31.679
treatise, especially back then when presidents
actually submitted treaties that were treaties to the

137
00:11:31.720 --> 00:11:37.679
Senate as they should. So there's
very interesting cultural institutional characteristics of the United

138
00:11:37.720 --> 00:11:41.720
States. So then I'm not saying
that that the China is like the United

139
00:11:41.720 --> 00:11:46.759
States. But I think every country
does have some kind of cultural institutional context

140
00:11:46.799 --> 00:11:52.720
to really fundamentally shapes years can do
or not. Go back to the US

141
00:11:52.720 --> 00:11:58.000
real quickly, there is that it
seems that you know, you are Roosevelt

142
00:11:58.039 --> 00:12:01.679
and his especially early in his administration, like he really thought that imperialism was

143
00:12:01.720 --> 00:12:05.039
the way to go. He's been
advocating that for a while before being president,

144
00:12:05.759 --> 00:12:09.240
but he found There's even quotes him
saying like gosh, I wish the

145
00:12:09.320 --> 00:12:13.200
United States was a country that could
be imperialist, because I think it could

146
00:12:13.240 --> 00:12:16.799
be great imperialist. But where a
structure, a system is structure, we

147
00:12:16.840 --> 00:12:20.120
just can't do it. This is
him in response to trying to strengthen the

148
00:12:20.240 --> 00:12:24.480
US position the Philippines and so on. So I think looking at the China,

149
00:12:26.000 --> 00:12:31.559
part of the China context is that
they certainly don't have a system of

150
00:12:31.639 --> 00:12:35.919
checks and balance like the United States. It's a vastly different system. But

151
00:12:35.000 --> 00:12:45.159
they certainly do have important cultural characteristics
there that can combine in various different ways.

152
00:12:45.200 --> 00:12:52.320
So you have contutionism, Taoism,
you have more recent concepts from now

153
00:12:52.480 --> 00:12:54.519
and even now. I think she
jing Ping, I mean one way it

154
00:12:54.559 --> 00:13:01.120
looked this is why Jing really trying
to push this id ideological line hijin king

155
00:13:01.240 --> 00:13:05.080
thought and so on, is that
he's plausibly trying to create new space for

156
00:13:05.159 --> 00:13:11.600
him to be able to act within
in terms of this cultural ideological malou in

157
00:13:11.720 --> 00:13:16.000
China and to kind of push China
in a certain direction ideologically and culturally,

158
00:13:16.039 --> 00:13:18.759
you know, So I think that
it's important. I don't think, you

159
00:13:18.799 --> 00:13:22.399
know, we use the term strategic
culture in the paper Elsie's in my book,

160
00:13:24.000 --> 00:13:28.200
and some people seem to use that
as being like, oh, therategic

161
00:13:28.240 --> 00:13:33.200
culture always points in one direction and
countries are a certain way in terms of

162
00:13:33.279 --> 00:13:37.000
their identity and culture and they're definitely
gonna behave in this way. I think

163
00:13:37.000 --> 00:13:43.320
that's that's tortually inaccurate, because every
country has, you know, different subcultures

164
00:13:43.679 --> 00:13:48.600
within it that then push sometimes in
different directions. So like in US history,

165
00:13:48.639 --> 00:13:54.519
there's definitely been a very strong expansionist
line. The US expanded across the

166
00:13:54.519 --> 00:14:00.720
whole continent. So expansionism is definitely
part of the US culture in history.

167
00:14:00.759 --> 00:14:03.399
But then when the US shifted to
the or are we going to actually be

168
00:14:03.759 --> 00:14:09.559
a colonial power and governed people who
don't want to be governed? Bias that

169
00:14:09.600 --> 00:14:16.799
really came into conflict with anti imperialism
rooted in the American culture of classical liberalism

170
00:14:16.799 --> 00:14:22.039
and republicanism, and so there's always
going to be sort of attention within the

171
00:14:22.120 --> 00:14:24.639
culture. So this is something that
she's been paying in the CCP has to

172
00:14:24.679 --> 00:14:31.720
deal with. Is that is China
a harmonious country, a harmonious and peaceful

173
00:14:31.759 --> 00:14:37.360
country that really just wants harmonies to
the world. That's sort of one element

174
00:14:37.360 --> 00:14:43.240
of Chinese culture or in terms of
even about like the Chinese the Chinese dream

175
00:14:43.360 --> 00:14:46.320
is trying need to go out and
struggle and achieve and things like that.

176
00:14:46.440 --> 00:14:50.240
So there are always these elements that
are you know, pushing against each other,

177
00:14:50.799 --> 00:14:54.320
and so that to us is one
element of the uncertainty. And you'll

178
00:14:54.320 --> 00:14:58.159
take someone like you know, John
Merscheimer will be like, oh, no,

179
00:14:58.759 --> 00:15:03.120
China is the this hardcore culture of
offensive realists essentially, and they're going

180
00:15:03.200 --> 00:15:07.039
to go for it. That's just
simply not true if you look at the

181
00:15:07.080 --> 00:15:11.399
history of Chinese cultural good and ideology
and so on. So really you just

182
00:15:11.440 --> 00:15:15.879
wanted to bring to light. You
know, we're not saying China is a

183
00:15:15.879 --> 00:15:18.879
is a pacifist. You know,
confusion is sort of country. We're saying

184
00:15:18.919 --> 00:15:24.279
there's that element there, and we're
saying as the other elements too that are

185
00:15:24.279 --> 00:15:26.000
more aggressive, but you have to
kind of balance those, you know,

186
00:15:26.039 --> 00:15:31.679
when you think about what China may
or may not do. Yeah. I

187
00:15:33.080 --> 00:15:37.519
again, one of the things that
you know, if you've studied the history

188
00:15:37.519 --> 00:15:41.200
of China, they seem to be
for several thousand years. They've got a

189
00:15:41.240 --> 00:15:48.679
culture that far out out much older
than the US history which was created.

190
00:15:48.799 --> 00:15:52.200
So you know, they've got the
weight of all that history. And one

191
00:15:52.240 --> 00:15:54.799
of the things they seem to always
go back to is seeking stability, some

192
00:15:54.919 --> 00:16:00.279
kind of some kind of um as
you say, harmony. And you know,

193
00:16:02.000 --> 00:16:03.759
I think one of the things you
said in here was that they didn't

194
00:16:03.759 --> 00:16:11.519
really like the chaotic excesses of Western
right rights based liberal democracy. And I

195
00:16:11.559 --> 00:16:14.240
thought, well, that's that's you
know, that makes some sense. Chaos

196
00:16:14.320 --> 00:16:18.000
is bad if you're Chinese. They
worry about that, um And one of

197
00:16:18.039 --> 00:16:23.440
the one of the issues is in
seeking harmony and they and this goes back

198
00:16:23.480 --> 00:16:27.919
kind of the Middle Kingdom when everybody
was was going to pay a tribute to

199
00:16:27.960 --> 00:16:36.600
the Chinese emperor and and fall along
the Chinese way. Um is it?

200
00:16:37.000 --> 00:16:38.480
I mean, this is one of
the many questions I guess that you have

201
00:16:38.519 --> 00:16:41.399
to address. Is it. One
of the ways they seek to do this

202
00:16:41.519 --> 00:16:48.120
is by imposing either either by probably
not by force, but just being so

203
00:16:48.200 --> 00:16:52.679
big, so vast, and so
demanding the way they've taken over like the

204
00:16:52.720 --> 00:16:56.120
South China Sea, imposing this harmony
on their on their neighbors, and seeking

205
00:16:56.120 --> 00:17:03.200
to impose that same rule which is
of contrary, directly contrary to the to

206
00:17:03.320 --> 00:17:07.640
the current international order that the US
and the MR Allies tend to support.

207
00:17:11.039 --> 00:17:15.400
Yeah, certainly, I think that. And that's one of the interesting and

208
00:17:15.440 --> 00:17:22.119
intriguing and really difficult things about kind
of understanding this, this this background of

209
00:17:22.160 --> 00:17:25.240
ideas and culture is so well,
what does it mean to be harmonious?

210
00:17:25.240 --> 00:17:26.920
Which I think is exactly the point
you know you're getting at, And it

211
00:17:26.960 --> 00:17:33.519
can be defined in different ways,
and I think some dead China seems to

212
00:17:33.559 --> 00:17:36.799
be saying through some of the diplomacy
and actions as that, well, it's

213
00:17:36.839 --> 00:17:40.440
harmonious as long as you do what
we say, and that's not what a

214
00:17:40.480 --> 00:17:45.759
lot of other countries would view as
being harmonious, or in terms of thinking

215
00:17:45.759 --> 00:17:48.680
that harmonious are going to have some
justice element there like we wouldn't we wouldn't

216
00:17:48.680 --> 00:17:53.480
want to follow that, right,
So so I think that that's probably where

217
00:17:53.559 --> 00:17:57.279
China would like to be in terms
of this position of saying, yes,

218
00:17:57.319 --> 00:18:02.440
it's going to be harmonious as long
as you you submit, you pay fealty

219
00:18:02.519 --> 00:18:04.799
to China, and then we're going
to be cool with you. You're going

220
00:18:04.839 --> 00:18:07.559
to be cool with us, and
everything will be fine. We're not going

221
00:18:07.640 --> 00:18:11.720
to impose our will unnecessarily, though, we want you to accept that we

222
00:18:11.759 --> 00:18:15.880
are. You're the big player here
and you have to be subservient to us

223
00:18:15.920 --> 00:18:18.599
the same degree, which there's there's
a history of that too in terms of

224
00:18:18.960 --> 00:18:25.000
Chinese system, right. So I
think that's probably one of the areas where

225
00:18:25.440 --> 00:18:27.759
you know, China in the US
and other countries sort of talk past each

226
00:18:27.759 --> 00:18:32.839
other a bit in terms of China
saying well, we want harmony and everybody

227
00:18:32.920 --> 00:18:36.640
saying oh yeah, okay, harmony, but China meaning something probably different by

228
00:18:36.640 --> 00:18:41.039
it than other countries perhaps. And
I think one maybe intriguing example here is

229
00:18:41.079 --> 00:18:48.519
the Philippines under Duterte, and it
seemed like Duterte wanted to engage and have

230
00:18:48.680 --> 00:18:52.599
a friendship with China. Friendly relationship, but that was kind of hard to

231
00:18:52.640 --> 00:18:57.319
do in China kept you know,
infringing upon you know, Philippine sovereignty over

232
00:18:57.359 --> 00:19:00.200
and over again. It didn't really
work out. And so I think that

233
00:19:00.319 --> 00:19:03.359
the chimes of perspective is like,
yeah, we'll be friends, you have

234
00:19:03.440 --> 00:19:07.440
to follow our line. It can't
be friends in terms of being equals.

235
00:19:07.440 --> 00:19:10.440
You know, you have to be
you have to know your place essentially,

236
00:19:10.559 --> 00:19:12.799
which, of course, and then
to a certain extent, if China is

237
00:19:12.839 --> 00:19:18.119
able to effectively pursue that line,
that's probably the most dangerous sort of line

238
00:19:18.119 --> 00:19:22.359
in terms of US interests is that
is that China, through it's sort of

239
00:19:22.440 --> 00:19:26.839
force of grabua most just sort of
pulls everybody in East Asia in as part

240
00:19:26.920 --> 00:19:32.839
of the Chinese sphere, and then
and US loses allies and this is where

241
00:19:32.880 --> 00:19:40.079
we go down and there probably a
pretty negative route. In your article you

242
00:19:40.160 --> 00:19:45.240
also outline by their leaders basically three
periods. You had the Mao era,

243
00:19:45.480 --> 00:19:52.960
the Dang Xiang and who era and
now the President Shi era and in the

244
00:19:53.000 --> 00:19:59.400
president President shi era where we're talking
about, uh, you know, cooperation

245
00:19:59.759 --> 00:20:06.920
and harmony and this seems to have
mitigated a little bit, but not as

246
00:20:07.000 --> 00:20:10.000
much. People on who you look
at but there seems to be a different

247
00:20:10.039 --> 00:20:12.839
strain going on in the background.
I don't know whether it's a competing strain

248
00:20:14.039 --> 00:20:18.839
or this is getting a little bit
of a visual of the iron fifth underneath

249
00:20:18.839 --> 00:20:25.640
the velvet glove. But you had
the I guess it became really popular to

250
00:20:25.680 --> 00:20:30.680
say, about three or four years
ago, the Wolf Warrior diplomacy, after

251
00:20:30.759 --> 00:20:37.240
that silly movie they had. But
it almost seems as if after this manifestation

252
00:20:37.279 --> 00:20:41.319
and perhaps overreach on their part,
especially with the reaction Australia had to it

253
00:20:41.400 --> 00:20:45.480
in other nations, that's kind of
gone back into the background. Is that

254
00:20:45.559 --> 00:20:51.599
part of a manifestation of what your
response was to the previous question, or

255
00:20:51.640 --> 00:20:56.839
is this one of these competing schools
inside the People's Republic of China as they

256
00:20:56.880 --> 00:21:03.680
try to position themselves in a larger
role on the global stage. Yeah,

257
00:21:03.720 --> 00:21:15.880
that's interesting. I think that it's
probably some of both, in that there's

258
00:21:15.920 --> 00:21:22.039
there's there needs to be some some
degree of disagreement within China about you know,

259
00:21:22.079 --> 00:21:26.240
as China continue to grow and rise, like how does China get the

260
00:21:26.359 --> 00:21:32.160
status and prestige and other sort of
more material goods that it deserves as as

261
00:21:32.160 --> 00:21:33.240
a great power, as a supral
power, how do you want to call

262
00:21:33.279 --> 00:21:38.480
it? So I think that there's
still and we try to sort of at

263
00:21:38.519 --> 00:21:42.440
least hint it. This a bit
in the article that there are the peaceful

264
00:21:42.559 --> 00:21:52.039
rise is part of the Chinese thinking
is still be there and it's it does

265
00:21:52.079 --> 00:21:56.880
seem to have a bit of a
harder edge, and that's definitely developed over

266
00:21:56.920 --> 00:22:00.079
the past few years. And the
question is, yeah, is there sort

267
00:22:00.119 --> 00:22:08.599
of really clear competing ideas within the
Chinese leadership about this or is it more

268
00:22:08.640 --> 00:22:12.240
like you know the other' phrasing,
it's for me like you know, hide

269
00:22:12.279 --> 00:22:15.480
and bide your time kind of thing, or is it just like, oh

270
00:22:15.519 --> 00:22:19.279
so, how long do we sort
of keep it soft until we get much

271
00:22:19.279 --> 00:22:22.559
harder? You know? So is
it that there's agreement and that we're just

272
00:22:22.680 --> 00:22:26.599
hiding our you know, biding our
time until the right moment, and like

273
00:22:26.599 --> 00:22:30.599
when is the right moment? There
maybe disagreement there, but they also maybe

274
00:22:30.599 --> 00:22:33.119
a real disagreement about hey, what
is what's actually the best approach? Is

275
00:22:33.160 --> 00:22:37.880
it kind of a softer line where
that we're trying to prove that it's it

276
00:22:37.960 --> 00:22:42.240
can provide good more leadership for the
world, and therefore the essentially soft power,

277
00:22:42.319 --> 00:22:45.759
they will attract other countries to it
and to its point of view,

278
00:22:45.759 --> 00:22:52.160
into its position, and so so
I think there's there's both plausible options there

279
00:22:52.160 --> 00:22:57.839
and it's it's not really obvious to
me. I think that there's what's going

280
00:22:57.839 --> 00:23:03.240
on within the CCP within like the
Poor Beer and so on and Standing Committee

281
00:23:03.240 --> 00:23:07.480
and all that. It's she's told
be a bit opaque. And I'm definitely

282
00:23:07.519 --> 00:23:11.079
not a China expert at number one, but as an observer in someone who

283
00:23:11.079 --> 00:23:15.839
consumes a lot of analysis about China, it seems could be quite opaque about

284
00:23:15.839 --> 00:23:18.519
how that's really, how that's really
run and what the different sort of trends

285
00:23:18.519 --> 00:23:22.160
are within China. I think what
one thing that interested in the law was

286
00:23:22.200 --> 00:23:27.640
the end of the zero COVID policy. And there's a moment where it was

287
00:23:27.720 --> 00:23:32.000
that there was a growing protests.
He didn't know it's going to be like

288
00:23:32.000 --> 00:23:37.839
a replay of Kinnemen where there's a
massive, like harsh crackdown, or was

289
00:23:37.880 --> 00:23:41.279
the leadership going to kind of ease
off and they did ease off. And

290
00:23:41.359 --> 00:23:47.000
even though it seemed like she Jinking
had really one percent put his name behind

291
00:23:47.039 --> 00:23:49.880
the zero COVID policy, is that
this is about you know, they were

292
00:23:49.880 --> 00:23:52.319
going to win and Jan King is
going to win against COVID, There'll be

293
00:23:52.319 --> 00:23:56.400
no COVID cases, you know,
and then almost with a snap of the

294
00:23:56.440 --> 00:24:00.559
finger, it's like, oh no, never mind. You know, policies

295
00:24:00.680 --> 00:24:06.319
totally changed. Even now as authoritarian
countries like to do, they're sort of

296
00:24:06.319 --> 00:24:08.519
rewriting the past and saying, oh
no, we didn't really ever have a

297
00:24:08.960 --> 00:24:15.359
zero COVID policy. So so there's
something very interesting going on within within the

298
00:24:15.519 --> 00:24:18.720
Chinese leadership where it's not it doesn't
seem to be exactly that Hijin Pink says,

299
00:24:18.799 --> 00:24:22.319
yes, this is what happens,
is what we're going to do,

300
00:24:22.759 --> 00:24:26.519
and the story there seems to be
some degree of you know, pushback probably

301
00:24:26.599 --> 00:24:30.759
isn't exactly the right word, but
some debates that go on and there is

302
00:24:33.680 --> 00:24:37.519
some changing of policies that do happen. And so I think that's interesting to

303
00:24:37.559 --> 00:24:44.720
watch in terms of how things do
work domestically within China and give us about

304
00:24:44.759 --> 00:24:49.440
about again a premisicant uncertainty about well, like has China even decided what it

305
00:24:49.480 --> 00:24:52.720
wants to do? You know,
there's there's some authors will say, well,

306
00:24:52.880 --> 00:24:56.839
China has one hundred degrees one hundred
year plan to conquer the world,

307
00:24:57.680 --> 00:25:03.599
and I just we're not observed about
how governments work. They just don't work

308
00:25:03.640 --> 00:25:07.880
that way China or anyone else.
It is not possible. So I think

309
00:25:07.880 --> 00:25:11.759
that there's consider I'm talking about what
you know, whether it's China even knows

310
00:25:11.759 --> 00:25:15.240
what it's what it's really shooting for
in all these areas. So I think

311
00:25:15.279 --> 00:25:18.039
that there's there's a lot going on
there and a lot that we can't really

312
00:25:18.039 --> 00:25:26.240
observe very easily. Yeah, I
used to play around with decision free analysis

313
00:25:26.240 --> 00:25:29.880
and one of the you know,
when you're talking about uncertainties of outcome and

314
00:25:29.920 --> 00:25:33.640
what the probabilities are of certain things. The only things that seemed to stand

315
00:25:33.640 --> 00:25:37.839
out with China is that they've been
consistent about since nineteen forty nine of trying

316
00:25:37.880 --> 00:25:49.119
to bring Taiwan back as a state
in the Chinese in the Chinese name,

317
00:25:49.319 --> 00:25:53.400
I mean make it. They don't
recognize it as an independent nation, and

318
00:25:55.039 --> 00:26:00.400
um that they want to get over
now, I mean last the hud years

319
00:26:00.559 --> 00:26:06.279
of humiliation from that date back to
the the Opium Wars, so you know,

320
00:26:07.000 --> 00:26:10.519
and and if you base that,
then I think you all talk about

321
00:26:10.920 --> 00:26:19.960
the the BRI the UH program for
the Belt Belt Road initiative, and and

322
00:26:21.119 --> 00:26:25.359
they're they're an increasing number of nuclear
weapons. Kind of talk about how those

323
00:26:25.359 --> 00:26:29.240
things kind of play together, if
if if if what I've asked to make

324
00:26:29.319 --> 00:26:37.000
any sense at all? Yeah,
Um, so yes, I think that

325
00:26:37.279 --> 00:26:40.559
what we're trying to do is those
are kind of our two caseities there about

326
00:26:41.079 --> 00:26:45.799
looking at here two you know,
big picture national initiative, national international initiatives.

327
00:26:47.440 --> 00:26:51.400
The China's pushing them and pushing for
a while now, and they're they're

328
00:26:51.440 --> 00:26:53.559
investing a lot of resources, like
a lot of resources, right, and

329
00:26:53.599 --> 00:26:59.160
so um, a lot of people
look at let's take the Belt Road induitiative,

330
00:27:00.039 --> 00:27:03.599
and it's sometimes portrayed as wild.
This is, you know, China

331
00:27:03.720 --> 00:27:10.599
going out economically sort of like economic
to politics. They're projecting power through economic

332
00:27:10.720 --> 00:27:15.880
might and so on, and they're
gonna be pulling all these countries into its

333
00:27:15.960 --> 00:27:19.359
orbit in Central Asia and then the
least even sort of flirting mission stuff in

334
00:27:19.400 --> 00:27:25.079
Europe um, South Southeast Asia obviously, and so with all this, they're

335
00:27:25.119 --> 00:27:29.039
just going to really you know being
capture, capture all these these areas you

336
00:27:29.079 --> 00:27:33.799
know to some degree, right,
and so part of what we're trying to

337
00:27:33.359 --> 00:27:37.880
stay there. And this is actually
since we first wrote there, you know,

338
00:27:37.920 --> 00:27:40.839
this is one of the things they're
Renny walks on a lot. And

339
00:27:40.839 --> 00:27:47.000
and since this is written, is
that I've even gotten more awkward. I

340
00:27:47.000 --> 00:27:49.839
guess we're trying. I would saying
that there was there was stories coming out.

341
00:27:49.880 --> 00:27:53.119
I think these last week where all
these countries are gonna have to they're

342
00:27:53.119 --> 00:27:56.799
gonna have to be full closed upon. All these projects don't make money,

343
00:27:56.119 --> 00:28:02.039
they're not effective, they're breaking down, and they're supposed to these big infrastructure

344
00:28:02.119 --> 00:28:04.720
projects that would tie these countries to
China, but it's simply not working very

345
00:28:04.720 --> 00:28:10.400
well. And people who are you
know, on this sort of um or

346
00:28:10.440 --> 00:28:12.079
like libertarian side of things, would
be like, of course, you know,

347
00:28:12.079 --> 00:28:15.960
a huge, massive government projects,
they are often big flaws with them,

348
00:28:17.039 --> 00:28:21.759
right, And so when you also
look at countries like China and the

349
00:28:22.119 --> 00:28:26.039
you know these countries they're dealing with
here that are highly corrupt, you know,

350
00:28:26.160 --> 00:28:30.880
money that should go to making these
projects be super effective and wonderful for

351
00:28:30.920 --> 00:28:36.640
everybody, they're being siphoned off by
all all sides. Right, So so

352
00:28:36.720 --> 00:28:40.599
it's it's it's simply not working out. They don't have the capabilities to make

353
00:28:40.720 --> 00:28:45.920
these huge initiatives work out very well. And and people are of course noticing

354
00:28:45.960 --> 00:28:48.720
this now in other countries are seeing
that, well, China is not the

355
00:28:48.759 --> 00:28:52.920
savior, you know, that it's
not going to help our countries develop.

356
00:28:52.000 --> 00:28:56.480
You know, it's just not working
right. So I'm China making big efforts

357
00:28:56.519 --> 00:29:00.960
to kind of you know, so
it's weight around and get get more influencings

358
00:29:00.000 --> 00:29:04.400
to be not working out exactly how
China wanted it too. On the on

359
00:29:04.519 --> 00:29:12.720
the area of nucular weapons, which
the Renty's through his geospatial and intelligence work,

360
00:29:12.880 --> 00:29:17.880
he's you know, he's seen a
lot of satellite pictures of the stuff

361
00:29:17.880 --> 00:29:21.799
that China's been doing the particular weapons
program, and they're doing a lot.

362
00:29:21.960 --> 00:29:26.160
They are, they are doing a
lot to modernize their program. And but

363
00:29:26.240 --> 00:29:30.720
the question in is for a long
time they're the guiding policy was minimal deterrence.

364
00:29:32.319 --> 00:29:34.839
Essentially, the idea that well,
if we have you know, a

365
00:29:34.839 --> 00:29:40.279
couple hundred nukes and that's good enough
because we can probably get one through.

366
00:29:40.319 --> 00:29:42.319
If you can get one through to
get a major city, that's enough de

367
00:29:42.400 --> 00:29:45.599
terrence for us. We're not going
to worry that much about it. Beyond

368
00:29:45.640 --> 00:29:52.160
that um but that's not generally the
projet superpower would take. So we had

369
00:29:52.839 --> 00:29:56.319
the US and a Silvil union in
their long term competition during the Cold War,

370
00:29:56.960 --> 00:30:04.519
while that was express through competition over
creating better and more and biggers for

371
00:30:04.599 --> 00:30:11.200
their weapons. So China unsurprisingly probably
is following a similar line there where they

372
00:30:11.240 --> 00:30:15.240
want to maybe get closer to parody
with the US. But then again,

373
00:30:15.359 --> 00:30:19.759
is that a threat whereby China wants
to use a stronger nucular shield to be

374
00:30:19.799 --> 00:30:25.279
able to then do more stuff conventionally, and then maybe it feels like if

375
00:30:25.319 --> 00:30:29.519
it has a stronger nuclear deterrent than
they can do something more against Taiwan or

376
00:30:29.559 --> 00:30:34.000
other places and shield itself in that
way, These nuclear threats sort of coercive

377
00:30:34.279 --> 00:30:40.079
power, you know. Or is
it simply that China is tired of being

378
00:30:40.240 --> 00:30:45.240
so weak compared to the US and
it's this nucular weapons program. So even

379
00:30:45.960 --> 00:30:52.519
if you see a significant modernization increase
the nucular weapons of China, you still

380
00:30:52.519 --> 00:30:56.000
don't really have much to say about
their goals. We don't know what their

381
00:30:56.000 --> 00:31:00.079
goals are, what their intent is
with that, and that a lot of

382
00:31:00.079 --> 00:31:03.599
times I always looked like like to
think about, well, what if you

383
00:31:03.599 --> 00:31:07.359
know, the US was in China's
position vice versa. You know, would

384
00:31:07.400 --> 00:31:11.599
we want to sit here and have
a nuclear nuclear weapons program, you know

385
00:31:11.640 --> 00:31:15.799
whatever, Cora the size of China, you'd be happy with that. We

386
00:31:15.880 --> 00:31:21.200
probably wouldn't. So China probably isn't
even happy with that either. Now what

387
00:31:21.400 --> 00:31:25.359
exactly they intend to do with it? More powerful me to go weapon program

388
00:31:25.720 --> 00:31:32.599
that that we don't know. I
had to kind of grin when you were

389
00:31:32.599 --> 00:31:37.119
talking about how things with the Belton
Road and initiative or quote not working out.

390
00:31:37.759 --> 00:31:45.480
I think probably an area of agreement
US and Chinese counterparts and the planning

391
00:31:45.559 --> 00:31:49.880
parts in their state departments is talking
about the lessons you learn from trying to

392
00:31:49.920 --> 00:31:56.960
project your cultures onto others. Just
like we couldn't quite make Afghans, Iraqis

393
00:31:57.000 --> 00:32:00.359
and Nicaraguans into America, And it
looks like they're having a little bit of

394
00:32:00.359 --> 00:32:08.359
trouble getting Cambodians, Tree Lankans and
Zimbabweans to align with the Daoism and Confucious

395
00:32:08.440 --> 00:32:14.440
views of the world. But I
guess all expanding powers have to learn that

396
00:32:14.519 --> 00:32:22.240
lesson one way or another. In
the article, you outline some challenges in

397
00:32:22.279 --> 00:32:28.039
addition to the unknown challenges, you
had war fighting challenge, influenced challenge,

398
00:32:28.279 --> 00:32:36.240
and economics challenge. And I was
as curious as far as the PRC's ability

399
00:32:36.359 --> 00:32:40.000
that they're growing, how would you
rank those against each other? And on

400
00:32:40.039 --> 00:32:45.640
the other side of the coin,
where do you think the US and her

401
00:32:45.680 --> 00:32:52.759
friends and allies are best position to
counter? Yeah, that's a tough question.

402
00:32:53.279 --> 00:32:59.400
I think that. To me,
the I like to put this up

403
00:32:59.400 --> 00:33:04.359
on Twitter pretty frequently is that,
um, the China seems to be pretty

404
00:33:04.359 --> 00:33:07.720
bad at solf power and so on
the influence side, you know, even

405
00:33:07.799 --> 00:33:15.079
when they're trying to really do a
materially based, you know, economic sort

406
00:33:15.079 --> 00:33:19.599
of policy where they're essentially paying off
various countries to b R and stuff like

407
00:33:19.599 --> 00:33:22.839
that, they're not very successful of
that. And then other areas of influence,

408
00:33:22.880 --> 00:33:27.680
they seem to be just constantly putting
their foot in their mouths, shooting

409
00:33:27.720 --> 00:33:30.920
themselves in their foot, whatever the
footing metaphor you like, you can use

410
00:33:30.960 --> 00:33:35.640
any of those. It just don't
seem to be really good at at influencing

411
00:33:35.640 --> 00:33:39.359
other countries. And and so part
of this is sort of like the Wolf

412
00:33:39.359 --> 00:33:45.720
four year diplomacy part sort of taken
hold in where they're just acting pretty hostile.

413
00:33:45.319 --> 00:33:49.480
And so I think that's that's an
area where to me, the US

414
00:33:49.519 --> 00:33:54.799
has a presignificant advantage and that it's
been I think it's pretty sad the US

415
00:33:54.920 --> 00:34:00.519
isn't really doing more in that area. And I think that's a place where

416
00:34:00.359 --> 00:34:07.039
and it it becomes the US in
China conflict, you know, it really

417
00:34:07.240 --> 00:34:10.320
becomes an influenced challenge is South power
challenge thing. I'm super happy with that

418
00:34:10.559 --> 00:34:15.840
because I think DUS has a hugely
vantage there now. If you if you

419
00:34:15.920 --> 00:34:20.960
move over to the military or economic
arenas, there are some I think more

420
00:34:20.960 --> 00:34:24.599
skinis game challenges there. On that, I think that the US has to

421
00:34:24.679 --> 00:34:34.719
work harder in constructing trade agreements with
countries in East Asia South Asia and work

422
00:34:34.760 --> 00:34:38.559
harder on that. I think I
was not that happy when DUS did not

423
00:34:38.639 --> 00:34:45.760
go forward with the TPP that the
Transpacific Trade Partnership wherever the right acronym there

424
00:34:45.800 --> 00:34:49.599
is, and that's also becomes something
new now, so the US then asked

425
00:34:49.719 --> 00:34:52.800
would have to do a different process
to sign onto that. So I think

426
00:34:52.840 --> 00:34:55.800
something along those lines it would be
good for the US. But that's as

427
00:34:55.880 --> 00:35:01.559
economic composition. I think the US
has to know work in that area of

428
00:35:02.119 --> 00:35:07.119
how do we make sure that even
as these countries are trading a lot with

429
00:35:07.239 --> 00:35:10.639
China, that there's still a major
US trading partner as well, and that

430
00:35:10.639 --> 00:35:15.360
we're facilitating as much as we can. I think that's that's extremely important.

431
00:35:15.280 --> 00:35:22.599
I think on the military side,
in some ways, that's the biggest challenge.

432
00:35:22.639 --> 00:35:25.000
In some ways it's it's sort of
not I guess in the way that

433
00:35:25.000 --> 00:35:30.079
it seems to me to be a
very significant challenge is if the US is

434
00:35:30.079 --> 00:35:36.159
trying to project military power, you
know, within whatever, one hundred miles

435
00:35:36.159 --> 00:35:39.599
fifty miles in the Chinese coastline.
Um, that's that's a that's a pretty

436
00:35:39.599 --> 00:35:45.360
big challenge. And so that's probably
the hardest, hardest challenge that it seems

437
00:35:45.360 --> 00:35:49.719
to me that what what's going on
here? I think in terms of global

438
00:35:49.800 --> 00:35:55.280
projection of power, the China can
in no way match with US. Has

439
00:35:55.320 --> 00:36:00.320
not even close the amount of basis
the US has worldwide, the amount of

440
00:36:00.320 --> 00:36:05.880
the ability of the logistical ability of
US to project power abroad, Like I

441
00:36:05.960 --> 00:36:09.320
no one can match the US.
And that so if it becomes also a

442
00:36:09.360 --> 00:36:14.559
competition there we're China is trying to
go out in and sort of sort of

443
00:36:15.440 --> 00:36:20.079
actually physically sort of conquer the world
in terms of, you know, creating

444
00:36:20.079 --> 00:36:23.679
all these these basing initiatives to match
the US and so on. I think

445
00:36:23.679 --> 00:36:30.679
that's a failing um strategy for China. So so I guess the toughest thing

446
00:36:30.760 --> 00:36:35.880
would be if if the US is
somehow drawn into a North Try combat,

447
00:36:35.920 --> 00:36:39.800
which China very close to China.
That seems to be the toughest problem and

448
00:36:39.920 --> 00:36:47.280
ideally something that we can avoid.
Well, I thought, I thought it

449
00:36:47.320 --> 00:36:52.679
was interesting that that if we can't
predict well, I think you said,

450
00:36:52.679 --> 00:36:57.360
instead of trying to predict China's intentions, goals, and strategies, then we

451
00:36:57.360 --> 00:37:02.760
should focus on other things like shaping
conditions that affect China's intentions, goals and

452
00:37:02.840 --> 00:37:08.760
strategies. I mean, um,
when you're doing a commander's intent one of

453
00:37:08.760 --> 00:37:13.320
the things you look at or the
capabilities, at least what you believe the

454
00:37:13.360 --> 00:37:16.039
capabilities of I think you talked about
SyRI. You know, you assess the

455
00:37:16.039 --> 00:37:22.239
capabilities of the other guy, and
you're trying to figure out what they can

456
00:37:22.280 --> 00:37:24.519
do with those. So you know, you again you develop a decision tree

457
00:37:24.679 --> 00:37:29.320
kind of thing that well, you
know, but yours. I think part

458
00:37:29.320 --> 00:37:31.239
of what I got out of this
was that the suggestion is we don't have

459
00:37:31.320 --> 00:37:36.360
to worry about that. We need
to to uh, what's what's the word

460
00:37:36.440 --> 00:37:40.559
from, Oh gosh, kendeed,
we have to tend to our own garden.

461
00:37:40.599 --> 00:37:47.000
That garden includes, uh, as
you said, making good alliances and

462
00:37:47.239 --> 00:37:51.400
kind of go along with that thought, what should we be doing in life?

463
00:37:51.440 --> 00:37:53.920
The fact that we have a known
unknown that we don't really know where

464
00:37:54.079 --> 00:38:00.519
where the Chinese strategies are going.
Yeah, So I would say there's there's

465
00:38:00.519 --> 00:38:05.239
two big things, and it's that. One thing is what we call for

466
00:38:05.599 --> 00:38:08.079
self strengthening kind of things, building
up our own capabilities, capacities, and

467
00:38:08.159 --> 00:38:13.760
go on. In that there are
I think if we sat here for ten

468
00:38:13.760 --> 00:38:16.599
a manage to come with a hundred
things that the United States could do to

469
00:38:16.639 --> 00:38:22.360
put itself on stronger footing moving forward. A lot of it could be,

470
00:38:22.400 --> 00:38:24.880
you know, very internally oriented.
Some of it could be extreme oriented,

471
00:38:24.920 --> 00:38:29.800
but things that the US can do
to put its own house in order to

472
00:38:29.920 --> 00:38:32.880
make it stronger and moving forward,
A whole whole long list of things to

473
00:38:34.000 --> 00:38:36.800
do. Some things we would probably
disagree on, but there'd be a lot

474
00:38:36.840 --> 00:38:38.639
of things, proposals that we could
put out there, right, Um,

475
00:38:39.639 --> 00:38:43.719
And so there's there's that kind of
set of things that I think are important

476
00:38:43.719 --> 00:38:49.280
to look at. And then there's
also in terms of shaping. I think

477
00:38:49.440 --> 00:38:52.639
that, like I said, so
there's been this this wisdom going back for

478
00:38:52.840 --> 00:39:00.159
really for centuries from some Zoodo calls
its to even more recently widely. Um,

479
00:39:00.800 --> 00:39:04.519
Jesse Wiley, is that one thing
that you'd like to do in terms

480
00:39:04.519 --> 00:39:07.239
of the strategy is sort of you
know why, I think why they called

481
00:39:07.280 --> 00:39:10.440
it u shaping the pattern of war. Claus has said, you know,

482
00:39:10.519 --> 00:39:15.840
understanding what kind of conflicts you're in, and even if we take a step

483
00:39:15.880 --> 00:39:19.639
back and broaden that is like,
so, so what what and how and

484
00:39:19.679 --> 00:39:23.159
where is the competition going to occur
with China? You know, it's I

485
00:39:23.199 --> 00:39:27.039
mean, I think competition is an
okay word because it seems like we are

486
00:39:27.119 --> 00:39:30.119
in that right, So but then
what what form is it going to take?

487
00:39:30.159 --> 00:39:32.280
You know? And so the US
if you can, if if we

488
00:39:32.320 --> 00:39:37.119
can sort of shape that competition in
certain ways and put it push it towards

489
00:39:37.159 --> 00:39:40.719
a certain direction, it's better for
us, right, advantageous for us.

490
00:39:42.119 --> 00:39:45.480
That's a good thing. So I
think that, you know, trying to

491
00:39:46.519 --> 00:39:51.360
get trying to compete with US over
influence about Hey, maybe we should go

492
00:39:51.400 --> 00:39:55.880
to All fond the regional sort of
organization UM in Southeast Asian and say,

493
00:39:55.960 --> 00:40:00.079
hey, we're going to really invest
a lot or the romacy here. We're

494
00:40:00.119 --> 00:40:02.239
going to make sure we go to
all the meetings, We're going to try

495
00:40:02.280 --> 00:40:06.840
and set the agenda. We're going
to really try and push this and kind

496
00:40:06.840 --> 00:40:10.079
of see how it China responds.
In China can either we don't care about

497
00:40:10.119 --> 00:40:14.400
All Fiana. Nobody cares about that. There it's a weak organization and nobody

498
00:40:14.519 --> 00:40:16.760
nobody really cares. They can take
that and so they see that terrain to

499
00:40:16.840 --> 00:40:23.280
the US, and then the US
can use that to its advantage or trying

500
00:40:23.280 --> 00:40:25.199
to get back. Oh wait,
we need to get in on this game.

501
00:40:25.679 --> 00:40:30.159
So then the competition starts to play
out in terms of that are know

502
00:40:30.280 --> 00:40:32.440
which, like I said, I
think the US has an advantage there,

503
00:40:32.880 --> 00:40:37.840
and so I think that's in terms
of sort of shaping the type of conflict

504
00:40:37.880 --> 00:40:40.440
that happens. I think it's much
better for the US to be having that

505
00:40:40.519 --> 00:40:45.880
kind of competition rather than most other
kinds of competition. Right, So there's

506
00:40:45.920 --> 00:40:52.000
that that goes on. I think
the alliance piece kind of helps with both

507
00:40:52.039 --> 00:40:55.159
a bit. And so of course, you know, the one of the

508
00:40:55.199 --> 00:41:00.199
main purposes of an alliance is that
you aggregate your power. And there are

509
00:41:00.519 --> 00:41:05.159
some great allies in the East Asias
for the United States that can add a

510
00:41:05.199 --> 00:41:09.800
lot to our capabilities there across the
four range of those areas, you know.

511
00:41:09.920 --> 00:41:15.199
So of course Japan, I think
in the anarchos folks a lot on

512
00:41:15.800 --> 00:41:21.239
Japan and South Korea, and we're
writing it. It was sort of like

513
00:41:21.280 --> 00:41:23.119
a dream of like, oh,
hey, it would be great if this

514
00:41:23.199 --> 00:41:27.920
could be more of a trilateral alliance
instead of more of like a hubbands folks

515
00:41:27.920 --> 00:41:32.639
thing. A trilateral where the US
and the Republic of Korea and Japan that

516
00:41:32.719 --> 00:41:37.320
they're coming together and they're cooperating on
more and more things. That would be

517
00:41:37.280 --> 00:41:44.320
I think much better for the US
instead of having a tighter alliance, instead

518
00:41:44.320 --> 00:41:45.440
of being like, oh, the
US is going to talk to Japan,

519
00:41:45.559 --> 00:41:49.360
the US is then going to talk
to South Korea, go back to talk

520
00:41:49.360 --> 00:41:52.360
to Japan. That seems less effective, right, So moving in more towards

521
00:41:52.360 --> 00:41:59.039
trilateral and then also pulling in other
countries as it seems that that's purprise.

522
00:41:59.119 --> 00:42:00.880
So the Philippines probably be the next
on the list and be like, hey,

523
00:42:00.920 --> 00:42:07.679
this is another really important country in
the situation. You can simply look

524
00:42:07.679 --> 00:42:10.480
at a map and see what are
the most important countries there, and you

525
00:42:10.480 --> 00:42:15.639
look at Okay, Japan, South
Three, the Philippines, Vietnam, these

526
00:42:15.679 --> 00:42:19.760
are very important countries when you look
at US interests in the US since Southeast

527
00:42:19.800 --> 00:42:25.199
Asia, you know so and so. So I think that in my tracking

528
00:42:25.199 --> 00:42:30.159
of the news, the US has
been moving in this direction, and there

529
00:42:30.280 --> 00:42:34.360
is some kind of approachment going on
between South Korea and Japan. They seem

530
00:42:34.360 --> 00:42:38.280
to be cooperating together more on things. They're been looking more with the US

531
00:42:38.639 --> 00:42:43.000
in terms of a trilateral pan situation. Which that's another thing I like to

532
00:42:43.519 --> 00:42:46.320
highlight on our underlying a lot on
Twitter. A lot is is to point

533
00:42:46.320 --> 00:42:50.599
out when these things are happening,
and it really emphasizes are important and really

534
00:42:50.679 --> 00:42:54.480
useful for the US. And so
I think in terms of you know how

535
00:42:54.559 --> 00:42:59.280
alliance is. Of course, they
bring power, so that's a self strengthening

536
00:42:59.320 --> 00:43:04.280
thing. It brings power or to
US side and influence, and it also

537
00:43:04.360 --> 00:43:07.760
helps for shape the environment, so
that China all of a sudden, if

538
00:43:07.960 --> 00:43:10.519
China, if China looks, you
know, off its coastline and says,

539
00:43:10.519 --> 00:43:16.000
oh, you know, these alliances
to us have the pretty weak and they're

540
00:43:16.000 --> 00:43:21.639
divided, they're factionalized. These countries
are fighting amongst each other. The US

541
00:43:21.679 --> 00:43:24.199
and Japan might have a strong alliance, but the other country is everything else

542
00:43:24.280 --> 00:43:27.280
is kind of weak. We can
take advantage of this, we can kind

543
00:43:27.280 --> 00:43:30.880
of divide in content and stuff,
or China can look out and say,

544
00:43:30.920 --> 00:43:35.880
oh, wow, there's really tightening
alliances here. There's no room for us

545
00:43:35.880 --> 00:43:38.320
to push on that at all.
We need to change the way we look

546
00:43:38.320 --> 00:43:43.719
at this and rethink how we're going
about this, because you know, this

547
00:43:43.760 --> 00:43:46.039
is a good situation for us,
and we can't really divide and conquer.

548
00:43:46.119 --> 00:43:50.760
We have to rethink this, you
know. So I think there's regardless of

549
00:43:50.760 --> 00:43:53.480
whether even China does want to would
even think about trying to divide and conquer

550
00:43:53.639 --> 00:43:57.239
or not, if it's not feasible, they just aren't going to go that

551
00:43:57.280 --> 00:44:00.519
direction at all. So in this
way you can you can try in shape

552
00:44:00.559 --> 00:44:04.800
condition, you know, affect conditions
within shape, what Chinese intention will be

553
00:44:05.000 --> 00:44:09.119
in the future. I think that's
that's ideally abtection that the US could go.

554
00:44:12.920 --> 00:44:16.440
I really like how you and your
co authors brought in the concept of

555
00:44:16.519 --> 00:44:20.880
shaping is a way to tie in
a few things together. You know,

556
00:44:20.920 --> 00:44:25.039
we have our bilats with the Japanese
and the Australians, but we also have

557
00:44:25.159 --> 00:44:30.320
aucus that's bringing in the Brits more. But of course we also have one

558
00:44:30.360 --> 00:44:32.719
on the ones with the Brits.
Of course, the Australians and the Brits

559
00:44:32.760 --> 00:44:39.440
have their own relationships. You also
briefly mentioned the quad and it tied into

560
00:44:39.480 --> 00:44:43.679
another concept that you brought in later
on. You know, what are the

561
00:44:43.719 --> 00:44:47.000
frustrating things? Well, let me
let me reprioritize here. One of the

562
00:44:47.079 --> 00:44:55.280
great things about the US and most
of our allies is where we're wonderfully fractious

563
00:44:55.440 --> 00:45:02.199
democratic systems that change governments and have
competing centers of power at the end in

564
00:45:02.320 --> 00:45:07.360
theory trying to produce a better quality
of life for their citizens. Uh.

565
00:45:07.519 --> 00:45:15.599
The downside of our system of governance
compared to the PRCS is we are a

566
00:45:15.679 --> 00:45:21.599
fractious, ever changing of political system
that is hard to get some continuity.

567
00:45:21.679 --> 00:45:29.280
So people have been looking for that
that unicorn called the bipartisan consistent consensus that

568
00:45:29.960 --> 00:45:35.599
depending upon which party is in power, if you're if you're willing to expect

569
00:45:36.119 --> 00:45:40.719
accept the you know, eighty percent
agreement is continuity and the twenty percent is

570
00:45:40.760 --> 00:45:45.239
just creative friction. If you get
eighty percent, you have that bipartisan consensus.

571
00:45:45.800 --> 00:45:52.480
And towards the end, y'all brought
out something repurposing a word that goes

572
00:45:52.480 --> 00:45:58.119
back to George Washington, that,
um, there's this binary and I think

573
00:45:58.119 --> 00:46:01.360
and I believe we're in agreement here. I think it's a false argument that

574
00:46:01.400 --> 00:46:07.199
you have China doubs, you know, to pick your stereotype from the nineteen

575
00:46:07.320 --> 00:46:14.880
nineties through the mid twenty tens,
some people use the a word appeasement.

576
00:46:14.920 --> 00:46:21.039
They were really trying to just engage
with China engagement versus the other by false

577
00:46:21.079 --> 00:46:24.440
binary, I believe, which are
the China hawks, which is everybody needs

578
00:46:24.440 --> 00:46:29.880
to get ready to go to war
in physical year twenty twenty seven, because

579
00:46:30.000 --> 00:46:32.639
that's what the introls of the sheep
tells is going to take place. That

580
00:46:32.840 --> 00:46:39.199
in between there, it kind of
brings in the quad aucus and other arrangements

581
00:46:39.199 --> 00:46:44.679
of the Philippines. You were talking
about a moment ago is entanglement, which

582
00:46:45.159 --> 00:46:52.119
in the American instinct has the spines
go out and the clause come out defensively

583
00:46:52.400 --> 00:46:57.800
because it's it's a negative connotation.
But you try to describe how in your

584
00:46:58.639 --> 00:47:06.239
in your co author's view, that
a constructive entanglement is actually a positive outline

585
00:47:06.320 --> 00:47:10.960
the positive type of entanglement that y'all
were describing towards the end of the article.

586
00:47:13.800 --> 00:47:16.400
Yes, I wanted the use of
the word entanglement, which historically in

587
00:47:16.440 --> 00:47:22.119
the US it is the start with
the negative. Since Abelius is sort of

588
00:47:22.599 --> 00:47:27.920
you go back to the nineteenth century, even early twentieth century's out the twenty

589
00:47:27.960 --> 00:47:30.360
cent maybe that viearis should not be
entangled with the rest of the world.

590
00:47:30.360 --> 00:47:37.000
We should avoid these entanglements, and
that views actually is corrupted by being too

591
00:47:37.079 --> 00:47:42.360
much engaged with the concerns and the
rest of the world. As an exceptional

592
00:47:42.360 --> 00:47:45.800
it's different. Its to maintain that
space. That's like the guide, one

593
00:47:45.800 --> 00:47:50.280
of the guiding ideas and American diplomacy, early diplomacy now. And so it's

594
00:47:50.920 --> 00:47:57.159
so I kind of wanted to reclaim
that a bit and also sort of I

595
00:47:57.159 --> 00:48:00.280
guess sort of place place our flag
in the sand and say we're not just

596
00:48:00.360 --> 00:48:06.320
talking about you know, being a
little you know, being a little bit

597
00:48:06.400 --> 00:48:08.000
more. I wanted to really signify
like, no, no, this means

598
00:48:08.079 --> 00:48:13.920
doing a lot more in terms of
again creating that alliance system in these days

599
00:48:13.920 --> 00:48:17.039
of Asia, Western sit whatever you
want to call the region. And so

600
00:48:17.119 --> 00:48:20.119
I didn't, yeah, I didn't
want to say we just need to do

601
00:48:20.719 --> 00:48:23.079
a little bit more fine tuning alliances. Not I think we need to really

602
00:48:23.280 --> 00:48:28.280
invest a lot in that. And
that means you know a lot of time

603
00:48:28.360 --> 00:48:34.119
amongst the principles of being there and
really striving for a really strong alliance there

604
00:48:34.159 --> 00:48:40.000
again starting with the Japan and South
Korea and then expanding that out and in

605
00:48:40.679 --> 00:48:45.719
tying that in also with these other
these other partnerships there there Aucus and the

606
00:48:45.800 --> 00:48:51.719
Quad and so on. And also
wanted to draw attention to I think there's

607
00:48:52.159 --> 00:48:57.639
there's almost sort of an American fetish
with Australia that so I put this in

608
00:48:58.239 --> 00:49:05.000
two or two harsh aligned but is
that somehow that Australia is the strong position

609
00:49:05.159 --> 00:49:08.519
in the Western Pacific and this is
the position of strength and then you know,

610
00:49:09.400 --> 00:49:14.920
go against China something like that.
It's and again it's we should look

611
00:49:14.920 --> 00:49:16.800
at maps more and you look at
a map, and Australia is pretty far

612
00:49:16.840 --> 00:49:20.559
from China. You know, there's
a lot of countries, a lot of

613
00:49:20.599 --> 00:49:24.880
country's in between Australia and China.
And well, yes, I very much

614
00:49:24.920 --> 00:49:30.239
appreciate Australia, and there's there's strong
lines with the US. It's stocks solid,

615
00:49:30.280 --> 00:49:35.760
and it's great. Um. They
provide a lot of capacities and capabilities

616
00:49:35.880 --> 00:49:40.199
for the US and the partnership and
so on. But to me, the

617
00:49:40.320 --> 00:49:45.880
number one thing, the point of
action in this is Japan and South Korea

618
00:49:46.079 --> 00:49:51.199
and the Philippines. That area.
That's what I really want to focus on

619
00:49:51.760 --> 00:49:54.719
and say, hey, we need
to entangle ourselves in that region with those

620
00:49:54.760 --> 00:49:59.840
allies and really make that work.
And that's what we try and say is

621
00:49:59.840 --> 00:50:01.440
that, you know, no matter
what happens, no matter what kind of

622
00:50:01.480 --> 00:50:06.599
challenge we see emerging in the next
you know, five, ten, twenty

623
00:50:06.679 --> 00:50:09.280
thirty, even more years, that
that's merely regret to move right there,

624
00:50:10.440 --> 00:50:15.000
Having that strong alliance is going to
help no matter what happens. I mean,

625
00:50:15.000 --> 00:50:19.000
I can't say no matter what,
but anything I can imagine having that

626
00:50:19.199 --> 00:50:23.559
really strong alliance there is going to
help. Again on the economic side,

627
00:50:24.360 --> 00:50:30.719
if we really stank these relationships.
That means they're not going to be continually

628
00:50:30.760 --> 00:50:35.800
pulled into the Chinese economic orbit.
That means on the influence side, they're

629
00:50:35.840 --> 00:50:40.239
gonna stick with the US. On
the military side, they have huge capabilities

630
00:50:40.280 --> 00:50:45.679
there that they can they can contribute
to any kind of conflict that can happen

631
00:50:45.719 --> 00:50:49.400
in in these days. Also,
I was gonna're gonna try and look this

632
00:50:49.519 --> 00:50:52.880
up before it got on here,
but there's this article in the journal Orbits

633
00:50:52.880 --> 00:50:59.119
written I think it's around twenty eleven
twenty twelve, where it paints this describes

634
00:50:59.119 --> 00:51:05.480
as hypothetical situation where the US this
is a carrier in Eustasia and it's done

635
00:51:05.519 --> 00:51:09.679
by China, but it's done in
a way such that it blurs the situation

636
00:51:09.719 --> 00:51:15.840
so much that it's not really clear
what exactly happened. And because US influenced

637
00:51:15.840 --> 00:51:19.440
Inustasia has following so much, even
its allies are sort of like, well,

638
00:51:19.559 --> 00:51:21.639
yeah, we don't know it really
happens. We're not going to do

639
00:51:21.719 --> 00:51:23.920
anything about this, you know.
And so I think that I actually think

640
00:51:23.960 --> 00:51:28.079
about that a lot. It's a
good article and it draws to mind bit

641
00:51:28.480 --> 00:51:32.360
Also if you think about Ukraine,
is that the the importance of having allies

642
00:51:32.440 --> 00:51:37.639
on your side that are strong,
that can contribute and will trust you,

643
00:51:37.800 --> 00:51:42.039
I think is really priceless. So
I think going going all in on that,

644
00:51:42.320 --> 00:51:45.280
or not all in, but going
strongly in on that, I think

645
00:51:45.400 --> 00:51:50.159
helps no matter what the situation is. And I think, like you said,

646
00:51:50.760 --> 00:51:54.199
whether wherever you follow on that spectrum
of wanting to do more engagement or

647
00:51:54.320 --> 00:51:59.639
more more containment, or wherever I
mean you need that, you definitely need

648
00:51:59.639 --> 00:52:02.000
that is something that I think generally
a lot of people can agree upon.

649
00:52:02.119 --> 00:52:08.719
Is is investing in that. Yeah. What I liked about that approach was

650
00:52:08.800 --> 00:52:16.159
that you suggested that if we did
this right, we would not be again.

651
00:52:16.199 --> 00:52:20.960
It is not directed toward we're gonna
we need you to help us fight

652
00:52:21.039 --> 00:52:24.559
China. It is more we are
your allies. We will do we will

653
00:52:24.599 --> 00:52:28.480
work together with you in any number
of ways to meet a lot of different

654
00:52:28.519 --> 00:52:32.719
situations. As I think you said, entangle is quite distinct from engagement.

655
00:52:32.760 --> 00:52:37.800
While the latter was meant to foster
liberalization with China, Entangle takes active steps

656
00:52:37.880 --> 00:52:43.880
to strengthen alliances in rules based order
in East and Southeast Asia. Is largely

657
00:52:43.920 --> 00:52:47.280
independent of the internal characteristics of Chinese
politics. And society. It can respond

658
00:52:47.320 --> 00:52:53.480
to either a more aggressive or less
aggressive Chinese foreign policy. Can you kind

659
00:52:53.480 --> 00:52:55.400
of talk about that at more?
Is it? Because I think that's kind

660
00:52:55.440 --> 00:53:01.800
of a key section of what you
mean by this entanglement rather than pure alliance

661
00:53:02.400 --> 00:53:08.400
anti China stuff. Yeah, yeah, there is. There's there's ideas out

662
00:53:08.440 --> 00:53:12.920
there they're suggesting that, Well,
the way that we should approach this is

663
00:53:12.960 --> 00:53:19.360
just approach every everything of the country
out there and say hey, we want

664
00:53:19.360 --> 00:53:22.480
you on board to fight China,
we want you on board of this anti

665
00:53:22.559 --> 00:53:28.679
China agenda. Other countries are uncomfortable
with that. They don't want to make

666
00:53:28.719 --> 00:53:30.960
that choice when it's when it's puts
it them like that, it's like it's

667
00:53:31.000 --> 00:53:34.159
us for them. They don't really
want to make that choice, you know,

668
00:53:34.199 --> 00:53:37.920
and so it's it's alienating to try
and force that to sitting on all

669
00:53:38.039 --> 00:53:44.280
variety countries from from South Korea through
through South Asia to Africa. They don't

670
00:53:44.360 --> 00:53:49.119
want that. They also don't find
that authentic. It's you know, we're

671
00:53:49.119 --> 00:53:52.760
not going over to Nigerian saying hey, Nigeria, you're a great country,

672
00:53:53.000 --> 00:53:57.480
you're a strong country, you're growing. We really think that we can do

673
00:53:57.559 --> 00:54:00.519
great things together. If you fade
in that way, it's one way of

674
00:54:00.559 --> 00:54:02.159
doing it. In other ways,
like hey, Nigeria, you see these

675
00:54:02.239 --> 00:54:05.760
games of China. We don't like
that you have to choose us instead.

676
00:54:06.400 --> 00:54:08.559
That's not it's not the same way. It's not the same energy, the

677
00:54:08.599 --> 00:54:13.960
same vibe, you know. And
so I think that by approaching these countries

678
00:54:14.039 --> 00:54:16.440
and saying, hey, we want
to create these close relationships with you,

679
00:54:17.199 --> 00:54:22.360
and we think that our mutual interest
that we can we can work on here,

680
00:54:22.400 --> 00:54:24.519
I think that's a much better way
of approaching it. And I think

681
00:54:24.559 --> 00:54:29.400
that the side benefit will be that
again, as we didn't see this in

682
00:54:29.400 --> 00:54:31.639
the evolution of how South Korea's is
sort of looking at at China and the

683
00:54:31.719 --> 00:54:37.480
US and so on, is that
they're noticing that China is not They're not

684
00:54:37.599 --> 00:54:43.280
behaving well from this shuth Sam perspective, you know. And so so as

685
00:54:43.679 --> 00:54:45.360
if we come in and say,
hey, no, we don't. We're

686
00:54:45.360 --> 00:54:47.360
not trying to force you in your
anti Chinese perspective. We're just trying to

687
00:54:47.360 --> 00:54:52.960
get closer with you. And then
China steps on its own feet again,

688
00:54:52.000 --> 00:54:54.480
and there's all that stuff, and
then there's other kinds of like yeah,

689
00:54:54.519 --> 00:54:58.920
actually, China is not doing things
that we like. We're glad they we're

690
00:54:59.000 --> 00:55:01.320
close to the United States and is
actually driving as even closer que And we

691
00:55:01.440 --> 00:55:05.960
liked that You didn't force us to
make a choice. You gave us that

692
00:55:06.199 --> 00:55:09.079
option, You reached out your hand
of friendship. We took it, and

693
00:55:09.159 --> 00:55:13.880
now we're glad to have you as
friends because we're now getting very worried about

694
00:55:13.960 --> 00:55:17.000
China. I think that's sort of
what we're seeing in a series of countries

695
00:55:17.000 --> 00:55:24.760
here, and I think that's advantageous
to the United States for sure. Of

696
00:55:24.800 --> 00:55:29.840
course we haven't touched on it yet
today, but the the eight hundred pound

697
00:55:29.840 --> 00:55:35.639
guerrilla in the national security arena over
the last year has been the Russia Ukrainian

698
00:55:35.679 --> 00:55:44.760
War, and from both and economic
diplomatic In a military perspective, everybody looking

699
00:55:44.760 --> 00:55:50.719
at that to as you do with
all really medium sized wars, trying to

700
00:55:51.199 --> 00:55:57.119
learn some lessons, to see how
what theories play out, but confirms your

701
00:55:57.119 --> 00:56:01.719
priors, what challenges your priors uh
for for your perspective, you know,

702
00:56:02.360 --> 00:56:08.440
looking for Beijing as much as we
can, having looked at their priorities in

703
00:56:08.519 --> 00:56:14.119
their views, what do you think
are some of the takeaways the PRC is

704
00:56:14.280 --> 00:56:21.639
looking at closely from the Russia Ukrainian
War to this point. M Yeah,

705
00:56:21.599 --> 00:56:24.760
that's a good question. I think
that, Yeah, a lot of people

706
00:56:24.800 --> 00:56:29.360
are trying to sort of figure that
out, and there's sort of a debate

707
00:56:29.440 --> 00:56:31.840
going on that well. On the
one hand, maybe China is saying,

708
00:56:31.840 --> 00:56:37.000
wow, you know, military operations
seem pretty hard, and countries that even

709
00:56:37.039 --> 00:56:40.440
have a significant, you know,
quantitative advantage, they might have a lot

710
00:56:40.480 --> 00:56:45.320
of trouble in carrying out you know, complex operations, and as I think,

711
00:56:45.360 --> 00:56:50.320
that's possibly one way of thinking about
it. And I think, you

712
00:56:50.400 --> 00:57:00.519
know, in addition to that is
that I think that the tightening or nature

713
00:57:00.559 --> 00:57:04.239
of the Western alliance, I think
is something that's also probably getting some people's

714
00:57:04.239 --> 00:57:09.199
attention. And I think on both
those illnesses probably makes trying to a little

715
00:57:09.239 --> 00:57:15.280
more wary about trying to be aggressive
in any any sort of military fashion.

716
00:57:15.440 --> 00:57:19.679
Is the troubles that the Russian has
had and the ability of the US and

717
00:57:19.679 --> 00:57:22.960
its allies to respond, you know, pretty quickly and strongly to it.

718
00:57:22.519 --> 00:57:27.400
So I think on those ends that
probably gives trying to pause in certain ways.

719
00:57:29.039 --> 00:57:32.400
I think on the other side of
the equation, though, there's a

720
00:57:32.480 --> 00:57:39.320
number of countries that have not necessarily
cited obviously quickly with the United States,

721
00:57:39.320 --> 00:57:45.800
that they might do more strongly,
whether it's like Brazil or South Africa or

722
00:57:45.800 --> 00:57:47.800
other countries like that, or even
in India to some extent. You know,

723
00:57:47.920 --> 00:57:52.679
they're not really jumping in like maybe
THEOS would want them to do,

724
00:57:53.360 --> 00:57:59.599
I mean jumping in metaphorically of supporting
the US and supporting Ukraine and so on.

725
00:58:00.199 --> 00:58:01.679
So I think, you know,
China probably see some space there and

726
00:58:01.760 --> 00:58:07.679
kind of is maybe interested in that. Um. Otherwise, I think they're

727
00:58:07.719 --> 00:58:13.000
probably you know, very interested in
the performance of like certain weapons systems and

728
00:58:13.360 --> 00:58:21.559
things of that nature, and different
yes, overarching I don't necessaries the military

729
00:58:21.599 --> 00:58:25.440
strategies, but maybe operational already,
maybe the strategies behind it. They're probably

730
00:58:27.480 --> 00:58:30.480
how that's playing out in terms of
also with regards to what weapons system are

731
00:58:30.519 --> 00:58:37.079
being involved and are being useful or
not. I think those are some of

732
00:58:37.119 --> 00:58:43.000
the issues. But I think probably
the net effect is is pretty positive on

733
00:58:43.519 --> 00:58:46.280
the US and US allies kind of
side. At least That's how I'm sort

734
00:58:46.280 --> 00:58:54.639
of interpreting at this point. Well, that's a good point to put a

735
00:58:54.679 --> 00:58:58.920
stop to the show. Although I
think we could talk for quite a while

736
00:58:59.000 --> 00:59:00.880
more before we let you go,
and let me thank you for coming on

737
00:59:00.920 --> 00:59:06.360
with us, Jeffrey, and and
let me ask you this, where what

738
00:59:06.400 --> 00:59:08.800
are you working on that our people
be our listeners be interested in And where

739
00:59:08.800 --> 00:59:15.440
can people find out more about your
writings and other and other thoughts. Yeah,

740
00:59:15.519 --> 00:59:19.320
so I'm pretty active on Twitter and
I'm happy to engage with people there

741
00:59:19.599 --> 00:59:23.519
and happy to get messages. Or
you can also just Google me and find

742
00:59:23.519 --> 00:59:29.159
me on University of Portland website and
you can email me there. Happy to

743
00:59:29.519 --> 00:59:32.760
get emails and course long with people. Right now, my big project for

744
00:59:32.840 --> 00:59:39.159
the Summari is trying to finish up
this this manuscript on a book on strategy.

745
00:59:39.280 --> 00:59:43.440
So I've been trying to work a
lot on strategy for the past couple

746
00:59:43.440 --> 00:59:46.000
of years instead of trying to finally
get that wrapped up and hopefully get that

747
00:59:46.039 --> 00:59:52.920
out in publication in the next year. So it would be great. Well,

748
00:59:52.960 --> 00:59:55.880
Jeffrey has been great having you on
here, and I do encourage all

749
00:59:55.880 --> 01:00:00.559
the listeners to make sure and give
Jeffrey listen to when you get a chance,

750
01:00:00.599 --> 01:00:05.440
and to track what you're doing um
and look forward to the next opportunity

751
01:00:05.519 --> 01:00:12.000
Joe. Yeah, thanks for having
me. It's great fun. And thank

752
01:00:12.039 --> 01:00:15.360
you everybody for joining us for another
edition. Mid rats and until next time,

753
01:00:15.440 --> 01:00:23.960
hope y'all have a great Navy Day. Cheers. Need to be having

754
01:00:24.239 --> 01:00:35.519
all things like my loney want to
marry me and leave all your being to

755
01:00:35.760 --> 01:00:45.519
blame. Love told me silly holding
you all the same. It's a long

756
01:00:45.719 --> 01:01:00.800
way. It's a long way.
It's a long way, and I know

757
01:01:01.519 --> 01:01:10.719
I don't by Godeally. Well,
listen, swell. It's a long long

758
01:01:10.920 --> 01:01:15.639
way to sip my n It's but
my heart, my