WEBVTT 1 00:00:00.280 --> 00:00:07.599 The paved checklist. Another way to mitigate risk is to perceive hazards by incorporating 2 00:00:07.599 --> 00:00:12.279 the paved checklist into pre flight planning. The pilot divides the risks of flight 3 00:00:12.599 --> 00:00:22.719 into four categories Pilot in Command p I C, Aircraft Environment, end External 4 00:00:22.760 --> 00:00:29.399 Pressures p a v E, which form part of a pilots decision making process. 5 00:00:29.640 --> 00:00:34.000 With the paved checklist, pilots have a simple way to remember each category 6 00:00:34.079 --> 00:00:39.880 to examine for risk prior to each flight. Once a pilot identifies the risks 7 00:00:39.920 --> 00:00:44.399 of a flight, here or she needs to decide whether the risk or combination 8 00:00:44.479 --> 00:00:49.880 of risk can be managed safely and successfully. If not, make the decision 9 00:00:49.920 --> 00:00:54.560 to cancel the flight. If the pilot decides to continue with the flight, 10 00:00:54.920 --> 00:01:00.560 he or she should develop strategies to mitigate the risks. One way a pilot 11 00:01:00.600 --> 00:01:04.359 can control the risks is to set personal minimums for items in each risk category. 12 00:01:06.239 --> 00:01:11.319 These are limits unique to that individual pilot's current level of experience and proficiency. 13 00:01:11.359 --> 00:01:17.640 For example, the aircraft may have a maximum crosswind component of fifteen knots 14 00:01:17.680 --> 00:01:23.799 listed in the Aircraft Flight Manual AFM, and the pilot has experience with ten 15 00:01:23.879 --> 00:01:29.719 knots of direct crosswind It could be unsafe to exceed a ten knot crosswind component 16 00:01:29.719 --> 00:01:34.680 without additional training. Therefore, the ten knots crosswind experience level is that pilot's 17 00:01:34.719 --> 00:01:42.959 personal limitation until additional training with a certificated Flight instructor CFI provides the pilot with 18 00:01:42.000 --> 00:01:48.640 additional experience for flying in crosswinds that exceed ten knots. One of the most 19 00:01:48.680 --> 00:01:55.000 important concepts that safe pilots understand is the difference between what is legal in terms 20 00:01:55.040 --> 00:01:59.840 of the regulations and what is smart or safe in terms of pilot experience and 21 00:02:00.040 --> 00:02:07.840 proficiency. P equals Pilot in command PIC. The pilot is one of the 22 00:02:07.920 --> 00:02:12.520 risk factors in a flight. The pilot must ask, am I ready for 23 00:02:12.560 --> 00:02:17.919 this trip in terms of experience, recency, currency, physical and emotional condition. 24 00:02:19.919 --> 00:02:27.719 The im safe checklist provides the answers A equals aircraft? What limitations will 25 00:02:27.759 --> 00:02:32.840 the aircraft impose upon the trip? Ask the following questions, is this the 26 00:02:32.960 --> 00:02:38.919 right aircraft for the flight? Am I familiar with? And current in this 27 00:02:38.080 --> 00:02:45.080 aircraft? Aircraft performance figures in the AFM are based on a brand new aircraft 28 00:02:45.520 --> 00:02:50.680 flown by a professional test pilot. Keep that in mind while assessing personal and 29 00:02:50.800 --> 00:02:58.599 aircraft performance. Is this aircraft equipped for the flight instruments, lights, navigation, 30 00:02:58.639 --> 00:03:04.479 and communications equipment adequate? Can this aircraft use the runways available for the 31 00:03:04.520 --> 00:03:08.639 trip with an adequate margin of safety under the conditions to be flown? Can 32 00:03:08.639 --> 00:03:15.919 this aircraft carry the planned load? Can this aircraft operate at the altitudes needed 33 00:03:15.080 --> 00:03:22.400 for the trip? Does this aircraft have sufficient fuel capacity with reserves for trip 34 00:03:22.439 --> 00:03:29.400 legs planned? Does the fuel quantity delivered match the fuel quantity ordered? V 35 00:03:29.840 --> 00:03:39.159 equals environment weather Weather is a major environmental consideration. Earlier, it was suggested 36 00:03:39.240 --> 00:03:45.240 pilots set their own personal minimums, especially when it comes to weather. As 37 00:03:45.319 --> 00:03:49.960 pilots evaluate the weather for a particular flight, they should consider the following. 38 00:03:51.159 --> 00:03:57.199 What are the current ceiling invisibility in mountainous terrain? Consider having higher minimums for 39 00:03:57.319 --> 00:04:03.319 ceiling invisibility, particularly if the rain is unfamiliar. Consider the possibility that the 40 00:04:03.400 --> 00:04:09.199 weather may be different than forecast. Have alternative plans, and be ready and 41 00:04:09.319 --> 00:04:15.719 willing to divert should an unexpected change occur. Consider the winds at the airports 42 00:04:15.759 --> 00:04:20.160 being used and the strength of the cross wind component. If flying in mountainous 43 00:04:20.240 --> 00:04:26.519 terrain, consider whether there are strong winds. Aloft Strong winds and mountainous terrain 44 00:04:26.680 --> 00:04:30.800 can cause severe turbulence and down drafts and be very hazardous for aircraft even when 45 00:04:30.839 --> 00:04:36.399 there is no other significant weather. Are there any thunderstorms present or forecast? 46 00:04:38.600 --> 00:04:43.600 If there are clouds, is there any icing current or forecast? What does 47 00:04:43.600 --> 00:04:47.600 the temperature? Do points spread? And the current temperature at altitude? Can 48 00:04:47.639 --> 00:04:54.399 discent be made safely all along the route? If icing conditions are encountered. 49 00:04:54.800 --> 00:04:59.959 Is the pilot experienced at operating the aircraft's de icing or anti icing equipment? 50 00:05:00.920 --> 00:05:05.199 Is this equipment in good condition and functional for what icing conditions? Is the 51 00:05:05.240 --> 00:05:15.120 aircraft rated if any terrain Evaluation of terrain is another important component of analyzing the 52 00:05:15.120 --> 00:05:20.800 flight environment. To avoid terrain and obstacles, especially at night or in low 53 00:05:20.920 --> 00:05:28.000 visibility, determine safe altitudes in advance by using the altitude shown on VFR and 54 00:05:28.160 --> 00:05:34.000 i FR charts. During preflight planning, use maximum elevation figures me efs, 55 00:05:34.480 --> 00:05:40.680 and other easily obtainable data to minimize the chances of an inflight collision with terrain 56 00:05:40.920 --> 00:05:48.399 or obstacles. Airport What lights are available at the destination and alternate airports? 57 00:05:49.319 --> 00:05:55.639 VASSI or pappy or ils glides slope guidance. Is the terminal airport equipped with 58 00:05:55.680 --> 00:06:00.040 them? Are they working? Will the pilot need to use the radio to 59 00:06:00.079 --> 00:06:05.399 activate the airport lights? Check the notices to airmen, notems for closed runways 60 00:06:05.519 --> 00:06:11.480 or airports. Look for runway or beacon lights out nearby towers, etc. 61 00:06:13.120 --> 00:06:17.920 Choose the flight route wisely. An engine failure gives the nearby airports supreme importance. 62 00:06:19.160 --> 00:06:27.079 Are there shorter or obstructed fields at the destination and or alternate airports airspace? 63 00:06:28.199 --> 00:06:31.199 If the trip is over remote areas, our appropriate clothing, water, 64 00:06:31.319 --> 00:06:36.120 and survival gear on board in the event of a forest landing. If the 65 00:06:36.160 --> 00:06:42.759 trip includes flying over water or unpopulated areas with a chance of losing visual reference 66 00:06:42.759 --> 00:06:47.079 to the horizon, the pilot must be prepared to fly IFR. Check the 67 00:06:47.120 --> 00:06:56.079 airspace in any temporary flight restriction TFRs along the route of flight. Nighttime night 68 00:06:56.079 --> 00:07:01.319 flying requires special consideration. If the trip includes flying at night over water or 69 00:07:01.399 --> 00:07:06.399 unpopulated areas with a chance of losing visual reference to the horizon, the pilot 70 00:07:06.519 --> 00:07:12.959 must be prepared to fly IFR. Will the flight conditions allow us safe emergency 71 00:07:13.040 --> 00:07:18.480 landing at night? Preflight. All aircraft lights interior and exterior for a night 72 00:07:18.480 --> 00:07:25.680 flight carry at least two flashlights, one for exterior preflight and a smaller one 73 00:07:25.720 --> 00:07:32.360 that can be dimmed and kept nearby. E equals external pressures. External pressures 74 00:07:32.399 --> 00:07:38.160 are influences external to the flight that create a sense of pressure to complete a 75 00:07:38.160 --> 00:07:43.639 flight, often at the expense of safety. Factors that can be external pressures 76 00:07:43.639 --> 00:07:48.920 include the following someone waiting at the airport for the flight's arrival, a passenger 77 00:07:48.959 --> 00:07:55.759 the pilot does not want to disappoint, the desire to demonstrate pilot qualifications, 78 00:07:56.920 --> 00:08:03.240 the desire to impress someone. Probably two most dangerous words and aviation are watch 79 00:08:03.319 --> 00:08:09.639 this, the desire to satisfy a specific personal goal get home itis, get 80 00:08:09.680 --> 00:08:15.480 their itis, and let's go itis. The pilot's general goal completion orientation, 81 00:08:16.839 --> 00:08:22.600 emotional pressure associated with acknowledging that skill and experience levels may be lower than a 82 00:08:22.639 --> 00:08:28.199 pilot would like them to be. Pride can be a powerful external factor managing 83 00:08:28.240 --> 00:08:35.080 external pressures. Management of external pressure is the single most important key to risk 84 00:08:35.159 --> 00:08:39.879 management because it is the one risk factor category that can cause a pilot to 85 00:08:39.919 --> 00:08:46.000 ignore all the other risk factors. External pressures put time related pressure on the 86 00:08:46.080 --> 00:08:52.519 pilot and figure into a majority of accidents. The use of personal standard operating 87 00:08:52.559 --> 00:09:00.519 procedures SOOPS is one way to manage external pressures. The goal is to supply 88 00:09:00.639 --> 00:09:05.639 a release for the external pressures of a flight. These procedures include, but 89 00:09:05.720 --> 00:09:09.320 are not limited, to allow time on a trip for an extra fuel stop 90 00:09:09.799 --> 00:09:15.879 or to make an unexpected landing because of weather. Have alternate plans for a 91 00:09:15.960 --> 00:09:20.919 late arrival or make backup airline reservations for must be their trips. For really 92 00:09:20.960 --> 00:09:24.879 important trips, plan to leave early enough so that there would still be time 93 00:09:24.919 --> 00:09:31.200 to drive to the destination. Advise those who are waiting at the destination that 94 00:09:31.240 --> 00:09:35.960 the arrival may be delayed, know how to notify them when delays are encountered. 95 00:09:37.120 --> 00:09:43.320 Manage passengers expectations. Make sure passengers know that they might not arrive on 96 00:09:43.360 --> 00:09:46.519 a firm schedule, and if they must arrive by a certain time, they 97 00:09:46.519 --> 00:09:52.879 should make alternative plans. Eliminate pressure to return home even on a casual day 98 00:09:52.879 --> 00:09:58.399 flight, by carrying a small overnight kit containing prescriptions, contact lens, solutions 99 00:09:58.440 --> 00:10:05.600 toiletry, or other necessities on every flight. The key to managing external pressure 100 00:10:05.799 --> 00:10:09.679 is to be ready for and accept delays. Remember that people get delayed when 101 00:10:09.679 --> 00:10:15.559 traveling on airlines, driving a car, or taking a bus. The pilot's 102 00:10:15.600 --> 00:10:20.960 goal is to manage risk, not create hazards. Refer to Figure seventeen dash 103 00:10:20.080 --> 00:10:30.519 six human behavior. Studies of human behavior have tried to determine an individual's predisposition 104 00:10:30.919 --> 00:10:35.840 to taking risk and the level of an individual's involvement in accidents. In nineteen 105 00:10:35.879 --> 00:10:43.039 fifty one, a study regarding injury prone children was published by Elizabeth Metchem Fuller 106 00:10:43.240 --> 00:10:48.799 and Helen B. Bond of the University of Minnesota. The study was comprised 107 00:10:48.799 --> 00:10:54.840 of two separate groups of second grade students. Fifty five students were considered accident 108 00:10:54.879 --> 00:11:00.519 repeaters and forty eight students had no accidents. Both groups were from the same 109 00:11:00.559 --> 00:11:05.279 school of six hundred, and their family demographics were similar. The accident free 110 00:11:05.320 --> 00:11:11.399 group showed a superior knowledge of safety, were considered industrious and cooperative with others, 111 00:11:11.440 --> 00:11:18.360 but were not considered physically inclined. The accident repeater group had better gymnastic 112 00:11:18.440 --> 00:11:24.679 skills, were considered aggressive and impulsive, demonstrated rebellious behavior when under stress, 113 00:11:24.399 --> 00:11:30.440 were poor losers, and liked to be the center of attention. One interpretation 114 00:11:30.519 --> 00:11:35.080 of this data an adult predisposition to injuries stems from childhood behavior and environment, 115 00:11:35.879 --> 00:11:41.639 leads to the conclusion that any pilot group should be comprised only of pilots who 116 00:11:41.679 --> 00:11:46.720 are safety conscious, industrious, and cooperative. Clearly, this is not only 117 00:11:46.759 --> 00:11:52.879 an inaccurate inference. It is impossible pilots are drawn from the general population and 118 00:11:52.960 --> 00:11:58.120 exhibit all types of personality traits. Thus, it is important that good decision 119 00:11:58.159 --> 00:12:05.320 making skill be taught to all pilots. Historically, the term pilot error has 120 00:12:05.320 --> 00:12:09.399 been used to describe an accident in which an action or decision made by the 121 00:12:09.480 --> 00:12:15.120 pilot was the cause or a contributing factor that led to the accident. This 122 00:12:15.159 --> 00:12:20.840 definition also includes the pilot's failure to make a correct decision or take proper action. 123 00:12:20.720 --> 00:12:26.240 From a broader perspective, the phrase human factors related more aptly describes these 124 00:12:26.279 --> 00:12:31.960 accidents. A single decision or event does not lead to an accident, but 125 00:12:33.080 --> 00:12:37.480 a series of events and the resultant decisions together form a chain of events leading 126 00:12:37.519 --> 00:12:43.519 to an outcome. In his article Accident Prone Pilots, doctor Patrick R. 127 00:12:43.639 --> 00:12:50.240 Valetti uses the history of Captain Everyman to demonstrate how aircraft accidents are caused more 128 00:12:50.320 --> 00:12:56.200 by a chain of poor choices rather than one single poor choice. In the 129 00:12:56.279 --> 00:13:01.399 case of Captain Everyman, after a year up landing accident, he became involved 130 00:13:01.440 --> 00:13:05.200 in another accident. While taxing a beach fifty eight p baron out of the 131 00:13:05.279 --> 00:13:09.240 ramp. Interrupted by a radio call from the dispatcher, every Man neglected to 132 00:13:09.279 --> 00:13:13.919 complete the fuel cross feed check before taking off. Every Man, who was 133 00:13:13.960 --> 00:13:20.240 flying solo, left the right fuel selector in the cross feed position. Once 134 00:13:20.279 --> 00:13:24.279 aloft and cruising, he noticed a right roll tendency and corrected with ailer on 135 00:13:24.399 --> 00:13:28.759 trim. He did not realize that both engines were feeding off the left wing's 136 00:13:28.799 --> 00:13:33.759 tank, making the wing lighter. After two hours of flight, the right 137 00:13:33.799 --> 00:13:37.879 engine quit when every Man was flying along a deep canyon gorge. While he 138 00:13:37.919 --> 00:13:43.000 was trying to troubleshoot the cause of the right engine's failure. The left engine 139 00:13:43.080 --> 00:13:46.919 quit. Every Man lended the aircraft on a river sand bar, but it 140 00:13:48.000 --> 00:13:52.679 sank into ten feet of water. Several years later, every Man flew at 141 00:13:52.759 --> 00:13:58.039 Havel and twin Otter to deliver supplies to a remote location. When he returned 142 00:13:58.039 --> 00:14:01.759 to home base and landed the air aircraft veered sharply to the left, departed 143 00:14:01.759 --> 00:14:05.679 the runway, and ran into a marsh three hundred and seventy five feet from 144 00:14:05.679 --> 00:14:13.960 the runway. The airframe and engines sustained considerable damage. Upon inspecting the wreck, 145 00:14:13.320 --> 00:14:20.200 accident investigators found the nosewheel steering tiller in the fully deflected position. Both 146 00:14:20.240 --> 00:14:24.799 the after takeoff and before landing checklist required the tiller to be placed in the 147 00:14:24.879 --> 00:14:33.399 neutral position. Every man had overlooked this item now is every man accident prone 148 00:14:33.600 --> 00:14:39.120 or just unlucky? Skipping details on a checklist appears to be a common theme 149 00:14:39.200 --> 00:14:43.879 in the preceding accidents. While most pilots have made similar mistakes, these errors 150 00:14:43.879 --> 00:14:48.960 were probably caught prior to a mishap due to extra margin, good warning systems, 151 00:14:50.039 --> 00:14:54.679 a sharp copilot, or just good luck. What makes a pilot less 152 00:14:54.679 --> 00:15:01.000 prone to accidents? The successful pilot possesses the ability to conson trait, manage 153 00:15:01.039 --> 00:15:07.639 workloads, monitor and perform several simultaneous tasks. Some of the latest psychological screenings 154 00:15:07.799 --> 00:15:13.440 used in aviation test applicants for their ability to multitask, measuring both accuracy as 155 00:15:13.480 --> 00:15:20.480 well as the individual's ability to focus attention on several subjects. Simultaneously, the 156 00:15:20.639 --> 00:15:26.240 FAA oversaw an extensive research study on the similarities and dissimilarities of accident free pilots 157 00:15:26.240 --> 00:15:31.480 and those who were not. The projects surveyed over four thousand pilots, half 158 00:15:31.480 --> 00:15:35.200 of whom had clean records, while the other half had been involved in an 159 00:15:35.200 --> 00:15:41.559 accident. Five traits were discovered in pilots prone to having accidents. These pilots 160 00:15:43.360 --> 00:15:48.519 have disdained toward rules, have very high correlation between accidents on their flying records 161 00:15:48.519 --> 00:15:54.480 and safety violations on their driving records. Frequently fall into the thrill and adventure 162 00:15:54.519 --> 00:16:02.720 seeking personality category, are impulsive rather the methodical and disciplined, both in their 163 00:16:02.759 --> 00:16:07.080 information gathering and in the speed and selection of actions to be taken. A 164 00:16:07.200 --> 00:16:14.720 disregard for and under utilization of outside sources of information, including copilots, flight 165 00:16:14.759 --> 00:16:22.399 attendants, flight service personnel, flight instructors, and air traffic controllers. End 166 00:16:22.480 --> 00:16:23.559 of Part two of Chapter seventeen.