WEBVTT 1 00:00:00.600 --> 00:00:05.000 Why everyone. Today's a big day because Jason and I, who were former 2 00:00:05.400 --> 00:00:10.720 Team House groupies, have now been elevated to running our own podcast. We're 3 00:00:10.759 --> 00:00:14.519 still on the so at the little table, you know, forty minutes, 4 00:00:15.279 --> 00:00:20.600 but the you know, in all seriousness, this podcast is meant to complement 5 00:00:20.719 --> 00:00:24.839 its big and more sophisticated brother, the Team House. I know that we're 6 00:00:24.879 --> 00:00:28.800 probably not used to hearing the term the team House and sophisticated rolled up in 7 00:00:28.839 --> 00:00:32.759 the same sentence, but it's all relative. So in a moment, we're 8 00:00:32.759 --> 00:00:37.719 going to introduce ourselves. I'm going to talk a little bit, very briefly 9 00:00:37.719 --> 00:00:40.759 about what this podcast is about. Okay, and there's a lot of things 10 00:00:40.799 --> 00:00:46.079 it's not. It's not a part of an echo chamber. Is two guys 11 00:00:46.119 --> 00:00:51.759 who are reasonably well informed from their background, the experience, but most importantly, 12 00:00:51.799 --> 00:00:57.039 I hope have enough emotional intelligence between us not to not to let this 13 00:00:57.280 --> 00:01:03.759 just become a you know again, echo chamber and reciting match. So for 14 00:01:03.840 --> 00:01:10.400 me, I'm Andy, as I said, longtime, longtime Teamhouse groupie and 15 00:01:10.799 --> 00:01:18.599 former marine, former founder of the Mozart group, now washed up doing podcasts 16 00:01:19.040 --> 00:01:23.040 for Ford Talking. Actually, I'm very thrilled to be doing so, Jaysonovid 17 00:01:23.079 --> 00:01:30.079 you Thanks Andy. I'm Jason. I'm also a longtime Teamhouse fan. Jack 18 00:01:30.159 --> 00:01:34.120 and I go back to our days when I worked for him writing for Soft 19 00:01:34.239 --> 00:01:40.560 Rep and we've stayed friends ever since. Met Dave at the Teamhouse as well, 20 00:01:40.799 --> 00:01:44.040 and you know, I've been a guest a few times on there, 21 00:01:44.120 --> 00:01:49.439 co hosted once and I have a background for marine ten years, worked in 22 00:01:49.519 --> 00:01:56.680 nuclear security and then did eight years at CIA or Central Intelligence Agency. And 23 00:01:57.159 --> 00:02:00.519 I'm happy to be here and see where we go with this, right and 24 00:02:00.560 --> 00:02:12.560 then for all women listeners in particular, d I'm Dmitri. Yeah, that's 25 00:02:12.560 --> 00:02:15.759 why I'm here for the sex appeal. I'm Dmitri. I'm the producer of 26 00:02:15.800 --> 00:02:19.360 the Team House, and I think this is gonna be a fun show. 27 00:02:19.400 --> 00:02:22.080 I was a huge fan of when you guys were on the show. I 28 00:02:22.120 --> 00:02:24.680 think you guys did a great job guest hosting the show. And uh, 29 00:02:25.199 --> 00:02:28.639 you know, we were sitting around like what would make sense in terms of 30 00:02:28.639 --> 00:02:30.800 a vertical for the Teamhouse, because we really try to showcase our guests, 31 00:02:32.400 --> 00:02:37.319 would be something that's more topical, more current events driven, you know, 32 00:02:37.439 --> 00:02:43.000 in terms of geopolitics, less so domestic current events, and I think you 33 00:02:43.039 --> 00:02:46.840 two guys would make like a perfect team. The two marine thing I did 34 00:02:46.919 --> 00:02:51.400 not. That's like a happy accident. I guess you can call it. 35 00:02:51.400 --> 00:02:53.800 It wasn't on purpose. You know. Hopefully you guys don't blow it too 36 00:02:53.800 --> 00:03:01.159 bad. Well, yeah, I mean, at least are you bring our 37 00:03:01.199 --> 00:03:07.560 collective IQ up at least to room temperature? Hey, so you know we've 38 00:03:07.599 --> 00:03:09.840 already blown for you a few minutes here. They typically the episode is going 39 00:03:09.879 --> 00:03:14.919 to be about forty to forty five minutes, so about about the length of 40 00:03:14.919 --> 00:03:19.520 a commute or a PT session. And today to jump right into it, 41 00:03:19.560 --> 00:03:24.719 of course, the elephant in the room is the ah the much expected and 42 00:03:24.960 --> 00:03:32.159 assumed to be imminent retaliation strikes that the that the President and the administration had 43 00:03:32.199 --> 00:03:39.919 been talking about delivering against Iran and or proxies and retaliation or the hit by 44 00:03:40.000 --> 00:03:44.400 a drone on Tower twenty two. Jason, what do you do you are 45 00:03:44.400 --> 00:03:47.639 you familiar with Tower twenty two? I am not. I can actually say 46 00:03:47.639 --> 00:03:51.120 that I'm the broad area. I have a little bit of knowledge, but 47 00:03:51.240 --> 00:03:55.080 Tower twenty two I have been trying to catch up on. Okay, cool, 48 00:03:55.199 --> 00:04:00.159 all right, I planted that question on Jason. So that so that 49 00:04:00.199 --> 00:04:02.560 we can talk a little bit about Tower twenty two without appearing to be too 50 00:04:02.639 --> 00:04:08.199 much of a diversion for the more cognizanti among our guests. Okay, so 51 00:04:08.439 --> 00:04:14.319 Tower twenty two is a it's a it's an extremely small If I use the 52 00:04:14.439 --> 00:04:18.279 term base, then you know, I grant I make it so much granded 53 00:04:18.319 --> 00:04:25.879 that it is. It is a combat outposts essentially just within the Jordanian border, 54 00:04:25.959 --> 00:04:30.480 kind of in the triborder area between the rack Syria and Jordan. It's 55 00:04:30.519 --> 00:04:36.839 only about six miles for instance, from the Iraqi border and around the same 56 00:04:36.879 --> 00:04:43.000 actually to the Syrian border. Now it's it's a bit of a shithole. 57 00:04:43.199 --> 00:04:49.839 And you may have this hasn't been used coverage of it yet from the of 58 00:04:50.160 --> 00:04:55.240 the drone strink, but what we are hearing is that it hit a you 59 00:04:55.319 --> 00:04:58.879 accommodation Carter is Now that that makes it sound too grand. I will tell 60 00:04:58.879 --> 00:05:02.399 you that that accommodation quarters not only last time I was there, which was 61 00:05:02.680 --> 00:05:06.879 you know, three years ago, but I'm told even up to until now 62 00:05:09.360 --> 00:05:13.920 was it was nothing like one might expect. But it was heavily sandbagged, 63 00:05:15.720 --> 00:05:20.439 and you know there was there were bunkers available, and all of the all 64 00:05:20.480 --> 00:05:25.720 of the above. It's very easy after an occasion like this to start, 65 00:05:25.839 --> 00:05:30.319 you know, to talk about all the things that went wrong. So typically 66 00:05:30.360 --> 00:05:33.879 there's about three hundred and fifty guys there, three hundred to three hundred and 67 00:05:33.920 --> 00:05:40.040 fifty. That hasn't changed much since we the United States started using Tower twenty 68 00:05:40.079 --> 00:05:42.759 two and late twenty fourteen. And the reason why we use it, the 69 00:05:42.800 --> 00:05:47.279 reason why we have a garrison there is simply to supply another come at our 70 00:05:47.399 --> 00:05:53.439 post called our tenth, which is twenty kimeters twelve miles into Syria. I'm 71 00:05:53.480 --> 00:05:58.839 almost directly north actually a little bit northwest. Now Our tenth is extremely important 72 00:05:58.879 --> 00:06:05.079 to the United States. It's manned by a very small garrison typically in soft 73 00:06:05.160 --> 00:06:14.759 terms and AO B company of M s F guys plus a collection of Indigenous 74 00:06:14.759 --> 00:06:25.439 Indigenous soldiers and Indigenous force Syrians and Andy, what does AOB mean? Yeah 75 00:06:25.519 --> 00:06:28.800 you're here? Yeah, there was a company level heads. You know what? 76 00:06:30.680 --> 00:06:36.079 Uh, you know what? The army SF community is gonna just kill 77 00:06:36.160 --> 00:06:45.279 me. Alpha the Bravo something operating based Bravo, right, AOB? What 78 00:06:45.279 --> 00:06:50.959 does he A stand for? Alpha? No? God? You know what 79 00:06:51.240 --> 00:06:56.240 Okay, I'm going to be lambassed listeners. You're talking about two marines, 80 00:06:56.279 --> 00:07:00.720 but I'll remember what AOB stands for. But essentially it is an army SF 81 00:07:00.759 --> 00:07:10.199 company. Is it an advanced operating based Yeah? Is that you know what? 82 00:07:10.319 --> 00:07:14.879 We've already gonna have like five thousand emails front, yes, okay, 83 00:07:14.959 --> 00:07:17.800 right in the right in the comments they get taken off. Yeah, let 84 00:07:17.839 --> 00:07:23.800 me continue anyway. Al Tam all right, you know all together, and 85 00:07:24.120 --> 00:07:28.879 numbers there vary, but it's seldom above two hundred dudes. Now TAMP has 86 00:07:28.920 --> 00:07:31.319 been manned around the same time since twenty fifteen. The reason why Al Tamp 87 00:07:31.439 --> 00:07:36.160 is important and the reason why we have a small garrison of Special Obersions troops 88 00:07:36.199 --> 00:07:41.120 there, which is a great example by the way of self achieving strategic effect, 89 00:07:41.639 --> 00:07:44.720 is because of its location, all right, not just near the Trient 90 00:07:44.759 --> 00:07:50.079 border region, but it's lies astride the old bad Dad Damascus Highway which is 91 00:07:50.160 --> 00:07:58.879 now which is now a weapons running route. And and you know what, 92 00:07:59.040 --> 00:08:01.800 you've heard this term used many times part of the land bridge, right that 93 00:08:03.639 --> 00:08:09.160 that line has pretty much the facto established between or you know, all the 94 00:08:09.160 --> 00:08:15.240 way to the sea across a rock in Syria. So our tamp is important. 95 00:08:15.399 --> 00:08:20.639 It's a it's a it's a fall in the side of our of the 96 00:08:20.680 --> 00:08:26.480 Syrian regime. It's a fall in the side obviously of Uranians and Russians there 97 00:08:26.600 --> 00:08:31.080 too, But it's of great importance to the US. And because of that 98 00:08:31.399 --> 00:08:35.279 Tower twenty two is important. And why are they all there? While they're 99 00:08:35.279 --> 00:08:39.159 there? Partly, of course, I mean presence in Syria, which is 100 00:08:39.200 --> 00:08:43.360 pretty h the most volatile we thought the most volatile place until it's Rother talk 101 00:08:43.399 --> 00:08:48.399 about price recently. But more importantly, you know, keep an eye on 102 00:08:48.399 --> 00:08:52.399 the Islamic state, but also keep an eye on our on on you know, 103 00:08:52.480 --> 00:08:56.399 the other bad rather adversarial actors in Syria, namely Russia and Iran. 104 00:08:56.879 --> 00:09:01.519 All right, and you know, again when talking about light footprint, heavy 105 00:09:01.559 --> 00:09:05.879 footprint, I think how tamph is exactly you know, well, it's kind 106 00:09:05.879 --> 00:09:09.960 of the what we are seeing across the world and we will continue to see 107 00:09:09.000 --> 00:09:15.720 increasingly as far as US presence, a very light footprint, not a not 108 00:09:16.360 --> 00:09:20.759 not in a typical way. Tason back to you, any any you know, 109 00:09:20.799 --> 00:09:24.279 any anything to to add or ask deep before I go on to I 110 00:09:24.320 --> 00:09:31.200 can talk a little bit about the tach itself and what happened afterwards est as 111 00:09:31.279 --> 00:09:33.720 far so I, you know, me, I look at things from an 112 00:09:33.759 --> 00:09:41.039 intelligence perspective, and where would what would I be thinking? Not necessarily from 113 00:09:41.039 --> 00:09:45.159 the President on down, but at least from the the ambassador, from that 114 00:09:45.279 --> 00:09:48.840 regional you know, command area on down. Uh. And for me, 115 00:09:50.720 --> 00:09:54.080 as soon as I got the word that this is happening as a as an 116 00:09:54.080 --> 00:09:58.919 intelligence agency, I would want to spool up my assets and want to know 117 00:10:01.200 --> 00:10:03.919 we have an idea. You know, the the the media is saying it's 118 00:10:03.960 --> 00:10:07.919 Iran. We pretty much know it is, but I would want to know 119 00:10:07.120 --> 00:10:11.679 solid concrete evidence that it's Iran. So I'd be spoiling my assets. Who 120 00:10:11.720 --> 00:10:16.159 did it? What was that the actual target? What was the endgame here? 121 00:10:16.879 --> 00:10:20.759 You know, try to get those kind of things quite answered so that 122 00:10:20.879 --> 00:10:24.799 when the President and Joint chiefs and everyone else are brief that they have all 123 00:10:24.840 --> 00:10:30.279 the information. And uh. The reason why this show is called eyes on 124 00:10:30.440 --> 00:10:33.519 is because we have you know, you have eyes on the target. We 125 00:10:33.559 --> 00:10:37.000 have eyes on who we think it is. But until we have solid intel, 126 00:10:37.320 --> 00:10:41.120 that's all it is. So that's the kind of stuff that I would 127 00:10:41.159 --> 00:10:43.879 want to be pushing. Yeah, I mean that that's a great that's a 128 00:10:43.879 --> 00:10:48.240 really good point. Glad to hear it, Jason, and I love I'll 129 00:10:48.240 --> 00:10:50.279 bring in one of Jack's favorite terms that you know, when you when you 130 00:10:50.399 --> 00:10:56.840 have a gallery of people howling for uh, you know, hewling for blood 131 00:10:56.840 --> 00:11:03.360 and willing to expend the last drop of other people's blood on the American side 132 00:11:03.399 --> 00:11:07.519 to deferther the cause. You know it, all of us get a get 133 00:11:07.519 --> 00:11:11.480 a little concerned, you know, without being snowflakes. Right, but I 134 00:11:11.519 --> 00:11:16.360 think, well, I do know you know what you say is exactly right. 135 00:11:16.399 --> 00:11:22.039 I mean, it's corroboration and it's removal a plausible deniability from Iran that's 136 00:11:22.480 --> 00:11:30.320 in order to strike into Iran and or even you know Iranian targets goods force, 137 00:11:30.399 --> 00:11:35.879 which we've already done many times Iraqan. But to do it again then 138 00:11:37.080 --> 00:11:41.919 certainly we need that kind of that smoking gun. K not not. I 139 00:11:41.960 --> 00:11:52.039 mean, it's interesting. Peddicon spokesman said this had the hallmarks of kh very 140 00:11:52.039 --> 00:11:56.799 good. Yeah, Katar has follow nothing to do with Big Daddy has followed 141 00:11:56.919 --> 00:12:03.320 and Lebanon katas followed, is a a pro Iranean militia Because you've seen you 142 00:12:03.360 --> 00:12:09.000 know, you've seen a group that no one's ever heard of before, right 143 00:12:09.080 --> 00:12:13.360 the I forget what it was, the Islamic Resistance, whatever it was, 144 00:12:13.399 --> 00:12:20.600 the Army claiming responsibility. But you know, if you've got a Pentagon spokesman 145 00:12:20.039 --> 00:12:26.200 mentioning k H and saying it has the hallmarks of you can bet that there's 146 00:12:26.200 --> 00:12:31.519 some intelligence. But you know that wasn't that wasn't a throwaway line, so 147 00:12:31.600 --> 00:12:35.519 you know what I mean. And I just say, I just want to 148 00:12:35.559 --> 00:12:39.120 talk a little bit about after math of the attack, because I'm not sure 149 00:12:39.120 --> 00:12:43.080 this was in the media. So about an hour after the attack on Tower 150 00:12:43.120 --> 00:12:48.879 twenty two, and you can imagine, you know, the absolute pandemonium there. 151 00:12:48.919 --> 00:12:52.039 I mean, these guys were not I mean, the Army reserve is 152 00:12:54.039 --> 00:12:58.600 certainly not. It's not the same as if a drone had hit our tank. 153 00:12:58.720 --> 00:13:01.519 Let me it that way, you know, it's it must have been 154 00:13:03.600 --> 00:13:07.879 very confusing. Well, and another attack, another drone, some of the 155 00:13:09.039 --> 00:13:13.759 type suspected Iranian made. Not not quite a loitering munition, not that sophisticated, 156 00:13:13.759 --> 00:13:18.720 but it was a you know, it was a one way suicide drone 157 00:13:20.399 --> 00:13:24.159 gave me to attack out tap and was destroyed, all right, by one 158 00:13:24.200 --> 00:13:28.960 of the anti drone systems they had there. I think it was a coyote. 159 00:13:28.200 --> 00:13:33.639 It's a Raythian system. Apparently it's pretty I've heard it's pretty effective. 160 00:13:33.639 --> 00:13:35.559 But if anyone out there has heard differently, please, you know, please 161 00:13:35.600 --> 00:13:39.519 pile in. Which is a kind of a good news story. But but 162 00:13:39.679 --> 00:13:45.120 my point being this was obviously was it was a very well, you know, 163 00:13:45.159 --> 00:13:48.360 it was a planned attack, and and it was you know, it 164 00:13:48.399 --> 00:13:54.480 wasn't just a lucky shot from from some dude in The attack came from within 165 00:13:54.519 --> 00:13:58.600 Iraq. We know that much. So it is conceivable certainly that it was 166 00:13:58.639 --> 00:14:03.240 kh And when people talk about the hallmarks of cage, you know, it 167 00:14:03.279 --> 00:14:05.960 would be not just the type of drone which was at Iranian manufacture, but 168 00:14:07.000 --> 00:14:11.559 it would be various other things, even down perhaps to the operators who used 169 00:14:11.559 --> 00:14:16.240 it. So to be interesting to see now, Jason, you know, 170 00:14:16.279 --> 00:14:20.799 in answer to when you were talking about, yeah, right right on target. 171 00:14:20.840 --> 00:14:26.080 That's it's very easy in kind of the silence after after the strike. 172 00:14:26.200 --> 00:14:31.519 You know that that stun silence for people to be howling in that vacuum. 173 00:14:31.639 --> 00:14:33.279 So we need to do this or that. It's much more difficult to be 174 00:14:33.320 --> 00:14:39.320 in a leadership position, remembering that you you know, you're at the helm 175 00:14:39.360 --> 00:14:41.320 of the United States. It has to be seen to act in a way 176 00:14:41.639 --> 00:14:46.000 that is in constlet with US law. Yes, I know that seldom happens, 177 00:14:46.080 --> 00:14:50.600 but that you know, that is what's going on. And the challengehip 178 00:14:50.639 --> 00:14:56.080 course is the you know, the smoking gun is intent, right, and 179 00:14:56.200 --> 00:15:01.720 did the Iranians intent for this to happen. That's what the Ranians would like 180 00:15:01.960 --> 00:15:09.320 to assume. But the smoking gun is the fact that Iran has supplied has 181 00:15:09.360 --> 00:15:13.919 made these organizations capable of these attacks in the first place. Right. Intent 182 00:15:15.080 --> 00:15:20.919 is icing on the cape could have you know, Coos Force, could have 183 00:15:20.000 --> 00:15:26.360 foreseen that their prodigas would want to you know, exercise control of their weapons 184 00:15:26.799 --> 00:15:31.639 by themselves sooner or later. Absolutely, And I think something else to think 185 00:15:31.639 --> 00:15:37.639 about too is the uh, the tangible benefits to Iran of this attack like 186 00:15:37.639 --> 00:15:41.399 this. I mean, yes, you get the you know, you have 187 00:15:41.480 --> 00:15:46.519 the debts and wounding of US service personnel, you have the the United States 188 00:15:46.600 --> 00:15:48.559 looking at its vulnerability in the area. You have them now you know, 189 00:15:48.639 --> 00:15:56.360 people within the US government and otherwise questioning administration and response to all this stuff. 190 00:15:56.399 --> 00:16:00.720 But they also have the benefit of turning the world attention away from their 191 00:16:00.840 --> 00:16:07.080 own internal Iran's internal issues, that terrorism that they're you know, all of 192 00:16:07.120 --> 00:16:11.279 that stuff. So something to think about. Yeah, Jason, really a 193 00:16:11.320 --> 00:16:15.399 really good point. So you know, when we're talking about striking back, 194 00:16:15.480 --> 00:16:22.600 and again, you know there's the there there would be warriors who who say, 195 00:16:22.679 --> 00:16:26.679 yeah, we should strike white into Iran itself, okay, and there's 196 00:16:26.679 --> 00:16:30.399 a I'm not you know, I wouldn't I wouldn't say a blanket no to 197 00:16:30.480 --> 00:16:33.720 that, but I would say there's some You've got to bear in mind some 198 00:16:33.799 --> 00:16:37.279 things. One thing is, you know, the Persian mentality, very proud 199 00:16:37.399 --> 00:16:44.240 people. They they do have a history to prove, recent history of dissent. 200 00:16:44.639 --> 00:16:48.519 But if you strike Iran, you're going to watch everyone unite behind the 201 00:16:48.600 --> 00:16:53.320 regime, which is exactly the same. Yeah, so we've got to you 202 00:16:53.360 --> 00:16:56.440 know, it's I'm not I'm not saying obviously, hey, that's too high 203 00:16:56.440 --> 00:17:00.600 a price, but we've got to understand that that is the price. Right, 204 00:17:00.039 --> 00:17:03.519 just as in the same way as when we hit SOLEMANI we knew likely 205 00:17:03.640 --> 00:17:07.279 that US servicemen would die in retaliation. Right, It's going to be a 206 00:17:07.319 --> 00:17:15.640 deliberate decision and that, yeah, and so, and you know there are 207 00:17:15.960 --> 00:17:19.920 I mean, I think it's such a trikeliche saying we have a range of 208 00:17:19.960 --> 00:17:23.440 options. But there are a range of options, but they have to be 209 00:17:23.480 --> 00:17:26.480 imaginative. We can't do more of the same, right, what is more 210 00:17:26.480 --> 00:17:33.720 of the same. We have conducted I think eight strikes. I'm not counting 211 00:17:33.799 --> 00:17:38.720 Yemen. I'm just talking Iran and Iraq and Syria since October the seventh right 212 00:17:38.920 --> 00:17:48.480 to include two in which we specifically targeted IRGC personnel, both in Syria on 213 00:17:48.720 --> 00:17:52.079 I believe it was eight and twelve of November. So there are precedents. 214 00:17:52.160 --> 00:17:57.440 Right, We've already killed Iranians in Iraq and Syria. We have not killed 215 00:17:57.680 --> 00:18:03.240 Iranians in Iraq in Iran itself. In fact, the last time we killed 216 00:18:03.279 --> 00:18:07.559 Iranians that were not in Iran Syria was nineteen eighty eight as part of an 217 00:18:07.559 --> 00:18:11.519 operation called Praying Mantis. And so my point is simply this, this is 218 00:18:11.559 --> 00:18:15.359 a big precedent. It's not simply okay, hey, let's do this. 219 00:18:15.519 --> 00:18:18.880 And you know why we haven't done that because there is some kind of an 220 00:18:19.000 --> 00:18:26.440 unspoken understanding between the Iranians and the US on this are what are the real 221 00:18:26.519 --> 00:18:33.880 red lines, okay, and US and striking Iranian homeland is one of those 222 00:18:33.920 --> 00:18:38.519 red lines. And that is why the United States has been a conciliatory or 223 00:18:38.839 --> 00:18:45.720 had a conciliatory effect on Israel whenever Israel goes on the war path demanding war 224 00:18:45.839 --> 00:18:49.240 with Iran. So we'll see, you know. But when I say range 225 00:18:49.240 --> 00:18:52.799 of options, and you know, it's got to be it's got to escalate 226 00:18:52.839 --> 00:18:56.599 it beyond what we've done so far. So what could that be? Well, 227 00:18:56.640 --> 00:19:03.000 it could be a comprehensive strike right erad Syria, but also the Persian 228 00:19:03.000 --> 00:19:10.240 Gulf, Iranian naval assets, who knows, maybe infrastructure in the Persian Gulf 229 00:19:10.359 --> 00:19:15.640 right which would also you know, have an economic impact on Iran. When 230 00:19:15.680 --> 00:19:21.000 I say strikes, I mean if there is a smoking grind connecting the drone 231 00:19:21.640 --> 00:19:26.920 with you know, with ILGC, as I'm sure there is, then then 232 00:19:26.400 --> 00:19:33.480 then removing IRGC capability or severely diminishing not just lacking one or two dudes, 233 00:19:33.519 --> 00:19:41.400 but I mean going after kingpins and facilities and infrastructure in such a manner that 234 00:19:41.480 --> 00:19:47.440 we prevent the IRGC from being able to operate effectively over a period of time. 235 00:19:47.880 --> 00:19:52.359 Okay, that's that's a reasonable expectation and it and it hurts Iran and 236 00:19:52.720 --> 00:19:55.960 it gives us a sense of possible done. Well were they doing there anyway? 237 00:19:56.079 --> 00:19:59.960 You say, you know, and it keeps us on the moral high 238 00:20:00.079 --> 00:20:03.920 ground. And there's you know, as you guys know, there's a there's 239 00:20:03.960 --> 00:20:11.519 a whole welter of other stuff we do in the cyber realm that that doesn't 240 00:20:11.559 --> 00:20:17.160 even get noticed or talked about. The dumb thing to do would be to, 241 00:20:17.920 --> 00:20:22.440 you know, to to go all hands out and send tens of thousands 242 00:20:22.440 --> 00:20:26.559 of troops out to the Middle East where they provide just a greater effective target 243 00:20:26.599 --> 00:20:30.279 for the Iranians. The other dumb thing to do would be to withdraw troops 244 00:20:30.480 --> 00:20:33.519 from the Middle East, right we you know, as I said, the 245 00:20:33.519 --> 00:20:38.680 pattern that we should maintain that is, you know, light footprint bass similar 246 00:20:38.720 --> 00:20:45.920 to our time for Tower twenty two. Obviously well fortified, secure, armed 247 00:20:45.960 --> 00:20:51.519 with mostly i mean man most of the soft guys, but not mostly soft 248 00:20:51.519 --> 00:20:55.680 guys, as there are in those soft needs. Soft needs conventional horses in 249 00:20:55.759 --> 00:21:00.279 order to operate and survives, so conventional forces there are support with soft doing 250 00:21:00.279 --> 00:21:04.640 the operations. You have minimal risks there and you have the prettiest potential for 251 00:21:04.799 --> 00:21:10.079 strategic effect. Of course, the Iraqis are going to pretty decide what our 252 00:21:10.119 --> 00:21:14.640 footprint is pretty soon within Iraq. You guys said that. That was one 253 00:21:14.680 --> 00:21:18.319 of the questions I wanted to ask, was what happens with that like tentative 254 00:21:18.359 --> 00:21:22.880 deal of us getting out of Iraq that they announced? Kind of does that, 255 00:21:23.440 --> 00:21:26.000 you know, uh, throw our wrench in that? Are you going 256 00:21:26.079 --> 00:21:30.839 to stay in Iraq in terms of like soft or whatever, and something makes 257 00:21:30.880 --> 00:21:37.319 it more difficult for us? Right and as far as containment containing Iranian influence, 258 00:21:37.960 --> 00:21:41.920 but we weren't doing that pretty tall but doing that anyway, I mean, 259 00:21:41.960 --> 00:21:48.839 we weren't containing Iranian influence by having military guys there, so I you 260 00:21:48.880 --> 00:21:56.319 know, yeah, obviously I'm not I'm not dismissing our dismissal from Iraq as 261 00:21:56.359 --> 00:21:59.279 being unimportant. What I am saying, of course, you know, is 262 00:22:00.039 --> 00:22:03.359 that that we can we can accomplish the mission from other places where we know 263 00:22:03.480 --> 00:22:07.119 we so quick. I got a question, like a laming question, what 264 00:22:07.160 --> 00:22:10.400 does it look like? Does it just look like more air strikes more often? 265 00:22:10.799 --> 00:22:14.240 Is it? Is it setding like you know, two hundred rangers in 266 00:22:14.279 --> 00:22:18.400 adulta squadron to go smoke, you know, command and control guys, like, 267 00:22:18.480 --> 00:22:21.559 what does it look like in terms of our response from the head on 268 00:22:21.640 --> 00:22:25.079 Tower twenty two? I mean, I'm sorry to take go ahead. What 269 00:22:25.119 --> 00:22:26.759 do you do? You know? I mean, I mean you're you're a 270 00:22:26.759 --> 00:22:34.079 little bit closer to the strategic military response than I am. But I would 271 00:22:34.079 --> 00:22:38.920 think that for right now, what you don't really you don't fix what's not 272 00:22:38.920 --> 00:22:42.400 broken. The air strikes are working, and we're hitting the targets that we 273 00:22:42.440 --> 00:22:45.400 want to hit and killing the people we want to kill for lack of a 274 00:22:45.440 --> 00:22:49.759 better term, and and it's all going to depend on we hit what does 275 00:22:49.799 --> 00:22:52.400 Iran do? We hit what does Iran do? It's just I think it's 276 00:22:52.400 --> 00:22:56.160 going to depend on that. But I think all that other stuff you mentioned, 277 00:22:56.240 --> 00:23:00.400 the soft teams, the ranger battalions, all that stuff, that's all 278 00:23:00.440 --> 00:23:03.559 brewing underneath, and they're ready to go. I'm sure staged and ready to 279 00:23:03.599 --> 00:23:07.480 go, or at least the word has come down be ready to go. 280 00:23:07.720 --> 00:23:11.319 But I think because we've set the president, and this is my opinion, 281 00:23:11.359 --> 00:23:15.599 set the president already between the who thi's and the strikes that we've done in 282 00:23:15.680 --> 00:23:19.039 Iraq, and all I think we might keep that up for a little bit 283 00:23:19.799 --> 00:23:26.160 and wait and see what I Ran is the government's going to do, and 284 00:23:26.240 --> 00:23:29.759 something else. To piggyback on what you're saying, Andy, it made me 285 00:23:29.799 --> 00:23:37.200 think about another benefit quote unquote for Iran is the entity that would be willing 286 00:23:37.400 --> 00:23:41.960 to go into Iran and has proven that they would do it, which is 287 00:23:41.960 --> 00:23:47.039 Israel. They've got their own stuff going on, so we can't necessarily call 288 00:23:47.079 --> 00:23:48.400 on them, not saying that we won't, not saying that they can't, 289 00:23:48.559 --> 00:23:52.720 but it would appear that right now they're tied up, you know, with 290 00:23:52.759 --> 00:23:56.920 what's going on in Gaza. So you know, that's another thing that not 291 00:23:56.960 --> 00:24:00.880 necessarily take off the table, but it's something we may say, Okay, 292 00:24:00.960 --> 00:24:03.559 we'll have to keep that to the side, you know, until the Israelis 293 00:24:03.680 --> 00:24:07.480 you know, give us the green light that they can do it, the 294 00:24:08.359 --> 00:24:12.480 the in in you know, just to piggyback on what Jason said, and 295 00:24:12.720 --> 00:24:18.240 I agree, Yeah, the strikes are largely I mean when I say working 296 00:24:18.279 --> 00:24:23.720 that that's certainly hurting that Iran I would imagine. But when I talk about 297 00:24:25.079 --> 00:24:30.079 a difference an escalation, I mean synchronizing strikes to remove a capability. I 298 00:24:30.079 --> 00:24:34.799 mean, think about what we've been doing simply before, is you know, 299 00:24:34.880 --> 00:24:40.519 we something is done against us, and we retaliate, but it's a proportional 300 00:24:41.119 --> 00:24:44.359 retaliation, right, and then we de escalate, you know, we kind 301 00:24:44.359 --> 00:24:47.319 of say, okay, that was it, you know, don't don't fuck 302 00:24:47.359 --> 00:24:49.039 around again, or we'll do it, only it'll be worse next time. 303 00:24:49.119 --> 00:24:55.599 Right, this time we need to ramp, you know, we we really 304 00:24:55.640 --> 00:25:03.960 need to hurt Iran's capability, all right, it's ability to control those proxies, 305 00:25:03.240 --> 00:25:07.960 to to have an effect on those proxies. We're hitting right at the 306 00:25:07.480 --> 00:25:11.960 right at the point that hurt us, right, We're not you know, 307 00:25:11.000 --> 00:25:15.319 we're not going through some esoteric route or sanctioning and all of that, right, 308 00:25:15.319 --> 00:25:18.240 I mean, yes, we do. We continue to do that, 309 00:25:18.599 --> 00:25:23.119 but that okay, it's not about just strikes. It's about what are those 310 00:25:23.160 --> 00:25:29.920 strikes doing, how they're coordinated and timed that that could have a different effect 311 00:25:30.000 --> 00:25:33.400 when you talk about and again I don't find you know, people chime in 312 00:25:33.440 --> 00:25:37.599 on this today disagree, But when when we're going against a state actor, 313 00:25:38.640 --> 00:25:44.160 are the roles that soft play obviously change? Right? So it's I mean, 314 00:25:44.200 --> 00:25:48.000 it's very little door kicking and grabbing people. The door kicking is normally 315 00:25:48.079 --> 00:25:53.599 involved in kinetic strikes where you use soft and normally involved in taking out key 316 00:25:53.720 --> 00:25:59.279 infrastructure where there is fear of colladal damage if we go in with strikes or 317 00:25:59.279 --> 00:26:03.200 for some other Okay, if you think through a little bit and you can 318 00:26:03.200 --> 00:26:07.599 think of the types of infrastructure that might involve, right, and you know, 319 00:26:07.720 --> 00:26:11.680 doubtless, again, I don't have any I don't have any inswer. 320 00:26:11.920 --> 00:26:15.880 No one's letting me into on the intel on this. I promise you guys 321 00:26:15.599 --> 00:26:22.920 wouldn't. So this is all speculation. Yes, So can I like another 322 00:26:22.000 --> 00:26:26.839 question? So yeah, So that's what I was gonna say, Like they 323 00:26:26.880 --> 00:26:32.119 have to be I'm assuming their CIA and covert stuff is going to be a 324 00:26:32.119 --> 00:26:33.720 big factor in this, right because I assume you so you want to hurt 325 00:26:33.720 --> 00:26:40.960 their capabilities. You want to hurt like how they supply their proxies with equipment, 326 00:26:41.039 --> 00:26:45.200 whether it's drones or AMMO or money or whatever. So I'm assuming the 327 00:26:45.359 --> 00:26:48.920 CIA is going to have a hand in like hitting them there, which I'm 328 00:26:48.960 --> 00:26:56.119 sure they already do Anyway. Yeah, I think people just want right now 329 00:26:56.119 --> 00:27:00.359 because like their especially the Twitter people, they want things to be blowing up 330 00:27:00.559 --> 00:27:03.319 again. We want to see some skyline shots of things blowing up, and 331 00:27:03.359 --> 00:27:07.559 it's I don't know if that's exactly the right way of doing one thing. 332 00:27:07.599 --> 00:27:12.079 It won't be for sure, I'm well, I hope not will be. 333 00:27:12.480 --> 00:27:18.880 You know, a similar series of strikes simply against Tatar Paswama. I mean 334 00:27:19.119 --> 00:27:23.599 because because the problem is more fundamental and endemic than that. We know that, 335 00:27:23.839 --> 00:27:30.640 and it's part of the same problem that's that's resulted in strikes on forty 336 00:27:30.680 --> 00:27:36.160 cargo ships on the Red Seat in the last three months, and not a 337 00:27:36.279 --> 00:27:40.279 single one of those was bound for Israel, you know. I mean, 338 00:27:40.279 --> 00:27:45.720 there was all kinds of weird stories invented to attack these ships, but that 339 00:27:45.920 --> 00:27:51.599 is that's significant too. I mean, twelve percent of the world shipping passes 340 00:27:51.720 --> 00:28:00.599 through the Barbauman debt the band the ban as you you probably heard. So 341 00:28:02.759 --> 00:28:07.559 yeah, it's it is time to take action. But it's going to be 342 00:28:07.599 --> 00:28:11.440 imaginative, right, I mean, it really does. It's not We're beyond 343 00:28:11.960 --> 00:28:18.680 the era of compit bombing countries since thinking that it's taught them anything. And 344 00:28:18.759 --> 00:28:23.480 as we talked about, it's just simply going to drive Iran. It's going 345 00:28:23.559 --> 00:28:29.920 to unite Iran. Yeah, I have one more question. Yeah, ever 346 00:28:29.960 --> 00:28:37.000 since October seventh, and like Israel has been hidden back on Gaza and Hamas, 347 00:28:37.039 --> 00:28:44.039 have these incidences spiked up with Iranian proxies whether obviously the Huthi's Yes, 348 00:28:44.160 --> 00:28:48.359 it's spiked up. But like I'm talking like in Syria hits on US. 349 00:28:48.759 --> 00:28:57.279 Yeah, one hundred and sixty attacks on US troops basis since seven October. 350 00:28:59.319 --> 00:29:03.119 That is meaningless number unless you compare it to before. And I can't give 351 00:29:03.160 --> 00:29:08.880 you exact numbers many times, many times, the numbers of the tacks over 352 00:29:08.920 --> 00:29:14.440 the previous the number of taxes three months. So so would part of the 353 00:29:14.519 --> 00:29:19.680 strategy of retaliating against US getting hit in Iranian proxies is trying to rein back 354 00:29:19.759 --> 00:29:26.240 Israel a little bit in Gaza? Yes, certainly so, I would imagine, 355 00:29:26.440 --> 00:29:30.599 and you know what, whatever again, I mean, we'll talk more 356 00:29:30.599 --> 00:29:37.559 about this is I think I think Jason and my stance is probably going to 357 00:29:37.599 --> 00:29:42.119 be on there, say, look where we're bipartisan or a political but we 358 00:29:42.160 --> 00:29:45.960 do criticize dumb policy and when we see dumb policy regardless, right, Otherwise 359 00:29:47.000 --> 00:29:53.319 this becomes an anodyne pablom show. But but my point here is that it's 360 00:29:53.440 --> 00:30:04.039 not easy. Yes to chart a of course be us Netnia who is whacked 361 00:30:04.720 --> 00:30:11.640 right, and yet we are hitched to his wagon, and for for all 362 00:30:11.720 --> 00:30:17.359 kinds of reasons that you guys understand very politically hitch to his wagon, regardless 363 00:30:17.400 --> 00:30:23.119 of the administration. But but we have this guy who's leading us, right, 364 00:30:23.279 --> 00:30:30.640 he's leading us into a bad place, and and we're watching, we're 365 00:30:30.680 --> 00:30:33.519 facing I mean, we used to to not being a popular, not being 366 00:30:33.559 --> 00:30:37.160 popular in parts of the country, but we're being heavily criticized, even by 367 00:30:37.240 --> 00:30:41.759 our allies, and that should cause us to pause and think, right, 368 00:30:41.920 --> 00:30:49.359 regardless, that's that's that's good policy to do that. But but yes, 369 00:30:49.440 --> 00:30:55.000 and and answer your question, dah I. At the same time, behind 370 00:30:55.039 --> 00:30:59.240 the scenes, I'm sure that I know there's a good deal of pressure taking 371 00:30:59.279 --> 00:31:04.000 place and mill to mill too about trying to cut down on casualties. And 372 00:31:04.039 --> 00:31:10.039 I'll make a controversial actually, i won't make a controversial statement at all at 373 00:31:10.079 --> 00:31:17.680 all, because I'm still awaiting full permission to visit to visit God of Gaza 374 00:31:17.720 --> 00:31:22.279 for my book. Multi follow on that. Oh yeah, And at the 375 00:31:22.359 --> 00:31:30.839 end of the day, Iran's gonna Iran. So they've proven historically that they 376 00:31:30.119 --> 00:31:33.759 don't necessarily operate in a vacuum. They want some sort of a conflict or 377 00:31:33.799 --> 00:31:38.559 some sort of an an issue where they can operate. Now they can insert 378 00:31:38.599 --> 00:31:44.960 themselves. Whether that was in the in the goal for in Iraq when we 379 00:31:45.359 --> 00:31:48.680 went into Iraq, and now look at the issues that are happening, it's 380 00:31:48.720 --> 00:31:55.400 always conflicts, some sort of issue where they insert themselves. So whatever Netanyahu 381 00:31:55.480 --> 00:32:00.039 does, Iran has already taken full advantage of what's going on now. So 382 00:32:00.319 --> 00:32:04.079 I think that that's going to continue for the foreseeable future. So I think 383 00:32:04.160 --> 00:32:07.559 we say, if I'm if I'm the president, which nobody wants. If 384 00:32:07.599 --> 00:32:12.519 I'm the president, you got to let all that external noise go and say, 385 00:32:12.559 --> 00:32:15.359 okay, we'll talk to you in a minute. Now we got to 386 00:32:15.440 --> 00:32:17.759 handle what's going on now. Our three people are dead. We have to 387 00:32:17.759 --> 00:32:22.359 respond to it. So I think that it can be done. People are 388 00:32:22.440 --> 00:32:25.119 very black or white. You know, either you're all in or you're not 389 00:32:25.160 --> 00:32:29.160 in at all. And I don't think that that's how you should go. 390 00:32:29.240 --> 00:32:32.400 How we should govern, how we should our military should respond, Like you 391 00:32:32.400 --> 00:32:37.680 know, Andy's been talking about we have there's layers to it. You know, 392 00:32:37.759 --> 00:32:39.720 we don't have to go all in you know, glass parking lot. 393 00:32:39.839 --> 00:32:43.680 We also don't have to, like you said, pull everybody out and say, 394 00:32:43.680 --> 00:32:46.640 okay, it's yours. You know, we can we can layer our 395 00:32:46.680 --> 00:32:51.759 responses up to a point where we think that we're pushing too far and we're 396 00:32:51.759 --> 00:32:53.720 going to cross the line that's going to result in an all out regional war, 397 00:32:54.079 --> 00:32:57.640 and then we can we don't have to necessarily step back. We just 398 00:32:57.720 --> 00:33:01.480 stop, you know, like we didn't first go for we stopped, you 399 00:33:01.480 --> 00:33:06.759 know, short of you know, running into Iraq and just you know running 400 00:33:06.839 --> 00:33:09.599 ripshot in there, and we we just stopped. And we have that capability. 401 00:33:09.799 --> 00:33:15.519 We just have to you know, the administration and for future administration because 402 00:33:15.519 --> 00:33:19.440 this is I don't believe that this is gonna stop once, you know, 403 00:33:19.440 --> 00:33:24.039 whether Biden's re elected or not. I believe that whoever is in charge needs 404 00:33:24.039 --> 00:33:29.319 to just cut out the external noise and all the crap on social media and 405 00:33:29.440 --> 00:33:32.759 you know, all that stuff and just lead, you know, listen to 406 00:33:32.799 --> 00:33:39.880 your military leaders and you know, move forward that way on a Yeah, 407 00:33:39.920 --> 00:33:44.960 I mean I had one hundred percent, Jason, I couldn't agree more at 408 00:33:44.960 --> 00:33:50.039 the you know, the strategic level, and then you know, at the 409 00:33:50.079 --> 00:33:53.079 way down at the tactical level. It makes me think about our vulnerabilities, 410 00:33:53.279 --> 00:33:58.240 you know, within the soft community. I mean think about you know, 411 00:33:58.279 --> 00:34:05.880 there have been six very high profile US deaths overseas since twenty seventeen. Okay, 412 00:34:05.920 --> 00:34:09.199 I mean that's not but I mean, well two incidents right three in 413 00:34:09.639 --> 00:34:16.239 Nize are twenty seventeen, and then the three hair where US SOFT support personnel 414 00:34:16.440 --> 00:34:22.039 or person that I mean personnel supporting US SOFT were targeted and killed. And 415 00:34:22.079 --> 00:34:24.880 I think that's something we've got to be wary of in the future, you 416 00:34:24.920 --> 00:34:30.599 know. I mean there's a reason why Tower twenty two was targeted, and 417 00:34:30.679 --> 00:34:34.480 there's probably a reason why the drone got through at Tower twenty two and didn't 418 00:34:34.519 --> 00:34:38.000 get through, you know, in Tower tamp Our TAMF was on combat footing 419 00:34:38.000 --> 00:34:45.119 and it was mined with soft personnel. Tower twenty two was part of Jordan 420 00:34:45.199 --> 00:34:47.199 Hill. I mean, you know, an hour or so away you can 421 00:34:47.239 --> 00:34:52.239 get a beer and have a good time. It didn't feel like a war 422 00:34:52.280 --> 00:35:00.119 footing. These guys were you know, reservists, and they were engineers, 423 00:35:00.480 --> 00:35:05.079 not combine engine is. So you know. My point is that, yeah, 424 00:35:05.119 --> 00:35:10.239 we've got gaping vulnerabilities out there across the Middle East, even with a 425 00:35:10.320 --> 00:35:15.639 light footprint, and and it isn't our soft guys who are going to be 426 00:35:15.679 --> 00:35:17.840 taking the brunt of these attacks. And we need to be we need we 427 00:35:17.880 --> 00:35:22.320 need to harden ourselves and really look at that soft part of our footprint going 428 00:35:22.360 --> 00:35:27.920 ahead. I got a question about Tyer twenty two. Did you guys see 429 00:35:27.960 --> 00:35:30.679 like some of the twitter like it is on Twitter, most like the report 430 00:35:30.800 --> 00:35:36.719 saying that it got hit because they tailed a friendly drone into there and they 431 00:35:36.760 --> 00:35:39.159 got in under that. I feel like, is that did you hear? 432 00:35:39.480 --> 00:35:46.599 Is that true? I can't say conclusively it's true that came I guess from 433 00:35:49.400 --> 00:35:52.760 I don't know where it came from, you know, supposedly from guys on 434 00:35:52.800 --> 00:35:57.760 the base. De Pengegon didn't deny that, but there's an investigation going on, 435 00:35:57.880 --> 00:36:00.760 obviously, I mean, think about it. I'm not done I get 436 00:36:00.800 --> 00:36:05.000 at all, but that. But here's what I think happened, because I've 437 00:36:05.000 --> 00:36:07.880 seen this many times. Jason Briley has too. You know, people put 438 00:36:08.119 --> 00:36:13.840 people see things happen. Then probably a US you know, a drone did 439 00:36:13.880 --> 00:36:16.159 return and then shortly after the attack occurred, and people put two and two 440 00:36:16.159 --> 00:36:21.960 together. But it's actually very difficult to locate and follow a drone, all 441 00:36:22.039 --> 00:36:25.039 right, and it doesn't really make I mean, it isn't you know, 442 00:36:25.480 --> 00:36:34.760 It isn't that easy. And it's hard to imagine them having done that and 443 00:36:34.840 --> 00:36:37.639 slipped through the air defenses that way. But they did get through air defenses, 444 00:36:37.679 --> 00:36:40.159 so they did, you know, they managed it somehow, and that's 445 00:36:40.400 --> 00:36:46.159 that's what the investigation should try and uncover. Why why did the you know 446 00:36:46.239 --> 00:36:52.599 what what succeeded in Tower twenty I mean outa that that failed in Tower twenty 447 00:36:52.639 --> 00:36:55.840 two. Yeah, yeah, I agree. I don't. I can't. 448 00:36:55.840 --> 00:37:00.159 I'm not a drone guy, so I can't say that, you know, 449 00:37:00.280 --> 00:37:04.880 they were able to uh follow the track of the returning ux drone anything as 450 00:37:04.920 --> 00:37:09.079 possible. It just doesn't at this point doesn't seem likely. But like Andy 451 00:37:09.119 --> 00:37:13.800 said, you know, I think the key is what worked at you know, 452 00:37:14.199 --> 00:37:16.800 at the sawpace that didn't work here, you know, and vice versa. 453 00:37:17.039 --> 00:37:22.239 You know. So that's I think that's we won't know the full story, 454 00:37:22.280 --> 00:37:24.000 if we know the full story, for probably months, you know, 455 00:37:24.199 --> 00:37:29.760 to come and in the interim as they're finding things out. I'm sure that 456 00:37:29.760 --> 00:37:32.960 that intel is getting out to other bases, you know, as Andy spoke 457 00:37:34.039 --> 00:37:37.840 on to Harden, you know, their defenses. So because it's gonna it's 458 00:37:37.840 --> 00:37:40.039 gonna keep happening, They're gonna keep testing these waters till it doesn't work and 459 00:37:40.079 --> 00:37:47.760 then they'll try something else. All right. Yeah, that that's that that 460 00:37:49.239 --> 00:37:52.440 sum set up beautifully, Jason. So you know at this point, I 461 00:37:52.440 --> 00:37:54.800 mean, way, we don't. We don't want these two to over run. 462 00:37:54.960 --> 00:38:01.280 So we'll bring this to a to a graceful close. So if you 463 00:38:01.280 --> 00:38:06.880 were a betting man, when would you expect the strikes to go in? 464 00:38:06.960 --> 00:38:12.119 Jason? What do you expect to see? Me? Personally? I'm thinking 465 00:38:12.199 --> 00:38:15.960 probably by this coming weekend. I don't I mean, we had the assets 466 00:38:16.000 --> 00:38:21.480 in place to do it, So what they are exactly, I don't know, 467 00:38:22.199 --> 00:38:25.840 but I think we have the capability to launch the miss probably before this 468 00:38:25.880 --> 00:38:30.360 weekend. But I would say we will start hearing about it probably by this 469 00:38:30.480 --> 00:38:37.639 coming weekend. Their thoughts, Yeah, next three to four days probably, 470 00:38:37.840 --> 00:38:43.599 right, I mean we have to respond with it, to show response, 471 00:38:43.639 --> 00:38:47.239 and I mean I would put money on Okay, so I would put money 472 00:38:47.239 --> 00:38:55.480 on this Okay, multiple IRGC directed strikes simultaneous or rob Syria, but also 473 00:38:57.239 --> 00:39:06.960 Iranian naval assets in the Yeah, Iranian naval assets and potentially two if they 474 00:39:07.000 --> 00:39:09.920 look if they locate this factory, which isn't gonna be difficult to do. 475 00:39:10.239 --> 00:39:15.320 If there is a strike into Iran itself, I would guess that it would 476 00:39:15.320 --> 00:39:21.400 be going after that factory because that's very that you know, obviously that's relevant, 477 00:39:21.400 --> 00:39:24.679 but it's also very easy to compound mentalize in terms of their slation. 478 00:39:25.239 --> 00:39:30.599 Absolutely, I would bet that they don't hit Iran like my RAN's mainland. 479 00:39:30.920 --> 00:39:35.960 I could see them small like blowing up container ship or two that's heading to 480 00:39:36.079 --> 00:39:39.960 like im In or wherever. Bucks. Yeah, I'm in. I'll bet 481 00:39:40.039 --> 00:39:44.440 that No, no inside of Iran, but I could see them blowing up 482 00:39:44.440 --> 00:39:49.480 a ship because that is something we've never seen before. Bring cash with you 483 00:39:49.559 --> 00:39:52.840 on the twenty, No problem, I'll have it. I'll hold the money. 484 00:39:52.039 --> 00:39:57.280 Yeah, all right, guys. Any closing comments, Dan, what 485 00:39:57.320 --> 00:40:02.039 do you you've got an email at us for us right? Uh? For 486 00:40:02.199 --> 00:40:06.360 eyes for eyes on now, not yet, but we will have an email 487 00:40:06.400 --> 00:40:09.440 address for that. I mean I'm assuming so like if anyone has like questions 488 00:40:09.440 --> 00:40:15.320 and stuff like that. They can they can email the Teamhouse podcast at gmail 489 00:40:15.360 --> 00:40:20.239 dot com. You know, you can also write them in the comments and 490 00:40:20.280 --> 00:40:22.519 the comments might get lost in the sauce, but oh man, it's like 491 00:40:22.559 --> 00:40:27.159 get those clowns off their No, yeah, they'll be they'll be okay. 492 00:40:27.519 --> 00:40:30.880 And especially like you know, don't tell you know, we got to tell 493 00:40:30.920 --> 00:40:37.360 people to like subscribe, uh, check out the Patreon check out, tell 494 00:40:37.360 --> 00:40:40.360 your friends about this, whether you listen to it on Spotify or Apple rated 495 00:40:40.440 --> 00:40:45.679 five stars and review it on Apple. That helps to so getting get engaged. 496 00:40:46.280 --> 00:40:51.119 Yeah, yeah, all of the above. So and I mean on 497 00:40:51.199 --> 00:40:53.920 the on the email out of this. What what we really want to do 498 00:40:53.960 --> 00:40:59.519 is spend I don't know, five minutes, ten minutes maybe at the end 499 00:40:59.559 --> 00:41:06.880 of every episode going through just a handful of input from from the listeners, 500 00:41:07.239 --> 00:41:12.199 watchers, audience. And notice they said, you know, not just questions, 501 00:41:12.440 --> 00:41:16.880 free to meet comments and we will comment on your comments. So please 502 00:41:16.920 --> 00:41:20.400 do and uh yeah great,