Chapter eleven of Meditations of Marcus Aurelius. This is a LibriVox recording. All
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please visit LibriVox dot org. Recording by Leon Meyer. The Meditations of Marcus
Aurelius by Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, translated by George Long, Chapter eleven. These
are the properties of the rational soul. It sees itself, analyzes itself,
and makes itself, such as it chooses the fruit which it bears itself enjoys
for the fruit of plants, and that in animals, which corresponds to fruits
others enjoy. It obtains its own end wherever the lumit of life may be
fixed, not as in a dance and in a play, and in such
like things where the action is incomplete, if anything cuts it short, but
in every part, and wherever it may be stopped, it makes what has
been set before it full and complete, so that it can say, I
have what is my own. In further, it traverses the whole universe and
the surrounding vacuum, and surveys its form, and it extends itself into the
infinity of time, and embraces and comprehends the periodical renovation of all things.
And it comprehends that those who come after us will see nothing new, nor
have those before us seen anything more. But in a manner, he who
is forty years old, if he has any understanding at all, has seen
by virtue of the uniformity that prevails all things which have been in all that
will be. This too, is a property of the rational soul, love
of one's neighbor, and truth and modesty, and to value no more than
itself, which is also the property of law. Thus, then right reason
differs not at all from the reason of justice. Thou wilt set little value
on pleasing song and dancing in the pancratium, if thou wilt distribute the melody
of the voice into its several sounds, and ask thyself as to each if
thou art mastered by this, for thou wilt be prevented by shame from confessing
it. And in the matter of dancing, if at each movement and attitude
thou wilt do the same, and the like also in the matter of the
pancratium. In all things, then, except virtue and the acts of virtue.
Remember to apply thyself to their several parts, and by this division to
come to value them little. And apply this rule also to thy whole life.
What a soul that is which is ready if at any moment it must
be separate from the body, and ready to be extinguished or dispersed, or
continue to exist. But so that this readiness comes from a man's own judgment,
not from mere obstinacy, as with the Christians, but considerately and with
dignity, and in a way to persuade another without tragic show. Have I
done something for the general interest? Well, then I have had my reward.
Let this always be present to thy mind, and never stop doing such
good. What is thy art to be good? And how is this accomplished?
Well? Except by general principles, some about the nature of the universe,
and others about the proper constitution of man. At first, tragedies were
brought on the stage as means of reminding men of the things which happen to
them, and that it is according to nature for things to happen so,
and that if you are delighted with what is shown on the stage, you
should not be troubled with that which takes place on the larger stage. For
you see that these things must be accomplished thus, and that even they bear
them who cry out o sytheroon. And indeed, some things are said well
by the dramatic writers, of which kind is the following, especially me and
my children. If the God's neglect, this has its reason too. And
again we must not chafe and fret at that which happens, and life's harvest
reap like the wheat's fruitful ear, and other things of the same kind.
After tragedy, the old comedy was introduced, which had a magisterial freedom of
speech, and by its very plainness of speaking, was useful in reminding men
to beware of insolence. And for this purpose too, Diogenes used to take
from these writers. But as to the middle comedy which came next, observe
what it was, and again for what object the new comedy was introduced,
which gradually sunk down into a mere mimic artifice. That some good things are
said even by these writers, everybody knows, but the whole plan of such
poetry and dramaturgy to what end does it look? How plain does it appear?
That there is not another condition of life? So well suited for philosophizing,
as this in which thou now happenest to be a branch cut off from
the adjacent branch, must of necessity be cut off from the whole tree.
Also so to a man, when he is separated from another, man has
fallen off from the whole social community. Now as to a branch, another
cuts it off. But a man by his own act separates him from his
neighbor when he hates him and turns away from him, and he does not
know that he is at the same time cut himself off from the whole social
system. Yet he has this privilege, certainly from zeus who frame society,
for it is in our power to grow again to that which is near to
us, and again to become a part which helps us to make up the
whole. However, if it often happens this kind of separation, it makes
it difficult for that which detaches itself to be brought to unity and to be
restored to its former condition. Finally, the branch, which from the first
grew together with the tree and has continued to have one life with it,
is not like that which, after being cut off, is then ingrafted.
For this is something like what the gardeners mean when they say that it grows
with the rest of the tree, but that it has not the same mind
with it as those who try to stand in thy way. When thou art
proceeded according to right reason, will not be able to turn THEE aside from
thy proper action. So neither let them drive THEE from thy benevolent feelings towards
them, but be on thy guard equally in both matters, not only in
the matter of steady judgment and action, but also in the matter of gentleness
towards those who try to hinder or otherwise trouble thee. For this is also
a weakness to be vexed at them, as well as to be diverted from
Thy course of action, and to give way through fear. For both are
equally deserters from their post, the man who does it through fear, and
the man who is alienated from him, who is by nature a kinsman and
a friend. There is no nature which is inferior to art, for the
arts imitate the natures of things. But if this is so, that nature,
which is the most perfect and the most comprehensive of all natures, cannot
fall short of the skill of art. Now all arts do thee inferior things
for the sake of the superior. Therefore the universal nature does so too,
And indeed hence is the origin of justice, And injustice the other virtues have
their foundation. For justice will not be observed if we either care for middle
things things indifferent, or are easily deceived and careless and changeable. If the
things do not come to THEE, the pursuits and avoidances of which disturb THEE
still in a manner, Thou goest to them. Let then thy judgment about
them be at rest, and they will remain quiet, and thou wilt not
be seen either pursuing or avoiding. The spherical form of the soul maintains its
figure when it is neither extended toward any object, nor contracted inwards, nor
dispersed, nor sinkst down, but is illuminated by light by which it sees
the truth, the truth of all things, and the truth that is in
itself. Suppose any man shall despise me, let him look to that himself.
But I will look to this, that I be not discovered doing or
saying anything deserving of contempt. Shall any man hate me, let him look
to it, But I will be mild and benevolent towards every man, and
ready to show even him his mistake, not reproachfully, nor yet as making
a display of my endurance, but nobly and honestly, like the great Phocion,
unless indeed he only assumed it for the interior parts ought to be such,
and a man ought to be seen by the gods, neither dissatisfied with
anything, nor complaining. For what evil is it to thee? If thou
art now doing what is agreeable to thy own nature, and art satisfied with
that which, at this moment is suitable to the nature of the universe,
Since thou art a human being placed at thy post in order that what is
for the common advantage may be done in some way, men despise one another
and flatter one another, and men wish to raise themselves above one another and
crouch before one another. How unsound and insincere is he who says I have
determined to deal with THEE in a fair way. What art thou doing?
Man? There is no occasion to give this notice. It will soon show
itself by acts. The voice ought to be plainly written on the forehead,
such as a man's character is he immediately shows it in his eyes, just
as he who is beloved forthwith reads everything in the eyes of lovers. The
man who is honest and good ought to be exactly like a man who smells
strong, so that the bystander, as soon as he comes near him,
must smell, whether he choose or not. But the affectation of simplicity is
like a crooked stick. Nothing is more disgraceful than a wolfish friendship. Avoid
this most of all. The good and simple and benevolence. Show all these
things in the eyes, and there is no mistaking as to living in the
best way. This power is in the soul if it be indifferent to things
which are indifferent, and it will be indifferent if it looks on each of
these things separately and altogether, and if it remembers that not one of them
produces in us an opinion about itself, nor comes to us. But these
things remain immovable, and it is we ourselves who produce the judgments about them,
and as we may say, write them in ourselves, it being in
our power not to write them, and it being in our power if perchance
these judgments have imperceptibly got a mission to our minds to wipe them mouth.
And if we remember also that such attention will only be for a short time,
and then life will be at an end. Besides, what trouble is
there at all in doing this? For if these things are according to nature,
rejoice in them, and they will be easy to thee. But if
contrary to nature, seek what is conformable to thy own nature, and stride
towards this, even if it bring no reputation. For every man is allowed
to seek his own good. Consider whence each thing is come, and of
what it consists, and into what it changes, in what kind of a
thing it will be when it is changed, and that it will sustain no
harm. If any have offended against thee, consider first what is my relation
to men? And that we are made for one another. And in another
respect, I was made to be said over them as a ram over the
flock or a bull over the herd. But examine the matter from first principles.
From this, if all things are not mere atoms, it is nature
which orders all things. If this is so, the inferior things exist for
the sake of the superior, in these for the sake of one another.
Second, consider what kind of man they are at table, in bed,
and so forth, and particularly under what compulsions in respective opinions they are,
And as to their acts, consider with what pride they do what they do.
Third that if men do rightly what they do, we ought not to
be displeased. But if they do not write, it is plain that they
do so involuntarily and in ignorance. For as every soul is unwillingly deprived of
the truth, so also it is unwillingly deprived of the power of behaving to
each man according to his deserts. Accordingly, the men are pained when they
are called unjust, ungrateful, and greedy, and in a word, wrongdoers
to their neighbors. Fourth, consider that thou also doest many things wrong,
and that thou art a man like others. And even if thou dost abstain
from certain faults, still thou hast the disposition to commit them, though either
through cowardice or concern about reputation, or some such mean motive, thou dost
abstain from such faults. Fifth, consider that thou dost not even understand whether
men are doing wrong or not, For many things are done with a certain
reference to circumstances, and in short, a man must learn a great deal
to enable him to pass a correct judgment on another man's acts. Sixth,
consider, when thou art much vexed or grieved, that man's life is only
a moment, and after a short time we are all laid out dead.
Seventh, that it is not acts which disturb us, for those acts have
their foundation in men's ruling principles. But it is our own opinions which disturb
us. Take away these opinions, then, and resolve to dismiss thy judgment
about an act as if it were something grievous, and thy anger is gone.
How then shall I take away these opinions by reflecting that no wrongful act
of another brings shame on thee For unless that which is shameful is alone bad,
thou also, must, of necessity do many things wrong, and become
a robber and everything else. Eighth, consider how much more pain is brought
on us by the anger and vexation caused by such acts than by the acts
themselves at which we are angry and vexed. Ninth, consider that a good
disposition is invincible if it be genuine and not an affected smile in acting apart,
for what will the most violent man due to THEE if thou continuest to
be of a kind disposition towards him, and if, as opportunity offers,
thou gently admonishest him and calmly correctest his errors at the very time when he
is trying to do thee harm, saying, not so, my child,
we are constituted by nature for something else. I shall certainly not be injured.
But thou art injuring thyself, my child, and show him with gentle
tact and by general principles, that this is so, and that even bees
do not do as he does, nor any animals which are formed by nature
to be gregarious. And thou must not do this, neither with any double
meaning, nor in the way of reproach, but affectionately and without any rancor
in thy soul. And not as if thou wert lecturing him, nor yet
that any bystander may admire. But either when he is alone, and if
others are present, remember these nine rules as if thou hast received them as
a gift from the Muse, and begin at last to be a man while
thou livest. But thou must equally avoid flattering men and being vexed at them,
for both are unsocial and lead to harm. And let this truth be
present to thee in the excitement of anger, that to be moved by passion
is not manly, but that mildness and gentleness. As they are more agreeable
to human nature, so also are they more manly. And he who possesses
these qualities possesses strength, nerves, and courage, and not the man who
is subject to fits of passion and discontent. For in the same degree in
which a man's mind is nearer to freedom from all passion, in the same
degree also is it nearer to strength. And as the sense of pain is
a characteristic of weakness, so also is anger. For he who yields to
pain and he who yields to anger, both are wounded, and both submit.
But if thou well wilt receive also a tenth present from the leader of
the muses, Apollo. And it is this that to expect bad men not
to do wrong as madness, for he who expects this desires an impossibility.
But to allow men to behave so to others, to expect them not to
do thee any wrong is irrational and tyrannical. There are four principal aberrations of
the superior faculty, against which thou shouldst be constantly on thy guard. And
when thou hast detected them, thou shouldst wipe them out, and say,
on each occasion, thus this thought is not necessary. This tends to destroy
social union. This which thou art going to say, comes not from the
real thoughts, for thou shouldst consider it among the most absurd of things,
for man not to speak from his real thoughts. But the fourth is when
thou shalt reproach thyself for anything, For this is an evidence of the diviner
part within thee being over are powered and yielding to the less honorable and to
the perishable part, the body, and to its gross pleasures, thy aerial
part, and all the fiery parts which are mingled in THEE. Though by
nature they have an upward tendency, still in obedience to the disposition of the
universe, they are overpowered here in the compound mass the body, and also
the whole of the earthy part in THEE, and the watery, though their
tendency is downwards, still are raised up and occupy a position which is not
their natural one. In this manner, then the elemental parts obey the Universal,
For when they have been fixed in any place perforce, they remain there
until again the Universal shall sound the signal for dissolution. Is it not then
strange that thy intelligent part only should be disobedient and discontented with its own place,
And yet no force is imposed on it, but only those things which
are conformable to its nature. Still it does not submit, but is carried
in the opposite direction. For the movement toward injustice and in temperance, and
to anger and grief and fear is nothing else than the act of one who
deviates from nature. And also when the ruling faculty is discontented with anything that
happens, then two it deserts its post. For it is constituted for piety
and reverence toward the Gods, no less than for justice. For these qualities
also are comprehended under the generic term of contentment with the constitution of things,
And indeed they are prior to acts of justice. You, who has not
one and always the same object in life, cannot be one and the same
all through his life. But what I have said is not enough unless this
also is added. What this object ought to be. For as there is
not the same opinion about all the things which, in some way or other
are considered by the majority to be good, but only about some certain things,
that is, things which concern the common interest, so also we ought
to propose to ourselves an object which shall be of a common kind, social
and political. For he who directs all his own efforts to this object will
make all his acts alike, and thus will always be the same. Think
of the country mouse and of the town mouse, and of the alarm and
trepidation of the town mouse. Socrates used to call the opinions of the many
by the name of lay me e bugbears to frighten children. The Lacedaemonians,
at their public spectacles used to set seats in the shade for strangers, but
themselves sat down anywhere. Socrates excused himself to Perdicus for not going to him,
saying, it is because I would not perish by the worst of all
ends, that is, I would not receive a favor and then be unable
to return it. In the writings of the Ephesians, there was this precept
constantly to think of someone of the men of former times who practice virtue.
The Pythagoreans bid us in the morning look to the heavens, that we may
be reminded of those bodies which continually do the same things, and in the
same manner perform their work, and also be reminded of their purity and nudity.
For there is no veil over a star. Consider what a man's Socrates
was when he dressed himself in a skin after Xanthipi had taken his cloak and
gone out, And what Socrates said to his friends, who are ashamed of
him and drew back from him when they saw him dress. Thus, neither
in writing nor in reading will I'll be able to lay down rules for others
before thou shalt have learned to obey rules thyself. Much more is this so
in life a slave thou art. Free speech is not for thee and my
heart laughed within Odyssey nine four thirteen. And virtue they will curse speaking harsh
words. He see it works in Days one eighty four. To look for
the fig in winter is a madman's act. Such is he who looks for
his child when is no longer allowed Epictetus three twenty four eighty seven. When
a man kisses his child, said Epictetus, he should whisper to himself tomorrow,
perchance thou wilt die. But those are words of bad omen. No
word is a word of bad omen, said Epictetus, which expresses any work
of nature, or if it is so, it is also a word of
that omen. To speak of the ears of corn being reaped Epictetus three twenty
four, eighty eight. The unripe grape, the ripe bunch, the dried
grape, all are changes not into nothing, but into something which exists not
yet Epictetus three twenty four. No man can rob us of our free will
Epictetus three twenty two one oh five. Epictetus also said, a man must
discover an art or rules. With respect to giving his assent, and in
respect to his movements, he must be careful that they be made with regard
to circumstances, that they be consistent with social interests that they have. Regard
to the value of the object, and as to sensual desire, he should
altogether keep away from it, and as to avoid he should not show it
with respect to any of the things which are not in our power. The
dispute, then, he said, is not about any common matter, but
about being mad or not. Socrates used to say, what do you want,
souls of rational men or irrational souls of rational men? Of what rational
men sound or unsound sound? Why then do you not seek for them because
we have them? Why then do you fight and quarrel? End of Chapter eleven,