Hello, then welcome to Western CIV. As I do on occasion, I
wanted to drop a bonus episode into the feed from Western SIV two point zero.
You can get access to this by clicking the link in the show notes,
and for a few dollars a month, you can get access to the
total backlog of all the episodes that I have. Essentially, Western SIV two
point zero is a reboot of the original podcast. I love ancient and classical
history, as you've probably guessed right now, but when I recorded a lot
of those episodes many many moons ago, audio equipment wasn't as good and I
didn't have a good sense of what I was doing. So I decided to
go back and have another crack at it and really delve into some of the
stories then kind of glossed over the first time around. Today's episode is the
bonus episode that I recorded on the First Punic War, which I gave very
short trift to in the original feed, But as you'll see, here goes
into a lot greater detail as to how the Romans ultimately come out on top
over their Carthaginian opponents. So this gives you a sense of what's available.
This is episode sixty three, the First Punic War. If you'd like to
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without further ado, let's take a listen to Western Hip two point zero,
episode sixty three, The First Punic War. Once the Romans and Carthaginians had
committed themselves to the aid or aggression toward Syracuse, the die was cast.
The First Punic War would be fought on and over Sicily. Well, certainly,
the fleet and the army for both sides worked together. Most historians I
have read break the various campaigns down between the war on land and the War
on sea. I, given that I am not a historian and am in
no way in a position to question the wisdom of this approach, will do
the same. You shall begin with the land war on Sicily. Syracuse provided
the Romans with a secure base of operations on the island, while Masana was
quickly taken, which was the whole basis for the beginning of the conflict.
There is no indication either side attempted negotiations. Carthage saw no reason to negotiate.
Its early losses could be easily reversed, and they saw Sicily as theirs.
The Romans were upstarts and needed to be pushed back off the island as
soon as possible. The Romans, for their part, believe the Carthaginians needed
to understand that they had lost and they had to come to terms favorable to
Rome, just like Hero the Tyrant of Syracuse had done. Plus, it
certainly did not hurt that Sicily was rich and they the Romans wanted it for
the next several hundred years. Those two factors, in fact, are going
to justify quite a lot of conflicts. Carthage immediately went to work raising a
mercenary army. Rome responded by dispatching both consuls and four legions into sixty two.
Carthage decided to use agrigentum about midway along the coast of Sicily, on
the southern side, as its base is for operations. But the Roman consuls
moved quickly, and by the time the commander within the city had a chance
to react, forty thousand Roman legionnaires were bearing down upon him. This commander,
named Hannibal, because of course, pulled everyone back within the walls,
which Romans took as a sign of weakness. It happened to be harvest time,
so the consuls sent their men out to forage for food. Hannibal saw
the chance, and he took it, launching a vigorous sally. The only
thing that held back a complete Roman disaster was their camp picket line, which,
though badly outnumbered, put up a stout defense. In the end,
the Romans were able to regroup and Hannibal suffered major losses. Both sides came
away chastened. Hannibal knew that he couldn't afford to keep taking such losses,
and the Romans realized they needed to stop underestimating their foe now. The easiest
way to take a city during the Punic Wars was by surprise or treachery.
An attacker might launch a surprise offensive at night and seize key defensive points before
the defender knew what was going on. This was all the easier if there
happened to be a disaffected group within the city that might aid in the attack.
In the Punic Wars, more cities fell by treachery than by any other
means, but that wasn't the case here. Agrigentum would not be betrayed,
so the Romans would need to resort to their other options. Assault or blockade.
Assault was the one aspect of ancient warfare most affected by technological advances.
It involved the attacker finding a way over, through, or under the defender's
fortifications. The simplest method was escalade, when the attacking infantry carried ladders up
to the wall and attempted to scale them, but this always involved heavy casualties
and was rarely successful unless the walls were virtually devoid of defenders. Mobile siege
towers, which dropped a drawbridge onto a rampart and allowed men to cross while
providing covering fire from archers or artillery on top, were essentially an extension of
the same basic ladder principle. The main alternative was to create a breach in
the walls by battering rams or tunneling underneath to what was called undermine them.
But this all required extensive preparation, scientific knowledge, and labor to create siege
works, allowing engines such as a battering ram to pass over any defensive ditches
and then reach the wall. All the time the defender would be employing artillery
to hinder this activity, countermining to thwart the attackers, tunneling and launching sallies
to burn the siege engines. The ingenuity of both sides was constantly tested as
they struggled to find countermeasures like a constant ping pong or a back and forth.
We saw this a lot with Tire in Alexander the grid. Once the
defenders had been breached, then ingenuity and technical skill went out the window as
the assaulting infantry had to storm their way inside. Casualties would still probably be
heavy, and failure was a real possibility even then. Such was the massive
effort and uncertainty of the outcome that assaults on major cities were not contemplated lightly.
Convention decreed that a defender would normally only be permitted on terms to surrender
if he did so before the first battering ram touched the wall. If they
did not, then the city would be subject to a sack. At this
period, the Roman army lacked the technical skill to undertake such a project on
a city as large as Agragentum with any real prospect of success, since the
only choice available to the Romans at Agrigentum was blockade, and they took it.
Luckily for the consular armies, Agrigentum was not on the coast, which
is a rarity for a Carthaginian city. Without ships, the Romans never could
have blockaded the city, but because it was situated on a plateau several miles
inland, the Romans were able to construct a series of forts and ditches to
effectively hem the city. In Sensing that the situation was quickly becoming dire,
Hannibal called for aid. After just five months, The Carthaginians sent all the
troops they had fostered, perhaps as many as seventy thousand men, which would
have given them a slight advantage over the Romans, at least in terms of
numbers. The Carthaginian army quickly cut the Romans supply lines, and the weakened
men began to fall sick in their crowded camps. The Carthaginians followed up on
this success with a lightning cavalry strike that was also successful already in Sicily.
The Romans were discovering that their cavalry was just no match for the light numidian
horse of Carthage, and we're going to see that again, but much more
decisively, in the Second Punic War. The Romans and then Carthaginians then started
a sort of cat and mouse game, each offering battle in turn, only
to have the other side to climb. Ultimately, forced by desperate messages from
Agrigentum that the city was soon to capitulate, the Carthaginians gave in and accepted
the Roman offer to fight a pitched battle. Olybyus gives few details of this
battle, but it seems that the Carthaginian army was deployed in more than one
line, with a front line of infantry supported by a second containing more infantry
and the elephants. It is possible that the intention was to tire out the
Roman infantry, weakening their formation and destroying the impetus of their advance, but
this is no more than pure speculation. Presumably, the cavalry was on the
wings and the Romans were in their usual triple axis after a long struggle.
It was the Romans who drove back and routed the Carthaginian first line. As
these mercenaries retreated, the panic spread to the reserve formations, and these fled.
The Romans captured the Punic camp and most of the elephants. Theodorus claims
that the Carthaginian commander Hanno lost three thousand infantry and two hundred cavalry killed and
four thousand men captured. Eight elephants were killed outright and thirty three disabled,
but this is included in the total losses of the earlier cavalry battle. That
being said, Deodorus also admits that Roman losses in the siege and battle amounted
to over thirty thousand infantry and five hundred and fifty cavalry, but this is
from an army of one hundred thousand, which he claims the besiegers were able
to muster. Both the size of the army and the casualties seemed too high,
although the latter may well have been substantial. Another historian, Zenarius,
provides a different version of the battle, in which Hanna hoped to coordinate his
attack with a sally by Hannibal's garrison within agrigentum, but this was thwarted when
the Romans learned of the plan and ambushed the main force while easily defeating the
garrison's raid with the outposts guarding the camp and siege lines. Zenarius implies the
battle began late in the day, and the same thing is claimed by Frontotius,
who attributes the council Postidimus the stratagem of refusing battle and remaining close to
the camp, as he had already done for several days. When the Carthaginians
decided that the Romans were unwilling to fight and began to withdraw, satisfy that
they had demonstrated their better fighting spirit, the Romans suddenly attacked and defeated them.
It's just not possible to know how accurate all of these different traditions are,
but we can say and our sources at least agree that the battle ended
in a clear Roman victory. Hanno's use of elephants has often been criticized given
their failure to support the first line. It has been suggested that the Carthaginians
at this point were not used to employing elephants and unaware of correct tactics.
This being the first recorded instance of their use by a Punic army. However,
lacking a more detailed narrative, we cannot be certain what Hanno's battle plan
act actually was, or if it went wrong, precisely what went wrong.
The failure of the different elements in his army to support each other effectively may
have been a reflection of its armies composition. Most of these troops were recently
raised and had not had much time to maneuver as an army or to become
familiar with their commanders. After the loss, Hannibal was able to get the
majority of his army out of the city in the dead of night by secretly
filling a section of the Roman ditch with earth. The upshot of this,
however, was that Aggregentum fell to the Romans. While the campaign had tactically
been a success, neither Roman Council was awarded a triumph, suggesting some displeasure
with how often and how close to disaster the Romans had frequently come. Still,
the Senate now voted to expand the Roman War aim to include the complete
ejection of Carthage from Sicily. What had begun as a minor border dispute with
Messana was now an all out war of conquest. The defeat of Hanno outside
Agrigentum was one of only four massed battles fought on land throughout the twenty three
years of the First Punic War, which is incredible and a marked contrast with
the Second Punic War, where as we're going to see, pitched battles were
by far more common, which I suppose to an extent is what makes the
Second Punic War a little bit more interesting. And trust me, I'm very
excited to break down any of these battles. Now. Two of these four
battles, so half of them, occurred in the relatively brief African campaign of
Regulus, and this is something I'm going to get to later, and the
only two in Sicily, despite the deployment of large number of soldiers there by
both sides for much of the war. Now, look, part of the
reason that we don't have a lot of pitch battles in the First Punic War
is just the topography of Sicily. There's a lot of rugged terrain in most
of central Sicily and it just doesn't favor the movements of large armies with so
many good defensive positions. It was difficult for a commander to force a battle
on an unwilling adversary. More importantly, the bulk of the island's population lived
in the numerous walled cities or in their dependent villages. These were the key
to Sicily, and only through controlling these communities could the island be secured.
The territories controlled by Syracuse and Carthage had little unity, being composed of by
a patchwork of these small city states, most of whom enjoyed almost unfettered local
autonomy. From the earliest actions to break the blisscade around a Messana, the
operations of armies were dominated by the need to secure each individual town and cities.
So it's very much sort of a plodding most World War One style warfare
that we have going on here. The outcome of a pitch battle was always
uncertain, and a defeat might well involve very high casualties and the demoralization of
the rest of the army. Even a victory merely left the successful army to
pursue its main task of subduing cities more freely, which might not actually be
any easier depending upon the nature of that victory. Under normal circumstances, the
potential gains were insufficient for both sides to be willing to risk joining battle.
It is significant that both the major battles to occur in Sicily were fought outside
and for the control of cities. A high proportion of the troops deployed in
Sicily were probably dispersed in small garrisons to hold the various cities. As always
in siege warfare, the advantage remained with the defender. It was extremely difficult,
if not impossible, to keep armies in the field in one location for
very long. At the outset of the Punic War, Rome lacked the technical
expertise that it needed to take walled and well defended cities. Hence, if
a city fell, as I mentioned before, it almost always fell after treachery,
or more often, it just switched sides after one side. Cartha Jerome
won a pivotal battle. Treachery, though, was also well treacherous. It
was hard to determine how much to trust a group willing to betray their fellow
citizens. There were several times during the First Punic War when a commander believed
an offered to defect, only to find himself and his advance guard surrounded and
massacred. Frankly, given our sources, it's difficult to provide a chronological narrative
of the First Punic War on land. There are a lot of sieges,
surprise attacks, raids, and then frequently long periods when absolutely nothing happened at
all. What I can say is that over time the Romans were willing to
devote more and more resources to the island. Well Carthage was not. Eventually
this tipped the scales in their favor in such a way that there simply was
no coming back for Carthage. But I guess it's important to note that throughout
the First Punic War, and maybe this explains why there's a second Punic War,
Carthage never really loses a decisive battle on land. They're going on sea,
but not in land. There was much more war of attrition. In
two fifty six PCE, the Romans launched a full scale invasion of North Africa.
This was as a result of the massive naval victory at Econdomus, which
I will discuss in a minute. The hero of the day was the Roman
counsul Marcus Attilius Regolous. Many myths came to be surrounding Regulus And, as
was all other important figures of the First Punic War, including Hero the Tyrant
of Syracuse and hamilcar Barka. It is now impossible to know what sort of
a man he was. He was clearly an able commander, and if he
was perhaps over regressive, this was a common trait in Roman commanders and not
considered a vice. One tradition claimed that Regulus and was impoverished by senatorial standards,
and it was only reluctantly, following an assurance by the Senate that they
would provide for his wife and children at statics events, that he accepted the
Africa command. However, that this antecdote is highly moralistic and therefore almost certainly
a later invention as part of the myth surrounding Regulus. Regulus's army in Africa
consisted of fifteen thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry. It was probably a standard
consular army, if maybe an understrength one, since Polybius later mentions a first
legion which implies that he had at least two The disproportionately low number of cavalry
was, of course results the difficulty of transporting the horses across the sea from
Italy. Now, once Carthage realized it could not prevent Regulus from landing nearby
Cape Bam, it immediately looked to its own defenses. Two generals were elected,
and a third, Hamil Carbarka, was recalled from Sicily, with five
thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry together. We're not sure how large Carthage's army
was, but no source indicates a disproportionate advantage on either side, so it
was probably about as big as Rome's army. While the Carthaginians were not about
to risk a pitched battle, if they lost, then Carthage would be totally
undefended, they did their best to shadow the Roman force so it could not
pillage with impunity. However, the Romans believed they had the advantage, so
in a somewhat surprising move, they immediately advanced on the Carthaginian camp, though
Carthage held the high ground. We should remember here that the goal was probably
to put enough pressure on Carthage to force a surrender on terms favorable to Rome.
It was not to conquer North Africa, not yet at least. Olybius
tells us that the Romans attacked the Hilltop camp at dawn, but another historian
says the assault occurred at night, although his claim that many Carthaginians were killed
in their beds seems unlikely. It is possible that a nighttime approach march was
followed by a dawn attack, for it seems that the Carthaginians did not have
a significant enough warning to deplore more than a part of their army. Two
Roman columns assaulted from opposite sides of the camp. A group of mercenaries did
manage to form up and drive back the first legion in considerable disorder, but
then it pursued too rashly. They were attacked from the rear by the other
Roman force and themselves routed. Their defeats seemed to have marked the end of
an effective resistance, and the rest of the army abandoned the camp in a
panicked flight, although the cavalry at Elephants escaped with few casualties once they reached
the level ground. The bold attack had been an outstanding success, but the
repulse of the first legion emphasized the risks involved. The twin attack does not
appear to have occurred simultaneously, perhaps as a result of the nighttime approach March,
although in the event that this resulted in the fortuitous appearance of the second
Roman force in the mercenaries rear. Had the Romans been detected during their approach,
they risked having to fight a deployed Carthaginian army attacking down from high ground.
However, it is worth noting once again that a recently created Carthaginians force
failed to coordinate its different elements effectively, and successful Mercenary counterattack was never supported.
The Romans followed up their success by taking Tunis, using it as a
base to mount raids in the area around Carthage itself. Carthaginians at this point
were depressed. In the last year, their proud navy, which had put
to sea with more ships than ever before, had been decisively defeated at Econmus,
and now their army tasked with defending the capitol itself had been beaten with
eats by Regulus. At the same time, they were involved in bitter fighting
with the Numidian kingdoms resulting from attempts to expand Carthaginian territory in Africa, a
policy which had been pursued alongside the struggle with Rome. Refugees from areas raided
by the Numidians as well as the Romans flooded into Carthage itself, spreading panic
and creating some food shortages. According to Polybius, it was at this point
that Regulus guess that the enemy might be willing to negotiate to end the war,
and sent peace envoys, which were welcomed at first by the Carthaginians.
He was said to be nervous that his first year of office had nearly expired,
and that he might not have finished the war before a successor arrived to
gain an easy victory. Similar motivation clearly did influence the behavior of the other
Roman magistrates. All our other sources agree that it was the Carthaginians who actually
began the negotiations after their recent defeats. Only Dio of all of our historians
claims to preserve the details of the terms dictated by regulars, but their absence
from all earlier sources can only make their authenticity unlikely to dubious. For what
they're worth, these were that the Carthaginians should give up both Sicily and Sardinia,
release all Roman prisoners freely, while ransoming their own pay. The Romans
and indemnity and amual tribute, only make war and peace on the approval of
Rome, and only retain one warship for their own use, but to provide
fifty to serve under the Romans whenever they requested. In several respects, notably
the inclusion of Sardinia. These terms are harsher than the treaty, which actually
does conclude the war into forty one BCE. Whatever the precise details, it
is clear that Regulus sought to impose a treaty which forced the Carthaginians to admit
defeat of his total defeat their war with Rome. All our sources state that
the Carthaginians felt the terms were far harsher than their actual fortunes in the war.
Despite its recent setbacks, the cities was by no means out of resources.
Faced with a Roman refusal to grant any concession, the talks failed.
During the winter of two fifty five, the Carthaginians reformed their army. According
to our sources, most of the actual reforming was done by a Spartan mercenary
named Xanthipius. To an extent, this is probably our sources waxing romantically about
the glorious Spartan military prowess of old, but Xanthipius was critical of Carthage's prior
decision to fight the Romans on unfavorable ground where their cavalry and elephants could not
be brought to bear. Regardless, Carthaginian morale improved, and by spring Carthage
had assembled a new army of twelve thousand infantry, four thousand cavalry, and
one hundred elephants, all prepared to fight using Spartan techniques. The scene was
now set for the only true land battle of the First Punic War that resembles
anything like those of the second. This is referred to in our sources as
the Battle of Tunis, though no one knows exactly where it was really fought.
The Romans eagerly accepted Carthage's offer of battle because they wanted to inflict the
decisive crushing blow. Xanthipius is credited for the Carthaginian battle formation, which placed
the citizen failings in the center, with mercenaries on the right, and left
the cavalry on the wings and the elephants out in front of the inventory in
a single line. We're told that Regulus lined up the legions in deeper maniples
than usual. What this means remains a matter of conjecture, but the most
likely interpretation is that the Romans still lined up in the triple axis, but
that each line was a little deeper, not that they abandoned or substantially modified
their usual battle formation. The Romans consequently wouldn't actually abandon the triple axis until
the first century BCE. The main advantage of deeper lines was that it would
make it harder for panicking men to turn and run at the side of the
elephants. But because the lines were deeper, they couldn't be as long,
leaving both flanks vulnerable and possibly enveloped. After a delay of the type that's
so common before these sorts of pitch battles, Xanphipius ordered the Elephants to attack,
and the Romans move forward to meet them, raising a battle cry and
rhythmically their weapons against their shields in what Polybius describes as their usual custom.
The Roman cavalry, facing odds of at least four to one, were almost
immediately routed. The two thousand men on the left flank of the Roman infantry
line, who normally would have been allied troops actually achieved considerable success. Eager
to avoid the elephants and contemptuous of the mercenaries again we're quoting Polybyas here,
who had been defeated in the previous battle, they just charged the units on
the enemy right flank, routed them immediately and chased them back to their camp.
Elsewhere. The Roman infantry didn't do quite as well. They reeled under
the onslaught of a mass of elephants and took heavy casualties, though to be
fair, the depth of their formation prevented them from breaking. A few manipoles
and small groups fought their way past the animals, and, after reforming,
moved against the Carthaginian failings. Low were now gone and greatly outnumbered. However,
they were easily defeated. In the meantime, the Carthaginian cavalry had swept
in against the flanks of the Roman infantry. Their attacks robbed the Roman formation
of what forward impetisit had left, as flanking manipolds had to turn to face
the new threat. Struck by missiles from cavalry or trampled by the elephants,
the Romans were destroyed. Whether they stood their ground or turned to flee Regulus,
and five hundred men initially made their escape but were quickly captured. Only
the two thousand men who had broken through the mercenaries were able to retire in
decent order, eventually making their way back to Aspes, which, with the
troops left there, they successfully defended until evacuation by a Roman fleet later that
year. This was the only substantial portion of the Roman army to escape,
though Polybias records losses of eight hundred men amongst the routed mercenaries, but it
doesn't give us a figure for the casual he suffered by the rest of the
army. This was the most striking success achieved by Elephants throughout the course of
the Punic Wars, and had a great moral effect on the Roman armies in
Sicily, who for the next few years didn't dare to try to contest control
of open ground with the Carthaginians for fear of being attacked by elephants. However,
it's important to note that the victory had not been achieved by the elephants
alone, and it owed a great deal of successful cavalry actions which had allowed
the envelopment of the Roman infantry, which is kind of what I warned was
the problem with the Roman formation in the first place. If Regulus's plan had
been to use his superior infantry to break the enemy's main line before the numerically
superior cavalry could come into play, it had simply failed, and in part
it had failed, probably because of the elephants at Trivia in two eighteen a
future battle, a substantial part of another Roman army, which had been defeated
on both wings, was able to burst through the Carthaginian line. In his
Sisape, however, Regulus's army was about one third the size of that later
force, which made it much easier for the Punic cavalry to envelop the infantry
center, even more so as its deeper formation could only have reduced the front
of the lines. Xanthipius, interestingly enough, departed after his success, aware
and this is according to Polybius, of the jealousy of the Carthaginian nobility,
and subsequently he actually served under the ptolemise in Egypt. Later, there was
this deeply romantic tradition that developed around Regulus, claiming that the Carthaginians sent him
as an ambassa to Rome to negotiate for the ransom of Roman prisoners, but
he, again this is romantic and famous, advised the Roman senate against making
the agreement bound an oath to return to Carthage. Regulus nobly kept his faith
and refused to stay in Rome in spite of the fact that he knew that
if he went back he would suffer a cruel death by and guess what he
did. One source says that his eyelids were first cut off, and then
he was finally trampled to death by an enraged elephant. Another tradition told how
his wife was given two eminent Carthaginian captives, and, in vengeance for her
husband, had them brutally maltreated until one died. Sometimes scholars have been tempted
to accept this part of the account and claim that the Regulus story was invented
to excuse his family's cruelty, but it's probably safer for us to honestly just
reject the whole thing, especially because absolutely none of this is mentioned by Polybius.
The African campaign was one of the most dramatic events of the First Punic
War. It ultimately revived Carthage's confidence. Rome made no further attempts to invade
after Regulus's defeat. The question has actually been ever since, why did the
Romans invade North Africa in the first place. The most logical response is that
to put pressure on the Carthaginians to force the city's ultimate captitulation. But I
think there's another reason here. Opportunity. Regulars had the opportunity, and aggressiveness
was what Roman commanders were supposed to be. Some later writers blamed Regulars for
trying to get treaty terms that were too harsh after his first victory, but
it's difficult to imagine another Roman general doing anything else. Rome always fought until
its enemy admitted total defeat and a subservient status. Carthage fought wars like they
were part of a business strategy. Rome fought to the death to a large
extent, it explains why they won. By the late two fifties, Carthage's
Sicilian possessions were reduced to the northwest corner of the island. When Penorius fell,
one of the few large cities still loyal to Carthage, it seemed like
Carthage's time on the island was over. In late two point fifty, a
Roman army routed at Carthaginian one at Lillibaum, which had fallen to the Romans
years earlier and had subsequently traded hands quite a few times. Essentially, in
this case, the Carthaginian commander allowed himself to be drawn closer and closer to
the walls until the Roman reinforcements poured forth from the gate and destroyed their opponent.
According to our sources, Carthage suffered between twenty to thirty thousand men lost,
but this is clearly a gross exaggeration. Regardless, this was one of
the last masked land actions of the war. The last few years of the
conflict only saw various blockades and siege actions as the Romans painstakingly took city after
city. It is in the last years of the war in Sicily that the
most famous of all Carthaginian generals of the conflict appeared on the scene, hamilcar
Barkup. His name was a suitably dramatic one, derived from the Semitic word
for lightning, or perhaps sword, like the flashing of a sword. But
his greatest achievements were to come after the war with Rome, and it's doubtful
whether or not he would have gotten as much tension as he has in history.
Were he not the father of Hannibal and this time yes, I'm talking
about the Hannibal. Nevertheless, Bolibius considered him the ablest commander on either side
throughout the First conflict. By the time that he landed in Sicily in two
forty seven, the Carthaginians had been hemmed into a small enclave. He established
himself on a hill called Herkit, not far from Honorius, a secure base
with command of a good anchorage. For three years, he skirmished with the
Roman forces near the city, winning minor victories but not achieving anything in the
long term. Then in two forty four he withdrew at night and sailed to
Ierks near Dapana. The Romans had captured the abandoned town in two forty eight,
installing a garrison there on the mountain summit. Hamilcar captured the town in
a surprise attack, cutting off the force on the summit, which was occupying
the Temple of Venus, from the main Roman forces at the foot of the
mountain. He managed to maintain this position and besiege the force for the remaining
years of the war, again winning minor successes in the frequent raiding and skirmishing
that was pursued by both sides. Hamilcar didn't have the resources, though,
to do anything. More. Certainly, he could not face the Romans in
an open pitched battle. We do not know this for certain, but historians
now believe that it's highly likely that Carthage was dealing with internal revolts back in
North Africa and could no longer afford to devote the men or money, really
money, to what looked like a losing cause in Sicily. Again, for
Carthage, the war was really a business decision regardless. The land action in
the First Punic War was all practical purposes irrelevant. The First Punic War,
as we will turn to now, was decided at sea. The First Punic
War was the greatest naval conflict of antiquity. The resources both sides lavished on
their fleets were truly enormous, and their losses in men and material staggering.
If our sources are correct, then the Battle of Encomis in two fifty six
may have involved more people than any other sea battle in history. Sea battles
were more common than major land actions during the war and ultimately proved decisive.
Bolibyas marveled at the scale of the Naval War, but even more at the
speed with which the Romans, who he claims had never before built a warship,
adapted to the sea, and created a navy able to defeat Carthage with
its long maritime tradition. The early years of the naval conflict witnessed a spectacular,
almost unbroken string of Roman successes over an enemy whose ships were better constructed
and whose crews far more skillful. When the war ended in two forty one,
Rome will have replaced Carthage as the unchallenged sea power in the Western Mediterranean.
The navies created during the war made possible all the later victories over Carthage
again in the second Third Punic Wars, and then in the Eastern Mediterranean against
of various Hellenistic kingdoms. Polybius's assertion that the Romans had no experience at all
at sea prior to the First Punic War is hyperbole, but not by much.
The Romans had not needed sea power to conquer Italy. Only in three
eleven had the Romans created two posts responsible for the construction and maintenance of warships.
Even in the early third century, Rome continued to rely upon its Italian
allies for its fleet. Indeed, in the early stages of the First Punic
War, it was Allied ships, not Roman ships per se, that transported
the legions to Sicily and provided naval support. Bolybyus was not wrong in his
assertion that, however small it was, the Roman navy truly developed in the
First Punic War. Regardless, So in two sixty one BCE, the Roman
Senate voted to construct a fleet of one hundred quin quareems and twenty triremes capable
of directly confronting the Carthaginians. It's very possible that this vote mirrored a change
in war aims resulting from the fall of Agrigentum, but we can't be certain
of that. There is one record of a council arguing for the construction of
a fleet as early as two sixty three. Either way. Honestly, given
the reality that Sicily was and still is an ireland, I cannot see how
the Romans ever thought that they would be able to claim it using land power
alone. Hence, whenever the idea came about with the construction of a fleet,
it was an inevitability. If the Romans truly wanted to win the war.
Now recounting just how naval combat functioned in the ancient and classical world,
it's extremely difficult. In general, the ancient sources are far less informative about
operations in sea than they are on land. The problem is made worse by
the essentially alien nature of or warships. To the modern age, maritime archaeology
has started to provide some information, although RECs of warships rather than merchantmen are
exceptionally uncommon, and much less has been learned by reconstruction. Therefore, nevertheless,
there are numerous gaps in our understanding of the construction and maintenance of classical
galleys, which is what we imagine when we imagine classical maritime warfare, and
especially of the strategic and tactical uses of these fleets. An indication of all
of this is our uncertainty as the precise design of what was the standard warship
of the Punic wars the Quinquerim, the great naval battles of the fifth century,
when the Greeks had defeated the Persian invaders and Athens and Sparta had vied
for dominance, were fought in one by trirems. The evidence for this type
of ship is actually pretty good, much of it coming from the literature of
classical Athens and excavations of shipyards in the Piraeus Harbor. The full scale reconstruction
of an Athenian Triyrem in the nineteen eighties and its extensive sea trials vastly increased
our knowledge. The Trirem, or three as I'm going to call it,
derived its name from the basic growing group of three men. Each man sat
on a different level and operated an or of about fourteen feet or so in
length, those of the upper row projecting from an outrigger. Considerable skill was
required in each oarsman for the successful functioning of the ship. It was long
and sleek. In fact, the Athenian Triyrem was about one hundred and twenty
feet in length, but just under twenty feet across its widest. It carried
a crew of about two hundred, around thirty of who were deck crew officers
and marines, and the remainder of which were all rowers, so about one
hundred and seventy rowers. In trials, the reconstructed version reached speeds of eight
knots and could maintain a steady four knots for hours on end, with half
the rowers resting in any one given time, turns through one hundred and eighty
degrees were completed in a distance equivalent to two and a half shipped lengths.
These speeds were achieved despite the comparative inexperience of the modern crew and their use
of ores, which were probably heavier than the originals. Under sail, the
Trirem was able to achieve eight knots in a favorable breeze. All in all,
the performance of the reconstructed Trirem was remarkably good and challenged many past assumptions
about ancient naval warfare. In the fourth century, several Hellenistic states began to
construct larger warships than the Trirem. The Carthaginians were the first to build fours
or quadririms, while Dionysus, the first the tyrant of Syracuse in the early
fourth century, was responsible for the design of the five. This is called
the panius in Greek or the quininquirm in Latin. The kingdoms which emerged in
the Hellenistic world in the late fourth century were able to lavish huge resources on
the construction of their fleets. Some of the largest ships were built by the
Tallamac Kingdom of Egypt, including according to legend, such massive ships as Ptolomae
the seconds, thirties and forties, but there's no record of anything actually larger
than a ten seeing real combat. The realization that although the Trirem had three
banks of ores, its name derived in fact from the number of each team
of rowers, goes a long way towards understanding the design of these ships.
Clearly, galleys with four or five banks of oars would have been incredibly impractical,
and ones with ten or more impossible. In fact, there's no evidence
for any warship in the classical world ever, having more than three banks of
ores. Therefore fours and larger ships like quein Kareems fives who might call them,
at least some of these ores had to have been operated by more than
one rower. The quin Kaream had a basic team of five rowers, but
how are they arranged? Did it have one level of ores rowed by five
men each two levels, one road by three, one road by two,
or three levels with two ores operated by a pair of rowers and one by
a single man. There were navies of the Mediterranean powers in the late Middle
Ages, including many galleys, and all of these had a single bank of
ores, regardless as to how many rowers operated each one. Two men can
sit side by side and they can operate an or effectively. But if there
are more than two rowers per ore, that's necessary for them to rise to
their feet and dip the blade and then hurl themselves back to the bench when
they deliver the stroke. Now, this was the method that was employed in
the Middle Ages. It must also have been used in some of the larger
galleys in the classical world of necessity. This design required a somewhat broader and
heavier hull to accommodate the rowers, which probably made them slower and less maneuverable
than the sleeker types like trireams. There has been a suggestion by different historians
that this system of having multiple rowers per or was actually more effective, and
the reason is is because you actually only need one skilled rower as long as
the other two could just simply follow the instructions of that man, then you
don't need quite as many. And this was the basis on which historians have
assumed that Carthage came into the conflict with the superior navy now that they had
tens of thousands of expertly skilled rowers, but that they may have had ten
thousand that were then spread out across all the various ships at different points.
This might explain why the Punic ships were individually faster and more maneuverable than their
Roman counterparts. However, Polybius tells us explicitly that the Roman ships were copied
from a captured design of a Carthaginian five, and there seems no good reason
to reject this evidence. The superior performance of the Carthaginian ships for most of
the war was a reflection of their more highly trained crews and at the very
beginning, better construction, not from a fundamentally different design. On the whole.
It's more likely that the queen quareams of this period had more than one
bank of ores. Two levels of ores with three and two rowers respectively would
have meant an uneasy combination of two different designs, and it's more probable that
the quin kerriam had three levels, the lowest with a single rower and the
others with a pair. This would make the quinquerream a more logical development from
the Trirem. Directly, levels of ores in a trirem were mounted in an
outrigger and this has sometimes been perceived as a weakness. Even if that's true,
it would have remained a failing in similarly designed fives, and it's distinctly
possible that the quin quareems of the Punic Wars were constructed differently. There were
two main tactical options open to ancient galleys, ramming and boarding. Given the
limitations of technology at the time, there simply was no amount of projectiles that
could be launched by any one ship to incapacitate another. Missiles were useful to
clear an enemy deck before boarding, but any decisive result, just like on
land, required two opposing ships to close with one another and fight it out.
Ram started out as pointed, but even by the fifth century they've been
refashioned into blunt objects. Why well, a pointed ram just ran too much
of a risk of being stuck to the end enemy hull. This is why
rams were built onto but were never part of the ship's keel. Likewise,
ships never tried to ram each other head on. That is to say,
you would never aim for the bow of an opposing ship. That was the
strongest part of both ships and would almost certainly result in major damage to both
should it have been attempted. Instead, any decent captain would try to ram
a ship's side. Ideally you would actually strike the side at an angle,
puncturing not just one hole, but a series of holes. In reality,
what this meant was that ancient naval warfare devolved into a series of one on
one duels, much like aerial combat during the First World War. There were
some larger strategies, likely employed by squadrons of ships, but it's highly unlikely
whole naval squadrons worked in tandem somehow, and certainly not an entire navy.
That's just not possible given the limitations of communication. Such seems just unbelievable.
Now, the likely are scenario wasn't ramming, it was boarding. This is
for a few reasons. Ramming requires a lot of technical skill, and not
just for the commander either. All the rowers needed to be highly trained and
needed to spend hundreds of hours learning how to row together. This worked in
a state like classical Athens, which had manpower, resources and a willingness to
devote the time to developing these skills, but Rome needed to fill the legions,
not the rowers benches. Boarding, on the other hand, required a
lot less skill. You just had to get osen off to grapple the enemy's
ship, and then it basically turned into a land battle on the water.
That was what the Romans wanted to do, and by and large it was
what all Hellenistic kingdoms sought to do as well. It's worth remembering that all
of these vessels were powered by oarsmen, thus their crews were huge by comparison,
of course, to later sailing ships. As a result, it was
both only common to take on marines directly before a major combat, and also
impossible for these sheeps to spend long periods of time on the water since they
couldn't carry many supplies. The majority of the ships that the Romans constructed for
the First Punic War were fives so Quentin Quarnes with five rows for oarsmen.
Bolivias tells us that the designs for these ships were modeled on a Carthaginian craft
that ran aground during the initial phase of the conflict. I mentioned that two
episodes ago. Actually, whether it's completely true or not as pure speculation,
but it is interesting to think that an incident of pure happenstance might have altered
the course of history. Certainly, Southern Italian Roman allies have been making fives
for decades. However, it has long been thought that this particular design for
a five was different, specifically Carthaginian design, that it was superior to at
least have been or thought to have been superior to anything else presently in construction.
Regardless, what we do know that the Romans used the same template for
all the fives they constructed throughout the wars. We know this because the remains
of these ships have markers still present on the beams showing the workmen where and
how to cut them. This allowed the Romans to fit together multiple beams using
joints which were much longer than the natural wood. Using a template for consistent
designs is something that had hitherto been thought impossible before the Industrial Revolution. As
with many things, the Romans were a bit head of the curve. These
huge ships took not only massive crews of workmen to build, but also would
have required in total thirty thousand rowers if we multiplied out for all the ships.
Certainly some of these would have been provided by Roman allies. However,
I think it's certain, despite Roman attitudes at the time toward naval warfare,
that a good number of these oarsmen were the urban poor from Rome itself.
These men would not have met the property qualifications for service in the legions.
Now. One of the earliest engagements of the naval war in the First Punic
War was a painful setback for Rome. One of the two Roman consuls for
two sixty BCE Nya. Scipio, received word that Lepara, a crucial town
not far from Masana, wanted to defect the Roman side. Scipio believed them
and took seventeen ships and occupied the harbor. What happened next is still a
matter of debate whether this was all a ruse. From the beginning were not
sure, but regardless, Hannibal sent twenty ships of his and blockaded the Romans
in Their crews panicked and quickly surrendered, and Scipio found himself in captivity.
Don't worry too much about him, though. He won the consulship again into
fifty four. But soon after this success, Hannibal managed to stumble upon a
major Roman fleet while his fleet was scattered and unprepared. Our reports for this
are murky, but he seems to have lost at least twenty five ships as
a result. What these two events highlight is just how difficult it was to
maneuver a large fleet in the classical world when no one really knew where the
enemy was. The Romans remained eager for a major confrontation. However, their
desire for such was only heightened when probably one of their best commanders of the
entire First Punic War arrived, Caius Julius. The Romans realized that their ships
were neither as fast nor as maneuverable as their Punic counterparts. They'd copied the
methods of their construction, but as of yet they couldn't implicate the skill of
the Carthaginian shipwrights, and even more importantly, Roman crews were far inferior.
It was clear that they could anticipate little success if they relied on ramming to
defeat the enemy, and that therefore they have to depend on getting close to
boarding. To this, someone put forward the idea of a new type of
boarding bridge, known to modern historians by the Latin word corvus, which means
raven, although no ancient author employs the term, and Polybiates uses the equivalent
Greek word korvacs. The name of its inventor has not been recorded, so
some have suggested that the man was a Sicilian Greek, a foreigner with whom
the Romans had no wish to share the glory of the subsequent success the corvus
brought, or even that the inventor may have been the young Archimedes, but
of course this is just conjecture. Later sources view the corvus as some sort
of grapnel, which encouraged historians to doubt Polybius's description, but the reliability of
his account was finally confirmed when later on a constructed, viable, working model
of the engine was made in the early twentieth century. The corvas was a
boarding bridge. It was four feet wide and thirty six feet long, with
a knee high parapet on either side. The last third of its length formed
the two prongs, separated by a long groove slotted around a twenty foot four
high pole erected on the deck of the ship. Pullies allowed the bridge to
be raised at any angle against the pole. Underneath the raised end of the
bridge was a heavy pointed spike resembling a bird's beak, from which the device
probably got its name. When released, the corvs fell onto the deck of
an enemy ship. The spike embedded itself into the planking. The groove allowed
the bridge to be swung around in a wide arc to fall ahead or on
either side of the ship's bow, depending on the direction of the approaching enemy.
Once the bridge was securely fixed in the other vessel, the Roman marines
could swarm across and overwhelm the enemy crew with their skill as swordsmen. It
was a simple practical device allowing the Romans to extend their advantages in land fighting
to naval battles, and it enjoyed spectacular success during its relatively brief career.
Soon after his arrival with the fleet, Dulius received a report that the Carthaginian
fleet had been raided around an area called Malai, a city situated on a
peninsula on the northern coast of Sicily. The entire Roman fleet put to sea
and moved around the coast towards Malai, and soon as this was reported to
Hannibal, he prepared his fleet to meet them. Polybius tells us that the
Carthaginians mustered one hundred and thirty ships, which seems more likely than Deodorus's figure
of two hundred. Hannibal himself led the action from a Heptaris or seven,
which might have actually been captured from Peris way back in two seventy six.
The Romans had what was left of their original one hundred and twenty ships,
minus the seventeen that were lost with a Scipio plus. However, many Punic
ships were captured in the earlier engagement, they had been able to salvage and
man, as well as any other vessels provided by their naval allies. The
bulk of ships on both sides were presumably quin Querim's fives, and it's improbable
that either fleet was markedly bigger than the other. Polybius tells us that the
Carthaginians were confused by the strange appearance of the tall corvas near the prow of
each Roman ship, but remained supremely confident of their own superiority over their inexperienced
enemy. It was extremely difficult for the commander of an ancient fleet to exercise
much control over his squadrons during a battle, but Hannibal appears to have allowed
his fleet to just get out of hand. Out the gate, Punic ships
surged toward the enemy, with the Great Seven in the front. Some of
the Roman ships were rammed, but each was able to drop its corvs,
whose beakspeared through the deck of the enemy vessel and held them tight. Thirty
Punic warships, all those who had first engaged, were grappled and held fast.
Amongst them was Hannibal's flagship, attacked by a trirene according to his Zenorius,
although he tends to use that word as a generic term for a warship,
and was more likely that the ship was a Roman five, since the
difference in height between a seven and five would have been just unbelievable. In
each case, the Roman marines poured across the boarding bridges and swiftly defeated the
enemy crews. Hannibal abandoned his flagship and escaped in a small rowing boat.
The remainder of the Carthaginian fleet then took advantage of the superior speed of their
vessels and swung around outflanking the Roman line and attacking it from a stern,
hoping in this way to avoid the corvas. Somehow, we don't know how
the Romans were able to maneuver to meet this new onslaught, and once again
any Punic ship which came within the range was pinned and held tight by the
corvas. Polybius describes how boarding bridges quote swung around and plunged down in all
directtions end quote, but were not clear what he means by this. A
corvus mounted near the prow of a ship would have been able to be dropped
ahead and for a short distance to the port of starboard, but clearly it
could not have reached the stern. Evidently, a Roman ship, seeing an
enemy vessel approaching, would have tried to turn to bring the enemy within the
arc. Many historians have suggested that the Roman ships may have been formed into
two lines, and that it was the second line which turned to face the
second Punic attack, But while this is certainly plausible, our sources are simply
too brief for us to be able to confirm or deny it. These with
which Carthaginians were able to subsequently disengage and retreat, once again confirm the superior
speed of their ships, but they had failed to achieve anything positive Because of
this advantage. It was a spectacular success for the new Roman fleet, owed
almost exclusively to the ingenuity of whoever designed to the corvus. According to Polybius,
fifty Punic ships were lost, although our later soores give thirty three one
captured and thirteen to fourteen sunk figures, which may derive from the inscription that
was later erected by Julius himself in commemoration of his victory. It's called the
Kolomna Rustra, although this has survived in fragmentary form, so only the first
X of a numeral can be read. The tone of the surviving text is
very typical of the Roman aristocracy self promotion, with its emphasis on having been
the first Roman to ever defeat a Punic navy, claiming in his land operations,
Julius defeated all the greatest of the Carthaginian forces. This text actually mentions
only trirems, and is being reconstructed as also mentioning quinquarems, which might offer
additional confirmation for our suspicion that the fleets of this conflict were not exclusively quinqueramines
or fives. The new Man Julius celebrated Rome's first naval triumph ever, decorating
the speaker's platform in the Forum with the prows or raw ustra cut off from
captured ships from which the speaker's platform would later derive its name. When Dulius
went out to dine at Rome, he was accompanied to and from his host's
house by a procession of musicians. But interestingly enough, in spite of all
these great honors, he never went on to accomplish much more later in his
career. Now, Hannibal survived the disastrous defeat, but not for long.
He was put to death by his own officers not long afterwards. There were
no other major sea confrontations until two fifty seven, when the Roman consul Caius
Regulus managed to inflict a relatively significant defeat on the main fleet, capturing ten
ships and sinking eight. The main Punic force, however, withdrew not interested
in fighting a full scale battle at that point. In two fifty six,
the Romans made their bold but characteristic decision to escalate the conflict by mounting the
invasion of North Africa I talked about before. To accomplish this, they amassed
an enormous fleet of hundred and thirty vessels, which moved along the Italian coast
and crossed to Messana before sailing south along the Sicilian shore, pasted Syracuse and
then linking up with the main army. The pick of the Roman infantry were
taken on board to serve as marines and provide an invasion force, so that
now each queen quareim had a complement of around one hundred and twenty marines.
Polybius claimed that the combined total of the cruise at marines and the Roman fleet
was around one hundred and forty thousand men. The Carthaginians had managed to put
together a grand total of three hundred and fifty ships, which sailed from Africa
to Lillibayum before moving around to the southern coast of Sicily. Polybius gives us
their strength in men is more than one hundred and fifty thousand, presumably calculated
on the assumption that their crews were roughly the same size as those of the
Romans. Certainly, most modern historians believe that Plybeus's numbers are inflated, but
it's impossible to say by how much. So. For the purposes of the
Battle of Encomness, the only major battle of the war, frankly, I'm
going to assume the numbers are roughly accurate. Essentially, the Roman fleet set
sail with two intentions. Either there would be a major engagement or they would
continue on to North Africa, but it seems that the Carthaginians had resolved that
a battle off the coast of Sicily offered them the best chance of protecting their
capital city. Such was the importance of this venture that both of that year's
consuls Lucius Manlius Vulso and Marcus Attilis Rigolus, were present. They divided the
fleet into four divisions, numbered one to four and labeled as either squadrons or
legions. This was simply a nickname and bore no relation to their actual size,
and it seems that the four divisions were not equal in numbers. The
first two groups were led by the consuls themselves, who's two two sixes headed
the Roman formation. The other ships from these squadrons took station from the flagships
in line echelon back to either side, so that each ship's prow lay behind
and to the side of the ship in front. So imagine now in effect,
these squadrons formed the tip of a triangle. The base was then composed
of the third squadron, which was arrayed in a line of breast, each
ship towing one of the horse transports. The fourth squadron was behind this group
and probably more numerous than the third because its ships overlapped its line on either
flank, protecting the rear of the formation and acting as the ultimate reserve.
This fourth squadron was also nicknamed the Triari. The Roman formation was praised by
Polybius for its practicality, being relatively dense and keeping the fleet together, but
also permitting it to turn and face a threat from direction. It was a
sign of the improved quality of Roman crews and the greater experience of their commanders
that they were able to adopt such a plan, and there's no good reason
to doubt Polybius's account or assume that he had misunderstood but was no more than
an accidental formation. Macarthaginians made some changes to their deployment once the Roman fleet
came into view, having apparently advanced in a normal battle formation in simple line
abreast, the Carthaginian line was formed with the coast of Sicily to its left.
The left wing, one quarter of the fleet ships reached forward towards the
shore. Angled away from this was the remainder of the fleet to the extreme
right, which was commanded by Hanno. He's the same general who had failed
to relieve Argagentum back in two sixty one. This was made up as the
fastest ships and extended beyond the flank of the Roman formation. The center was
led by the overall commander in Sicily, Hamilcar, who had instructed the captains
of his division to begin by withdrawing in the face of a Roman attack.
Hamil Carr's plan appears to have been to break up the compact Roman formation so
that his divisions on the right and left could sweep in and attack the enemy
from the flank or, best case scenario, the rear. This would produce
a series of smaller encounters between parts of each fleet, in which the Carthaginians
might hope to exploit their skill in ramming tactics and avoid frontal attacks on the
corvus equipped Roman ships. Some historians have made efforts to suggest a far more
complicated Carthaginian battle plan, but to be honest with you, those are speculative
and not convincing. The battle began just as Hamilcar had hoped. The Romans
saw the large gaps between the Punic ships and the center, and they drove
straight at them as instructed. Hamilcar's ships withdrew and the Roman compact formation began
to spread out as those ships towing the horse convoys couldn't keep up. When
enough of a gap opened up, hamil Kart gave the signal and his ships
wheeled around. Both sides engaged, and a series of individual duels developed,
with fierce fighting up and down the lines. Meanwhile, Hanno's right wing was
successful in enveloping the third Roman line, which had to cast the horse convoys
adrift to effectively take part in the action. Hence, what we have here
is actually three separate battles within a battle. You would expect that this would
probably favor Carthage, but it didn't. Why well, there's a few reasons.
First, the Romans were just much better trained than they had been back
in two sixty. Second, Carthage's own naval expansion watered down the effectiveness of
its cruise. Third, and, by far and away, most importantly,
at least in my view, Carthage still had no answer for the deadly Corvus.
The Romans quickly defeated the Carthaginian center after Hamilcar's ships gave up the fight
and fled. This allowed the Roman consuls to wheel back and help the third
line. There Carthage had actually been winning, but now the Romans closed on
their rear and effectively sandwiched to the remaining Punic fleet between them. The battle
was over. Rome had triumphed. Before this war, no one would have
thought it even conceivable that Rome would defeat Carthage in a major naval engagement,
and it is a testament to Rome's willingness to adapt and change. In the
end, the Romans lost twenty four ships, all sunk. Carthage lost sixty
four ships by boarding, plus another thirty that sunk to the bottom of the
sea. A total disaster. It was the largest clash of the war and
might even still to this day have been the largest naval battle in history in
terms of the number of people who took part, which is saying something.
Afterwards, the Carthaginian fleets retreated in three different directions. The Romans returned to
Sicily and made repairs before continuing their voyage to North Africa, the result of
which I discussed earlier. In two fifty five, after Regulus was finally beaten
in North Africa, two new Roman consuls sailed to North Africa. There they
gathered the survivors and even defeated another Punic fleet on their way, but their
success was short lived. A massive storm struck the fleet as it made its
way back to Sicily. According to Polybius, all but sixty ships were lost.
If this is true, that Rome might have suffered a loss ratio in
this storm of nearly eighty nine percent. We have no idea if these numbers
were one hundred percent accurate, but clearly it's a huge loss. Some scholars
have argued that the corvus actually made the galley more susceptible to sinking in a
storm. That's saying something. Galleys are already really susceptible to sinking in the
storm because they just kind of ride so low on the water. Modern recreations
suggest that this was highly likely, though how much of a role that played
in the catastrophe is hard to say. The following year two fifty four,
two hundred and twenty ships new ships were built and floated in just three months,
an incredible achievement which shows just how Rome didn't so much always win in
combat. Is it just simply refused to lose. It was this fleet in
two point fifty that then blockaded and took enormous perhaps the last major Carthaginian city
on Sicily, so from this point forwarding the First Punic War, most of
the engagements are quite minor. Rome continued to raid the North African coast,
but in two fifty three it lost another one hundred and fifty ships in a
storm, suggesting that Carthage would have been better off never engage at the Romans
and just letting the sea do its work for it. In two forty nine,
one of the two consuls for the year, Publius Claudius Polkar, decided
to launch a surprise attack on the last Punic naval depot on Sicily, Japana.
It was an audacious move, but Claudius was an audacious man. This
is the man who, famously, when told that the auspicious signs for a
battle were poor because the sacred chickens wouldn't eat, grabbed them and hurled them
overboard, proclaiming that if they would not eat, then he would let them
drink. However, despite his reputation for arrogance, Claudius's initial preparations were careful
enough. He put to sea at night to avoid being spotted, and news
of his departure being carried by land to Jirpana and sailed along the coast.
However, and in the darkness, it was difficult for the Romans ships to
remain in a close formation, especially since they were crewed by a mixture of
experienced rowers and brand new draftees. The route was simple to follow since it
hugged the coast, but throughout the night the Roman fleet straggled, and by
the morning it was a long, scattered line as it approached the enemy base.
Claudius's flagship was somewhere, not sure where, near the rear the Romans
were spotted and word brought to ad Herbal actually someone not named Hannibal or Hamilcar,
the Punic admiral, who then took the bold decision to put to sea
and confront the enemy. He didn't want to permit himself to be plockaded into
the harbor. He gathered his crews and collected large numbers of mercenaries to act
as marines. It now became a matter of time as to whether or not
the Carthaginian fleet would escape from the harbor and gain the sea room before the
Roman ships were able to block the entrance. The disordered and scattered formation of
the Roman fleet and the poorer quality of their crews proved decisive, but honestly
only in the narrowest of margins. The entrance to the harbor at Tripana was
wide, and as the first Roman ships were entering its southernmost edge, o
her Ball's flagship was rowing out past the long spit of land which formed the
northern edge. He signaled the rest of the fleet to follow him. So
the Carthaginian ships proceeded in line astern, rounded the two small islands opposite the
harbor mouth, and then turned southward parallel to the coast, but further out
to the sea than the Roman fleet. Claudius knew he had just missed his
chance and sought to signal to bring some sort of order to his fleet,
which was now spread over a wide area. Dreadful confusion resulted as the ships
which had entered the harbor tried to turn around and escaped back into the open
sea. Some ships collided and ships had oars sheared off by friendly vessels.
Eventually, the Romans managed to form a rough line of ships close in the
shore, with their rams facing out to the sea, the flagship now being
on the extreme left of the Roman line. In the meantime, odd Herball
had outflanked the left of the Roman line with five ships, angled forward and
placed his own ship facing the Roman line. As the rest of the fleet
came up, he ordered them to form a line on his vessel, subordinate
officers regulating the deployment, presumably in smaller boats. After this delay, the
two fleets formed up, ad her Ball signaled his ships to attack. It
would prove the only significant defeat suffered by the Roman navy throughout the war.
Ninety three Roman ships were captured in the disaster. Many more were sunk.
This was the only time when Carthage was able to use its skill advantage to
bring about a decisive victory. The Romans were evidently no longer using the corvus,
which had protected them from ramming Claus. With their sterens firmly to the
coast, the Romans just simply had no room to maneuver. Had the battle
been fought on the open sea, things might have been different, but Claudius
had gotten himself into a really difficult situation from which he was at a significant
disadvantage. From the word go. Carthage just had much more room to maneuver
than the Roman ships. Did. The next year, Rome lost another one
hundred strong fleet to a storm, but this time was different the storm I
mean because it came after a defeat, not a victory, so things seemed
a lot more serious. Rome could not afford to build yet another fleet and
abandoned for the moment the war at sea. Roma had taken a lot of
losses in this war so far. The census in two fifty one showed that
there were two hundred and ninety seven thousand, seven hundred and ninety seven registered
Roman male citizens, but in two forty seven, four years later, that
number had fallen to two hundred thousand, forty one seven to twelve. That's
a loss of over fifty thousand men. But once again Rome refused to give
in. In two forty three, the Romans realized that if they were going
to win the war, then they had no choice but to build another fleet.
This one, however, two hundred quinquoreems strong, would need to be
financed by wealthy individuals who would be paid back after the war. The Senate,
you see, was broke. One of the consuls for two forty two,
Ulius Posthumus Albinus, held the priest shood known as the Flamen Martalus and
was forbidden by religious taboo from leaving the city, so the fleet was entrusted
to the command of his colleague Caius Lutellus Catullus, backed by the senior Prietor.
The Romans immediately renewed their pressure on the enemy's last major strongholds in Sicily,
moving to capture finally the harbor at Drepana, and tried to cut off
Lily Bayham from the sea. Hamilcar Barca, who is now the major commander
on Sicily, was now cut off from resupply by the sea. Olybyas tells
us explicitly, the main Roman objective in these operations was to provoke a major
encounter with the Carthaginian fleet, since they felt its defeat would be a greater
blow than any successes might have achieved in Sicily. To this end, Katullus
took a lot of care to exercise his ships at sea each day, training
the crews to the highest level efficiency that he could achieve. His sailors were
never allowed to waste away in heavy labor, but were kept healthy and provided
a good diet of food, and by two forty one the Roman fleet was
in superb condition, its crews experienced and skilled, Its ships built to a
far better design than in the past. The number of ships constructed in the
preceding twenty years and the Roman's practical experience of naval operations only refined the skills
of their ship rights. The Carthaginians were far less well prepared for the upcoming
encounter, for they hadn't made little use of their naval superiority, which they
achieved after Japana and the Roman losses to weather. The Punic navy had done
little in the years since then, and it appears that relatively viewships had actually
even been kept in commission. It took them time to muster the crews for
the fleet of two hundred and fifty or so ships, which they ultimately gathered
to send to Sicily. For probably the first and maybe only time in the
war, the average Carthaginian crew was less well trained than its Roman counterpart.
It's also possible that many crews were under strength, although certain tea is impossible.
Their objective was twofold. In the first instance, the priority was to
load the ships with supplies of grain for Hamilcar's army and the remaining Punic garrisons
in Sicily. The Roman pressure on these troops made it difficult for them to
survive by foraging. Once the supplies had been offloaded, the idea was that
the fleet would then take on board the pick of Hamilcar's soldiers to serve as
marines, and then seek out and destroy the Roman fleet. Command in this
operation was given to another guy named Hanno, and we actually don't know.
He might have been the same guy who had presided over the defeats at Agrigantum
in two sixty one and in Commness in two fifty six, if so,
bad choice. The Carthaginians followed the same route as the fifty ships carrying reinforcements
and supplies which Hannibal, son of Hamilcar, had sailed into Libeium in two
fifty Crossing to the Agates Islands, which are just to the west of Sicily.
They stopped the westernmost of these, which then was known as the Holy
Island, and waited for a favorable breeze to carry them all the rest of
the way. The Romans were not aware of their presence yet. However,
Katulus received a report of their arrival and immediately took on board extra marines drawn
from the army and crossed to another of the islands in this same Agattes group.
That next day, this is now the tenth of March two forty one,
the wind brew strongly from the west in just the direction that Hanno had
hoped for. The Punic ships raised their sails and begun to run in line
to link up with their land forces. Katulus now had a tough choice to
make. The heavy swell was really against the Romans. The rowers would have
to battle hard against the wind if they were going to move and intercept the
Punic fleet. In the past, Roman commanders, who had treated the elements
and storms in a cavalier manner, had presided over the largest disaster of the
war. However, if Katullus delayed, then he was unlikely to stop the
Carthaginians joining Hamilcar and taking on board large numbers of experienced soldiers. Katulus took
the risk and put to sea. This time, though the Punic fleet stood
little chance. It was overburdened with grain and had few marines. The Romans
crashed straight into them, and by the end of the day the Punic losses
were one hundred and twenty ships. Either lost or sunk. The Romans suffered
losses as well. Actually, nearly thirty ships sank and another fifty were crippled.
Luckily for Carthage, the wind picked up and allowed the remainder of the
fleet to escape, but that counted for very little. The Battle of the
Agatees Islands decided the war. Hamilcar Barka was now totally isolated in Sicily.
Carthage made no effort to rebuild on other fleet and instead conceded defeat. The
resources expended in the naval campaigns in the war had been massive, Bolibya's claiming
that the Romans had lost about seven hundred warships and the Carthaginians near five hundred,
although the accuracy of these figures has been doubted. The heaviest Roman losses
all occurred in storms, and this ensured that the casualties suffered by the crews
were disproportionately high. Many of the crews of the Punic ships were saved,
although this sometimes meant going into captivity. It was the victors, ironically who
suffered the greatest losses at sea. Ultimately, the Romans won because of their
ruthless determination and the pursuit of victory made them willing to accept its high price
in men and ships. The initial decision to create a Roman fleet may have
at least been motivated in part by a desire to defend the Roman coast from
the Punic navy, but the Romans used their naval power in a consistently aggressive
manner. The support of the navy allowed the Roman landforces in Sicily to press
on more successfully with the task of subduing Punic strongholds there, And of course
we can never forget the ingenuity of the Corvus, which really swung the naval
theater in Rome's direction for those first crucial years when we might have expected the
Punic naval tradition to carry the day. Carthage, however, never displayed the
aggressiveness that allowed the Romans to win. They had naval advantages in two sixty
four to sixty three and again briefly in two forty one, but they never
used them. Punic commanders in Sicily only lost territory, they never even attempted
to win any back. The Roman approach to the war was very different from
what Carthage had encountered before, and it seemed not to know what to make
of it. If you ask me what one Rome the First Punic War came
down to one word attitude. Okay, fine, maybe two words attitude and
corvus. After the disastrous defeat at the Agatas Islands, the Carthaginians gave Hamilcar
barka full authority to negotiate a peace with Rome. In fact, Hamilcar,
eager to disassociate himself from any admission of defeat, acted through one of his
subordinate officers, gus Go, the consul. Catullus's year of office had almost
expired, and the desire to gain credit for completing such a major war before
his successors arrived to steal the glory may have made him actually a little bit
more conciliatory. An initial Roman demand that Hamilcar's Sicilian army should immediately surrender its
weapons and hand over for punishment all Roman and Italian deserters was swiftly rejected.
The mercenaries would leave the army with their arms and honor intact. Yet this
seems to have been the only concession that the Carthaginians were able to gain,
and as we'll find out in a minute, it wasn't much of a concession.
In other respects. The peace terms made it clear that they had been
defeated and that Rome was not negotiating with an equal Peace was declared between Roman
Carthage, provided that all the following conditions were matt hey. The Carthaginians were
to evacuate all of sicily be Neither side was to make war on the other's
allies, nor seek to subvert their allegiance by allying with them directly or becoming
involved in their internal affairs. They were not to recruit soldiers or raise money
for the construction of public buildings in the territory of the other. See.
The Carthaginians were to give up all Roman prisoners freely, while paying a ransom
for their own. And finally, deep the Carthaginians were to pay an indemnity
to the Roman states of twy two hundred Eubuoyan talents over a twenty year period.
Now, Roman council did not have the authority to make a final peace
treaty himself. The Roman people had devoted in their centuries to ratify any treaty.
Thus Catullus had to take these terms back to Rome. The Roman people
in this case felt that the terms were too lenient The indemnity was therefore increased
from two thousand, two hundred to three thousand, two hundred talents, with
the one thousand increase payable immediately. The only other change was a minor clause
requiring Carthage to evacuate all the small islands between Sicily and Africa. The Romans
had clearly accomplished their war aim. Carthage was completely expelled from Sicily. Moreover,
Carthaginian naval power had been broken. Yet for the moment, Carthage had
lost no territory in Spain or North Africa, and it even held on to
Sardinia for a time. The Romans recognized that Carthage was different from the sam
Nights or any other Italian community they had subdued. It couldn't simply annex all
of Carthage, not yet at least. The war also brought an administrative change
for Rome, its first province. Historians are not sure exactly when the change
happened, but by two twenty seven BCE, Western Sicily got its first Roman
governor and became the first Roman province as we understand the term today. With
hindsight, it's honestly difficult to pinpoint any point during the war, when the
Carthaginians came close to victory, the most serious Roman losses were due to bad
weather and not to enemy action. Perhaps in the earliest phases, if Carthage
had been able to prevent the Roman expedition from crossing the Straits of Messina,
or had defeated Claudius's army after it landed, then they might have dissuaded the
Romans from further adventures in Sicily, or at least in the short term.
But that in fact would have been to prevent the crisis from developing into a
war in the first place, so that when count is winning the war.
Yet it was extremely difficult for squadrons of galleys to block a stretch of water,
and the Punic forces in Sicily in two sixty four were totally inadequate to
achieve such a quick victory over a Roman consular army. Apart from the decision
to continue the struggle and send a large army to Sicily after Rome's defeat of
Syracuse, the Carthaginian war effort was basically passive. They were always reacting to
Roman moves, all intended to protect their existing positions in Sicily, never expand
them, even when they sought to harass the enemy by raiding the Italian coast.
The main objective was to draw Roman forces away from Sicily on the island
itself. Their strategy followed the traditional Carthaginian pattern of enduring an enemy onslaught and
trying to maintain and control over as many strongholds as possible, waiting for the
enemy to weakend so that eventually the lost ground could be regained. Carthage had
been involved in sporadic conflict in Sicily for centuries before the Romans arrived, and
if car Which had never gained full control of the island, neither had Carthage
ever been completely expelled. The Romans were not like Peris, though, who
would abandon his offensive when he failed to gain widespread support from the Greek communities
of Sicily. Nor was their power as precarious as that of all the tyrants
of Syracuse over the years. Roman persistence was at least the equal of Carthages,
but it was married to an extremely aggressive mode of war making, applying
continuous pressure on an enemy in an effort to force capitulation. Throughout the conflict,
they consistently assumed the offensive methodically expanding their territory which they controlled in Sicily,
continuing to do so even when their armies morale reached a low EBB after
the defeat of Rigolus. More importantly, they were willing to escalate the conflict
in an effort to defeat the enemy invading africast of all, deciding to create
a fleet and pursue the war at sea. In spite of their colossal losses.
Rome's huge reserves of manpower made it possible to absorb appalling losses, but
this in and of itself doesn't explain the willingness with which the population continued to
be ready to serve in the war. Another change in Roman behavior during the
war was the election of consuls based on ability and experience rather than pure political
connections. After Durpana in two forty nine BCE, there was a market change
and who was elected. In fact, after Dripana, the Romans appointed a
military dictator to control the operations in Sicily for a period, the only time
in the war that that happened. Still, Rome continued its practice of appointing
two consuls by and large, and they still rotated command went in the field
together. The only reason The weakness in this system was not more apparent during
the First Punic War was because there weren't more pitched battles, but that is
soon to change. True. Carthaginian commanders may have been more quote unquote professional
than the Roman counterparts, and certainly remained in their posts for much longer periods,
but few would have had much experience of commanding such large forces as frequently
employed during the war. This was totally true of the admirals appointed to the
control of the operations of what were unprecedentedly large fleets, which were formed on
several occasions. Their inexperience of command at this level added to the already major
practical difficulties in coordinating the movements of hundreds of ORed warships, and was perhaps
another factor in denying the Carthaginian Navy the advantages it ought to have derived from
the superior skill of its crews. Several Punic generals were crucified in the aftermath
of military failures during the war, usually it seems, by order of their
own immediate subordinates. Yet other defeated leaders escaped punishment and went on to hold
for their commands, which suggests that political influence as much as actual responsibility determined
their fate. The Romans were considerably more lenient toward their magistrates, who presided
over disasters, awarding triumphs to successive admirals who had lost most of their fleets
to bad weather. Only Claudius was prosecuted on the charge of what they called
perdulio. In a sense, it meant sort of like bringing the state into
disrepute, and that was for his behavior at Rohana. But he even narrowly
escaped condemnation and was instead found guilty of a lesser charge than fined. After
the war, Carthage faced another conflict that nearly saw the complete destruction of the
city itself, the Mercenary War. This was one hundred percent a self inflicted
wound. Normally, mercenaries were returned to Carthage by nationality, paid and then
sent back to their country of origin, but this time Carthage decided that no
one would be paid until all the mercenaries were present, a huge mistake.
Compounding this mistake, Carthage decided that it would try to renegotiate the amounted ode
to the very men whould risk their lives and served Carthage well for years yikes.
As a result, and after numerous disturbances on the streets of Carthage,
the mercenaries were sent to the town of Sika, were they encamped without a
commander and with no duties to maintain their discipline. Understandably, the mercenaries,
who had fought loyally and well for their masters and according to their contracts,
were reluctant to accept any payment less than their due. They felt totally betrayed.
They were especially bitter towards Hamilcar, who had made lavish promises of future
rewards during the operations in Sicily, only to abandon them to the whims of
a government and the generals they did not know. The Carthaginians soon realized the
negotiations were not succeeding, and aware that they would have the difficulty in controlling
twenty thousand well equipped veteran soldiers, agreed to pay the full amounts the men
were due, But it was too late. The disfrontled mercenaries had become aware
of their own strength, and they steadily increased their demands, forcing one concession
after another out of Carthage. Resentment at their unfair treatment gradually turned into deep
hostility toward the Carthaginians. Like all Punic armies, the veterans for Sicily were
a mixture of many different peoples Libyans, Gaulls, Spaniards, Ligurians, Sicilian
Greeks, runaway slaves, disorters from Rome. Lacking a common language and without
a unifying force of a Carthaginian command structure, the mercenaries at Sicca had fragmented
into groups along ethnic lines. The Libyans were the largest of these, and
it was they who finally turned mutiny into open revolt when they seized and imprisoned
the unfortunate Gezgo, the man the mercenaries themselves had chosen to deal with as
the only Punic officer that they trusted. It was the presence of this Libyan
element within the army which was to make the rebellions so serious, because they
were able to swiftly rally most of the countrymen to their cause. Carthaginian rule
had always been harsh and unpopular for the Libyan peasantry, but during the war
with Rome, the burdens of taxation and conscription had grown far worse. With
very few exceptions, the Libyan communities declared for the rebels and swelled the size
of their forces. They were joined by many of the Numidian princes, whom
the Carthaginians had been fighting to control over the last decade, and who now
saw an opportunity for revenge. Soon, an army many times the size of
the one Regulus had led began a blockade of Carthage. The main rebel leaders
were Mathos, a Libyan, and Spendius, an escaped Campanian slave who feared
being returned to his former master for execution. These were supported by a gall
A torriatas, a chieftain of remarkably unreliable band of warriors in the war,
or, if we were being fair, some of his followers had actually deserted
to the Romans during the war and later went on to betray them as well.
Though veteran soldiers, Spendius had an especially distinguished record during the war with
Rome. None of these men had experience of high command, and the movement
of the rebel armies were clumsy and poorly coordinated. This is one of the
few advantages that the Carthaginians enjoyed in the conflict. It was always difficult for
them to raise large armies quickly, but the situation worsened when their own mercenaries
turned against them, in addition to the rebellion in Libya. This denied them
access to revenue and resources of manpower in which they could normally rely. The
forces which were able to raise, composed of some still loyal mercenaries who felt
no particular bond with unfamiliar Sicilian veterans and newly raised citizen soldiers, were heavily
outnumbered. Further problems were caused by a divided command, similar to the appointment
of three generals to lead the operations back in the Punic War in two fifty
six to fifty five. Hamilcar, Barka, and Hanno, who was better
organizer than commander, didn't get along with each other, and the operations of
their armies were hindered by the sort of disputes which were normally actually more typical
of the Romans. Hannah was later forced to resign by a vote of the
army or probably just the senior officers, and replaced by a more amenable Hannibal,
son of Hamilcar. It is in these campaigns, far more than in
the war in Sicily, that we see evidence of Hamilcar's skill as a general.
Consistently out maneuvering the larger rebel forces. He combined force with diplomacy.
For instance, when Navaras, a Numidian prince, offered to defect with his
followers, he was rewarded with a marriage to Hamilcar's daughter. Both sides mide
extensive and ever escalating use of horror and atrocity, Hamilcar ordering captured mercenaries to
be trampled to death by his elephants. Eventually, the two commanders, Mathos
and Spendius were both captured and crucified. Well, the unfortunate Gezgo and the
other hostages were dismembered and tossed into a ditch where they bled to death.
Eventually, by two thirty seven, the rebel armies had finally been defeated and
the Libyan community surrendered and the mercenary revolt collapsed. Yet in the end,
the message is clear, guys, just pay your mercenaries now. I mentioned
that Carthage would hold on to Sardinia, but only for a time. In
two forty Punic officers and their soldiers on the island mutinied. They called to
Rome for aid, promising them land in Sardinia if they allied against Carthage.
Someone. Surprisingly, Rome said no, it would abide by the treaty,
but by two thirty seven, when the same thing happened again, the Romans
lost their scruples and sent a force to take the island. Carthage objected,
but it was in no position to do anything about it, so Rome got
another province that being said I should mention. Sardinia proved a tough nut to
crack, and Rome had to fight until two thirty one to subdue the resistance
there. Sicily and Sardinia were lost, and in the aftermath of the Mercenary
Rebellion, Africa was too unstable for further expansion to be contemplated, so Carthage
turned its attention increasingly to Spain. In two thirty eight to thirty seven,
Hamilcar Barka was sent at the head of an army to take charge of the
province there, and the choice of such an experienced and aggressive commander for a
region which does not appear to have faced a major threat can only mean that
the objective was expand For the next nine years, Hamilcar fought almost continuously securing
Punic control of the coastal stirrup of southern Spain and pushing up the Valley of
Guadalavie until he was killed in an ambush by a Celtic Tiberian tribe known as
the Orentai in two twenty nine. One source actually claims that he deliberately sacrificed
himself to save his sons. He was succeeded in his command by his son
in law and second in command at the time, Hasdrubal, who continued the
program of expansion, achieving more through diplomacy than war, even marrying a Spanish
princess to cement one alliance. The succession seems to have been voted for first
by the army in Spain and subsequently approved back in Carthage. This was certainly
the case when Hasdrubal himself was assassinated in two twenty one, and the army
or at least its officers, gave the command then to Hamilcarr's eldest son,
Hannibal, a decision later ratified by the popular Assembly in Carthage. So the
basic story of Punic expansion in Spain under the Barque family is pretty straightforward,
and it's not controversial at all, even if our sources sometimes contradict each other.
On minor points. Still, many important questions remain unanswered. It's unclear
how and why Hamilcar was given Spanish command in the first place, and to
what extent his activities once there were supervised. One extreme view is to see
this period as a triumph of a sort of popular maybe even populist party in
Carthage. Hamilcar the demagogue, winning the support of ordinary citizens or tired of
the incompetence displayed by the old aristocracy during the First Punic War with Rome and
then subsequently in the Mercenary Rebellion. This allowed him to secure an unlimited command
in Spain, with the freedom to wage war and enrich himself for his own
purposes. There may be a few indications of political change at Carthage, since
the Council of one oh four seems far less important during this period, and
the importance of two annually elected Sioux fights may have increased. However, it
must always be remembered that any evidence that we have for this constitution and internal
politics of Carthage is exceptionally poor and sometimes non existed completely. Most of our
sources do portray the Barkeet family as facing strong opposition from rivals who feared their
growing power and from those who objected to their policies, but it's unclear how
strong and consistent such opposition was. In one tradition, Hamilcar used the booty
from his Spanish campaigns both to secure the loyalty of his soldiers and to buy
himself political support at home. It is equally possible to interpret the same evidence
as showing Hamilcar as nothing more than a servant of the state, appointed with
the general approval of the elite at Carthage, and frankly, my guess is
the truth is somewhere in between. The Second Punic War really begins in Spain,
making the activity of the Barquet family there in the years after the first
war especially important, But our sources awareness of this only makes it more difficult
to understand sort of regime they created, How significant was it and why did
it matter that command was always exclusively held by members of one family. It's
not entirely clear whether the Carthaginians just ratified the army's choice of leader because they
felt they were powerless to change this, or because that was always the plan.
There may have been practical benefits from this, since it was far easier
for the Spanish tribes and leaders to focus their loyalty on an individual general and
on his family rather than a distant Carthage a concept, and these are emotions
which the Romans would later exploit. The activities of the bar Kids in Spain
may simply be seen as an effective way for the Carthaginian state to expand its
territory, there allowing them more easily to exploit the resources of both mineral wealth
and military manpower. For other historians, these years saw the creation of what
was in effect a semi independent principality ruled by the bark And family for their
own ends. Our evidence, however, isterly inadequate to resolve this debate.
The same series of coins produced in Punic Spain in this period have been interpreted
as showing hamilcar and Hasdrubal depicted as Hellenistic kings even with divine associations. Hasdrubald,
definitely, we know, founded a major city called New Carthage, which
is modern Cartagena. But whether this should be seen as a seat of provincial
government or a capital of a semi independent kingdom depends on the view that you
take of the Barkheads themselves. The Romans certainly kept a weary eye on the
Carthaginian activity in Spain, although as of yet there was no direct involvement from
Rome in the area. In two thirty one, a delegation of some owners
went to Hamilcar to ask him about the motives for his aggressive campaigns, and
was told that these were necessary if Carthage was to pay that massive indemnity that
it owed to Rome. Later, sometime around two twenty six, another set
of envoys went to Hasdrbal who formerly agreed not to expand me on the River
Ebro. And this is of course going to be the spark later that's going
to start off the Second Punic War. As possible that Rome's interest in Spain
was encouraged by her longtime ally Messia. That's modern day man say in Spain
or in France. Excuse me, but the concern over growing Carthaginian power may
well have been genuine. As yet, Rome had no direct connection at all,
to be clear, with the Spanish peninsula. Latin traders were certainly active
there, but they didn't have any government influence. In fact, between two
forty one and two eighteen, Rome found itself mostly occupied around the Po River.
In modern northern Italy. This is the region around Milan, but referred
to in our Roman sources as Cisalpine Goal. It took the Romans until two
eighteen to finally subdue the people there and continue what had turned into a lengthy
process of colonization. Spain and northern Italy would see much activity when the war
was finally renewed between Rome and Carthage. In addition, many of the individuals
on both sides were prominent in the campaigns in the two twenties and would later
play a significant role in the war with Hannibal. For a generation of Roman
commanders who grew up between the wars with Carthage the First and Second Punic War,
their military experience was in Sardinia, Illyria and as I mentioned, most
of all Ssalpine Gaul, and they got accustomed to warfare against armies which were
tactically unsophisticated. Though the individual soldiers were skilled and very brave, it was
though poor preparation for confronting a general as skilled as Hannibal at the head of
a well trained army. Next time discussed the beginnings of the Second Punic War,