WEBVTT 1 00:00:00.320 --> 00:00:02.879 Hey, guys, it's Jack. I just wanted to talk to you today 2 00:00:03.000 --> 00:00:06.879 about a way that you can help support the podcast. If you're not already, 3 00:00:07.200 --> 00:00:10.720 we would really appreciate it if you guys went and reviewed us on Apple 4 00:00:10.839 --> 00:00:15.320 or Spotify. Those reviews really help people find the podcast and help it get 5 00:00:15.359 --> 00:00:18.760 recognized, and you know, if you've been enjoying the show, we really 6 00:00:18.800 --> 00:00:23.879 appreciate your support. Another thing that you can do to support the channel is 7 00:00:23.960 --> 00:00:28.839 to become a Patreon member. So we have Patreon memberships that started just five 8 00:00:28.879 --> 00:00:32.719 dollars a month, and when you sign up, you get access to all 9 00:00:32.799 --> 00:00:36.520 of our episodes add free. That's the big bonus for that. I mean, 10 00:00:36.520 --> 00:00:41.640 we also do some Patreon bonus episodes for our subscribers, but this is 11 00:00:41.719 --> 00:00:47.560 the biggest and best way that you can support the Teamhouse channel and podcast if 12 00:00:47.600 --> 00:00:51.240 you'd like to, and we really appreciate that. So go and check us 13 00:00:51.240 --> 00:01:03.759 out at patreon dot com. Slash the Teamhouse, Special Operations Coberts SB and 14 00:01:03.840 --> 00:01:17.760 I The Team House with your host Jack Murphy and David Park. Hey, 15 00:01:17.840 --> 00:01:21.079 folks, welcome to episode two hundred and seventy four of the Teamhouse. I'm 16 00:01:21.120 --> 00:01:25.680 Jack Murphy. Dave's out tonight, D's back there producing. Our guest on 17 00:01:25.719 --> 00:01:30.359 tonight's show is Eric Volez. He served as a career FBI agent, including 18 00:01:30.400 --> 00:01:36.040 two stints as assistant directors, and we're really excited to talk about his whole 19 00:01:36.040 --> 00:01:38.680 career. A lot of interesting stuff, kidnapping cases, counter drugs stuff, 20 00:01:38.840 --> 00:01:42.879 then and then intelligence, so we'll get into all of that. I just 21 00:01:42.879 --> 00:01:48.959 want to give a quick shout out to Casa Carabeo Cigars for providing the cigars 22 00:01:48.959 --> 00:01:53.920 for this show. You'd find them at Costacarabeo dot com and please also check 23 00:01:53.959 --> 00:01:57.599 out our Patreon there's a link down in the description. If you sign up 24 00:01:57.599 --> 00:02:00.400 for five dollars a month, you get access to all the episodes of the 25 00:02:00.400 --> 00:02:05.400 Teamhouse ad free. And we really appreciate you guys supporting the channel. So 26 00:02:06.480 --> 00:02:09.120 with that said, Eric, welcome to the show having me. Cheers, 27 00:02:10.159 --> 00:02:16.319 Thank you for coming in. Absolutely so yeah, thank you for having me. 28 00:02:16.840 --> 00:02:21.960 I mean, it's our pleasure. So I'll ask you to start at 29 00:02:21.960 --> 00:02:23.479 the beginning with, you know, kind of your origin story, like how 30 00:02:23.479 --> 00:02:28.000 did you grow up and what was like that pathway that took you towards the 31 00:02:28.080 --> 00:02:31.240 FBI. Sure, actually it's an interesting story. It's kind of like a 32 00:02:31.439 --> 00:02:37.000 it's my bureau story. Is a real true mail room to boardroom type of 33 00:02:37.039 --> 00:02:38.639 story. So I grew up in Puerto Rico. My dad was an army 34 00:02:38.639 --> 00:02:43.520 so I'm an army brat born in Fort Gordon, Georgia, but Puerto Ricole's 35 00:02:43.520 --> 00:02:46.360 where I call home, and back when I was coming out of high school, 36 00:02:47.639 --> 00:02:51.280 it was right around that time where there was a group called the Machetetro 37 00:02:51.360 --> 00:02:55.800 Group, an independence movement terrorist organization in Puerto Rico, and my dad had 38 00:02:55.800 --> 00:03:00.919 gotten a job post army working in the FBI as an eye. It's not 39 00:03:00.000 --> 00:03:04.560 an intel analyst. These these are folks, investigative assistants, and so the 40 00:03:04.599 --> 00:03:07.280 agents work in their cases. These are the folks that would do a lot 41 00:03:07.280 --> 00:03:09.719 of the DMV runs, some of the background stuff to kind of help the 42 00:03:09.759 --> 00:03:15.039 agents along their cases. In eighty five, I believe it was eighty four, 43 00:03:15.240 --> 00:03:21.360 is when happens the organized agent shoots a law rocket into the FBI office 44 00:03:21.400 --> 00:03:23.840 in San Juan and it hits right above the offices on the fifth floor. 45 00:03:23.840 --> 00:03:27.120 It hits on the sixth floor. But at the time they said, hey, 46 00:03:27.199 --> 00:03:30.400 let's beef up the night crew. So there was one guy that did 47 00:03:30.439 --> 00:03:32.080 midnight to eight, another guy then four to midnight. There was a swing 48 00:03:32.080 --> 00:03:36.639 shift guy, and so they wanted to put somebody else on quickly. So 49 00:03:36.800 --> 00:03:38.360 here I am. I'm eighteen years old, I have no credit and worked 50 00:03:38.360 --> 00:03:43.840 anywhere. So my background took like nothing to get in. And so my 51 00:03:44.080 --> 00:03:51.000 first job is working the night shift in Puerto Rico and picking up confidential trash, 52 00:03:51.039 --> 00:03:55.199 you know, doing radio, doing mail deliveries. And that's how I 53 00:03:55.199 --> 00:03:59.800 get started into the FBI. And then from there, you know. I 54 00:04:00.120 --> 00:04:02.400 at that point, I was studying airway science. I wanted to be something 55 00:04:02.439 --> 00:04:05.960 to do with aviation, air traffic controller. I went maybe pilot. But 56 00:04:06.000 --> 00:04:11.759 then my first exposure to FBI agents. I remember sitting there was just a 57 00:04:11.840 --> 00:04:15.280 kid, and there had been this raid earlier on. They'd taken down this 58 00:04:15.280 --> 00:04:19.319 big gang and some swat guys had come up with this guy. This one 59 00:04:19.720 --> 00:04:24.399 guy was all tatted up and some bad guy. And I'm sitting there in 60 00:04:24.519 --> 00:04:26.959 my desk and there's a chair and they said, hey, we're gonna put 61 00:04:27.000 --> 00:04:29.439 him right here, and they sat the guy next to me, and they 62 00:04:29.439 --> 00:04:32.720 had these two big old swat guys, you know, all jacked up and 63 00:04:34.800 --> 00:04:38.600 at that moment, I went like I want to be that, Like that's 64 00:04:38.600 --> 00:04:41.160 what I want to do. And so I changed and I start to like 65 00:04:42.040 --> 00:04:44.920 everything I'm studying in school changes, and I'd become an agent in ninety two, 66 00:04:45.000 --> 00:04:47.279 So I have seven years clerical what they called. I was a clerk 67 00:04:47.319 --> 00:04:51.040 back then, and then I become an agent in ninety two. So, 68 00:04:51.920 --> 00:04:55.879 I mean, that's an interesting way to kind of, like you said, 69 00:04:55.959 --> 00:05:00.800 you know, graduate up into the organization. Is that like, that's not 70 00:05:00.879 --> 00:05:04.240 that's like atypical. Usually it's like college or law enforcement into correct Yeah, 71 00:05:04.240 --> 00:05:08.480 it's not. I mean there are folks that start off in the bureau kind 72 00:05:08.519 --> 00:05:11.600 of either as analysts or others, and then they become agents later on. 73 00:05:12.720 --> 00:05:15.959 It's usually in agent careers. An agent position is usually a second or third 74 00:05:16.000 --> 00:05:18.680 career. It's not your first thing you're doing. So a lot of them 75 00:05:18.720 --> 00:05:23.160 have a background there the military law enforce is something accounting lawyers, and then 76 00:05:23.199 --> 00:05:26.879 they become agents. Where in mind was my whole thing was, I'd started 77 00:05:26.879 --> 00:05:29.800 from the organization. I was a GS three, so that's I was making 78 00:05:29.839 --> 00:05:31.560 eleven thousand dollars a year. I mean, it's like back then, those 79 00:05:31.720 --> 00:05:34.279 for me I mean, I'm eighteen years old, nineteen years old, and 80 00:05:34.279 --> 00:05:36.360 I'm making eleven thousand bucks. That was a lot of money for me. 81 00:05:36.519 --> 00:05:42.839 So but yeah, that's it's not typical. My path is not. At 82 00:05:42.920 --> 00:05:46.560 least back then it wasn't. So nineteen ninety two, you go to Quantico. 83 00:05:46.879 --> 00:05:49.560 Yeah, what's it like going through the training to be a special agent 84 00:05:49.600 --> 00:05:54.079 at that time? Man, I tell you, I remember somebody once told 85 00:05:54.120 --> 00:05:56.319 me this, and it was the best way to describe Quantico. It was 86 00:05:56.360 --> 00:06:01.360 like, it's the best time of my life, but I never want to 87 00:06:01.360 --> 00:06:06.439 do it again. So it's every day I was there sixteen weeks. I 88 00:06:06.480 --> 00:06:10.319 think they've upped it too. It's I'm not sure exactly how long it is 89 00:06:10.360 --> 00:06:15.319 now, but back then it was sixteen weeks. And every day it's like, 90 00:06:15.519 --> 00:06:17.120 you're going to do this, You're going to take this test, You're 91 00:06:17.120 --> 00:06:20.199 gonna do this whatever, You're gonna shoot this many times you're gonna and you 92 00:06:20.319 --> 00:06:23.920 just get by day by day, and at the end of the day you're 93 00:06:23.920 --> 00:06:27.199 exhausted, and you just go day two and before you know it, you're 94 00:06:27.279 --> 00:06:30.120 you're graduating there and you're giving you a gun and a badge and they're sending 95 00:06:30.160 --> 00:06:33.040 you out. But but it's it's not easy, it's not meant to be 96 00:06:33.079 --> 00:06:39.199 easy. But they it's like I said, best thing I ever did, 97 00:06:39.360 --> 00:06:43.720 I never would do it again. Yeah, at the time in nineteen ninety 98 00:06:43.759 --> 00:06:46.600 two, I mean, what's kind of like the culture of the FBI, 99 00:06:46.759 --> 00:06:48.759 Like what is it that they're training you to do? I mean, what 100 00:06:48.920 --> 00:06:54.319 is the main focus of the organization at that time? Well, when I 101 00:06:54.360 --> 00:06:58.160 was coming in, it was around the time Janet Reno, the kind of 102 00:06:58.199 --> 00:07:01.360 the war on Drugs Southwest Border initiative. And I remember, because I was 103 00:07:01.399 --> 00:07:05.000 in the FBI, A lot of the agents, you know, would tell 104 00:07:05.040 --> 00:07:08.199 me like, hey, you know, you know where you're going, right, 105 00:07:08.240 --> 00:07:10.360 And I go, because you don't know where you're going. You get 106 00:07:10.399 --> 00:07:12.639 Quantico. You open up your letter at week eight and they tell you where 107 00:07:12.639 --> 00:07:14.959 you're gonna go, and they go, You're going to the border, like 108 00:07:15.000 --> 00:07:16.279 you're gonna work dope in the border. And I go, how do you 109 00:07:16.319 --> 00:07:19.839 know that? Because everybody's anybody speaks Spanish is going to go and being Puerto 110 00:07:19.920 --> 00:07:24.600 Rican, I spoke Spanish and uh, and sure enough there were four of 111 00:07:24.680 --> 00:07:28.079 us in my class that spoke Spanish. Two got McAllen and two got El 112 00:07:28.120 --> 00:07:30.199 Paso. So yeah, we were and that was the way it was back 113 00:07:30.240 --> 00:07:35.519 then. I so you graduated from Quantico and that must have been a big 114 00:07:35.560 --> 00:07:40.160 moment for you huge Yeah. Yeah, yeah, the best shape in my 115 00:07:40.199 --> 00:07:47.040 life. But it's just exciting, exciting to go to Texas to McCallen, 116 00:07:47.079 --> 00:07:53.120 you know, to actually work work drug cases. And it was hit the 117 00:07:53.160 --> 00:07:55.720 ground running. I mean you got there. I remember the day I got 118 00:07:55.759 --> 00:07:59.879 to McCallen, I get called like, hey, tomorrow morning, four o'clock, 119 00:08:00.079 --> 00:08:01.759 we got an arrest. You know, it's like like that, it's 120 00:08:01.839 --> 00:08:05.639 on. It was. Mccownan was a very busy office back then, not 121 00:08:05.680 --> 00:08:07.879 just drugs, but fugitives, you know, folks that are coming and hiding 122 00:08:07.920 --> 00:08:11.160 back in the valley. And so it was a NonStop and for an agent, 123 00:08:11.199 --> 00:08:15.120 it's the best time of your life because you're just you're resting, you're 124 00:08:15.160 --> 00:08:18.120 you're involved in a lot of it. And we were. We were teamed 125 00:08:18.199 --> 00:08:20.399 up with our partners at DEA and Customs at the time, you know, 126 00:08:20.439 --> 00:08:24.959 and another's I R S others that worked there, but DEA and US and 127 00:08:24.000 --> 00:08:28.040 Customs, we were all parts of task forces and all the guys. We 128 00:08:28.040 --> 00:08:30.759 all knew each other. It was really cool. It was nice being part 129 00:08:30.759 --> 00:08:33.039 of that community. Yeah, and you mentioned a little bit of it. 130 00:08:33.120 --> 00:08:39.759 I mean that Janet Reno was really escalating the pressure on the flow of drugs 131 00:08:39.759 --> 00:08:43.840 coming across the border. Could you expand on what kind of like what you 132 00:08:43.879 --> 00:08:46.679 were seeing what was going on at that time. Well, it's interesting because 133 00:08:46.679 --> 00:08:50.320 we you know, we had Title twenty one authority, which allowed a bureau 134 00:08:50.320 --> 00:08:54.799 to work drug cases much like DEA. So what the approach that the bureau 135 00:08:54.960 --> 00:09:01.399 was taking was that we we focused on the law large cartels, whether they're 136 00:09:01.399 --> 00:09:09.679 Cardio Fuentes. You know, what's the other the different you know, Juan 137 00:09:09.679 --> 00:09:15.919 Garciabo, which is garciab Ran, the golf cartel. So McAllen, that's 138 00:09:15.960 --> 00:09:18.279 what. So for us, we had a squad, a squad, and 139 00:09:18.399 --> 00:09:22.639 typical squad is usually you know when it were ten twelve fifteen agents. We 140 00:09:22.679 --> 00:09:28.960 had about eighteen agents on our squad. And the way we did it in 141 00:09:30.039 --> 00:09:33.240 McCallen was there was one case, maybe two cases, but you had to 142 00:09:33.320 --> 00:09:37.399 link the case to a cartel. If you could not establish that link, 143 00:09:37.519 --> 00:09:41.679 you could, Yeah, I mean you only had so many resources and so 144 00:09:43.279 --> 00:09:48.279 the case agent basically ran the case and then the rest of us supported it. 145 00:09:48.320 --> 00:09:50.200 We did a surveillance, we did we sat on wire taps, we 146 00:09:50.240 --> 00:09:56.080 did whatever. But that's how it was, and that's my first My first 147 00:09:56.559 --> 00:10:01.039 activity as an agent was sitting on wire taps, you know, like bouncing 148 00:10:01.080 --> 00:10:05.519 around like, you know, supporting cases. And I knew. I said, 149 00:10:05.519 --> 00:10:07.919 I'm gonna end up doing this for the rest of my life unless I 150 00:10:07.000 --> 00:10:11.200 become the case agent. You know, you told me earlier on that it 151 00:10:11.279 --> 00:10:15.440 was kind of funny listening to the wires. Yeah, because you speak Puerto 152 00:10:15.519 --> 00:10:18.039 Rican Spanish. Yeah, these guys speak like Mexican prison Spanish. Yeah. 153 00:10:18.120 --> 00:10:20.320 Yeah, Well I remember it because they sent me up. I was in 154 00:10:20.399 --> 00:10:24.559 mccaun. I just got my apartment and then they said it was around Christmas 155 00:10:24.600 --> 00:10:26.200 time or Thanksgiving. It was the holiday, and they said, hey, 156 00:10:26.360 --> 00:10:28.840 you need to come up to San Antonio. It was a wire. We're 157 00:10:28.879 --> 00:10:35.919 working a Mexican mafia wire and the main subject I believe was was in California. 158 00:10:35.320 --> 00:10:39.440 But you know, there's the leadership of the Mexican mafia was in San 159 00:10:39.440 --> 00:10:43.759 Antonio. We were up on these wire taps and you know, I show 160 00:10:43.840 --> 00:10:46.000 up and it's me. I think I have the four to midnight and it's 161 00:10:46.080 --> 00:10:50.519 me and I think we're on four lines. So the other three were San 162 00:10:50.519 --> 00:10:52.360 Antonio PD guys. You know, they all grew up in the Earth and 163 00:10:52.399 --> 00:10:56.559 they they know the they know the language, you know, and so I 164 00:10:56.559 --> 00:10:58.360 remember my first call comes in. You know, at the time, we 165 00:10:58.440 --> 00:11:03.879 had cassette players like you know now it's all digital, but back then you 166 00:11:03.919 --> 00:11:07.240 have accept players. And we had like three three machines to explain all that 167 00:11:07.279 --> 00:11:09.360 to our younger audience. Yeah. Yeah, So we had like three machines 168 00:11:09.559 --> 00:11:13.200 and then the machines of the original one. You take that one out, 169 00:11:13.240 --> 00:11:16.919 you seal it, that's evidence, don't mess with it. They put a 170 00:11:16.960 --> 00:11:20.759 fourth one for me. That was because that first call I remember going off 171 00:11:20.799 --> 00:11:22.240 and I put it on, put the headphones on, and they're like, 172 00:11:22.240 --> 00:11:28.000 oh, it just goes on and on and it ends, and I take 173 00:11:28.039 --> 00:11:31.639 that thing off, my headphones off, and I look around the room and 174 00:11:31.679 --> 00:11:35.559 I said, I have I didn't understand a word these people just said. 175 00:11:35.919 --> 00:11:37.720 And I said, I don't know what I'm gonna do. So they put 176 00:11:37.759 --> 00:11:41.320 another machine. Then I could take it out and in between calls, I 177 00:11:41.360 --> 00:11:43.440 could read listen, and I would pick things up, like, for example, 178 00:11:43.559 --> 00:11:50.519 like in Spanish, moble like means furniture. You know, weblee and 179 00:11:50.720 --> 00:11:54.240 them is a car, you know, and the fattie is for us some 180 00:11:54.360 --> 00:11:56.840 fare and then for them it's money. And so they today's you can see 181 00:11:56.840 --> 00:12:01.879 that fatty and I'm like something about furniture, and they're going to some fair 182 00:12:01.960 --> 00:12:05.600 and these guys sand into a PB. I just laugh and they laugh and 183 00:12:05.679 --> 00:12:09.440 laugh the only thing that made me feel good is that the opposite of thing 184 00:12:09.679 --> 00:12:13.559 like when the Mexican American agents, the agents that were from Texas or whatever, 185 00:12:13.559 --> 00:12:16.320 that that kind of grew up with that language Spanish kind of when they 186 00:12:16.360 --> 00:12:20.559 got sent to Puerto Rico and they sat on Puerto Rican wires and they had 187 00:12:20.559 --> 00:12:26.440 to listen to to like like where I came from talk. They say, 188 00:12:26.519 --> 00:12:28.919 that is impossible. So I at least at least at least I picked up 189 00:12:28.960 --> 00:12:31.759 the language. But it wasn't easy at all. It was it was pretty 190 00:12:31.799 --> 00:12:35.320 It was very challenging at first. So how did you make that jump then? 191 00:12:35.360 --> 00:12:39.000 From you know, you said you didn't want to spend your whole career 192 00:12:39.039 --> 00:12:41.320 sitting on wires? Yeah, how did you make that jump to you know, 193 00:12:41.360 --> 00:12:43.600 working cases. Yeah, well, I mean, like I figured out 194 00:12:43.600 --> 00:12:46.519 real quick. I said, okay, so I got it. I've got 195 00:12:46.559 --> 00:12:50.200 to open up. I got to start a case and I have to tie 196 00:12:50.279 --> 00:12:56.000 it to to a large cartel, one of the one of the top organizations. 197 00:12:56.559 --> 00:13:00.480 And and at the time I was stationed in McCallum, but we had 198 00:13:00.519 --> 00:13:03.679 we had Hidago County, and then there were Star County, which is just 199 00:13:03.759 --> 00:13:07.320 west of the UH and a lot of dope was coming up through Star County 200 00:13:07.320 --> 00:13:11.919 through rig Grand City, Roma, Texas. And I said, you know, 201 00:13:11.960 --> 00:13:13.399 I was single, so I figured, like, you know, it's 202 00:13:13.440 --> 00:13:16.879 not like a forty five minute drive or something. And there's enough work in 203 00:13:16.960 --> 00:13:20.399 McCallen. You could stay in mccount But but I was gonna go out to 204 00:13:20.440 --> 00:13:22.639 the to the wild West, and I was gonna I was gonna go find 205 00:13:24.000 --> 00:13:26.960 the big case. And I and I remember I teamed up with a Border 206 00:13:26.960 --> 00:13:31.519 Patrol agent one Garcia is the name Janetho, we called him. And he 207 00:13:31.559 --> 00:13:35.440 took me under his wing. And you know, I said, hey, 208 00:13:35.440 --> 00:13:37.720 listen, I want to make a case. Like I you know, I'm 209 00:13:37.759 --> 00:13:41.240 tired of sitting on these wires. I want my own case, and he 210 00:13:41.279 --> 00:13:43.679 says, okay, And I said, well, who's the biggest, baddest 211 00:13:43.679 --> 00:13:45.960 guy here, Who's who's the one everybody wants. At the time, there 212 00:13:45.960 --> 00:13:50.240 was a guy named labru Ha the witch and uh and he says, labru 213 00:13:50.320 --> 00:13:52.679 Has the guy that runs here and he's tied to Garcia Ibrago and this and 214 00:13:52.720 --> 00:13:58.240 that and whatever and uh. He he taught me how to become a good 215 00:13:58.279 --> 00:14:03.879 agent, like and I stayed with him and sure enough, in fact, 216 00:14:03.000 --> 00:14:07.159 I'll talk a little bit when I talk about my intel career, but he 217 00:14:07.159 --> 00:14:13.320 he taught me the value of intelligence, like how intelligence drives investigations, like 218 00:14:13.399 --> 00:14:18.919 for example, Juanito, like being border patrol. They could come in I 219 00:14:18.919 --> 00:14:22.080 believe it's twenty five miles within from the border. They can get into the 220 00:14:22.200 --> 00:14:24.559 ranches, you know, and do what they have to do for obvious reasons. 221 00:14:24.960 --> 00:14:30.559 And whenever there was a big load that had crossed, the organizations would 222 00:14:30.639 --> 00:14:33.080 celebrate it by having a pachanga. Pachanga is coining like a like a like 223 00:14:33.120 --> 00:14:37.360 a barbecue, you know, the fajita's beer and they're celebrating. So Janito 224 00:14:37.480 --> 00:14:41.039 had this really smart idea that you know, when he saw pachanga's happening in 225 00:14:41.159 --> 00:14:46.080 ranches. You know, he'd just write down the license plate numbers of the 226 00:14:46.120 --> 00:14:48.159 cars the trucks that were at the pachangas, and so he had a whole 227 00:14:48.200 --> 00:14:52.639 list. And so when you're working your cases and you know DA had taken 228 00:14:52.679 --> 00:14:54.399 down this load or there was a load that was crossed and you're sharing back 229 00:14:54.440 --> 00:14:58.720 and forth, then he could piece together like this guy has been at a 230 00:14:58.759 --> 00:15:01.960 pat chang go every time this organizam. And that's how he tied it all 231 00:15:03.000 --> 00:15:07.960 up. So that's the true meaning of collection, like intelligence collection, understanding 232 00:15:09.000 --> 00:15:11.879 like what your gaps are, and how he was smart and did that, 233 00:15:11.000 --> 00:15:13.399 and he taught me all those kind of things. And later on I used 234 00:15:13.440 --> 00:15:18.320 those examples when we started talking about how the Bureau transformed into this this kind 235 00:15:18.320 --> 00:15:22.080 of dual agency, you know, with with the Intel mission as well. 236 00:15:22.559 --> 00:15:24.720 But yeah, that was that's how I got in. And sure enough we 237 00:15:24.759 --> 00:15:28.440 got up on one wire tap and we ended up spinning off on three more, 238 00:15:28.559 --> 00:15:33.080 four more, and we ended up taking down that entire organization, disrupting 239 00:15:33.080 --> 00:15:37.559 that entire organization. Was that a Riverwich Riverwich, Yeah, River Rich was 240 00:15:37.559 --> 00:15:39.559 a code name. We gave it just because La Bruja which means the Witch 241 00:15:39.840 --> 00:15:45.080 and the Rio Grande Valley and the river. So Riverwich was Operation River which 242 00:15:45.159 --> 00:15:48.840 was the one that uh that that was that was my first big case. 243 00:15:48.039 --> 00:15:52.679 So how did how did that investigation progress as you get warrants for these wire 244 00:15:52.720 --> 00:15:56.039 taps and start developing the case. Yeah, you you basically you know, 245 00:15:56.399 --> 00:15:58.879 you you try to get up on a phone, you know, through the 246 00:16:00.039 --> 00:16:04.720 court order, you know of one of these these leaders of this organization and 247 00:16:04.840 --> 00:16:11.039 hopefully because it's hard to penetrate those organizations through regular human sources. You know, 248 00:16:11.039 --> 00:16:15.320 they're very close knit, they're very tight hold. Everybody knows everybody, 249 00:16:15.399 --> 00:16:17.960 Like the cars you drive. A minute you're driving in there, they know 250 00:16:18.039 --> 00:16:23.440 you're not from here. So getting somebody in is is hard. So you 251 00:16:23.440 --> 00:16:29.399 you have to be smart enough to understand like how they're communicating and what phones 252 00:16:29.440 --> 00:16:33.960 they're using, and then developing the problem cause to to actually be able to 253 00:16:33.960 --> 00:16:37.159 to intercept that phone with a court go to a judge with an affidavit and 254 00:16:37.399 --> 00:16:41.440 get that doing. But once you're on the once you're on the right phone, 255 00:16:41.720 --> 00:16:44.440 you're picking up a lot. Now they all talked in code, you 256 00:16:44.480 --> 00:16:48.240 know, like each of them had numbers and areas. I remember one time 257 00:16:48.279 --> 00:16:51.679 there was we were on this, on this this, and I would go 258 00:16:51.720 --> 00:16:56.559 and every day I would look at the pen registers and see, like what 259 00:16:56.759 --> 00:16:59.600 numbers. I knew all the numbers. I had memorize every single number. 260 00:17:00.200 --> 00:17:02.159 And I saw one number. I was like, wait a minute, this 261 00:17:02.240 --> 00:17:06.039 one I don't know. And sure enough that led me to a house. 262 00:17:06.160 --> 00:17:08.359 And then you know, little by little we started to develop its improper cause. 263 00:17:08.640 --> 00:17:12.559 But there was one of the interesting things about that case was there was 264 00:17:12.559 --> 00:17:18.759 always this allgate. There was always this rumor that there was somebody that was 265 00:17:18.799 --> 00:17:23.759 at the with the customs time that an immigration I'm sorry, that was allowing 266 00:17:23.880 --> 00:17:29.440 the loads to come in, and they knew who she was. But you 267 00:17:29.519 --> 00:17:33.079 know, she's very smart about it. And and I remember one time I 268 00:17:33.200 --> 00:17:37.559 go in and it's like, I said, hey, any anything, I 269 00:17:37.640 --> 00:17:41.079 asked the translators, like anything relevant, And I look at the stack of 270 00:17:41.240 --> 00:17:44.759 notes, you know, summaries, and I saw one it said like it 271 00:17:44.880 --> 00:17:48.039 said you know, hey, VA was like, this's going to happen and 272 00:17:48.039 --> 00:17:56.400 it goes see alauna memo pescado like where we eat fish? And I knew. 273 00:17:56.640 --> 00:18:00.400 I knew that there was there was a of entry near at Falcon Lake, 274 00:18:02.519 --> 00:18:03.319 and there was a place you could eat fish. There was like a 275 00:18:03.319 --> 00:18:07.640 little restaurant there, and I went, wow, I wonder if something's gonna 276 00:18:07.680 --> 00:18:12.759 happen at one o'clock at that port of entry. And so I had been 277 00:18:12.799 --> 00:18:17.799 working with the immigration folks, and I said, hey, listen, you 278 00:18:17.839 --> 00:18:22.559 know is she what is her schedule? She goes, well, she's she 279 00:18:22.559 --> 00:18:23.920 she was supposed to be in real Grand City, but she asked to work 280 00:18:25.000 --> 00:18:26.880 Roma at one o'clock. She takes a one o'clock shift. And I went, 281 00:18:27.400 --> 00:18:30.279 I told my boss, it's happening. He's like, what do you 282 00:18:30.319 --> 00:18:32.920 mean. I go, it's happening, Like they're going to cross and she's 283 00:18:32.960 --> 00:18:36.000 going to be there. Are you sure? And I said, I know 284 00:18:36.119 --> 00:18:37.920 it. I just know it. I mean I've been working this case long 285 00:18:37.000 --> 00:18:40.039 enough, something's going to happen. So we had everybody out there, we 286 00:18:40.039 --> 00:18:44.599 had we had a really cool setup with DPS and and sure enough, man, 287 00:18:44.839 --> 00:18:52.400 I remember she she requests to kind of start at two o'clock or she 288 00:18:52.480 --> 00:18:55.559 changes her time. And I went, oh, man, now I got 289 00:18:55.559 --> 00:18:59.440 everybody out there that would be like, what's Eric up to? And then 290 00:18:59.440 --> 00:19:03.000 sure enough, call comes in and goes like hey, ALASDS like they they 291 00:19:03.119 --> 00:19:06.920 changed the time too, And I knew then sure, no, I remember, 292 00:19:07.039 --> 00:19:10.880 I remember we were all we had, we had people kind of inside 293 00:19:10.960 --> 00:19:15.079 the customs or the immigration office that could has an eye view of what's going 294 00:19:15.119 --> 00:19:19.119 on there. As a lanes would come in and uh like clockwork man. 295 00:19:19.279 --> 00:19:22.799 The first car comes in, the first car, she she enters the tag 296 00:19:22.960 --> 00:19:26.599 and you know, we we could see that she was in. She enters 297 00:19:26.640 --> 00:19:30.400 the tag and it's the right tag, and we say, don't follow that 298 00:19:30.440 --> 00:19:33.720 one. Let that one go. Then here comes a Crown Vic. Those 299 00:19:33.880 --> 00:19:37.720 Crown Victoria's they can hold like five hundred pounds a weaves in the trunk. 300 00:19:37.079 --> 00:19:41.839 And the Crownvic comes and she makes this a gesture like she's entering something. 301 00:19:42.240 --> 00:19:47.880 But we the guy in our task force, our customs guy, he said 302 00:19:48.240 --> 00:19:51.720 she didn't enter anything, and we knew that one. That one comes in, 303 00:19:51.759 --> 00:19:53.880 and then two more Crownvics come right boom boom right back there, and 304 00:19:53.920 --> 00:19:59.039 we were like, okay, so everybody, hold tight, you know, 305 00:19:59.119 --> 00:20:03.319 hold tight tight. But then DPS, you know, they're they're fantastic. 306 00:20:03.359 --> 00:20:07.359 They you know, they did the traffic stop. But these guys ran and 307 00:20:07.400 --> 00:20:10.279 all three of them took off and jumped in once a couple of them jumped 308 00:20:10.319 --> 00:20:14.279 and river and went back south. But we ended up taking down fifteen hundred 309 00:20:14.359 --> 00:20:18.400 pounds of week that day. That five hundred pounds in each each trunk. 310 00:20:18.480 --> 00:20:22.720 And then the wire went crazy. That's when it gets really good. What 311 00:20:22.839 --> 00:20:26.599 happened? Yeah, they're all exact, they're all pointy figures. Who you 312 00:20:26.640 --> 00:20:29.920 know, what happened? So and then the case just goes on it. 313 00:20:30.279 --> 00:20:34.400 That was that was the most fun area. And you busted a corrupt immigation. 314 00:20:34.640 --> 00:20:37.240 Yes, yep, yep, yep, because she she ended up getting 315 00:20:37.240 --> 00:20:42.519 prison time obviously for that. But that's how you you had to you had 316 00:20:42.519 --> 00:20:48.279 to put the work in, like you had to really understand what what normal 317 00:20:48.359 --> 00:20:52.559 looked like and then what is out of place? And that one call was 318 00:20:52.559 --> 00:20:56.240 out of place? That one call was like who is this person? Turns 319 00:20:56.279 --> 00:21:02.039 out the call that he made was a fugitive that was that was up north. 320 00:21:02.079 --> 00:21:04.400 It had come in and was living in McAllen and that person had made 321 00:21:04.440 --> 00:21:07.559 the call. And so that's all it took was that one break and then 322 00:21:07.559 --> 00:21:10.680 we were able to take down this But that's it's a lot of fun. 323 00:21:10.720 --> 00:21:15.839 I mean it shows it shows really kind of how agencies working together because we 324 00:21:15.920 --> 00:21:19.279 had I R. S D, A Customs, we were in a nos 325 00:21:19.359 --> 00:21:22.640 DEF task force. It was it was just the best time. I mean, 326 00:21:22.680 --> 00:21:26.319 that was obviously a huge event. But you mentioned that the wire goes 327 00:21:26.400 --> 00:21:30.799 crazy. Was there like a kind of culmination of this case. Yeah, 328 00:21:30.880 --> 00:21:36.880 yeah, it culminates we take down the whole organization everybody. It's you know, 329 00:21:36.920 --> 00:21:38.880 you want to take the time to identify who all these players are. 330 00:21:38.880 --> 00:21:44.359 You don't want to take it down too soon. Uh, but sometimes on 331 00:21:44.400 --> 00:21:48.559 these wires, you know, it gets risky because you're you don't want to 332 00:21:48.559 --> 00:21:51.559 heat it up. So like you're taking down a load, you don't want 333 00:21:51.559 --> 00:21:55.039 to let the dope walk. So you've got to have creative ways of you 334 00:21:55.039 --> 00:21:59.119 know, like the we would random Yeah, like the Furious Texas was the 335 00:21:59.200 --> 00:22:02.000 checkpoint, so we let them know like hey listen, this is coming up, 336 00:22:02.000 --> 00:22:03.440 and then they do a search and then the wire go out. What's 337 00:22:03.440 --> 00:22:07.480 going on? It's like, you know how it starts to get the point 338 00:22:07.480 --> 00:22:11.279 where you can't do that too because it's going to start heating up. And 339 00:22:11.319 --> 00:22:15.720 so we we calculated the time I had been transferred to Puerto Rico right before 340 00:22:15.720 --> 00:22:18.680 the takedown, and another case agent had taken it up after I had left. 341 00:22:18.319 --> 00:22:22.160 But but yeah, that was that was one of the best people. 342 00:22:22.720 --> 00:22:27.640 I don't remember dozens I know in which organization was this. It was A 343 00:22:27.759 --> 00:22:32.480 It was A. The guy that was running the show was his name with 344 00:22:32.519 --> 00:22:36.680 Hector Martinez, but he was tied to the wan Garcia Abergo organization with the 345 00:22:36.680 --> 00:22:41.519 golf cartel. Some people might know that if you watch that show Narco, 346 00:22:41.839 --> 00:22:45.640 Yeah, the one they do not in Columbia, but the Mexican version he 347 00:22:45.720 --> 00:22:48.039 shows, you know, he's on that and so on. But that was 348 00:22:48.599 --> 00:22:52.240 that I tell people, like my kids and stuff like, if you watch 349 00:22:52.319 --> 00:22:55.640 that, that's what my life was like. That that was because that was 350 00:22:55.680 --> 00:22:59.000 literally nineteen ninety two is around there when I when I got to McCallan. 351 00:22:59.079 --> 00:23:03.799 So, yeah, a lot of fun and then from there you get sent 352 00:23:03.880 --> 00:23:08.799 down to Puerto Rico working you know, gang cases and public corruption. Can 353 00:23:08.839 --> 00:23:11.200 you set this stage, I mean, especially because you're from Puerto Rico, 354 00:23:11.279 --> 00:23:15.839 can you set the stage a little bit for sort of the the political but 355 00:23:15.880 --> 00:23:19.920 also the criminality that that you had to deal with. Yeah, So Puerto 356 00:23:19.960 --> 00:23:23.720 Rico just opened up some we call them resident agencies, are like suboffices, 357 00:23:25.319 --> 00:23:29.400 one in each side of the island Ponce Fajardo. Then where I was in 358 00:23:29.440 --> 00:23:33.640 the west, the west part of the island, a lot of gang activity. 359 00:23:33.000 --> 00:23:37.920 We were there was a something called the Safe Street Task Force and everything's 360 00:23:37.000 --> 00:23:41.599 multi agency with POPR Police of Puerto Rico, and we had task Force officers 361 00:23:41.640 --> 00:23:45.440 that were on our team, police officers that we had brought on our squad. 362 00:23:45.720 --> 00:23:48.519 There was a lot of that, a lot of public corruption work, 363 00:23:51.119 --> 00:23:55.720 bribes, you know, federal money going into Puerto Rico and then people taking 364 00:23:55.759 --> 00:23:57.240 cuts of it and things like that. So it's like they say, the 365 00:23:57.279 --> 00:24:00.880 target rich environment. You know, there was there or lack of course, 366 00:24:00.000 --> 00:24:04.720 the Puerto Rican nationalist movement still kicking at this point. It wasn't like it 367 00:24:04.920 --> 00:24:07.920 was when I was when you started. Yeah, yeah, not like when 368 00:24:07.920 --> 00:24:15.319 it was when I was in the eighties. There was there was a fugitive 369 00:24:15.559 --> 00:24:18.519 that everyone was trying to trying to catch that was tied to the machitos they 370 00:24:18.519 --> 00:24:23.079 thought was around our he was he was our Io R. But but that 371 00:24:23.160 --> 00:24:26.240 was it. That was extensive, and it was you know, I mean 372 00:24:26.319 --> 00:24:30.960 there was work, but I was focused on you know, gangs and public 373 00:24:30.079 --> 00:24:33.000 eruptions, stuff like that. Any any memorable cases that you worked on during 374 00:24:33.039 --> 00:24:41.279 that time down there, Well, the there was a case, the the 375 00:24:41.279 --> 00:24:45.240 biggest case that I worked when when I was down there was a case that 376 00:24:45.359 --> 00:24:51.720 involved a corrupt mayor that was taking money federal money that was coming in. 377 00:24:52.079 --> 00:24:57.319 He had he had he had an architect, I'm sorry, an engineer that 378 00:24:57.440 --> 00:25:06.160 drew up plans. And this engineer basically would would do the work, but 379 00:25:06.200 --> 00:25:10.319 he'd have to pay the mayor thirty percent of the work. And I remember 380 00:25:10.319 --> 00:25:17.599 when we first that case came in. My partner, uh, may rest 381 00:25:17.640 --> 00:25:19.039 in peace. He passed away, but he he, he and I were 382 00:25:19.079 --> 00:25:22.720 sitting in the office and we got a call about like, hey, listen, 383 00:25:22.799 --> 00:25:26.000 this is this guy he has some information, you know about corruption going 384 00:25:26.039 --> 00:25:30.000 on. And it was late, you know, like, yeah, you 385 00:25:30.039 --> 00:25:33.640 know, really does he really kind of thing? I said, sure, 386 00:25:33.880 --> 00:25:37.000 we'll talk to him, tell him to come over to our office. And 387 00:25:37.079 --> 00:25:38.400 we waited for him, and he showed up and he was he was an 388 00:25:38.440 --> 00:25:42.920 engineer, you know, and and I remember, uh, he'd tell it. 389 00:25:42.960 --> 00:25:45.839 He's telling me about the mayor, and I said, you know what, 390 00:25:47.079 --> 00:25:49.279 there's there's one way we can make sure this is true. And he 391 00:25:49.279 --> 00:25:52.079 says how says, well, we'll go go talk to him, but we're 392 00:25:52.079 --> 00:25:55.960 gonna we're gonna wire you up. You know. So we got we got, 393 00:25:56.000 --> 00:25:59.640 you know, authority to do all of that and consent. And I 394 00:25:59.640 --> 00:26:03.960 remember because at the time this is so now you like watch movies and you 395 00:26:03.000 --> 00:26:07.960 know, you all this sophisticated technology, but it was a cassette recorder. 396 00:26:08.200 --> 00:26:11.119 Dude. It was as big as that note pad, it seemed like, 397 00:26:11.680 --> 00:26:15.359 and it was about this big is in it. And so we ended up 398 00:26:15.400 --> 00:26:18.279 going to a hotel room and then I said, okay, drop your pants 399 00:26:18.279 --> 00:26:21.599 because we're gonna put it like here on your ankle. We're gonna run that, 400 00:26:21.640 --> 00:26:22.839 we're gonna run the wire up here, we're gonna tape it up here. 401 00:26:23.240 --> 00:26:27.519 And the man is sweating his sweating and you need to relax because you 402 00:26:27.559 --> 00:26:30.119 can't go in looking like this, you know. He's like, do you 403 00:26:30.119 --> 00:26:33.759 have anything smaller like in the movies, everything smaller than No, this is 404 00:26:33.799 --> 00:26:37.440 it. But I said, nobody's there. He'll never suspect the thing. 405 00:26:37.480 --> 00:26:40.039 And sure enough, he goes in and he has a conversation with him, 406 00:26:40.640 --> 00:26:45.000 and he's like, either give me the thirty percent or you're never gonna work 407 00:26:45.039 --> 00:26:49.319 in this town again. It's perfect. And that led to just a long 408 00:26:49.359 --> 00:26:55.680 investigation where ultimately on video we're you know, paying, he's paying, you 409 00:26:55.720 --> 00:27:00.200 know the money, and it was another huge takedown, another good case, 410 00:27:00.240 --> 00:27:03.400 and that that was you know that that's important to me because I mean, 411 00:27:03.440 --> 00:27:04.839 I love Puerto Rico. It's island I grew up on. In the corruption, 412 00:27:06.119 --> 00:27:08.039 you know, that impacts a lot of everything. You know, when 413 00:27:08.079 --> 00:27:12.039 you're when you're having to take money that's meant to go to fixed streets and 414 00:27:12.039 --> 00:27:15.920 schools and stuff like that, and then you're people are stealing it. So 415 00:27:15.319 --> 00:27:18.880 that gave me a lot of a lot of pleasure work in that, you 416 00:27:18.920 --> 00:27:21.359 know, put those kind of guys away. I know, that's awesome. 417 00:27:21.680 --> 00:27:26.079 Yeah and uh and then you get sent to D A S O D. 418 00:27:26.519 --> 00:27:33.240 Yeah. Yeah, so that's I become a supervisor. It's funny because people 419 00:27:33.359 --> 00:27:36.319 ask me because I spend a lot of time in leadership roles in the bureau, 420 00:27:36.559 --> 00:27:38.160 and I would give leadership speeches and stuff like that, you know, 421 00:27:38.680 --> 00:27:42.079 and sometimes people say, like, you know, were you inspired by you 422 00:27:42.119 --> 00:27:47.200 know, some particular leader. You know, it's like, what drove you 423 00:27:47.240 --> 00:27:49.039 to be kind of a leader in the FBI? And I tell them, 424 00:27:49.160 --> 00:27:56.200 like, well, actually, what drove me was I had when I was 425 00:27:56.240 --> 00:27:57.839 an eight. I love being a street agent. I just loved it. 426 00:27:57.880 --> 00:28:02.039 I mean, you work your cases a lot of fun. And my time 427 00:28:02.079 --> 00:28:03.920 in management, I don't think I was ready for it. Let I still 428 00:28:03.920 --> 00:28:07.319 wanted to spend more time in the field. But I had. I had 429 00:28:07.680 --> 00:28:11.519 just built a house and it was on the on the the beautiful home was 430 00:28:11.519 --> 00:28:15.119 on the cliff, right up on the water, and I was building the 431 00:28:15.160 --> 00:28:17.880 house, and I'd gotten a loan at the bank, just like everything else. 432 00:28:18.039 --> 00:28:23.680 And hurricane I think it was Hugo comes by and it blows. The 433 00:28:23.720 --> 00:28:27.359 whole house is destroyed. So the whole top of the thing is gone. 434 00:28:27.400 --> 00:28:30.759 And so when I go to I go to find the builder. I can't 435 00:28:30.759 --> 00:28:34.160 find the builder. The builder is gone. And it turns out the builder 436 00:28:34.240 --> 00:28:38.240 was involved in this kind of sort of a Ponzi scheme where he was using 437 00:28:38.279 --> 00:28:42.960 money from certain loans to fix other homes that were yelling at him. And 438 00:28:44.000 --> 00:28:48.559 so it turns out like I don't now I don't have any money. The 439 00:28:48.559 --> 00:28:52.599 builder's gone and I have to build the house myself. And I just literally 440 00:28:52.640 --> 00:28:55.200 would get up early in the morning go to the concrete place. I'd hire 441 00:28:55.240 --> 00:28:57.359 people like it was a disaster. And I said, I'm going to go 442 00:28:57.440 --> 00:29:00.839 broke because I'm this. You know, I don't I can't afford this, 443 00:29:02.400 --> 00:29:07.200 and and uh yeah. So so I did know that if I got a 444 00:29:07.279 --> 00:29:15.599 promotion, I could sell my house through through the transfer program, the relocation 445 00:29:15.720 --> 00:29:18.559 program, and so I said, okay, you know, I'm gonna I'm 446 00:29:18.559 --> 00:29:22.319 gonna see if there's any jobs at headquarters and then I'll get a promotion headquarters 447 00:29:23.039 --> 00:29:26.359 and then and then I did, and that's when I got my job. 448 00:29:27.000 --> 00:29:32.480 And then sure enough, you know, the relo company buys my house and 449 00:29:32.519 --> 00:29:36.160 I'm able to get out from under. So it wasn't like inspired through a 450 00:29:36.200 --> 00:29:40.000 book by Poland Powell or anything like that or George Washington. It was like 451 00:29:40.319 --> 00:29:44.000 I was broke and if I did not sell this house. And so, 452 00:29:44.160 --> 00:29:45.880 but when I become in a leadership role. When I was at SD, 453 00:29:45.960 --> 00:29:49.400 I didn't really manage people. I was more part of Special Operations Division, 454 00:29:49.480 --> 00:29:55.880 kind of helping manage investigations that were nationwide. But I really liked when I 455 00:29:55.880 --> 00:30:00.279 became a supervisor. I liked working with the teams. I like being part 456 00:30:00.319 --> 00:30:03.359 of that and uh, and that's when I stayed on. But the kind 457 00:30:03.359 --> 00:30:07.319 of the trajectory into like leadership roles in the FBI. But it was it 458 00:30:07.359 --> 00:30:11.319 really was more than you know, trying to get from from under from a 459 00:30:11.400 --> 00:30:15.839 low Yeah, not not a very not a very glamorous story, like you 460 00:30:15.880 --> 00:30:18.640 said, not not inspired by a JFK speech, But yeah, it's still 461 00:30:18.640 --> 00:30:22.839 a reason got you still, Yeah, yeah, exactly. No, it's 462 00:30:22.880 --> 00:30:25.480 a hell of a it's a hell of a motivator when something like that happens. 463 00:30:26.160 --> 00:30:29.000 Uh. Could could you tell a little bit more about what s OD 464 00:30:29.240 --> 00:30:30.799 was, because I I've heard of them before. But yeah, I don't 465 00:30:30.839 --> 00:30:33.519 really know too much myself, you know, I don't A lot of people 466 00:30:33.559 --> 00:30:36.960 don't talk about In fact, I don't. I don't know how much I 467 00:30:36.960 --> 00:30:41.319 can say about it. I will just say it's it's a multi agency organization. 468 00:30:41.440 --> 00:30:48.240 DEA runs it and they bring in partner agencies and they're focused on helping 469 00:30:48.279 --> 00:30:55.359 to coordinate large scale investigations that are that are across the country, you know, 470 00:30:55.720 --> 00:30:59.160 I mean the types of investigations are coordinating. You know, have subjects 471 00:30:59.200 --> 00:31:02.759 that are in all like maybe ten different states, and so the what we 472 00:31:02.839 --> 00:31:07.640 call we call ourselves staff coordinators, and we basically you know, helped help 473 00:31:07.680 --> 00:31:12.240 provide resources, financial resources to these major operations like huge drug trafficking rooms. 474 00:31:12.359 --> 00:31:18.440 They're all drug trafficking cases, big drug tracking cases. And yeah, and 475 00:31:18.480 --> 00:31:22.720 so what what I would do is I would support certain offices in my region 476 00:31:22.799 --> 00:31:26.880 was the Texas area, and so whether it was San Antonio, Dallas, 477 00:31:26.920 --> 00:31:30.440 Houston, Opasso, and I would work with the case agents of those big 478 00:31:30.480 --> 00:31:34.160 cases and help them any way I could, you know, with resources and 479 00:31:34.200 --> 00:31:37.119 things like that. So but yeah, that was it was a lot of 480 00:31:37.119 --> 00:31:41.319 fun. And again I'd worked with DA my whole career, so it was 481 00:31:41.400 --> 00:31:48.119 kind of neat being able to work with them there. Then let's talk a 482 00:31:48.160 --> 00:31:52.079 little bit about you know, kind of like around this timeframe nine to eleven. 483 00:31:52.160 --> 00:31:53.799 Half. Yeah, if you tell us a little bit about where you 484 00:31:53.880 --> 00:31:59.079 were and what your job was, you know, and weading into the next 485 00:31:59.079 --> 00:32:02.000 thing you got pulled into. Well. So yeah, so nine to eleven, 486 00:32:02.119 --> 00:32:06.240 the actual date of nine to eleven, I was in Puerto Rico. 487 00:32:06.319 --> 00:32:08.839 I was there doing a training, I was I was part of the EA's 488 00:32:08.920 --> 00:32:14.599 s O D. But I was supporting. I was in a training team 489 00:32:14.960 --> 00:32:19.160 going to San Juan. I remember the secretary kind of telling me like, 490 00:32:19.200 --> 00:32:22.839 hey, there's a plane flew into the World Trade Center. And I went 491 00:32:22.880 --> 00:32:25.359 over to the TV and I and I saw kind of what, you know, 492 00:32:25.440 --> 00:32:31.359 what's now if everybody knows, you know, the first tower and then 493 00:32:31.599 --> 00:32:37.279 the second tower hits, and it's like because we thought, like somebody just 494 00:32:37.519 --> 00:32:39.599 accidentally took a small plane. You know, we don't know what's going on. 495 00:32:42.240 --> 00:32:46.440 The Special Agent in charge of the San Juan Office basically designates us this 496 00:32:46.720 --> 00:32:50.720 team of people from headquarters like we're part of the San Juan Field Office at 497 00:32:50.720 --> 00:32:53.920 this point, and so all hands on deck, and we we wanted to 498 00:32:54.400 --> 00:33:00.160 we wanted to get back home because you know, like my wife and kids. 499 00:33:00.279 --> 00:33:02.279 You know, I was worried because I mean I didn't know exactly what 500 00:33:02.319 --> 00:33:07.759 was going on, but I didn't know that our house we lived over near 501 00:33:07.839 --> 00:33:10.640 Oakden, where the planes would fly over our house all the time, you 502 00:33:10.640 --> 00:33:14.799 know, and I'm thinking, you know, if they shoot that plane to 503 00:33:15.319 --> 00:33:19.480 all this stuff's going you know, But there was no flights leeving and one 504 00:33:19.480 --> 00:33:22.240 of the most eerie things I remember was when the first United Airlines flight that 505 00:33:22.440 --> 00:33:28.359 left San Juan to go back to Dulles. They let us get on that 506 00:33:28.400 --> 00:33:30.680 plane and so we you know, blue lighted it all the way to the 507 00:33:30.720 --> 00:33:35.559 airport, and the agents that were on our training team got on that first 508 00:33:35.680 --> 00:33:39.599 United Airlines flight back to San Juan and it was I'm sorry, back to 509 00:33:39.680 --> 00:33:45.759 Dulles. The flight attendants on that plane were friends of the many of the 510 00:33:45.759 --> 00:33:50.319 flight attendants that passed away because one of the flights originated from Dulles and so 511 00:33:50.359 --> 00:33:53.640 they were going back home and they would come up to us crying, just 512 00:33:53.720 --> 00:33:57.720 thanking us for being there. They were very scared, you know, like 513 00:33:58.480 --> 00:34:00.720 Veig would imagine. And then when we get to Dulles and we land. 514 00:34:01.119 --> 00:34:02.920 I don't know if you've been to Dullas there, but I'm sure you have 515 00:34:04.039 --> 00:34:07.440 ye. There was nobody. It was completely empty. It was the most 516 00:34:07.480 --> 00:34:14.239 eerie feeling. And the next day we all were to report to headquarters, 517 00:34:14.639 --> 00:34:19.599 to the SIOC, which was think of it as like a big command post 518 00:34:19.599 --> 00:34:23.960 there in the building, and there was a line of people and to SoC 519 00:34:24.039 --> 00:34:29.840 the entrance of sichs Syock. Sich's designed to be a command post where you 520 00:34:29.880 --> 00:34:32.719 know, you have a large scale investigation. They'd be coordinated, and one 521 00:34:32.800 --> 00:34:37.440 hijacking would have had that place going crazy. I mean just filled to the 522 00:34:37.480 --> 00:34:42.559 top. Right. There were four hijackings here and so I remember lining up. 523 00:34:42.599 --> 00:34:45.039 We were all lined up, and then I got to the front of 524 00:34:45.079 --> 00:34:51.320 the room and I said, Eric Vilez, you know SOD Criminal Division, 525 00:34:51.400 --> 00:34:53.599 and he says okay, And it was pretty chaotic. He goes go to 526 00:34:53.679 --> 00:34:55.719 room E two. I forget what the name of the room was, and 527 00:34:55.760 --> 00:34:59.960 he's like and I said, okay. So I walk right through the center 528 00:35:00.079 --> 00:35:05.880 of psyok and it is like controlled chaos is probably the way to describe it. 529 00:35:06.039 --> 00:35:09.840 Just like there's a lot of movement. Everybody's just talking. And I 530 00:35:09.880 --> 00:35:15.000 find room E two and there's another guy sitting at the table and I go, 531 00:35:15.320 --> 00:35:17.239 Eric Velez, like they told me to come here, and he goes, 532 00:35:17.320 --> 00:35:21.800 okay, you see that box that all those boxes along the wall. 533 00:35:21.840 --> 00:35:24.159 There was a lot of boxes up along the wall, and I go yeah. 534 00:35:24.199 --> 00:35:27.800 He goes, well, those are all letters that people have written to 535 00:35:27.880 --> 00:35:30.760 director Muller. You need to open them, read them and see if there's 536 00:35:30.760 --> 00:35:34.719 anything of value. Tip value in them. You know, somebody could have 537 00:35:34.719 --> 00:35:37.480 written and said, you know, hey, my neighbor or whatever. So 538 00:35:37.559 --> 00:35:40.800 I start to open letter by letter, and the one of the most interesting 539 00:35:40.840 --> 00:35:45.440 things, like the most patriotic letters you'd ever read. Like there are people. 540 00:35:45.480 --> 00:35:47.199 I remember one was like, you know, dear mister Director. They 541 00:35:47.199 --> 00:35:50.320 all started like that. It's like, you know, I'm a former marine. 542 00:35:50.360 --> 00:35:52.239 I still were size thirty two. Put me in. You know, 543 00:35:52.280 --> 00:35:55.960 you don't have to pay me. Everybody was coming together. Everybody wanted to 544 00:35:55.960 --> 00:36:00.440 be part of this, and I always wondered, like, whatever happened to 545 00:36:00.480 --> 00:36:02.920 all those letters, because I thought like it'd be great to kind of put 546 00:36:02.960 --> 00:36:07.599 a book together called Dear Mister Director and kind of show because I think that 547 00:36:08.039 --> 00:36:10.840 the further we get away from that, I mean, there's people that are 548 00:36:10.880 --> 00:36:15.760 now police officers and government and law enforcement and serving the country that weren't even 549 00:36:15.800 --> 00:36:21.480 alive when that happened. But the further we get away, it's easy to 550 00:36:21.519 --> 00:36:24.320 forget, like how we came together as a country and how we united. 551 00:36:25.039 --> 00:36:29.400 You know, I remember how hard it was to buy an American flag because 552 00:36:29.679 --> 00:36:31.199 they were all out of stock. They were all over the bridges and American 553 00:36:31.239 --> 00:36:37.639 flags everywhere It was crazy because like I'd come into the sock and I work 554 00:36:37.679 --> 00:36:42.239 a night shift and there would be like boxes of skittles or boxes of freedo 555 00:36:42.360 --> 00:36:45.519 as potato chips or something that people were you know, donating, so that 556 00:36:45.559 --> 00:36:50.480 we because we were working around the clock NonStop. How it's crazy how we 557 00:36:50.519 --> 00:36:54.920 all came together. And but yeah, that was that changes because now I 558 00:36:55.000 --> 00:36:59.239 go from I get an assignment right around then, I get assigned to the 559 00:36:59.360 --> 00:37:04.000 LA where working the drug squad a supervisor in Santa Anna, Orange County. 560 00:37:04.239 --> 00:37:07.719 But that doesn't last very long. I become a JTTF, a Joint Tearism 561 00:37:07.760 --> 00:37:13.039 Task Force supervisors. My my career transitions from criminal work to national security work 562 00:37:13.440 --> 00:37:16.679 before we get into that in not long after nine to eleven. I guess 563 00:37:16.719 --> 00:37:22.960 in two thousand and two, there's a kidnapping case. Yes, tell us 564 00:37:22.960 --> 00:37:27.119 a little bit about how your involvement in that came about. Yeah, that's 565 00:37:27.119 --> 00:37:30.159 one of the hardest cases I ever was involved in. I mean, when 566 00:37:30.199 --> 00:37:34.880 you work in these rasse res an agencies, these smaller offices, you tend 567 00:37:34.920 --> 00:37:37.239 to work a lot of different types of cases. Even though you may be 568 00:37:37.239 --> 00:37:43.719 assigned to one squad that like my squad that worked drugs or then became a 569 00:37:43.800 --> 00:37:47.559 terrorism task force. If the violent crime squad that had kidnappings, if there 570 00:37:47.599 --> 00:37:51.320 was ever a child kidnapping, it was all hands on deck of that we 571 00:37:51.400 --> 00:37:55.480 all worked it. And this was a case that involved a little girl I 572 00:37:55.519 --> 00:38:00.119 think she was six years old named Samantha Runyon. A lot of your listeners 573 00:38:00.159 --> 00:38:04.960 and viewers may remember that, especially people from that area. A little girl 574 00:38:05.000 --> 00:38:10.519 that got kidnapped right from from her front porch. And my job was, 575 00:38:10.599 --> 00:38:15.559 Okay, Eric, you head over to the command post, which was over 576 00:38:15.599 --> 00:38:17.960 by Orange County sheriffs that had set up something near where the little girl lived. 577 00:38:19.440 --> 00:38:25.719 And I never wanted to work crimes against children cases like I have by 578 00:38:25.719 --> 00:38:30.079 at the time my daughter was six years old looked a lot like her, 579 00:38:30.119 --> 00:38:36.119 you know. And I mean, God bless all those agents and officers and 580 00:38:36.199 --> 00:38:39.400 law enforcement that worked those cases. But it's hard to kind of see that 581 00:38:39.480 --> 00:38:45.039 kind of stuff. And so my job was, I was we had we 582 00:38:45.039 --> 00:38:49.800 were going to interview every single person that lived anywhere near that place, like 583 00:38:49.920 --> 00:38:53.800 and we said, hundreds of agents that had been deployed from Los Angeles down 584 00:38:53.840 --> 00:38:58.639 to Orange County, and I was keeping track of Okay, you hit this 585 00:38:58.800 --> 00:39:00.639 apartment complex, you this artment comface, and we're tracking all the leads, 586 00:39:00.760 --> 00:39:07.559 so I didn't have to kind of look at any of the images or anything 587 00:39:07.599 --> 00:39:09.360 like this. But I remember I was sitting there and there was a guy 588 00:39:09.400 --> 00:39:16.440 from behavioral analysis unit from Quantico had come in and he he he asked me, 589 00:39:16.519 --> 00:39:21.320 he says like, he says, do you think this was post mortem? 590 00:39:22.000 --> 00:39:27.559 And he shows me the picture of her. Messed me up? That 591 00:39:27.719 --> 00:39:31.280 messed me up, Like I remember how hard that was, you know, 592 00:39:31.519 --> 00:39:36.360 because of my daughter. And I remember that that affecting me in ways I 593 00:39:36.559 --> 00:39:40.280 never thought it would affect me even as much. And I talk about mental 594 00:39:40.320 --> 00:39:43.679 health a lot because a lot of folks are like, especially guys, like, 595 00:39:43.920 --> 00:39:45.639 you know, I'm not gonna, I can, I'm can tough it 596 00:39:45.639 --> 00:39:49.079 out. But that that messed me up. And I definitely had to need 597 00:39:49.119 --> 00:39:53.000 to get some help and to talk through that because it was tough. It 598 00:39:53.039 --> 00:39:55.639 was tough to see that that's what messes up you know what what? And 599 00:39:55.719 --> 00:39:59.320 I mean, it's perfectly natural. Botherre's a lot of guys, a lot 600 00:39:59.320 --> 00:40:02.400 of the soldiers we have on here, people who have PTSD. A lot 601 00:40:02.480 --> 00:40:06.960 of it is from kids on the battlefield. It's it's from exactly that. 602 00:40:07.559 --> 00:40:12.079 It's hard because I mean sometimes you know, you think, you know, 603 00:40:12.360 --> 00:40:14.960 like I don't want to seek any help or talk to anybody about it, 604 00:40:15.199 --> 00:40:17.760 and you internalize it. Eventually it's going to come out. Yeah, you're 605 00:40:17.760 --> 00:40:21.599 gonna deal with it some way, you know, whether it's through addictions or 606 00:40:21.599 --> 00:40:24.039 through some sort of thing you're gonna have. It's gonna be hard for you. 607 00:40:24.159 --> 00:40:28.800 And it caught up to me later in life. It's, you know, 608 00:40:29.119 --> 00:40:32.599 because I held all that stuff in so I do a lot around that 609 00:40:32.719 --> 00:40:36.360 area, like helping people in that area, you know, just to talk 610 00:40:36.400 --> 00:40:39.840 about PTSD and things like that and cheer my story with them, you know, 611 00:40:40.159 --> 00:40:44.280 helps the open up. Did you guys run that killer down? Oh? 612 00:40:44.360 --> 00:40:51.679 Yeah, yeah, he got the death sentence. Yeah. Tragic, 613 00:40:51.800 --> 00:40:55.039 I mean tragic Jesus Christ. Tragic. Well, but I mean, like 614 00:40:55.079 --> 00:40:58.360 you said, I mean thank god that you know, well, you were 615 00:40:58.400 --> 00:41:00.400 one of them. But all of these guys who work cases like that, 616 00:41:00.480 --> 00:41:04.679 oh my god. As you point out, it takes a real toll on 617 00:41:05.079 --> 00:41:07.760 it does on the cops. I mean, I remember years ago I went 618 00:41:07.800 --> 00:41:14.440 to a conference for police officers and prosecutors who work counter human trafficking cases. 619 00:41:15.079 --> 00:41:19.920 I remember talking to one of the police officers and he said something that was 620 00:41:19.960 --> 00:41:25.840 like so banal, but so striking when you picture his life. He was 621 00:41:25.880 --> 00:41:29.400 there at this conference down in Tampa, and he's like, you know, 622 00:41:29.679 --> 00:41:31.440 I was just standing out on the beach today looking out over the ocean. 623 00:41:31.599 --> 00:41:35.760 I thought, damn, it feels good to not have to look at Kiddy 624 00:41:35.840 --> 00:41:39.320 Porton today. So I imagine what that guy's life is like and what he's 625 00:41:39.360 --> 00:41:45.480 going through. And I mean, pour one out for these dudes and women 626 00:41:45.639 --> 00:41:50.480 who do that job. They're really important people. Yeah, especially the women. 627 00:41:50.519 --> 00:41:52.480 A lot of a lot of the agents were female agents that work those 628 00:41:52.639 --> 00:41:54.840 cases. And you know, they have kids of their own, they have 629 00:41:54.880 --> 00:42:00.800 families of their own, and yet you know, they were much stronger than 630 00:42:00.800 --> 00:42:06.000 me, you know, like but yeah, So that was the only time 631 00:42:06.039 --> 00:42:09.280 I really had to work anything like that. You know, Terroism kept me 632 00:42:09.320 --> 00:42:14.800 busy. And so you were a drug supervisor out in the LA office, 633 00:42:14.880 --> 00:42:19.119 and then that transferred over into the Joint Terrorism Task Force the JTTF. For 634 00:42:19.360 --> 00:42:22.679 folks out there who don't understand that, can you explain what the JTTF is? 635 00:42:22.800 --> 00:42:24.480 Why that was created. Yeah, so it was created, you know, 636 00:42:24.519 --> 00:42:29.360 post nine to eleven in order to form task forces in which you could 637 00:42:29.400 --> 00:42:34.920 bring in your state, local partners, other federal agencies. They all have 638 00:42:34.960 --> 00:42:37.239 their specialties and they all have different things they bring to the fight. And 639 00:42:37.320 --> 00:42:44.719 so the JTTF is basically that. And each office had a JTTF and some 640 00:42:44.760 --> 00:42:49.159 have multiple jgtfs. Task Forces in LA being as big as it was, 641 00:42:49.599 --> 00:42:52.800 they had started one in Orange County. You know, obviously the population of 642 00:42:52.800 --> 00:42:55.480 Orange County and there was a lot going on, and it was done in 643 00:42:55.559 --> 00:43:00.800 conjunction with the Orange County Sheriff's Department, and and uh, I remember, 644 00:43:00.920 --> 00:43:04.599 you know, I remember my boss calling me in and telling me one day 645 00:43:05.599 --> 00:43:08.639 like, hey, listen, starting Monday, you're you're no longer your squad 646 00:43:08.719 --> 00:43:12.639 is no longer going to be a drug squad. Your squad is going to 647 00:43:12.639 --> 00:43:15.760 be a terrorism squad. Wow. And I was like terrorism, you know, 648 00:43:15.760 --> 00:43:21.760 It's like, I don't know how to work terrorism. It's like and 649 00:43:21.760 --> 00:43:23.679 and he says, well, you know how to work task forces. And 650 00:43:23.719 --> 00:43:29.079 that was the difference. Like, because what happens after nine to eleven. 651 00:43:29.159 --> 00:43:32.760 Everybody, like not everybody, but a lot of people transition from criminal work 652 00:43:32.800 --> 00:43:37.719 into counter terrorism work. And one of the things that happened because of that 653 00:43:37.920 --> 00:43:42.719 is the way we worked criminal cases. We worked always with partners, So 654 00:43:42.920 --> 00:43:44.159 you know, I was the first thing I was saying, well, who's 655 00:43:44.199 --> 00:43:47.000 our CIA person, who's our like who are partners? Bring them in, 656 00:43:47.159 --> 00:43:52.800 Like, let's let's let's let's leverage everybody's expertise, because that's how we did 657 00:43:52.800 --> 00:43:55.960 it on the criminal side. And so that whole JTTF concept was all around 658 00:43:57.000 --> 00:43:59.719 that, and it was a lot of the criminal guys that came in that 659 00:43:59.760 --> 00:44:02.800 brought that type of work experience to the table. So to me, it 660 00:44:02.880 --> 00:44:07.239 was more about learning kind of the different roles of national security and the guidelines 661 00:44:07.280 --> 00:44:13.360 that that that govern how you do national security investigations versus how you do criminal 662 00:44:13.360 --> 00:44:16.039 investigations. I want to talk a little bit about, like also, since 663 00:44:16.039 --> 00:44:21.360 we're going down this road in this topic, the differences between the two because 664 00:44:21.679 --> 00:44:25.440 an a counter terrorism investigation, I imagine you guys are doing a lot of 665 00:44:25.440 --> 00:44:30.440 surveillance, a lot of watching. When a lot of FBI guys want to 666 00:44:30.440 --> 00:44:32.760 make arrests, they want to work those cases and put someone in handcuffs, 667 00:44:32.840 --> 00:44:38.280 right, Yeah, It's funny because you know, don't get me wrong, 668 00:44:38.360 --> 00:44:42.800 Like an FBI agent is going to do whatever they need you to do. 669 00:44:42.960 --> 00:44:45.559 Like if you're you're signed to work counter intel, counter terrorism, cyber or 670 00:44:45.599 --> 00:44:52.159 whatever, you're doing it. Most most of us, I guess, I'll 671 00:44:52.199 --> 00:44:55.199 say that, at least when I was coming, wanted to like catch bad 672 00:44:55.239 --> 00:44:59.159 guys, right, you know, letch bank robbers, bank robbers, like 673 00:44:59.360 --> 00:45:01.360 the FBI agents put the cuffs on the bad guys, put them in jail. 674 00:45:01.400 --> 00:45:05.760 There's a there's this kind of instant gratification you get from your work. 675 00:45:05.800 --> 00:45:10.199 You know, you're like and uh, and so you work in fugitives and 676 00:45:10.239 --> 00:45:15.000 you're doing a lot of that kind of stuff. But and and even going 677 00:45:15.039 --> 00:45:17.800 to cases trial and learning what it's like to go to court. And then 678 00:45:17.880 --> 00:45:22.239 you work some of these counter terroristies and national security cases, and they they 679 00:45:22.280 --> 00:45:28.519 don't always provide that kind of instant gratification. You're working long long terms. 680 00:45:28.559 --> 00:45:32.559 A lot of stuff that you're doing is is in support of other agencies and 681 00:45:32.559 --> 00:45:36.679 things like that. And so it became a bit of a challenge to try 682 00:45:36.719 --> 00:45:38.920 to kind of recruit people from the criminal squads to kind of come and fill 683 00:45:38.960 --> 00:45:43.480 the JTTF or the terrorism squads. But you know, like I said, 684 00:45:44.119 --> 00:45:46.159 you gotta do what you gotta do. But but yeah, there's there's there's 685 00:45:46.199 --> 00:45:51.920 a difference work in those kind of you spend some time out there in LA 686 00:45:52.000 --> 00:45:55.519 working both drugs and terrorism. Yeah, could you describe, like what's the 687 00:45:55.760 --> 00:46:00.519 from an FBI agent's perspective, what's the criminality seem like along around Los Angeles? 688 00:46:00.559 --> 00:46:05.119 I mean I imagine it's like it's literally an underworld unto itself. Right. 689 00:46:05.159 --> 00:46:08.800 Oh yeah, yeah, those offices in New York, LA, Washington 690 00:46:08.840 --> 00:46:15.760 Field Office, Big Off, Chicago, Miami, there's a lot, a 691 00:46:15.800 --> 00:46:20.079 lot of work. I remember. I think when I started in LA, 692 00:46:20.719 --> 00:46:23.800 we must have had I think we had about at least twelve, maybe fourteen 693 00:46:24.239 --> 00:46:31.639 drug squads, like squads of agents that work drug cases throughout our territory. 694 00:46:32.639 --> 00:46:37.199 And so you could focus either like on your aor or you know, sometimes 695 00:46:37.239 --> 00:46:43.719 you focus on a particular organization. But yeah, when it came to crime, 696 00:46:44.079 --> 00:46:46.400 I mean, and I like that, you know, I kind of 697 00:46:46.519 --> 00:46:51.199 like working in offices where you you're busy. Yeah, you're busy. I 698 00:46:51.239 --> 00:46:55.199 remember when I got McAllen Texas. It's when you're in Quantico there's this whole 699 00:46:55.239 --> 00:47:00.320 process and week number eight, after you've passed your second legal exam. At 700 00:47:00.320 --> 00:47:02.480 that point they figure, okay, guy's gonna make it. You know, 701 00:47:02.559 --> 00:47:07.719 you think you're taking your second PT exam and your second legal exam, and 702 00:47:07.760 --> 00:47:10.760 so there, I guess, you know, they're comfortable enough now to give 703 00:47:10.800 --> 00:47:15.199 you your orders. You know. So there's this whole kind of ceremonial thing 704 00:47:15.239 --> 00:47:20.199 where at the end of the day, it's usually your Friday. You there's 705 00:47:20.239 --> 00:47:22.079 a big board of the US down at the bottom, and you're all sitting 706 00:47:22.119 --> 00:47:29.920 like in this kind of like stadium style seating in the classrooms, and the 707 00:47:30.000 --> 00:47:34.559 our class counselor or whatever would pull an envelope out of a fish bowl kind 708 00:47:34.559 --> 00:47:37.159 of thing, and then you'd read the name on the front, and then 709 00:47:37.199 --> 00:47:39.719 when they called your name, you'd come down and you'd open your letter and 710 00:47:39.760 --> 00:47:44.239 you'd tell your class where you're going, you know, and you know, 711 00:47:44.360 --> 00:47:47.639 valeis I'm usually last, but in this case the fish bowl thing, you 712 00:47:47.639 --> 00:47:51.159 know, I think I was like a third or fourth person. You know. 713 00:47:51.480 --> 00:47:55.039 I remember what somebody got, like I don't know, Colorado springs or 714 00:47:55.079 --> 00:47:58.199 something like that. I go, wow, that's nice, you know, 715 00:47:58.440 --> 00:48:00.760 and I had. You know, now I think you're allowed to list them 716 00:48:00.800 --> 00:48:04.159 all. You can all fifty six offices. You can put in like number 717 00:48:04.159 --> 00:48:06.559 one to fifty six. Back when I went through, you could pick three 718 00:48:06.559 --> 00:48:08.119 offices that you want to go to. I wanted to go back to Puerto 719 00:48:08.199 --> 00:48:12.480 Rico, but they wouldn't let agents go back to Puerto Rico at that time. 720 00:48:12.559 --> 00:48:17.000 First office agents, you know, I don't know, just figured, 721 00:48:17.039 --> 00:48:20.079 you know, I'm an agent, why can I go back? But anyway, 722 00:48:20.079 --> 00:48:25.239 so I picked at Miami, Atlanta and Charlotte. Like I figured if 723 00:48:25.239 --> 00:48:28.400 I could get there, I can get like a quick flight too. And 724 00:48:28.440 --> 00:48:31.039 so when I opened my letter, it's like you've been assigned to the San 725 00:48:31.079 --> 00:48:40.679 Antonio Division McAllen Resident Agency. And like people are like, oh, you 726 00:48:40.719 --> 00:48:44.679 know you're gonna hate it, blah blah blah blah. Well you had to 727 00:48:44.760 --> 00:48:46.480 pin you you had to go up and put a pin on the map, 728 00:48:46.519 --> 00:48:50.159 and like this is ruly elaborate. Yeah, yeah, you're going you put 729 00:48:50.199 --> 00:48:52.800 a little pin on the map. And I remember looking at the map and 730 00:48:52.840 --> 00:48:54.760 I go, okay, here's Texas. Like I had never lived anywhere like 731 00:48:55.480 --> 00:48:59.519 near Texas, but I was like, okay, here's Texas and here's San 732 00:48:59.559 --> 00:49:01.599 Antonio somewhere in the middle in this area. So I'm looking at that. 733 00:49:01.639 --> 00:49:07.480 Okay, so McAllen, I don't see anywhere, and they're like lower lower, 734 00:49:07.519 --> 00:49:09.920 and I'm like lower. I'm like lower, Like I got all the 735 00:49:09.960 --> 00:49:13.679 way to the bottom, and it was like I was like Mexico. I 736 00:49:13.679 --> 00:49:15.159 think I went to Mexico and I kind of went back up and it was 737 00:49:15.199 --> 00:49:21.400 like pum and I pinned it there and I was like wow, like because 738 00:49:21.679 --> 00:49:24.719 you know, some people were laughing, you know, I don't know then 739 00:49:24.760 --> 00:49:29.280 I And it was funny because there's another pert Rican guy who's like a brother 740 00:49:29.320 --> 00:49:30.880 to me named Erica, named Eric as well, and he was in my 741 00:49:30.920 --> 00:49:36.320 class and he says, oh, man, you're screwed, and I go, 742 00:49:36.960 --> 00:49:39.559 hey, it can't be that bad, you know, It's like and 743 00:49:39.599 --> 00:49:43.760 so he goes he gets his letter and he opens up San Antonio vision McAllen, 744 00:49:45.079 --> 00:49:49.159 and so we both got McAllen. The best thing that ever happened. 745 00:49:49.559 --> 00:49:52.880 I freaking love McCallen Texas. And it's like the cases that we worked and 746 00:49:53.159 --> 00:49:57.639 the other other people that got these little officers in these Colorado springs, nothing 747 00:49:57.639 --> 00:49:59.599 against them, but like you know, hey, they were like, hey, 748 00:49:59.639 --> 00:50:01.159 can you have on this case? There's five pounds coming up on a 749 00:50:01.199 --> 00:50:07.239 controlled delivery? Five pounds like no, like ten thousand pounds maybe, you 750 00:50:07.280 --> 00:50:10.719 know, that's the kind of stuff we were working. So being assigned to 751 00:50:10.760 --> 00:50:15.519 officers like LA, you know, McAllen Texas, those those were blessings for 752 00:50:15.599 --> 00:50:20.239 me. I got to work great cases, you know. And one of 753 00:50:20.280 --> 00:50:22.519 those cases you mentioned to me was the j I S case. Yeah, 754 00:50:22.599 --> 00:50:27.199 the Jazz case was a terrorism case that was after I got right after I 755 00:50:27.239 --> 00:50:35.960 get the the JTTF job in LA shortly. You know, this is this 756 00:50:36.000 --> 00:50:38.880 is two thousand and two, I think, so think about it. So 757 00:50:39.000 --> 00:50:45.960 it's it's not far removed from nine to eleven. We're handling thousands and thousands 758 00:50:45.000 --> 00:50:49.599 of leads. You know, everything is run down, everything, no matter 759 00:50:49.639 --> 00:50:52.199 how crazy it sounds. Somebody in a crystal ball saw something in LA. 760 00:50:52.719 --> 00:50:54.559 Who is it, Let's go figure out who it is. And it was 761 00:50:54.719 --> 00:50:59.760 NonStop, and so most of them, as you would imagine, all wash 762 00:50:59.760 --> 00:51:02.800 out. You know, you look out suspicious, but nothing And I remember 763 00:51:02.840 --> 00:51:07.440 one time in this case. JS case is probably one of the most significant 764 00:51:07.519 --> 00:51:10.880 terrorism cases in the country that's ever been worked in the US, and yet 765 00:51:10.960 --> 00:51:13.719 not a lot of people know about it. I had never heard of it 766 00:51:13.800 --> 00:51:17.119 until you told me. And it's because it's it's anchored by two huge events 767 00:51:17.159 --> 00:51:21.679 that occur in this two week period of time where we're working this case. 768 00:51:21.880 --> 00:51:24.400 Two major events which I'll tell you happened. I remember getting the call my 769 00:51:24.480 --> 00:51:29.679 boss at the time, really good guy, Randy Parson's. He calls me, 770 00:51:30.159 --> 00:51:34.440 and I'm having dinner at the time with my wife and some friends who 771 00:51:34.480 --> 00:51:37.599 flew in from San Antonio, and he says, here, can you step 772 00:51:37.639 --> 00:51:40.920 out? And he goes, hey, this this is a for reals, 773 00:51:42.000 --> 00:51:45.639 Like I go what I could tell by the tone of his voice that something 774 00:51:45.719 --> 00:51:50.800 was different about this particular case. And this case involved the Torrents Police Department. 775 00:51:51.719 --> 00:51:53.519 Some people may may recognize it now when I get into it. The 776 00:51:53.559 --> 00:52:00.760 Torran's Police Department had been tracking down some crips that were some guys that were 777 00:52:00.800 --> 00:52:07.639 robbing some gas stations, and during one of the gas station robberies, uh, 778 00:52:07.719 --> 00:52:09.239 the guy drops his cell phone. The cell phone leads them to an 779 00:52:09.280 --> 00:52:15.639 apartment complex, and the apartment they find all sorts of stuff Al Qaeda literature, 780 00:52:15.039 --> 00:52:20.000 a manual called the jis manual that talks about how they you know, 781 00:52:20.679 --> 00:52:25.840 and it was a it was a radicalized uh person up in fulsome prison that 782 00:52:27.599 --> 00:52:31.840 had radicalized this these guys, this particular guy while he was in prison, 783 00:52:32.119 --> 00:52:36.639 and then when he got out of prison, he went on to build this 784 00:52:36.760 --> 00:52:42.039 organization and to conduct this terrorist attack. And so these guys were originally just 785 00:52:42.079 --> 00:52:45.239 a street gang, yeah yeah, and then in prison, in prison, 786 00:52:45.320 --> 00:52:49.679 one of them was radicalized with Islamic extremism. Yeah. So right, there 787 00:52:49.719 --> 00:52:54.239 was somebody in fulsome prison that was that was radicalizing people that didn't have life 788 00:52:54.239 --> 00:52:58.079 sentences that were going to come back out. And so this particular guy, 789 00:52:58.119 --> 00:53:00.280 he was coming back out, and so he had a mission and it was 790 00:53:00.320 --> 00:53:02.960 all described what he was going to do, how he was going to recruit 791 00:53:04.000 --> 00:53:06.760 people, how he was going to conduct the terrace, how he was going 792 00:53:06.800 --> 00:53:08.239 to find his target, how he's going to conduct the attacks, and it 793 00:53:08.400 --> 00:53:12.599 was all written down. It was like, wait a minute. So they 794 00:53:12.679 --> 00:53:15.760 pick up the guys. Obviously, they pick them up, and both of 795 00:53:15.800 --> 00:53:21.960 these guys are now they are they are in custody at Torrents Police Department. 796 00:53:22.119 --> 00:53:24.760 So I go from Orange County up to Torrents and I remember getting to the 797 00:53:24.760 --> 00:53:28.280 command post. I don't know what time it is. It's in the middle 798 00:53:28.280 --> 00:53:30.840 of the night, and there's a bunch of stuff and we're kind of like 799 00:53:30.920 --> 00:53:34.840 we're really starting to dig into this thing, and we're interviewing the two people 800 00:53:34.840 --> 00:53:38.679 in custody. They're being interviewed at the time, and I remember sitting there 801 00:53:38.719 --> 00:53:42.679 and I look up at the screen and there's this on the TV screen. 802 00:53:42.679 --> 00:53:46.039 It's like, you know, breaking news, and there's this red bus in 803 00:53:46.079 --> 00:53:51.000 London that's got the top blown off of it. So that's the day of 804 00:53:51.039 --> 00:53:53.960 the London attacks. Is the day that we are at the command post. 805 00:53:54.440 --> 00:53:58.280 So, as you can imagine, the whole focus is on that. Now. 806 00:53:58.400 --> 00:54:01.800 Bureau is focused on that, like everybody's doing everything they can to ensure 807 00:54:01.840 --> 00:54:06.280 that that there's nothing else that's gonna you know, what else can we do 808 00:54:06.719 --> 00:54:09.599 to help that case. So we're just plugging away. One of these guys 809 00:54:09.599 --> 00:54:15.880 says that there's twelve other members out there. There's twelve members that we've said 810 00:54:16.119 --> 00:54:21.239 what okay, So we had two and there's twelve unknowns, and they would 811 00:54:21.239 --> 00:54:24.360 give us a first name, they would give us, like one guy wasn't 812 00:54:24.360 --> 00:54:29.639 talking at all, who was radicalized by the first guy. The other guy 813 00:54:29.760 --> 00:54:31.599 was doing. He was talking, he was talking about these twelve people. 814 00:54:31.960 --> 00:54:37.760 And coincidentally, the next morning we had a JTTF executive board meeting. This 815 00:54:37.840 --> 00:54:40.400 is where we brought the leadership of all the different organizations and so I got 816 00:54:40.440 --> 00:54:43.880 in front of them all and I said, hey, here's what's happening. 817 00:54:44.199 --> 00:54:47.000 And so every single person in that room we divvied out kind of you know, 818 00:54:47.159 --> 00:54:52.519 so LA Sheriff had surveillance, you know, LAPD did these particular leads. 819 00:54:52.800 --> 00:54:55.480 DEA was helping, NCIS was help, everybody was helping, and we 820 00:54:55.559 --> 00:55:00.400 divvied out all the work and we were tracking down these twelve people. Tracked 821 00:55:00.440 --> 00:55:04.320 all twelve of them down within a couple of days. Wow, all of 822 00:55:04.360 --> 00:55:09.079 them. I mean, because like DEA and LAPD had a task force where 823 00:55:09.079 --> 00:55:15.639 they they knew they knew that city very very well, and so they were 824 00:55:15.679 --> 00:55:19.960 able to like hit their sources and go and so but ultimately we ended up 825 00:55:20.320 --> 00:55:24.639 taking down that organization with this two So the first event is the London bombings. 826 00:55:24.679 --> 00:55:29.719 The day that Chief Bratton is up on the podium and he's announcing the 827 00:55:29.760 --> 00:55:36.280 indictments and the arrest of this organization who were targeting Jewish l air lax, 828 00:55:36.360 --> 00:55:43.679 the ll counter and synagogue and some other targets. They he announces this and 829 00:55:43.719 --> 00:55:45.599 on the screen you see Bratton and then on the bottom of the screen you 830 00:55:45.639 --> 00:55:51.400 see this big, huge hurricane and that's the day Katrina hits. So Katrina's 831 00:55:51.440 --> 00:55:54.280 hitting as we're taken down the group. So now the whole focus is on 832 00:55:54.400 --> 00:55:59.719 Katrina's you can imagine. So a lot of people don't even know that one 833 00:55:59.760 --> 00:56:06.000 of the biggest kind of cases of potential terrorist attack that was thwarted and that 834 00:56:06.079 --> 00:56:09.079 was worked in this organ You know, how we all came together is kind 835 00:56:09.119 --> 00:56:13.199 of forgotten, but it was. It was. I mean, I slept 836 00:56:13.239 --> 00:56:17.280 on the couch up in La like we we whatever sleep you can get, 837 00:56:17.320 --> 00:56:21.079 like you need a lot. Everybody was working around the clock for two weeks. 838 00:56:21.079 --> 00:56:22.079 It was. It was. It was fascinating to see how we all 839 00:56:22.119 --> 00:56:24.679 came together. Yeah, I mean, it's also interesting that, you know, 840 00:56:24.800 --> 00:56:30.400 given the time frame that these guys that they want to go after the 841 00:56:30.440 --> 00:56:34.960 Israeli National airlines. Yeah, it seems like there are so many I mean, 842 00:56:35.000 --> 00:56:37.400 if they're al Qaeda. Yeah, and ben Laden's big thing was, 843 00:56:37.519 --> 00:56:42.719 you know, attack America. It's it's weird that they instead of attacking America 844 00:56:42.760 --> 00:56:46.679 somewhere, they went straight towards the Jewish community. Yeah. It had something 845 00:56:46.719 --> 00:56:52.280 to do with kind of their their radicalized philosophy. The guy that was up 846 00:56:52.280 --> 00:56:55.159 in Fulsome, you know, he his his views. He was very you 847 00:56:55.199 --> 00:57:00.760 know, anti Israel, and you know that's why they selected those targets. 848 00:57:00.840 --> 00:57:05.320 Uh and uh it was. It was. You know, it's pretty scary 849 00:57:05.400 --> 00:57:07.320 because you know, like who were these fo You know when we when we 850 00:57:07.400 --> 00:57:12.880 found these twelve people, they had been approached by this guy, like they 851 00:57:12.920 --> 00:57:15.239 said, oh yeah, you know, he came up to me, one 852 00:57:15.280 --> 00:57:16.480 of me, part of this group. He gave me a manual. They 853 00:57:16.519 --> 00:57:20.159 have a j S manual and I read it and I thought, like, 854 00:57:20.239 --> 00:57:22.760 I'm not doing this guy stuff. What the hell was j I S. 855 00:57:22.800 --> 00:57:25.320 By the way, it's it's and you're gonna catch me here is like Jamal 856 00:57:25.719 --> 00:57:31.880 is something that was but not j it was it was it was an acronym 857 00:57:32.119 --> 00:57:37.159 of the leader in Folsome had called this organization, so it was something. 858 00:57:37.199 --> 00:57:40.719 It was something he came up with the name and and it was three words 859 00:57:40.800 --> 00:57:44.679 j I and we just used that as the initials of it, but it 860 00:57:44.719 --> 00:57:47.440 was not Jamal, it was it was a separate organization. And so when 861 00:57:47.440 --> 00:57:52.159 you rolled up these twelve guys, I mean how did you find them? 862 00:57:52.199 --> 00:57:54.239 I mean were it was like guy living with his mom, guy, I 863 00:57:54.239 --> 00:57:59.400 mean what, yeah, we had little we had little, small leads. 864 00:57:59.800 --> 00:58:04.400 He frequents this place like this, right, and he's best friends with a 865 00:58:04.400 --> 00:58:07.239 guy in a wheelchair, I mean stuff like that, and we're like, 866 00:58:07.320 --> 00:58:12.039 okay, and his name is you know whatever, like Tom or something like 867 00:58:12.079 --> 00:58:16.880 that, you know, and so yeah, just good old fashion police work, 868 00:58:16.960 --> 00:58:20.840 you know. They they go, you know, guy, some guy 869 00:58:20.880 --> 00:58:23.800 in the wheelchair, blah, you know, one by one everybody, you 870 00:58:23.840 --> 00:58:29.320 know what, and how did how did the prosecution go? It went extremely 871 00:58:29.360 --> 00:58:34.320 well. Yeah, I think we never went to trial. I mean they 872 00:58:34.320 --> 00:58:38.079 all played out, you know, and they all got their sentences. But 873 00:58:42.400 --> 00:58:45.320 no, no, no, these were like material support cases. These are 874 00:58:45.360 --> 00:58:50.760 like major counter chairs and charges. They all played out and they all get 875 00:58:50.800 --> 00:58:52.960 their senses. That's another reason a lot of people don't know about it because 876 00:58:52.960 --> 00:58:54.599 it everyone's trials. It didn't get the you know, the publicity. But 877 00:58:54.880 --> 00:59:00.440 it's a fascinating case like how that thing developed and it shows, you know, 878 00:59:00.519 --> 00:59:05.480 just how when we come together as partners, and there was never at 879 00:59:05.519 --> 00:59:07.800 any time. I mean I understand that this guy had like Alcado literature and 880 00:59:07.880 --> 00:59:13.760 admired that had aspirations, but there was no overseas nexus for this particular group. 881 00:59:13.880 --> 00:59:17.639 No, that's really interesting. Yeah there was. Yeah, there wasn't 882 00:59:17.679 --> 00:59:25.599 an overseas connection for the group other than the fact that the guy was inspired 883 00:59:25.679 --> 00:59:31.079 by some of the folks. But never there was there any direct contact with 884 00:59:31.119 --> 00:59:37.480 somebody. So as you go through this period of time, I mean we 885 00:59:37.559 --> 00:59:42.039 get to about two thousand and eight, you're in Oh, well, first, 886 00:59:42.119 --> 00:59:46.039 let's talk about Terror Screening Center. Yeah. Yeah, so that's my 887 00:59:46.159 --> 00:59:52.000 first job in the in the senior executive service ranks, the SEES ranks, 888 00:59:52.039 --> 00:59:54.239 and I was a deputy director there and they recently stood up and that's the 889 00:59:54.280 --> 00:59:58.960 center, you know, the multi agency center again that handles kind of watch 890 00:59:59.039 --> 01:00:02.320 listing and the whole well terrace, you know that terist watch list. Imagine 891 01:00:02.360 --> 01:00:06.880 that was a huge headache. That was it was really busy. You know 892 01:00:07.519 --> 01:00:12.159 again, it was we were just standing it up, so we were building 893 01:00:12.199 --> 01:00:16.840 all the different protocols. But uh, but yeah, again it's another multi 894 01:00:16.920 --> 01:00:23.039 agency environment. I'm very comfortable in that space, great people. And uh 895 01:00:23.119 --> 01:00:27.199 and I did that for it only a year. I mean I was there 896 01:00:27.239 --> 01:00:31.960 for about a year. When I got I got worried about this position in 897 01:00:32.079 --> 01:00:37.039 Los Angeles as the head of intelligence for the Special Agent in charge of the 898 01:00:37.039 --> 01:00:42.119 Intelligence Branch in Los Angeles. And and you know, I was asked that 899 01:00:42.119 --> 01:00:45.639 would be something I was interested in, and uh, I love LA. 900 01:00:45.760 --> 01:00:47.480 So I was like, I'll go back to LA. And but I was 901 01:00:47.519 --> 01:00:51.760 like, I don't know anythink about this intelligence stuff. You know, this 902 01:00:51.800 --> 01:00:59.239 is kind of after the nine Learving Commission and the Terrorism Reform Act that that 903 01:00:59.360 --> 01:01:02.320 establishes, you know, the the National Security Branch of the FBI and all 904 01:01:02.320 --> 01:01:07.320 this other stuff. And so I was the first specially in charge of intelligence 905 01:01:07.320 --> 01:01:10.039 in the field. And then that folded under like the Patriot Act. It 906 01:01:10.159 --> 01:01:17.880 was a separate bill. Yeah, it's just it was the Terrorism Prevention Act, 907 01:01:17.880 --> 01:01:24.360 the two thousand and four after after, but it establishes the you know 908 01:01:24.800 --> 01:01:30.880 the role of the Executive Assistant Director of the FBI's Intelligence Branch and uh. 909 01:01:30.920 --> 01:01:37.280 And it sets up the mandate of the FBI's mission to also, you know, 910 01:01:37.320 --> 01:01:42.679 embrace the criminal work that we do, but also accept our role as 911 01:01:42.719 --> 01:01:46.199 part of the intelligence community, and you know, how we operate in the 912 01:01:46.239 --> 01:01:50.719 domestic environment, you know, and the different regulations and guidelines that guide to 913 01:01:50.719 --> 01:01:54.239 all that, but how we work with our partner agencies domestically. And so 914 01:01:54.320 --> 01:02:00.719 when I got that job, I knew nothing about intelligence as you would think 915 01:02:00.760 --> 01:02:05.360 of it from the I see the intelligence community aspect. So, I mean, 916 01:02:05.360 --> 01:02:09.840 are we talking about running human intelligence networks? Human intelligence? I mean, 917 01:02:09.880 --> 01:02:14.280 the Bureau is a human is kind of our bread and butter, you 918 01:02:14.320 --> 01:02:19.360 know, it's you know, obviously through court orders and authorizations we can do 919 01:02:19.920 --> 01:02:23.079 we can collect different ways, but human is a huge part of it. 920 01:02:23.159 --> 01:02:27.039 You know. That's what we do as agents. I remember somebody once said, 921 01:02:27.119 --> 01:02:30.639 like, and it's really interesting, like our role as agents is you 922 01:02:30.639 --> 01:02:34.320 know, how we how we communicate and we're able to get information from you 923 01:02:34.360 --> 01:02:38.760 know, through building relationships and different things that we do. So it's it's 924 01:02:39.559 --> 01:02:45.280 it's interesting because when when we move out kind of into this world of this 925 01:02:45.480 --> 01:02:51.599 kind of transformation that occurs, even even the idea of transforming the FBI left 926 01:02:51.639 --> 01:02:54.719 some people with a little bit of a bitter feeling of because you know, 927 01:02:55.199 --> 01:02:59.239 I mean, I worked the FBI thirty three years total. I was just 928 01:02:59.280 --> 01:03:02.320 a kid when I start. I love that organization and the men and women 929 01:03:02.480 --> 01:03:07.559 of the FBI. I mean, I wish everybody could see the dedication of 930 01:03:07.599 --> 01:03:09.320 these folks have. I mean, they're regular human being, They're regular Americans, 931 01:03:09.840 --> 01:03:12.599 and they wake up every day. You know. I just love that 932 01:03:12.760 --> 01:03:16.039 organization. And so when you talk about the special agent rank, the eighteen 933 01:03:16.079 --> 01:03:20.880 eleven rank, and now you're telling them that you know, we're transforming, 934 01:03:21.239 --> 01:03:22.800 you know, they're like, wait a minute. And so I think when 935 01:03:23.199 --> 01:03:27.119 my role, one of the things, because I kind of got tagged, 936 01:03:27.199 --> 01:03:29.719 is kind of like the intel guy. You know, I didn't start off 937 01:03:29.800 --> 01:03:31.239 I told you about my career. I was like, I started off working 938 01:03:31.320 --> 01:03:36.320 drugs, violent crime, stuff like that. But when I got to the 939 01:03:36.360 --> 01:03:39.760 intelligence branch and that side of the house, I think the first thing that 940 01:03:39.800 --> 01:03:45.119 I was hit by was the fact that there was a translation problem. There 941 01:03:45.199 --> 01:03:49.920 was like anytime you're going to transform an organization, a big organization such like 942 01:03:50.000 --> 01:03:53.920 the FBI or any organization, it's commitment versus compliance. That's a huge thing 943 01:03:53.960 --> 01:03:59.079 for me. If you try to transform an organization through compliance, it's going 944 01:03:59.119 --> 01:04:01.400 to fail because they're going to do things as long as you're watching them, 945 01:04:01.400 --> 01:04:09.000 and you're like, on the other hand, if you spend the time talking 946 01:04:09.039 --> 01:04:13.440 to them, letting them understand so that they're committed to it as much as 947 01:04:13.480 --> 01:04:15.719 you are, they believe in it as much, then they'll do it when 948 01:04:15.760 --> 01:04:17.480 you're not looking because they feel it's important, that's what they want to do. 949 01:04:17.960 --> 01:04:21.719 And I just felt like at that time we were very compliance driven. 950 01:04:21.800 --> 01:04:25.679 Everybody knew they had to do X, Y and Z, and they had 951 01:04:25.679 --> 01:04:30.719 to produce this and that and they but nobody, even though we tried, 952 01:04:30.880 --> 01:04:33.519 it just had not It had not been enough. And so I said, 953 01:04:33.519 --> 01:04:35.760 I'm going to go out to every field office and I'm going to talk to 954 01:04:35.840 --> 01:04:41.280 every agent, every and I'm going to explain like what it is that we're 955 01:04:41.280 --> 01:04:45.000 doing and showing them that what we're talking about is stuff that we have done 956 01:04:45.039 --> 01:04:46.840 our entire life. When I told you the story abou Juanito, Yeah, 957 01:04:47.679 --> 01:04:54.039 And I would use that story to explain to them, like I had requirements, 958 01:04:54.239 --> 01:04:59.719 Intel requirements, where do they cross their dope? Who you know? 959 01:05:00.199 --> 01:05:02.480 You know, who are they sending money to? Those are my requirements. 960 01:05:02.519 --> 01:05:06.719 So I would develop sources and I would specifically go to collect that information. 961 01:05:06.880 --> 01:05:11.639 Right. All we were telling them now is that you have to understand, 962 01:05:11.679 --> 01:05:14.960 like when you're working your cases and you're you have the certain authorities that you 963 01:05:15.000 --> 01:05:20.280 can operate under that allows you to kind of ask other questions that maybe our 964 01:05:20.719 --> 01:05:25.320 our partners might be interested in. That's all we're asking. We're not asking 965 01:05:25.400 --> 01:05:29.840 you just stop doing this great work this and so by explaining to them and 966 01:05:30.320 --> 01:05:31.639 them realizing, you know, there's almost like, well, why did you 967 01:05:31.639 --> 01:05:34.119 just say that in the first place, you know, Like, but so 968 01:05:34.159 --> 01:05:39.559 if I'm if I'm hearing you correctly, you're saying that the FBI Directorate of 969 01:05:39.599 --> 01:05:44.320 Intelligence was like a clearinghouse of information that everything would come into you guys, 970 01:05:44.360 --> 01:05:47.760 and you disseminate it where it needs to go. Not necessarily, the Director 971 01:05:47.800 --> 01:05:54.679 of Intelligence was basically it's it's a director that basically governed the way that we 972 01:05:55.000 --> 01:06:00.760 developed our analytic workforce. So it had oversight of of workforce plan development, 973 01:06:00.320 --> 01:06:03.280 formalized a lot of yeah, but we were yeah, we formalized a lot 974 01:06:03.320 --> 01:06:08.719 of that, you know, training budgets. I mean, it's a headquarters 975 01:06:08.880 --> 01:06:14.800 entity, but our field offices are set up so that they're each office has 976 01:06:14.840 --> 01:06:18.519 its intelligence division within the field offices. You know, they call them squads 977 01:06:18.599 --> 01:06:25.400 branches, and so, uh, we had that throughout the and all the 978 01:06:26.000 --> 01:06:29.880 d I just established policies and governance over that, and that's kind of that's 979 01:06:29.880 --> 01:06:31.599 the difference. So I did it in the field from a field perspective, 980 01:06:31.599 --> 01:06:35.880 but also went back to headquarters and ran ran the program from the national level 981 01:06:35.920 --> 01:06:43.039 as well. Uh so, I mean during that time, I mean you 982 01:06:43.119 --> 01:06:45.719 say, what kind of stuff you were working on? Were these like counter 983 01:06:45.760 --> 01:06:50.000 terrorism investigations drug when I was in the d I or like when I was 984 01:06:50.239 --> 01:06:57.119 like when you were working in FBI intelligence. Yeah, so No, from 985 01:06:57.159 --> 01:07:00.599 the d ICE perspective, we weren't involved in investigator. I mean, the 986 01:07:00.840 --> 01:07:05.199 bereals divided up and we had our own you know, and uh yeah, 987 01:07:05.199 --> 01:07:09.599 so we didn't work cases like that. I mean, we worked with our 988 01:07:09.639 --> 01:07:12.639 partner agencies. We like I said, a lot of a lot of a 989 01:07:12.679 --> 01:07:15.480 lot of what you do at headquarters are setting up national policies and guidance and 990 01:07:15.599 --> 01:07:19.119 budgets and things like that. So but yeah, are my other my other 991 01:07:19.199 --> 01:07:24.800 partner ads and executive assistant directors that had those responsibilities, you know, work 992 01:07:24.880 --> 01:07:29.480 the criminal counter teraars and cases, and this is about Is this about the 993 01:07:29.519 --> 01:07:32.559 time that they ask you to be an assistant director? Yeah, so I 994 01:07:33.000 --> 01:07:36.400 get I get asked to come back to headquarters. This was I was in 995 01:07:36.559 --> 01:07:40.800 LA as a special Agent in charge. I'm asked to come back to headquarters 996 01:07:40.800 --> 01:07:45.400 to be the acting deputy assistant director of the d I. So that's there's 997 01:07:45.400 --> 01:07:48.440 an assistant director that runs the director of Intelligence, and then there's there. 998 01:07:48.480 --> 01:07:51.360 At the time, there were three deputy assistant directors, and I'm asked, 999 01:07:51.360 --> 01:07:54.400 can you come back for a couple of weeks. And I remember my boss 1000 01:07:54.400 --> 01:07:56.920 in LA saying, like, you know, you're never coming back. I 1001 01:07:56.920 --> 01:07:59.679 go, no, they just need me for two weeks, but turned up 1002 01:07:59.679 --> 01:08:01.639 me seven years. Like he was right. I never came back, and 1003 01:08:01.679 --> 01:08:05.559 I ended up in headquarters. Because I ended up, they moved me into 1004 01:08:05.599 --> 01:08:09.119 that role as a deputy assistant director. And then I got promoted to be 1005 01:08:09.159 --> 01:08:15.480 the assistant director when Director Moller was there, and then and then I became 1006 01:08:15.519 --> 01:08:19.000 the executive assistant director when Director Comy was there. Do you want to tell 1007 01:08:19.039 --> 01:08:25.279 the story about Director Moler when you got almost got yourself fired? Yeah? 1008 01:08:25.640 --> 01:08:31.199 Yeah, right, So you know I worked for all three directors, and 1009 01:08:31.279 --> 01:08:36.119 you know, they all had their different styles, and I enjoyed working for 1010 01:08:36.159 --> 01:08:44.640 all three of them. Uh, Director Mohler, he was you know, 1011 01:08:45.840 --> 01:08:50.199 I loved his style because like you knew, you knew if you messed up, 1012 01:08:50.560 --> 01:08:54.880 you knew you messed up like he you you just knew it. And 1013 01:08:54.880 --> 01:08:59.840 and I liked his former marine style and you know he but he was in 1014 01:09:00.000 --> 01:09:02.439 intimidating, I will say that. And I every morning, we would brief 1015 01:09:02.520 --> 01:09:08.079 him every morning, and before we brief him, we have like four pre 1016 01:09:08.119 --> 01:09:11.520 briefs, so they start like five point fifty in the morning. They're briefefing 1017 01:09:11.640 --> 01:09:13.239 me, then we go to the next person. We kind of go up 1018 01:09:13.279 --> 01:09:17.640 the chain until we end up in director Mueller's conference room for the morning briefs. 1019 01:09:18.359 --> 01:09:23.560 And you have to be prepared. So like the one thing you're you 1020 01:09:23.560 --> 01:09:27.159 don't want to don't try to bullshit him. If you're not prepared, he's 1021 01:09:27.199 --> 01:09:30.760 going to know it. So you just you prepare yourself. And that's important, 1022 01:09:30.800 --> 01:09:33.720 right, So every morning I got prepared and we get there super So 1023 01:09:34.640 --> 01:09:39.159 one thing you also knew is like don't be late. So you can imagine 1024 01:09:39.199 --> 01:09:43.000 right before his brief were lined up ready to go. All the people are 1025 01:09:43.000 --> 01:09:45.239 gonna be in the brief. There's all the different assistant directors were lined up 1026 01:09:45.239 --> 01:09:48.960 in the hallway and they're waiting for his secretary to say you can come in 1027 01:09:49.000 --> 01:09:53.479 now. Then we'd all pile into the conference room. And then his office 1028 01:09:53.479 --> 01:09:55.640 is in the back. And then he comes in at the time and he 1029 01:09:55.640 --> 01:09:58.920 sits at the main chair, and you know, the brief goes on. 1030 01:09:59.000 --> 01:10:03.359 The brief starts on. You got to know because he asked very he's detailed 1031 01:10:03.439 --> 01:10:06.560 questions and so you and so every time you survive one of those things, 1032 01:10:06.600 --> 01:10:10.840 you're like, okay, you know, so I had another live another day 1033 01:10:10.920 --> 01:10:15.359 and made it through that brief. But I remember one time I was supposed 1034 01:10:15.399 --> 01:10:19.439 to brief him on something that was not a morning brief, and it's you 1035 01:10:19.520 --> 01:10:23.479 know, it was a brief that I was I was working a special project. 1036 01:10:24.039 --> 01:10:27.560 It was called the Directors, one of his party initiatives, and I 1037 01:10:27.800 --> 01:10:31.000 was the briefer. Okay, And so you know, Director Mueller would sit 1038 01:10:31.039 --> 01:10:34.039 in the main chair. The would be a conference room over here to this 1039 01:10:34.159 --> 01:10:38.439 side, here to his right as the deputy director, and then right here 1040 01:10:38.479 --> 01:10:41.159 to the left is that first chair. That's where the briefer sits okay, 1041 01:10:41.279 --> 01:10:44.319 that was my chair, and then around the ROO table there are all the 1042 01:10:44.319 --> 01:10:47.039 other executives. And so the meeting was supposed to be at ten o'clock in 1043 01:10:47.039 --> 01:10:50.640 the morning. I make up some of these times just because I don't remember 1044 01:10:50.680 --> 01:10:53.800 exactly the times. But it was ten o'clock in the morning, i'd say, 1045 01:10:54.119 --> 01:10:59.439 and I remember getting there at nine forty five. Now I had prepared 1046 01:10:59.479 --> 01:11:01.319 this. I probably didn't slap. I mean, I was just focused because 1047 01:11:01.319 --> 01:11:06.239 I'm in a brief Director Moler. And so I get to the secretary and 1048 01:11:06.279 --> 01:11:09.479 I just want to let her know that I'm fifteen minutes early, but i'll 1049 01:11:09.479 --> 01:11:12.319 be out here in case she needs me. And before I get even open 1050 01:11:12.359 --> 01:11:15.880 my mouth to say like, I'm early, she's like, where have you 1051 01:11:15.960 --> 01:11:18.800 been? And I go, I was in my office. I'm just I'm 1052 01:11:18.880 --> 01:11:25.279 here early because this meeting started at nine to thirty, so it's fifteen minutes 1053 01:11:25.319 --> 01:11:30.560 already into it. And she had sent an email to my secretary to tell 1054 01:11:30.600 --> 01:11:34.159 me about the time change, which obviously I didn't even know. And so 1055 01:11:34.199 --> 01:11:38.720 I see the door and I have finally go like, oh my god, 1056 01:11:39.239 --> 01:11:41.680 because I have to open the door, and I could see. I could 1057 01:11:41.800 --> 01:11:44.119 just I know there's gonna be a conference room table, there's gonna be a 1058 01:11:44.119 --> 01:11:46.760 bunch of executives, and there's gonna be director Moler looking right at me. 1059 01:11:46.920 --> 01:11:50.359 And I almost didn't want to go in, but I figured this one I'm 1060 01:11:50.399 --> 01:11:54.840 fired, you know, Okay, it's my career's over. So I just 1061 01:11:55.439 --> 01:11:58.000 opened the door. And it was like, you know, those movies were 1062 01:11:58.000 --> 01:12:00.640 like the jukebox stops and everybody's just like looks. And here I come walking 1063 01:12:00.680 --> 01:12:04.600 what seems to be like a mile to get to my little chair right in 1064 01:12:04.640 --> 01:12:11.640 the front there. And it's interesting because around the room there's almost like this 1065 01:12:11.800 --> 01:12:15.239 sense of, oh, this is gonna be good. Eric's intro, this 1066 01:12:15.359 --> 01:12:21.600 is gonna be good. He's gonna get filayed right here. And so I 1067 01:12:21.640 --> 01:12:25.680 get up to the front chair. There's, you know, in this case, 1068 01:12:25.840 --> 01:12:29.520 here I am, Director Mueller's right here. And as I'm kind of 1069 01:12:30.239 --> 01:12:33.720 starting to pass out papers that you know, which is like I said, 1070 01:12:33.760 --> 01:12:36.920 the guy, the guy that was sitting on my side, he knew about 1071 01:12:36.920 --> 01:12:40.640 the product. He already started kicked it off, so they already started. 1072 01:12:40.640 --> 01:12:43.720 He was winging it. So as I'm doing this, he says, director 1073 01:12:43.760 --> 01:12:45.560 Moto says something to me, but I can't. I can't hear him. 1074 01:12:45.680 --> 01:12:47.760 I don't hear him. I'm like, I'm at this point, I'm thinking, 1075 01:12:47.800 --> 01:12:54.479 like, what's gonna happen to me? And so at the time the 1076 01:12:54.520 --> 01:12:59.600 general counsel, she says, I don't think he heard you. And then 1077 01:13:00.119 --> 01:13:01.840 he said, did you hear what I said? And I said, no, 1078 01:13:01.920 --> 01:13:05.720 sir, I didn't hear you. And he says, I said, 1079 01:13:05.840 --> 01:13:11.359 you're going to like anchorage this time of the year, and I said, 1080 01:13:11.560 --> 01:13:14.600 I said, you do know I'm Puerto Rican, right, and it was 1081 01:13:14.760 --> 01:13:17.439 in I would have never said something like that to him, but at this 1082 01:13:17.520 --> 01:13:20.920 point, you know, I'm fired, right, And I wasn't being disrespectful, 1083 01:13:20.960 --> 01:13:26.079 it's just just what came out. And he started laughing like a belly 1084 01:13:26.199 --> 01:13:29.840 laugh like he was really he thought that was just so funny, and it 1085 01:13:29.960 --> 01:13:31.199 kind of calmed me down, you know, and I was I was able 1086 01:13:31.199 --> 01:13:34.840 to get through my brief, actually the best brief I've ever done, because 1087 01:13:35.000 --> 01:13:36.880 you know, I didn't think I had a job after that. I figured, 1088 01:13:36.880 --> 01:13:40.000 you know whatever, I'm going back to work cases, you know, 1089 01:13:40.159 --> 01:13:43.039 and nailed the brief. And then as I was getting up, he said, 1090 01:13:43.039 --> 01:13:45.079 Hey, just want to let you know it's okay. This stuff like 1091 01:13:45.079 --> 01:13:47.039 that happens, you know, and he just made me feel real good about 1092 01:13:47.039 --> 01:13:53.359 it. And it just like I admired that about him that you know, 1093 01:13:53.479 --> 01:13:58.439 he he was tough, you know, he had to be tough. Yeah, 1094 01:13:58.560 --> 01:14:01.119 but he also you know, he was a good guy too, you 1095 01:14:01.159 --> 01:14:05.239 know. But that was that was the scariest time. That was the scariest 1096 01:14:05.239 --> 01:14:09.119 thing that ever happened to me. But I don't even know if he remembers 1097 01:14:09.119 --> 01:14:15.359 that, but I remember it. Before we're moving on any other interesting things 1098 01:14:15.359 --> 01:14:18.199 about you know, your time as the assistant director the first time that you 1099 01:14:18.279 --> 01:14:23.600 want to mention, I'm not really. I mean, like I said, 1100 01:14:23.600 --> 01:14:26.600 it was a lot. It was a time of change, and I take 1101 01:14:26.640 --> 01:14:29.359 a lot of pride and kind of been able to be part of that, 1102 01:14:29.439 --> 01:14:31.279 you know, try to make sure that we do everything and keep our country 1103 01:14:31.319 --> 01:14:35.920 safe. But no, I mean it's I enjoyed the people I had to 1104 01:14:35.920 --> 01:14:40.960 around me, great people. It was a good time. And after that, 1105 01:14:41.000 --> 01:14:45.520 you left the bureau, yeah, and took a job doing security for 1106 01:14:45.560 --> 01:14:49.119 Disney, Yes, the Walt Disney Company. Yeah, that was twenty sixteen. 1107 01:14:49.840 --> 01:14:55.800 You know, when you're an agent any eighteen eleven kind of was the 1108 01:14:55.840 --> 01:15:00.479 designation, Like you could retire at fifty then you're we were mandatory at fifty 1109 01:15:00.520 --> 01:15:04.800 seven, and so anywhere between that time people are usually leaving. And so 1110 01:15:05.239 --> 01:15:10.680 I was just about to turn fifty and this is twenty sixteen, and I 1111 01:15:10.680 --> 01:15:15.720 had gotten the job at at Disney as head of security for their parks and 1112 01:15:15.800 --> 01:15:20.079 resorts segments. So I left the Bureau on a Friday and I started in 1113 01:15:20.119 --> 01:15:23.800 Burbank on a Monday. So I went right into that, you know, 1114 01:15:25.159 --> 01:15:29.680 and and my I had a huge span of control. So basically anything that 1115 01:15:29.760 --> 01:15:35.039 was a theme park, a ship, a store, or a hotel resort 1116 01:15:35.520 --> 01:15:42.880 around the world fell under my my role as the vice president for that segment. 1117 01:15:43.960 --> 01:15:48.159 And it was I tell you I tell you man that there that's a 1118 01:15:48.239 --> 01:15:54.760 that's a hard job because Disney is I mean, one, they have an 1119 01:15:54.760 --> 01:15:59.279 incredible security program, you know, because security is foremost, you know, 1120 01:15:59.479 --> 01:16:03.239 keeping all the guests and cast members safe. But there's like a saying like 1121 01:16:03.279 --> 01:16:09.399 the sun never sets on a Disney park because like I would fall asleep if 1122 01:16:09.399 --> 01:16:12.439 you call it that, and then I'd wake up in the morning and I'd 1123 01:16:12.479 --> 01:16:15.479 just dread looking at my phone because while I was sleep in, Paris was 1124 01:16:15.560 --> 01:16:18.720 up and running. You know, you know, Orlando and Disneyland and Anaheim 1125 01:16:18.760 --> 01:16:23.960 there there there sleep, but but Paris is up and and I look at 1126 01:16:23.960 --> 01:16:27.079 my phone and it was like almost every day there's and it's it's it's one 1127 01:16:27.119 --> 01:16:30.960 of these things because the Disney brand attracts a lot of attention from the media. 1128 01:16:30.359 --> 01:16:32.520 So you know, I was almost like, I'm the vice president of 1129 01:16:32.600 --> 01:16:36.399 de escalation, like I have to like, okay, try to keep things 1130 01:16:36.479 --> 01:16:41.159 crisis man. Yeah, from because like for example, and then in Paris, 1131 01:16:42.079 --> 01:16:45.640 you know that there's a you know, there's a train station and chess 1132 01:16:45.840 --> 01:16:48.319 that actually it's a public train station that when you come out of the train 1133 01:16:48.359 --> 01:16:51.600 station, there's there's I mean, I don't know, it's like maybe half 1134 01:16:51.600 --> 01:16:56.800 a football field from the train station to the gates of the Disney you know, 1135 01:16:56.800 --> 01:16:59.479 where you come in. And so people becoming they have suitcases with them 1136 01:16:59.520 --> 01:17:01.640 because they're tr traveling maybe through up to Germany or something on this train, 1137 01:17:02.319 --> 01:17:06.119 and then they can't bring their suitcases in, so they'll they'll they'll maybe they'll 1138 01:17:06.199 --> 01:17:09.520 hide it, you know, behind a tree or something like that. And 1139 01:17:09.560 --> 01:17:13.119 so now you have a suspicious package there, you got to run the dogs, 1140 01:17:13.159 --> 01:17:15.239 you gotta and then if the media picked up on it, it'll be 1141 01:17:15.239 --> 01:17:18.640 the big story. You know, Disneyland pairs shut down for possible this, 1142 01:17:18.960 --> 01:17:26.000 and it was these little things like this that that could turn into like and 1143 01:17:26.039 --> 01:17:29.560 so now you're on calls and you've got executives in different parks and you're trying 1144 01:17:29.600 --> 01:17:33.720 to and I did that for almost four years, and it takes it takes 1145 01:17:33.720 --> 01:17:36.840 a toll. I mean, that's that's I mean, if you think about 1146 01:17:36.880 --> 01:17:47.159 it, we were dealing with Super Bowl level of attendance crowds every day in 1147 01:17:47.359 --> 01:17:53.000 six of these parks around the world, every day screening. I think there 1148 01:17:53.000 --> 01:17:56.600 was like one hundred and fifty million people we'd screened a year coming in through 1149 01:17:56.600 --> 01:18:00.199 bag check and everything. And so you could just imagine what it's like just 1150 01:18:00.479 --> 01:18:04.079 because and so so I could only do that for so long. I did 1151 01:18:04.079 --> 01:18:06.239 it for almost four years, and then I just felt like it was time 1152 01:18:06.279 --> 01:18:10.479 for me. Were there any like big active threats that had to be mitigated 1153 01:18:10.560 --> 01:18:16.119 during that timeframe, I mean, nothing like you would you would think of 1154 01:18:16.199 --> 01:18:19.720 that sense, But like Disney, the it's iconic and it attracted a lot 1155 01:18:19.760 --> 01:18:26.920 of attention. So it wasn't uncommon that you would see somebody you know that 1156 01:18:27.000 --> 01:18:30.760 would say something or write something and mention Disney, you know, and then 1157 01:18:30.920 --> 01:18:33.239 then we would take that extremely seriously, like what is it all about? 1158 01:18:33.239 --> 01:18:38.880 So we work with our partners to understand what that threat was. But but 1159 01:18:39.039 --> 01:18:41.920 most of the times it was just it was just the brand that attracted a 1160 01:18:41.920 --> 01:18:45.119 lot of attention, right, And I imagine you know, security encompasses a 1161 01:18:45.159 --> 01:18:49.520 lot of things, not just terrorism, but like husband beats up his wife, 1162 01:18:49.560 --> 01:18:53.560 or hotel or something, you know something. Oh yeah, everything everything 1163 01:18:53.600 --> 01:18:59.479 from you know, just the crowd control, like you know, you know 1164 01:18:59.479 --> 01:19:04.119 when we open into park in Shanghai for example, you know it's it's you 1165 01:19:04.159 --> 01:19:11.279 know. You you would sometimes you would had you know, guests who didn't 1166 01:19:11.319 --> 01:19:13.800 understand, like you know, for example, like you get off a ride, 1167 01:19:13.920 --> 01:19:15.000 you know, Pirates of the Caribbean for example, you know, ride's 1168 01:19:15.000 --> 01:19:16.920 over, what do you do? Everybody knows you get up, you walk 1169 01:19:16.920 --> 01:19:19.159 over here on this side and you exit. Next road comes in, you 1170 01:19:19.199 --> 01:19:23.880 know, but like sometimes they wouldn't get up because they want to do it 1171 01:19:23.880 --> 01:19:25.600 again. You know. It's like, well, you can't do it again, 1172 01:19:25.640 --> 01:19:28.079 you know, little things like this and then would cause scuffles, culture 1173 01:19:28.319 --> 01:19:31.520 difference, cultural things between them and the cast members, and then little things 1174 01:19:31.600 --> 01:19:35.800 like that, you know, but you know there could be just think of 1175 01:19:35.800 --> 01:19:39.479 there, like many cities that are going on, and like I was, 1176 01:19:39.479 --> 01:19:43.680 like the chief of police of It's so funny you mentioned that because like I'm 1177 01:19:43.680 --> 01:19:50.680 having flashbacks to when I went to it was a theme park. I probably 1178 01:19:50.680 --> 01:19:55.800 shouldn't even tell the story, but I just I just bring it up. 1179 01:19:55.800 --> 01:19:59.880 My my at a theme park with my daughter and my ex mother in law 1180 01:20:00.199 --> 01:20:03.000 who is not American, and she did exactly that on the ride. Oh 1181 01:20:03.039 --> 01:20:05.520 really, well, we're gonna We're gonna ride it again. Yeah. It 1182 01:20:05.560 --> 01:20:10.319 caused the big sea Oh yeah, yeah yeah. I mean in the US, 1183 01:20:10.319 --> 01:20:12.399 you're trained, you know, you just get up, you know, 1184 01:20:13.199 --> 01:20:15.680 but and you're opening these parks in different parts of the world and they're new 1185 01:20:15.720 --> 01:20:17.800 to it, you know. But for the time, it all, you 1186 01:20:17.800 --> 01:20:20.439 know, all right, breaks, it all starts to click right right, 1187 01:20:20.520 --> 01:20:25.760 But you know there's different things, you know, counterfeiting of products for things 1188 01:20:25.800 --> 01:20:28.560 like that. It's it just runs the gamut of what you can imagine. 1189 01:20:29.319 --> 01:20:32.399 Were there any notable differences from you going from being federal law enforcement and out 1190 01:20:32.439 --> 01:20:34.479 private sector. I mean, yeah, you don't. You're not a cop 1191 01:20:34.479 --> 01:20:38.960 anymore. You don't have arrest authorities. No, but I imagine you have 1192 01:20:39.000 --> 01:20:43.720 a huge budget. Yeah. Well, you know interesting because it's like I 1193 01:20:43.760 --> 01:20:45.800 did when I left Disney. I started a podcast on my own called The 1194 01:20:45.840 --> 01:20:48.319 Humble Sermon. I don't do it anymore, but it was it was really 1195 01:20:48.479 --> 01:20:53.279 it was meant to help people public certain people find it out there if they 1196 01:20:53.279 --> 01:20:55.920 look for it. Yeah, I'm pretty sure. I mean I think I 1197 01:20:55.960 --> 01:20:59.600 did like ten episodes maybe, and then and then it was like I think, 1198 01:20:59.640 --> 01:21:00.760 my wife times, you need to do something to make some money, 1199 01:21:00.840 --> 01:21:06.479 Like because I started a podcasting racket, I didn't have as many followers as 1200 01:21:06.479 --> 01:21:10.199 you had, but and I wasn't making any money. I was just kind 1201 01:21:10.199 --> 01:21:14.239 of like it was cool because I got to you know, I'd started my 1202 01:21:14.279 --> 01:21:17.800 own company at the same time. But my company started in March of twenty 1203 01:21:17.800 --> 01:21:20.159 twenty, right in the middle of COVID, so like nothing was happening. 1204 01:21:20.199 --> 01:21:25.079 So I started this podcast and it was designed to help a public servants, 1205 01:21:26.840 --> 01:21:30.640 military, firefighters, law enforcement, whatever transition from government from private government into 1206 01:21:30.680 --> 01:21:34.600 private sector. Roles and like some of some of the complexities with that, 1207 01:21:34.680 --> 01:21:39.000 like even how they write their resumes and things they talk about, how they 1208 01:21:39.039 --> 01:21:44.479 talk about and stuff like that. And and it's you know, when you're 1209 01:21:44.479 --> 01:21:46.399 in public service, if you're let's say you're a police officer, I mean, 1210 01:21:46.720 --> 01:21:50.680 you have a lot of skills that you're learning that are so transferable, 1211 01:21:51.279 --> 01:21:55.199 so valuable to the private sector. I mean, think about your ability to 1212 01:21:55.239 --> 01:21:59.079 connect with others, to de escalate things, to solve problems quickly. Think 1213 01:21:59.199 --> 01:22:02.640 think on your toe, all your managed budgets, I mean, all that 1214 01:22:02.680 --> 01:22:06.720 you could transfer it. But sometimes the way we describe what we do doesn't 1215 01:22:06.760 --> 01:22:11.920 resonate sometimes with like somebody on HR, so I was helping them kind of 1216 01:22:12.039 --> 01:22:15.640 do a little, you know, help them with that. It probably the 1217 01:22:15.640 --> 01:22:18.439 biggest the biggest thing that you realize is that when when I was in the 1218 01:22:18.520 --> 01:22:23.159 FBI, you know, we were kind of like the whole organization was about 1219 01:22:24.359 --> 01:22:28.840 national security, and we were we were the focus of what we were doing. 1220 01:22:28.880 --> 01:22:32.319 When you go into the private sector, you know, these companies are 1221 01:22:32.479 --> 01:22:38.119 you know, it's shareholder value, it's it's it's they're generating revenue or company 1222 01:22:38.159 --> 01:22:44.039 you know, and security isn't the primary mission of the Walt Disney Company. 1223 01:22:44.039 --> 01:22:46.399 It's an important aspect, right, but it isn't what drives it, you 1224 01:22:46.399 --> 01:22:48.720 know. It's like, so you have to be able to integrate with the 1225 01:22:48.760 --> 01:22:53.800 operational side and the and the revenue side to make sure that you're incorporating the 1226 01:22:53.840 --> 01:22:57.159 security to an extent where you could still be a viable business. And you 1227 01:22:57.199 --> 01:23:01.760 kind of keep managing that. But when you I went from being the guy 1228 01:23:01.840 --> 01:23:06.199 in the room who knew the most about something because I was in an environment 1229 01:23:06.239 --> 01:23:10.960 where I was very comfortable with the intel and whatever I was doing, to 1230 01:23:11.239 --> 01:23:14.439 being the guy in the room who knew the least about what they're talking about, 1231 01:23:14.760 --> 01:23:17.760 like the whole Disney culture in the way that they spoke and everything like 1232 01:23:17.800 --> 01:23:23.399 that. I had to learn all of that and that transition is hard. 1233 01:23:23.680 --> 01:23:29.359 But I will say this because there is this thing where a lot of corporations 1234 01:23:29.399 --> 01:23:32.960 that are hiring corporate chief security officers. They don't want somebody right out of 1235 01:23:33.000 --> 01:23:38.000 government. They want you to to actually have time in the private sector and 1236 01:23:38.039 --> 01:23:41.479 then they'll hire you. So it's kind of a tough situation because how am 1237 01:23:41.479 --> 01:23:45.079 I going to get that experience? You're not hiring me, right, and 1238 01:23:45.159 --> 01:23:50.600 so I remember somebody wants you know, I went through my gauntlet of interviews, 1239 01:23:50.600 --> 01:23:54.479 because when you go through these jobs, you're like you're interviewed by everybody, 1240 01:23:54.560 --> 01:23:59.640 like the OGC to the head of finance. And one of them asked 1241 01:23:59.640 --> 01:24:03.720 me, like, you do you worry about if your your ability to transition 1242 01:24:03.920 --> 01:24:08.399 from government into the private sector. You asked me that question, and I 1243 01:24:08.439 --> 01:24:11.319 go, you know, actually and he said to Disney, And I said, 1244 01:24:11.880 --> 01:24:15.359 actually, I would probably be more worried the other way around, Like 1245 01:24:15.920 --> 01:24:19.239 I'm more of the kind of Disney kind of like I am okay with like 1246 01:24:19.640 --> 01:24:24.319 you know, working in environments where you know, you have a lot of 1247 01:24:24.319 --> 01:24:27.800 different team members and you know, the culture may be different, the way 1248 01:24:27.800 --> 01:24:32.000 they speak. I have no issue transitioning here. I'm I think I'm wired 1249 01:24:32.159 --> 01:24:35.439 to fit really well in this company. I'd be the other way if you 1250 01:24:35.479 --> 01:24:40.520 ask me that that might be where the challenge would come from. But but 1251 01:24:40.600 --> 01:24:44.920 it is a challenge. I mean, you just you know, everything's different. 1252 01:24:44.960 --> 01:24:46.640 I you know, the way I brief is different, like when you 1253 01:24:46.760 --> 01:24:49.279 briefed Mueller, Like you know, you get to the point, you know, 1254 01:24:49.399 --> 01:24:53.640 like you know, here it is it's very it's very regimentded. Blob 1255 01:24:53.680 --> 01:24:56.039 blo blo boom, You're hitting everything somebod these one is called like a military 1256 01:24:56.039 --> 01:24:59.159 brief built. You know, I remember doing I'll tell you a Disney story 1257 01:24:59.159 --> 01:25:00.920 because it's it's actually in one of my podcasts and it kind of got a 1258 01:25:00.920 --> 01:25:06.560 lot of attention. At the time. I was working for Bob Chapek, 1259 01:25:08.399 --> 01:25:11.720 who was my boss, and then Ron Iden, who also was the Chief 1260 01:25:11.720 --> 01:25:16.840 Security Office, and I was going to brief Bob Iger on something and uh 1261 01:25:16.880 --> 01:25:21.159 and it was it was it was a an operation security plan for something at 1262 01:25:21.159 --> 01:25:25.479 Walt Disney World that we put together and we were going to brief Bob Iger. 1263 01:25:26.640 --> 01:25:28.479 And it's kind of cool you get to brief Bob Iger, you know, 1264 01:25:28.479 --> 01:25:31.439 it was it was it was He's he's not a hard person to brief. 1265 01:25:31.479 --> 01:25:35.079 He's a very very nice guy. But I you know, I studied 1266 01:25:35.079 --> 01:25:38.119 for my brief just like I would with Mueller. You know, it's like 1267 01:25:38.239 --> 01:25:41.359 or anyone call me or Director Ray. You just want to be prepared. 1268 01:25:42.840 --> 01:25:45.439 And so when I finished my I remember sitting in front of Bob Ayger's in 1269 01:25:45.479 --> 01:25:48.159 front of me. Bob chap Peck is right to his left, and and 1270 01:25:48.479 --> 01:25:53.439 Chipick's like looking at me like a lot like and I'm looking at Iiger and 1271 01:25:53.560 --> 01:25:58.439 Chippick's like he's just got his eyes locked on me, and and I at 1272 01:25:58.439 --> 01:26:00.000 the after the brief, Silver, I I think I nailed it. Like 1273 01:26:00.279 --> 01:26:03.039 I walked around going like I think my wife and she asked you, My 1274 01:26:03.079 --> 01:26:05.880 wife asked me, like how to go? I nailed it. It's the 1275 01:26:05.920 --> 01:26:12.199 best brief I ever gave. Only to find out that Bob Chapik he wanted 1276 01:26:12.239 --> 01:26:15.359 to talk to me to give me some feedback on it. And I said, 1277 01:26:15.720 --> 01:26:17.359 be fantastic. He said, how great I did? And oh, 1278 01:26:17.399 --> 01:26:20.439 it's so great. Did you learn how to brief? No, he said, 1279 01:26:21.760 --> 01:26:25.760 for content, you get an A. For delivery, you get a 1280 01:26:25.760 --> 01:26:31.640 C. And he goes you get to see because like he had he I 1281 01:26:31.680 --> 01:26:33.960 appreciate that he took the time, he said, like forty five minutes to 1282 01:26:34.039 --> 01:26:38.439 kind of give me this this feedback. He says, you know, we're 1283 01:26:38.439 --> 01:26:44.520 in an entertainment company. We're all about we're storytellers. You know, your 1284 01:26:44.520 --> 01:26:47.520 brief was very rigid. You know, it's like it's very you know, 1285 01:26:48.119 --> 01:26:51.600 you need to kind of form it in a way and tell a story. 1286 01:26:51.760 --> 01:26:57.159 And he like and to me, it was almost like what you want me 1287 01:26:57.199 --> 01:27:00.039 to get in her start like telling a story like you knows, like Cinderella, 1288 01:27:00.520 --> 01:27:03.479 like you know, like like like in other words, he's like relax, 1289 01:27:03.880 --> 01:27:08.840 he said, the way you dress needs to kind of tone down like 1290 01:27:08.880 --> 01:27:11.680 I was. I was dressed like a government person, you know, like 1291 01:27:12.560 --> 01:27:15.000 I came in very formal, you know, because I had been trained that 1292 01:27:15.000 --> 01:27:18.560 that's how you look culture. But no, you know, it's like so 1293 01:27:18.560 --> 01:27:20.960 I ended up buying like new clothes. I kind of got a little bit 1294 01:27:20.960 --> 01:27:25.039 more disney esque the way I looked, and I appeared in the way because 1295 01:27:25.079 --> 01:27:28.880 he was giving that like pink pinstripes. It's just like more like it's like 1296 01:27:28.920 --> 01:27:31.279 that more modern executive you know, no tie. You know, you kind 1297 01:27:31.279 --> 01:27:35.399 of have a nice sleek look what it is, but it's it's definitely not 1298 01:27:35.479 --> 01:27:39.880 the way you dress when you walk it into you know, the director's conference 1299 01:27:39.960 --> 01:27:44.359 room. It was great feedback, but those things like that, you know, 1300 01:27:44.439 --> 01:27:45.720 where you I'm glad he told me, you know, and I was 1301 01:27:45.760 --> 01:27:48.479 able to transition and change and the next time I had a briefing, you 1302 01:27:48.520 --> 01:27:50.600 know, I didn't get up there and start tap dancing, but at least 1303 01:27:50.840 --> 01:27:54.159 I was much more relaxed, you know, And it makes sense. You've 1304 01:27:54.159 --> 01:27:58.039 got to tailor it to the audience, and this audience is exactly exactly. 1305 01:27:58.119 --> 01:28:01.439 So that's that's that's an example of kind some of the transitions difficulty. So 1306 01:28:01.640 --> 01:28:09.079 that's a great story. But you said that this job did take a toll 1307 01:28:09.159 --> 01:28:12.199 on you, and it's like it was a high stress. Oh yeah, 1308 01:28:12.800 --> 01:28:15.800 very high stress, very high stress. High stress. I didn't have no 1309 01:28:15.840 --> 01:28:19.159 problem in stress. Like I love two minute drill work. I love that. 1310 01:28:19.199 --> 01:28:24.800 Stressful environments kind of get me energized. But when you know your stuff, 1311 01:28:25.000 --> 01:28:28.239 like you you know what you're doing because you have years and years of 1312 01:28:28.279 --> 01:28:32.000 experience versus like your brand new and everything coming out of your mouth is wrong, 1313 01:28:32.720 --> 01:28:36.039 you know, Like I would say something and people like what, Okay, 1314 01:28:36.039 --> 01:28:39.399 I'm not supposed to say that. Or I would do something They're like, 1315 01:28:39.399 --> 01:28:42.600 what, I'm not supposed to do that? And now you're leading a 1316 01:28:42.720 --> 01:28:47.960 huge stressful environment. Everybody's focused on you and you just don't. It takes 1317 01:28:48.079 --> 01:28:51.159 years to learn this kind of stuff, you know. But so but but 1318 01:28:51.239 --> 01:28:56.000 yeah, I actually like being busy. I like that kind of stuff, 1319 01:28:56.279 --> 01:28:59.000 and so it was it kind of a relief when they asked you to come 1320 01:28:59.039 --> 01:29:02.600 back to the bureau. Yeah, So I don't know if released the word 1321 01:29:02.600 --> 01:29:06.479 because remember by this time, I've already I've left Disney, I've started my 1322 01:29:06.560 --> 01:29:13.319 company, which nothing's happening, it's COVID, and I got my podcast going. 1323 01:29:14.039 --> 01:29:19.159 I really missed the mission part. Like I'm a mission person. I 1324 01:29:19.199 --> 01:29:25.119 come from generations of law enforce. My father was a cop, his father 1325 01:29:25.279 --> 01:29:29.000 was a cop, and then we have like four generations of police of Puerto 1326 01:29:29.079 --> 01:29:36.640 Rico throughout my entire Like family and serving my country and being part of the 1327 01:29:36.720 --> 01:29:42.880 FBI and the greater community of public service like that was everything for me, 1328 01:29:43.239 --> 01:29:45.840 no matter how cool Disney was. But the cool thing with Disney was I 1329 01:29:45.840 --> 01:29:47.760 felt like I was a public servant too because I was keeping families safe, 1330 01:29:47.920 --> 01:29:53.319 right, you know what I'm saying, I'm keeping people safe. But I 1331 01:29:53.600 --> 01:29:59.680 longed for like the fellowship that comes with being part of something like the FBI. 1332 01:30:00.319 --> 01:30:04.000 And when I got that call, man like in three second, yep, 1333 01:30:04.439 --> 01:30:09.119 I'll go back and a heartbeat, and I got to experience what most 1334 01:30:09.119 --> 01:30:12.520 people probably don't get to experience, like to go back, you know, 1335 01:30:12.600 --> 01:30:17.279 into an organization and to be able to continue that mission that work was like 1336 01:30:18.479 --> 01:30:21.720 I can't even tell you how happy I was. In fact, I probably 1337 01:30:21.720 --> 01:30:25.319 would still be there if it wasn't for the fact that I, you know, 1338 01:30:25.359 --> 01:30:28.560 I left to start my my my new company, which is a tech 1339 01:30:28.600 --> 01:30:32.439 startup company to help solve like a challenge in technology with public partner partnerships. 1340 01:30:32.439 --> 01:30:36.920 You tell us about your second stint at FBI, then you know, yeah, 1341 01:30:38.159 --> 01:30:41.720 what what was this job that they asked? So it was to become 1342 01:30:41.720 --> 01:30:45.239 the Assistant director what's called the Office of Private Sector. It's like a it's 1343 01:30:45.279 --> 01:30:50.640 a smaller strategic arm of the Bureau that that really its focus is to build 1344 01:30:50.680 --> 01:30:56.560 relationships and partnerships with our private sector partners that are all kind of facing the 1345 01:30:56.600 --> 01:31:00.000 same challenge as we are. You know now with with the way threats have 1346 01:31:00.119 --> 01:31:04.319 changed, cyber being a huge focus. Is that a lot of involve also 1347 01:31:04.399 --> 01:31:12.079 like corporate counter intelligence, like things that involve national security. Not necessarily, 1348 01:31:12.159 --> 01:31:15.960 I mean it could not necessarily. For example, there's something there's these two 1349 01:31:16.279 --> 01:31:20.279 huge national programs in the Bureau, the Domestic Security Alliance counts a d SAC, 1350 01:31:20.840 --> 01:31:25.880 and these are chief security officers from different companies and these these folks, 1351 01:31:26.039 --> 01:31:30.119 they they have to make security decisions every day to keep their companies safe, 1352 01:31:30.159 --> 01:31:33.000 you know, and they rely on any information threat information that we can provide 1353 01:31:33.039 --> 01:31:36.600 to them, you know, And so we are we are providing information to 1354 01:31:36.680 --> 01:31:40.600 them so that allows them to be able to execute their mission to keep their 1355 01:31:40.680 --> 01:31:43.720 companies safe. But you know, now, I mean there's a there's a 1356 01:31:43.800 --> 01:31:46.399 number out there that's been thrown around the eighty five percent of our critical infrastructures 1357 01:31:46.439 --> 01:31:49.279 owned by the private sector. Okay, so the front lines have kind of 1358 01:31:49.600 --> 01:31:56.560 shifted, you know, and uh, and there is a huge need for 1359 01:31:56.680 --> 01:32:02.359 us to to incorp integrate, you know, again through legal means, like 1360 01:32:02.399 --> 01:32:05.159 you know, you know, we're building relationships and we're sharing information and we 1361 01:32:05.159 --> 01:32:08.920 could share with them, but we have to go from I always call it 1362 01:32:08.920 --> 01:32:15.359 like right now we're partners, we got to be teammates because the folks that 1363 01:32:15.399 --> 01:32:18.359 are on the front lines now, that are in these companies without the information 1364 01:32:18.439 --> 01:32:20.720 of like, hey, this is a potential risk and to be sure that, 1365 01:32:20.880 --> 01:32:25.560 you know, our entire critical infrastructure is at risk. And you know, 1366 01:32:25.600 --> 01:32:28.079 I look at like what happened at nine to eleven, with nine to 1367 01:32:28.119 --> 01:32:31.079 eleven after the Commission report studies came out and people started to look at the 1368 01:32:31.479 --> 01:32:39.079 failures that occurred information sharing between the federal government and the state and local partners. 1369 01:32:39.600 --> 01:32:43.920 Was was obvious, like, how are the police officers supposed to do 1370 01:32:43.960 --> 01:32:47.199 their job if the at the national and we have information that they need. 1371 01:32:47.840 --> 01:32:53.960 Right, So you saw this entire movement to bring the police departments and state 1372 01:32:54.000 --> 01:32:58.239 local bares better integrated with the federal side so that we have better information share. 1373 01:32:58.359 --> 01:33:00.159 There's work to be done, but it's it's a big improvement than it 1374 01:33:00.239 --> 01:33:05.640 was back you know, nine to eleven. I am convinced that we're kind 1375 01:33:05.640 --> 01:33:12.319 of heading down a path that some major cyber attach could occur, in which 1376 01:33:12.840 --> 01:33:17.920 when you start to analyze what happened, if there's information that that's that person, 1377 01:33:17.960 --> 01:33:20.880 that SISO or that chief security officer could have had that could have done 1378 01:33:20.960 --> 01:33:25.960 something to kind of help protect it, we didn't get it to them. 1379 01:33:26.119 --> 01:33:28.560 We're going to be figuring out why. You know, it's going to be 1380 01:33:28.600 --> 01:33:30.399 things like technology. There was an old policy in place, I couldn't do 1381 01:33:30.399 --> 01:33:34.000 it stuff, and we could either wait till that happens and then we could 1382 01:33:34.039 --> 01:33:36.439 all or we could do something about it. Now, and that's kind of 1383 01:33:36.479 --> 01:33:41.399 what my mission is now is to is to do something about it. And 1384 01:33:41.560 --> 01:33:45.560 technology is a huge challenge like how we share this information and that's kind of 1385 01:33:45.560 --> 01:33:48.840 what I what I'm building my company to help. That's that's really interesting, 1386 01:33:49.720 --> 01:33:54.720 like from a public safety standpoint, Yeah, but also I mean a lot 1387 01:33:54.760 --> 01:33:57.640 of the things, the conversations we've been having the last couple of years in 1388 01:33:57.680 --> 01:34:00.760 regards to China where it's like, how do we do a public private partnership 1389 01:34:00.800 --> 01:34:05.560 to protect our information? As you point out, protect our infrastructure. That's 1390 01:34:05.600 --> 01:34:10.039 going to be a critical issue in the coming years, isn't it. And 1391 01:34:10.159 --> 01:34:14.760 you know there are there are great public private partnership programs in place, you 1392 01:34:14.760 --> 01:34:18.800 can put them in all and you know the OSAK which is the overseas version 1393 01:34:18.840 --> 01:34:23.319 of d SAC that State Department runs. You know, DHS has an analytic 1394 01:34:23.319 --> 01:34:27.479 exchange program that they do. They there's FBI is doing a lot in the 1395 01:34:27.520 --> 01:34:31.800 space Police departments NYPD E their shield program, they're doing a lot in that 1396 01:34:31.840 --> 01:34:36.039 thing. Again, the whole concept of moving from partners to teammates. If 1397 01:34:36.079 --> 01:34:39.600 your teammate, then you need to know you gotta be on the same you 1398 01:34:39.640 --> 01:34:45.319 know, same playbook you got to understand. And that's where I think where 1399 01:34:45.319 --> 01:34:49.000 we have room to improve is in that era. I'm kind of interested in, 1400 01:34:49.199 --> 01:34:55.279 Like when we one of the hold ups, you know potentially here, 1401 01:34:55.319 --> 01:34:59.920 I mean, if it's appending imminent terror attack, obviously there's responsibility to inform 1402 01:35:00.039 --> 01:35:02.600 people about that. Yeah, but then what do you do when there's other 1403 01:35:02.640 --> 01:35:09.720 cases where it's classified information or government proprietary information. How do you share that 1404 01:35:09.800 --> 01:35:13.439 responsibly with Yeah? Well, you know, you know, the duty to 1405 01:35:13.479 --> 01:35:17.520 warn that's always going to be. If you have information that can help save 1406 01:35:17.640 --> 01:35:21.520 lives or can help protect you're going to get that information to them. There 1407 01:35:21.560 --> 01:35:26.960 are means to declassify information and to get it to a point in which you 1408 01:35:27.000 --> 01:35:30.680 can protect and you know sources and methods and things like that that have caused 1409 01:35:30.720 --> 01:35:32.800 it to be classified that and get to something that where you could actually get 1410 01:35:32.800 --> 01:35:39.159 that information. When I was there was never a time in which there was 1411 01:35:39.199 --> 01:35:42.760 a potential risk or threat to somebody that we we would sit on that. 1412 01:35:42.880 --> 01:35:45.279 It's like, nope, we're going to get it to them. We're going 1413 01:35:45.359 --> 01:35:47.840 to follow whatever rules that we have to follow, but you're going to get 1414 01:35:47.840 --> 01:35:50.840 that information to them. And so there are ways of doing that, you 1415 01:35:50.880 --> 01:35:57.239 know, So that's never going to be something that's going to stop us from 1416 01:35:57.319 --> 01:36:00.840 making sure people are safe. And how long did you do this job before 1417 01:36:00.880 --> 01:36:04.680 you retired a second time? My second retirement so two years. So, 1418 01:36:06.319 --> 01:36:09.760 like I said, I would have stayed another year, two three, I'd 1419 01:36:09.800 --> 01:36:11.600 still be there. I mean, I loved it that much. I had 1420 01:36:11.600 --> 01:36:15.520 the most amazing team of folks, and you know, like the Bureau, 1421 01:36:15.800 --> 01:36:19.720 like any of these organizations, is very generational, like in my generation, 1422 01:36:20.479 --> 01:36:24.279 you know, I mean, I'd be fifty eight next month. So when 1423 01:36:24.319 --> 01:36:29.720 I had retired in sixteen, everybody that I worked with is retired, you 1424 01:36:29.760 --> 01:36:32.119 know, and then new leadership has kind of come in into place. But 1425 01:36:32.159 --> 01:36:38.319 there are people who worked for me, maybe a couple different levels maybe in 1426 01:36:38.359 --> 01:36:41.600 my organization, who are now leading the organization. So I was able to 1427 01:36:41.640 --> 01:36:45.520 come back, and I was able to rea to meet all the new people, 1428 01:36:45.680 --> 01:36:49.399 like and like I used to know every special agent in charge by first 1429 01:36:49.520 --> 01:36:55.279 name across all fifty six field offices like Boom, Bob, Michelle, whoever 1430 01:36:55.279 --> 01:36:58.960 it was, pick up the phone talk and then as I left every year, 1431 01:36:59.079 --> 01:37:00.800 I would know like ninety percent of them. Then I would know eighty 1432 01:37:00.800 --> 01:37:04.720 percent of them by the time I was out six years before I between this 1433 01:37:04.920 --> 01:37:08.479 time I left the first time, to say, six years had passed by 1434 01:37:08.640 --> 01:37:13.640 and I probably knew like a handful of them, and everybody else was new. 1435 01:37:13.680 --> 01:37:15.439 So when I came back as assistant director, now I got t I 1436 01:37:15.479 --> 01:37:19.159 get to meet all of them. And you know, I I will say 1437 01:37:19.159 --> 01:37:24.039 this, I mean the bureau. You know, there's takes a lot of 1438 01:37:24.039 --> 01:37:27.920 heat. You see, you see it in the media, and you know 1439 01:37:27.960 --> 01:37:30.680 there's there's times in which it's deserved. I mean sometimes, you know, 1440 01:37:31.119 --> 01:37:39.000 our strongest asset is that you know we're humans. Because we're humans and we're 1441 01:37:39.000 --> 01:37:43.199 regular people, we can do our job more effectively. But sometimes the weakest 1442 01:37:43.239 --> 01:37:47.199 link is that we're humans, right, and we make mistakes and things happened. 1443 01:37:47.600 --> 01:37:53.720 But I can tell you, like the people that I've worked with, 1444 01:37:53.960 --> 01:38:01.119 the folks in the FBI, I mean especially every nine to eleven super Bowls, 1445 01:38:01.479 --> 01:38:08.640 weddings, anniversaries, kids, none of that. You missed all those 1446 01:38:08.680 --> 01:38:13.159 things because everybody was focused on keeping people safe. Anytime you saw an event, 1447 01:38:13.199 --> 01:38:16.079 everybody's laughing and joking and everybody's having a good time. There are hundreds 1448 01:38:16.079 --> 01:38:19.159 and thousands of people that are working NonStop to make sure that you can do 1449 01:38:19.239 --> 01:38:23.479 that. And that's the people that I that's the bureau I saw. So 1450 01:38:23.520 --> 01:38:26.359 when I was like you get to come back, of course I'm coming back, 1451 01:38:26.399 --> 01:38:30.720 you know, it's like why wouldn't I. But they're just the most 1452 01:38:30.760 --> 01:38:32.840 amazing people. And then to being part of a community of public services, 1453 01:38:32.880 --> 01:38:35.439 like that's the best thing ever. You know. Yeah, it sounds like 1454 01:38:35.520 --> 01:38:39.600 you really enjoyed the camaraderie and the culture. Love it, love it, 1455 01:38:39.840 --> 01:38:42.079 love that, and I missed it. I really did miss it. And 1456 01:38:43.439 --> 01:38:45.479 you know, so, hey, they asked me come back and do it 1457 01:38:45.520 --> 01:38:49.600 three times. Do tell us about what you're doing now. You're fully into 1458 01:38:49.600 --> 01:38:54.680 the private sector. Now, have a couple of different business endeavors and companies 1459 01:38:54.720 --> 01:38:56.840 that you're running. Tell us about those. Yeah, I really, I 1460 01:38:56.880 --> 01:38:59.520 really have one company. The first one I started back in twenty twenty, 1461 01:39:00.079 --> 01:39:01.439 I think made about five bucks. I don't know how much money I made 1462 01:39:01.600 --> 01:39:06.720 that one that that's no longer. Now I have a tech startup company called 1463 01:39:06.760 --> 01:39:11.840 intel Sec. We we the biggest challenge that we had, like I mentioned, 1464 01:39:12.000 --> 01:39:15.760 was kind of our inability to kind of share information with our partners in 1465 01:39:15.800 --> 01:39:20.319 a trusted environment, like we know who you are and and so we built 1466 01:39:20.560 --> 01:39:26.039 we built up a collaboration platform we call sector net. We actually launched it 1467 01:39:26.079 --> 01:39:30.520 next week. Uh So it's super you know, exciting. You know, 1468 01:39:30.560 --> 01:39:35.000 it's scary because I don't have a job, so I'll be CouchSurfing if this 1469 01:39:35.039 --> 01:39:40.359 thing doesn't work. But I'm I'm convinced that it really is going to help 1470 01:39:40.399 --> 01:39:44.239 solve a problem that we have in government right now and in this area of 1471 01:39:45.000 --> 01:39:47.680 public private partnerships. And so that's that's kind of the big thing. Like 1472 01:39:47.720 --> 01:39:51.880 I said, I feel like I was uniquely positioned because I spent time on 1473 01:39:51.960 --> 01:39:56.359 the corporate security side and I saw what its life was like there, and 1474 01:39:56.399 --> 01:40:00.479 I've spent time on the government side that I've lived both of those worlds, 1475 01:40:00.520 --> 01:40:04.319 and I've led teams to understand like what it is that's keeping us from getting 1476 01:40:04.359 --> 01:40:06.880 to that level of maturity that we have to get to. And that's kind 1477 01:40:06.880 --> 01:40:12.239 of my mistion. Can you talk at all about what that challenge is that 1478 01:40:12.239 --> 01:40:15.520 you're trying to solve. Yeah, So, for example, there's information like 1479 01:40:15.600 --> 01:40:21.279 that that the government provides to its private sector partners and you know, like 1480 01:40:21.800 --> 01:40:26.279 little advisories that they'll say, I here's some malware that you need to be 1481 01:40:26.319 --> 01:40:30.560 familiar with. So SISA and organizations are providing this to folks. The Bureau 1482 01:40:30.680 --> 01:40:35.920 is providing information to corporate security programs about threats, you know, the threats 1483 01:40:35.960 --> 01:40:39.920 of different things that are merging and so on, and this work is actually 1484 01:40:39.920 --> 01:40:44.119 happening. The challenge is that the way that the information is being provided to 1485 01:40:44.159 --> 01:40:48.159 them because we're we're on separate technology platforms. You know, the government has 1486 01:40:48.199 --> 01:40:53.159 its platforms, the pricery has platforms, and the two of them aren't connected. 1487 01:40:53.239 --> 01:40:57.199 You know, a lot of times they'll get sloppy in how we do 1488 01:40:57.239 --> 01:40:59.840 it. So we may take something and just put a huge distroy list on 1489 01:40:59.880 --> 01:41:01.239 it and send it out. Well, you don't even know if the person 1490 01:41:01.920 --> 01:41:05.640 who had that is the same person anymore, and so there's a lot of 1491 01:41:05.720 --> 01:41:10.840 vulnerabilities. And then each of the different agencies that are doing this kind of 1492 01:41:10.880 --> 01:41:13.560 create their own way of doing it. Like, you know, we created 1493 01:41:13.560 --> 01:41:15.279 a portal and you got to log in to this portal and read it. 1494 01:41:15.279 --> 01:41:17.720 But then if you want this here, you created another portal, and an 1495 01:41:17.720 --> 01:41:20.960 agency created another portal. So here you are on the private sector with fifteen 1496 01:41:21.000 --> 01:41:27.000 different passwords and log and check each of these things every it's not standardized, 1497 01:41:27.119 --> 01:41:30.319 and so I started thinking, like, how can we make it so that 1498 01:41:30.359 --> 01:41:34.560 we could all coexist on one platform and that we could then share and know. 1499 01:41:34.720 --> 01:41:40.880 So we call it collaborate with confidence because we use authentication protocols and make 1500 01:41:40.880 --> 01:41:43.760 sure when you're coming in you are who you say you are. And then 1501 01:41:44.159 --> 01:41:45.800 when you're in that environment, you can you can talk and you can share 1502 01:41:45.800 --> 01:41:49.880 information at a controlled and classified level. So it's not secret top secret information. 1503 01:41:49.920 --> 01:41:53.720 We're talking about this information that's already been shared. It's to share, 1504 01:41:53.840 --> 01:41:57.720 yes, cleared to share, and we're just centralizing and making it super easy 1505 01:41:57.720 --> 01:42:01.119 for everybody to be able to access that information. And it's so desperately needed, 1506 01:42:01.239 --> 01:42:03.960 and I, you know, I'm so excited about getting that out there 1507 01:42:04.560 --> 01:42:08.359 and creating kind of a just a better way of keeping our country safe. 1508 01:42:08.479 --> 01:42:12.079 And you were telling me earlier that the website for its launching next week. 1509 01:42:12.239 --> 01:42:14.680 Yeah, if you want to tease it out though, for people to go 1510 01:42:14.720 --> 01:42:17.840 and soak out when. Yeah, we're we're going to be on the the 1511 01:42:17.880 --> 01:42:23.600 Azure Government cloud side and so it's sectornet dot us is going to be the 1512 01:42:23.600 --> 01:42:28.279 way you log into our website and then to become a member of Sector net 1513 01:42:28.439 --> 01:42:31.399 to to be which are these different agencies that are whether you're police department, 1514 01:42:31.479 --> 01:42:35.880 governations or a private sector person. Then there's ways that you could request to 1515 01:42:35.880 --> 01:42:39.800 become a member of Sector net and to be part of that community. So 1516 01:42:39.800 --> 01:42:42.680 so yeah, so that'll be a big, big deal for us. And 1517 01:42:42.920 --> 01:42:45.720 uh, it's it's like a traditional tech startup. It's a small group of 1518 01:42:45.720 --> 01:42:50.239 people, you know, handpicked that that it worked tirelessly to get this done. 1519 01:42:50.319 --> 01:42:56.640 But yeah, super excited. That's awesome. I mean we covered a 1520 01:42:56.640 --> 01:43:00.199 lot here, But I mean, is there anything that I missed any Yeah, 1521 01:43:00.279 --> 01:43:04.479 big career highlights or anythings about transitioning out of federal service, anything that 1522 01:43:04.520 --> 01:43:08.000 you you'd like to talk about that I didn't ask. Yeah, no, 1523 01:43:08.079 --> 01:43:10.600 I think I think we covered a lot. It's been it's been a lot 1524 01:43:10.600 --> 01:43:14.239 of fun. I do want to kind of put a plug in for There's 1525 01:43:14.239 --> 01:43:18.920 a group called the Green Beret Project and these are folks, a lot of 1526 01:43:18.920 --> 01:43:26.199 folks in soft community that are coming together and helping kind of inner city kids 1527 01:43:27.840 --> 01:43:32.119 around kind of the Dover Baltimore area. Wow, these these folks. You 1528 01:43:32.159 --> 01:43:36.960 know, it's a small team of people and you know, hopefully I can 1529 01:43:36.960 --> 01:43:43.359 put a link on this to actually get people to see the work that they're 1530 01:43:43.359 --> 01:43:46.520 doing. Because one of the cool things about the Green Beret Project is like 1531 01:43:46.960 --> 01:43:51.520 they won't just find kids that need you know, help kind of. You 1532 01:43:51.520 --> 01:43:55.479 know, they're in their environments now, you know, they they're maybe their 1533 01:43:55.520 --> 01:44:00.520 parents are in prison, they've they're they're covered surrounded by crime, and you 1534 01:44:00.560 --> 01:44:03.039 know, here these men and women come and they help these kids. But 1535 01:44:03.079 --> 01:44:05.439 they don't just like, hey, come over here, we're going to have 1536 01:44:05.479 --> 01:44:10.239 this barbecue, and where they stay with them, and they stay with them 1537 01:44:10.279 --> 01:44:14.520 throughout the journey of not only just helping them get through this adversity that they're 1538 01:44:14.560 --> 01:44:17.479 experiencing in their communities, but get them jobs. And they're putting these kids 1539 01:44:17.479 --> 01:44:23.399 into you know, companies and and work. There's there's one kid who's applied 1540 01:44:23.439 --> 01:44:27.159 to be an FBI agent. You know, it's like unbelievable, and they're 1541 01:44:27.199 --> 01:44:30.159 doing it just you know, with limited funding. They're doing it with limited 1542 01:44:30.199 --> 01:44:32.479 you know resources that I never heard of it before, and like I said, 1543 01:44:32.520 --> 01:44:35.279 it's it's it's perfect for you know, your audience. You know, 1544 01:44:35.319 --> 01:44:40.079 which you know, these these folks who you know, they take them to 1545 01:44:41.039 --> 01:44:44.159 they do do cool things. I mean we do on hiking trips, on 1546 01:44:44.880 --> 01:44:47.439 whitewrod or rafting, you know, just giving them a sense of kind of 1547 01:44:47.479 --> 01:44:51.199 like sometimes filling that gap of you're not alone, We're here to help you. 1548 01:44:51.680 --> 01:44:55.439 And it's just an amazing, amazing thing that happens. And I just 1549 01:44:55.439 --> 01:44:58.520 wanted to put a plug in for that. That's so cool. And I 1550 01:44:58.560 --> 01:45:01.439 know it isn't the intent of the project, but like I really believe that, 1551 01:45:02.199 --> 01:45:04.680 you know, Special Operations will go ahead and put a finger on that. 1552 01:45:04.880 --> 01:45:08.119 I wish they did a little bit of better job reaching out to some 1553 01:45:08.159 --> 01:45:12.199 of the inner city kids and telling them about some of these opportunities that exists 1554 01:45:12.199 --> 01:45:15.079 in the military. I'll tell you, man, you know, who doesn't 1555 01:45:15.119 --> 01:45:19.680 look up to somebody in Special Forces and look up with like, you know, 1556 01:45:19.720 --> 01:45:24.159 I want to be like you or you know, if you say it, 1557 01:45:24.239 --> 01:45:27.520 like I believe it. You know, it's like that's perfect leadership right 1558 01:45:27.520 --> 01:45:30.760 there. You know. It's like I just know, like when these kids 1559 01:45:30.800 --> 01:45:34.399 are around these guys, they're motivated to want to do better and to be 1560 01:45:34.399 --> 01:45:38.640 better, you know, and so we just need to do more of it. 1561 01:45:38.720 --> 01:45:43.439 That's really cool. Yeah, do we have questions for Eric? We 1562 01:45:43.520 --> 01:45:48.399 have a couple from m Corbin. Thanks for your work. Commitment versus thanks 1563 01:45:48.399 --> 01:45:53.520 for your work. Commitment versus compliance is a very nuanced take care to split 1564 01:45:53.560 --> 01:45:59.520 the hairs on the militarization of various narcotics organizations and the interplay on spheres of 1565 01:45:59.560 --> 01:46:06.560 influence and the interplay of on spheres of influence that have on them. I 1566 01:46:06.640 --> 01:46:09.840 kind of I think I heard two. Was there two questions? The one 1567 01:46:09.840 --> 01:46:13.760 about commitment versus compliance? Is that? Yeah, and to split the hairs 1568 01:46:13.760 --> 01:46:19.079 about on the militarization of various narcotics organizations. Okay, So on the commitment 1569 01:46:19.159 --> 01:46:21.960 versus compliance thing, I mean, you can you know I didn't make this 1570 01:46:23.119 --> 01:46:27.399 up. I mean, if you googled commitment versus compliance leadership style, it's 1571 01:46:27.439 --> 01:46:31.239 it's basically that. It's it's putting the work up front and creating an environment 1572 01:46:31.239 --> 01:46:35.920 in which you explain to the folks on your team why this is important, 1573 01:46:36.199 --> 01:46:40.760 why we're doing what we're doing anything. I mean, I think you should 1574 01:46:40.840 --> 01:46:44.119 lead that way anyway. A lot of times. One of the one of 1575 01:46:44.159 --> 01:46:45.359 the simple ways of doing something like that is if you have a team, 1576 01:46:45.600 --> 01:46:48.439 and you're going to set your goals and objectives and your strategy. A lot 1577 01:46:48.439 --> 01:46:51.520 of times the manager sits there and comes up with it, you know, 1578 01:46:51.560 --> 01:46:56.479 bring your team together, let's all collectively determine what we're going to do, 1579 01:46:56.920 --> 01:47:00.880 so that now there's buy in and there's commitment because we've all together to say 1580 01:47:00.880 --> 01:47:03.720 this, versus compliance where the leader will do it and say here's our ten 1581 01:47:03.760 --> 01:47:08.000 things we're gonna do this year, do it or else that's the more compliance 1582 01:47:08.039 --> 01:47:09.960 guy, you know. For that, for that to be effective, I 1583 01:47:10.000 --> 01:47:12.399 mean I agree with you. For for that to be effective, I just 1584 01:47:12.439 --> 01:47:16.920 point out the boss selling it, of course, And like I can tell 1585 01:47:16.960 --> 01:47:21.000 that you're very passionate about these subjects, like oh, these things matter to 1586 01:47:21.039 --> 01:47:26.159 you and that. But that sort of passion is like infectious too in it 1587 01:47:26.239 --> 01:47:30.359 is it is like and you can't b s your team either, like especially 1588 01:47:30.399 --> 01:47:35.560 you're gonna like you're surrounded by age, like and you think you're gonna pull 1589 01:47:35.600 --> 01:47:39.920 one over on them, like if they'll sniff it out if they think that 1590 01:47:39.960 --> 01:47:43.720 you're doing this for the wrong reasons, or you're doing it for some you 1591 01:47:43.760 --> 01:47:46.319 know, or you don't even believe in it. You're not gonna pull it, 1592 01:47:46.600 --> 01:47:50.399 So you have to be one percent dedicated to the mission yourself and believe 1593 01:47:50.399 --> 01:47:53.960 it or else. Yeah, it'll false. As far as about the militarization 1594 01:47:54.000 --> 01:47:59.520 of these drug organizations, I don't know how much I could even provide of 1595 01:47:59.520 --> 01:48:01.640 any value you on that. I mean, you can you know these organizations 1596 01:48:02.399 --> 01:48:10.199 they are going to build arsenals and to try to keep up any way they 1597 01:48:10.239 --> 01:48:13.479 possibly can, and they got the money to do it. But you might 1598 01:48:13.520 --> 01:48:15.359 want to get one of your guests that actually know a little bit more about 1599 01:48:15.359 --> 01:48:19.079 that. It wasn't as big of a thing when I was working drugs back 1600 01:48:19.119 --> 01:48:21.880 then as it is now. You know, back back when I was, 1601 01:48:23.000 --> 01:48:28.399 there was was a little different environment. So we have one from Isaac in 1602 01:48:28.439 --> 01:48:32.159 your professional opinion, Should private companies like Disney et cetera start doing hack back 1603 01:48:32.399 --> 01:48:38.920 as part of their cybersecurity pack practices. I don't know if I know what 1604 01:48:38.960 --> 01:48:42.479 a hack back is that like offensive hacking. I don't. I can't help 1605 01:48:42.520 --> 01:48:48.680 either. I'm sorry. We have one more, yeah, mmc one. 1606 01:48:49.159 --> 01:48:53.359 They offered me a job as chief electrician at Disney. I told them I 1607 01:48:53.359 --> 01:48:59.640 wouldn't. I won't work for no Mickey mouse outfit. Thanks MMC. Yeah 1608 01:48:59.720 --> 01:49:05.319 yeah, yeah, hey you worked for the mouse. I worked for the 1609 01:49:05.359 --> 01:49:08.960 mouse. Had a good worked out pretty well, Yeah, I had a 1610 01:49:09.000 --> 01:49:14.760 good time. Well. Uh, Eric, I mean thanks a lot for 1611 01:49:14.800 --> 01:49:17.000 coming and doing this. Man, I'm glad. I hope you enjoyed yourself. 1612 01:49:17.039 --> 01:49:19.239 I remember when you reached out to me, like, of course I'll 1613 01:49:19.279 --> 01:49:24.439 do this, you know. So it's always sometimes there's there's some people I 1614 01:49:24.520 --> 01:49:28.079 reach out to who are like friends of friends, you know, it's a 1615 01:49:28.079 --> 01:49:30.680 little easy. But like I kind of shot you a message on LinkedIn, 1616 01:49:30.800 --> 01:49:32.279 like a shot in the dark. Yeah, hey man, yeah, and 1617 01:49:32.319 --> 01:49:35.840 I said, of course. I mean once I realized you know who your 1618 01:49:35.920 --> 01:49:39.880 your main audience is, like, of course, dem and I just like 1619 01:49:40.279 --> 01:49:43.720 love to be involved anyway I can. Yeah, thank you. Anything else 1620 01:49:44.159 --> 01:49:45.640 that you want to tell people, anything else you want to plug before we 1621 01:49:45.800 --> 01:49:48.600 roll out? No, I think that's it, you know. Yeah. 1622 01:49:49.079 --> 01:49:54.159 Uh. Next Friday, we're going to have a State Department Foreign Service officer 1623 01:49:54.279 --> 01:49:59.279 on, a guy who had a lot of experience in Afghanistan, experience with 1624 01:49:59.319 --> 01:50:02.319 the bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, some other hot spots around the world. 1625 01:50:02.439 --> 01:50:06.119 Actually, our first foreign Service officer, I think that we've had on the 1626 01:50:06.119 --> 01:50:10.840 show. Yeah, and then we'll be back on is it Monday, d 1627 01:50:11.479 --> 01:50:15.520 the eighth. We'll be back on Monday with Adam Gamal. He is the 1628 01:50:15.800 --> 01:50:21.479 guy who authored the book The Unit about an Army Special Mission Unit. I'll 1629 01:50:21.560 --> 01:50:26.840 let Adam describe all of that. Yeah, he'll be here in studio. 1630 01:50:26.960 --> 01:50:30.720 We're gonna have a black box over his face because we can't reveal his identity, 1631 01:50:30.800 --> 01:50:32.720 all this good stuff, but it's gonna be a really fun interview. 1632 01:50:33.239 --> 01:50:38.479 So please join us on Friday and Monday. Eric again, thank you, 1633 01:50:38.560 --> 01:50:43.199 ye and we'll see all of you guys on Friday and then Monday. Take 1634 01:50:43.199 --> 01:50:44.439 care out there, have a good night.