WEBVTT 1 00:00:31.079 --> 00:00:35.240 Welcome to Midrats with sal from Commander Salamander and the Eagle One from Eagles Speak 2 00:00:35.439 --> 00:00:39.880 at Sea or Shore your home for a discussion of national security issues in all 3 00:00:39.880 --> 00:00:46.880 things maritime. And welcome board everybody, and glad to have you on board 4 00:00:46.920 --> 00:00:51.439 today for a mid Rat And because we're live, I always like to do 5 00:00:51.560 --> 00:00:54.600 my altar call. If you're with us, go ahead and scroll down to 6 00:00:54.679 --> 00:00:57.840 the bottom of the show page. That's where you will find a link to 7 00:00:57.960 --> 00:01:00.200 the chat room. We already got a few folks are ready to keep you 8 00:01:00.280 --> 00:01:04.879 company. And if you have some observations you'd like to share during the course 9 00:01:04.920 --> 00:01:08.599 of the show, Arthur, is a question you would like for us to 10 00:01:08.599 --> 00:01:12.200 bring up to our guests as our conversation goes for the next hour, that's 11 00:01:12.239 --> 00:01:15.599 a great place to put it. We'll both be monitoring during the course of 12 00:01:15.640 --> 00:01:21.120 the show. And also if you've got to run off to take care of 13 00:01:21.159 --> 00:01:26.000 some business and you want to figure out what happened while you're gone, If 14 00:01:26.000 --> 00:01:30.799 you don't already, go ahead and go over to Spotify, iTunes, Spreaker, 15 00:01:30.920 --> 00:01:37.200 whichever podcast aggregator you subscribe to, and look for mid Rats and subscribe. 16 00:01:37.319 --> 00:01:40.480 Can't beat the price, and that way we'll be waiting for you to 17 00:01:40.519 --> 00:01:45.920 listen at a time more to your convenience and getting onto today's show. It's 18 00:01:45.959 --> 00:01:48.959 one of those one of those things. This is going to be part of 19 00:01:48.959 --> 00:01:57.560 opening question to our guest that after a couple of decades of smallish wars in 20 00:01:57.760 --> 00:02:05.480 Southwest Asia and Central Asia, that some topics were in the back burner and 21 00:02:05.519 --> 00:02:09.039 some are hidden in the back closet that have come back to the front now 22 00:02:09.080 --> 00:02:15.080 that people are able to focus their attention elsewhere, and especially in the last 23 00:02:15.199 --> 00:02:22.159 year, one of the more technologically challenging and essential parts of modern warfare, 24 00:02:22.560 --> 00:02:27.039 that's ground based, counter air and missile defense, has come back into people's 25 00:02:27.039 --> 00:02:30.719 attention, not just for what we've seen in the Russia Ukrainian War, but 26 00:02:30.840 --> 00:02:37.199 also a growing appreciation of what the People's Republic of China has built in the 27 00:02:37.240 --> 00:02:44.840 Western Pacific to cover what she considers her backyard and a lot of our bases 28 00:02:44.919 --> 00:02:50.319 and our habits and for many ways preconceptions on how we would operate there. 29 00:02:50.759 --> 00:02:55.319 People are starting to realize that we are located in operating under the guns of 30 00:02:55.319 --> 00:03:04.599 a potential adversary, and people who look at both sides of the Eastern European 31 00:03:04.840 --> 00:03:12.120 and Eastern Asian landmasses, looking at the challenge from small lawn lower size unmanned 32 00:03:12.439 --> 00:03:19.800 combat vehicles to your standard issue ballistic missiles and hypersonics. And our guest today 33 00:03:19.840 --> 00:03:23.800 discuss these and related challenges is Tom Carrocot. He's a senior fellow with the 34 00:03:23.879 --> 00:03:30.240 International Security Program and the director of the Missile Defense Project at the Center for 35 00:03:30.319 --> 00:03:35.000 Strategic and International Studies. Tom, it's great to have you on mid Rats. 36 00:03:35.080 --> 00:03:38.919 Welcome, mord Well, sal it's a pleasure to be with you. 37 00:03:38.960 --> 00:03:45.639 It's a beautiful, beautiful afternoon in Virginia, Smoke curling off the grill called 38 00:03:46.080 --> 00:03:50.280 whiskey in the glass. And I just have a question if if this is 39 00:03:50.319 --> 00:03:55.479 an ultra call, am I supposed to testify? We shall witness and lay 40 00:03:55.520 --> 00:04:01.000 hands upon you as you proceed in your next sea All right, all right, 41 00:04:01.159 --> 00:04:05.840 let's go. Well, we got everything from Virginia to Florida, and 42 00:04:06.520 --> 00:04:12.680 Mark is holding down the North Carolina venue, so we've got got the Eastern 43 00:04:12.759 --> 00:04:16.480 seaboard covered. And I appreciate you coming back on mid Rats for this topic 44 00:04:16.600 --> 00:04:21.480 because it's kind of like I mentioned in the intro that there were a lot 45 00:04:21.519 --> 00:04:30.399 of things that are an essential part of a major military power such as ourselves 46 00:04:30.439 --> 00:04:36.279 that for obvious reasons, for most of this century, where risk was accepted, 47 00:04:36.600 --> 00:04:44.160 attention was diverted, some things were large percentage were just playing decommissioned or 48 00:04:44.160 --> 00:04:47.959 gotten rid of that. Now that people's minds and attentions have been able to 49 00:04:48.360 --> 00:04:55.800 focus elsewhere, there is a growing appreciation that while we were focused elsewhere, 50 00:04:56.319 --> 00:05:00.240 the rest of the world was not polite enough to wait for us to regain 51 00:05:00.279 --> 00:05:04.839 our attentions. And the events of the last year have given an opportunity for 52 00:05:04.879 --> 00:05:11.720 a lot of people. And you're one of them who has spent a lot 53 00:05:11.800 --> 00:05:18.920 of intellectual time and effort and work and understanding and looking at what is needed 54 00:05:18.959 --> 00:05:25.279 in areas such as missile defense and counter air challenges. And you know, 55 00:05:25.360 --> 00:05:30.439 from from your perspective, you know, since twenty twenty two showed up, 56 00:05:30.759 --> 00:05:35.399 you know, fourteen fifteen months ago. What are a couple of the items 57 00:05:35.439 --> 00:05:42.360 that really has gotten your attention, Either things that you wouldn't expect would reach 58 00:05:42.360 --> 00:05:46.879 a level of that they have, or perhaps some things you thought would take 59 00:05:46.920 --> 00:05:53.639 place in this arena that had just not materialized. Yeah, well again, 60 00:05:54.079 --> 00:06:00.920 so thanks for having me on um. I think that was a little bit 61 00:06:00.959 --> 00:06:04.560 like polite southern gentleman's way to ask, you know, what are the I 62 00:06:04.639 --> 00:06:12.240 told you sos from the past year. And there are a few that's true, 63 00:06:12.360 --> 00:06:14.920 you know, it's it's not that there's a whole lot of surprises, 64 00:06:14.959 --> 00:06:18.199 but it is interesting, I would say, gratifying that some of these issues 65 00:06:18.279 --> 00:06:25.879 have come to the four and sort of the more popular consciousness over the past 66 00:06:25.959 --> 00:06:30.480 year as you as you rightly point out, and whether it's whether whether or 67 00:06:30.680 --> 00:06:36.439 formulating the problem from mud to space or formulating the problem from c foam to 68 00:06:36.600 --> 00:06:45.360 space. Uh, you know that particular air and missile threat spectrum have become 69 00:06:45.399 --> 00:06:50.959 increasingly rich and diverse and uh and challenging. And what we see in Ukraine 70 00:06:50.959 --> 00:06:56.879 over the past the past year and change has just really brocrous. Not that 71 00:06:56.920 --> 00:07:01.920 we didn't know it or that wasn't there. It's become again more they popularly 72 00:07:02.639 --> 00:07:10.120 accepted and appreciated on the UAV, the UAFS problem for instance, the lawyering 73 00:07:10.199 --> 00:07:18.800 munitions where the twenty five cent sat word for the problem, and then of 74 00:07:18.879 --> 00:07:24.279 course the cruise missiles and so you know, as I always like to say, 75 00:07:24.959 --> 00:07:29.839 or should as I have been saying for some time, probably tediously to 76 00:07:29.920 --> 00:07:33.360 some folk ars, it's not just about the road state ballistic missile anymore. 77 00:07:34.399 --> 00:07:41.399 And we've seen that in spades in terms of the UAV and the cruise missile 78 00:07:41.959 --> 00:07:47.800 activity of the past of the past year and change. And I will I 79 00:07:47.879 --> 00:07:55.000 will give the Biden administration credit in their missile defense review, like the previous 80 00:07:55.399 --> 00:08:01.040 missile defense review, highlighting the the extent of that threat spectrum, but the 81 00:08:01.160 --> 00:08:05.560 most recently, the most recent one and what was the end of October last 82 00:08:05.639 --> 00:08:09.639 year, you know, included UAVs there for the first time. And uh, 83 00:08:11.240 --> 00:08:16.360 you know, UAVs really are kind of the to to expropriate a phrase, 84 00:08:16.720 --> 00:08:22.120 poor man's cruise missile and uh, and that's that is fundamentally part of 85 00:08:22.360 --> 00:08:26.600 the part of the problem that we have to contend with. We don't get 86 00:08:26.639 --> 00:08:30.839 to decide that, you know, we just want to do missile defense against 87 00:08:30.839 --> 00:08:35.360 certain things. We have to do air and muscile defense against the full spectrum 88 00:08:35.399 --> 00:08:43.679 of threats. We just we just uh acknowledged the fourtieth anniversary of of the 89 00:08:43.840 --> 00:08:48.320 SBI speech last last the last week I think it was, uh. And 90 00:08:48.519 --> 00:08:54.840 so you know, a lot's changed since then, and this arrow u endo 91 00:08:54.879 --> 00:09:01.080 atmospheric part of the threat spectrum, I would say, is the brunt And 92 00:09:01.159 --> 00:09:05.240 so that's where from a policy, from a from a strategy, from a 93 00:09:05.919 --> 00:09:09.519 budget and programmatics point of view, that's where so much of the conversation is 94 00:09:09.639 --> 00:09:18.240 right now. Yeah. You you put out a piece called North America is 95 00:09:18.279 --> 00:09:22.360 a Region two um. And one of the things that struck me about that 96 00:09:22.440 --> 00:09:28.000 was you you start out saying that there's a dichotomy and the way we've approached 97 00:09:28.759 --> 00:09:33.799 air and missile defense. Can you kind of elaborate on what that dichotomy is 98 00:09:33.919 --> 00:09:41.440 and what we should be doing to change change that. Yeah, so you're 99 00:09:41.480 --> 00:09:46.039 referencing a big report that the Missile Defense Project to See as asked, put 100 00:09:46.080 --> 00:09:50.840 out last summer. That was July of twenty twenty two. We worked closely 101 00:09:50.879 --> 00:09:56.000 with Marad Northcom on that. It was specifically on the homeland cruise missile defense. 102 00:09:58.039 --> 00:10:03.000 Uh. And the reason we entitle it North America's origion two is that 103 00:10:03.759 --> 00:10:11.159 these kinds of threats have historically been kind of relegated to something we can we 104 00:10:11.519 --> 00:10:16.480 can worry about over there, but not over here. And you know, 105 00:10:16.679 --> 00:10:22.559 sort of the full threat spectrum that can be dialed up and down in any 106 00:10:22.639 --> 00:10:28.039 region whatsoever is kind of point to that. So this is something that the 107 00:10:28.120 --> 00:10:33.120 head of Northcom, General Van Hurt, has been kind of halving the table 108 00:10:33.120 --> 00:10:37.279 about for some time, and by the ways, probably second only to him 109 00:10:39.240 --> 00:10:45.080 is a general bottom us of the excuse me the head of Transcom as well, 110 00:10:45.440 --> 00:10:52.720 you know, because one of the potential scenarios or images as it were, 111 00:10:52.480 --> 00:10:58.360 of why someone might might want to attact the United States homeland with something 112 00:10:58.440 --> 00:11:05.840 like a Christmas usole and think of connersional crudinism is to impeed, retard, 113 00:11:07.879 --> 00:11:13.120 affect our ability with power projection with all of the forces that we have at 114 00:11:13.120 --> 00:11:18.759 any given time within KONAS. And so the North America's a region two thing 115 00:11:18.960 --> 00:11:20.639 is just sort of, you know, one of the handful of phrases that 116 00:11:22.360 --> 00:11:28.080 I like to use to kind of emphasize the commonality and really the ubiquity of 117 00:11:28.240 --> 00:11:33.759 that air missile threat spectrum. You know, back in the well, let's 118 00:11:33.759 --> 00:11:39.840 just go back for a second to the Clinton administration, they actually amended the 119 00:11:39.759 --> 00:11:46.840 the ABM freety with this kind of distinction between theater ballistic missiles missile defenses and 120 00:11:48.240 --> 00:11:52.679 quote unquote national missiles, and they did so with the reference point that basically 121 00:11:52.720 --> 00:12:00.519 how fast the thing could go. But the theater national dichotomy on that has 122 00:12:00.600 --> 00:12:03.879 kind of stuck. The Bush administration comes in, gets rid of the ab 123 00:12:05.039 --> 00:12:09.320 M three and actually renames one of our weapon systems just to make a point. 124 00:12:09.799 --> 00:12:16.159 They rename is a bad Ballisticness of Defense interceptor, just to make a 125 00:12:16.240 --> 00:12:24.799 point. They're changing it from the theater the theater and Anti air Defense two 126 00:12:24.039 --> 00:12:30.799 terminal, just to get rid of that. The problem is the dichotomy has 127 00:12:30.879 --> 00:12:37.120 persisted and the old theater of versus national thing has re emerged yet again as 128 00:12:37.240 --> 00:12:43.440 the regional versus homeland dichotomy. And as they say, the threat gets the 129 00:12:43.519 --> 00:12:46.519 vote, the threat has voted, and we don't get to the side. 130 00:12:48.840 --> 00:12:56.879 Whether it's or whether it's Alaska or Harbor or frankly Guan, we don't get 131 00:12:56.159 --> 00:13:00.279 We're not the ones who gets to the side. What is the mix of 132 00:13:00.399 --> 00:13:05.039 air missile threats that the bad guys get to compose into a structured attack. 133 00:13:05.840 --> 00:13:11.639 They get moved And that's kind of where the active, active air and news 134 00:13:11.639 --> 00:13:16.320 deplement comes in for the things that we can't move or hide and I will 135 00:13:16.399 --> 00:13:20.799 again refer back to Ukraine here that in the first week of the attack, 136 00:13:20.879 --> 00:13:26.799 the Russians actually did a pretty good job surprisingly according to some reports public reports 137 00:13:26.919 --> 00:13:35.000 of suppressing seventy some percent of fixed air defenses that the Ukrainians had. And 138 00:13:35.120 --> 00:13:37.799 they had a lot of that stuff in terms of the fixed stuff, about 139 00:13:37.840 --> 00:13:43.840 seventy percent of it with suppress in the first week. But what what wasn't 140 00:13:43.919 --> 00:13:46.000 depressed it which is one of the facts, thats you why they've been able 141 00:13:46.039 --> 00:13:56.039 to move on is mobility or relocalability or deception or distribution of air defenses. 142 00:13:56.399 --> 00:14:01.120 And that's been a pretty interesting component. But for those things that you cannot 143 00:14:01.159 --> 00:14:03.879 move or hide, you're going to have to have a little bit more robust 144 00:14:05.600 --> 00:14:11.039 activit event and again Guam I mentioned a minute ago, that's really the centerpiece 145 00:14:11.200 --> 00:14:18.200 of this whole discussion. And uh, certainly a heavily maritime aspect to that. 146 00:14:20.080 --> 00:14:24.559 Yeah, as as a former resident of Guam, it is not it's 147 00:14:24.559 --> 00:14:30.000 a small place, but it's not so small you can hide it. Um. 148 00:14:31.600 --> 00:14:33.679 I wanted I wanted to follow up what you said because one of the 149 00:14:33.720 --> 00:14:37.960 things in that report that I that I looked at was this was a figure 150 00:14:39.039 --> 00:14:41.120 four from the thing which is about the cruise that to North America from the 151 00:14:41.279 --> 00:14:46.320 Arctic. And I had never I must confess, and I had never really 152 00:14:46.360 --> 00:14:50.399 thought until I read that piece that the Russians could could launch cruise missiles from 153 00:14:50.480 --> 00:14:56.759 inside Russia that would go across the pole and threaten a huge chunk of of 154 00:14:56.960 --> 00:15:03.759 the northern hemisp which we which we in the United States occupies. UM. 155 00:15:05.200 --> 00:15:09.039 It is do people have trouble grasping the ideas these these long range crew miss 156 00:15:09.120 --> 00:15:16.600 cruise missiles, which some of which can fly under the various radar uh areas 157 00:15:16.679 --> 00:15:22.320 we have, are a threat and a huge threat. So I think what 158 00:15:22.399 --> 00:15:26.200 you're reverencing is an image that we put together for the report. All those 159 00:15:26.279 --> 00:15:31.080 images were produced in house. UM, an image that from a polar perspectives 160 00:15:31.120 --> 00:15:37.879 just what kind of standoff you could do for twenty five y filometer cruise missiles 161 00:15:39.039 --> 00:15:46.440 love an RTHERN warning system in the Arctic and be able to reach out for, 162 00:15:46.320 --> 00:15:52.159 if not all, at least most of knas. And I appreciate your 163 00:15:52.200 --> 00:15:56.320 calling out that. I think it's a cool one encourage for us to take 164 00:15:56.320 --> 00:16:00.279 a look at it. You're right, I've never seen that which a version 165 00:16:00.320 --> 00:16:06.879 of that image produced before, so we we put it out. But you 166 00:16:06.919 --> 00:16:11.519 know, cruise missiles really fit the description, or excuse me, fit the 167 00:16:11.639 --> 00:16:18.480 phrase the assistants sectory of defense. John Plumb, who has space and muscile 168 00:16:18.519 --> 00:16:21.799 defense and a bunch of other stuff in his portfolio, what he used the 169 00:16:21.840 --> 00:16:27.279 phrase weapons of choice in his testimony from May last year. And I really 170 00:16:27.360 --> 00:16:30.960 think that just nailed it on the head. And you don't have to take 171 00:16:32.080 --> 00:16:36.720 my word for it. Look at the thousands that they have employed in the 172 00:16:36.879 --> 00:16:41.200 Ukraine conflict over the past what thirteen months and change. And in fact, 173 00:16:42.320 --> 00:16:47.759 my colleague in THESI Missile Events Project, Ian Williams, is about to put 174 00:16:47.799 --> 00:16:52.639 out at probably in the next week or so, specifically on the air and 175 00:16:52.799 --> 00:16:57.840 Missile war PUTS. Missile war is the name of the report that we'll put 176 00:16:57.919 --> 00:17:04.880 out here soon, talking about thinking about understanding what has transpired and accomplished the 177 00:17:06.160 --> 00:17:10.920 role of air defenses and the degree to which the missile attacks have been successful 178 00:17:11.079 --> 00:17:15.839 or or not successful. But weapons of choice, and that's why it's you 179 00:17:15.920 --> 00:17:22.359 know, important to pay attention to them, and whether it be for Guam 180 00:17:22.599 --> 00:17:30.279 quahum Land gua Guam quaw power projection or that matters. And oh, by 181 00:17:30.359 --> 00:17:36.880 the way, uh, what comes after Guam is things like the defense of 182 00:17:37.000 --> 00:17:41.079 Hawaii. And I know everybody likes to use the what about cyber pearl harbor 183 00:17:41.240 --> 00:17:45.319 or a space pearl harbor. Well, I'm just a kid from World taxes, 184 00:17:45.359 --> 00:17:49.599 and so I'm simplistic enough to worry about that pearl harbor pol harbor, 185 00:17:51.119 --> 00:17:55.319 which is to say, an air missile attack and other kinds of attack and 186 00:17:55.319 --> 00:17:59.240 a little bit more unconventional kind of thing. And so that is in this 187 00:17:59.559 --> 00:18:03.039 in this environment with these weapons for choice, we got where about that aspect 188 00:18:03.079 --> 00:18:07.400 as well. So there's actually some two things for that in the PP twenty 189 00:18:07.440 --> 00:18:10.400 four budget requests. I think you're going to see more of that in the 190 00:18:10.519 --> 00:18:15.400 in the coming years. And I share you're concerning with some of the people 191 00:18:15.480 --> 00:18:21.880 that they seem very fascinated with. I mean, they're important areas in cyber 192 00:18:22.640 --> 00:18:29.079 I think a lot of it just because it's something that is not kinetic and 193 00:18:29.599 --> 00:18:32.680 is sterile, and a lot of people have come from computers. But you 194 00:18:32.759 --> 00:18:37.119 know, building off the discussion of the Great Circle routes over the over the 195 00:18:37.279 --> 00:18:41.000 Arctic and what we've seen in the last year. One thing that keeps popping 196 00:18:41.039 --> 00:18:49.440 into the back of my head is a lot of our thoughts and conceptions about 197 00:18:49.599 --> 00:18:55.680 ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. I think still has a hangover from the Cold 198 00:18:55.720 --> 00:18:59.880 War, where everybody thinks nuclear, everybody thinks, well, nobody will do 199 00:19:00.160 --> 00:19:07.200 that because that might trigger a nuclear war. I think that that steel has 200 00:19:07.240 --> 00:19:11.119 been broken in a few ways. One is the hundreds of short, intermediate, 201 00:19:11.279 --> 00:19:18.839 and medium range ballistic missiles the PRC has built, and also recent combat. 202 00:19:18.160 --> 00:19:22.079 You know, going back to whether you're looking at twenty fourteen in Georgia 203 00:19:22.240 --> 00:19:27.440 or what's been going on for the last year here, that conventional ballistic and 204 00:19:29.160 --> 00:19:37.119 cruise missiles have been married with the modern secret heads and warheads using Independent of 205 00:19:37.200 --> 00:19:41.000 whether you can jam the GPS, there's a lot of really neat stuff behind 206 00:19:41.039 --> 00:19:45.200 the cipher door in the multi spectral environment that makes this old technology incredibly accurate. 207 00:19:45.880 --> 00:19:52.440 And we we did some writing and some some talking last week about what 208 00:19:52.640 --> 00:19:56.880 really started in nineteen nineties but has really set root in the last couple of 209 00:19:56.920 --> 00:20:03.440 decades is our defense infas structure is incredibly not resilient. Whether you're looking everything 210 00:20:03.640 --> 00:20:11.119 from propellant manufacturing to precursor chemicals. We have the spreadsheets and consolidations of gotten 211 00:20:11.200 --> 00:20:15.440 US to the point that we do have significant single points of failure here in 212 00:20:15.559 --> 00:20:21.559 conus that you can go through a variety of scenarios where an opponent five, 213 00:20:21.680 --> 00:20:30.200 ten, fifteen years down the road has a pretty good conventional intercontinental capability. 214 00:20:30.759 --> 00:20:37.920 And then when you look at the handful of interceptors we have in Alaska and 215 00:20:38.119 --> 00:20:41.680 if you've got a nisia shift in Port, well good on you. But 216 00:20:42.440 --> 00:20:48.559 how much of a concern do you have that of a that being a legitimate 217 00:20:48.640 --> 00:20:53.640 concern, and be if so, how much of a conversation is that taking 218 00:20:53.759 --> 00:20:57.839 place to see what we need in five to ten to fifteen years to maybe 219 00:20:57.880 --> 00:21:06.240 have a more modern few of those threats. So you said a lot there, 220 00:21:06.319 --> 00:21:11.400 So I did that reaction? I don't know. That's don't know what 221 00:21:11.559 --> 00:21:18.599 good um couple reactions. One. I appreciate the emphasis on the non nuclear 222 00:21:19.440 --> 00:21:26.920 version of this. This is basically my pet rock and my you know, 223 00:21:26.079 --> 00:21:33.559 favorite sort of theme that I've been propounding for close to a decade now, 224 00:21:34.799 --> 00:21:40.880 which is that so much of the one depends more airmus amount the conversation is 225 00:21:40.920 --> 00:21:45.519 stuck in something of the time work, and we're stuck in the kind of 226 00:21:45.680 --> 00:21:51.079 nineteen nineties, can't get out of the EBM treaty, rhetorical talking points of 227 00:21:51.839 --> 00:21:53.920 Oh my goodness, gracious, what did somebody, you know, duct tape 228 00:21:53.960 --> 00:21:56.559 a couple of SCUD missiles together and put a nuke on the front of it? 229 00:21:57.519 --> 00:22:03.279 Um, wouldn't that be terrible sort of image of the problem. And 230 00:22:03.920 --> 00:22:11.079 you alluded in your comments there too. I called the sort of democratization the 231 00:22:11.160 --> 00:22:15.839 globalization of the precision guide of munition. And so it's the formulation that I 232 00:22:15.960 --> 00:22:25.400 like to use is non nuclear strategic tank whereby an adversary or for that matter, 233 00:22:25.559 --> 00:22:30.319 US, but really adversaries following you might say the American way of war 234 00:22:32.359 --> 00:22:37.759 are looking for ways to operate and hold the United States at risk under the 235 00:22:37.920 --> 00:22:48.400 nuclear threshold, to do and to get away with the full the maximum effect 236 00:22:48.960 --> 00:22:53.680 without any radiation being released, as a very little radiation being released as a 237 00:22:53.759 --> 00:22:57.039 work. And so you know, as I like to say, if Guam 238 00:22:57.200 --> 00:23:03.079 goes away, or if a half a dozen fights on Guam go away without 239 00:23:04.160 --> 00:23:15.079 any uranium and plutonium being energized, the effect is nevertheless similar. And so 240 00:23:15.319 --> 00:23:19.039 that's that is so much of the reason why for the things that we cannot 241 00:23:19.119 --> 00:23:25.000 move or hard, why we are forced into contending with the active ary muscile 242 00:23:25.079 --> 00:23:30.519 defense of things like like Guam. That is the signature, whether they whether 243 00:23:30.559 --> 00:23:33.000 it's kind of a bump or sticker or not, that is the signature. 244 00:23:33.319 --> 00:23:41.759 Biden administration mustile defense program of about five billion dollars in this decade, and 245 00:23:41.559 --> 00:23:45.000 they are right to do that. And the only question is whether they're doing 246 00:23:45.079 --> 00:23:49.119 it at the speed of relevance and whether they're doing it to cover the entire 247 00:23:49.599 --> 00:23:55.640 threat spectrum in this as they as they call it, the Decisive decade. 248 00:23:56.359 --> 00:24:00.759 So yes, I've been basically to anybody that will listen and to people that 249 00:24:00.880 --> 00:24:08.640 won't, talking about the non nuclear Strategic Attact problem and why I profoundly and 250 00:24:08.839 --> 00:24:15.720 emphatically prefer framing the threat problem in terms of a new missile age, which 251 00:24:15.759 --> 00:24:18.240 is to say, focusing on the deliver system, as opposed to a quote 252 00:24:18.279 --> 00:24:25.400 unquote new nuclear age, which is to say, focusing on one particular payload 253 00:24:26.359 --> 00:24:33.160 or effect that the spectrum can deliver that obscures it kind of dilutes the problem 254 00:24:33.480 --> 00:24:37.920 too much, and we have to worry about the non nuclear strategic contact problem. 255 00:24:38.200 --> 00:24:41.839 And that is where the diversity, the diversity of the air missile thread 256 00:24:41.880 --> 00:24:49.039 spectrum is just so profound and so so present and concerning. And if you 257 00:24:49.119 --> 00:24:55.799 hadn't figured that out before the Ukraine conflict, you should have from the Gornal 258 00:24:55.920 --> 00:25:00.960 Caraboc, from the even the Uranian packs, you know, all this sort 259 00:25:02.000 --> 00:25:04.319 of stuff. Whatever the range did in twenty nineteen. You know, the 260 00:25:04.440 --> 00:25:08.759 Russians and Chinese are people with borders of magnitude war and so that's that's what 261 00:25:08.880 --> 00:25:15.240 we have to That's why all this is uh is interesting and fascinating in a 262 00:25:15.319 --> 00:25:22.839 board. Yeah, I'm glad you mentioned the I call it no gomo and 263 00:25:22.480 --> 00:25:27.559 comp crumb. One of it is Karabakh because one of the some of your 264 00:25:27.559 --> 00:25:30.240 colleagues wrote a piece on it and they said, the primary lesson from the 265 00:25:30.279 --> 00:25:36.000 air war in that area is the importance of full spectrum air defense. And 266 00:25:36.240 --> 00:25:38.039 I'm sitting there thinking, well, you know, full spectrum air defense covers 267 00:25:38.079 --> 00:25:45.799 a lot of ground, but we've watched UAVs in Ukraine carrying grenades and dropping 268 00:25:45.880 --> 00:25:52.039 them down the open hatches of tanks. Uh. You know, the the 269 00:25:52.400 --> 00:25:56.960 the amount of information that you try and cover with this missile and air defense 270 00:25:57.039 --> 00:26:02.079 stuff. I mean, it is, it is awesome, It's it's overwhelming 271 00:26:02.160 --> 00:26:06.279 almost. But you know, if we didn't learn that lesson from watching other 272 00:26:06.440 --> 00:26:10.000 folks go through this stuff, what what would it take for us really to 273 00:26:10.079 --> 00:26:14.519 get serious about And I'm hoping that there are a lot of serious people out 274 00:26:14.519 --> 00:26:17.079 there taking it seriously now, but what would it really take for us to 275 00:26:17.119 --> 00:26:23.880 get totally serious about, you know, the full spector Mayer defense. Yeah, 276 00:26:25.000 --> 00:26:29.759 so, I think the bad guys have given us enough warnings an example, 277 00:26:29.880 --> 00:26:33.160 at this point today, we ought to be taking it seriously. I 278 00:26:33.200 --> 00:26:37.400 think the Pentagon really is so at this point over the past year, we've 279 00:26:37.480 --> 00:26:41.799 now we're past the kind of early Indica indications in the warning. We're like 280 00:26:41.960 --> 00:26:47.279 to the you know, in your face stage of the problem. So I 281 00:26:47.400 --> 00:26:52.039 think you're referencing in terms of the report, you're probably referencing. The only 282 00:26:52.480 --> 00:26:56.599 write up of it that I know about is my colleague Sean Shaik, who 283 00:26:56.680 --> 00:27:00.480 did a write up of the new Gorno Carebat conflict. This was a new 284 00:27:00.599 --> 00:27:03.920 years ago while it was going on, And uh, and you're right, 285 00:27:04.400 --> 00:27:07.200 Um, that was sort of that was our early that was sort of our 286 00:27:07.240 --> 00:27:14.000 Spanish Civil War kind of warning of what was to come and what is to 287 00:27:14.119 --> 00:27:18.720 come. So so now we're kind of seeing it, I will say Thou 288 00:27:18.880 --> 00:27:26.119 in his opening remarks the ultracol Analogy, UM, I think noted the divestment 289 00:27:27.559 --> 00:27:36.960 that the Joint Force did about a decade ago of air defense problems because hey, 290 00:27:37.839 --> 00:27:45.079 the number one we were focused on VP two we had the birthright of 291 00:27:45.480 --> 00:27:51.599 air superiority that we could take to the bank. Uh see, there was 292 00:27:51.599 --> 00:27:56.359 a reset in Russian China. We're you know, our our sort of kind 293 00:27:56.400 --> 00:28:03.519 of friends. And also m B we D excuse me D where we have 294 00:28:07.000 --> 00:28:14.079 the phenomenon that at the time was called sequestration. And so with the first 295 00:28:14.279 --> 00:28:21.519 three predicates, the twenty and twelve ish time frame included some making, some 296 00:28:21.640 --> 00:28:26.000 hard choices and divestments, and one of those was that the regular US Army 297 00:28:26.680 --> 00:28:33.400 divested of for instants m shore AD from its regular regular force. That is 298 00:28:33.480 --> 00:28:41.960 something that came one hundred and eighty degrees just five years later in twenty seventeen, 299 00:28:41.200 --> 00:28:45.799 with the army's new modernization priorities. But think about what happened between twenty 300 00:28:45.839 --> 00:28:52.480 twelve and twenty seventeen. Charmian happened Chinese shenanigans in the you know, in 301 00:28:52.559 --> 00:28:57.119 their backyard, in lots of different ways. And so between twenty twelve and 302 00:28:57.160 --> 00:29:04.160 twenty seventeen, the Army went from divesting maneuver so rad short range of defense 303 00:29:04.559 --> 00:29:11.720 too, saying aramis defense is one of the top five modernization priorities for that 304 00:29:11.920 --> 00:29:15.680 service. And of course the Army has some really important roles and missions for 305 00:29:15.880 --> 00:29:22.079 the Joint force overall, and they are dramatically, dramatically understaffed in terms of 306 00:29:23.960 --> 00:29:30.359 air defense, air defenders, and in terms of equipment for that number one 307 00:29:30.799 --> 00:29:38.519 cruise missile defense number two counter US And this is like the big thing kind 308 00:29:38.559 --> 00:29:44.000 of problem and other aspects of aramisis defense overall. And it don't take my 309 00:29:44.160 --> 00:29:48.640 word for it. If you have any doubt about the US Army's and strength 310 00:29:48.400 --> 00:29:53.119 and capability of limitations on air and cruise missive defense, just listen to Frank 311 00:29:53.200 --> 00:29:57.160 Kendall, Secretary of the Air Force, who was constantly pointing that out. 312 00:29:57.559 --> 00:30:03.640 He's both right, and the Army is also right to say that they can't 313 00:30:03.680 --> 00:30:07.880 defend everything, and they can't defend every airbase. Give them the given the 314 00:30:08.359 --> 00:30:12.640 means that they have. It is such a dramatic mismatch on those things. 315 00:30:14.440 --> 00:30:18.519 So, uh, it's it's a problem that we've seen coming. This is 316 00:30:18.559 --> 00:30:22.319 back to the I told you solves is a probably we've seen coming for a 317 00:30:22.480 --> 00:30:26.160 long time. It's crept up keeps getting worse, and it's one of the 318 00:30:26.240 --> 00:30:36.319 reasons why I'm I'm gratified that the Army is prioritizing counter us and cruisin about 319 00:30:36.400 --> 00:30:42.119 to the extent that it is. I'm glad you brought up the the Iranian 320 00:30:42.200 --> 00:30:45.559 incident because I'm learning to kind of wrap a question about it. I'll actually 321 00:30:45.559 --> 00:30:48.720 break my question into two so I don't think one of my soliloquies again. 322 00:30:49.440 --> 00:30:53.079 But one of the great things about spending a few years as an ADO officer, 323 00:30:55.200 --> 00:30:56.359 and you could probably do a show on this by itself, is the 324 00:30:56.440 --> 00:31:00.240 fact that a lot of our allies there are sense is not an Army job, 325 00:31:00.440 --> 00:31:06.400 it's an air Force job, and their their air base defense is pretty 326 00:31:06.440 --> 00:31:08.319 good as a result of it, because they're not begging their army tights to 327 00:31:08.400 --> 00:31:12.839 take care of their airfields. And I had an interesting back and forth with 328 00:31:12.920 --> 00:31:19.319 an Army Field great officer right after the Iranian ballistic missile attack or rocket attack 329 00:31:19.400 --> 00:31:23.160 to paim on how you wanted to find it. I think missile attack sounds 330 00:31:23.160 --> 00:31:27.880 sex here. But um, after a really snarky comment he made that I've 331 00:31:27.920 --> 00:31:32.759 heard since I was a JO that you know there are there are grown men 332 00:31:32.799 --> 00:31:36.839 and women who cry at service election when they find out that they're going air 333 00:31:36.920 --> 00:31:40.519 defense because they know they're not going to be promoted or have a very exciting 334 00:31:40.599 --> 00:31:44.039 career. But I asked him the obvious question, um, you know, 335 00:31:44.240 --> 00:31:48.119 where was our air defense? He said that we don't have enough, Like, 336 00:31:48.279 --> 00:31:52.000 well, what are they doing? This more important than defending our air 337 00:31:52.079 --> 00:31:57.359 fields under an Iranian threat? And he went on at thirty minutes speech enraged 338 00:31:57.440 --> 00:32:01.160 that I won't go into it here, but you combine that with what we 339 00:32:01.319 --> 00:32:09.599 saw in both Afghanistan and Iraq as well, where something that everybody's favorite, 340 00:32:09.720 --> 00:32:15.720 RTT two in the Navy, our s was was brought ashore to give rocket 341 00:32:15.839 --> 00:32:21.960 and mortar defense to our air bases. And you combine that with what we're 342 00:32:22.079 --> 00:32:29.000 seeing with the flying lawnmowers and everything else. Building on the comment you made 343 00:32:29.000 --> 00:32:32.279 about the army before, I know everybody wants money right now, and they 344 00:32:32.319 --> 00:32:36.039 seem to want to get involved in our land war in Asia for some reason. 345 00:32:36.680 --> 00:32:42.279 But is the concern being reflected in money and emphasis from the army to 346 00:32:42.400 --> 00:32:49.000 give an appropriate response to what is a pretty clear demand signal on real world 347 00:32:49.200 --> 00:32:55.799 combat operations that we're seeing right now. Again, sal you put a lot 348 00:32:55.839 --> 00:33:00.559 on the table. I'll do my best to answer your um. Look, 349 00:33:01.880 --> 00:33:09.319 there was a Washington, DC based think tank I won't name who kind of 350 00:33:09.400 --> 00:33:19.400 listed up every military cemetery and a veterinary clinic the US military operates in the 351 00:33:19.440 --> 00:33:24.559 world to kind of puff up the number of Ford operating bases of the United 352 00:33:24.559 --> 00:33:30.559 States has um. You don't have to get to that level of what's just 353 00:33:30.759 --> 00:33:38.839 exaggeration. However, two conclude that there's a lot to defend. There's too 354 00:33:38.960 --> 00:33:44.960 much to defend. And so the folks that rouse where were the where was 355 00:33:45.000 --> 00:33:50.960 the where was the c ram or where was the patriots to defend that base 356 00:33:51.039 --> 00:33:53.079 and Iraq when it was attacked? What the January twenty twenty or so. 357 00:33:55.039 --> 00:34:00.759 You can't defend everything, You just can't. And in that Homeland Cruise Missile 358 00:34:00.799 --> 00:34:07.119 Defense report that I alluded to earlier, I'm pretty sure we said a version 359 00:34:07.159 --> 00:34:13.320 of the falling, which is the beginning of wisdom is to appreciate that you 360 00:34:13.840 --> 00:34:19.400 you can't defend everything, and that you shouldn't try now if you're if you're 361 00:34:19.440 --> 00:34:28.760 a chef, if you are a carrier group, for instance, that's the 362 00:34:28.840 --> 00:34:34.679 level of risk you can't really take on the same way necessarily. But for 363 00:34:35.920 --> 00:34:40.719 air bases, for all those other stuff, there is a dramatic traumatic mismatch. 364 00:34:42.800 --> 00:34:45.079 I credit the US Army to answer your question directly, sow. I 365 00:34:45.159 --> 00:34:53.559 credit the US Army for increasing the four structures for especially what's called the trust 366 00:34:54.000 --> 00:34:58.840 some acronyms around here. I'm sorry, but if PICK, which is essentially 367 00:34:58.920 --> 00:35:02.320 kind of the cruise missile defend part of the Army's Area Musim Defense program, 368 00:35:04.599 --> 00:35:10.039 and Patriot. They're moving from fifteen to sixteen battalions for Patriot, But fifteen 369 00:35:10.119 --> 00:35:17.159 or sixteen battalions and those batteries within them is still nothing, still nothing compared 370 00:35:17.719 --> 00:35:23.320 to the number of critical assets around the world we kind of like to defend. 371 00:35:24.239 --> 00:35:34.360 And so, with all respect and all appropriate concern for the American service 372 00:35:34.440 --> 00:35:40.199 members printed at that Iraqi Air Base in Iraq in twenty twenty twenty, that 373 00:35:42.079 --> 00:35:47.000 probably wasn't in the top of the list and things to defend and so it's 374 00:35:47.039 --> 00:35:52.760 a challenge. The US Army is increasing via I think it's like seven thousand 375 00:35:53.400 --> 00:35:59.239 air defenders going into if Pick over the the coming couple of years. They're 376 00:35:59.239 --> 00:36:01.760 adding, as a said, an additional Patriot battalion, and Congress is sort 377 00:36:01.800 --> 00:36:06.400 of asking them, as in the past last nbaa hey, maybe we need 378 00:36:06.480 --> 00:36:10.880 to think about some more Patriot battalions. There's no there is I think this 379 00:36:12.079 --> 00:36:15.679 is the case. There's there's no aspect of the joint force that has a 380 00:36:15.760 --> 00:36:23.400 higher operational or personnel tempo that's higher than the Patriot the Patriot Force, So 381 00:36:24.519 --> 00:36:30.199 lots and lots of demand signal for that stuff. And why is there the 382 00:36:30.239 --> 00:36:36.079 demand signal because of the threat Because and then you kind of move this over 383 00:36:36.159 --> 00:36:42.679 to something like law importantance, which is the perfect aaron missile defense problem. 384 00:36:43.360 --> 00:36:46.679 And it's going to take some army stuff, army affectors, army elements, 385 00:36:46.840 --> 00:36:52.920 is going to take some Navy elements and NBA elements to get that right. 386 00:36:53.320 --> 00:36:59.159 And it's going to be important for this to be approached in an appropriate way, 387 00:36:59.239 --> 00:37:04.000 which is to say, joint way. And I recognize the Navy doesn't 388 00:37:04.039 --> 00:37:07.639 want a man ashore. I recognize if the army doesn't want a man, 389 00:37:07.199 --> 00:37:12.599 you know, a version of ages Ashore on glam. But all the services 390 00:37:13.119 --> 00:37:19.480 have to recognize that there's benefits and there's a necessity for the active baron missile 391 00:37:19.519 --> 00:37:23.840 events of things like blom and everybody's gonna have to pull you up something because 392 00:37:24.840 --> 00:37:29.760 you know, we can't. It's not going to be a single service a 393 00:37:29.840 --> 00:37:34.159 single service solution. And I know the ship's don't like being tethered, for 394 00:37:34.280 --> 00:37:37.039 instance, for the ballistic missile event mission. They're also not going to like 395 00:37:37.159 --> 00:37:45.639 being tethered for hypersonic queuing and warning. Nonetheless, the threat gets to vote. 396 00:37:45.639 --> 00:37:49.840 The threat has voted, and I'm gonna be a little I'm gonna be 397 00:37:49.840 --> 00:37:52.760 a skunk the garden party here, which is to say, the several services 398 00:37:52.800 --> 00:37:59.880 are going to have to contribute to this solution set because the threat is already 399 00:38:00.119 --> 00:38:06.679 in the way that has you it's not a piece of yours at the Hoover 400 00:38:06.840 --> 00:38:09.960 Institute on Deterrence, Air Defense and Munitions Production and the new missile age. 401 00:38:10.360 --> 00:38:15.000 And you pose a couple of great questions in there that I think kind of 402 00:38:15.079 --> 00:38:21.599 feed into we can't defend everything. But yeah, I think you asked the 403 00:38:21.719 --> 00:38:25.639 question. Without a renewal of conventional munition stockpiles and the air defenses need to 404 00:38:25.719 --> 00:38:30.679 counter those of our adversaries, this posture would come increasingly under question. And 405 00:38:30.840 --> 00:38:40.320 then the other question was can we produce enough munitions to cover ourselves? Would 406 00:38:40.320 --> 00:38:44.719 you say, here, the apostle of munitions production been built, a plant 407 00:38:44.760 --> 00:38:49.000 under secret defense or acquisition, who has emphasized a need to re orient toward 408 00:38:49.119 --> 00:38:52.679 mass munitions production to anyone who will listen. And you also point out that 409 00:38:52.800 --> 00:38:59.360 the just in time manufacturing we've adopted is a big part of the problem we 410 00:38:59.480 --> 00:39:01.800 have. Uh, And I guess I think you also point out to the 411 00:39:02.559 --> 00:39:06.599 whoever the auditors are who come along and look at that too, Well, 412 00:39:06.679 --> 00:39:07.960 we've got too many tomahawks. I don't know if you can have too many 413 00:39:08.000 --> 00:39:10.760 tomahawks, but I guess somebody will complain about it no matter what you do. 414 00:39:12.199 --> 00:39:15.199 So, you know, let's talk a little bit about the production side 415 00:39:15.239 --> 00:39:20.559 of this. It is enough money can be thrown at this problem that we're 416 00:39:20.559 --> 00:39:22.000 going to work our way out. And do we have time to do that? 417 00:39:24.639 --> 00:39:28.480 Yeah? So here's another kind of I told you so, um, 418 00:39:28.719 --> 00:39:32.039 and I will. And it's fascinating that as as I like to say, 419 00:39:32.079 --> 00:39:37.719 Official Washington has over the past twelve months learned a new word. And that 420 00:39:37.840 --> 00:39:45.119 new word that they've learned is munitions. And now it's, you know, 421 00:39:45.519 --> 00:39:50.199 it's the new hotness to be talking about munitions production. And you just you 422 00:39:50.360 --> 00:39:53.400 can't swing a dead cat and two pont circles that, you know, talking 423 00:39:53.440 --> 00:39:58.400 to finding something tankled for talking about such a thing that wasn't true? What 424 00:39:58.480 --> 00:40:05.840 year goes that just wasn't true? And everybody's kind of recognized this problem. 425 00:40:06.360 --> 00:40:12.880 And now we're moving from diagnosis to prognosis, and soon we'll get to the 426 00:40:13.000 --> 00:40:15.800 treatment stage. But that's kind of where we're right now. We're kind of 427 00:40:15.840 --> 00:40:20.079 in the prognosis stage. It is kind of like it oops, you know, 428 00:40:20.199 --> 00:40:24.960 we've really gone short on munitions production for so long. You had Brian 429 00:40:25.039 --> 00:40:29.880 McGrath on the show a couple of weeks ago, and he was he was 430 00:40:30.639 --> 00:40:37.559 articulating a version of this formulation. Mark you referenced the too many tamahawks phrase. 431 00:40:37.639 --> 00:40:40.440 That's not my phrase, that's that's build a plant's phrase. Sometimes I 432 00:40:40.519 --> 00:40:45.800 call him the Apostle. Sometimes I think it's it's more appropriate to come in 433 00:40:45.840 --> 00:40:49.000 front of the John the baptist of this topic, which was he was he 434 00:40:49.199 --> 00:40:53.360 was warning about this before anybody else, and now everybody else has kind of 435 00:40:53.400 --> 00:41:00.679 been catching up to him. The under Secretary for Acquisition and Sustainment twelve forty 436 00:41:00.719 --> 00:41:04.960 four of the National Defense Authorization Act, the converse put out late last year, 437 00:41:05.400 --> 00:41:09.000 had a multi year procurement provision from you know, most of the critical 438 00:41:09.000 --> 00:41:15.000 ammunitions that we might we might want to to produce in greater quantity. And 439 00:41:15.480 --> 00:41:20.480 I give that Converse course a lot of credit for that. Think there's probably 440 00:41:20.519 --> 00:41:27.280 some more to be done there, but on this front, because we've kind 441 00:41:27.280 --> 00:41:31.320 of gone from a peacetime efficiency based model to kind of an oops, we've 442 00:41:31.400 --> 00:41:39.199 been neglectful in this realization, it's gonna it's gonna take a little while to 443 00:41:39.840 --> 00:41:45.880 ramp up. And I will say I think it was Foul a little bit 444 00:41:45.960 --> 00:41:54.639 ago who referenced the very impolite and sensitive observation that there are far too many 445 00:41:55.920 --> 00:41:59.800 single points of Fairier on our production side. And I don't even like to 446 00:42:00.039 --> 00:42:02.400 talk about that because you don't want to help the bad guy to put together 447 00:42:02.400 --> 00:42:07.679 a target list. But it's it's a little scary way you think about it 448 00:42:07.760 --> 00:42:13.280 in terms of the in terms of the single points of failure for our munitions 449 00:42:14.039 --> 00:42:20.599 industrial base with large and that applies to both the strike side and the air 450 00:42:20.679 --> 00:42:23.000 in the sible defense side as well, So across the board, we got 451 00:42:23.079 --> 00:42:34.199 to get the unit production cost down. But again my formulation is we've gotten 452 00:42:34.199 --> 00:42:37.559 to the prognosis stage and now we're we're going to move to the treatment stage, 453 00:42:38.000 --> 00:42:46.159 and you will the proof of the pudding is in the eating here and 454 00:42:47.719 --> 00:42:52.480 and so show me the money. And to their credit, I believe the 455 00:42:52.639 --> 00:42:59.760 Old is doing an okay job actually of saying, yeah, let's go quadruple 456 00:43:00.920 --> 00:43:07.599 or whatever our gimla's production. The challenge is the defense industrial base is not 457 00:43:07.760 --> 00:43:14.880 a ferrari and it doesn't go from zero to six ft. It's it's more 458 00:43:14.920 --> 00:43:19.800 of a little you know, put put along to In terms of the workforce 459 00:43:20.239 --> 00:43:23.599 and in terms of the production lines and the facilitization, you've got to you 460 00:43:23.639 --> 00:43:30.480 know, build buildings and create and fill them with big complex machining tools to 461 00:43:30.960 --> 00:43:36.440 do certain things. And that takes time. And some of these are government 462 00:43:36.480 --> 00:43:38.760 owned, contractor operated et cetera, et cetera. That all takes time. 463 00:43:39.440 --> 00:43:47.320 And so I am cautiously optimistic that we're moving out on the treatment stage in 464 00:43:47.519 --> 00:43:58.440 time, but I'm not. I'm not super edulent on the matter. And 465 00:43:58.719 --> 00:44:00.719 at the end of the day, that's got a new sport, because if 466 00:44:00.800 --> 00:44:05.360 we get to a problem and we haven't built up the industrial base, or 467 00:44:05.440 --> 00:44:07.800 Japan hasn't gotten this four hundred Tomahawks in time, et cetera, et cetera. 468 00:44:09.119 --> 00:44:15.400 I hate to say that that's what we had new sports. That's one 469 00:44:15.480 --> 00:44:21.519 reason why you want a very, very strong and capable of conventional because you 470 00:44:21.519 --> 00:44:24.800 don't want decision makers to feel like that they're whether they're American or they're Russian, 471 00:44:24.840 --> 00:44:29.960 I guess that they're they're backed into the nuclear corner. Um. I 472 00:44:30.079 --> 00:44:32.760 wanted to touch on something. You know, I always have to make sure 473 00:44:32.840 --> 00:44:39.280 and fully advertise my biases. I love a few things better than the GAPPERD 474 00:44:39.360 --> 00:44:47.480 thirty five millimeter anti aircraft system. That Flack Flack, Ryan Metal, Ryan 475 00:44:47.559 --> 00:44:54.840 Metal was that Flack is back, the death Flaq is back, and I 476 00:44:54.880 --> 00:45:00.199 think Ryan Metal last month, after getting tired of arguing with the squid like 477 00:45:00.320 --> 00:45:02.320 everybody does, they're gonna go ahead and produce. I saw some figure. 478 00:45:02.360 --> 00:45:06.639 I think it was three hundred and four hundred thousand rounds a thirty five millimeter, 479 00:45:07.000 --> 00:45:09.239 so they're getting good use out of the thirty or so that they've sent 480 00:45:09.719 --> 00:45:15.199 to Ukraine. But I almost used as the picture and the pre show announcements 481 00:45:15.239 --> 00:45:20.880 something that caught my attention about this topic because everybody loves to talk about. 482 00:45:20.960 --> 00:45:23.559 On the American side, patriot, we have fad or whatever we're calling it 483 00:45:23.679 --> 00:45:29.119 this week up up in Alaska. We have a few of our Avengers, 484 00:45:29.159 --> 00:45:31.920 which is basically for a navy guys, it's eight stingers on the back of 485 00:45:31.960 --> 00:45:37.079 a Humby. But the Ukrainians have got to the point on the lower end 486 00:45:37.119 --> 00:45:44.079 of the threat spectrum that they have. They've recreated something straight out of World 487 00:45:44.159 --> 00:45:46.960 War Two, because sometimes you have to. They've got spotlights, they've got 488 00:45:47.119 --> 00:45:53.000 quad twenty three millimeters and even fifty cows and dual amounts trying to find some 489 00:45:53.159 --> 00:46:00.119 way to address this lower end. The Iranian Shahi to find him pronounced it 490 00:46:00.159 --> 00:46:02.199 correctly, you know that threat. That's one thing that you were talking about. 491 00:46:02.239 --> 00:46:07.079 The Spanish Civil War that has tapped me on the shoulder a couple of 492 00:46:07.159 --> 00:46:13.079 times. The Iranians warned everybody what they could do when they attacked the Saudi 493 00:46:13.840 --> 00:46:20.480 Oil oil refinery a couple of years ago, and they're they're learning some great 494 00:46:20.599 --> 00:46:24.920 cought benefit analysis. Weaponeering there. And on that low end of the spectrum, 495 00:46:27.360 --> 00:46:32.079 have you seen any movement on the US side of the house to look 496 00:46:32.360 --> 00:46:40.000 at what we can do besides throwing multimillion dollars missiles at tens of thousands of 497 00:46:40.079 --> 00:46:47.159 dollars small end drones that could because wherever that's going to come, American forces 498 00:46:47.199 --> 00:46:51.559 are going to be targets of that threat the next time we go forward. 499 00:46:52.000 --> 00:46:54.400 It's just clear to me that that's going to be an issue. But I 500 00:46:54.440 --> 00:46:58.639 don't see anything in our in our inventory they can address that very well. 501 00:47:00.920 --> 00:47:07.199 Uh. I would say yes, yes, um, and so much I 502 00:47:07.280 --> 00:47:13.639 would say of what the US Army is doing south of Patriot, uh, 503 00:47:14.199 --> 00:47:17.960 in terms of lower tier than Patriot is all about that stuff. Because you 504 00:47:19.000 --> 00:47:22.480 don't want to shoot a Patriot missile at a at a chief threat if you 505 00:47:22.559 --> 00:47:28.320 don't have to. It's been done, uh, Corey News reports it has 506 00:47:28.400 --> 00:47:34.480 been done. U. Some of our partners, have allies have used a 507 00:47:34.760 --> 00:47:40.280 Patriot missiles some kind against the US, for instance. But you want to 508 00:47:40.320 --> 00:47:47.280 be able to have that layered defense and have cheaper and more any more numerous 509 00:47:47.639 --> 00:47:55.199 effectors to deal with the the more prolific and cheaper threat. So yea verily 510 00:47:57.840 --> 00:48:02.440 and so much of what instance, I would say, both in terms of 511 00:48:02.480 --> 00:48:10.000 the non kinetic, think laser, think hypower marc wave, think other forms 512 00:48:10.039 --> 00:48:16.800 of directed energy, and also think electronic attack. And last a week ago 513 00:48:17.119 --> 00:48:22.760 we could go in two days, I had Admiral Hill from the Missile Plan's 514 00:48:22.760 --> 00:48:27.039 Agency over for a thing or an event, and we talked about the two 515 00:48:27.079 --> 00:48:30.000 between four and we talked about kind of the last forty years of missile events. 516 00:48:31.159 --> 00:48:35.960 And I asked him for his vision of the future, because you know, 517 00:48:36.039 --> 00:48:38.239 we're forty years in from Reagan's speech and all that jazz. And I 518 00:48:38.280 --> 00:48:45.199 said, okay, what's your vision going out and and and his response was 519 00:48:45.960 --> 00:48:50.199 it wasn't the usual kind of naud in the direction of lasers. It was 520 00:48:50.280 --> 00:48:57.360 actually h e W, which is electronic attack. And so I think that 521 00:48:57.800 --> 00:49:07.920 there's there's other there's there's a there's a lot of interesting non kinetic things out 522 00:49:08.000 --> 00:49:16.440 there that can and should be pursued. It's not just about lasers that that 523 00:49:16.639 --> 00:49:22.599 are being that are being rightfully pursued and some of those have the light of 524 00:49:22.679 --> 00:49:27.239 day and some of them some of them don't. But back to kind of 525 00:49:27.280 --> 00:49:31.760 connecting our conversation now foul in terms of basically the cost per killed, cost 526 00:49:31.800 --> 00:49:40.079 per shot, to the larger discussion of essentially the weapons of choice that are 527 00:49:40.400 --> 00:49:44.920 ato atmospheric of so many different kinds of whether it be a cruise MISSI or 528 00:49:45.000 --> 00:49:47.519 the Shahid. And by the way, some of those shahids are basically a 529 00:49:47.599 --> 00:49:52.599 poor man's cruise missiles, right um, And so it makes sense to go 530 00:49:52.800 --> 00:49:57.760 after that. And so that's that's that's one reason why I think it's been 531 00:49:58.440 --> 00:50:04.119 useful and important. Uh, you know, think think about the think about 532 00:50:04.119 --> 00:50:07.400 the draw down the United States is given to Ukraine over the past sever years, 533 00:50:07.719 --> 00:50:15.280 past year, especially from stingers to uh nasans right nasans, the cruise 534 00:50:15.320 --> 00:50:22.400 mussile killer uh to ultimately up to the patriots system. And I will be 535 00:50:22.559 --> 00:50:27.320 candid, I was very cautious. I know there was a lot of cheerleaders, 536 00:50:27.360 --> 00:50:30.559 and certainly in this in the subject area, it's all too dominated by 537 00:50:30.679 --> 00:50:37.079 cheerleaders. But I was very cautious about the the transfer of a even a 538 00:50:37.159 --> 00:50:45.559 single picture battery to Ukraine because those are extremely precious and scarce assets for the 539 00:50:45.719 --> 00:50:54.679 US Army, the US Joint Force that we cannot unfortunately backfill fast. And 540 00:50:55.079 --> 00:51:01.320 I've already alluded to the operational and personal tempo that that those air defenders operate 541 00:51:01.400 --> 00:51:06.639 under, and by the way, that also translate to the modernization tempo of 542 00:51:06.719 --> 00:51:12.039 the Patriot Force. You start taking out a single battery that affects people adversely 543 00:51:12.480 --> 00:51:17.000 within the air defense aretelry, and that therefore effects They're ability to upgrade and 544 00:51:17.079 --> 00:51:21.159 all that sort of stuff so they can be better at what they do to 545 00:51:21.239 --> 00:51:30.480 protect those air bases. So that's why the cheaper, cheaper effects are important 546 00:51:30.960 --> 00:51:37.760 on this point. Sow you highlighted the flat guns for instance there Beaverily. 547 00:51:37.000 --> 00:51:42.960 That's all for the good and they're being used to good effect. It's unfortunate 548 00:51:43.199 --> 00:51:47.400 that the foreign policies of several countries you noted the Swiss, I think in 549 00:51:47.480 --> 00:51:52.239 the German along the way, have gotten the way of that basically is well, 550 00:51:52.280 --> 00:51:54.119 we don't know how it's something going to come out, and we want 551 00:51:54.119 --> 00:52:00.880 to be on Russia's good side to some extent economically when it does. It's 552 00:52:00.880 --> 00:52:05.960 also one of the reasons that iron don't has reportedly not been transferred even from 553 00:52:06.000 --> 00:52:12.960 the United States to Ukraine because of those foreign policy kind of consideration. So 554 00:52:14.039 --> 00:52:19.920 it's a hard problem we need, excuse me, the Ukrainians need and you 555 00:52:20.000 --> 00:52:27.400 can imagine that anybody's fighting a major power like Russure China would need tacity, 556 00:52:28.320 --> 00:52:36.199 cheap effectors, large numbers, kind of a layered defense for all this stuff. 557 00:52:36.639 --> 00:52:39.320 And you can't patriot your way out of this problem. You need the 558 00:52:39.440 --> 00:52:46.239 cheaper stuff too. Yeah, speaking of cheaper stuff, one of the one 559 00:52:46.280 --> 00:52:52.960 of the other interesting things that loaned up for this discussion to day. We're 560 00:52:52.000 --> 00:52:55.639 looking at it what the hoodies hoofies wherever they are down in Yemen are doing 561 00:52:55.760 --> 00:53:04.000 with ballistic missiles and you ease you whatever they've got, uh you know they 562 00:53:04.119 --> 00:53:09.719 they the the Saudis have have are fighting that proxy war with Iran. Maybe 563 00:53:09.800 --> 00:53:15.199 that's maybe the piece is going to break out now that China has intervened with 564 00:53:15.320 --> 00:53:19.199 both those countries. But I mean, that is a really interesting case study 565 00:53:19.280 --> 00:53:22.840 that I'm sure, I hope that we're paying a lot of attention to because 566 00:53:23.039 --> 00:53:29.079 they're the ones who engaged US Navy ships with the anti ship missiles. They're 567 00:53:29.119 --> 00:53:34.119 the ones who've attacked the Saudi refineries and cities and air fields and stuff. 568 00:53:34.199 --> 00:53:38.440 It's uh, it should be a real study. Are are other than the 569 00:53:38.480 --> 00:53:45.000 people that c sis as anybody paying attention to that that uh uh stuff going 570 00:53:45.039 --> 00:53:51.400 on down there in the Arabian Peninsula. The Iranian threat you mean specifically, 571 00:53:54.719 --> 00:54:00.639 is that right? I'm sorry, the what the Iranians breaking? No, 572 00:54:01.079 --> 00:54:05.719 Look, I think that in some respects it's a little bit of a stocking 573 00:54:05.760 --> 00:54:10.519 horse for the larger threat problem. Um, yes, we are indeed tracking 574 00:54:10.960 --> 00:54:19.559 if you've asked those those challenges. So what I would say is that the 575 00:54:20.360 --> 00:54:25.000 whether it be anti ship or whether it be drawn or whatever, I'm skeptical, 576 00:54:25.440 --> 00:54:30.280 I would say, I'm I am concerned about the kind of broke ering, 577 00:54:30.679 --> 00:54:35.800 the real broke rings going on obviously between the Chinese and the Sauadies, 578 00:54:35.800 --> 00:54:39.639 for instance, But I'm also skeptical that that kind of thing would will hold. 579 00:54:40.440 --> 00:54:45.760 And so before you get too excited about peace breaking out between the Saudis 580 00:54:45.760 --> 00:54:49.960 and the Iranians, there's a couple of thousand years of history there that will 581 00:54:50.039 --> 00:54:59.719 probably reassert itself before before too long. The very optimistic about the Abraham Accords 582 00:55:00.159 --> 00:55:06.400 kind of kind of thing Uh, there's a lot going on in that particular 583 00:55:07.320 --> 00:55:12.440 area of the world right now in terms of Israel and Saudi and Iran as 584 00:55:12.480 --> 00:55:15.480 you as you fish your note, but we have to I guess, I 585 00:55:15.719 --> 00:55:22.559 guess, my my gut. There is whatever is going on politically, diplomatically 586 00:55:22.599 --> 00:55:24.199 and all this kind of stuff. We've got to be prepared for when it 587 00:55:24.960 --> 00:55:30.159 falls apart in a month, the months rough whenever it does. And so 588 00:55:30.360 --> 00:55:37.119 the problem hasn't really gone away. It's just it's just fuctering and blistering in 589 00:55:37.159 --> 00:55:46.039 a different way. We talked a fair bit about about missiles, we haven't 590 00:55:46.039 --> 00:55:51.960 really talked much about the counter error problem. And you can put me in 591 00:55:52.039 --> 00:55:58.000 this category that when the Crucho Ukrainian War kicked off, you just look at 592 00:55:58.039 --> 00:56:02.199 a spreadsheet of the world's air forces and at least on paper, their capabilities, 593 00:56:04.000 --> 00:56:09.400 and the Russian Air Force on paper looked really, really good. But 594 00:56:09.639 --> 00:56:15.199 you know, here we are months later, and a lot of it may 595 00:56:15.239 --> 00:56:19.880 have been biased because we were used to pretty much owning the air a where 596 00:56:19.920 --> 00:56:22.760 we had been the last few decades. You know, we had a little 597 00:56:22.800 --> 00:56:29.840 bit of a contested air environment in Iraq that the first time around when I 598 00:56:29.960 --> 00:56:35.119 was a jo was measured in a couple of days, and Dash two and 599 00:56:35.199 --> 00:56:37.239 Dash three was measured in hours. But you know, here where are we 600 00:56:37.320 --> 00:56:50.199 find ourselves over a year and the Russian Air Force has either underperformed or people 601 00:56:50.440 --> 00:56:58.199 underestimated the ability of modern anti air systems to create a contested airspace such that 602 00:56:59.440 --> 00:57:05.199 do you see the future being more less like what we've seen since nineteen ninety 603 00:57:05.280 --> 00:57:10.679 one, but more like North Vietnam in the late sixties in early seventies, 604 00:57:12.199 --> 00:57:17.159 where you have to earn your access to airspace. It's still I still am 605 00:57:17.239 --> 00:57:28.360 shocked the underperformance of the Russian Air Force. Interesting comments. There lot a 606 00:57:28.400 --> 00:57:35.440 lot in what you just said. There some smart people who I talk to 607 00:57:36.119 --> 00:57:43.760 will make the observation that what you described as the underperformance or maybe the absence 608 00:57:44.599 --> 00:57:46.480 of the Russian airporce you don't see carbon bombing, right, where's the bomber? 609 00:57:46.639 --> 00:57:54.039 That right has to do with the reluctance of the Russian Air Force to 610 00:57:54.159 --> 00:58:06.400 fly not over Ukorean over their own Russian air defenses, which is to say, 611 00:58:06.440 --> 00:58:08.639 it's kind of the what we you know, we would call the iff 612 00:58:09.159 --> 00:58:13.800 problem. Um, they don't want to be shot down by their own air 613 00:58:13.840 --> 00:58:17.599 defence, and so there's some of that going on. It's a little surprising 614 00:58:17.639 --> 00:58:25.000 they haven't figured that out more than they more than they have. But whether 615 00:58:25.119 --> 00:58:32.000 it's the strength of the Ukrainian or the the lack of disambiguation on the part 616 00:58:32.039 --> 00:58:36.519 of the Russian air defenses, like, there's clearly some some things going on 617 00:58:36.679 --> 00:58:39.920 there. So if they get past that, which is to say, if 618 00:58:39.920 --> 00:58:49.199 the Russians get past that, that may be the different cost for the for 619 00:58:49.360 --> 00:58:52.480 the Russian air force we were they to go that route. But if they 620 00:58:52.519 --> 00:58:58.440 were to get past there, that would be a big development and a big 621 00:58:58.559 --> 00:59:08.400 problem obviously. And the you see these news reports for instance, about while 622 00:59:09.599 --> 00:59:17.039 the Russians distensibly you know, and being in really bad cruise missiles or stuff 623 00:59:17.079 --> 00:59:21.360 like that that they or may not even have a warhead on them. Is 624 00:59:21.400 --> 00:59:27.400 it to just soak up Ukrainian air defense capacity? Right back to you know, 625 00:59:29.159 --> 00:59:31.360 what is the Lensky number one ask, it's all the time. It's 626 00:59:31.400 --> 00:59:36.840 like air defen they need air defense if they run out, if they go 627 00:59:36.960 --> 00:59:42.239 Winchester to use that phrase on this stuff, then what you talk about, 628 00:59:42.280 --> 00:59:47.440 will you allude to their foul becomes a much bigger problem. And so that's 629 00:59:47.559 --> 00:59:54.760 that's kind of the head nod to the act of air defense to the saliens 630 00:59:54.800 --> 00:59:59.719 of active air defense for Ukraine, because if they get to a point where 631 00:59:59.760 --> 01:00:05.760 they are ava schlips, then that is where you will see you the rushing 632 01:00:05.800 --> 01:00:14.239 air force. I believe reassert in a way that it surprisingly enough hasn't so 633 01:00:14.400 --> 01:00:25.239 far. Well, Tom, there we go to the top of the hour. 634 01:00:27.159 --> 01:00:30.599 It's been a really fast hour and I did not finish all my questions, 635 01:00:30.400 --> 01:00:34.840 which which is which is good because we had some good conversation back and 636 01:00:34.960 --> 01:00:39.960 forth for the listeners. If they wanted to keep track of what you and 637 01:00:40.079 --> 01:00:45.280 CSIS are working on, where's a good place for them to look And are 638 01:00:45.360 --> 01:00:50.000 there some projects that you have in the oven right now that we should keep 639 01:00:50.000 --> 01:00:52.920 an eye open for over the next few weeks or months. Yeah, I 640 01:00:52.960 --> 01:00:58.199 appreciate that. Look just Google see as I ask in missile defense and you'll 641 01:00:58.239 --> 01:01:02.239 find a pretty good smatter what we're doing. Um and in the next couple 642 01:01:02.760 --> 01:01:07.320 weeks and months you'll see a number of reports coming out from the team. 643 01:01:07.639 --> 01:01:15.840 I mentioned that Ukraine Aaron mussile War and Air Defense report that's coming out very 644 01:01:15.880 --> 01:01:20.559 soon, but also a count of us report that's being led by Sean Shake 645 01:01:20.679 --> 01:01:23.760 who authored the endogonal Carabac piece from a number of years ago. And then 646 01:01:23.800 --> 01:01:29.400 we've got a couple of other irons in the fire for budget analysis and for 647 01:01:30.719 --> 01:01:36.199 space sensors for all this stuff. So lots of threats mud to space. 648 01:01:36.320 --> 01:01:39.559 We try to we do our best to cover them all. And look appreciate 649 01:01:40.960 --> 01:01:45.159 the time sal and Mark for being able to kind of come in and chat 650 01:01:45.280 --> 01:01:52.159 with you all about these problems. It's been great times, so much times. 651 01:01:54.320 --> 01:01:59.000 Thanks thanks again, Tom, Yeah, look forward to next time, 652 01:02:00.960 --> 01:02:06.119 all right, thank you everybody for joining us yep, and thank you everybody 653 01:02:06.199 --> 01:02:08.679 for join us for another edition of Midrat And until next time, I hope 654 01:02:08.719 --> 01:02:22.840 everybody has a great Navy day. Cheers. Having a king like my lonely 655 01:02:23.000 --> 01:02:34.840 want to marry me and leave randomly for you being to blame lovely told me 656 01:02:35.239 --> 01:02:45.960 city holding you all the dame. It's a long way to It's a long 657 01:02:45.159 --> 01:03:00.679 way. It's a long way to God. I don't bye think I dealing 658 01:03:01.639 --> 01:03:08.280 well, listen atwell, it's a long long way to get an it. 659 01:03:08.760 --> 01:03:10.880 But my heart, my