WEBVTT 1 00:00:30.280 --> 00:00:34.039 Welcome to mid Rats with found from Commander Salamander, an Eagle one from Eagle 2 00:00:34.119 --> 00:00:39.079 Speak at seer Shure your home for a discussion of national security issues and all 3 00:00:39.079 --> 00:00:45.119 things maritime. And thank you very much everybody for joining us for another edition 4 00:00:45.159 --> 00:00:49.280 of mid Rats. And because we are alive today, i'd like to extend 5 00:00:49.280 --> 00:00:53.799 an invitation for those that are coming in on time. If you scroll down 6 00:00:53.840 --> 00:00:56.880 to the bottom of the show page, that is where you will find the 7 00:00:57.000 --> 00:01:00.600 chat room. We've already got Paul another half dozen guys in there already. 8 00:01:02.000 --> 00:01:04.879 If you have some observations you'd like to share during the course of the show, 9 00:01:06.359 --> 00:01:10.359 or if you there's a question you would like to direct to either one 10 00:01:10.400 --> 00:01:11.879 of us, that would be a great place to do because we will monitor 11 00:01:11.920 --> 00:01:15.519 it during the course of the show. And this is our melee format, 12 00:01:15.879 --> 00:01:19.400 so we have our ideas what we want to talk about and what we'll kick 13 00:01:19.439 --> 00:01:23.439 off with. But as always we're interested to hear your questions as well. 14 00:01:23.920 --> 00:01:29.280 And if you don't have stage fright and you are so inclined, right there 15 00:01:29.280 --> 00:01:32.359 on the show page you have the studio line. We have open phones too. 16 00:01:32.400 --> 00:01:36.680 You're always welcome to call in, but we already did most of the 17 00:01:36.719 --> 00:01:40.319 show, and on the Free Show, I was just joking with my co 18 00:01:40.400 --> 00:01:42.680 host is like, hey, we got to remember all these great points. 19 00:01:42.959 --> 00:01:48.040 So I guess we got to go back to zero point one, egle one 20 00:01:48.079 --> 00:01:53.040 and kick up the conversation happy after Thanksgiving to you. Oh great, thank 21 00:01:53.079 --> 00:01:55.920 you very much, And yeah, we need to we need to get this 22 00:01:55.959 --> 00:01:57.359 going. There's a lot going on in the world, all by the access 23 00:01:57.359 --> 00:02:02.000 of Evil, which the new Act of evils Iran, China and Russia. 24 00:02:02.159 --> 00:02:08.039 So we've got all their proxy forces in operations. What more could you ask 25 00:02:08.120 --> 00:02:13.039 for for a show that deals with national defense issues? And I guess if 26 00:02:13.039 --> 00:02:16.680 we're looking at what is on the above the fold, you know, let's 27 00:02:16.680 --> 00:02:20.639 go ahead and go down to the bottom of the reds to the Red Sea. 28 00:02:20.719 --> 00:02:23.879 The USS Carney, for those that have been paying attention, evidently has 29 00:02:23.919 --> 00:02:28.159 had from the as I like to say, you can't buy training like this. 30 00:02:28.800 --> 00:02:31.000 They had, you know, back for those that remember, back on 31 00:02:31.039 --> 00:02:36.919 the nineteenth of October, the USS Carney, which for those that don't know, 32 00:02:37.000 --> 00:02:43.879 it's a Mayport based Arley Burke Flight one destroyer, a CRISP twenty seven 33 00:02:43.960 --> 00:02:49.719 years old. But they had a good extended shoot down on the nineteenth of 34 00:02:49.759 --> 00:02:53.120 October, and evidently the last day, I've seen a couple of reports saying 35 00:02:53.159 --> 00:03:02.479 that she had an extended five hour engagement down there right off of the mouth 36 00:03:02.599 --> 00:03:07.599 of the Red Sea, and it went on for about five hours, going 37 00:03:07.639 --> 00:03:13.039 after both evidently not just reconnaissance drones coming from the Houthi rebels and Yemen, 38 00:03:13.639 --> 00:03:20.280 but there was a British owned a British flagship who has a distant connection of 39 00:03:20.400 --> 00:03:23.719 one of its co owners of that company is in Israeli that evidently was hit 40 00:03:23.800 --> 00:03:28.520 by by one of them. So it's been a great Navy day for the 41 00:03:28.560 --> 00:03:34.719 surface warfare community, who's getting some good training. Yeah, it's uh, 42 00:03:35.520 --> 00:03:38.800 it's undoubtedly good training. I always worrying that we're also training the Chinese ships 43 00:03:38.800 --> 00:03:45.080 which were sitting off there not participating in this action, although they're sure not 44 00:03:45.199 --> 00:03:49.439 to be capable of it, but they're certainly going to be learning some good 45 00:03:49.520 --> 00:03:53.159 lessons from from us, which may they'll put into their their knowledge ben and 46 00:03:53.280 --> 00:03:57.960 call on it later if they if they feel the need. And I think 47 00:03:58.000 --> 00:04:02.039 it's important as people hear things that are you see Houthi up there, you 48 00:04:02.080 --> 00:04:08.479 see what's happening in the Red Sea. You're wondering why we're we're firing missiles 49 00:04:08.520 --> 00:04:12.520 and whatever else we're shooting at them to shoot them down. Why part of 50 00:04:12.560 --> 00:04:17.079 it is, that's what we do. It's part of enforcing the international world 51 00:04:17.199 --> 00:04:20.040 order. But everybody needs to keep in the back of their head the Houthis 52 00:04:20.079 --> 00:04:26.000 aren't doing this for their own good. Yeah, they've taken pot shots at 53 00:04:26.040 --> 00:04:29.360 us. A few years ago, the USS Mason took down some stuff that 54 00:04:29.439 --> 00:04:33.079 was actually fired at them. We think some of these missiles that was shot 55 00:04:33.120 --> 00:04:40.079 down were actually headed for Israel's towns. Some of them are heading for the 56 00:04:40.079 --> 00:04:43.639 ships. We've had some ships hit, We've had the Houthis see some ships. 57 00:04:43.680 --> 00:04:48.959 We've broken it out, but it is all happening because they're sponsorship by 58 00:04:48.959 --> 00:04:54.639 Iran. And I think that's the real challenge for decision makers is to make 59 00:04:54.759 --> 00:05:02.319 sure that we understand why the Houthis are doing this so and maybe what they 60 00:05:02.360 --> 00:05:06.879 want is what they deserve and maybe they should get. But it's a big 61 00:05:06.959 --> 00:05:12.480 challenge to try to figure out how we should respond to this. And another 62 00:05:12.480 --> 00:05:15.399 thing that just off the top of my head that we mentioned in the pre 63 00:05:15.519 --> 00:05:17.959 show and made a one to bring up. I want to pull out one 64 00:05:18.000 --> 00:05:25.160 of my my dusty old hobby horses. Is we've heard for the last really 65 00:05:25.199 --> 00:05:31.959 since Mike Mullen was cingo the idea of the thousand ship Navy. And yeah, 66 00:05:32.000 --> 00:05:35.120 we don't have frigates, but our allies do. We don't have enough 67 00:05:35.959 --> 00:05:40.120 surface ships. But that's okay because our allies could come with us and we 68 00:05:40.319 --> 00:05:43.360 you know, you look at CTF one, P. Fifty one, where 69 00:05:43.439 --> 00:05:47.639 one of the Japanese ships supposedly helped during that hijacking. But when you look 70 00:05:47.720 --> 00:05:56.519 at who is doing the shooting down of the Houthi missiles, it's either headed 71 00:05:56.560 --> 00:06:00.959 for Israel or headed for international shipping in the Red Sea. It is the 72 00:06:00.040 --> 00:06:06.399 United States Navy. And if you're somebody who, regardless of your nationality, 73 00:06:06.439 --> 00:06:14.360 are political stamps, if you are interested in maintaining the international order that's existed 74 00:06:15.079 --> 00:06:18.560 since the end of World War Two, you have to realize that that begins 75 00:06:18.600 --> 00:06:25.199 and ends on the high seas, and there is nobody who is going to 76 00:06:25.240 --> 00:06:30.879 be able to help enforce that. That's not the United States Navy or led 77 00:06:30.959 --> 00:06:34.959 by the United States Navy. And it's just another one of those data points 78 00:06:35.079 --> 00:06:41.279 when you're trying to make discussions with people, and I'd be very interested to 79 00:06:41.360 --> 00:06:47.040 see what the insurance rates are for various companies trying to go through the Red 80 00:06:47.040 --> 00:06:51.519 Sea, because I think it's clear that the huthis via the Iranians have a 81 00:06:51.560 --> 00:06:59.240 pretty good intel network of what ships are there and which ones have in Israeli 82 00:06:59.240 --> 00:07:02.519 are an American connection that they can go make a point whatever that point is. 83 00:07:04.560 --> 00:07:08.319 Yeah, it's uh, you know, in addition to everything else, 84 00:07:08.360 --> 00:07:12.399 it's not I don't think it's that hard to find out that information in open 85 00:07:12.439 --> 00:07:15.920 source materials. I mean, it's not. It hasn't been a great big 86 00:07:15.959 --> 00:07:20.040 secret who owns these things? They're But you know, in the convoluted world 87 00:07:20.079 --> 00:07:25.959 of merchant shipping is that it's it's so remote. You know, you may 88 00:07:26.000 --> 00:07:32.079 own a ship, but the ships are belong to you lease them or whatever 89 00:07:32.120 --> 00:07:36.079 to an organization that puts their name on them, and you, your ownership 90 00:07:36.160 --> 00:07:41.879 is is not really involved with the except basically collect a rent on those on 91 00:07:42.000 --> 00:07:45.519 those ships, while the operating company is the one that has to worry about 92 00:07:45.519 --> 00:07:48.040 profits and losses. But you know that just is another like it's like Flags 93 00:07:48.120 --> 00:07:53.800 Conveniences, another one of those twists and turns in this in the in the 94 00:07:53.800 --> 00:07:58.439 merchant shipping business the for For those are interested, there was a really good 95 00:07:58.560 --> 00:08:03.519 article uh or piece written in the for the by the Center Strategic and International 96 00:08:03.560 --> 00:08:16.319 Studies back in twenty nineteen on the Iran's proxy war and it's it's a little 97 00:08:16.399 --> 00:08:18.279 dated because it's twenty nineteen, but if you want to know who the Houthis 98 00:08:18.279 --> 00:08:22.199 are and all that stuff, then it's it's a it's a good piece. 99 00:08:22.240 --> 00:08:28.160 I'll put a link up in the in the chat room. And but you 100 00:08:28.199 --> 00:08:31.000 know, it's pretty clear that Tehran is if they they've got the the Houthis 101 00:08:31.039 --> 00:08:35.799 they've got and they're fighting with Saudi Arabia in a proxy war. They've got 102 00:08:35.840 --> 00:08:41.559 the uh the Hisbollah in Lebanon, and they've got a whole bunch of other 103 00:08:41.559 --> 00:08:46.080 folks, and they really want that that the land routes, some land routes 104 00:08:46.360 --> 00:08:52.000 to get to the Mediterranean. And it's it's an interesting, an interesting time 105 00:08:52.039 --> 00:08:56.360 to be alive. Yeah, I know there is. In the president administration, 106 00:08:56.480 --> 00:08:58.960 there was some people who had a theory that if we're nice to the 107 00:09:00.039 --> 00:09:05.279 Houthis and we try to re engage with the Iranians, that things will get 108 00:09:05.320 --> 00:09:09.000 better. Are the real cynical people said that they want the Iran deal because 109 00:09:09.000 --> 00:09:13.000 they want to have their Iran deal because they want to have the Iran deal 110 00:09:13.879 --> 00:09:18.759 back from the Obama administration. But either way, it just plain it didn't 111 00:09:18.799 --> 00:09:24.440 work out at all. And Hey, one great thing about our melees and 112 00:09:24.919 --> 00:09:31.159 free for all formatches. We get nice surprises. And we've got a caller 113 00:09:31.200 --> 00:09:33.200 in here that I know is going to be a favorite for those on mid 114 00:09:33.279 --> 00:09:37.080 rats then coming here for years, and it's always great to have them on 115 00:09:37.159 --> 00:09:43.480 board. Mark Vandraff, Hey, good afternoon, Thanks for calling in after 116 00:09:43.720 --> 00:09:48.240 sounding after an eagle. How are you guys doing tonight? Well, we're 117 00:09:48.240 --> 00:09:52.000 having I think a well at least where I am. It's nice and hot 118 00:09:52.000 --> 00:09:54.840 and humid, as it always is. But you know how this part of 119 00:09:54.840 --> 00:09:58.799 a year is after Thanksgiving, it can be cold, or it could be 120 00:09:58.840 --> 00:10:01.240 April for the rest of the year. But Dad, we're we're doing well. 121 00:10:01.320 --> 00:10:05.799 So are you Are you up up north with your charges? Are you 122 00:10:05.799 --> 00:10:11.840 you back home in the Mid Atlantic? Back in the in the Middle Atlantic 123 00:10:11.960 --> 00:10:16.639 just for the UH the weekend. I'm back on a plane to UH to 124 00:10:16.799 --> 00:10:22.120 points further north tomorrow. Morning for for a few weeks, you know. 125 00:10:22.240 --> 00:10:26.960 So the uh uh the travel of shipbuildings that never stops beating, so uh 126 00:10:28.519 --> 00:10:33.480 uh gotta gotta get back up to work and uh and uh and make more 127 00:10:33.559 --> 00:10:39.879 progress. I'm glad that you guys are talking about the goings on in the 128 00:10:39.919 --> 00:10:46.000 Red Sea and down there at the southern end, and I'm gonna do something 129 00:10:46.200 --> 00:10:50.519 that for once. I'm glad I can keep some prey that I would direct 130 00:10:50.559 --> 00:10:58.000 you and any of your listeners to the US Extral Commands additional Twitter X or 131 00:10:58.039 --> 00:11:01.759 whatever we're calling it now feed. The actually put out today an excellent, 132 00:11:01.559 --> 00:11:07.600 as they say in we speak, TikTok that they put out an hour by 133 00:11:07.679 --> 00:11:13.600 hour timeline of what the carning was involved in. And uh it's it's actually 134 00:11:13.600 --> 00:11:16.559 a little more than five hours, it is. I clocked the TikTok. 135 00:11:18.480 --> 00:11:24.679 There was almost eight hours of the can be described as combat shuttling between two 136 00:11:24.759 --> 00:11:31.159 different ships, providing eight two different ships that have been attacked and and and 137 00:11:33.039 --> 00:11:37.200 we're in very it looks like one was damaged the other was undamaged. Uh. 138 00:11:37.399 --> 00:11:41.440 And I just said, and during all of that, having to periodically 139 00:11:41.559 --> 00:11:48.120 shoot down missiles or drones that were headed in the Carneing's general direction, and 140 00:11:48.720 --> 00:11:52.919 you know there was you know, it was about eight straight hours of maritime 141 00:11:52.039 --> 00:11:58.039 combat that the Carning was involved in, and Sitcom laid it all out pretty 142 00:11:58.080 --> 00:12:03.919 welfare general in their Twitter feed. So I commend them for the transparency, 143 00:12:03.960 --> 00:12:07.720 and I commend that a command for putting that out there. It's also been 144 00:12:09.080 --> 00:12:13.840 repeated by Fifth Fleet. So either those two Twitter feeds, people could go 145 00:12:13.000 --> 00:12:18.039 to and take a look and see what Karnie did. You made me feel 146 00:12:18.159 --> 00:12:22.919 very old, and he said carne was a twenty seven year old destroyer because 147 00:12:22.919 --> 00:12:26.960 I think we remember being a keep ship bath while it was being built. 148 00:12:26.679 --> 00:12:33.279 So it's still seems mean to me, although that was almost thirty years ago 149 00:12:33.519 --> 00:12:37.799 that that was going on. So yeah, that was that I felt the 150 00:12:37.960 --> 00:12:43.679 old. I guess carnial world, I'm feeling old. But yeah, I 151 00:12:43.399 --> 00:12:48.000 am glad to have the chance to talk a little bit about the huts. 152 00:12:48.960 --> 00:12:54.759 That was a subject that I touched upon during my year at the National Security 153 00:12:54.840 --> 00:13:00.679 Council. Well, talk a little bit about it. Put up a link 154 00:13:00.799 --> 00:13:07.600 to that Sentcom report at Twitter or x. But talk a little about the 155 00:13:07.600 --> 00:13:11.039 hoothies because I don't think many people quite understand who the heck these folks are 156 00:13:11.080 --> 00:13:13.840 and what's going on with what they're trying to do in the Red Sea area. 157 00:13:15.639 --> 00:13:20.879 So Yemen, like a lot of countries that has government issues, much 158 00:13:22.120 --> 00:13:26.600 like in Lebanon. In Lebanon you have an official government of Lebanon that doesn't 159 00:13:26.679 --> 00:13:31.840 control very much of the country, and then you have Hesbola, which is 160 00:13:31.919 --> 00:13:37.840 a terrorist organization that controls the good chunks of the country. The Yemeni in 161 00:13:37.919 --> 00:13:43.960 and actually recognized government of Yemen doesn't have a lot of control over the territory 162 00:13:43.000 --> 00:13:46.799 of Yemen man control over part of it. And then there's a couple of 163 00:13:46.879 --> 00:13:52.440 other groups that part of the who cans now have control over the largest part 164 00:13:52.559 --> 00:14:00.120 of the populated part of the country. They are absolutely a quiet organization of 165 00:14:00.799 --> 00:14:05.240 the Iranians. Like the Iranians, they are share not city. There are 166 00:14:05.799 --> 00:14:13.279 ethnically Arabs that there is a friction point there between the Houthis and their person 167 00:14:13.399 --> 00:14:18.559 pay masters, but not much. But I mean, I would say that 168 00:14:18.639 --> 00:14:24.759 the Hoo thieves are a take study and should be studied from now on by 169 00:14:24.840 --> 00:14:31.039 people who are really interested in being interested in being serious about national security. 170 00:14:31.440 --> 00:14:33.799 But if you let problems faster. They don't get better on their owns. 171 00:14:35.559 --> 00:14:41.679 The houthis controlled less territory, they have less capability. They were less of 172 00:14:41.759 --> 00:14:48.399 a problem five six, seven years ago, and the government of the UAE 173 00:14:48.639 --> 00:14:58.039 and Saudi Arabia were fairly effectively fighting a kind of insurgency against them on the 174 00:14:58.120 --> 00:15:03.879 side of the recognize them womany government and the entire international community, and we're 175 00:15:03.960 --> 00:15:07.720 not. We were part of that. We the United States and American part 176 00:15:07.720 --> 00:15:11.480 of that kept putting more and more pressure on the Sadies in the unit to 177 00:15:11.720 --> 00:15:15.320 ease up, because the Hepings, not unlike them up, were very good 178 00:15:15.759 --> 00:15:22.399 at putting civilians in between themselves and the military forces and viewing in and the 179 00:15:22.519 --> 00:15:28.759 Saudis and the minion athorities were frankly not as good as the Ausailis at attacking 180 00:15:30.159 --> 00:15:37.960 military forces without causing civilians damage and civilian death. So the humanitarian crisis was 181 00:15:39.039 --> 00:15:45.039 quite severe and the lessing. What the international community did was put pressure not 182 00:15:45.320 --> 00:15:50.200 on someone to edit quickly so that they could get to a better place for 183 00:15:50.320 --> 00:15:56.720 the many people, but to simply stop a Saudis and the Amoratis stop fighting 184 00:15:58.120 --> 00:16:03.600 uh In. In fact, the the Emoradis were very sensitive about that. 185 00:16:03.320 --> 00:16:07.320 When they stopped, they wanted it to be known that they were all the 186 00:16:07.360 --> 00:16:11.279 way out of Yemen because they just didn't like the international seat anymore. If 187 00:16:11.320 --> 00:16:18.159 you're the the Emaradis who depend on both the rich tuty, but now they 188 00:16:18.240 --> 00:16:22.879 depend a lot on the international business and the willingness of other people to do 189 00:16:22.080 --> 00:16:27.759 international business. They dubay An Abu Dhabi that helped generate the considerable wealth of 190 00:16:27.840 --> 00:16:32.080 that country. So they didn't want to let a file the Europeans, they 191 00:16:32.080 --> 00:16:37.320 didn't want to let a file do Americans, and basically they let the problem 192 00:16:37.440 --> 00:16:45.080 fester. And now you have a first class problem in the Red Sea because 193 00:16:45.720 --> 00:16:52.559 the Babo Zeb is one of the world's primary take place of very significant chunks 194 00:16:52.600 --> 00:16:56.879 of the world's wealth, closed through that narrow passage on its way to or 195 00:16:56.960 --> 00:17:03.000 from the Suez Canal. And now you have a very irrespons blacker who is 196 00:17:03.200 --> 00:17:08.920 going to tank action on a timeline the bay and their iranium pay masters set 197 00:17:08.960 --> 00:17:17.240 fi to affect the flow of trade that straight and now it's going to take 198 00:17:17.920 --> 00:17:22.519 much more significant military action now than it would have taken god, six seven 199 00:17:22.599 --> 00:17:26.200 years ago if we just not to saw these Maamaradis continue their canter insurgency. 200 00:17:26.599 --> 00:17:33.720 You didn't have that problem right now. So for people in the nationalist d 201 00:17:33.039 --> 00:17:40.200 professionals need to understand that as pain frol something might be in a short term, 202 00:17:40.680 --> 00:17:44.039 it is always it's not always, at least nothing's always in the the 203 00:17:44.119 --> 00:17:48.920 nationalist purty, but it's usually better to take some short term pain rather for 204 00:17:49.119 --> 00:17:52.839 a long term stability. Things will be better in the long term and they 205 00:17:52.839 --> 00:17:57.759 will ultimately be less than suffering, even if it seems like there's level of 206 00:17:57.839 --> 00:18:03.880 in it something that you might find intolerable in the short term. To win 207 00:18:03.920 --> 00:18:07.960 in a region, to enjoy the bad actor, you will ultimately minimize the 208 00:18:08.039 --> 00:18:11.799 long term amount of human suffering, because right now there's about to be a 209 00:18:11.920 --> 00:18:17.960 lot of human suffering in them. And if the Hohopis continue to do what 210 00:18:18.039 --> 00:18:22.160 they're doing, I don't know how the United States, the United Kingdom, 211 00:18:22.880 --> 00:18:30.880 other powers that are interested in the world don't start a significant military campaign to 212 00:18:30.000 --> 00:18:36.160 keep that straight open. Its economically it's not viable. So that is that, 213 00:18:36.359 --> 00:18:40.599 and that is where we are headed. If something doesn't change. Yeah, 214 00:18:40.640 --> 00:18:44.960 that's that's one of the the two things. There's a third thing I 215 00:18:45.039 --> 00:18:49.519 wanted to bounce off you Mark. You know. The first thing is history 216 00:18:49.599 --> 00:18:52.720 is replete with people making one hundred and eighty degree turns, you know, 217 00:18:52.759 --> 00:18:56.519 the only Nixon can go to China type of thing. But a lot of 218 00:18:56.839 --> 00:19:04.519 the senior point in the National security arena for this administration, they have an 219 00:19:04.839 --> 00:19:11.920 agenda that they are trying to pursue with Iran. That it's just a series 220 00:19:11.960 --> 00:19:14.799 of rakes to keep stepping on it. You know, eventually maybe it'll be 221 00:19:14.920 --> 00:19:18.599 too much. But you know, you brought up the fact that the international 222 00:19:18.680 --> 00:19:22.920 community, regardless of what they may think of Iran and what's going on in 223 00:19:23.039 --> 00:19:30.319 Gaza, these economies they need that straight open in economic manner. You know, 224 00:19:30.480 --> 00:19:33.200 what is the pain threshold here? Because we do have a few thousand 225 00:19:33.279 --> 00:19:38.000 years of records of how to deal with pirate nests if you want to look 226 00:19:38.039 --> 00:19:41.240 at it like that, the way they're behaving. But there's a larger issue 227 00:19:41.319 --> 00:19:48.039 that we were talking about in the pre show that regardless of where this is 228 00:19:48.279 --> 00:19:52.880 and who the players are, and we've had it go too long, you 229 00:19:52.960 --> 00:19:59.759 know what, what is the impact of the precedents we're saying, we're setting 230 00:20:00.720 --> 00:20:07.359 that Okay, if you take pot shots at US Navy warships in international waters, 231 00:20:07.400 --> 00:20:10.319 as long as we shoot the missile down, you know, no harm, 232 00:20:10.440 --> 00:20:15.359 no foul, Maybe you'll have better luck next time. Is you establish 233 00:20:15.519 --> 00:20:23.559 habits, you establish norms and what's expected, And how much longer can we 234 00:20:25.079 --> 00:20:32.440 expect to just allow people to lob missiles at our ships and not having a 235 00:20:32.599 --> 00:20:37.319 significant retaliation to make a point not just to them, but to the next 236 00:20:37.440 --> 00:20:42.559 bad actor six months down the road, because eventually something will get through. 237 00:20:44.319 --> 00:20:48.359 And we have a ship that carries over two hundred Americans and we know how 238 00:20:48.400 --> 00:20:51.400 these things can work if you take a bad hit. Look what happened to 239 00:20:51.440 --> 00:20:55.319 the Russian cruiser in the Black Sea. That's a lot of families that are 240 00:20:55.400 --> 00:21:02.440 going to be asking why that's questure. It'll be true. And and you 241 00:21:02.559 --> 00:21:07.720 need to look no further than current modern Israel for your example. There. 242 00:21:07.599 --> 00:21:15.160 Somehow the Israelis got used to having markets come at them every so often. 243 00:21:15.359 --> 00:21:19.079 I mean, I don't know if you would feel okay where we're gonna live 244 00:21:19.160 --> 00:21:23.359 our lives and we have a pretty good sences theeramistic defense, but you know, 245 00:21:23.519 --> 00:21:26.400 every few weeks, Silen's gonna go off. We're all go run too 246 00:21:26.440 --> 00:21:30.880 a strong room in our basement. Uh and we're going to consider that normal 247 00:21:30.240 --> 00:21:37.640 for several years, and eventually we'll just deal with it because to end it 248 00:21:37.480 --> 00:21:44.880 seems too hard to be too much international outcry. We're gonna have to cause 249 00:21:44.920 --> 00:21:48.559 a lot of suffering that rightly we don't want to cause, because we'd rather 250 00:21:48.720 --> 00:21:55.920 not uh enflipt the kind of response that would fix the problem, because of 251 00:21:56.000 --> 00:21:57.680 the collateral damage. It's tran likely, you know, you know, we 252 00:21:57.720 --> 00:22:00.079 don't want to We don't want to do that yet, and I'm sure these 253 00:22:00.079 --> 00:22:03.599 Alis don't want to do that in Gaza. And if you keep with me, 254 00:22:04.839 --> 00:22:07.440 I'll hope that the problem gets better. Are all around to live with 255 00:22:07.559 --> 00:22:12.039 it. The problem never gets better. The problem problems need to be fixed 256 00:22:12.160 --> 00:22:17.960 or they get worse. That is a a repeated less nothing of history everyone 257 00:22:18.160 --> 00:22:21.119 likes these days. And I don't know what's the great analogy, but people 258 00:22:21.200 --> 00:22:26.400 talk about the thirties and Nazi Germany, and that was the lesson was the 259 00:22:26.519 --> 00:22:30.519 problem didn't get better, it got bad, and then fixing it was the 260 00:22:30.599 --> 00:22:40.000 World War that almost destroyed moderate civilization. In the end, it's completely up 261 00:22:40.160 --> 00:22:41.799 end of the world to where it tooks decades to a cover from World War 262 00:22:41.880 --> 00:22:47.160 Two. If you want to the world economy and and you know, to 263 00:22:47.359 --> 00:22:51.160 just change the world someday prasts to the better fit with the United States. 264 00:22:51.240 --> 00:22:55.880 We've benefited from the post World War two world warter. That was a tremendous 265 00:22:55.960 --> 00:23:02.759 price to pay for not taking the threat seriously early because it just seemed too 266 00:23:02.880 --> 00:23:07.000 hard to have to go deal with it in a serious way. And that's 267 00:23:07.039 --> 00:23:11.799 where we're at now, right we have stopped. We have not dealt with 268 00:23:11.920 --> 00:23:15.599 this in a serious way. The counterpoint to that, I was in a 269 00:23:15.640 --> 00:23:22.039 conversation with some folks over Thanksgiving dinner table and they asked, they challenged me 270 00:23:22.599 --> 00:23:32.000 to try and make the Obama Biden foreign policy case for them. It's like, 271 00:23:32.559 --> 00:23:34.519 you understand, I'm a critic of that. I'm not an advocate. 272 00:23:34.920 --> 00:23:38.359 And they said, yes, but everyone has a point. Can you can 273 00:23:38.400 --> 00:23:45.000 you put on a debating hat and articulate the other side? And I said, 274 00:23:45.000 --> 00:23:47.680 if I was trying hard, I would come up with a with a 275 00:23:47.920 --> 00:23:52.799 point that I think there's a legitimate point. The Iranian people are not the 276 00:23:52.880 --> 00:23:59.400 Iranian government, and we should It seems like the United States should be able 277 00:23:59.480 --> 00:24:07.839 to have a reliably productive relationship with Iran because we actually do have a lot 278 00:24:07.880 --> 00:24:15.359 of common interests and their population is generally favorable towards America. And if you 279 00:24:15.559 --> 00:24:21.960 credit the Iranian government, meaning the MOLAS and the RGC, if you credit 280 00:24:22.039 --> 00:24:25.839 them with more rationality than I believe they actually have, you might be able 281 00:24:25.839 --> 00:24:30.079 to talk yourself into well, if we address the legitimate security concerns, they'll 282 00:24:30.119 --> 00:24:34.079 be addressed, and that's you know, then they will change their behavior. 283 00:24:36.920 --> 00:24:41.799 I just I don't know how my critique of that ing to be. I 284 00:24:42.000 --> 00:24:48.000 just think that the history of the last well basically said, the Iranian Revolution 285 00:24:48.119 --> 00:24:52.000 is seventy nine, but certainly the last time of fifteen years shows that you 286 00:24:52.160 --> 00:24:57.799 can't credit the Iranian leadership and especially they are, as you see, with 287 00:24:57.960 --> 00:25:03.960 a Western level of rationality. They are motivated by what motivates them. But 288 00:25:04.079 --> 00:25:11.720 that's you know, that is not evenly reconcilable with what we would consider legitimates 289 00:25:11.759 --> 00:25:18.359 and consecurity concerns. They are an expansion of power. They are they they 290 00:25:18.480 --> 00:25:25.519 want to dominate the Middle East. They are viciously endearantly anti Zionists and anti 291 00:25:25.599 --> 00:25:30.240 Semitic, so they would be happy to wipe Israel off the map until as 292 00:25:30.240 --> 00:25:33.960 many Jews as possible, and that is their sittingtient goal. That's that's what 293 00:25:34.279 --> 00:25:41.319 victory looks like to Iran. So the idea that we can address that, 294 00:25:41.680 --> 00:25:45.240 it's not like, well, you know, make sure that they're in a 295 00:25:45.279 --> 00:25:51.519 position where the city Muslim states can't violate their territorial integrity and those are good. 296 00:25:51.640 --> 00:25:53.359 Now I'm happy, and it's not that that's not where they're at. 297 00:25:53.960 --> 00:25:59.599 Uh And I think anyone who takes that they can be accommodated and has an 298 00:25:59.720 --> 00:26:11.559 any correct understanding, I'm I think you'd be impressed that former Obama Secretary of 299 00:26:12.480 --> 00:26:18.960 Defense and uh CIA director did say the other day that the US should respond 300 00:26:19.039 --> 00:26:23.799 to the increasing number of attacks by Iron's proxy groups, and he would say, 301 00:26:23.839 --> 00:26:26.839 he said, I would be much more aggressive. I want to go 302 00:26:26.880 --> 00:26:30.559 after those or firing missiles in our troops. Make sure they understand when they 303 00:26:30.599 --> 00:26:33.839 fire a missile, they're going to die. And this is he was referring 304 00:26:33.920 --> 00:26:41.319 to the troops in Iraq. And yeah, I love Secretaryanata's remarks. I 305 00:26:41.440 --> 00:26:48.519 even retweeted them with great approval. I believe Secretary of Kanada is seeing the 306 00:26:48.599 --> 00:26:56.039 world clearly what he said. Yeah, I think you know there there is 307 00:26:56.720 --> 00:27:00.440 out there. Everybody always likes to talk about the bipartisan can Since this, 308 00:27:00.519 --> 00:27:04.319 I think, especially the events of October seventh, it's it's been clarifying in 309 00:27:04.400 --> 00:27:11.200 a lot of ways, and it's making people perhaps throw away a few assumptions 310 00:27:11.599 --> 00:27:15.079 if they're on the fence, push them one side or the other. But 311 00:27:15.039 --> 00:27:23.400 what you can realistically accomplish with Iran versus what the Iranians are willing to accomplish, 312 00:27:23.759 --> 00:27:30.160 there's a big delta there, and after a while, people will continue 313 00:27:30.200 --> 00:27:33.359 to signal to you what they want to do. And if you look what 314 00:27:33.559 --> 00:27:40.279 the situation that we've been discussing in the Red Sea, and you look at 315 00:27:40.440 --> 00:27:45.880 the medieval activity that Hamas kicked off on the seventh of October, both of 316 00:27:45.960 --> 00:27:52.720 those are inside of the Iranian leaderships plan, whatever that ultimate plan is. 317 00:27:52.279 --> 00:27:57.160 None of that seems aligned with a repro Schmall are trying to move to a 318 00:27:57.279 --> 00:28:03.440 more settled situation, and just the opposite, you try to get in the 319 00:28:03.519 --> 00:28:07.880 head of the Iranians using the hoo thies. I guess there's an outside chance 320 00:28:07.960 --> 00:28:12.920 that the Houthis are just doing what hoo thies do, but there's a larger 321 00:28:14.000 --> 00:28:22.319 chance that they would really like somehow to get the United States to get involved 322 00:28:22.480 --> 00:28:26.680 to raise the temperature more, which is why you know, earlier on the 323 00:28:26.759 --> 00:28:33.079 show I mentioned is there an overlap between what they want and really what they 324 00:28:33.240 --> 00:28:37.799 deserve? And I know there is a lot in our toolkit and for decision 325 00:28:37.839 --> 00:28:44.920 makers, they just got to rack and stack whatever the higher intentions and direction 326 00:28:45.039 --> 00:28:48.960 and guidance are, what if any response we can do. But I think 327 00:28:48.000 --> 00:28:52.240 one of the worst things that could happen to us as we wind up having 328 00:28:53.319 --> 00:28:57.680 Americans killed or are captured in the process. But we have a lot of 329 00:28:57.759 --> 00:29:04.039 tools in our toolbox that we can make make our point rather firmly risk not 330 00:29:04.240 --> 00:29:07.559 much more than how we're operating today. Of course, the second order, 331 00:29:07.799 --> 00:29:12.400 second third order effects from what we do and how we do it can be 332 00:29:12.559 --> 00:29:17.480 interesting. But one thing about these missiles in these drones that they have, 333 00:29:17.680 --> 00:29:25.720 even though last decade hesblon Lebanon did surprise an Israeli saw our corvette with a 334 00:29:26.920 --> 00:29:33.680 old Chinese version of the Yeah Yeah satto too. But we have to know 335 00:29:33.880 --> 00:29:38.960 where these things are are roughly located, that we could at least affect their 336 00:29:40.000 --> 00:29:45.480 inventory for a change. Oh. Absolutely, That's that gets back into now 337 00:29:45.559 --> 00:29:49.680 we have the Israel problem because all of the Houthi, their their drone storage 338 00:29:49.720 --> 00:29:56.640 facilities, all in towns, populated towns with civilians, all of their launch 339 00:29:56.720 --> 00:30:02.400 points for their surface SOFIA some surface to ship ballistic missiles. When they go 340 00:30:02.519 --> 00:30:04.640 to set them up, they set them up next to schools and mosques, 341 00:30:06.359 --> 00:30:11.319 uh, and and and medical facilities. They're not they're not out in an 342 00:30:11.359 --> 00:30:15.079 open field there. So you want to hit them with tomahawks. You want 343 00:30:15.079 --> 00:30:18.960 to hit them with with uh you know uh land attack missiles coming off of 344 00:30:19.039 --> 00:30:22.319 an F fifteen. Uh. You want to fly in there with an F 345 00:30:22.440 --> 00:30:26.440 thirty five coming out of you know, get tucking the Amadis you know, 346 00:30:26.799 --> 00:30:30.640 have you know enough your favorite F thirty five coming out of Aldfra and putting 347 00:30:30.680 --> 00:30:34.160 some ordinance on that target. You know, once they start with the missiles, 348 00:30:34.480 --> 00:30:40.359 there's there's gonna be a civilian body cap And then the question is who 349 00:30:40.400 --> 00:30:44.759 are we to criticize Israel and tell them, oh, we need you guys 350 00:30:44.839 --> 00:30:51.039 to be very careful when when when it's our operations, we're footing civilians at 351 00:30:51.119 --> 00:30:55.759 risk too. But if the who thies keep putting missiles into the Red Sea, 352 00:30:55.880 --> 00:30:59.559 at what point do you does that price have to be paid? And 353 00:30:59.680 --> 00:31:02.799 that's that's the dilemma that we're going to be facing. So and the potentially 354 00:31:02.880 --> 00:31:07.319 we can be face the strain. There's no question that that the you know, 355 00:31:07.000 --> 00:31:12.640 it's what the hooping capability is not easily conceals, right in that they 356 00:31:12.960 --> 00:31:17.839 all of those myth sites, all of those all their their last points, 357 00:31:17.960 --> 00:31:22.880 all their storage for their drones. Those those are not easy to conceal between 358 00:31:22.519 --> 00:31:26.759 our airborne intelligence, that satellite intelligence. It's not that we can't target them. 359 00:31:27.079 --> 00:31:33.359 If you're targeting them will bring a significant risk of civilian claudor damage. 360 00:31:33.359 --> 00:31:36.799 And then the question is is not a price that we're willing to time? 361 00:31:37.440 --> 00:31:41.519 Well, that's there. During the Gulf War, we talked about the CNN 362 00:31:41.599 --> 00:31:45.720 effect. Now we're talking about everybody in the world with a cell phone camera 363 00:31:47.279 --> 00:31:52.480 showing whatever they see and putting it immediately on the Internet, which you know 364 00:31:52.680 --> 00:31:56.680 is the CNN effect written large. It is a challenge to to demonstrate that 365 00:31:57.240 --> 00:32:00.279 the problem that you've solved by a element in one of these sites that happened 366 00:32:00.279 --> 00:32:06.559 to be next to his school, was was worth that that effort and that 367 00:32:06.640 --> 00:32:09.440 we've made every effort not to not to target civilians. But you know that 368 00:32:09.720 --> 00:32:13.839 that is that is an issue that I think is a lot of trouble for 369 00:32:14.039 --> 00:32:16.480 us. The other issue I have is we spend a lot of money on 370 00:32:16.720 --> 00:32:19.920 and this is somebody just put this up on our chat, a lot of 371 00:32:19.960 --> 00:32:24.799 money on the weaponry used to shoot down these some slow flying drones and some 372 00:32:24.920 --> 00:32:31.519 other systems that I just keep thinking, we must have some cheaper alternative that 373 00:32:31.640 --> 00:32:36.160 we could we could put in the air to take out some of these things 374 00:32:36.640 --> 00:32:42.079 without the expenditure of of you know, a few hundred thousand dollars missile or 375 00:32:43.400 --> 00:32:46.279 something like that. But you got any thoughts along those lines, Yeah, 376 00:32:46.759 --> 00:32:50.359 you should have Barn McGraph ad to that talk. I mean, I have 377 00:32:50.519 --> 00:32:55.359 thoughts, but I think Brian's thoughts are it's not better than mine. He's 378 00:32:57.559 --> 00:33:01.359 spent more time operating warships to seek I buy stuff and I build stuff, 379 00:33:01.440 --> 00:33:07.680 But Brian spent more time operating. And he makes the point and has publicly 380 00:33:07.799 --> 00:33:13.400 on his twitter feed and his blogs that at least at this point, your 381 00:33:13.480 --> 00:33:20.759 risk calculation is not one where you want to not want to employ your full 382 00:33:20.839 --> 00:33:24.599 defense and depth. Frankly, I think we're probably and I don't have I 383 00:33:24.640 --> 00:33:29.839 have no inside knowledge, so I'm going on very sketchy public reporting because we 384 00:33:29.920 --> 00:33:36.279 don't know all of what's been engaged. The Navy and the Pentagon has not 385 00:33:36.359 --> 00:33:39.119 put out that level of detail. But assuming we use an SM two to 386 00:33:39.200 --> 00:33:44.480 take out a lot of these targets, so we're doing that at range, 387 00:33:45.240 --> 00:33:51.960 A lot of these drone targets would be very easily engageable by on a DBG 388 00:33:52.119 --> 00:33:58.119 fifty one by a five and fifty four using the appropriate frag rounds to do 389 00:33:58.279 --> 00:34:02.960 that, but now you're engaging them in a much shorter range. It gave 390 00:34:04.039 --> 00:34:08.320 me get fewer shots off. And if you're a co out there right now, 391 00:34:08.360 --> 00:34:12.320 if you're on Carney, if you're on Mason, if you're at Hodness, 392 00:34:13.760 --> 00:34:17.920 you're probably not too worried about what the exchange rate looks like over a 393 00:34:19.039 --> 00:34:24.199 long term and over the dollars and cents. What you're looking at is I 394 00:34:24.320 --> 00:34:28.960 can't take a hit. So as soon as I see something that I'm determining 395 00:34:29.000 --> 00:34:31.360 as a threat, I'm gonna take a shot with the longest range weapon that 396 00:34:31.440 --> 00:34:36.679 I have currently in my inventory. I'm not gonna wait with the idea of 397 00:34:36.760 --> 00:34:38.880 saying, this guy's not that much of a threat. I have a good 398 00:34:39.000 --> 00:34:45.119 high confidence kill with a five inues frift before. So instead of using five 399 00:34:45.199 --> 00:34:49.760 hundred or six hundred thousand dollars air missile, I'll use an eight thousand dollars 400 00:34:49.960 --> 00:34:54.639 frag round out of a five inch or whatever five inch rounds cost these days 401 00:34:55.679 --> 00:35:00.280 and take that out. But I'm gonna wait a long on time. I 402 00:35:00.360 --> 00:35:07.480 don't think that at this point anyone's got that as part of their calculation. 403 00:35:07.559 --> 00:35:12.119 I think once they've determined that something is a threat, then they're going to 404 00:35:12.199 --> 00:35:16.239 go after that. As far as the short range blistic missile, that is 405 00:35:16.360 --> 00:35:22.440 a completely different when it comes to weapon selection. You know, Dave Carnie 406 00:35:22.519 --> 00:35:27.039 probably has a few of its surface pair missiles, some of the versions of 407 00:35:27.079 --> 00:35:30.920 the s M two the s M three that it's carrying that are specifically designed 408 00:35:30.039 --> 00:35:34.920 for the blistic missile threat, and that's what they're going to use against that 409 00:35:35.039 --> 00:35:38.679 threat. But against cruise missiles and uav which frankly are the same kind of 410 00:35:38.760 --> 00:35:43.079 threat. The only difference is is a little bit of speed and what do 411 00:35:43.159 --> 00:35:47.559 you call them. But again it's the same kind of threat. I think 412 00:35:47.639 --> 00:35:52.559 that they're going to use an s M two just because they don't want it 413 00:35:52.599 --> 00:35:53.679 to get closer, And then I want to take the risk of something any 414 00:35:53.679 --> 00:36:01.679 closer this point the geo strategic questions, I mean ufnaving destroyers taking a hit 415 00:36:01.800 --> 00:36:07.760 right now would be very high. And so if I'm fifth leader, if 416 00:36:07.760 --> 00:36:12.840 I'm said com I'm calling up every one of those ship captains and I'm in 417 00:36:12.880 --> 00:36:15.159 a personal discussion with them and say, whatever you do, do not take 418 00:36:15.199 --> 00:36:21.480 a hit. Yeah, I think that's clear. You know, you go 419 00:36:21.639 --> 00:36:27.679 Winchester and then you just leave because the repercussions of taking a hit, and 420 00:36:27.800 --> 00:36:31.960 you know, how long can we can we rope adope this with One thing 421 00:36:32.000 --> 00:36:38.159 we talked about before everything kicked off here is the fact that we don't have 422 00:36:38.239 --> 00:36:42.280 to convince you or most of the listeners here that we don't have the size 423 00:36:42.280 --> 00:36:46.480 of the navy we have, and especially when you are four deployed like that, 424 00:36:47.480 --> 00:36:51.880 and who knows what the mix is and those VLS cells, but you 425 00:36:51.960 --> 00:36:57.079 can't do it for a long time. And the who the these they're not 426 00:36:58.199 --> 00:37:01.280 they're not producing these themselves at least. I think they might do some local 427 00:37:01.320 --> 00:37:05.840 productions, some really low end stuff, but this stuff is getting to them 428 00:37:05.920 --> 00:37:13.239 from Iran and occasionally you were I mean, yeah, go back to the 429 00:37:13.280 --> 00:37:15.320 press release, you know. I mean, for the last five years, 430 00:37:16.000 --> 00:37:20.880 you can go with release of peaks. The US Navy and other Allied Navy 431 00:37:21.480 --> 00:37:28.920 have intercepted weapons being smuggled into Yemen for the Hooties by the Iranians on a 432 00:37:29.000 --> 00:37:31.679 pretty regular basis. And that's just the stuff that stopped. So you have 433 00:37:31.800 --> 00:37:36.960 to assume that if you're stopping a fair amount of stuff, a fair amount 434 00:37:36.960 --> 00:37:40.440 of stuff must be getting through. But I mean, just go back to 435 00:37:40.559 --> 00:37:45.880 sexual commands press releases from the last three or four years, and you'll see 436 00:37:45.000 --> 00:37:52.360 plenty of press releases of the just cruisers and just destroyers based Allied chips. 437 00:37:53.159 --> 00:37:57.159 Uh, you know, some of the US Coast starships that are operating over 438 00:37:57.199 --> 00:38:00.400 in the fifthe ao R all of this with you know, just the laid 439 00:38:00.440 --> 00:38:05.480 out on their flight deck, rockets, rocket parts, glitch of the cops, 440 00:38:06.079 --> 00:38:10.239 RPGs, SIP. The themisis the whole gamut laid out on a flight 441 00:38:10.320 --> 00:38:19.840 deck being inventory because we found dows and other non traditional methods smuggling that, 442 00:38:20.480 --> 00:38:25.159 and the source for all of that was Iran, and I don't know how 443 00:38:25.199 --> 00:38:29.239 many more ships it would take. And if you could get any of our 444 00:38:29.320 --> 00:38:35.280 allies who would be willing to do something tight like that, and we'd have 445 00:38:35.400 --> 00:38:39.119 to get anybody, no good admiralty lawyer. But you'd also have to look, 446 00:38:39.159 --> 00:38:45.159 you what can you do against Tahuthi, which is they're not a nation, 447 00:38:45.719 --> 00:38:50.599 they're a rebel organization who's acting in a piratical manner. I would be 448 00:38:50.800 --> 00:38:55.000 very interested to see what additional steps you could take without you know, you 449 00:38:55.079 --> 00:39:00.000 can't preach the International Order if you're violating it all the time. But they're 450 00:39:00.039 --> 00:39:05.039 there has to be some additional options we could take. But until people decide 451 00:39:05.159 --> 00:39:07.960 that that's not going to interfere with larger things they want to do with Iran 452 00:39:08.880 --> 00:39:14.519 treaty. Wise, I guess we just have to keep being pretty damn good 453 00:39:14.920 --> 00:39:20.000 at knocking things out of the air. Yeah, I'll tell you if anyone, 454 00:39:20.199 --> 00:39:23.000 if you you foul a letter of Mark right and you find yourself with 455 00:39:23.039 --> 00:39:27.760 a vessel, give me a call. I'll slid up. I'll be one 456 00:39:27.800 --> 00:39:32.840 of Salamander's private theres. Yeah, you know, I think under international law 457 00:39:32.840 --> 00:39:37.719 of war, these huthis who are not a uniform service but are engaging activities 458 00:39:37.719 --> 00:39:40.400 like dose, I think they're fair game. I don't think there's any any 459 00:39:40.519 --> 00:39:45.800 restriction on what you can do to people were shooting it too. You've got 460 00:39:45.800 --> 00:39:47.760 the you know, there is a law of self defense, and I think 461 00:39:47.800 --> 00:39:54.960 that includes the right to take out the source of the things that are attacking 462 00:39:55.079 --> 00:40:00.039 you. So i'd have to bote, I have to go back. I 463 00:40:00.119 --> 00:40:01.000 can look at it, but I think I think they're fair game. I 464 00:40:01.039 --> 00:40:05.159 think they're sort of like as you've said there, they're pirates. All their 465 00:40:05.400 --> 00:40:08.920 their pirate like but they're on on shore and they remind me of some of 466 00:40:09.000 --> 00:40:14.440 the other questions we've had dealt with insurgent forces. A lot of people are 467 00:40:14.480 --> 00:40:16.280 getting, you know, the international law is and what it used to be. 468 00:40:16.360 --> 00:40:21.320 Apparently, under international law, if you're a belligerent, you have a 469 00:40:21.480 --> 00:40:28.639 responsibility to provide the other belligerent with power and utility left to be considered a 470 00:40:28.719 --> 00:40:35.119 war crime to not provide the other belligerent. Uh, and that I was 471 00:40:35.239 --> 00:40:39.480 trying to find that in any of the Geneva Conventions or the Hague Conventions. 472 00:40:39.960 --> 00:40:44.400 I somehow couldn't admits it. But there were many people in my Twitter feeds 473 00:40:45.039 --> 00:40:51.960 that were insisting that that somehow a belligerent has a responsibility to provide the the 474 00:40:52.000 --> 00:40:55.400 obligements on the oppo opposite party with utilities left to be a war crime. 475 00:40:55.519 --> 00:40:59.800 The ken were off. The head of Amnesty International is very insistent on that, 476 00:41:00.440 --> 00:41:05.480 and he has to be an expert on international umanitarian law. I can't 477 00:41:05.599 --> 00:41:09.079 just be that he's a Jew hating thumbbag and its applied that only to Israel. 478 00:41:09.159 --> 00:41:13.440 I'm sure he's better than that, but I again, I don't understand. 479 00:41:13.559 --> 00:41:17.480 So I would say in the international still we have a right to prevent 480 00:41:17.559 --> 00:41:21.480 the who thies from taking the action that they are. But but who can 481 00:41:21.599 --> 00:41:25.960 tell what international laws anymore? It's active the discussions we haven't had it on 482 00:41:27.079 --> 00:41:34.000 Kidner, Yeah, there's a Again, it's been a wonderfully clarifying event or 483 00:41:34.159 --> 00:41:37.559 a sadly clarifying event, depending on how you want to look at it. 484 00:41:37.119 --> 00:41:43.000 With a lot of a lot of policymakers in the West, they don't have 485 00:41:43.440 --> 00:41:49.119 as much pull in the rest of the world unless it is fully aligned with 486 00:41:49.239 --> 00:41:52.360 him. A lot of these international organizations that have been around for a long 487 00:41:52.440 --> 00:41:57.440 time, and you know, we're gentlemen of a certain age. We remember 488 00:41:57.559 --> 00:42:00.320 they were. They weren't real supportive of the world during the Cold War. 489 00:42:00.760 --> 00:42:05.960 They were very selected there. But you know, there are a few realities 490 00:42:06.199 --> 00:42:10.960 that people are going to have to start pushing back on. For instance, 491 00:42:15.039 --> 00:42:17.440 the army talks a lot about urban war, and you know we need to 492 00:42:17.880 --> 00:42:21.480 and I think we've talked about it a few years ago here on the show 493 00:42:22.239 --> 00:42:25.960 that the challenges of the urban landscape in the coastal environment is very very real. 494 00:42:27.239 --> 00:42:30.039 It's also very very real if you have an enemy who is, as 495 00:42:30.119 --> 00:42:35.639 you said, launching their missiles next to the schools, mosques, you know, 496 00:42:37.800 --> 00:42:43.719 clinics, kindergartens. There is a certain point that we have to look 497 00:42:43.800 --> 00:42:46.719 back at the history of warfare. A couple of things. When we we 498 00:42:46.880 --> 00:42:54.280 had to take out ball bearing parent plants in Schweinfurt, we didn't mean to 499 00:42:54.360 --> 00:42:59.320 take out the schools and the hospitals that are three blocks away. But you 500 00:42:59.400 --> 00:43:02.880 know, that's just the way war is. And if you are fighting an 501 00:43:04.000 --> 00:43:07.800 enemy who is killing you, killing your children, raping your wives, and 502 00:43:08.119 --> 00:43:15.920 they are hiding inside of hospitals and shooting at you. That's a different set 503 00:43:15.199 --> 00:43:21.360 of requirements that people are going to have to just learn this is what we're 504 00:43:21.400 --> 00:43:24.400 going to do. You can take precision weapons and do the best you can 505 00:43:24.519 --> 00:43:32.920 do so, but you're I'm comfortable saying you're under no moral obligation to allow 506 00:43:34.039 --> 00:43:38.519 your enemy to use your virtue against you. And an existential battle that certain 507 00:43:38.559 --> 00:43:45.079 people are going to be fighting. How you start that conversation, I don't 508 00:43:45.159 --> 00:43:52.280 know, but a lot of it would be not responding to certain international organizations 509 00:43:52.320 --> 00:43:57.039 who feel like they can put out a press release and have spokesmen go up 510 00:43:57.079 --> 00:44:02.400 to the podium and try to talk around it are apologized. I'm waiting to 511 00:44:02.440 --> 00:44:08.719 see that movement take place in higher echelons of areas. But there's a window 512 00:44:08.800 --> 00:44:17.360 there if people want to speak correctly and speak realistically about what we're looking at. 513 00:44:19.000 --> 00:44:24.599 And as the Gaza operation goes another truth that I've found very frustrating, 514 00:44:25.760 --> 00:44:31.199 and a lot of the people wearing the white hats are doing it as well. 515 00:44:31.760 --> 00:44:37.719 One thing that's been constant throughout all human written history in a war, 516 00:44:37.320 --> 00:44:43.679 when there is an urban area under siege or in conflict, all supplies that 517 00:44:43.840 --> 00:44:49.840 come in water, food, medical, It goes to the garrison first. 518 00:44:50.280 --> 00:44:54.480 So all these trucks that are coming across the Egyptian border for quote humanitarian aid, 519 00:44:55.559 --> 00:45:02.119 that's just not going to be noncombatants whatever that is in Gaza. It's 520 00:45:02.199 --> 00:45:07.119 going to take care of the garrison first, and that's going to extend this 521 00:45:07.239 --> 00:45:13.480 conflict longer. Which if you really wanted to be a dark, dark minded 522 00:45:13.559 --> 00:45:17.199 person, that's why the hostages were taken. They played this out pretty well. 523 00:45:17.719 --> 00:45:23.639 They're going to play our virtue against this hour being the non hamas sorting 524 00:45:24.480 --> 00:45:30.360 part of the planet. They know that there's a lack of patience and there's 525 00:45:30.480 --> 00:45:36.880 a lot of people who they can't be discussed with reasons and hard facts. 526 00:45:36.880 --> 00:45:40.679 They're just very, very emotional and it's worked in the past and it's kind 527 00:45:40.719 --> 00:45:45.840 of working in certain areas right now. Hopefully we'll have leaders that will have 528 00:45:45.960 --> 00:45:49.960 this mind that you need at times like this. Yeah, it helps to 529 00:45:50.039 --> 00:45:53.000 take along of you. Since where you're saying that, and since we're in 530 00:45:53.079 --> 00:46:00.800 the Christmas season, I actually thought about the seventh chapter of the Book of 531 00:46:00.880 --> 00:46:07.119 Isaiah, which I know that there's blinds in there that the people of the 532 00:46:07.199 --> 00:46:15.320 Christian faith would view as being prophetic of the of the of the Birth of 533 00:46:15.440 --> 00:46:20.360 Jesus, some seven hundred years after it was written. But if you read 534 00:46:20.960 --> 00:46:28.199 the entire chapter, when Isaiah looks at the king and says, you know, 535 00:46:28.400 --> 00:46:32.559 behold, this young woman will be with child uh and and uh and 536 00:46:32.760 --> 00:46:36.800 that you know the people will call it, she will call it. Then 537 00:46:36.840 --> 00:46:40.880 God is with us. The rest of that is the sign that says, 538 00:46:42.320 --> 00:46:46.760 and you know before he knows who speak, you know, knows what is 539 00:46:46.880 --> 00:46:51.039 different from good and evil. He will be eating clean and butter. The 540 00:46:51.559 --> 00:46:55.679 historical context around that when you read that in context with the Book of Cross, 541 00:46:55.719 --> 00:47:00.039 of the Book of King is Jerusalem was under seat, right, I 542 00:47:00.079 --> 00:47:04.159 mean, and the people were starving and the king was losing faith, and 543 00:47:04.280 --> 00:47:08.360 Isaiah was telling him, listen, this child will have food to eat when 544 00:47:08.440 --> 00:47:14.000 it is born, because God will deliver us from this siege. That was 545 00:47:14.159 --> 00:47:20.920 the point that Isaiah was making to the king in saying that, And you're 546 00:47:20.960 --> 00:47:24.519 exactly right, the kid would have been the last one to get said in 547 00:47:24.679 --> 00:47:29.000 whatever they had because they needed food for the soldiers to keep the speech, 548 00:47:29.199 --> 00:47:31.880 because that would mean that the siege is over. And that was the sign 549 00:47:32.000 --> 00:47:36.559 that Isaiah was promising the king from God? Is that is that the kid 550 00:47:36.599 --> 00:47:43.199 would be able to eat rich food because that therefore the siege would be over 551 00:47:43.280 --> 00:47:46.440 it because in their siege, you don't feed the kids, and we have 552 00:47:47.199 --> 00:47:52.440 That's twenty seven hundred years ago and in many ways know less true today. 553 00:47:54.639 --> 00:48:00.159 Yeah, I am. I look at some of this situation. I'm wondering 554 00:48:00.199 --> 00:48:05.639 where European allies are. I mean, and specifically with the Red Sea. 555 00:48:06.280 --> 00:48:10.840 Where's France, Where's Spain? Where's Italy? Where is the UK? Where 556 00:48:10.880 --> 00:48:15.079 are the Germans? I mean, I know they did their anti piracy patrols, 557 00:48:15.159 --> 00:48:20.039 but but there we're not the ones although we use a lot of Middle 558 00:48:20.079 --> 00:48:22.599 East oil, we're not the ones who are totally depend on Middle East oil 559 00:48:22.719 --> 00:48:27.800 like some of the countries I just rolled through. So uh, you know 560 00:48:27.960 --> 00:48:30.039 that back in the days we had that concept of a thousand ship navy, 561 00:48:31.119 --> 00:48:35.519 and we've got all these we've got all these allies, Where the heck are 562 00:48:35.599 --> 00:48:39.559 they? And why are they not assisting in the in the thwarting of the 563 00:48:40.159 --> 00:48:49.360 ill doings of the Huthis and and keeping the the Red Sea and the Suez 564 00:48:49.440 --> 00:48:52.440 Canal open? Because I mean, last time this went through, this kind 565 00:48:52.480 --> 00:48:57.360 of Shindig nineteen sixty seven that the Suez Canal was closed for eight years. 566 00:48:57.960 --> 00:49:00.199 I don't think we want to go through that again. Well, I thot 567 00:49:00.719 --> 00:49:05.800 the you know, a great idea for a show the two people to debate 568 00:49:05.920 --> 00:49:08.800 what you know the Europeans are doing, should be doing, and how we 569 00:49:08.880 --> 00:49:14.760 should be engaging with them. You should have a host of mid rats conversation 570 00:49:15.440 --> 00:49:19.519 with Bridge Polby and Coy Shockey. Get the two of them together and have 571 00:49:19.719 --> 00:49:23.960 a too serious thinkers with two very different views on on the on what the 572 00:49:24.079 --> 00:49:30.360 role of of the US visa, the the European our European allies is and 573 00:49:30.440 --> 00:49:32.000 should be. You have you'd have a great show that I would. I 574 00:49:32.039 --> 00:49:38.920 would absolutely. I've listened to that over and over again. We'll write that 575 00:49:39.079 --> 00:49:49.039 down. Take that good note. The one thing that kind of along the 576 00:49:50.760 --> 00:49:55.119 the same lines of when we were talking earlier about you know, we always 577 00:49:55.159 --> 00:50:00.440 had this conversation that trying to explain and you know this is a time where 578 00:50:00.480 --> 00:50:02.599 you need more ships. We don't have enough navy. I mean, we've 579 00:50:02.639 --> 00:50:07.400 talked about that over and over again, and I saw something that just it 580 00:50:08.440 --> 00:50:13.360 kind of knocked me back, because before you can have that conversation. You've 581 00:50:13.400 --> 00:50:19.480 got to have an audience that has some open years and kind of a change 582 00:50:19.480 --> 00:50:21.679 of the topic here for a bit. But I don't know if you saw. 583 00:50:22.599 --> 00:50:27.320 Ben Coleman was out at the Ronald Reagan by National Security and he took 584 00:50:27.360 --> 00:50:37.480 a screenshot of the faith in various institutions and it was on the slide. 585 00:50:37.960 --> 00:50:44.719 In addition to let's see what we have here, we've got the Presidency, 586 00:50:44.960 --> 00:50:47.639 Supreme Court, everything else. You also have the US military. And if 587 00:50:47.639 --> 00:50:53.000 you look at twenty eighteen, the US military had a seventy percent confidence then 588 00:50:53.559 --> 00:51:00.679 and now we're down to forty six percent. It's been a larger drop than 589 00:51:00.760 --> 00:51:04.039 any of those other all the institutions that people have the less faith in, 590 00:51:04.119 --> 00:51:07.360 but the military has had the most drastic drop. When you know you're up 591 00:51:07.440 --> 00:51:14.559 high, you can go down pretty far. As we go forward in the 592 00:51:14.559 --> 00:51:17.440 next few years, as we try to use examples like what we have in 593 00:51:17.480 --> 00:51:21.039 the Red Sea, not just talking to our allies to do more, but 594 00:51:21.159 --> 00:51:25.280 talking to the American public and they're representatives about hey, this is why this 595 00:51:25.519 --> 00:51:30.400 is serious. How do you like to buy these imports? How would you 596 00:51:30.480 --> 00:51:35.280 like to pay two times for them? The whole economic tie in and the 597 00:51:35.360 --> 00:51:38.320 fact that these things don't magically happen, and a world full of bad faith 598 00:51:38.440 --> 00:51:43.599 actors, you have to have good faith actors with forces willing to stand up 599 00:51:43.679 --> 00:51:46.320 to them. Are you just like we've lost most of the South China Sea 600 00:51:46.400 --> 00:51:50.039 because a bad faith actor went in there and said, this is mine, 601 00:51:50.119 --> 00:51:55.079 do something about it. Eventually we go back to a eighteenth and seventeenth century 602 00:51:55.280 --> 00:52:01.639 world were some parts of the ocean you just don't go in. Is what 603 00:52:01.760 --> 00:52:06.400 are your thoughts one about why that has fallen so fast? And is that 604 00:52:06.639 --> 00:52:13.719 something that will be part of the headwinds We have to try to explain why 605 00:52:13.840 --> 00:52:17.400 our naval why our navy needs to be stronger, and why naval naval power 606 00:52:17.800 --> 00:52:24.199 needs to be a more important part of our national security investments. Yeah, 607 00:52:25.159 --> 00:52:31.639 I saw that flied from the from the Reagan Defense Forum. One. I 608 00:52:31.760 --> 00:52:42.920 think it's we're caught up in institutions losing their credibility. Part of that is 609 00:52:43.239 --> 00:52:52.159 we need better institutions. Part of that is we have a and I hate 610 00:52:52.719 --> 00:53:02.239 so there's so much bad information out there, and so the impulse of many 611 00:53:02.360 --> 00:53:07.639 is we have to regulate the information flow, and that will only make the 612 00:53:07.719 --> 00:53:12.239 problem worse. You know, Yes, there's a lot of garbage on social 613 00:53:12.320 --> 00:53:15.840 media that a lot of people will take a look at it, it'll and 614 00:53:15.000 --> 00:53:21.159 make it seem truthful, and then it's like, well, we have to 615 00:53:21.280 --> 00:53:25.159 regulate to make sure that there's not different disinformation out there. I think that 616 00:53:25.400 --> 00:53:29.079 within the United States. I mean, I'm a big believer in banning TikTok 617 00:53:30.079 --> 00:53:36.880 because that's a foreign influence operation. But for American social media companies, I 618 00:53:37.000 --> 00:53:44.960 think that more information, clearer information is the best antidotes to that. And 619 00:53:45.360 --> 00:53:51.440 frankly, institutions need to learn how to communicate their own effectiveness and work. 620 00:53:51.519 --> 00:53:57.960 That's part of the mission test good in the military is not good at that 621 00:53:58.159 --> 00:54:00.639 anymore. We used to be better at it. I mean, we're not 622 00:54:00.800 --> 00:54:06.480 good at it anymore, and we are they I still may be occasionally think 623 00:54:06.519 --> 00:54:10.119 of myself as part of an organization I've retired from. They need to learn 624 00:54:10.199 --> 00:54:16.199 to adapt and overcome and be able to communicate effectively with the people whose support 625 00:54:16.320 --> 00:54:23.400 that they need, and they're not doing that. And if you can't describe 626 00:54:23.440 --> 00:54:29.320 to people why what you're doing is relevant to their life, then don't expect 627 00:54:29.360 --> 00:54:31.360 them to care about it because people got lots of things to care about, 628 00:54:32.480 --> 00:54:36.400 and that's that's just the way, you know, that's that's the way the 629 00:54:36.440 --> 00:54:42.239 cookie crumbles. There's less people in the general population with military experience, and 630 00:54:42.719 --> 00:54:49.400 frankly, more and more people view what goes on overseas as not connected to 631 00:54:49.480 --> 00:54:52.840 them, and they wish that there was just that they could deal with less 632 00:54:52.920 --> 00:55:04.079 of it. And I fully understand that impulse. But what responsible people need 633 00:55:04.239 --> 00:55:08.719 to be able to communicate is that what happens overseas will ultimately affect the lives 634 00:55:09.480 --> 00:55:15.360 of the American people. So the degree something's going on overseas that isn't going 635 00:55:15.440 --> 00:55:17.920 to affect the lives of the American people, then I think we need to 636 00:55:17.960 --> 00:55:22.159 be less engaged in that. There's a lot of do gooderism that has made 637 00:55:22.280 --> 00:55:30.119 up US policy over certainly the twentieth into the twenty first century, ebbs and 638 00:55:30.199 --> 00:55:34.320 flows at various times, and if it's not going to directly affect the way 639 00:55:34.400 --> 00:55:37.079 the American people live their lives, then you know, maybe the right answer 640 00:55:37.239 --> 00:55:39.920 is we're just going to be less interested in that. We're going to commit 641 00:55:40.159 --> 00:55:45.000 not so many resources to that. That's part of the argument with going on 642 00:55:45.159 --> 00:55:50.920 now with support the Ukraine. I think that what happens in you saying will 643 00:55:51.039 --> 00:55:57.199 matter to the average Americans sooner or later, and therefore I'm comfortable that we 644 00:55:57.320 --> 00:56:04.199 need to continue to commit resources to avoid Ukraine from falling to Russian aggression. 645 00:56:04.800 --> 00:56:07.400 But that's got to get explained and if the how and the why need to 646 00:56:07.440 --> 00:56:12.639 get tied together, which is something that I understand isn't getting done real well. 647 00:56:12.719 --> 00:56:17.880 So I understand people who are skeptical about making that connection again. You 648 00:56:17.960 --> 00:56:22.280 know, you know, a guy like Bridge Colby has written eloquently about the 649 00:56:22.440 --> 00:56:28.360 Indo pay com and why we need to care because it will affect the way 650 00:56:28.519 --> 00:56:31.800 Americans be their life if that goes in a south direction. But if we 651 00:56:31.800 --> 00:56:37.920 don't make the case of why things overseas affect how people live their lives in 652 00:56:37.960 --> 00:56:43.480 the United States, then they're going to be right not to care. Yeah, 653 00:56:43.719 --> 00:56:49.880 I think we need some good insurance salesman talk about how the US Navy 654 00:56:50.039 --> 00:56:53.639 Hexcess has an insurance policy for the country, and we need some clever advertising 655 00:56:53.719 --> 00:56:55.760 to get that out to the public. I don't think we do a very 656 00:56:55.800 --> 00:57:00.519 good job. But one of the other questions I have for you is if 657 00:57:01.039 --> 00:57:07.119 given the the number of ships we have, apparently we have two DDGs on 658 00:57:07.679 --> 00:57:12.559 pretty much in or near the Red Sea right now, and you know they're 659 00:57:12.599 --> 00:57:17.119 both firing off their weaponry. Uh, where are we going to? Are 660 00:57:17.159 --> 00:57:21.039 we? Do we have enough dds to keep cycling a couple of these things 661 00:57:21.079 --> 00:57:24.079 in and out if their other job is to is to provide escort duties for 662 00:57:24.159 --> 00:57:29.840 the carriers who've got in the region, good question. I'm not. I 663 00:57:29.880 --> 00:57:35.400 don't do global force management anymore. So oh darn you should know anywhere the 664 00:57:35.639 --> 00:57:39.840 uh uh you know. That was one of the nice things about my year 665 00:57:40.360 --> 00:57:49.519 on the National Security Council staff was that every morning all the service chiefs, 666 00:57:50.280 --> 00:57:54.719 that's a brief. It's got a PowerPoint slide of where all of their forces 667 00:57:54.800 --> 00:57:59.280 are all over the world. So the Navy has one, the Air Force 668 00:57:59.360 --> 00:58:05.599 has one, Marine Corps. It was just getting stood up for Space Force 669 00:58:06.360 --> 00:58:08.840 as I was there. And then there's kind of an overall phynopsis that the 670 00:58:08.960 --> 00:58:16.519 chairman gets and those intel breachs that are geared towards each service and then what's 671 00:58:16.559 --> 00:58:20.559 going on and then what the lay down is and the blue and the red 672 00:58:21.440 --> 00:58:23.280 I had because of what the job by an NFC. I was on everyone's 673 00:58:23.320 --> 00:58:25.960 distribution for that. So the first thing I would do when I would turn 674 00:58:27.000 --> 00:58:30.960 on my computer and boot up Jawiz is I would see where all of our 675 00:58:30.039 --> 00:58:37.039 deployed forces were across every service across all over the world, and that kind 676 00:58:37.039 --> 00:58:40.159 of gave me something to frame my day with. I haven't had that since 677 00:58:40.840 --> 00:58:45.199 December of twenty twenty, so I'm three years and changed out of date on 678 00:58:45.280 --> 00:58:49.760 that. So I don't know. I just know what the US. I 679 00:58:49.960 --> 00:58:53.760 followed the DoD and it's co COM's press releases on my Twitter feed. That's 680 00:58:53.800 --> 00:58:59.800 why I was so happy that Central Command put out a good, solid information 681 00:59:00.519 --> 00:59:05.480 timeline for what's going on with Carne. There have been reports the Hudner, 682 00:59:05.480 --> 00:59:08.719 which is one of the newer DDGs, and the Mason, which is one 683 00:59:08.719 --> 00:59:15.239 of the early Flight two a's eighty seven have had reports of them in the 684 00:59:15.360 --> 00:59:22.960 area of the Red Sea and engaged in different activities visa the hoopies since October 685 00:59:22.159 --> 00:59:27.119 seventh. So I've read about those three shifts, but I don't know where 686 00:59:27.199 --> 00:59:32.480 we might have additional missile staged for reload. I don't know where we might 687 00:59:34.119 --> 00:59:38.079 have additional DDGs either in the fifth fleet or sixth feet aor they could come 688 00:59:38.159 --> 00:59:42.960 in and out and slop through them. I don't do global force management it 689 00:59:43.000 --> 00:59:47.559 anymore. So I hope you've got the resources to keep the president of station 690 00:59:47.719 --> 00:59:53.880 for as long as if you need to to keep that choke point open. 691 00:59:54.639 --> 01:00:00.440 But you have to ask someone else through the details are at well. You 692 01:00:00.639 --> 01:00:05.719 just you just made me feel bad because now I miss Jaywicks too. But 693 01:00:05.800 --> 01:00:08.320 it's been fourteen years for me, So you're right that that's a great way 694 01:00:08.400 --> 01:00:12.599 to start your morning. You just kind of you peek behind the curtains and 695 01:00:12.960 --> 01:00:15.840 see what the world's greatest navy is doing. Mark, it's the top of 696 01:00:15.920 --> 01:00:22.280 the hour. We really appreciate you coming in and joining us here. I 697 01:00:22.400 --> 01:00:29.039 know you've got a legit really good paying gig coming up. Just just for 698 01:00:29.199 --> 01:00:31.119 the listeners, what are some of the great things you can you can tell 699 01:00:31.119 --> 01:00:35.840 them to look forward to with your baby as we look forward to her commissioning. 700 01:00:37.440 --> 01:00:43.079 So we've got next year at I think Canta Manette Marine we're going to 701 01:00:43.320 --> 01:00:49.519 deliver the last three of the lcs's. I know that that's a program that 702 01:00:49.599 --> 01:00:53.280 you have many opinions on. I'll just say, well, we've got to 703 01:00:53.599 --> 01:00:59.199 accepted trials on on Nantucket next week. That's some things. I'm going back 704 01:00:59.239 --> 01:01:02.719 to it. And then early as soon as the ice belts on the Great 705 01:01:02.760 --> 01:01:07.159 Links, we should be doing trials on Beloit and Cleveland, and then we 706 01:01:07.239 --> 01:01:15.719 will be done with Elsies and what they do. Oh, for some reason 707 01:01:15.800 --> 01:01:19.880 we just lost Mark. Well, Mark, we got a bit and we 708 01:01:20.000 --> 01:01:22.480 thank you very much for join us. You go on, you have anything 709 01:01:22.599 --> 01:01:27.400 for our listeners before we close it down. No, I want to thank 710 01:01:27.480 --> 01:01:31.079 Mark for coming on, and I thank the people who would listen to us 711 01:01:31.079 --> 01:01:36.519 today. Thanks for all the great comments in the chat room. It's been 712 01:01:36.639 --> 01:01:40.000 very educational. You guys are always teaching us new stuff. Yeah. Absolutely, 713 01:01:40.039 --> 01:01:43.639 I appreciate everybody that does come in the chat room. It's good to 714 01:01:43.679 --> 01:01:49.559 see Ms Boston Maggie there as well. And I thanks everybody for join us 715 01:01:49.599 --> 01:01:53.480 for another edition of mid Rats. And I hope everybody has a safe, 716 01:01:53.760 --> 01:01:59.480 enjoyous holiday season and going through to the New Year's and so next time, 717 01:01:59.519 --> 01:02:16.440 I hope you'll have a great Navy day. Likely want to marry me and 718 01:02:17.840 --> 01:02:25.559 release a friend of becondily for you being to blame my love fairly love me 719 01:02:27.000 --> 01:02:35.880 silly, falling your the tame. It's a long way to dip y. 720 01:02:36.880 --> 01:02:45.119 It's a long way. It's a long way to dip the enemy. To 721 01:02:45.400 --> 01:02:59.039 the Queen dor becdi fairwell, listen, swell, it's a long long way 722 01:02:59.199 --> 01:03:19.440 to differ. But at Phaara and Pharah, our philosophy can be boiled down 723 01:03:19.519 --> 01:03:24.119 to one word. Respect. Respect for every client, regardless of who they 724 01:03:24.159 --> 01:03:29.920 are or the size of their case, respect for innocent victims, and respect 725 01:03:29.960 --> 01:03:34.159 for the law. So when the insurance company thinks they can bully you instead 726 01:03:34.199 --> 01:03:38.119 of paying a claim, we respectfully disagree. If you're hurt, call Phair 727 01:03:38.159 --> 01:03:43.000 and Pharah. We'll help you get the respect you deserve. Call eight hundred, 728 01:03:43.079 --> 01:03:46.880 five hundred fifty five fifty five, Jacksonville. At the Blue Cross and 729 01:03:46.920 --> 01:03:52.280 Blue Shield Federal Employee Program, we're helping you spend less on your prescriptions With 730 01:03:52.400 --> 01:03:57.119 the FVP Medicare Prescription Drug Program. 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