WEBVTT

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Welcome to mid Rats with sal from
Commander Salamander and the Eagle One from Eagles

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Speak at see your Shore, your
Home for a discussion of national security issues

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in all things maritime, and welcome
aboard everybody. Is great to be here

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again with you. And for those
that are with us live, we already

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see Paul is there, but I'd
like to do my normal altar call.

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Scroll down to the bottom of the
show page. That's where you will find

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the chat room. We'll be watching
it during the course of the show.

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If there's some topics that you would
like for us to address or some questions,

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that's a perfect place to put it. Also, if you're with us

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live, at the top of the
show page, you will see this studio

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number and if you want to call
in at ry code three four seven three

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zero eight eight three ninety seven,
that's the place to do it. Give

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us a call. We'll be glad
to take you on board and answer your

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question. Because today we have the
ever popular mid Rats free for all where

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it's just my illustrious co host and
I here today talking about the interest interesting

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items. It may have come up, or may not have come up,

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but popped into our minds nonetheless.
So, hey Eagle, one, good

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afternoon. It's great to be sitting
here with you again. Hey, Soil

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could to talk to you. Well, what's on your mind this week?

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Well, as usual, we cheated
a little bit in the pre show and

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I think we pretty much completed.
So we already did the show and now

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we're done, but we ACTI had
to at least get our kickstart going.

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And one of the things that has
a lot of people interesting, and I

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think it's a topic that should be
interesting to everybody, depend upon what tribe

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you belong to. Those that like
military fiction are the defense entrepreneur crowd,

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who are looking for ways that we
can harness either new existing or new emerging

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technologies or developments or platforms or capabilities
to be aful for us to be able

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to create effects on the battlefield,
whether you're at sea or shore, in

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the air and lower or whatever that
can give us a comparative advantage over potential

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adversaries. And usually it is technology, because we have been blessed for most

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of our living memory of not only
being the largest, but being the most

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technologically adapt and that has given us
the ability, especially during the Cold War,

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to try to get an advantage over
maths and centralized control. That was

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the Soviet Union, and we had
a little bit of a break from history,

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distracted by some international terrorists for a
few decades. And now we are

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facing a nation who if they had
three hundred and forty billion people, which

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is a few billion correction, three
hundred and forty million people of their population

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disappear, which is a few million
more than what the US has, they

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would still have a billion people there. They are about to eclip us in

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the economy, and if you're just
counting holes in the water, they already

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have a larger navy. And so
the Deputy Secretary of Defense Hicks, whose

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reputation and good work before speak for
herself, she has come out and last

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couple of weeks she teased it and
then she gave a presentation on it.

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And I actually wrote on it,
and I'll put a link to it if

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I can in the chat room.
I think it was my Thursday post.

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If people wanted to go over to
my subject, they can read it that

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when I was looking it over and
I just I read the text. However,

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my illustrious co host actually watched it, which I think is always an

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advantage because you get tone and inflection
and emphasis and spoken word that you don't

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get just by reading text. I
thought it was eighty percent not quite what

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we want. That kind of scratched
my early zero zero's age of transformationalism,

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a little bit of salesmanship, a
little bit of off set seeking. But

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the other twenty percent, I thought
the last part of it was really good,

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had some solid stuff, And I've
if she ever asked my advice,

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which of course she didn't, I
would say take this eighty percent and rewrite

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it in tune with the latter twenty
percent, because I think the replicator is

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doing what we've talked about here a
little bit is it's looking at the lessons

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learned the last two and three quarters
of years of the Russia and listened to

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her. What was kind of some
of your takeaways from it? Well,

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I've kind of take the opposite I
say opposite, completely opposite to you,

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but I have I have a more
optimistic view of this. First thing is

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that for years we've recognized the Chinese
relpability US on capital ships, that that

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they've got a really good anti access
area of denial system in place that poses

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problems. And we've discussed with people
about using various kinds of unmanned vessels,

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surface and subsurface and aerial equipment to
kind of get into that system to stop

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up the gaps we have to worry
about. I think this is kind of

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a step above that, which is
earning great lessons from the Ukrainian approach and

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from an old book, uh,
Tom Classy's Red Storm Rising, which is

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uh and if you if you remember
the carriers are out there and they're fighting

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the Russians, and that there's a
wave of missiles that come in bound,

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and that the carrier fights it up. But by the time they fight off

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this initial wave, I think I've
got this story right, they have gone.

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They're out of out of bullets to
fight the next wave of things that

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are coming in. So, uh, you know what what you're talking about.

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I don't know if you've seen it
yet, but I wanted to point

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it out while we're on the topic. On YouTube, there's a guy or

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a group of folks who took that
scene from Red Storm Rising, which it

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was the old TU sixteen with I
think it was the celt with their out

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David anti ship cruise missile that they
had spooping backfire bombers and they've actually gone

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into one of those video games simulate
and simulated the scene. It actually have

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the words for the book. It's
really good. If you go over and

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you know Red Storm Rising on YouTube, this whole series of places where that

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they theo that. But yeah,
that's that's a real good comparison. Yeah.

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So I'm looking at this thinking,
Okay, if if we have problems

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with numbers and their defenses, what
is the best way to attack uh defenses

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like that? And uh, like
an old football coach, I'm thinking,

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well, i want to run all
my wide receivers and tight ends down there

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near the end zone. We're just
going to flood the zone. Somebody will

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be open because they can't cover everybody. And that's you know, that's what

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I see this. This is if
you're going to flood the zone, you

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take you build cheap assets, expendable
assets for not much money. And here

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we are talking to Ukrainians making cardboard
drones to attack. You know, they

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can't their their their radar difficult to
find, and they don't cost that much.

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But they're doing the job. And
you know, we need to look

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at that approach. We need and
I'm I am happy that they're there's a

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desire there to innovate and and to
talk about the innovation to come in,

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not mentioning specifics, which I think
is you know, what she said was,

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we're building on existing programs. This
is not a new program, and

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we're gonna use the existing programs as
guests, as frames or models for what

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we're going to be doing. Plus
the I'm sure they're going to incorporate a

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lot of stuff from from the uh
we're learning from from the Russians and the

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Ukrainians, I mean, and the
Iranians for that matter. I mean,

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the Russians are now, as I
understand it, constructing Iranian drones for their

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use. So this is getting really
interesting in the in the Ukrainis. So

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you know, if you we just
want to build enough stuff to flood the

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zone, we want to do it
in the air. We want to do

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it in the surface. We want
to do it subservice. We want to

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make all the racket we can.
What's the best way to hide your units?

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Make so much noise, make so
much clutter that you're difficult to pick

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out what's real and what isn't real. And uh so I'm I'm hopeful for

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that, and you know it it
is I hope she says, this is

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not a long term project. This
is this is this is for five years.

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Basically, we want to have this
stuff ready to go in a year

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or two and and we don't expect
this program to last maybe five seven years,

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and and then we'll follow it on
with whatever comes next. So I

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thought that was, you know,
that was not one of these this will

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be the answer once and for all, This will this will be the perfect

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solution. It was. It was
opposite that, it was, we know,

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we've got a short term problem.
We've got to come up with a

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short term solution. And and away
she was describing is it. This doesn't

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require any new money. They're going
to do this out of the Defense Innovation

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Board or whatever group that is.
And and apparently they're going to pool all

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the innovation money from the services and
they're going to self fund this without having

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to go through Congress to get new
approvals and all that. And you know,

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it's I'm impressed with that. I'm
this is the kind of thing that

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I think many of us have been
thinking should have been done done a while

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ago. But you had to have
the right people in the right place and

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somebody recognize it. Oh my gosh, we're kind of behind the eight ball

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now, so maybe that spurred this
on. You know, one thing,

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unfortunately I can't for whatever reason,
I can't post in the chat room.

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But if people go to my stub
stack on Thursday, I have embedded in

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there a great podcast I think I
may have mentioned on the show before.

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It's from twenty four July of this
year. It's on geopolitics Decanted, and

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it's on the experience that they've had
using tactical drones various drones in Ukraine,

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the advantages of disadvantages, the perception, the reality. Some of the issues

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that I had with the first eighty
percent of her speech was kind of derived

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from what I listened to in that
video. Is there are whether you're talking

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about communications and range to supply chain, issues of building these in large scale.

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And I think that in the short
term be interested to see how we're

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going to interface with Taiwan, because
these aren't things that you're going to be

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able to launch from Guam. If
you want to produce something fast, it's

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going to have to be what comes
off this shelf. There are some agricultural

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drones that there was a real neat
video that came out this week for those

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that are familiar with some of the
agricultural drones where you would see air tractor

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sprain and secticide and fungicide over fields. But they have as they have these

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industrial size quad copters that when you
open them up, they're about the size

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of a small Hyundai. They're pretty
big, but they will carry a few

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hundred pounds of insecticide or fungicide,
and they're just programmed to go do this

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this field of soybeans, so to
speak. Well, obviously if you have

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something that big, they can carry
a couple hundred pounds of liquid fungicide,

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they can carry a couple hundred pounds
of other things. And they're doing some

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the equivalent of precision one hundred and
fifty five millimeter around which are those ex

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caliber I don't remember off the top
of my head that those things like are

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in the mid five to low six
figures cost each. But they're using these

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agricultural drones to take those big Mod
sixty two anti take minds and the one

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video I saw of it, it
basically look like they duct tape the broom

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handle and a two liter plastic bottle
as a stabilizer on it, and they're

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dumping those out with a circle area
probability of single digit meters of the target.

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So yeah, there are some interesting
things out there. But I'm hoping

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that this is an additive thing,
and you're right. I think she verbalizes

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the fact this is an additive thing. I'm just a little bit concerned that

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people will overplay this again and use
this as an excuse not to do other

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things. I think a hard problem
we're going to have to fix at sea

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is, and you touched on it
a little bit, is the aw anti

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are warfare math is now very different
when you have X number of vls bells.

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You know, this makes Brian McGrath
really itchy when you start talking about

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vlsls that are going west. What
percentage of those have land attack cruise missiles?

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What percentage of those have you know, lightweight torpedoes, harpoons, et

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cetera. Take those out. That's
your remaining air to air missiles, whether

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it's standard missiles or quad packed essms. If you have X number of anti

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air missiles but you have four x
targets coming in, you go Winchester really

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fast. And that's an addition to
the ability those intermediate medium range ballistic missiles

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to try keep us closer to the
mid Pacific. If we start getting close

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to Pacific and our support ships go
Winchester on anti air, we can't.

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We can't any further. I think. I think that math and that problem

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is something that you know, you
look at what you can learn ashore to

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take to see that's a start of
tickling the back of my mind recently is

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along the lines of what you said, you've flood the zone. Whether I'm

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talking about the air here, but
you're right subsurface as well. When you

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have so few options in the magazine
to pursue a subsurface target that after a

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while your defense defensive weapons they're shot. How many days can you do that?

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So I think that is a great
concern. It would be great instead

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of being on the defensive about it, if we could be on the offense

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about it, which I think there
there is some some potential to use there

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to complicate the problem with the People's
Republic of China, especially when you look

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at some of the map that people
have done with the maritime militia and the

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coast Guard ships. What they could
do to the zone on the surface,

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how do you pick your targets?
It's a tough problem. Yeah, I

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think that the one of the great
benefits about this as you've got China preparing

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for exactly what we just talked what
you just talked about, you know,

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the carriers coming in, the the
all that stuff. What how do we

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change things so that they now have
to worry about something completely different? I

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mean, I mean that this is
the way you announce a program like this,

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and now the now the ball's back
in their court. Well, you

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know, yeah, we've we've we've
got all this nice stuff to fight the

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the US fleet. But what if
they can what if they come up with

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something completely weird that we haven't seen
except why you you know, Ukraine and

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Russian And if the Americans are as
innovative as they tend to be. Uh,

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and this is one of the things
that that Secretary Hicks was talking about.

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Wash gosh, let's let's uh,
let's be innovative. Let's think about

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the problem and get some really smart
people in there from industry and everyplace else.

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Sand Well, here's what we need
to do and go from there.

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I think I think there's a chance
here for this to be a remarkable five

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year period, seven year period.
And we have a caller, so let's

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uh see what the dice comes up
here, Eric Co two oh four,

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you're on midret Good afternoon, Sol. How are you doing today? It's

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Mark Hey, Mark doing quite well. It's good to hear it from you.

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I am, I am. I
am up in with Cotson, enjoying

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the r your podcast here on a
Sunday afternoon before I go back to to

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building ships tomorrow. So uh,
and I'm glad that you and Eagle are

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are talking about replicator and I caught
I joined a little late. Had you

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had a chance to talk in connection, because I think and I don't know

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if they're expreadly linked, but I'm
I'm I'm cautiously optimistic, although probably probably

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with more caution than optimism, on
the reporting that the Navy may establish what

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they're calling a Disruptive Capabilities Office what
in the Air Force and Space Force right

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now is called a rapid Capabilities Office. I don't know if you an Eagle

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talked about that at all. I
haven't have you Have you heard of that?

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Mark? I have so, and
I think, I mean, these

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are all kind of different avenues,
whether it's replicator or you know what's going

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on. I'm you have covered in
some of your blog posts and I've seen

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it elsewhere. The Army Rapid Capability
Office has done a great job, in

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my mind, of doing what an
r CEO should do, and you've seen

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that they're they're using existing systems in
many cases navies, existing systems like SM

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six and Tomahawk, and using that
in new and creative ways to take,

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you know, something from the maritime
domain and give the Army an advantage in

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the land domain. And that's great. My only worry about that you talked

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about that. I am worried about
how many SM six is, Tomahawks is

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the different variants, and then the
laz and the long range standoff missile.

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But that's a naval version of a
land attack missiles that the Air Force uses,

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and I worry about what is the
maximum number of those that aren't producible

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with our current supply chain, because
whatever that number is, we should be

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producing at the maximum of those three
systems across all the services that are going

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to use it. But I don't
know what that maximum is, and not

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from my advantage point, I'm not
exactly sure. And I hope someone is

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working what and you do to make
that maximum number a bigger number, but

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that you know, the worry in
a future fight of of running out of

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vital ammunition too early in a fight
is absolutely priority one for everyone who's who's

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thinking about a potential conflict in the
in the end of pay comp But yeah,

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you know, the the thing what
I hope for if the Navy establishes

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what they're calling a disruptive Capabilities Office, that I think makes the other services

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that have established it useful. And
it's a thought, and I always worry.

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I know you are a I think
it'll be putting it mild South to

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say that you are a long time
critic of the latoral combat your program.

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Would that be a fair comment.
I've had some things to say, right

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and and there are plenty of things
about that program that the Navy shouldn't do

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again. But I always worried that
in learning lessons we end up at we

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we ended up, we run the
risk of learning the wrong lesson. So

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and what I'll say is the Air
Force and the Space Force, and in

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my mind of all the services,
actually I think the Space Force they inherited

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this from the Air Force. When
they were separated. I think makes the

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best use of its Rapid Capabilities Office. I saw on the thirtieth of August

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they put out an announcement quote the
United States of considering considering the establishment of

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a disruptive Capabilities Office focused on rapid
fielding of existing technologies to address operational problems.

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According to Sports as well as a
draft document obtained by Breaking Defense,

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the final details of this new office
are still in flux, and plans could

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change penning approval from maybe Secretary Carlos
del Toro and Acting Chief Naval Operations and

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release a Franchetti. The draft charter, dated for June of twenty three and

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circulated the Summer Industry Event, stated
that DCO would be a quote unique office

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capable of quote rapidly solving emergent operational
problems with a broad aperture, unconstrained by

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legacy processes unquote, which I think
you're right, that would run in parallel

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with what the Deputy Defense Secretary was
talking about. I think it also kind

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of points out again one of one
of my little hobby horses, that we

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keep creating these systems that go around
our processes, but nobody's ever really looking

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at fixing the process everybody's trying to
work around. But that, yeah,

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let me tell you that's encouraged.
Let me give you a group on that,

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right. And that's the thing that
I worry about is, you know,

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it's like, we hate our process, so we want to go around

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our process, but sometimes we need
our process part of the And I'll just

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assume let's say we're unhappy with LCS. I know that's not a universally health

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position LCF as its defenders, but
let's say take as an example LCS.

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We did the requirements process for that
very quickly, some would say way too

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quickly, under the theory that we
didn't need it. We knew what we

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wanted and we were going to make
an end around from our requirements process.

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And in the end we got a
set of requirements documents for a ship that

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at least right now, the Navy
says they don't really need or don't meet

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as many as they thought they needed. And now, in part of that,

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you could say the world changed.
But I would say, if you

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say the world changed, then you
were being kind of shortsighted, because even

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in the early two thousands, the
possibility of a rising China becoming a peer

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competitor and needing to do you know, a a you be able to perform

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against high end threat was certainly there, even though we were focused on more

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low end and latoral threats. So
what I would say is you're when you

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and and and I've made this comment
about other ship building programs too. If

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you're going to buy a ship,
like a Ford class aircraft carrier that's going

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to be around for fifty years,
then taking a couple of extra years to

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get the requirements right and make sure
you have a technical design that you're really

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really sure of that you you know
you've got it all the eyes and done

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all the testing, and and and
and cross all those teas, even if

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that takes longer than you wanted.
For a platform that's going to be a

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fifty year platform, that's probably good. And the acquisition process we have for

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an aircraft that's going to be in
service for thirty years, you know,

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an aircraft or a ship that's going
to be in service, a class of

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ship that might be in service from
the commissioning of the first to the decommissioning

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of the last fifty years. If
you're process puts an extra couple of years

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on it, an extra three years
on it to be in order to have

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some additional rigor. That's probably time
well spent. The problem is is when

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that rigger is then required for something
that you want six months from now and

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that you're probably only going to use
for the next four or five years.

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And in that case, the process
is you know, we've got wow.

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You know, then that extra three
years means you've gone and basically your process

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keeps you from doing anything useful.
I think the Air Force and Space Force

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so far with their RCO have been
good. They treat their RCO like a

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separate systems command, so think of
it as an equivalent organization of what would

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be like a NASC or a navair
in and the Air Force has equivalent organizations,

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they call them systems centers instead of
systems commands. And what you do

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is you get you bypass the contracting
and technical processes that are meant to build

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rigor in those big demands for big
programs and say for this, I'm going

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to go rapidly and I'm going to
use non traditional contracting, I'm going to

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be very light hand on technical authority, and I'm going to just get something

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out there, but the organization still
has the authority to buy and field.

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And then it's a question of you
need a really good way of making the

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decision up front when you want to
go fill a need. Do I feel

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this via the traditional need because this
is something that's going to be around for

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a while, or is this something
that I want to go fast? Because

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if you get that wrong, then
you're going to commit that. You know,

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you're gonna have a problem up front. If you want to build a

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rapid aircraft carrier right here, that's
not going to go well. But to

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adapt some commercial uad for a military
use, to take a missile that does

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one thing and make it do something
else related and then not go through the

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traditional acquisition process that has the ability
or the field real caper ability much faster

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by going in a different path.
And I just my hope as as secretary

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and as the uh, you know, Secretary Deldoro and an Admiral Franchetti or

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Frank Ketty I believe I'm always pronounced
their name wrong. Admiral Frank Ketty.

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You know they're making these decisions going
forward. My one hope for them is

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that they have a really good decision
process put in place for what are they

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going to try and do rapidly and
then what are they going to do traditionally.

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Yeah, I think yeah. Let
me interrupt you there for a minute,

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because I think one of the things
you're hitting is what Secretary Assistant Deputy

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Whatevery Deputy Secretary Hicks has said is
she knows the four or five year project.

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She and they're they're doing this with
money they already have, and I

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think it's since it's all expendable and
she's going to use knowledge that already exists

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and try and change it. I
mean, we already know drone swarms.

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We've seen them. Everybody's seen him. You can send will you marry me

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messages with him. I mean,
none of this, I think is inventing

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a whole bunch of new stuff.
And I think you're right that given that,

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I don't think they're intent is to
go through that that and what you

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described is that three year process which
gets you things wonderful things like the LCS.

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So I think you're exactly right.
And by the way, for those

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of you who are listening, who
we're talking to is Mark Vandroff, Who's

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who's uh, the former NAVC guy
and now works for the company that that

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makes uh is making the frigates for
the US Navy. And I'm sure that

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what he's saying or his opinions the
opinions of company, that they're only mine

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there right there, and they are
not the opinions of thin Cantieri. Uh.

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But you know, UH, they
are my opinions, and I but

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I will expressed these opinions both privately
and publicly, so I have no problem

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sharing them with with you and and
the listeners of the podcast. But it's

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just you know, you guys interviewed
me when I when I was done with

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the National Security Council, uh job
that I had in twenty twenty, and

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one of the advantages I had from
that job was I got to see how

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each of the different services did the
same thing. So you know, I

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was I got to see each of
the services. Having just worried, you

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know, my whole career about how
Navy does acquisition. I was exposed to

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as the Army do acquisition, had
as the Air Force do acquisition. And

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then since we were standing up Space
Force at that time, how was Space

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Force going to do acquisition as a
derivative of what they were inheriting from the

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Air Force. And you know,
as the Navy goes forward and they established

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this Disruptive Capability Office, I just
we should make sure institutionally that we don't

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have a non invented here mentality.
Each of the services, the other services

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that have done this have learned some
good lessons. They've done some really good

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thing and they've made mistakes and would
be great at the Navy modeled the good

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thing and learned from the mistakes so
we don't have to make the same mistake

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that the Air Force or the Army
made two or three years ago. And

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you know, and there's now an
ed hurdor and that the things they've done,

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like you said, especially in the
Space Force, which has fielded some

365
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really really good capability uh really quickly
uh for our in space assets that we

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learned from them, and then say, okay, we see, we see

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what kind of structures and governance they
did. That that was good. Let's

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let's go take a look at that
as an example going forward. Let me

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let me ask you about that,
because that's something and you know, the

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past was always perfect unless you lived
in it, then it was horrible.

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But you know, you can look
back at other times where they're almost as

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seemed to be a culture of competition, where you were aggressively trying to steal

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the other guys good ideas and on
it your own, you know, you

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know how they want to call it
one whatever. But we have different offices

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with similar mandates. We have different
people and different cultures. If you keep

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an eye on it, or ideally
you have a healthy interchange between the two,

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you can get to a culture of
benchmarking is a nice way of saying,

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stealing other people's ideas, But where
do you think the needle is trending

379
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there towards? If it wasn't my
idea, then I'm not going to do

380
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it on one side of the range. The other side of the range is

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00:31:37.279 --> 00:31:40.119
hey, Air Force guy, let's
go, let's go play eighteen holes and

382
00:31:40.200 --> 00:31:41.799
let's talk about what you're doing so
I can steal some of your ideas.

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00:31:41.880 --> 00:31:48.799
Where do you see that needle moving? So that's why another area where I'm

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00:31:48.839 --> 00:31:57.960
cautiously optimistic, because I think enough
people are staring the threats of you know,

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everybody not deeply does not want to
be in a conflict with the People's

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00:32:02.400 --> 00:32:07.799
Republic of China. It would be
horrific the United States and the People's Republic

387
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of China got into an armed conflict. I think enough people are now realizing

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that the best way to prevent that
armed conflict is to have a reasonable and

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00:32:20.599 --> 00:32:25.079
credible deterrence, and to have that
deterrence be something that the PRC recognizes,

390
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And so that's creating a sense of
urgency, and senses of urgency always helped

391
00:32:30.720 --> 00:32:36.440
focus the mind. I can't remember
whether it was Chesterton or Churchill who said,

392
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or was it Johnson who said,
nothing focuses the mind quite so much

393
00:32:39.880 --> 00:32:45.400
as knowing that you're to be hung
in a fortnight. You know, that's

394
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the I can't remember who said that, but that's a that's a quote,

395
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and that's you know. So so
I think that part is healthy. I

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00:32:52.920 --> 00:32:57.240
remember as long ago as when I
went through the da US program manager course,

397
00:32:59.079 --> 00:33:04.880
the the Navair guys and the Right
Patterson guys. So the Air Systems

398
00:33:04.880 --> 00:33:08.359
Center, which is the Air Force's
equivalent out of Right Fat Patterson Air Force

399
00:33:08.400 --> 00:33:12.200
Base in Ohio, which is their
version of nav Air. It's their tech

400
00:33:12.240 --> 00:33:17.319
authority and contracting authority for fighters and
bombers and all their kind of major attack

401
00:33:17.359 --> 00:33:22.559
aircraft and you know, their their
tactical aircraft. You got the pms from

402
00:33:22.559 --> 00:33:27.599
there and the PMS from nav Air. And by the beginning of the school

403
00:33:27.960 --> 00:33:30.799
they were all like, oh,
yeah, we're completely different than you guys.

404
00:33:30.839 --> 00:33:34.359
You guys, you know, they're
separate camps. And by the end

405
00:33:34.400 --> 00:33:38.559
of the twelve weeks you realize that
basically what they did was way more similar

406
00:33:38.599 --> 00:33:44.240
than different because they were trying to
solve the same sets of problems. Right

407
00:33:44.920 --> 00:33:47.720
in the end. They each had
their own unique requirements and each had some

408
00:33:47.759 --> 00:33:53.039
of their own culture, but trying
to get an aircraft that'll fly in in

409
00:33:53.079 --> 00:33:59.559
a combat environment as a set of
problems that both were trying to to solve

410
00:33:59.720 --> 00:34:02.279
and had the same money problems,
and they had the same physics problems.

411
00:34:02.720 --> 00:34:07.920
So yeah, a little bit of
you know, most of the not invented

412
00:34:07.960 --> 00:34:13.400
here, you know, my way
or the highway kind of thinking. In

413
00:34:13.440 --> 00:34:19.119
some cases it's good because when it's
grounded in someone who's got you know,

414
00:34:19.159 --> 00:34:24.039
a unique set of requirements or unique
you know, uh set of needs.

415
00:34:24.039 --> 00:34:28.159
But you always want to be on
the guard because in some case it is

416
00:34:28.519 --> 00:34:31.800
either simple hubrists or people kind of
guarding rice bowls, uh, And that's

417
00:34:31.880 --> 00:34:36.320
never healthy. Uh, And I
don't know that that ever goes away,

418
00:34:36.320 --> 00:34:39.440
because that's part of the failed nature
of human beings. You just gotta guard

419
00:34:39.440 --> 00:34:45.679
against it real carefully. Yeah,
I think for a while, I don't

420
00:34:45.719 --> 00:34:49.239
know have a great feelings for where
it's going. But you know, as

421
00:34:49.280 --> 00:34:52.599
a circuit twenty twenty, when I
was seeing at at least at the senior

422
00:34:52.679 --> 00:34:58.960
levels of the services, they look
to be more willing to cooperate on stuff

423
00:34:58.960 --> 00:35:04.599
like that. And frankly, you
know, operationally we've been as joint as

424
00:35:04.599 --> 00:35:08.639
we want to be for the last
half generation. I mean, the US

425
00:35:08.920 --> 00:35:14.920
armed forces fight combined arms. We
don't fight at single services anymore. We

426
00:35:14.920 --> 00:35:19.280
we fight at combined arms. The
question is can we develop in a combined

427
00:35:19.360 --> 00:35:22.320
manner. I think one of the
ways they're looking at fixing that issue is

428
00:35:22.360 --> 00:35:30.119
that, according to the Deputy's Secretary, that replicator will be under the charge

429
00:35:30.159 --> 00:35:37.000
of the Deputy's Innovation Steering Group,
chaired by Hicks, the Deputy Secretary,

430
00:35:37.039 --> 00:35:38.960
and the vice chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. Sounds to me like

431
00:35:39.239 --> 00:35:45.400
that the the the big cheeses in
this are not the service chiefs, but

432
00:35:45.480 --> 00:35:49.719
the the people who are going to
control the funding and where and the decision

433
00:35:49.760 --> 00:35:53.559
making about who gets what where when, uh and and at the at the

434
00:35:53.800 --> 00:36:00.400
dood itself rather than in the service
branches. And my concern about that is

435
00:36:00.400 --> 00:36:02.360
who is closest to the knee.
I mean, I'm sure the lall have

436
00:36:04.199 --> 00:36:07.760
that that room will have the services
will all have a voice. They usually

437
00:36:07.840 --> 00:36:13.920
do in rooms like that, you
know. And again, frankly, you're

438
00:36:13.960 --> 00:36:21.400
not going to get detailed decisions in
a deputy in something that's chaired by the

439
00:36:22.719 --> 00:36:27.239
deputy, right, just because that's
not you have not created a room there.

440
00:36:27.360 --> 00:36:30.800
And this is not a slam against
any of those people. I don't

441
00:36:30.840 --> 00:36:35.880
know doctor Hicks well at all,
but the people I know who know are

442
00:36:35.880 --> 00:36:38.599
a hold are in very high regard. But I do know admal Grading,

443
00:36:38.719 --> 00:36:42.920
the vice chief, you know,
from his time as a service worker officer,

444
00:36:43.159 --> 00:36:45.639
and I have enormous respect for him. But just the nature of being

445
00:36:45.639 --> 00:36:51.199
the vice chairman, you're no longer
in the details. So the best they

446
00:36:51.199 --> 00:36:53.840
can hope for is to come up
with a like I said, a good

447
00:36:54.280 --> 00:36:59.960
government system to give the right problem
to the right people who can go out

448
00:37:00.039 --> 00:37:04.320
execute it right and then and then
know where where do I have a group

449
00:37:04.360 --> 00:37:09.480
that can go execute the the you
know, the solution to the problem that's

450
00:37:09.480 --> 00:37:15.440
been raised and identified, you know, and that's if if, if the

451
00:37:15.519 --> 00:37:20.119
Deputies Group, Innovation Group can do
that, then I think they will have

452
00:37:20.360 --> 00:37:22.000
you know, you know, gone
a long way to fulfilling that mission.

453
00:37:24.719 --> 00:37:29.039
Now you saw this up close the
last time they came around. But of

454
00:37:29.119 --> 00:37:34.039
the variety of eight hundred pound guerrillas
in the room. One thing that's coming

455
00:37:34.159 --> 00:37:38.840
up as we're approaching the last last
few weeks of the fiscal year is twenty

456
00:37:38.920 --> 00:37:45.239
twenty four is an election year.
And I've already heard a couple of people

457
00:37:45.679 --> 00:37:51.639
talk about the possibility of another sequester
coming down the road. And last time

458
00:37:51.639 --> 00:37:53.920
we had a sequester, it wasn't
a high inflation environment, but it was

459
00:37:54.039 --> 00:38:00.000
enough of a challenge as it is. Uh projects that that in many ways

460
00:38:00.280 --> 00:38:07.760
you can say, are bipartist in
their attractions much as but the but he's

461
00:38:07.880 --> 00:38:14.079
very defendive trying to do and rapid
capabilities of reptive capability, stuff like that.

462
00:38:15.800 --> 00:38:22.119
Can those be lost in the distraction
of the election year, whether it's

463
00:38:22.159 --> 00:38:27.039
something from sequester or they want to
pursue as we've seen in a few venues

464
00:38:28.079 --> 00:38:31.280
other issues, because our senior leaders
do only have a twenty four hour day

465
00:38:31.320 --> 00:38:36.440
in which they can invest their time. Yeah, what I'll say about that

466
00:38:36.559 --> 00:38:43.119
is you have a great admirer in
Congressman Gallagher, Uh you know who represents

467
00:38:43.280 --> 00:38:45.599
uh the sec of the Woods in
Wisconsin. I know he listened to your

468
00:38:45.639 --> 00:38:49.880
podcast because the last time I was
with him, he and I talked about

469
00:38:49.920 --> 00:38:54.840
your one of your podcasts. So
one you talked to his common folks,

470
00:38:54.880 --> 00:38:58.719
you should try and to invite him
on for an hour if he has time

471
00:38:58.760 --> 00:39:04.480
on one Sunday afternoon, presumably the
Packers aren't playing. I know he loves

472
00:39:05.639 --> 00:39:08.119
but he might take some time out
from a Packers game to talk to you.

473
00:39:08.679 --> 00:39:12.559
But when I talk to him,
and I actually got to talk to

474
00:39:12.920 --> 00:39:21.039
him and his ranking member a couple
of weeks ago at an events from the

475
00:39:21.119 --> 00:39:24.039
China Committee. And now I'm mind
blanking on the ranking members name. He's

476
00:39:24.039 --> 00:39:29.679
a gentleman from Illinois, so I'm
not remembering his name, which is a

477
00:39:29.719 --> 00:39:37.239
shame because they have they have been
very bipartisan, and one of the things

478
00:39:37.679 --> 00:39:42.960
that they've tried to do with the
China Committee and the Congressman Gallagher said publicly

479
00:39:43.079 --> 00:39:49.440
is their report is only going to
recommend things that has significant support on both

480
00:39:49.440 --> 00:39:52.880
sides of the island. I think
they will be able to recommend things that

481
00:39:52.920 --> 00:39:57.760
has significant support on both sides of
the aisle. And the Republicans and Democrats

482
00:39:57.800 --> 00:40:02.320
on that committee have seem to be
working together well, even when they disagree,

483
00:40:02.599 --> 00:40:07.840
it's in a healthy and responsible way, and everyone is focused that China

484
00:40:08.039 --> 00:40:13.000
is a calling a challenge, a
threat, and different folks would use different

485
00:40:13.000 --> 00:40:17.920
words, and it's something that across
not just defense, but diplomacy and industrial

486
00:40:17.960 --> 00:40:24.719
base and trade and all the different
levers of government that that Congress needs to

487
00:40:24.760 --> 00:40:30.000
take some action on. So in
that sense, I think there's hope that

488
00:40:30.840 --> 00:40:35.360
even though there will be, as
natural in an election year, a fair

489
00:40:35.400 --> 00:40:40.880
amount of partisanship, that our China
policy could rise above that. But I

490
00:40:40.880 --> 00:40:45.559
would not make any predictions that I
would say, if you want something someone

491
00:40:45.559 --> 00:40:50.199
who's an expert on politics, talk
to a politician and not a ship builder.

492
00:40:50.239 --> 00:40:52.800
So I'd say, you know,
to the bi Congress and galagronics to

493
00:40:52.920 --> 00:40:54.960
your show, and he can tell
you about the politics. He's an elected

494
00:40:54.960 --> 00:41:02.199
official, he is a politician,
you know. I just I hope based

495
00:41:02.239 --> 00:41:05.920
on the success of the China Committee, or at least what they've been doing

496
00:41:05.960 --> 00:41:13.760
so far, that that whatever are
China issues are can be dealt with responsibly

497
00:41:14.559 --> 00:41:19.639
in a bipartisan way in the in
the year ahead. And I think that's

498
00:41:19.679 --> 00:41:22.559
the exact right hope going along.
You know, your statement of a few

499
00:41:22.559 --> 00:41:25.880
minutes ago that uh, you know, lie to Candle that everybody is imbued

500
00:41:27.000 --> 00:41:31.440
with the knowledge that this is something
that needs to focus the mind, and

501
00:41:31.719 --> 00:41:36.880
that we can if we can't establish
a firewall, we can at least try

502
00:41:36.960 --> 00:41:40.280
to have some good installation between what's
going to be happened in twenty twenty four

503
00:41:40.840 --> 00:41:50.159
and what every all people of goodwill
for our national security knows that needs a

504
00:41:50.280 --> 00:41:53.159
regular focus and push over the course
of the next few years. And I

505
00:41:53.199 --> 00:41:58.320
think there is hope for optimism because
a lot of the people you see involved

506
00:41:58.719 --> 00:42:05.039
these are are serious people who take
their their jobs with the appropriate level of

507
00:42:05.199 --> 00:42:08.280
seriousness, right. I mean,
like I said, I wish I would

508
00:42:08.280 --> 00:42:14.039
I would wish that every committee in
Congress and really all of the federal government

509
00:42:14.400 --> 00:42:21.039
would have the have what what Chairman
Gallagher's UH China Committee is doing. They're

510
00:42:21.199 --> 00:42:27.239
they're focused on real things and they're
not they're not looking for, you know,

511
00:42:27.440 --> 00:42:30.119
clicks on social media. They're you
know, they're working very hard to

512
00:42:31.039 --> 00:42:36.599
try and do good policy, and
in some cases that's limiting. I mean,

513
00:42:36.639 --> 00:42:38.039
I don't want to say I don't
want to get too specifics. I

514
00:42:38.039 --> 00:42:40.679
want to say anything that you know, you could ask Congressman Gallagher this if

515
00:42:40.679 --> 00:42:44.400
he goes on your show. I
know there are things that he would like

516
00:42:44.519 --> 00:42:49.119
to do that will probably not be
a committee recommendation because they are things that

517
00:42:49.199 --> 00:42:52.920
only Republicans would support and for various
reasons, uh, you know, Democrats

518
00:42:53.000 --> 00:42:57.920
wouldn't. And I'm sure the ranking
member has similar things that you know,

519
00:42:58.559 --> 00:43:01.719
he would like to see that that
would not get Republican support, and so

520
00:43:01.840 --> 00:43:05.599
be it. That's why we have
elections and that's why we have political parties

521
00:43:05.599 --> 00:43:10.559
and the democracy. I think it's
helpful that they're identifying things that do have

522
00:43:10.599 --> 00:43:15.280
bipartisan supports that kind of everyone can
agree that, well this something like this

523
00:43:15.360 --> 00:43:17.280
makes sense. It's like, okay, then for those things, let's let's

524
00:43:17.320 --> 00:43:22.000
put down the let's put aside from
the other issues that are divisive or that

525
00:43:22.039 --> 00:43:25.840
where there's not agreement and where there's
something useful where there is agreement, let's

526
00:43:25.840 --> 00:43:30.639
go ahead agree and to do and
do that. And I'm hopeful that that

527
00:43:30.800 --> 00:43:35.239
on the issue of China and things
related to China, that that is going

528
00:43:35.320 --> 00:43:39.199
to take hold. I think you
still have some ability to see what happens

529
00:43:39.199 --> 00:43:43.559
this year with that. Then if
some actual legislation gets done. But you

530
00:43:43.599 --> 00:43:46.320
know, I remain you know,
cautiously optimistic, with a fair amount of

531
00:43:46.360 --> 00:43:55.920
caution thrown into that opposite. Yeah, well, I'm admiring the Marine Corps

532
00:43:57.559 --> 00:44:01.119
innovation for US as Marine Corps special
ops people, special Ops Command, whatever

533
00:44:01.119 --> 00:44:05.599
they call themselves, seem to be
the cutting the edge of some of these

534
00:44:05.639 --> 00:44:09.199
innovasive things. They are always able
to get funding that that does not go

535
00:44:09.320 --> 00:44:14.719
through the red tape. But there's
a great story about how the Marines have

536
00:44:14.800 --> 00:44:19.480
got these uh uh. They've taken
a lesson from the drug smugglers. Those

537
00:44:19.519 --> 00:44:25.559
small low visibility boats. They can
strap a couple of of some naval strike

538
00:44:25.599 --> 00:44:30.079
missiles to them, and they create
a supply a system that can supply wherever

539
00:44:30.079 --> 00:44:35.639
their units are without being detected.
And if they do get detected, they're

540
00:44:36.159 --> 00:44:38.519
pretty much expendable because they're pretty cheap. That's the kind of innovation. I

541
00:44:38.559 --> 00:44:44.039
think that's good these days. The
other thing that the Marine Corps found it's

542
00:44:44.079 --> 00:44:51.320
interesting is you know it'll be it'll
be years before we have a landing ship

543
00:44:51.360 --> 00:44:54.000
medium. I mean, I believe
they just held their industry their public industry

544
00:44:54.079 --> 00:45:00.199
Day a couple of weeks ago,
which means, you know, you'll usually

545
00:45:00.239 --> 00:45:06.119
that's your last step before going out
for a contract. So if they you

546
00:45:06.119 --> 00:45:10.360
know, if they release a repressing
proposal for a contract sometime in the next

547
00:45:10.360 --> 00:45:14.960
few months, you know, that
means six to nine months later you'll have

548
00:45:15.079 --> 00:45:21.320
actually an award of a contract and
then you have to actually do the details,

549
00:45:21.320 --> 00:45:23.079
divide it, build the ship.
So you know, your years away

550
00:45:23.119 --> 00:45:29.639
from having a ship. That hasn't
stopped the Marines from either leasing or otherwise

551
00:45:29.679 --> 00:45:36.119
getting their hands on, you know, widely used ships in the available commercially

552
00:45:36.159 --> 00:45:38.760
that they're used in like the oil
and gas industry or in the ferry business

553
00:45:38.880 --> 00:45:43.119
or whatever, and saying, well, let me at least experiment with these.

554
00:45:43.159 --> 00:45:45.079
What if I put something on this
ship or ramp up you know,

555
00:45:45.159 --> 00:45:49.960
so like that, and how many
marines can I pack aboard that and do

556
00:45:50.039 --> 00:45:54.719
some exercises just to establish doctrines and
tactics, techniques and procedures for the day

557
00:45:54.719 --> 00:46:01.639
when they actually get their actual military
ships to do the the expeditionary based operations.

558
00:46:02.320 --> 00:46:09.320
And I think that will that will
help a measurably to speed the time

559
00:46:09.480 --> 00:46:15.199
from when they actually get new equipment
to when that new equipment is actually used

560
00:46:15.199 --> 00:46:22.599
for the field. While I have
your cornered here, this is this is

561
00:46:22.599 --> 00:46:27.440
not a scary question, but it's
something that it's bounced around my head.

562
00:46:27.559 --> 00:46:30.760
While a little announcement came out about
how for the first time since I think

563
00:46:30.840 --> 00:46:37.320
in twenty years, we now have
more trade with Mexico than we have with

564
00:46:37.519 --> 00:46:45.480
China, and there's been a big
push since twenty nineteen in trying to diversify

565
00:46:45.559 --> 00:46:49.119
and get a little more security and
supply chains. And you know, building

566
00:46:49.159 --> 00:46:54.320
a ship, you have to worry
about everything from different grades of steel all

567
00:46:54.360 --> 00:46:59.639
the way up to micro chips.
And I'm just curious in the ship building

568
00:46:59.679 --> 00:47:02.920
into stream, like you can't get
supplies and equipment from companies that you're at

569
00:47:02.960 --> 00:47:08.519
war with. Changes, our refocuses, our efforts have been made in that

570
00:47:08.599 --> 00:47:15.559
industry to look at some of the
vulnerabilities and their supply chain and to try

571
00:47:15.559 --> 00:47:20.840
to mitigate some of that. Yeah, so that's an interesting question. Let

572
00:47:20.920 --> 00:47:27.480
me get you two things on that. The first, I won't I'll use

573
00:47:27.519 --> 00:47:34.119
a something that isn't theoretical, but
that is that is real that has has

574
00:47:34.199 --> 00:47:39.400
happened, not so much here but
over in Europe. So by law,

575
00:47:40.679 --> 00:47:46.159
the steel for US Navy ships have
to be milled in ship in steel mills

576
00:47:46.239 --> 00:47:52.000
in the United States. So the
steel for the future frigate is coming from

577
00:47:52.079 --> 00:47:59.920
steel mills in Indiana and Alabama,
presumably a couple of different and then there's

578
00:48:00.079 --> 00:48:04.679
there's a couple of other smaller suppliers. Those are my two biggest suppliers you

579
00:48:04.719 --> 00:48:10.119
know, of where the steel is
coming from. And I think it's Alabama.

580
00:48:10.159 --> 00:48:12.920
I know it's down to the South, I mean. And then the

581
00:48:13.360 --> 00:48:15.440
bigger one that's here in the Midwest
is the company that we use is from.

582
00:48:15.440 --> 00:48:20.440
It is a company in the end, so that's you know, that's

583
00:48:20.480 --> 00:48:24.159
that's where the steel are. Steal
is coming from most of the ships in

584
00:48:24.199 --> 00:48:28.199
Europe to get built, and not
just worship, but I've talked to cruise

585
00:48:28.239 --> 00:48:34.880
ships and ferries and everything else.
Up until twenty twenty two, that steal

586
00:48:34.960 --> 00:48:37.480
was mostly coming from Ukraine. Right. Ukraine was the biggest producer of steel

587
00:48:37.920 --> 00:48:45.159
of roth steel in Europe right up
until the war started. So a lot

588
00:48:45.239 --> 00:48:52.280
of places in Europe have been scrambling
for steel, and you know they've all

589
00:48:52.320 --> 00:48:55.320
adjusted for better or for worse.
But I will tell you the price of

590
00:48:55.360 --> 00:49:00.920
steel over in Europe went up,
and uh, you know, a lot

591
00:49:00.960 --> 00:49:07.800
of economic price adjustment clauses and contracts
ended up getting invoked when customers started paying

592
00:49:07.800 --> 00:49:14.480
more for ships because the steel that
goes in those ships suddenly went up across

593
00:49:14.559 --> 00:49:21.599
the European ship building industry. So
there's your example right where a war causes

594
00:49:21.639 --> 00:49:25.599
a disruption in a supply chain.
So you know, we don't get steel

595
00:49:25.719 --> 00:49:30.679
for our ships in the United States
from overseas. That's good, and that's

596
00:49:30.719 --> 00:49:36.559
one area where we're so reasonably.
I would like us to actually be that

597
00:49:36.679 --> 00:49:38.519
self sufficiould be great if we had
a there's a whole another topic would be

598
00:49:38.559 --> 00:49:45.639
great if we had a large commercial
ship building industry, which would require us

599
00:49:45.679 --> 00:49:50.760
to have either import steel or have
more domestic steal. But right now,

600
00:49:50.800 --> 00:49:58.280
the domestic steel industry is capable of
supporting our warship building. There is a

601
00:49:58.280 --> 00:50:00.559
lot of other stuff. He talked
about micro tips. There are other raw

602
00:50:00.599 --> 00:50:06.239
materials. I'm more worried about the
law material to make the microchips uh,

603
00:50:06.280 --> 00:50:10.719
and what happens where those get disrupted? And even if you have if you're

604
00:50:10.760 --> 00:50:15.559
not getting them from an enemy actor, right, if they're the question is

605
00:50:15.599 --> 00:50:19.559
how hard are they to get to
where you need them? You know,

606
00:50:20.000 --> 00:50:25.719
there's a lot of rare minerals in
Australia if those were to be mined as

607
00:50:25.800 --> 00:50:30.360
a source, you know, to
get so you're not sourcing from China,

608
00:50:30.239 --> 00:50:35.199
you still have to get those across
the Pacific. UH. And that's that's

609
00:50:35.199 --> 00:50:38.320
a vulnerability in a in a conflict. UH. You know, I don't

610
00:50:38.360 --> 00:50:45.719
know that we've fully internalized that.
In a potentially worldwide conflict, it becomes

611
00:50:45.719 --> 00:50:51.000
hard to move everything around, right
because anything that's moved around that's a military

612
00:50:51.079 --> 00:50:58.880
value is potentially targetable. And you
know that's the the the uh. And

613
00:50:59.239 --> 00:51:04.519
that's the very true in the Indo
Pacific, where the distances are large and

614
00:51:04.559 --> 00:51:07.960
you're generally having to move things across
a whole lot of water. So you

615
00:51:08.000 --> 00:51:14.079
know, that's the that is absolutely
a question. The other thing I'll say

616
00:51:14.159 --> 00:51:20.039
about supply chain is and this is
an area that I've become very familiar with

617
00:51:20.079 --> 00:51:29.320
working to think can't carry because the
Defense Security and counter Intelligence Agency Defense counter

618
00:51:29.360 --> 00:51:36.000
Intelligence and Security Agency dc SA,
they're in charge of mitigating what is called

619
00:51:36.360 --> 00:51:40.079
folk I foreign ownership control and influence. So if you have a foreign owned

620
00:51:40.639 --> 00:51:49.239
company doing business with DoD, the
DoD has to approve a mitigation plan to

621
00:51:49.239 --> 00:51:52.880
make sure that the foreign ownership doesn't
adversely affect US interests. Now, when

622
00:51:52.880 --> 00:51:58.000
you're talking like for my company with
an ally and another NATO country like Italy,

623
00:51:58.360 --> 00:52:04.039
the mitigation plans fairly simple and straightforward
and good understands. You know who

624
00:52:04.239 --> 00:52:08.440
who owns the company, They understand
who the officers and directors are, and

625
00:52:08.679 --> 00:52:14.400
they have some joint approval of that
along with the Italian owners, and it's

626
00:52:14.559 --> 00:52:19.760
it's quite easy. If the country
was less firmly a friend, then the

627
00:52:20.639 --> 00:52:27.480
mitigation gets more tricky. That's for
ownership. The law changed last year in

628
00:52:27.519 --> 00:52:32.360
the NBAA section eight forty seven change
the definition of influence. So if now

629
00:52:32.480 --> 00:52:38.119
a foreign nation has influence over your
supply chain, not just influence over the

630
00:52:38.199 --> 00:52:42.400
people running the company, but if
they can affect your supply chain, that's

631
00:52:42.400 --> 00:52:47.199
considered foreign influence and a country has
a company has to show how they're mitigating

632
00:52:47.239 --> 00:52:53.800
that to DCSA. And that's well
and good and noble. But my concern

633
00:52:53.880 --> 00:52:59.280
there is that is a huge job, and it basically means everybody now has

634
00:52:59.360 --> 00:53:02.800
foreign influence because that doesn't apply to
a company like Mane. That's everybody,

635
00:53:04.000 --> 00:53:07.559
right, everybody has far an influence
over their supply chain. And I don't

636
00:53:07.559 --> 00:53:15.559
know that either the companies or DoD
has the requisite bandwidth to have intelligent mitigation

637
00:53:15.119 --> 00:53:21.920
across that broad a problem. But
that is now law in the most recent

638
00:53:22.039 --> 00:53:27.360
NDAA that you know, you're supposed
to at least have considered and taken steps

639
00:53:27.360 --> 00:53:30.280
to mitigate or at least have a
mitigation plan if there is far an influence

640
00:53:30.320 --> 00:53:35.480
in your supply chain and your a
company doing business with DoD above a certain

641
00:53:35.480 --> 00:53:38.719
threshold value. And that's going to
get very interesting and potentially very hard,

642
00:53:38.840 --> 00:53:44.320
very fast, just because that problem
is so vast. Yeah, we spent

643
00:53:44.559 --> 00:53:51.480
we spent three decades globalizing the marketplace
for everything, and it's it's something that's

644
00:53:51.480 --> 00:53:54.679
not going to be unwound in thirty
six months, right, right, It's

645
00:53:55.039 --> 00:53:59.920
it's one thing to identify it and
understand it, which I think is step

646
00:54:00.079 --> 00:54:02.840
one. Under ye, the first
first step of solving a problem is admitting

647
00:54:02.880 --> 00:54:07.320
you have a problem, and then
the second step is is identifying the problem.

648
00:54:07.400 --> 00:54:13.760
But fixing the problem is not something
that happens overnight. It's just it's

649
00:54:14.880 --> 00:54:17.679
you. You know. What you
have to do is identify and then figure

650
00:54:17.719 --> 00:54:22.119
out, Okay, what's the biggest
problem that's solvable right now, and then

651
00:54:22.159 --> 00:54:25.960
go solve that one and then continue
to evaluate, understand, and solve the

652
00:54:27.000 --> 00:54:31.199
problems one by one in a rational
priority. But you know, the leg

653
00:54:31.280 --> 00:54:36.960
that the global supply chain is just
too global to suddenly say I can fix

654
00:54:37.000 --> 00:54:38.880
everything, and I can fix it
quickly, or I can assess it.

655
00:54:38.920 --> 00:54:43.199
In some cases you can say I
assess it and it's not far right.

656
00:54:43.239 --> 00:54:46.320
So there's a lot of stuff vital
to the frigates right now. I will

657
00:54:46.360 --> 00:54:50.559
go into detail that we get from
a foreign source, and the foreign sources

658
00:54:50.639 --> 00:54:54.360
Canada. I'm not worried. I'm
not worried the Canada is going to subdly

659
00:54:54.480 --> 00:54:59.159
start trying to undermine our interests.
They're not far away, especially from with

660
00:54:59.239 --> 00:55:01.239
customs, right you know, they're
just right there. You know there's a

661
00:55:01.280 --> 00:55:05.679
border there great, but but you
know, yeah, I left that that's

662
00:55:05.760 --> 00:55:08.079
you know, far part of my
supply chain. But I think we can

663
00:55:08.599 --> 00:55:14.239
categorize that at low risk and put
that aside and say that's probably okay,

664
00:55:14.519 --> 00:55:17.119
and then look to, you know, where where is there a greater level

665
00:55:17.280 --> 00:55:22.320
of risk and what do you do
about? Yeah, we spend a lot

666
00:55:22.320 --> 00:55:24.320
of time in this show, and
John Conrad, who's listening in today,

667
00:55:24.360 --> 00:55:28.840
we'll we'll verify this. We talk
a lot about supply chains and the issues

668
00:55:29.239 --> 00:55:32.280
confronting getting goods from one part of
them. I mean, we're usually talking

669
00:55:32.280 --> 00:55:37.079
about sending goods out to the area
of interest, but getting goods from the

670
00:55:37.159 --> 00:55:39.760
places and we normally get them safely
here as a big part of that.

671
00:55:39.880 --> 00:55:45.159
There used to be a federal agency
whose java was and I think they still

672
00:55:45.199 --> 00:55:51.400
do this for certain truly strategic materials
to keep track of how how much of

673
00:55:51.480 --> 00:55:57.199
each let's say, an obtainium we
had and where where it could come from

674
00:55:57.239 --> 00:56:01.039
if we ran out. And I
don't know why we're not having that kind

675
00:56:01.079 --> 00:56:05.519
of agency. Look at exactly the
topic you're talking about it and it's great

676
00:56:05.519 --> 00:56:07.719
to have a loss and you're gonna
you're gotta do this, But who's gonna

677
00:56:07.760 --> 00:56:14.280
who's gonna make the judgment calls on
whether or not the unobtainium comes from East

678
00:56:15.239 --> 00:56:19.880
Fondobamo and and as are as that
country a threat because the Chinese Chinese just

679
00:56:19.920 --> 00:56:24.159
build a port there. Right so, right now for defense companies, right

680
00:56:24.320 --> 00:56:31.960
that is the law assigned DCSA,
that responsibility the Defense Counterintelligence Security Agency is

681
00:56:32.000 --> 00:56:37.920
the is the agency that's supposed to
make those assessments. And you know,

682
00:56:37.960 --> 00:56:40.480
and look at a company's mitigation and
say, yep, that's a low I

683
00:56:40.519 --> 00:56:45.519
agree, that's that's you know,
a low risk or this is a higher

684
00:56:45.599 --> 00:56:46.679
risk. You need to be doing
we need ask some plan to do more

685
00:56:46.679 --> 00:56:52.000
about this. But but again the
mismatch is that there's not a lot of

686
00:56:52.000 --> 00:56:55.800
people in that agency and they're not
you know, they're not a big Hebaly

687
00:56:55.880 --> 00:57:01.960
funded part of d D and you
know, they've just been assigned to analyze

688
00:57:02.079 --> 00:57:07.320
a pretty vast problem. And then
that's not even considering the problem of how

689
00:57:07.360 --> 00:57:12.880
do you get stuff from here to
there? Because that's not always something that

690
00:57:13.039 --> 00:57:16.599
the company gets solved. Right That's
a that's a that's a much bigger national

691
00:57:17.199 --> 00:57:21.480
priority of you know, in a
pinch what are you going to really expend

692
00:57:21.519 --> 00:57:24.400
resources about to try and make sure
something gets where it's supposed to go.

693
00:57:24.800 --> 00:57:29.960
Right, That's that's a you know, that's a that's a that's a that

694
00:57:30.119 --> 00:57:35.639
is a big national problem. Hopefully
it's something that the China Committee is thinking

695
00:57:35.639 --> 00:57:38.199
about as well, because that's right, that's that's a you know, that's

696
00:57:38.199 --> 00:57:44.760
that's not a a one small agency
putting charge and solve it. That's a

697
00:57:44.960 --> 00:57:47.719
that's a big national push, right
yeah, And it's it's it's not the

698
00:57:47.760 --> 00:57:52.239
first time we faced this. I
mean rubber during World War Two. And

699
00:57:52.280 --> 00:57:55.199
if you if you read these these
books on on the supply chains in World

700
00:57:55.199 --> 00:57:58.559
War two, I mean, none
of this is new. It's just we've

701
00:57:58.639 --> 00:58:00.960
forgotten about it, you know.
Just we need we need people to go

702
00:58:01.000 --> 00:58:02.920
read those books and go, oh, oh, that's how they did it

703
00:58:04.400 --> 00:58:07.400
and what are we gonna do about
it. I was still of the National

704
00:58:07.440 --> 00:58:12.360
Scurity Councils. That would be that
would be an excellent that would be an

705
00:58:12.360 --> 00:58:16.760
excellent set of dcs and DCCs to
hold across the whole of government and come

706
00:58:16.840 --> 00:58:21.440
up with something. Well, I
guess now they're callers can say an NSPM

707
00:58:21.480 --> 00:58:24.719
but that was in the buy administration
and NSM is there Acritive and Natural Sturity

708
00:58:24.760 --> 00:58:29.800
memorandum that basically says, Okay,
let's take a whole government approach. Here's

709
00:58:29.800 --> 00:58:32.079
what I want all the different agencies
you know, to do about it.

710
00:58:32.159 --> 00:58:35.360
DG, you do this, stake, you do this, commerce, you

711
00:58:35.440 --> 00:58:37.800
do this, transformation, you do
this you know. Yeay verily, So

712
00:58:37.960 --> 00:58:44.159
that's uh, that would that that
actually would be key. I hope,

713
00:58:44.199 --> 00:58:46.239
I hope some of the people who
had my old job are actually thinking about

714
00:58:46.239 --> 00:58:51.599
that right now. So hey,
speaking tapp into your jobs. We talked

715
00:58:51.599 --> 00:58:54.000
about supply chain and a few other
things. And one of the things I

716
00:58:54.360 --> 00:58:59.440
do during the show is I've got
a couple of screens at from me because

717
00:58:59.599 --> 00:59:02.239
I have people who listen to the
show who will drop me a DM on

718
00:59:02.559 --> 00:59:07.159
X or Twitter or whatever it's called
now, or we'll send me a text

719
00:59:07.199 --> 00:59:10.719
on my phone or on Skype or
something like that. And while we are

720
00:59:10.719 --> 00:59:19.280
here, Andy Berner sent me a
note about there at the Seahawks game,

721
00:59:20.239 --> 00:59:22.679
there was a very interesting ad and
while you're talking, I was looking it

722
00:59:22.760 --> 00:59:28.559
up. I don't know if you've
heard of build Submarines dot com. Yeah,

723
00:59:28.559 --> 00:59:30.440
but it's a real neat ad.
If you look look it up on

724
00:59:30.480 --> 00:59:35.079
YouTube or if you're on if you're
on Twitter, you can you can see

725
00:59:35.320 --> 00:59:38.519
see it in my t L.
But if that actually a nice I didn't

726
00:59:38.519 --> 00:59:43.960
listen to the audio because we're talking, but I was watching the visuals really

727
00:59:44.000 --> 00:59:47.280
well produced. It's actually just visually. I don't know what they're saying,

728
00:59:47.360 --> 00:59:52.760
but it seems fairly inspirational about working. And when you go on build Submarines

729
00:59:52.840 --> 00:59:57.280
dot com, it's got this.
This will probably get our friend John Cundra

730
00:59:57.360 --> 01:00:00.159
at all excited. Maybe the fellot
the other salam or Cogliatos around too,

731
01:00:00.519 --> 01:00:07.119
but it's latest jobs and you've got
a C and C machinist for while Scilla

732
01:00:07.320 --> 01:00:14.239
never heard of them. Manufacturing engineer, Wartzilla makes sealed and they also make

733
01:00:15.360 --> 01:00:19.639
which are the components they make for
the Columbia. They make one they're best

734
01:00:19.639 --> 01:00:23.840
known for shaft steal, but they
also make it makes something. Wartzilla's a

735
01:00:24.400 --> 01:00:29.039
I mean, you know, I
want to it's it's a it's a European

736
01:00:29.079 --> 01:00:34.719
company, but they have US subsidiaries
and there I basically know them as pumps

737
01:00:34.719 --> 01:00:37.920
and sealed. But I'm not being
fair to them because they do other kind

738
01:00:38.119 --> 01:00:43.760
of HM and E maritime equipment.
I know that they've that they are working.

739
01:00:44.119 --> 01:00:46.239
Uh, you know, they've got
some work on the Columbia. They

740
01:00:46.280 --> 01:00:50.960
make huge They make huge diesel engines
that power a lot of the merit the

741
01:00:51.079 --> 01:00:55.280
merchant marine ships and usually have people
from from your your part of the woods

742
01:00:55.360 --> 01:01:01.000
during universal over in depair Wisconsin.
Fun pronouncing that correctly, you got try

743
01:01:01.199 --> 01:01:07.239
Marine just south of right just stuf
the Green Bay Schneider Electric. So anyway,

744
01:01:07.239 --> 01:01:10.519
because I know we had talked in
the past about h correct me if

745
01:01:10.519 --> 01:01:13.679
I'm wrong here, but I think
I asked you once, you know,

746
01:01:13.800 --> 01:01:15.480
what's the one thing you could do
if you had a pile of money.

747
01:01:15.519 --> 01:01:21.360
It's like I'd like to hire a
hundred welders. But people are so important,

748
01:01:21.360 --> 01:01:25.280
and people you can you can desire
and fund to grow the biggest navy

749
01:01:25.320 --> 01:01:30.199
that you can. But if you
don't have people that can go out there

750
01:01:30.400 --> 01:01:35.880
and put steel together and run cables. Are an engineer to run knows knows

751
01:01:35.960 --> 01:01:38.880
what a moment are, You're not
going to be able to do anything.

752
01:01:39.000 --> 01:01:44.440
So, you know, do you
have a comment or an update on how

753
01:01:44.480 --> 01:01:49.639
the economy and getting these technicians trained
and in the industry. How that's going

754
01:01:50.840 --> 01:01:54.960
still hard. I'm very familiar with
we built submarines dot com. Uh that's

755
01:01:55.039 --> 01:02:01.119
you know, the uh that's a
combined decort. The sub folks over at

756
01:02:01.199 --> 01:02:06.480
NAVCY working with the entire summer,
you know, starting with general dynamic electric

757
01:02:06.519 --> 01:02:14.840
boats and the entires their supply chain, working to do training and uh uh

758
01:02:14.880 --> 01:02:20.440
you know, and and and recruiting
for just what you saw there. And

759
01:02:20.480 --> 01:02:24.440
they're doing that nationwide, and we've
been talking to them. I think the

760
01:02:24.880 --> 01:02:31.119
surface community, uh will you know, try and leverage some of that.

761
01:02:31.679 --> 01:02:37.039
We continue to work with the states
with contin in Michigan very successfully. We've

762
01:02:37.079 --> 01:02:43.480
had some some good traction there.
The Navy's given us some help on with

763
01:02:43.599 --> 01:02:49.159
things to do for recruiting. So, you know, I just I just

764
01:02:49.280 --> 01:02:53.519
hired I think I said one hundred. I think between welders and ship fitters,

765
01:02:53.960 --> 01:02:59.239
I've hired like thirty new ones in
the last month, which is good,

766
01:03:00.000 --> 01:03:02.880
and I still need more. So, uh, you know, getting

767
01:03:04.440 --> 01:03:10.840
people trained for industrial work and having
people willing to do industrial work is you

768
01:03:10.880 --> 01:03:14.719
know, is still going to be
a challenge going forward, and it's one

769
01:03:14.760 --> 01:03:20.000
that's taken up a lot of bandwidth
on both the government and industry side trying

770
01:03:20.039 --> 01:03:22.599
to make that happen. And I
will say if anyone in Wisconsin, if

771
01:03:22.599 --> 01:03:27.159
there's a young person in Wisconsin you
know who's you know, who doesn't love

772
01:03:27.239 --> 01:03:30.320
being in college or getting ready graduate
fromhigh school or whatever, I will say,

773
01:03:31.199 --> 01:03:37.000
if you're living in Marinette County,
you make more welding for me than

774
01:03:37.039 --> 01:03:44.039
you would as an assistant district attorney
in the District Attorney's office here in Marinette

775
01:03:44.079 --> 01:03:46.119
County. And I don't need you
to go to law school and get three

776
01:03:46.199 --> 01:03:52.960
years of law school debts or four
years of college debt will pay for all

777
01:03:52.000 --> 01:03:57.360
of your welding certifications and training for
you. And then you know what,

778
01:03:57.519 --> 01:04:01.039
you're fully certified. You'll make more
than a lawyer does here. So not

779
01:04:01.079 --> 01:04:03.199
more than a lawyer does in New
York City, but more than a lawyer

780
01:04:03.280 --> 01:04:06.920
does. And Marinette was uh,
you know, uh, Marinette, Wisconsin.

781
01:04:08.039 --> 01:04:12.719
So you get and you get to
stay in the great state of Wisconsin

782
01:04:12.800 --> 01:04:16.760
with all that great duck hunting and
walleye fishing, deer hunting, hunting,

783
01:04:16.800 --> 01:04:20.400
deer hunting, and the backers and
cheese, lots of you can and you

784
01:04:20.400 --> 01:04:25.400
can actually afford to. It's a
place of the country you can actually afford

785
01:04:25.400 --> 01:04:28.159
to live in. The public schools
are good from what I've heard, so

786
01:04:28.360 --> 01:04:30.960
you know, yeah right yeah,
so right, yeah, you know,

787
01:04:31.039 --> 01:04:35.679
so right right, I'll do I
will do a plug that you're inviting me

788
01:04:35.760 --> 01:04:39.719
to do, that, right,
you know, Uh think can't Kerry Marine

789
01:04:39.719 --> 01:04:45.719
Group dot com thin Kntierry Marine Group
dot com and click on careers. Uh.

790
01:04:45.760 --> 01:04:48.920
And if you're interested in being part
of a shipbuilding team either here in

791
01:04:48.960 --> 01:04:54.719
Marinett's or at our commercial yard over
across the bay and Surgeon Bay, Uh,

792
01:04:54.920 --> 01:04:57.800
that is the website to go to. So think can Kerry Marine Group

793
01:04:57.840 --> 01:05:01.079
dot com and click on careers.
Yeah. Yeah. There are some people

794
01:05:01.119 --> 01:05:03.199
who said, well, you know, I always wanted to serve my country,

795
01:05:03.199 --> 01:05:05.440
but I didn't want to go into
military. You don't have to do

796
01:05:05.480 --> 01:05:10.199
a uniform like that. You know, one can easily make the argument that

797
01:05:10.280 --> 01:05:15.639
the the the artisans and craftsmen and
professional that builds the ship are just as

798
01:05:15.679 --> 01:05:18.320
important as the sailors that are in
it. So, you know, I

799
01:05:18.440 --> 01:05:23.000
hear that from some from my folks, both blue collar and white collar a

800
01:05:23.000 --> 01:05:28.199
lot, especially like uh, I
got a lot of folks who are you

801
01:05:28.239 --> 01:05:33.079
know, like buyers or their earned
value analysts, and you know, and

802
01:05:33.079 --> 01:05:38.519
and they they tell me it's like, you know, for some reason they

803
01:05:38.519 --> 01:05:42.360
either couldn't or didn't or you know, you know, but they feel like

804
01:05:42.440 --> 01:05:45.360
this is you know, like they're
contributing to the country, which they are,

805
01:05:45.719 --> 01:05:50.199
you know, by by helping build
navy ships, you know, in

806
01:05:50.239 --> 01:05:53.760
a way that you know, you
know, for some reason, if they

807
01:05:53.800 --> 01:05:57.199
couldn't serve this is another way to
serve their country. So uh, and

808
01:05:57.239 --> 01:06:01.639
it absolutely is. Well I hate
we we just you jumped on board and

809
01:06:01.679 --> 01:06:04.679
we wouldn't let go of you.
So I appreciate you staying with us until

810
01:06:04.719 --> 01:06:10.559
the top of the hour mark,
and definitely appreciate you having an opportunity to

811
01:06:10.840 --> 01:06:15.039
give give a plug. And we
thank everybody who's in the chat room.

812
01:06:15.039 --> 01:06:17.880
We brought in some some good ideas
as well. And yeah, I'll drop

813
01:06:18.119 --> 01:06:24.000
drop a line to Representative GALLAGHERY.
Maybe he's got a couple of minutes we

814
01:06:24.039 --> 01:06:27.159
could have him come on here.
But as always, if you've got something

815
01:06:27.199 --> 01:06:30.000
bouncing the red round in your head
you want to target about Mark, you

816
01:06:30.000 --> 01:06:33.280
know, drop us, drop us
a line. You're always a great conversation,

817
01:06:33.400 --> 01:06:38.119
Lens, and it's good to have
you on board. Thanks, Thanks

818
01:06:38.159 --> 01:06:41.599
Diego, thank you for letting me. Thank you for a while. I

819
01:06:41.599 --> 01:06:43.599
I heard you were doing a free
for all. I had a little time

820
01:06:43.599 --> 01:06:46.639
on a Sunday and and uh and
the topic you were talking about certainly struck

821
01:06:46.679 --> 01:06:50.760
a nerve with me. So glad
to contribute to the conversation. It's always

822
01:06:50.760 --> 01:06:56.320
a pleasure. Thank you, Mark, Thanks Diego, and thank you everybody

823
01:06:56.400 --> 01:06:59.760
for joining us for another edition of
mid Rets. And until next time,

824
01:07:00.039 --> 01:07:09.599
we hope you have a great Navy
day. Cheers, Molly, don't tell

825
01:07:09.719 --> 01:07:15.400
me to reply to warming Pandy all
king like my lonely wants to marry me

826
01:07:15.760 --> 01:07:20.840
and to all believe the plan that
be. Can't believe all you'll be to

827
01:07:21.079 --> 01:07:30.159
blame for love my family, to
old me, silly faulting your the same.

828
01:07:30.960 --> 01:07:41.199
It's a long way to different It's
a long way. It's a long

829
01:07:41.400 --> 01:07:55.480
way to differently, plyn I love, don't bye because Felwell left a swell.

830
01:07:56.800 --> 01:08:02.679
It's a long long way to tippery
and it was my life right there.

831
01:08:04.280 --> 01:08:05.480
Love, Love,