WEBVTT

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The Ham Radio two point zero audio
podcast rip. Thank you for downloading and

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listening to this podcast. So basically
what I do is I take all the

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audio clips out of my videos and
upload them to speaker and then from there

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they're spread out to iTunes and SoundCloud
and now Amazon Audible as well. But

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I want to welcome you and thank
you for joining the audio section of this

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series on Ham Radio. I hope
you enjoy it, and I would appreciate

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you leaving us a comment or review
on whatever podcast service you're listening from.

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Thank you. In seventy three,
hope you enjoy it. In Poland,

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two men were arrested for using radios
to interfere with their mass transit train system.

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And the art dead and say what
radio they used? But I wonder

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if you guys could guess this.
So I love these new story articles that

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have anything to do with radio.
I do HAM Radio, GMRS radio,

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CB radio. This one doesn't specify
what type of radio was used. It

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just says two polishmen arrested for radio
hack that disrupts trains. This is on

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Wired dot com, okay, and
I will share the link in the description

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blow so you guys can go read
more about this. The top part of

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the article talks about a cyber attack, cryptocurrency, et cetera, et cetera,

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and then it starts right here.
Last weekend, someone more on that

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later successfully disrupted more than twenty trains
in Poland. The incidents were originally described

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as a cyber attack, but it
actually was something much simpler, a radio

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hack. We're not high tech here, guys, using equipment that can cost

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as little as thirty dollars. Hint, hint. The attack exploited the train's

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unencrypted radio system to cause them to
perform an emergency stop. When more than

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twenty trains in Pulland were brought to
a halt last weekend in what was described

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as a cyber attack, all eyes
turned to Russia. After all, Poland's

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rails serve as a key piece of
infrastructure for supporting Ukraine's war effort. But

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as we reported a day later,
the disruption had been caused not through any

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sophisticated cyber intrusion, but through a
simple radio hack that sent a radio stop

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command, probably a DTMF tone I
would guess to the Polish trains over an

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unencrypted and unauthenticated system. So,
in other words, they don't have encryption,

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and unauthenticated means that your radio doesn't
have to register with their network in

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order to key up and be recognized
by the system. The frequencies are known,

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the tones are known, the equipment
is cheap. Polish speaking cybersecurity researcher

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lukaz olanjenk I know I'm saying that
wrong. Apologies. Told Wired everybody could

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do this, even teenagers trolling.
Okay, not teenagers exactly, but twenty

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septhings. This week, Polish police
arrested a twenty four year old man and

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a twenty nine year old man,
both Polish citizens, who had allegedly carried

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out a radio train hack. One
of the two men, based in the

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city of bialis Stock near the border
of Belarus, was a police officer.

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One of the two men was a
police officer whoa amateur radio equipment was found

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in one of their apartments, according
to Poland's RMF radio, where the younger

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man was found reportedly in a drunken
state. I probably would blame a couple

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of guys I know for this,
but they're not in Poland right now,

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so we'll just kind of bypass that. The motives for the two men's trains.

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Sabotage is still far from clear,
especially given that between the radio stop

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commands, they also broadcasted the Russian
national anthem and a clip of a speech

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by President Vladimir Putin. It's too
whilar to roll out Russian government involvement,

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but it's also very possible that the
hack was an extremely ill advised political statement

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or prank. Thirty dollars radio that's
easily attainable. What do you think.

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I'm gonna guess that Amazon has a
Polish version of their website where you can

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order stuff for delivery and Poland.
And someone went out and bought Fang.

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Now, Fang is tnically it is
and it is not a hamateur radio equipment.

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It's no secret that Valfang targets the
ham radio community with their Ubi five,

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RUV eighty two, several other models
of Balfang radios. They also have

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some GMRS only radios. They also
have some commercial only radios. They have

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a large line of radios for many
different services, but the amateur radio community

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is largely targeted when it comes to
Balfang. Now, I don't know that

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these guys had Balfang's I don't know. It doesn't say it just says they

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were easily obtained and they cost about
thirty bucks apot. What do you think

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it might be? I mean,
there's other radios out there that are cheap

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and you can get and you can
key up and type DTMF tones into the

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pad. So the lesson here is
to change frequencies and don't publish your frequencies,

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or to change your tones and don't
publish that, or to just get

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like some sort of encryption system,
which, let's face is expensive. It's

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expensive. I don't know. These
two guys were arrested for this radio hack

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presumably I mean poland they don't mess
around over there. You could probably do

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something like that here. Most of
our systems in this country, in the

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USA are either encrypted or some sort
of authentication system exists. Some sort of

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handshake has to take place before you
can just keep up with some random radio

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on either an analog or a digital
network. So something like that here is

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more unlikely but not impossible. It's
not impossible you could do something like this,

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but to have it just wide open. I think it's really great of

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the Polish police to have arrested someone
so quickly after the fact, because it

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might others think that they don't want
any part of it if they were wanting

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to try something, and it does
seem to be politically motivated. With the

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tension between the Ukraine and Russia right
now, with the war going on between

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Ukraine and Russia right now, it
does seem to be politically motivated. The

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fact that they were broadcasting the Russian
national anthem makes me think that, yeah,

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I'm even more in favor of these
guys getting arrested. But they didn't

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mess around. You know, everybody's
always saying that the FCC doesn't do anything.

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You're not gonna get arrested, they're
not going to come to your house,

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you're not gonna get fine, et
cetera, et cetera. Apparently in

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Poland that is not the case.
I read this article and I'm like,

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I like the fact that it didn't
name the radio because I'm like, I

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bet I know what that is.
I bet I know what that is.

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So what do you think? Have
you heard of this story? Have you

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heard of similar stories where a specific
thirty dollars radio has been used to interfere

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with a public transit system or some
sort of system that runs on radio,

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But it's not actually a radio repeater
or something like a train. A train's

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not a radio repeater, A train's
not a radio system, but it's controlled

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by radio. So they used a
radio to disrupt this train. Put a

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comment blow tell me what you think.