1 00:00:00,080 --> 00:00:08,080 Equipment use autopilot systems. In a single pilot environment, an autopilot system can 2 00:00:08,119 --> 00:00:14,199 greatly reduce workload prefer to Figure seventeen Dash twenty. As a result, the 3 00:00:14,240 --> 00:00:18,039 pilot is free to focus his or her attention on other flight deck duties. 4 00:00:18,920 --> 00:00:23,480 This can improve situational awareness and reduce the possibility of a sea fit accident. 5 00:00:24,559 --> 00:00:28,719 While the addition of an autopilot may certainly be considered a risk control measure, 6 00:00:29,239 --> 00:00:34,399 the real challenge comes in determining the impact of an inoperative unit. If the 7 00:00:34,439 --> 00:00:38,960 autopilot is known to be inoperative prior to departure, this may factor into the 8 00:00:39,000 --> 00:00:44,679 evaluation of other risks. For example, the pilot may be planning for a 9 00:00:44,799 --> 00:00:51,159 VHF omnidirectional range ther approach down to minimums on a dark night into an unfamiliar 10 00:00:51,200 --> 00:00:55,280 airport. In such a case, the pilot may have been relying heavily on 11 00:00:55,320 --> 00:01:00,679 a functioning autopilot capable of flying a coupled approach. This would free the pilot 12 00:01:00,719 --> 00:01:06,480 to monitor aircraft performance. A malfunctioning autopilot could be the single factor that takes 13 00:01:06,519 --> 00:01:11,760 this from a medium to a serious risk. At this point, an alternative 14 00:01:11,799 --> 00:01:15,239 needs to be considered. On the other hand, if the autopilot were to 15 00:01:15,319 --> 00:01:19,959 fail at a critical, high workload portion of this same flight, the pilot 16 00:01:21,000 --> 00:01:26,400 must be prepared to take action instead of simply being an inconvenience. This could 17 00:01:26,439 --> 00:01:30,760 quickly turn into an emergency if not properly handled. The best way to ensure 18 00:01:30,760 --> 00:01:36,079 a pilot is prepared for such an event is to carefully study the issue prior 19 00:01:36,120 --> 00:01:41,439 to departure and determine well in advance how an autopilot failure is to be handled. 20 00:01:42,959 --> 00:01:49,840 Familiarity. As previously discussed, pilot familiarity with all equipment is critical in 21 00:01:49,959 --> 00:01:56,200 optimizing both safety and efficiency. If a pilot is unfamiliar with any aircraft systems, 22 00:01:56,239 --> 00:01:59,680 this will add to the workload and may contribute to a loss of situational 23 00:01:59,799 --> 00:02:05,159 where This level of proficiency is critical and should be looked upon as a requirement, 24 00:02:05,599 --> 00:02:09,280 not unlike carrying an adequate supply of fuel. As a result, pilot 25 00:02:09,360 --> 00:02:14,840 should not look upon unfamiliarity with the aircraft in its systems as a risk control 26 00:02:14,879 --> 00:02:19,919 measure, but instead as a hazard with a high risk potential. Discipline is 27 00:02:20,000 --> 00:02:27,319 key to success. Respect for onboard systems. Automation can assist the pilot in 28 00:02:27,360 --> 00:02:31,240 many ways, but a thorough understanding of the system or systems in use is 29 00:02:31,360 --> 00:02:37,599 essential to gaining the benefits it can offer. Understanding leads to respect, which 30 00:02:37,680 --> 00:02:42,319 is achieved through discipline and the mastery of the onboard systems. It is important 31 00:02:42,319 --> 00:02:47,120 to fly the airplane using minimal information from the primary flight display PFD. This 32 00:02:47,280 --> 00:02:53,680 includes turns, climbs, descents, and being able to fly approaches. Reinforcement 33 00:02:53,719 --> 00:03:00,960 of onboard suites. The use of an electronic flight display may not seem intuitive, 34 00:03:00,280 --> 00:03:07,360 but competency becomes better with understanding and practice. Computer based software and incremental 35 00:03:07,400 --> 00:03:12,800 training help the pilot become comfortable with the onboard suites. Then the pilot needs 36 00:03:12,800 --> 00:03:17,039 to practice what was learned in order to gain experience. Reinforcement not only yields 37 00:03:17,080 --> 00:03:23,879 dividends in the use of automation, it also reduces workloads significantly. Getting beyond 38 00:03:24,039 --> 00:03:30,719 ROTE workmanship. The key to working effectively with automation is getting beyond the sequential 39 00:03:30,759 --> 00:03:36,639 process of executing an action. If a pilot has to analyze what key to 40 00:03:36,719 --> 00:03:40,879 push next, or always uses the same sequence of keystrokes when others are available, 41 00:03:42,400 --> 00:03:46,080 he or she may be trapped in a ROTE process. This mechanical process 42 00:03:46,199 --> 00:03:52,639 indicates a shallow understanding of the system. Again, the desire is to become 43 00:03:52,680 --> 00:03:57,719 competent and know what to do without having to think about what keystroke is next. 44 00:03:58,439 --> 00:04:03,240 Operating the system with potency and comprehension benefits a pilot when situations become more 45 00:04:03,319 --> 00:04:12,479 diverse and tasks increase, understanding the platform. Contrary to popular belief, flight 46 00:04:12,599 --> 00:04:17,920 in aircraft equipped with different electronic management suites requires the same attention as aircraft equipped 47 00:04:17,959 --> 00:04:24,600 with analog instrumentation and a conventional suite of avionics. The pilot should review and 48 00:04:24,720 --> 00:04:29,519 understand the different ways in which the EFD are used in a particular aircraft. 49 00:04:30,079 --> 00:04:34,839 Refer to Figure seventeen twenty one two simple rules for use of an ef D. 50 00:04:36,480 --> 00:04:42,160 Be able to fly the aircraft to the standards in the pts. Although 51 00:04:42,199 --> 00:04:46,920 this may seem insignificant, knowing how to fly the aircraft to a standard makes 52 00:04:46,920 --> 00:04:50,160 a pilot's airmanship smoother and allows him or her more time to attend to the 53 00:04:50,240 --> 00:04:58,399 system instead of managing multiple tasks. Read and understand the installed electronic flight systems 54 00:04:58,480 --> 00:05:03,240 manuals to include the use of the autopilot and other onboard electronic management tools. 55 00:05:04,120 --> 00:05:11,680 Managing aircraft automation. Before any pilot can master aircraft automation, he or she 56 00:05:11,839 --> 00:05:16,160 must first know how to fly the aircraft. Maneuver's training remains an important component 57 00:05:16,199 --> 00:05:21,800 of flight training because almost forty percent of all general aviation accidents take place in 58 00:05:21,839 --> 00:05:27,480 the landing phase, one realm of flight that still does not involve programming a 59 00:05:27,519 --> 00:05:32,680 computer to execute. Another fifteen percent of all general aviation accidents occurs during takeoff 60 00:05:32,839 --> 00:05:41,160 an initial climb. An advanced avionic safety issue identified by the FAA concerns pilots 61 00:05:41,160 --> 00:05:46,399 who apparently develop an unwarranted overreliance in their avionics and the aircraft, believing that 62 00:05:46,439 --> 00:05:53,519 the equipment will compensate for pilot shortcomings. Related to the overreliance is the role 63 00:05:53,560 --> 00:05:58,959 of ADM, which is probably the most significant factor in the general aviation accident 64 00:05:59,000 --> 00:06:04,199 record. Of high formance aircraft used for cross country flight. The FAA Advanced 65 00:06:04,240 --> 00:06:11,480 Avionics Aircraft's Safety Study found that poor decision making seems to afflict new advanced avionics 66 00:06:11,560 --> 00:06:15,360 pilots at a rate higher than that of general aviation as a whole. The 67 00:06:15,480 --> 00:06:21,199 review of advanced avionics accidents cited in this study shows the majority are not caused 68 00:06:21,199 --> 00:06:27,079 by something directly related to the aircraft, but by the pilot's lack of experience 69 00:06:27,279 --> 00:06:31,920 and a chain of poor decisions. One consistent theme in many of the fatal 70 00:06:31,959 --> 00:06:40,000 accidents is continued VFR flight into IMC. Thus, pilot skills for normal and 71 00:06:40,040 --> 00:06:45,680 emergency operations hinge not only on mechanical manipulation of the stick and rudder, but 72 00:06:45,839 --> 00:06:50,680 also include the mental mastery of the EFD. Three key flight management skills are 73 00:06:50,759 --> 00:07:00,959 needed to fly the advanced avionics safely. Information automation, and risk nation management. 74 00:07:01,040 --> 00:07:06,680 For the newly transitioning pilot, the PFD, MFD and GPS SLANT BHF 75 00:07:06,759 --> 00:07:13,920 navigator screens seem to offer too much information presented in colorful menus and sub menus. 76 00:07:14,800 --> 00:07:17,800 In fact, the pilot may be drowning in information but unable to find 77 00:07:17,800 --> 00:07:23,759 a specific piece of information. It might be helpful to remember these systems are 78 00:07:23,800 --> 00:07:28,160 similar to computers, which store some folders on a desktop and some within a 79 00:07:28,279 --> 00:07:33,959 hierarchy. The first critical information management skill for flying with advanced avionics is to 80 00:07:34,040 --> 00:07:41,040 understand the system at a conceptual level. Remembering how the system is organized helps 81 00:07:41,079 --> 00:07:46,600 the pilot manage the available information. It is important to understanding that learning knob 82 00:07:46,639 --> 00:07:51,439 and dial procedures is not enough. Learning more about how advanced avionics systems work 83 00:07:51,879 --> 00:07:57,680 leads to better memory for procedures and allows pilots to solve problems they have not 84 00:07:57,800 --> 00:08:03,759 seen before. There are also limits to understanding. It is generally impossible to 85 00:08:03,839 --> 00:08:09,959 understand all of the behaviors of a complex avionics system. Knowing to expect surprises 86 00:08:09,199 --> 00:08:16,000 and to continually learn new things is more effective than attempting to memorize mechanical manipulation 87 00:08:16,120 --> 00:08:20,480 of the knobs. Simulation software and books on the specific system used are of 88 00:08:20,519 --> 00:08:28,560 great value. The second critical information management skill is to stop look and read. 89 00:08:28,439 --> 00:08:33,240 Pilots new to advanced avionics often become fixated on the knobs and try to 90 00:08:33,279 --> 00:08:39,000 memorize each and every sequence of button pushes, pulls, and turns. A 91 00:08:39,120 --> 00:08:45,559 far better strategy for accessing and managing the information available in advanced avionics computers is 92 00:08:45,600 --> 00:08:50,799 to stop look and read. Reading before pushing, pulling, or twisting can 93 00:08:50,879 --> 00:08:56,759 often save a pilot some trouble. Once behind the display screens on an advanced 94 00:08:56,759 --> 00:09:01,879 avionics aircraft, the pilot's goal is to meet, manage, and prioritize the 95 00:09:01,919 --> 00:09:09,080 information flow to accomplish specific tasks. Certificated flight instructors cfis, as well as 96 00:09:09,120 --> 00:09:13,639 pilots transitioning to advanced avionics, will find it helpful to corral the information flow. 97 00:09:15,559 --> 00:09:20,159 This is possible through such tactics as configuring the aspects of the PFD and 98 00:09:20,399 --> 00:09:26,759 MFD screens according to personal preferences. For example, most systems offer map orientation 99 00:09:26,840 --> 00:09:33,240 options that include north up, track up, DTK, desired track up, 100 00:09:33,759 --> 00:09:39,320 and heading up. Another tactic is to decide, when possible, how much 101 00:09:39,720 --> 00:09:45,279 or how little information to display. Pilots can tailor the information displayed to suit 102 00:09:45,360 --> 00:09:50,840 the needs of a specific flight. Information flow can also be managed for a 103 00:09:50,879 --> 00:09:56,960 specific operation. The pilot has the ability to prioritize information for a timely display 104 00:09:56,399 --> 00:10:03,919 of exactly the information needed for any given flight operation. Examples of managing information 105 00:10:03,000 --> 00:10:11,519 display for specific operation include program map scale settings for en route versus terminal area 106 00:10:11,600 --> 00:10:16,799 operation. Utilize the terrain awareness page on the MFD for a night or IMC 107 00:10:16,960 --> 00:10:22,279 flight in or near the mountains. Use the nearest airports in set on the 108 00:10:22,360 --> 00:10:28,600 PFD at night or over inhospitable terrain. Program the weather data link set to 109 00:10:28,600 --> 00:10:37,200 show echoes and met our status flags. Enhanced situational awareness. An advanced avionics 110 00:10:37,240 --> 00:10:46,840 aircraft offers increased safety with enhanced situational awareness. Although aircraft Flight manuals AFM explicitly 111 00:10:46,840 --> 00:10:52,320 prohibit using the moving map, topography to rain awareness, traffic and weather data 112 00:10:52,360 --> 00:10:58,919 link displays as the primary data source, these tools nonetheless give the pilot unprecedented 113 00:10:58,960 --> 00:11:05,720 information for ann situational awareness without a well planned information management strategy. These tools 114 00:11:05,799 --> 00:11:11,320 also make it easy for an unwary pilot to slide into the complacent role of 115 00:11:11,440 --> 00:11:18,440 passenger in command. Consider the pilot whose navigational information management strategy consists solely of 116 00:11:18,519 --> 00:11:22,600 following the magenta line on the moving map. He or she can easily fly 117 00:11:22,799 --> 00:11:28,720 into geographic or regulatory disaster if the straight line GPS course goes through high terrain 118 00:11:30,360 --> 00:11:35,120 or prohibited airspace, or if the moving map display fails. A good strategy 119 00:11:35,200 --> 00:11:43,000 for maintaining situational awareness information management should include practices that help ensure that awareness is 120 00:11:43,120 --> 00:11:48,679 enhanced by the use of automation, not diminished. Two basic procedures are to 121 00:11:48,759 --> 00:11:54,039 always double check the system and verbal call outs at a minimum ensure the presentation 122 00:11:54,159 --> 00:12:01,399 makes sense. Was the correct destination fed into the navigation system call outs, 123 00:12:01,879 --> 00:12:07,679 even for single pilot operations, are an excellent way to maintain situational awareness as 124 00:12:07,720 --> 00:12:15,840 well as manage information. Other ways to maintain situational awareness include perform verification check 125 00:12:15,879 --> 00:12:20,679 of all programming before departure. Check all information programmed while on the ground. 126 00:12:22,799 --> 00:12:28,200 Check the flight routing before departure. Ensure all routing matches the planned flight route. 127 00:12:28,080 --> 00:12:31,840 Enter the planned route and legs to include headings and leg length on a 128 00:12:31,879 --> 00:12:37,120 paper log. Use this log to evaluate what has been programmed. If the 129 00:12:37,159 --> 00:12:41,559 two do not match, do not assume the computer data is correct. Double 130 00:12:41,639 --> 00:12:48,480 check the computer entry. Verify waypoints. Make use of all onboard navigation equipment. 131 00:12:48,840 --> 00:12:54,440 For example, use VR to back up GPS and vice versa. Match 132 00:12:54,519 --> 00:13:01,399 the use of the automated system with pilot proficiency. Stay with personal limitations. 133 00:13:01,679 --> 00:13:07,480 Plan a realistic flight route to maintain situational awareness. For example, although the 134 00:13:07,559 --> 00:13:13,279 onboard equipment allows a direct flight from Denver, Colorado to Destin, Florida, 135 00:13:13,399 --> 00:13:18,799 the likelihood of rerouting around Egglin Air Force Bases airspace is high. Be ready 136 00:13:18,799 --> 00:13:24,960 to verify computer data entries. For example, incorrect keystrokes could lead to loss 137 00:13:26,000 --> 00:13:31,360 of situational awareness because the pilot may not recognize errors made during a high workload 138 00:13:31,440 --> 00:13:41,279 period. Automation management Advanced avionics offer multiple levels of automation, from strictly manual 139 00:13:41,320 --> 00:13:46,840 flight to highly automated flight. No one level of automation is appropriate for all 140 00:13:46,919 --> 00:13:52,080 flight situations, but in order to avoid potentially dangerous situations when flying with advanced 141 00:13:52,120 --> 00:13:58,720 avionics, the pilot must know how to manage the Course Deviation Indicator CDI, 142 00:13:58,399 --> 00:14:03,639 the navigation source, and the autopilot. It is important for a pilot to 143 00:14:03,720 --> 00:14:11,279 know the peculiarities of the particular automated system being used. This ensures the pilot 144 00:14:11,360 --> 00:14:16,120 knows what to expect, how to monitor for proper operation, and promptly take 145 00:14:16,159 --> 00:14:20,919 appropriate action if the system does not perform as expected. For example, at 146 00:14:20,919 --> 00:14:26,879 the most basic level, managing the autopilot means knowing at all times which modes 147 00:14:26,919 --> 00:14:33,039 are engaged and which modes are armed. To engage, the pilot needs to 148 00:14:33,159 --> 00:14:39,919 verify that armed functions, for example, navigation tracking or altitude capture engage at 149 00:14:39,960 --> 00:14:45,559 the appropriate time. Automation management is another good place to practice the call out 150 00:14:45,600 --> 00:14:50,360 technique, especially after arming the system to make a changing course or altitude. 151 00:14:50,919 --> 00:14:58,440 In advanced avionics, aircraft. Proper automation management also requires a thorough understanding of 152 00:14:58,480 --> 00:15:03,639 how the autopilot interacts with other systems. For example, with some autopilots changing 153 00:15:03,639 --> 00:15:11,799 the navigation source on the EHSI from GPS to LC or VR while the autopilot 154 00:15:11,919 --> 00:15:18,440 is engaged in NAV, the course tracking mode will cause the autopilot's NAV mode 155 00:15:18,440 --> 00:15:26,480 to disengage. The autopilot's lateral control will default to rol wing level until the 156 00:15:26,559 --> 00:15:31,480 pilot takes action to re engage the NAV mode to track the desired navigation source. 157 00:15:33,399 --> 00:15:39,600 Risk management. Risk management is the last of the three management skills needed 158 00:15:39,600 --> 00:15:46,200 for mastery of the glass flight deck aircraft. The enhanced situational awareness and automation 159 00:15:46,240 --> 00:15:52,320 capabilities offered by a glass flight deck airplane vastly expand its safety and utility, 160 00:15:52,879 --> 00:15:58,320 especially for personal transportation use. At the same time, there is some risk 161 00:15:58,399 --> 00:16:04,320 that lighter workloads could lead to complacency. Humans are characteristically poor monitors of automated 162 00:16:04,399 --> 00:16:11,200 systems. When asked to passively monitor an automated system for faults, abnormalities, 163 00:16:11,320 --> 00:16:17,480 or other infrequent events, humans perform poorly. The more reliable the system, 164 00:16:17,879 --> 00:16:22,080 the poorer the human performance. For example, the pilot only monitors a backup 165 00:16:22,080 --> 00:16:26,919 alert system, rather than the situation that the alert system is designed to safeguard. 166 00:16:27,720 --> 00:16:33,799 It is a paradox of automation that technically advanced davionics can both increase and 167 00:16:33,000 --> 00:16:40,279 decrease pilot awareness. It is important to remember that electronic flight displays do not 168 00:16:40,360 --> 00:16:45,000 replace basic flight knowledge and skills. They are a tool for improving flight safety. 169 00:16:45,960 --> 00:16:51,399 Risk increases when the pilot believes the gadgets will compensate for lack of skill 170 00:16:51,759 --> 00:16:56,639 and knowledge. It is especially important to recognize there are limits to what the 171 00:16:56,679 --> 00:17:03,320 electronic systems in any light general aviation aircraft. Do. Being pic requires sound 172 00:17:03,360 --> 00:17:08,839 adm which sometimes means saying no to a flight. Risk is also increased when 173 00:17:08,880 --> 00:17:14,599 the pilot fails to monitor the systems. By failing to monitor the systems and 174 00:17:14,680 --> 00:17:18,440 failing to check the results of the processes, the pilot becomes detached from the 175 00:17:18,440 --> 00:17:26,119 aircraft operation and slides into the complacent role of passenger in command. Complacency led 176 00:17:26,160 --> 00:17:32,039 to tragedy in a nineteen ninety nine aircraft accident in Columbia, a multi engine 177 00:17:32,079 --> 00:17:37,400 aircraft crewed with two pilots struck the face of the Andes Mountains. Examination of 178 00:17:37,440 --> 00:17:44,440 their FMS revealed they entered a waypoint into the FMS incorrectly by one degree, 179 00:17:44,799 --> 00:17:48,920 resulting in a flight path taking them to a point sixty nautical miles off their 180 00:17:48,960 --> 00:17:53,079 intended course. The pilots were equipped with the proper charts, their route was 181 00:17:53,119 --> 00:17:57,880 posted on the charts, and they had a paper navigation log indicating the direction 182 00:17:57,920 --> 00:18:03,640 of each leg. They had all the tools to manage and monitor their flight, 183 00:18:03,160 --> 00:18:08,759 but instead allowed the automation to fly and manage itself. The system did 184 00:18:08,920 --> 00:18:14,599 exactly what it was programmed to do. It flew on a programmed course into 185 00:18:14,640 --> 00:18:18,680 a mountain, resulting in multiple deaths. The pilots simply failed to manage the 186 00:18:18,759 --> 00:18:25,559 system and inherently created their own hazard. Although this hazard was self induced, 187 00:18:25,880 --> 00:18:30,759 what is notable is the risk the pilots created through their own inattention by failing 188 00:18:30,759 --> 00:18:37,279 to evaluate each turn made at the direction of automation, the pilot's maximized risk 189 00:18:37,359 --> 00:18:41,240 instead of minimizing it. In this case, a totally avoidable accident became a 190 00:18:41,279 --> 00:18:48,559 tragedy through simple pilot error and complacency. For the general aviation pilot transitioning to 191 00:18:48,599 --> 00:18:53,519 automated systems, it is helpful to note that all human activity involving technical devices 192 00:18:55,200 --> 00:19:00,680 entails some element of risk. Knowledge, experience, and mission require ernaments tilt 193 00:19:00,720 --> 00:19:06,680 the odds in favor of safe and successful flights. The advanced avionics aircraft offers 194 00:19:06,720 --> 00:19:11,359 many new capabilities and simplifies the basic flying tasks, but only if the pilot 195 00:19:11,440 --> 00:19:18,359 is properly trained and all the equipment is working as advertised. Chapter Summary. 196 00:19:18,680 --> 00:19:23,920 This chapter focuses on helping the pilot improve his or her ADM skills, with 197 00:19:23,960 --> 00:19:30,119 the goal of mitigating the risk factors associated with flight in both classic and automated 198 00:19:30,119 --> 00:19:33,680 aircraft. In the end, the discussion is not so much about aircraft, 199 00:19:34,039 --> 00:19:41,000 but about the people who fly them. End of Part seven of Chapter seventeen.