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Situational awareness. Situational awareness is the
accurate perception and understanding of all the factors

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and conditions within the five fundamental risk
elements of flight, pilot, aircraft environment,

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and type of operation that comprise any
given aviation situation that affects safety before,

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during, and after the flight.
Monitoring radio communications for traffic, weather

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discussion, and ATC communications can enhance
situational awareness by helping the pilot develop a

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mental picture of what is happening.
Maintaining situational awareness requires an understanding of the

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relative significance of all flight related factors
and their future impact on the flight.

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When a pilot understands what is going
on and has an overview of the total

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operation, he or she is not
fixated on one perceived significant factor. Not

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only is it important for a pilot
to know the aircraft's geographical location, it

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is also important he or she understand
what is happening. For instance, while

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flying above Richmond, Virginia towards Dullis
Airport or Leesburg, the pilot should know

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why he or she is being vectored
and be able to anticipate spatial location.

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A pilot who is simply making turns
without understanding why has added an additional burden

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to his or her management in the
event of an emergency to maintain situational awareness.

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All of the skills involved in ADM
are used obstacles to maintaining situational awareness.

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Fatigue, stress, and work overload
can cause a pilot to fixate on

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a single perceived important item and reduce
an overall situational awareness of the flight.

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A contributing factor in many accidents is
a distraction that diverts the pilot's attention from

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monitoring the instruments or scanning outside the
aircraft. Many light deck distractions begin as

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a minor, such as a gauge
that is not reading correctly, but result

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in accidents as the pilot diverts attention
to the perceived problem and neglects to properly

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control the aircraft. Workload management.
Effective workload management ensures essential operations are accomplished

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by planning prior toizing and sequencing task
to avoid work overload refer to Figure seventeen

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sixteen. As experience is gained,
a pilot learns to recognize future workload requirements

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and can prepare for high workload periods
during times of low workload, reviewing the

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appropriate chart and setting frequencies well in
advance of when they're needed helps reduce workload

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as the flight nears the airport.
In addition, a pilot should listen to

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adis, automated surface observation system a
SAUCE or automated weather observing system a WASPS,

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if available, and then monitor the
tower frequency or Common Traffic Advisory Frequency

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c TAFF to get a good idea
of what traffic additions to expect. Checklists

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should be performed well in advance so
there is time to focus on traffic and

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atc instructions. These procedures are especially
important prior to entering a high density traffic

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area such as Class B airspace.
Recognizing a work overload situation is also an

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important component of managing workload. The
first effect of high workload is that the

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pilot may be working harder but accomplishing
less. As workload increases, attention cannot

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be devoted to several tasks at one
time, and the pilot may begin to

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focus on one item. When a
pilot becomes saturated, there is no awareness

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of input from various sources, so
decisions may be made on incomplete information,

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and the possibility of error increases.
Refer to figure seventeen seventeen team. When

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a work overloaded situation exists, a
pilot needs to stop, think, slow

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down, and prioritize. It is
important to understand how to decrease workload.

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For example, in the case of
the cabin door that opened in VFR flight,

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the impact on workload should be insignificant. If the cabin door opens under

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IFR conditions, its impact on workload
will change. Therefore, placing a situation

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in the proper perspective, remaining calm
and thinking rationally are key elements and reducing

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stress and increasing the capacity to fly
safely. This ability depends upon experience,

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discipline, and training. Managing risks. The ability to manage risk begins with

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preparation. Here are some things a
pilot can do to manage overall risk.

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Assess the flight's risk based upon experience. Use some form of risk assessment.

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For example, if the weather is
marginal and the pilot has low IMC training,

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it is probably a good idea to
cancel the flight. Brief passengers using

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the safety list s seat belts fastened
for takeoff taxi landing, shoulder harness fastened

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for takeoff landing, seat position adjusted
and locked in place, A air vents

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location and operation. All environmental controls
discussed. Action in case of any passenger

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discomfort, F fire extinguisher location and
operation, E exit doors, how to

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secure, how to open emergency evacuation
plan, emergency or survival kit location and

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contents, T traffic scanning, spotting, notifying pilot talking, sterile flight deck

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expectations, why your questions speak up
In addition to the safety list discussed with

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passengers, whether or not smoking is
permitted, flight route altitudes, time and

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route destination, weather during flight,
expected whether at the destination, controls and

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what they do, and the general
capabilities and limitations of the aircraft. Use

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a sterile flight deck one that is
completely silent with no pilot communication with passengers

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or by passengers, from the time
of departure to the first intermediate altitude and

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clearance from the local airspace. Use
a sterile flight deck during arrival from the

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first radar vector for approach or dissent
for the approach. Keep the passengers informed.

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During times when the workload is low, consider using passenger in the right

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seat for simple tasks such as holding
the chart. This relieves the pilot of

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a task. Automation in the general
aviation community. An automated aircraft is generally

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comprised of an integrated advanced avionics system
consisting of a primary flight display PFD,

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a multifunctioned flight display MD, including
an instrument certified gluible Positioning System GPS with

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traffic and terrain graphics, and a
fully integrated autopilot. This type of aircraft

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is commonly known as an advanced avionics
aircraft. In an advanced avionics aircraft,

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there are typically two displays, computer
screens PFD left display screen and the MFD.

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Automation is the single most important advance
in aviation technologies. Electronic flight displays

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efds have made vast improvements in howation
is displayed and what information is available to

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the pilot. Pilots can access electronic
databases that contain all of the information traditionally

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contained in multiple handbooks, reducing clutter
in the flight deck prefer to figure seventeen

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eighteen. With errata. Multifunction displays
mds are capable of displaying moving maps that

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mirror sectional charts. These detailed displays
depict all airspace, including temporary flight restrictions

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TFRs. MFDs are so descriptive that
many pilots fall into the trap of relying

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solely on the moving maps for navigation. Pilots also draw upon the database to

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familiarize themselves with departure and destination airport
information. More pilots now rely on electronic

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databases for flight planning and use automated
flight planning tools rather than planning the flight

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by the traditional methods of laying out
charts, draw the course, identifying navigation

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points assuming a VFR flight, and
using the pilot's operating handbook to figure out

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the weight and balance and performance charts. Whichever method of pilot chooses to plan

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a flight, it is important to
remember to check and confirm calculations. Although

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automation has made flying safer, automated
systems can make some errors more evident,

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and sometimes hide other errors or make
them less evident. There are concerns about

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the effective automation on pilots. In
a study published in nineteen ninety five,

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the British Airline Pilots Association officially voiced
its concern that airline pilots increasingly lack basic

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flying skills as a result of reliance
on automation. This reliance on automation translates

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into a lack of basic flying skills
that may affect the pilot's ability to cope

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with an in flight emergency, such
as sudden mechanical failure. The worry that

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pilots are becoming too reliant on automated
systems and are not being encouraged or trained

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to fly mannually has grown with the
increase in the number of MFD flight decks.

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As automated flight decks began entering everyday
line operations, instructors and check airmen

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grew concerned about some of the unanticipated
side effects. Despite the promise of reducing

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human mistakes, the flight managers reported
the automation actually created much larger errors.

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At times in the terminal environment,
the workload in an automated flight deck actually

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seemed higher than in the older analog
flight decks. At other times, the

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automation seemed to lull the flight crews
into complacency. Over time, concern surface

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that the manual flying skills are the
automated flight crew deteriorated due to overliance on

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computers. The flight crew managers said
they worried that pilots would have less stick

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and rudder proficiency when those skills were
needed to manually resume direct control of the

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aircraft. A major study was conducted
to evaluate the performance of two groups of

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pilots. The control group was composed
of pilots who flew an older version of

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a common twin jet airliner equipped with
analog instrumentation, and the experimental group was

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composed of pilots who flew the same
aircraft but newer models equipped with an electronic

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flight instrument System EPHIS and a flight
management system FMS. The pilots were evaluated

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in maintaining aircraft parameters such as heading, altitude, airspeed, glide, slope,

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and localizer deviations, as well as
pilot controlled inputs. These were recorded

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during a variety of normal, abnormal, and emergency maneuvers during four hours of

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simulator sessions. Results of the study, when pilots who had flown ephis for

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several years were required to fly various
maneuvers manually, the aircraft parameters and light

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control inputs clearly showed some erosion of
flying skills. During normal maneuvers such as

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turns to headings without a flight director, the ephist group exhibited somewhat greater deviations

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than the analog group. Most of
the time, the deviations were within the

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practical test standards PTS, but the
pilots definitely did not keep on the localizer

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and glide slope as smoothly as the
analog group. The differences in hand flying

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skills between the two groups became more
significant during abnormal maneuvers such as slam dunks.

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When given close crossing restrictions, the
analog crews were more adept at the

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mental math and usually maneuvered the aircraft
in a smoother manner to make the restriction.

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On the other hand, the EPHIS
crews tended to go heads down and

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tried to solve the crossing restriction on
the f MS referred to figure seventeen Dash

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nineteen with Arata. Another situation used
in the simulator experiment reflected real world changes

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in approach that are common and can
be assigned on short notice. Once again,

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the analog crews transitioned more easily to
the parallel runways localizer, whereas the

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EPHIS crews had a much more difficult
time, with the pilot going head down

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for a significant amount of time trying
to program the new approach into the FMS.

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While upon its lack of familiarity with
the EPHIS is often an issue.

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The approach would have been made easier
by disengaging the automated system and manually flying

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the approach. At the time of
this study, the general guidelines in the

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industry were to let the automated system
do as much of the flying as possible.

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That view has since changed, and
it is recommended that pilots used their

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best judgment when choosing which level of
automation will most efficiently do the task,

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considering the workload and situational awareness.
Emergency maneuvers clearly broadened the difference in manual

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flying skills between the two groups.
In general, the analog pilots tended to

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fly raw data, so when they
were given an emergency such as an engine

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failure and were instructed to fly the
maneuver without a flight director, they performed

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it expertly. By contrast, sop
for EPHIS operations at the time was to

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use the flight director. When EPHIS
crews had their flight directors disabled, their

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eye scan again began a more erratic
searching pattern, and their manual flying subsequently

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suffered. Those who reviewed the data
saw that the EPHIS pilots, who better

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managed the automation, also had better
flying skills. While the data did not

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reveal whether those skills preceded or followed
automation. It did indicate that automation management

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needed to be improved. Recommended best
practices and procedures have remedied some of the

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earlier problems with automation. Pilots need
to maintain their flight skills and ability to

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maneuver aircraft manually within the standards set
forth in the PTS. It is recommended

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the pilots of automated aircraft occasionally disengage
the automation and manually fly the aircraft to

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maintain stick and rudder proficiency. It
is imperative pilots understand that the EPD adds

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to the overall quality of the flight
experience, but it can also lead to

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catastrophe if not utilized properly. At
no time is the moving map meant to

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substitute for a VFR sectional or low
altitude en route chart. End to Part

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sixth of Chapter seventeen