WEBVTT 1 00:00:00.320 --> 00:00:02.879 Hey, guys, it's Jack. I just wanted to talk to you today 2 00:00:03.000 --> 00:00:06.879 about a way that you can help support the podcast. If you're not already, 3 00:00:07.200 --> 00:00:10.720 we would really appreciate it if you guys went and reviewed us on Apple 4 00:00:10.839 --> 00:00:15.320 or Spotify. Those reviews really help people find the podcast and help it get 5 00:00:15.359 --> 00:00:18.760 recognized, and you know, if you've been enjoying the show, we really 6 00:00:18.800 --> 00:00:23.879 appreciate your support. Another thing that you can do to support the channel is 7 00:00:23.960 --> 00:00:28.839 to become a Patreon member. So we have Patreon memberships that started just five 8 00:00:28.879 --> 00:00:32.719 dollars a month, and when you sign up, you get access to all 9 00:00:32.799 --> 00:00:36.520 of our episodes add free. That's the big bonus for that. I mean, 10 00:00:36.520 --> 00:00:41.640 we also do some Patreon bonus episodes for our subscribers, but this is 11 00:00:41.719 --> 00:00:47.560 the biggest and best way that you can support the Teamhouse channel and podcast if 12 00:00:47.600 --> 00:00:51.240 you'd like to, and we really appreciate that. So go and check us 13 00:00:51.240 --> 00:01:02.200 out at patreon dot com. Slash The Teamhouse, Special Operations, Cobert Ahs, 14 00:01:03.280 --> 00:01:11.159 SB and I The Team House with your host Jack Murphy and David Bark. 15 00:01:17.480 --> 00:01:19.079 Hey, folks, welcome to episode two hundred and seventy five of The 16 00:01:19.079 --> 00:01:23.519 Team House. I'm Jack here with Dave. Our guest on tonight's show is 17 00:01:23.719 --> 00:01:27.480 Dante Paradiso. He is the current director for East African Affairs at the State 18 00:01:27.519 --> 00:01:32.239 Department. He is a career Foreign Service officer. He's the author of The 19 00:01:32.319 --> 00:01:36.840 Embassy, which we hope you guys will take a look at. He had 20 00:01:37.000 --> 00:01:41.040 many different assignments, many different travels around the world, including some hot spots 21 00:01:41.079 --> 00:01:46.120 in Africa and as well as Afghanistan. We're excited to talk to him tonight. 22 00:01:47.640 --> 00:01:51.439 First up, top, do you want to give your disclaimer? Yeah, 23 00:01:51.640 --> 00:01:57.000 just as a current serving Foreign Service officer, I have to say the 24 00:01:57.120 --> 00:02:00.120 views I expressed are my own and not necessarily those of the United States Government 25 00:02:00.239 --> 00:02:05.159 or the United States Department of State. Thank you, And I just want 26 00:02:05.200 --> 00:02:07.280 to tell people before we get started. If you want, you can check 27 00:02:07.280 --> 00:02:12.719 out our Patreon the links down the description. Consider supporting the team house keeping 28 00:02:12.759 --> 00:02:15.840 this show going. And if you sign up for five bucks a month, 29 00:02:15.120 --> 00:02:19.520 you get all of these episodes ad free, both the video and the podcast. 30 00:02:19.639 --> 00:02:23.759 And we really appreciate you guys supporting us. So, you know, 31 00:02:23.800 --> 00:02:28.280 you're the first State Department guy we've had on the show. We've talked a 32 00:02:28.280 --> 00:02:30.400 lot on here about you know, they say there's the three options. There's 33 00:02:30.439 --> 00:02:35.840 military action, there's covert action, and then there's diplomacy. We haven't really 34 00:02:35.840 --> 00:02:40.080 talked about the diplomacy so much, but I wanted to just kind of, 35 00:02:40.120 --> 00:02:44.400 like, before we get into your personal story, kick off the conversation a 36 00:02:44.400 --> 00:02:47.759 bit because I was thinking as I was I was reading in Foreign Affairs this 37 00:02:47.800 --> 00:02:53.919 week about like why this matters, Why diplomacy matters? And in this article, 38 00:02:54.879 --> 00:03:00.000 the authors write, China, in contrast with the United States, invests 39 00:03:00.400 --> 00:03:04.800 and the diplomatic resource is necessary to market its initiatives, speaking of like the 40 00:03:04.840 --> 00:03:09.400 Belton Road initiative and things like that. It has more embassies and representative offices 41 00:03:09.439 --> 00:03:14.919 around the globe than any other country, and Chinese diplomats frequently speak at conferences 42 00:03:14.919 --> 00:03:17.879 and publish a stream of articles about China's various initiatives in local news outlets. 43 00:03:19.319 --> 00:03:23.960 So we talk a lot about great power, competition and these other buzzwords. 44 00:03:23.960 --> 00:03:29.680 Nowadays a new era of strategic competition diplomatically, Why does it matter that China 45 00:03:30.240 --> 00:03:36.240 is out diplomating US. Yeah, it's a great question to start with. 46 00:03:38.319 --> 00:03:46.439 The core of diplomacy is the management of relations between countries. Right, you 47 00:03:46.560 --> 00:03:53.800 can't go to another country, you can't trade with another country, you can't 48 00:03:53.479 --> 00:04:00.560 conduct operations through another country, you can't fly over another country without agreement of 49 00:04:00.560 --> 00:04:05.800 that country. I think a lot of folks, you know, we were 50 00:04:05.840 --> 00:04:13.639 talking offline about global war and terror, there was a lot of freedom of 51 00:04:13.719 --> 00:04:18.959 movement within other countries that there was always tension about sovereignty, but there was 52 00:04:19.000 --> 00:04:26.040 a question of how sovereign some of these entities were. In an error of 53 00:04:26.040 --> 00:04:32.279 strategic competition, sovereignty is at a premium, and so if you look at 54 00:04:32.319 --> 00:04:38.519 how integrated the world is, it's basically impossible to get along without the diplomatic 55 00:04:38.639 --> 00:04:46.319 aspect because you're not doing military solutions. For whether you get the component parts 56 00:04:46.839 --> 00:04:51.040 to make your iPhone through a series of countries into a manufacturing base that then 57 00:04:51.120 --> 00:04:58.079 sells back to the United States. The global flow of oil goes from refinery 58 00:04:58.120 --> 00:05:05.199 processes to export into plastics. That whole network is based on agreements between nations 59 00:05:05.240 --> 00:05:10.480 on how to treat the flow of goods, services, and people. So 60 00:05:11.120 --> 00:05:16.720 it's kind of a critical component to our everyday life that we don't see because 61 00:05:16.920 --> 00:05:24.000 so much of what America is and is built on was built out of diplomatic 62 00:05:24.079 --> 00:05:27.759 relations. I mean, you take French support for US in the Revolutionary War. 63 00:05:27.800 --> 00:05:31.519 It goes back to that. But that's sort of the core of diplomacy 64 00:05:31.800 --> 00:05:39.800 is managing how we interact as America with other states, and if we fall 65 00:05:39.839 --> 00:05:43.279 behind China, if they have more embassies, more consulates. I don't mean 66 00:05:43.319 --> 00:05:45.759 to just put an arbitrary number on it, but what I mean is if 67 00:05:45.759 --> 00:05:49.480 they're conducting more diplomacy and building more relationships than we are, does that affect 68 00:05:49.560 --> 00:05:55.800 us from a security standpoint an economic standpoint? Well, you know, I'd 69 00:05:55.800 --> 00:06:00.920 say economic and security are completely tied together. But you know, just to 70 00:06:01.279 --> 00:06:08.800 give a very very simple example, you know, Rarer, it's critical minerals, 71 00:06:09.759 --> 00:06:14.319 things that are minded that go into the technology that we're relying on to 72 00:06:14.319 --> 00:06:17.920 put on this show that we use in our phones, in our pockets. 73 00:06:19.959 --> 00:06:25.360 If supply chains get locked up by one country, it doesn't have to be 74 00:06:25.439 --> 00:06:28.600 China, it could be any country. If that supply chain gets locked up 75 00:06:29.120 --> 00:06:33.800 and we haven't paid attention to it because we haven't put resources into the diplomatic 76 00:06:33.879 --> 00:06:40.439 relations that would keep that supply chain open for us, what is that going 77 00:06:40.519 --> 00:06:44.040 to do. It's going to have an effect on whether the availability of that 78 00:06:44.079 --> 00:06:49.240 technology for us, which directly affects our lives, our economy, and it'll 79 00:06:49.240 --> 00:06:54.839 do things like drive inflation, right because things are harder to get at. 80 00:06:55.480 --> 00:07:01.439 So when we take a country like China that is in vesting in building up 81 00:07:01.560 --> 00:07:09.560 ties around the world, if we were to scale back significantly, it would 82 00:07:09.600 --> 00:07:13.319 have knock on effects for US. So I think that's you know, when 83 00:07:13.319 --> 00:07:17.360 you're talking strategic competition, it's not always a zero sum game. Diplomacy fundamentally 84 00:07:17.399 --> 00:07:20.879 is about how to manage the relationship. You try to get to cooperation, 85 00:07:20.959 --> 00:07:26.399 but when you're talking strategic competition there is a bit of that zero sum factor 86 00:07:26.439 --> 00:07:30.959 that comes in. Fascinating. Yeah, so Dante, thank you first off 87 00:07:30.000 --> 00:07:33.600 for that, for that answer. But to back up a little bit, 88 00:07:33.680 --> 00:07:36.800 I want to pick up a little bit with your story, and I want 89 00:07:36.839 --> 00:07:41.319 you to literally start at the beginning if you could, because I was convinced 90 00:07:41.319 --> 00:07:45.519 that your name is a pen name. I was like, where did Dante 91 00:07:45.600 --> 00:07:47.560 Paradiso come from? Who were you born to, where did you grow up? 92 00:07:47.600 --> 00:07:53.120 And how did that take you eventually towards governmental service? Yeah, I 93 00:07:53.160 --> 00:07:57.079 don't know. I don't know where the government came into that, you know, 94 00:07:57.160 --> 00:08:01.800 I'm a classic New Yorker Irish Italian. Uh. You know, my 95 00:08:01.800 --> 00:08:07.839 my mom's side of the family was Staten Island through Brooklyn, via Ireland. 96 00:08:07.560 --> 00:08:13.279 My dad's side of the family was Italian, Southern Italian Bronx classic New York 97 00:08:13.319 --> 00:08:18.600 love story. They met in the stacks at the Columbia University and the sort 98 00:08:18.639 --> 00:08:22.439 of school of General ad not the not the she she part of the School 99 00:08:24.240 --> 00:08:26.600 General Studies, right, yeah, exactly, they were. They were working 100 00:08:26.639 --> 00:08:31.600 in the stacks. They met there. It was the late sixties. Said 101 00:08:31.440 --> 00:08:37.080 and here I am. I started, uh started my first steps, you 102 00:08:37.080 --> 00:08:41.919 know in h Up in that area, you know, steps of Saint John's 103 00:08:41.960 --> 00:08:45.919 and things like that. It got pulled out of you know, the States. 104 00:08:45.919 --> 00:08:48.799 They were a little bit Bohemian. My my my mother's father, so 105 00:08:48.840 --> 00:08:54.759 my grandfather was an illustrator. He illustrated classics, illustrated comics, John Wayne 106 00:08:54.840 --> 00:09:00.600 comics. He did pulp comics in the fifties. But back in those days 107 00:09:00.600 --> 00:09:03.279 that was a poor thing to do, Like you didn't make a lot of 108 00:09:03.360 --> 00:09:07.279 money. You just turn this stuff out and uh, but you know, 109 00:09:07.679 --> 00:09:11.840 there was a lot of artistry in the family. Uh. Come from a 110 00:09:13.039 --> 00:09:20.279 lineage of artists and filmmakers, and uh, they they decamped. My parents 111 00:09:20.279 --> 00:09:24.000 decamped from New York to uh, Spain. If you go back to the 112 00:09:24.000 --> 00:09:28.240 early seventies, this is Franco So this is fascist Spain. Uh and uh 113 00:09:28.720 --> 00:09:35.240 and uh they stayed there a couple of years and didn't didn't quite work out 114 00:09:35.240 --> 00:09:39.600 as artists, you know. Uh. Uh they came back and uh. 115 00:09:39.720 --> 00:09:43.399 You know, I grew up in mostly in Connecticut, uh, and then 116 00:09:43.440 --> 00:09:46.039 returned to the city for high school. Uh. And over that time, 117 00:09:46.200 --> 00:09:50.799 you know, uh, I watched a lot of film. Back in the 118 00:09:50.879 --> 00:09:54.120 day, we didn't have the access to you know, our kids have today 119 00:09:54.120 --> 00:09:58.799 to everything, so you know, but that started to influence me. Film 120 00:09:58.840 --> 00:10:03.919 and literature started to influence me about getting interested in the world and overseas things. 121 00:10:03.919 --> 00:10:07.440 And then, as in New Yorker, you're just all day, we're 122 00:10:07.440 --> 00:10:11.200 confronted with opinions, so you got to develop some and you get you interested 123 00:10:11.200 --> 00:10:13.720 in the rest of the world. So that's I think sort of where the 124 00:10:13.759 --> 00:10:16.720 origins of my international interests started. And so what was the next step after 125 00:10:16.759 --> 00:10:20.279 high school? I mean, you presumably go to college and some interest in 126 00:10:20.320 --> 00:10:24.919 foreign affairs. Yeah, it's it really I had kind of wanted to be 127 00:10:24.960 --> 00:10:31.399 a journalist. I had gotten interested in high school in journalism. I'd read 128 00:10:31.440 --> 00:10:35.840 a lot of you know, literature, you know, folks like Steinbeck or 129 00:10:35.879 --> 00:10:39.960 big influences on me. And then, you know, a child of the 130 00:10:41.000 --> 00:10:43.559 seventies and the eighties, I also grew up on a lot of the Great 131 00:10:45.320 --> 00:10:48.360 War films like Apocalypse. Now, you know, these are like seminal films, 132 00:10:48.399 --> 00:10:54.639 and so you you kind of want to challenge yourself physically and mentally, 133 00:10:54.000 --> 00:10:58.120 and you also want to see the world and you want to participate in something 134 00:10:58.159 --> 00:11:01.720 that's bigger than yourself. You know. I really thought journalism would be a 135 00:11:01.720 --> 00:11:05.879 great way to do that. I took a course when I was at Yale. 136 00:11:05.440 --> 00:11:09.200 They had these seminars that you could take, and they brought in a 137 00:11:09.240 --> 00:11:13.600 guy who was a journalist for the Christian Science Monitor who had published a book 138 00:11:13.639 --> 00:11:20.200 on Afghanistan, but this was Soviet Afghanistan. He'd gone in through Peshawar and 139 00:11:20.320 --> 00:11:22.919 describe what that was like. His name is EDG. Gerr Day, you 140 00:11:22.919 --> 00:11:28.360 know, tremendous reporter. Still does stuff at a Geneva. He's got a 141 00:11:28.360 --> 00:11:35.919 little company called Global Geneva that still talks global issues and serious journalism, you 142 00:11:35.919 --> 00:11:39.600 know, trying to tell you what's going on is not politicized, this is 143 00:11:39.639 --> 00:11:43.799 sort of the story. So he was co teaching this with a guy who 144 00:11:43.840 --> 00:11:52.440 had worked as a UN lawyer. And this was ninety one, and you 145 00:11:52.440 --> 00:11:56.759 know, the Cold War was ending, and what he was trying to do 146 00:11:56.879 --> 00:12:03.639 now with the withdrawal all of the Soviets from Afghanistan, it was a turbulent 147 00:12:03.720 --> 00:12:07.240 time. They were trying to do was start a d mining effort through the 148 00:12:07.360 --> 00:12:13.639 United Nations. And he was a lawyer and he was trying essentially to get 149 00:12:13.639 --> 00:12:18.440 the Soviets to cough up maps of where they put the minds so that you 150 00:12:18.480 --> 00:12:24.600 could actually protect civilians. And I started to see that there were maybe other 151 00:12:24.679 --> 00:12:30.000 avenues to go down rather than just journalism. We also didn't have any money 152 00:12:30.000 --> 00:12:33.759 as a family. So you know, when I saw a lot of successful 153 00:12:33.799 --> 00:12:35.120 journalists, I would I would talk to them. I would say, how'd 154 00:12:35.120 --> 00:12:37.679 you become a journalist? Oh? You know, I was a stringer. 155 00:12:39.320 --> 00:12:43.279 It's like, how'd you pay the rent while you were stringing? Because people 156 00:12:43.320 --> 00:12:46.919 could do that, you would you would string for a while. You know, 157 00:12:46.960 --> 00:12:50.639 you'd write a few articles. People in the community would get to know 158 00:12:50.679 --> 00:12:52.720 you, they'd maybe get you picked up by an organization. But you know, 159 00:12:52.799 --> 00:12:56.559 I mean I didn't have any money to go to a place to strength. 160 00:12:58.080 --> 00:13:01.000 I also, you know, it was I had the James Woods model 161 00:13:01.080 --> 00:13:03.600 in my mind from you know, Salvador. If you guys ever saw that 162 00:13:03.679 --> 00:13:07.600 movie from the from this early eighties, I don't think it's a great film. 163 00:13:07.679 --> 00:13:11.679 Yeah, but you know that was James when he was on the left, 164 00:13:11.720 --> 00:13:15.360 not on the right, So you know, different James Woods back then. 165 00:13:15.399 --> 00:13:20.720 But so I started to get interested in, as you know, is 166 00:13:20.720 --> 00:13:26.039 there a way through law that you could do something. But so I graduated 167 00:13:26.639 --> 00:13:31.039 Yale and was kicking around. I you know, wasn't quite sure what to 168 00:13:31.080 --> 00:13:37.279 do. And I got called out by a friend of mine to build trails 169 00:13:37.360 --> 00:13:43.240 in northern California on a trail crew for at risk youth. The crew was 170 00:13:43.279 --> 00:13:46.879 for at risk youth, and I went out there. You know, I 171 00:13:46.919 --> 00:13:50.440 took a friend of mine from from Yale, also one of my one of 172 00:13:50.480 --> 00:13:52.960 my old roommates. He came out too. So we spent a year doing 173 00:13:54.000 --> 00:13:58.519 that, and from that I joined Peace Corps. Interesting story though, because 174 00:13:58.600 --> 00:14:03.879 I had wanted to join a navy and i'd add an injury. And it 175 00:14:03.960 --> 00:14:09.519 was sort of between this program and the Navy, and they the Navy came 176 00:14:09.559 --> 00:14:13.799 back and they you know, I took the ASVAB test and they were like, 177 00:14:13.840 --> 00:14:16.879 man, you you scored really well. We're gonna put you on the 178 00:14:16.919 --> 00:14:20.840 nuclear program. And I said, I'm like terrible at math. I don't 179 00:14:20.840 --> 00:14:26.080 know what. I don't know what happened, but apparently I sent them too 180 00:14:26.080 --> 00:14:30.440 many X rays to prove that the leg was good, so they need more 181 00:14:30.480 --> 00:14:33.679 time. And I got the other offer, and I just went out and 182 00:14:33.679 --> 00:14:37.279 did the trail crew, you know. So and then later I had developed 183 00:14:37.279 --> 00:14:43.440 a little bit of respiratory condition, so that was that path was foreclosed to 184 00:14:43.480 --> 00:14:46.559 me. So anyway, I ended up in Peace Corps coming out of that 185 00:14:46.600 --> 00:14:50.919 other thing, and that was my first real introduction to embassies. I didn't 186 00:14:50.960 --> 00:14:56.480 know much about what embassies did, but what what embassies do in places. 187 00:14:56.519 --> 00:15:01.039 I went to Kenya and a lot of peace corps you get kind of dirty 188 00:15:01.080 --> 00:15:09.200 and unshowered over the over the years. And some embassy communities are real nice 189 00:15:09.320 --> 00:15:13.279 and they may open their houses to the Peace Corps. And so, you 190 00:15:13.279 --> 00:15:16.720 know, when you go into Nairobi, some people would go and stay with 191 00:15:16.759 --> 00:15:20.799 an embassy family and they would have a weekend that was you know, with 192 00:15:20.879 --> 00:15:24.200 a clean bed and a shower and things like that. I didn't actually have 193 00:15:24.240 --> 00:15:28.120 those relationships, but I started to talk to people who were in the embassy 194 00:15:28.120 --> 00:15:31.240 community and learn a little bit about what an embassy does. And I learned 195 00:15:31.240 --> 00:15:37.240 things like, we have jobs that you report on the politics of a country, 196 00:15:39.000 --> 00:15:41.559 So it's kind of like being a journalist, but for the government feed 197 00:15:41.559 --> 00:15:46.600 that information back that determines what are policy is going to be to the country, 198 00:15:46.639 --> 00:15:50.879 but you're living over there. And I got interested in that, and 199 00:15:50.000 --> 00:15:56.200 so it took a couple more details, and I came back and I went 200 00:15:58.320 --> 00:16:02.240 still didn't have any money. You know, volunteer service doesn't really get you 201 00:16:02.320 --> 00:16:07.960 at nor does a minimum wage work for a trail call, but I highly 202 00:16:07.000 --> 00:16:11.399 recommend that kind of work. By the way, it was fantastic time building 203 00:16:11.399 --> 00:16:15.519 trails in the Redwoods. But didn't have any money. And you know, 204 00:16:17.759 --> 00:16:21.679 my set of folks were like, so law school is where you end up, 205 00:16:21.720 --> 00:16:26.200 And I ended up in law. A lot of my law school colleagues, 206 00:16:26.240 --> 00:16:30.559 of course, you know sort of you know, we're in it for 207 00:16:30.600 --> 00:16:37.240 the money. I was in the sort of you know, idealistic camp. 208 00:16:37.279 --> 00:16:41.039 I guess still sort of hoping to do international law, and I would talk 209 00:16:41.080 --> 00:16:44.399 to people, how do you do how'd you do international law? And there 210 00:16:44.480 --> 00:16:51.240 was this lawyer who was a prosecutor, Pierre Prospery became a big name prosecutor 211 00:16:51.279 --> 00:16:56.320 in l A. He was I think he had Haitian roots, so he 212 00:16:56.399 --> 00:17:04.359 spoke some French. And when the International Criminal Tribunals came for Rwanda, they 213 00:17:04.400 --> 00:17:10.440 were looking for an American prosecutor because we had some funding relationship with it, 214 00:17:11.160 --> 00:17:14.599 and so he ends up out there. I said, you know, how 215 00:17:15.200 --> 00:17:18.200 do you get these jobs? I just fell into it. I don't know 216 00:17:18.200 --> 00:17:21.400 how I'm going to fall into that job. He had a unique skill set. 217 00:17:22.680 --> 00:17:26.240 There was a genocide, it happened in a Francophone place, and you 218 00:17:26.400 --> 00:17:33.079 end up with the skill set that matches. So but like a lot of 219 00:17:33.160 --> 00:17:40.599 us, I'm a nine to eleven product. So before nine to eleven, 220 00:17:41.079 --> 00:17:51.039 I interned with the State Department in Tanzania and that was ninety eight. So 221 00:17:51.119 --> 00:17:56.160 they sent me over for the summer to be a reporting officer as an intern, 222 00:17:56.240 --> 00:18:02.079 and that was the year that the bombing happened, and so I was 223 00:18:02.119 --> 00:18:06.640 in the bombing, came back, still needed money, so I took the 224 00:18:06.640 --> 00:18:12.960 corporate law job, and then I'm up in Boston the morning those planes would 225 00:18:14.000 --> 00:18:15.480 have flown right past my office. I had an office on the twenty seventh 226 00:18:15.519 --> 00:18:22.359 floor, and I was on the call with the client. And I'll never 227 00:18:22.400 --> 00:18:26.119 forget it because the first plane hit and I assumed it was like one of 228 00:18:26.119 --> 00:18:33.079 these little biplane things. And you know, because of the ninety three bombing 229 00:18:33.160 --> 00:18:36.839 that everybody forgets in the World Trade Center, I thought it was I immediately 230 00:18:36.839 --> 00:18:38.359 assumed it was a bombing. Nobody else does, right, but you know, 231 00:18:38.480 --> 00:18:42.000 I kind of just assumed this was a sort of bombing. I called 232 00:18:42.000 --> 00:18:45.079 a friend of mine. I was like, yeah, they tried again. 233 00:18:48.960 --> 00:18:52.039 He was in New York. He hadn't even heard anything. It was the 234 00:18:52.039 --> 00:18:55.519 first he'd heard of it. I go back on with the client. The 235 00:18:55.519 --> 00:19:02.519 client is asking me about the minutia of board minutes, and somebody runs in 236 00:19:02.559 --> 00:19:06.599 and says, you know, the tower is on fire, like this is 237 00:19:06.799 --> 00:19:11.319 It was a This was a jet plane that went into the tower. And 238 00:19:11.400 --> 00:19:14.359 so I said, look, this is New York. I'm a New Yorker. 239 00:19:14.480 --> 00:19:15.920 I'm up there in Boston but the guy is up in New Hampshire, 240 00:19:15.920 --> 00:19:18.960 and I said, I gotta I gotta go, and he goes, you'll 241 00:19:18.960 --> 00:19:26.920 call me back, I'll go. I gotta go. So so I went. 242 00:19:26.680 --> 00:19:32.559 I watched with everybody else the second tower fall, and I'll never forget 243 00:19:32.559 --> 00:19:36.599 that either, because the newscaster on the feed that I was watching did not 244 00:19:37.000 --> 00:19:41.680 realize the second the towers were collapsing. They were just reporting as the towers 245 00:19:41.680 --> 00:19:45.680 are sort of on fire. They were just they just didn't know. And 246 00:19:45.720 --> 00:19:49.079 then, of course, because we were in a high rise, you know, 247 00:19:49.160 --> 00:19:53.240 they we evacuated the building, walked home. Everybody's out on the streets 248 00:19:53.279 --> 00:20:00.240 just wandering around in a daze, kind of crazy. And then, because 249 00:20:00.240 --> 00:20:03.960 it's the corporate world, within a few days, we're back at work and 250 00:20:04.000 --> 00:20:10.920 it is you don't even know. I mean, everybody's talking about it. 251 00:20:10.920 --> 00:20:15.720 It's a thing. But it's back to you know, meet the client deadlines, 252 00:20:15.720 --> 00:20:21.240 and the clients are focused on a whole bunch of other things. They're 253 00:20:21.240 --> 00:20:26.440 focused on corporate governance issues, bankruptcy issues, finance issues. The next mezzanine 254 00:20:26.519 --> 00:20:30.960 round of a financing for a joint venture, is it going to be affected 255 00:20:30.000 --> 00:20:34.000 by the events that are happening, you know, does this effect our you 256 00:20:34.039 --> 00:20:37.880 know, the funding that's coming in, you know, because there's some turbulence 257 00:20:37.920 --> 00:20:42.640 in the markets. I said, okay, I'm working away. And then 258 00:20:42.720 --> 00:20:49.079 we go into Afghanistan because the Taliban refused to turn over bin Laden. And 259 00:20:51.480 --> 00:20:53.440 you know, this is you know, two thousand and one now, and 260 00:20:55.279 --> 00:20:59.119 I'm a year year and a half in and I'm walking around the luffer. 261 00:20:59.200 --> 00:21:03.240 But I'm just sort of I mean, I really enjoyed the partners I worked 262 00:21:03.240 --> 00:21:06.720 with. There were some terrific people there. But I would poke my head 263 00:21:06.720 --> 00:21:11.119 in I go, you know where at war. People would look at me 264 00:21:11.240 --> 00:21:18.039 like you're a little different, and I'm like you had this feeling like, 265 00:21:18.200 --> 00:21:22.720 okay, this is a there's something larger going on here. It's my city 266 00:21:23.039 --> 00:21:27.200 that's affected. Afghanistan is something that I'd been tracking, you know, all 267 00:21:27.200 --> 00:21:30.799 the way back from you know, high school. I think we all remember 268 00:21:30.799 --> 00:21:33.680 that National Geographic cover with the girl with the green eyes, you know, 269 00:21:33.720 --> 00:21:37.519 I mean that that thing was all seered into us. Then I'd studied the 270 00:21:37.880 --> 00:21:44.000 topic, and colleges I discussed, and so I just had a sense that 271 00:21:44.119 --> 00:21:47.440 you know, you got to join and a lot of other people, you 272 00:21:47.440 --> 00:21:49.920 know, joined the military at that time. You know, for me, 273 00:21:49.960 --> 00:21:55.200 I ended up with an offer from from the Foreign Service, and so I 274 00:21:55.240 --> 00:22:00.119 said, okay, I'm taking that and headed off to you know, see 275 00:22:00.160 --> 00:22:02.920 what I can contribute. Now. The Foreign Service they don't you know, 276 00:22:02.920 --> 00:22:04.359 they'll say, okay, you're you're coming in. You're going to go to 277 00:22:04.519 --> 00:22:10.759 Afghanistan, right, But that's that's sort of how I got in into the 278 00:22:10.799 --> 00:22:14.839 career. Can weind rewind it a little bit because you you were involved in 279 00:22:14.839 --> 00:22:18.960 a bombing and then and and I'd love to hear about short experience if you 280 00:22:19.000 --> 00:22:23.680 don't mind talking. No, absolutely, So this is August seventh, nineteen 281 00:22:23.759 --> 00:22:32.839 ninety eight. Dara Salaam was a you know, bustling but relatively sleepy, 282 00:22:33.039 --> 00:22:38.200 dusty port town. I had just gotten back from a trip to Arusha to 283 00:22:38.400 --> 00:22:45.039 visit the International Criminal Court where I was kind of reporting on the activities there 284 00:22:45.079 --> 00:22:49.279 so we could kind of see where our investment uh. And they again, 285 00:22:49.279 --> 00:22:56.519 they were prosecuting folks that were responsible for the genocide and kind of wanted to 286 00:22:56.599 --> 00:23:00.480 see how that effort was going. And this is in northern Tanzania, at 287 00:23:00.519 --> 00:23:06.240 the base of kiliman Jarro, and it was having a great summer. Again. 288 00:23:06.279 --> 00:23:08.160 I had been a Peace Corps volunteer in Kenya, so I knew the 289 00:23:08.200 --> 00:23:12.839 region had a little opportunity to go on safari. It's always great, you 290 00:23:12.839 --> 00:23:22.079 know. And I get back and we're in a morning staff meeting during the 291 00:23:22.880 --> 00:23:29.039 summer, particularly at embassies that are smaller in their footprint. You know, 292 00:23:29.559 --> 00:23:34.000 not every embassy is Embassy Beijing with you know, a thousand people working there. 293 00:23:34.160 --> 00:23:38.440 You know, some of our African embassies may have you know, fifteen 294 00:23:38.559 --> 00:23:45.200 twenty officers. The summer is generally transfer season, so you have a lot 295 00:23:45.200 --> 00:23:51.200 of interns, temporary duty people out there, very small staff. So they 296 00:23:51.200 --> 00:23:56.839 were about ten or eleven of us in the charge's office. I mentioned charge 297 00:23:56.960 --> 00:24:03.519 is the acting ambassador. We hadn't had ambassador appointed yet, or had the 298 00:24:03.720 --> 00:24:10.799 ambassador hadn't arrived at post yet. The charge was John Lang and just a 299 00:24:10.839 --> 00:24:15.200 regular morning staff meeting to go over you know, where are we with development 300 00:24:15.240 --> 00:24:18.720 assistance today? That kind of thing, you know, who's in, who's 301 00:24:18.720 --> 00:24:26.240 out of the office, and we hear a large boom is the best way 302 00:24:26.279 --> 00:24:32.880 I can describe it. And then there was a strange, pressurized feeling and 303 00:24:33.400 --> 00:24:38.559 I was sitting right next to the charge on a couch just like yours, 304 00:24:41.319 --> 00:24:48.960 and I slouch, which is good because normally if I was standing up, 305 00:24:48.400 --> 00:24:56.200 the entire window structure went over us and hit the back wall of the office. 306 00:24:56.319 --> 00:25:00.039 And folks were sitting sort of in an L shape like me, and 307 00:25:00.319 --> 00:25:04.680 they were covered with debris. But if you'd been standing, if any of 308 00:25:04.759 --> 00:25:08.839 us have been standing in front of that window, somebody would have been decapitated. 309 00:25:11.200 --> 00:25:15.880 So people were sort of cut up in shock, kind of wondering and 310 00:25:18.640 --> 00:25:22.519 it's dar As Salam, What what's going to happen in Daras Salaam? You 311 00:25:22.559 --> 00:25:30.720 know, you had the trouble in the east, out in Goma where you're 312 00:25:30.759 --> 00:25:36.920 talking about, you know, the Rwandans and the Eastern DRC issue with the 313 00:25:37.000 --> 00:25:40.720 Hutus and the Tutsis are still you know, fighting. This is ninety eight, 314 00:25:40.839 --> 00:25:42.640 right, so you're you're doing you know, I mean, there's still 315 00:25:44.079 --> 00:25:47.799 still fighting there. So was it something related to that? Could it have 316 00:25:47.839 --> 00:25:52.039 been some sort of you know, honestly, gas explosion? Right, That's 317 00:25:52.160 --> 00:25:56.039 that's more what you're thinking. You're not thinking you're going to be the epicenter 318 00:25:56.200 --> 00:26:04.119 of a of a terrorist attack. It just but the shape of the embassy 319 00:26:04.400 --> 00:26:10.799 was such that the bomb went off on a corner and blew out the whole 320 00:26:10.799 --> 00:26:15.519 corner. We were sort of tucked around in a second wing of the embassy, 321 00:26:15.880 --> 00:26:21.319 so we sort of got the blast came around. It had come in 322 00:26:21.480 --> 00:26:30.119 under a water truck, water delivery truck. Massive, massive hole. So 323 00:26:30.480 --> 00:26:33.279 we didn't know any of this though. We start making our way out. 324 00:26:33.839 --> 00:26:38.240 We go one direction and we decide, okay, we got to there seemed 325 00:26:38.279 --> 00:26:44.400 to be some damage where things had fallen in. I was trailing the whole 326 00:26:44.440 --> 00:26:49.480 group. Our charge was at the lead. He disappeared. He went down 327 00:26:49.519 --> 00:26:56.039 to our consular section and was digging out one of the consular officers who was 328 00:26:56.119 --> 00:27:00.319 the spouse of one of our marines who was buried under the rubb. She 329 00:27:00.400 --> 00:27:07.119 survived, so he had made it immediately did that. We made our way 330 00:27:07.119 --> 00:27:11.119 out, and you know, we had a wall in front of the embassy 331 00:27:11.359 --> 00:27:19.640 that was concrete gone vaporized. All of the motor pool which was parked out 332 00:27:21.119 --> 00:27:29.480 front on the street pancaked. All the frames melted completely, right, but 333 00:27:30.359 --> 00:27:34.319 we kept hearing pop pop pop pop. Sounded like gunfire. It was tires 334 00:27:34.799 --> 00:27:41.079 exploding from the residual heat. So We're all standing there. Everybody's in a 335 00:27:41.160 --> 00:27:49.039 daze, and trucks pull up and ladders come over. I think it was 336 00:27:49.079 --> 00:27:52.960 like, I don't know, fire trucks, I don't know who's coming. 337 00:27:52.960 --> 00:27:55.960 Maybe it was the local Tanzania. We made our way over the wall. 338 00:27:56.039 --> 00:28:00.960 There was a French embassy compound on the far side of a a road. 339 00:28:02.119 --> 00:28:06.839 We went over there and then I could see everybody was completely dazed, and 340 00:28:07.759 --> 00:28:11.640 so I started doing accountability and just got out. I said hey, and 341 00:28:11.839 --> 00:28:17.000 I remember my boss, Chris mcmowan later became an ambassador, a great diplomat, 342 00:28:17.519 --> 00:28:19.720 the head of the political section, just absent mindedly, you know, 343 00:28:19.799 --> 00:28:25.279 handed me a pen and I took it one of those old yellow sheets and 344 00:28:25.359 --> 00:28:30.839 started saying, who's here. In the end, we didn't lose any Americans, 345 00:28:30.880 --> 00:28:34.000 but we lost eleven of our Tanzanian colleagues, and there were some other 346 00:28:34.039 --> 00:28:40.400 folks that were, you know, vaporized on the street. And then you 347 00:28:40.440 --> 00:28:45.000 know, from that point on, we sort of regrouped and we figured we 348 00:28:45.000 --> 00:28:51.559 were going to go to our public affairs officer's house and we regrouped there. 349 00:28:51.599 --> 00:28:53.480 That was the sort of the the part that we were going to go back 350 00:28:53.519 --> 00:28:59.599 to if there was ever anything like this, it's not a contingency plan, 351 00:29:00.519 --> 00:29:06.920 and we may have gone to the charge's house first. We ended up at 352 00:29:06.920 --> 00:29:08.720 the public affairs house. I think we went to the charge's house first. 353 00:29:10.920 --> 00:29:15.000 I remember at some point there was like a fax machine or something and I 354 00:29:15.039 --> 00:29:22.640 saw a printed thing come in that said this is Israelis think this is Issama 355 00:29:22.640 --> 00:29:27.920 bin Laden. Oh wow that quickly, Yeah, it was like within hours, 356 00:29:29.720 --> 00:29:34.160 right. But the other thing that happened is where there were like, 357 00:29:34.359 --> 00:29:37.440 okay, so this is a bombing, where at the epicenter of bombing, 358 00:29:37.480 --> 00:29:44.279 we don't know what's going on. The Marines are trying to secure the premises 359 00:29:44.839 --> 00:29:48.559 small it's our Marine Security detachment and you know, for embassy workers, these 360 00:29:48.559 --> 00:29:55.799 guys are gold right. Our MSG's are our core defense. They're under the 361 00:29:55.799 --> 00:30:00.519 control of the RSO, so they're cut to the Regional security off right. 362 00:30:00.200 --> 00:30:10.200 So it's a unique arrangement. And the Regional Security officer was immediately liaising with 363 00:30:10.559 --> 00:30:14.319 you know, host country officials. But they're trying to secure it. So 364 00:30:14.880 --> 00:30:18.039 we still had a whole bunch of communications equipment in there. I had to 365 00:30:18.039 --> 00:30:23.440 go back with our communicator to with a sledgehammer yeah, this is how we 366 00:30:23.480 --> 00:30:27.880 did with a sledgehammer to bust up everything. Because the truth is, we 367 00:30:27.880 --> 00:30:33.319 weren't going to be able to really fully secure this compound. And you know, 368 00:30:33.480 --> 00:30:36.160 back in those days, there was still a lot of paper files around. 369 00:30:36.920 --> 00:30:40.279 Then we're burning things, you know, feeding them into an incinerator and 370 00:30:40.279 --> 00:30:44.119 stuff. These days it's a lot it's more efficient because there's just a lot 371 00:30:44.200 --> 00:30:47.480 less paper. We had paper file cabinets. You had to break into the 372 00:30:47.519 --> 00:30:52.839 cabinet and so I did a lot of you know, destruction of the of 373 00:30:52.920 --> 00:31:00.960 the sensitive items with a sledgehammer with by one other coworker who was her responsibility. 374 00:31:00.960 --> 00:31:03.079 She ran that shop. I'd never even been back there. I had 375 00:31:03.119 --> 00:31:07.559 no oh we got servers. I have no idea what's going on. So 376 00:31:07.039 --> 00:31:11.480 but then I remember, you know, seeing you know, this has bin 377 00:31:11.599 --> 00:31:18.279 laden and this is a terrorist attack. But in that early in those early 378 00:31:18.319 --> 00:31:22.240 moments, were like, okay, so you know, we got to need 379 00:31:22.400 --> 00:31:29.559 Washington support. And we find out Nairobi's been bombed. So it took us 380 00:31:29.599 --> 00:31:33.640 a little time, but we realized that this is a dual bombing. And 381 00:31:33.680 --> 00:31:37.279 then everybody was under lockdown because they thought that Campala was going to be bombed 382 00:31:37.319 --> 00:31:45.279 too, but that shifted everybody's attention because Nairobi's embassy. Our embassy was in 383 00:31:45.400 --> 00:31:48.920 essentially a suburban area at a crossroads of two large roads. It was a 384 00:31:49.039 --> 00:31:56.279 dispersed explosion. It crushed the embassy, it crushed the chancery right, blew 385 00:31:56.319 --> 00:32:00.359 out all our walls, pancaked everything, but we had a small foot print 386 00:32:00.960 --> 00:32:07.640 and there were virtually no civilians around in Nairobi. There was a it was 387 00:32:07.680 --> 00:32:10.799 a complex attack where there was like a grenade or something went off in advance, 388 00:32:12.880 --> 00:32:16.920 and they're in a downtown concentrated area, and two hundred and forty people 389 00:32:16.920 --> 00:32:22.759 were killed. And you also had secondary explosions so that people had heard some 390 00:32:22.799 --> 00:32:29.000 sort of initial disturbance. Kenyans had gone to the windows in these downtown offices 391 00:32:29.079 --> 00:32:35.720 and the windows were all blown over them. So it was this massive event, 392 00:32:35.839 --> 00:32:40.200 and you know, Washington's attention went to Nairobi because we were also we 393 00:32:40.200 --> 00:32:45.799 had lost Americans. You had a collapsed building in downtown, and you had 394 00:32:45.880 --> 00:32:50.759 thousands of people trying to be helpful, you know, complete chaos, whereas 395 00:32:50.799 --> 00:32:55.039 we were in this sort of more days discreete and we had crowds gathering, 396 00:32:55.119 --> 00:33:00.319 but you know again it was the nature of the area. So you know, 397 00:33:00.400 --> 00:33:02.559 that was it. That was the start of you know, for me, 398 00:33:04.680 --> 00:33:08.160 the global warrant at that time ben Laden was he still in Sudan or 399 00:33:08.200 --> 00:33:12.400 he had been exiled by that No, he was in Sudan. And so 400 00:33:12.519 --> 00:33:17.000 if you guys remember we the initial response was was to you know, drop 401 00:33:17.079 --> 00:33:23.319 some some missiles on what was claimed to be some sort of pharmaceutical factory. 402 00:33:23.519 --> 00:33:28.920 You know, I honestly lost the thread on you know, sort of what 403 00:33:28.920 --> 00:33:34.160 what happened. But that's how you know this. The Sudanese didn't want any 404 00:33:34.200 --> 00:33:37.559 part of him after that. That's how he ended up in Afghanistan, right 405 00:33:37.960 --> 00:33:45.440 right, because he was looking for safe space and we were putting pressure to 406 00:33:45.319 --> 00:33:49.359 on the Sudanese to turn him over and he just got out of Dodge. 407 00:33:49.680 --> 00:33:54.480 So that takes us through. Then you told us about nine to eleven propelling 408 00:33:54.519 --> 00:34:00.920 you towards foreign service. Tell us about I mean, it sounds like maybe 409 00:34:00.920 --> 00:34:06.359 this was your first overseas assignment. Was was Liberia the first one? So 410 00:34:07.119 --> 00:34:12.760 I count this because I was an acting political officer. It was an internship, 411 00:34:12.840 --> 00:34:15.480 but you know, I was doing the job and you know, so 412 00:34:15.519 --> 00:34:19.719 I count that the first formal assignment was Liberia in two thousand and three. 413 00:34:19.840 --> 00:34:23.360 So I go through the whole you know, you know process to bring us 414 00:34:23.360 --> 00:34:27.079 in. They give us, you know, ten eleven weeks of training, 415 00:34:27.639 --> 00:34:32.400 and then you're out the door and I get to Liberia in April of two 416 00:34:32.440 --> 00:34:36.480 thousand and three. So what's happening in April of two thousand and three. 417 00:34:37.880 --> 00:34:49.079 Charles Taylor is in Liberia. He's under extraordinary sanction arms embargo. They had 418 00:34:49.119 --> 00:34:54.360 just done an embargo on Timber to try to cut off revenues to Taylor because 419 00:34:55.320 --> 00:35:00.440 you know, he had sort of come to power running a lot of irregular 420 00:35:01.119 --> 00:35:07.280 units. There's a lot of stories about the early nineties and sort of you 421 00:35:07.280 --> 00:35:15.119 know, his legendary coming in at Christmas and you know, eventually eventually winning 422 00:35:15.119 --> 00:35:20.920 an essentially internal struggle to get control of Liberia. He was definitely on the 423 00:35:21.239 --> 00:35:27.119 on the wrong side of Washington policy, so he was on the outs. 424 00:35:27.679 --> 00:35:34.760 But he had allowed his troops to get because he wasn't paying them to sort 425 00:35:34.760 --> 00:35:42.079 of go loot in internal conflict that had broken out in neighboring Cote Devoir, 426 00:35:43.280 --> 00:35:51.199 and the Ivorians got mad and they allowed an insurgency to you know, crop 427 00:35:51.280 --> 00:35:57.280 up there magically, while there was another ongoing one on the border with Guinea 428 00:35:57.760 --> 00:36:02.039 and Sierra Leone. The Lord rebels, No, it's not the Lord of 429 00:36:02.800 --> 00:36:08.079 right. Yeah, it was like Liberians united for the Restoration of democracy. 430 00:36:08.119 --> 00:36:12.440 You know. So everybody's got there. And the other one was Modell in 431 00:36:12.519 --> 00:36:21.920 the south. So so Taylor was now facing two insurgencies from different bases while 432 00:36:21.960 --> 00:36:30.559 being under tremendous pressure, and Liberia was just sort of collapsing in on itself 433 00:36:30.239 --> 00:36:36.719 and turning into a real humanitarian catastrophe. They had, you know, several 434 00:36:36.840 --> 00:36:45.000 hundred thousand internally displaced people, and the war started to come into toward Monrovia. 435 00:36:45.159 --> 00:36:50.039 They started making gains because again, you know, people weren't really getting 436 00:36:50.079 --> 00:36:53.800 paid and the payment was looting, and the looting was driving chaos and so 437 00:36:53.880 --> 00:37:00.920 it was it was all manner of bad situation. And so so you know, 438 00:37:00.960 --> 00:37:02.559 my first assignment was to go into the embassy. I you know, 439 00:37:04.519 --> 00:37:12.800 you get a bid list of potential places you could go. You're matched with 440 00:37:12.880 --> 00:37:17.559 I had eighty nine people in my incoming class. There's eighty nine places you 441 00:37:17.639 --> 00:37:21.760 find. Everybody enters. They have different ideas of what they want to do 442 00:37:21.800 --> 00:37:23.880 with their careers. You know, there's certain people who they want those parish 443 00:37:23.960 --> 00:37:30.800 jobs. Not a lot of parish jobs for the entry level officers. You 444 00:37:30.840 --> 00:37:32.679 know, I think I put like Moscow as my number one. I was 445 00:37:32.719 --> 00:37:37.840 always interested in sort of seeing what the Russians were up to. But I 446 00:37:37.880 --> 00:37:40.639 had library pretty high, and not a lot of people had library a very 447 00:37:40.679 --> 00:37:44.960 high, so, you know, and it was because of the crisis experience 448 00:37:45.000 --> 00:37:47.480 I had, and that again the sense that you want to do something with 449 00:37:47.519 --> 00:37:52.480 your career, that you're part of something bigger, different. I knew there 450 00:37:52.519 --> 00:37:57.639 was conflict, and you know, this is opportunity to diplomacy because for me, 451 00:37:58.199 --> 00:38:00.960 I talked about the management of international relations because you started with China, 452 00:38:01.159 --> 00:38:07.360 you start with strategic competition, right, so that is the core. But 453 00:38:07.079 --> 00:38:12.960 the core core is war and peace. And you know what drew me was 454 00:38:13.039 --> 00:38:17.360 the same impulse that drew me to apply for the Navy to be interested in, 455 00:38:17.840 --> 00:38:22.559 you know, working on military issues, is that that if you can 456 00:38:22.599 --> 00:38:29.239 be part of something that stops a war, you know, that can that 457 00:38:29.280 --> 00:38:32.400 can be meaningful work, deeply meaningful work, which I just want to point 458 00:38:32.400 --> 00:38:37.079 out the Libera experience is detailed in your book here the Embassy, not just 459 00:38:37.159 --> 00:38:40.159 your experience but some of your colleagues as well that you went through there. 460 00:38:40.199 --> 00:38:45.119 And I'm afraid I haven't read it yet, but I plan too. It 461 00:38:45.159 --> 00:38:51.000 sounds really good homework for you guys. But absolutely so. I would love 462 00:38:51.039 --> 00:38:55.159 to hear because we always hear about embargos and we hear about sanctions. What 463 00:38:55.440 --> 00:39:00.880 is an embargo? How does US enforce that of art bargo? And then 464 00:39:00.360 --> 00:39:05.119 at a time like maybe when China wasn't so much a near peer, but 465 00:39:05.280 --> 00:39:09.800 like Russia may have, how if we put in an embargo or sanctions in 466 00:39:09.840 --> 00:39:15.440 another country decides to just ignore that, What are the recourses for us? 467 00:39:15.760 --> 00:39:22.679 This is a great and timely question. You know, sanctions I think were 468 00:39:22.760 --> 00:39:28.199 viewed It's a little bit before our time, but I think they were viewed 469 00:39:28.360 --> 00:39:35.079 as an alternative to military solutions and as a way to sort of shape behavior 470 00:39:36.039 --> 00:39:43.480 in a world that is completely dominated by the US dollar. Okay, the 471 00:39:43.679 --> 00:39:49.719 sanctions idea, there's certain things that you could always do, like deny entry 472 00:39:49.760 --> 00:39:53.440 to the country, an individual sanction on visas, which you know is perfectly 473 00:39:53.480 --> 00:40:00.239 reasonable. You commit you know, human rights abuses or something right is not 474 00:40:00.239 --> 00:40:02.480 going to invite you to to the United States is that you don't have no 475 00:40:02.639 --> 00:40:06.920 right to come here, right, you need to apply to come here legally. 476 00:40:07.039 --> 00:40:10.719 So but you know, there were there were a couple things. Uh. 477 00:40:12.119 --> 00:40:19.039 So it was born out of the discomfort with apartheid and how do we 478 00:40:20.280 --> 00:40:28.840 shape South African behavior or you know, the government's and I hate the word 479 00:40:28.840 --> 00:40:31.960 behavior because we're not you know, you know, it's not a parent child 480 00:40:32.000 --> 00:40:36.559 relationships. It's patronizing right for us. But how do you how do you 481 00:40:36.679 --> 00:40:42.920 shape or influence policies of a foreign government? And one way to do that 482 00:40:43.199 --> 00:40:49.760 was, you know, to try sanctions, and so it was a means 483 00:40:49.800 --> 00:40:53.159 to respond to apartheid. It was one of the core ways to do it. 484 00:40:53.760 --> 00:41:01.039 An embargo where you stop sending uh you know, aid has a you 485 00:41:01.079 --> 00:41:07.400 know, is a way to express our own policy directly into a country. 486 00:41:07.039 --> 00:41:10.920 So, you know, the most famous examples are from the you know, 487 00:41:13.199 --> 00:41:17.679 the Carter years, where they introduced really human rights into the as a as 488 00:41:17.719 --> 00:41:21.599 a core part of our calculus. In the late seventies, and so we 489 00:41:21.639 --> 00:41:27.000 started trying to scale back military assistance to right wing governments in Latin America. 490 00:41:27.000 --> 00:41:29.639 And then when Reagan came in. He flipped it and he said, no, 491 00:41:29.519 --> 00:41:31.239 no, no, those are our allies. We're not giving it up 492 00:41:31.239 --> 00:41:37.519 to the Sandinistas. And so we're gonna we're going to turn the aid back 493 00:41:37.559 --> 00:41:39.679 on. So the embargo would be, hey, we're stopping that. So 494 00:41:40.639 --> 00:41:47.239 sanctions work if a country doesn't have friends, Okay, if the country has 495 00:41:47.280 --> 00:41:50.840 a lot of friends, sanctions don't work. Liberia didn't have a lot of 496 00:41:50.840 --> 00:41:57.199 friends. So, and we were at a moment in history where Russia and 497 00:41:57.239 --> 00:42:00.800 the Cold War was over. You're talking late nineties, early two thousands. 498 00:42:01.199 --> 00:42:06.920 China had not exceeded. They just acceeded to the WTO thanks to US. 499 00:42:07.360 --> 00:42:10.960 They were not an economic powerhouse. They did not have all these diplomatic resources. 500 00:42:10.960 --> 00:42:17.280 They were still very much dealing with China and and and you know, 501 00:42:17.360 --> 00:42:22.119 Russia's army was in complete disarray. They were at a point of you know, 502 00:42:22.559 --> 00:42:23.320 uh, not a lot of you know, it was the Yelts and 503 00:42:23.440 --> 00:42:30.480 years moving into early early putin. So the the KGB had not re established, 504 00:42:30.559 --> 00:42:32.079 you know, full control over things. And so here you have an 505 00:42:32.119 --> 00:42:39.000 isolated country that's running a cash economy right where the key sources of revenue or 506 00:42:39.079 --> 00:42:45.800 shipping registry. It's run out of Virginia. And you know timber that they 507 00:42:45.840 --> 00:42:49.440 were selling, and so if you sanction that, meaning you you get agreement 508 00:42:49.639 --> 00:42:54.320 at the Security Council that countries will not buy Liberian timber. There's no market 509 00:42:54.360 --> 00:42:58.719 for it. So when they go in and pull in to a port with 510 00:42:58.800 --> 00:43:05.440 the Liberian timber, it can't be offloaded. So now there's no revenue coming 511 00:43:05.440 --> 00:43:07.559 in. Now what are you doing. You're starving that country of the resources 512 00:43:07.559 --> 00:43:12.079 to do what buy guns to perpetuate the regime. It's a way to put 513 00:43:12.119 --> 00:43:16.039 pressure on the regime in that case. You know, eventually the objective really 514 00:43:16.119 --> 00:43:22.559 was to just have Charles Taylor leave, but you know the core objective was 515 00:43:22.599 --> 00:43:27.079 to steer them back to democratic elections. That's what we were trying to do. 516 00:43:27.559 --> 00:43:30.599 How did that go when you got there in two thousand and three? 517 00:43:30.599 --> 00:43:34.400 How did things kind of unfold in Liberia? Yeah? Well, what had 518 00:43:34.440 --> 00:43:37.280 happened was the sanctions were somewhat effective again, but it was part in just 519 00:43:37.320 --> 00:43:40.039 the sort of the way the country was being run. Where money would come 520 00:43:40.039 --> 00:43:45.679 in, it would be cash dispersed. They weren't doing a sophisticated banking section. 521 00:43:45.880 --> 00:43:52.199 There so the regime was collapsing, and you know, our thinking was 522 00:43:52.239 --> 00:43:57.079 that the war was going to be going on indefinitely, and so our role 523 00:43:57.320 --> 00:44:02.800 was to try to get the groups to the peace table. And I think 524 00:44:02.880 --> 00:44:08.360 Taylor started taking some hits in the south part of the southern part of the 525 00:44:08.360 --> 00:44:15.119 country because of again this new insurgency that had come up. I think it 526 00:44:15.239 --> 00:44:17.679 started. I think he was going to try to play the long game and 527 00:44:17.760 --> 00:44:22.679 go to peace talks and kind of draw it out. But the rebels didn't 528 00:44:22.679 --> 00:44:29.719 really have the ability to overthrow them, and so peace talks were initiated. 529 00:44:29.760 --> 00:44:36.400 They started up these trilateral peace talks in Ghana, and right at the start 530 00:44:36.440 --> 00:44:42.199 of the peace talks, a court for Sierra Leone, a special court that 531 00:44:42.239 --> 00:44:50.239 we are Congress was funding with an American prosecutor again for crimes that they accused 532 00:44:50.320 --> 00:44:54.960 Charles Taylor of committing in Sierra Leone. More backstory to why Charles Taylor was 533 00:44:54.960 --> 00:45:00.639 on everybody's blacklist was, if you guys remember the Sierra Leone, you know, 534 00:45:00.800 --> 00:45:05.199 conflict was horrific. You know, they would do things like, you 535 00:45:05.239 --> 00:45:08.280 know, cut the arms off children and pile them in a pile in the 536 00:45:08.280 --> 00:45:15.960 middle of the village and I mean just horrific, horrific crimes. So Taylor 537 00:45:15.000 --> 00:45:21.440 was in trouble with this Special Court. The Special Court unseals an indictment for 538 00:45:21.519 --> 00:45:27.480 the head of State of Liberia while he was out of the country in Ghana. 539 00:45:28.679 --> 00:45:31.800 This led the complete chaos back in Liberia where they were like, oh 540 00:45:31.840 --> 00:45:37.360 my god, are the President's gone. All of his militia, you know, 541 00:45:37.440 --> 00:45:43.480 started panicking, and so the Ghanaians were like, you're asking us, 542 00:45:43.599 --> 00:45:46.519 the court is asking us to We invited this guy for peace talks, to 543 00:45:46.599 --> 00:45:51.400 bring the parties together, and you're gonna tell us we're supposed to arrest him. 544 00:45:51.440 --> 00:45:55.159 They flew him back. They flew him back to Liberia because Liberia was 545 00:45:55.199 --> 00:46:00.239 melting down. And who gets who's the victims? The victims of the population 546 00:46:00.440 --> 00:46:06.000 that's at the mercy of you know, militia that are completely loyal to one 547 00:46:06.039 --> 00:46:12.320 guy who thinks their guy has been taken off the board and they're gonna loot 548 00:46:12.800 --> 00:46:17.199 and they're gonna rape and pillage and do damage. And then you also had 549 00:46:17.199 --> 00:46:21.559 rebel groups that were basically doing the same thing. So the rebel groups took 550 00:46:21.559 --> 00:46:24.760 that as a momentum play. Taylor returns he gets back command and control. 551 00:46:24.800 --> 00:46:30.679 But the rebels, you know, the other rebels, the lord attacks the 552 00:46:30.719 --> 00:46:35.360 city and they made it, you know, further than people thought. Over 553 00:46:35.400 --> 00:46:43.159 the course of the a three month period, the rebels attacked Monrovia three times 554 00:46:43.960 --> 00:46:49.280 and they ended up taking half the city and driving everybody into the center of 555 00:46:49.280 --> 00:46:53.360 the city. By everybody, I mean tens of thousands of displaced people and 556 00:46:53.400 --> 00:46:57.320 people who had lived in the city in the part of the city that the 557 00:46:57.320 --> 00:47:00.679 rebels had come in. They all came streaming into the uh the embassy, 558 00:47:02.239 --> 00:47:07.039 into the variety of the environs of the embassy. Because Liberia has such a 559 00:47:07.159 --> 00:47:13.679 unique relationship with the US, we essentially gave money to found the country. 560 00:47:14.079 --> 00:47:22.719 The idea was to give former slaves a homeland back in in the in Africa. 561 00:47:22.920 --> 00:47:25.239 Liberia is like liberty. Yeah, yeah, that's right. So so 562 00:47:25.840 --> 00:47:30.440 the whole idea of Liberia. So there's has been this long, unique historical 563 00:47:30.480 --> 00:47:37.039 relationship between Liberia and the United States. Far too complicated. We could do 564 00:47:37.079 --> 00:47:40.079 a whole nother podcast on that, but but for the for these purposes, 565 00:47:42.559 --> 00:47:47.360 you know, folks had sort of crowded around the embassy. What was amazing 566 00:47:47.559 --> 00:47:54.920 was at the low point. We had about six officers and seven marines and 567 00:47:54.960 --> 00:48:02.000 our local guards. So embassies, the embassy secure posture is generally reliant on 568 00:48:02.760 --> 00:48:08.599 host country security. Hear, the host country security or contract security, but 569 00:48:08.639 --> 00:48:14.840 there's also a relationship between the host country security and our contract security. So 570 00:48:14.920 --> 00:48:19.159 in Liberia, because of the ongoing conflict, we had contract security, but 571 00:48:19.199 --> 00:48:24.360 those are local Liberians, just as we had local Tanzanians that provide the bulk 572 00:48:24.400 --> 00:48:30.679 of the security for an embassy. So it's very unique dynamic. And your 573 00:48:30.719 --> 00:48:34.639 marines are really sort of inside the perimeter, you know, protecting the core 574 00:48:34.880 --> 00:48:40.039 things of the chancery. So you had seven marines and that, and that 575 00:48:40.199 --> 00:48:45.039 was sort of dealing with hundreds of thousands of people at the gate saying what 576 00:48:45.079 --> 00:48:50.840 are you going to do to help us out? What's also happening right at 577 00:48:50.840 --> 00:49:00.079 this time Iraq, Iraq. So from a US government military standpoint, from 578 00:49:00.119 --> 00:49:09.239 a Defense Department standpoint, particularly Rumsfeld, it was we do not need this 579 00:49:09.320 --> 00:49:16.360 problem. You guys are out. Colin Powell was Secretary of State and he's 580 00:49:16.440 --> 00:49:22.519 like, this is our credibility for all of our defense and security architecture in 581 00:49:22.519 --> 00:49:28.960 West Africa. So everybody will look to see what we are doing in Liberia. 582 00:49:29.800 --> 00:49:31.960 If the United States is committed to its partners, and we had been 583 00:49:32.000 --> 00:49:37.960 spending a lot of money on building up echoas the economic community of West African 584 00:49:37.960 --> 00:49:45.159 States, but from a military training standpoint to handle regional security problems, putting 585 00:49:45.159 --> 00:49:52.360 money into Nigeria Ghana, but it had been a mixed result. In the 586 00:49:53.119 --> 00:49:58.280 mid nineties, there had been Echo echoass missions that the Nigerians had gone into 587 00:49:58.320 --> 00:50:04.360 Liberian It didn't work out so well for anybody. So, you know, 588 00:50:04.960 --> 00:50:07.679 Colin Powell said, no, no, we have reasons to be there. 589 00:50:07.719 --> 00:50:12.719 There's a humanitarian crisis. We shouldn't just you know, abandon the folks in 590 00:50:12.719 --> 00:50:16.480 a country that we have a deep historical relationship to. We've got broader issues. 591 00:50:16.920 --> 00:50:23.239 And then there's always in the global War on terror world, the core 592 00:50:23.400 --> 00:50:28.960 belief right was ungoverned spaces are going to lead to places that you know, 593 00:50:29.039 --> 00:50:35.599 Al Qaeda and others can take root. And so this is the counter argument 594 00:50:35.639 --> 00:50:37.760 to just what are we doing. It's totally chaotic because if you look at 595 00:50:37.760 --> 00:50:44.880 it from a diplomatic security standpoint, a military standpoint, you say, you've 596 00:50:44.920 --> 00:50:52.559 got no way to exfiltrate the airport is twenty miles away. Your neighbor is 597 00:50:52.280 --> 00:50:57.039 you know, through the jungle. There are no roads going out there that 598 00:50:57.119 --> 00:51:01.480 are passable. It's you know, two days drive out through Sierra Leone. 599 00:51:02.480 --> 00:51:07.280 You can't convoy out. You can't convoy out through Guinea or you know, 600 00:51:09.239 --> 00:51:15.519 you know Cote dey Voors because rebels hold that territory. So what did we 601 00:51:15.559 --> 00:51:20.119 do. The first thing we did is the French came sent a warship. 602 00:51:20.960 --> 00:51:24.199 I got in touch with the one French attache who was there, and we 603 00:51:24.320 --> 00:51:30.920 conducted an evacuation. But the ambassador, John Blaney, said, hey, 604 00:51:30.679 --> 00:51:37.679 here's the case for staying. And I think it's my estimation that the Liberians 605 00:51:37.719 --> 00:51:44.480 want us to stay. That means the rebels and the government who were trying 606 00:51:44.519 --> 00:51:49.679 to get the head of state out, they still want us. He's making 607 00:51:49.719 --> 00:51:55.000 that assessment right, And so that's a call because if you look at it 608 00:51:55.039 --> 00:52:00.280 sort of tactically, if you're looking at threat streams, you're isolated. You 609 00:52:00.280 --> 00:52:05.440 don't have the assets. So we evacuated everybody onto this front. By everybody, 610 00:52:05.480 --> 00:52:09.000 I mean we called Americans that were in town and said hey, if 611 00:52:09.039 --> 00:52:13.079 you can make it to the embassy, well we'll get you out with the 612 00:52:13.079 --> 00:52:16.039 French, because the French were evacuating the UN and other foreign nationals. The 613 00:52:16.079 --> 00:52:22.320 Lebanese whoever was around, not a lot of It wasn't a big tourist destination. 614 00:52:22.920 --> 00:52:29.119 In two thousand and three, they got everybody out and a second rebel 615 00:52:29.119 --> 00:52:32.280 attack happened. Right again, I told you there were three attacks. So 616 00:52:32.400 --> 00:52:38.000 now you know the number one response for US is at the time we had 617 00:52:38.039 --> 00:52:45.079 a fast platoon that would come down from Europe to augment embassy security. The 618 00:52:45.079 --> 00:52:50.039 ambassador of course asked for the fast platoon. Rumsfeld held it wouldn't act on, 619 00:52:50.079 --> 00:52:53.280 it wouldn't send down, wouldn't let the platoon go down to starve us 620 00:52:53.280 --> 00:53:04.920 out real stuff. So they end up because of the high level differences in 621 00:53:04.960 --> 00:53:10.559 the cabinet between Rumsfeld and Powell, and Powell being the advocate to actually get 622 00:53:10.559 --> 00:53:20.480 something done here, we end up getting half the platoon and uh and we 623 00:53:20.599 --> 00:53:24.639 got some some seals to augment our security. So they went in. Yeah, 624 00:53:24.880 --> 00:53:30.400 they went in and uh so, so we had this this small augmentation, 625 00:53:30.679 --> 00:53:37.159 but everybody had mixed signals because some people were getting the signal that we're 626 00:53:37.159 --> 00:53:42.360 going to send an aircraft carrier and we did send an aircraft carrier, and 627 00:53:42.880 --> 00:53:45.960 the ambassador sent a cable because we needed to request a NEO to get the 628 00:53:46.039 --> 00:53:53.079 aircraft carrier to get out non competent evacuation operation. Right, and Don didn't 629 00:53:53.079 --> 00:53:58.159 care for that. I'm sure so well, so so well he wanted it 630 00:53:58.719 --> 00:54:00.679 at that point, he did well because the NEO is the way to get 631 00:54:00.719 --> 00:54:07.639 us out. What the ambassador did was he requested the neo, but the 632 00:54:07.639 --> 00:54:13.639 embassy would stay open with a core staff of two or three people to work 633 00:54:13.679 --> 00:54:19.239 the diplomacy. And that said, you know, that led to you know, 634 00:54:19.320 --> 00:54:23.679 just real, real, real fights. So the rebels pull out, 635 00:54:24.840 --> 00:54:30.199 they get beaten back, and we're in this sort of stasis. Charles Taylor 636 00:54:30.239 --> 00:54:32.920 can't leave, he can't go back to peace talks because he's under indictment and 637 00:54:34.000 --> 00:54:37.960 doesn't know if he's going to get rolled up. President Bush goes on television 638 00:54:38.000 --> 00:54:44.079 and says, Charles Taylor needs to go. Now. We talk about sanctions, 639 00:54:44.119 --> 00:54:47.400 we talk about the effect of diplomacy. Right, if you go back 640 00:54:47.440 --> 00:54:52.280 to if you said this today, a foreign leader may just say, what 641 00:54:52.599 --> 00:54:55.039 are we talking about? Who's going to remove me? Right? I've got 642 00:54:55.079 --> 00:54:59.719 friends, I've got other spate. Charles Taylor is looking, what did we 643 00:54:59.840 --> 00:55:02.039 just done to Saddam Hussein when we said Saddam Hussein has to do it? 644 00:55:02.119 --> 00:55:07.639 Right? He doesn't know, yeah, as a factual matter, that he's 645 00:55:07.719 --> 00:55:14.719 under indictment. Potential ships are coming, He's seeing more marines coming into the 646 00:55:14.760 --> 00:55:20.119 country. Right. He doesn't know that this is not an assassination operation, 647 00:55:20.440 --> 00:55:24.719 has no idea right right. It's also weird because to get all these people 648 00:55:24.719 --> 00:55:29.440 into the country. We're in touch with his national security advisor and his team 649 00:55:29.599 --> 00:55:32.559 saying, hey, don't shoot at our helicopters because we're bringing people in. 650 00:55:34.760 --> 00:55:40.039 So we're working with the guy. We're trying to remove fairly complicated stuff because 651 00:55:40.360 --> 00:55:50.320 I once had an analyst tell me that Americans politicians, you know they they 652 00:55:50.679 --> 00:55:55.880 or administrations. I say, they just don't understand like foreign mentalities, and 653 00:55:55.920 --> 00:56:02.960 that if they like shake hands with somebody, then that somebody thinks that America 654 00:56:04.039 --> 00:56:08.880 has their back, and they don't understand like that. They don't understand that 655 00:56:08.880 --> 00:56:14.599 that could shift two months or three months down the road if somebody else comes 656 00:56:14.639 --> 00:56:22.320 into office or somebody else's appointed to a position like that. Americans just don't 657 00:56:22.400 --> 00:56:24.960 understand that. So many of these people think very long term and Americans think 658 00:56:25.079 --> 00:56:29.920 very short term when it comes to politics or political Yeah, the way I'll 659 00:56:29.920 --> 00:56:34.920 put it, I mean our strength is a country is we're optimistic and forward 660 00:56:34.960 --> 00:56:37.639 looking. I mean, this is you know, and and and you know, 661 00:56:37.840 --> 00:56:45.880 folks who you know are your audience, are people who believe in purpose, 662 00:56:45.280 --> 00:56:51.920 believe in the country, believe in that that we stand for things right. 663 00:56:52.519 --> 00:56:59.280 But by definition that means we're very forward looking and we tend to allid 664 00:56:59.440 --> 00:57:04.159 history. We just tend to do it. And you know, I think 665 00:57:04.199 --> 00:57:08.840 a good example is, you know, going back a few years, we 666 00:57:08.840 --> 00:57:13.840 were on the wrong side from the African National Congress, from Mandela's party, 667 00:57:14.280 --> 00:57:17.280 were on the wrong side of the apartheid debate. Right when Mandela came in 668 00:57:17.840 --> 00:57:22.519 to us, Americans were like, this is a great story, right, 669 00:57:22.920 --> 00:57:29.000 He's a voice of the people. He's preaching a peaceful right, not a 670 00:57:29.000 --> 00:57:32.440 retributive thing. This is the story we all want to hear. It's a 671 00:57:32.480 --> 00:57:39.920 new multicultural South Africa, all of that, and so we love South Africa, 672 00:57:40.079 --> 00:57:45.519 right, and and multiple administrations, you know, looked at South Africa 673 00:57:45.559 --> 00:57:52.159 as this shining model of multi ethnic democracy, triumph of you know, progressive 674 00:57:52.239 --> 00:57:57.840 politics, right, South Africans are like, well, you've still got half 675 00:57:57.880 --> 00:58:02.599 of our people sanctioned as terrorists. So we didn't forget right, we were 676 00:58:02.679 --> 00:58:08.039 happy that you're you're happy with Mandela, but you they didn't forget that part 677 00:58:08.079 --> 00:58:14.360 of the history. We tend to be like, but that was that was 678 00:58:14.440 --> 00:58:19.760 like like that was like that was that was yesterday, and so you know 679 00:58:19.840 --> 00:58:27.400 this is true again, you know, there's a so there's a an ahistorical 680 00:58:27.440 --> 00:58:30.880 element to us foreign policy. We're looking at we're very much looking forward. 681 00:58:31.280 --> 00:58:34.519 And look, you guys have dealt with it a new rack. Yeah, 682 00:58:35.559 --> 00:58:38.079 you deal with it in places. Hey, uh, you know, we 683 00:58:38.239 --> 00:58:46.639 just we were I mean, we were supporting Saddam against the Iranians, right, 684 00:58:49.320 --> 00:58:51.519 and then all of a sudden, now we're on the wrong side of 685 00:58:51.519 --> 00:58:57.400 Saddam. So we gave all these terms to like fulfill. He did it. 686 00:58:57.639 --> 00:59:01.440 He thinks he thinks that like we're like cope aesthetic now and then it's 687 00:59:01.480 --> 00:59:04.400 like, oh, good off, he's got to go like yeah, I 688 00:59:04.440 --> 00:59:13.119 mean, and so that can lead to i'd seen some difficult outcomes or just 689 00:59:13.199 --> 00:59:19.960 misunderstanding. So again, the core for diplomats and the core for analysts, 690 00:59:20.480 --> 00:59:27.000 the people who are charged with the long term view is for your ambassador class 691 00:59:27.079 --> 00:59:31.000 and for those to learn the history, understand the history, understand the environment 692 00:59:31.079 --> 00:59:37.320 which you're operating in. As we define we, our administration, our Congress 693 00:59:37.639 --> 00:59:43.360 define us interests today, you've got to interpret that in a way for the 694 00:59:43.400 --> 00:59:46.599 local audience so they understand where we're coming from, so that you can say, 695 00:59:46.760 --> 00:59:51.440 Okay, you know, I recognize the history. I understand where we've 696 00:59:51.440 --> 00:59:54.280 come from. But here's why I'm saying the relationship has to get to a 697 00:59:54.280 --> 00:59:59.639 different place or here's where the relationship needs to be today, because the policy 698 00:59:59.639 --> 01:00:05.639 won't necessarily be taking the history into account. So rather wrap up Liberia for 699 01:00:05.760 --> 01:00:07.599 us because I'd like to make sure we have enough time to talk about Afghanistan. 700 01:00:07.679 --> 01:00:13.679 Yeah, for sure. So you know, in the end, what 701 01:00:13.840 --> 01:00:20.159 was interesting in Liberia is the ambassador wouldn't leave. He won. He had 702 01:00:20.360 --> 01:00:25.000 the backing of Colin Powell. It was a gutsy move because you know, 703 01:00:25.079 --> 01:00:30.320 if it goes wrong, you end up with, you know, a situation 704 01:00:30.400 --> 01:00:35.800 like Mexonity, and you're the person avery blame exactly. And the messer knew 705 01:00:35.840 --> 01:00:38.559 that. He gave us all an option he said to the whole you know, 706 01:00:38.599 --> 01:00:40.639 the country team, very few of us, but he said, anybody 707 01:00:40.679 --> 01:00:45.679 wants to leave, you can, you can check out. We had a 708 01:00:45.039 --> 01:00:55.880 extraordinary defense attage and she and I worked together to establish contact with the rebels 709 01:00:57.880 --> 01:01:06.519 and we got the numbers for the and eventually what happened was again you can 710 01:01:06.599 --> 01:01:13.199 read the details you know at your own leisure, But eventually what happened was 711 01:01:13.360 --> 01:01:19.599 we had the rebels owning half the city and Charles Taylor and his group in 712 01:01:19.679 --> 01:01:23.039 the other half of the city, and civilians caught in between mortars dropping on 713 01:01:23.079 --> 01:01:29.719 everybody. It was like fish in a barrel. Bad scenes, very tough 714 01:01:29.719 --> 01:01:36.960 time. We were able to go in and convinced Charles Tayler to leave, 715 01:01:37.280 --> 01:01:40.519 not us. That was done at senior levels, and he was convinced that 716 01:01:42.119 --> 01:01:45.679 he's going to have to leave. He ends up going to Nigeria. On 717 01:01:45.719 --> 01:01:52.519 the ground, we crossed the front lines with a small contingent of folks that 718 01:01:52.599 --> 01:01:59.360 had deployed from JTF Liberia. JTF was stood up and it deployed in through 719 01:01:59.400 --> 01:02:06.440 the embassy and we took a contingent of folks from JTF Liberia. We got 720 01:02:06.440 --> 01:02:12.199 an echo mill and West African peacekeepers were able to come in and we were 721 01:02:12.239 --> 01:02:16.920 able to broker a local ceasefire that got the rebels to voluntarily pull out of 722 01:02:16.920 --> 01:02:22.159 the capital and allow for the broader peace agreement to take hold, because otherwise 723 01:02:22.159 --> 01:02:27.559 they could have just fought until the end. It allowed the broader peace agreement 724 01:02:27.599 --> 01:02:30.559 to take hold that was hashed out in Ghana and we were able to end 725 01:02:30.599 --> 01:02:34.519 the war. So it was the core stuff of diplomacy, as I talked 726 01:02:34.519 --> 01:02:43.079 about. So after Liberia, tell us about your kind of entry into Afghanistan, 727 01:02:43.159 --> 01:02:46.679 how that begins for you. Yeah, So after Liberia, I went 728 01:02:46.679 --> 01:02:55.039 off to Beijing, and then I was in Ethiopia. And in Ethiopia I 729 01:02:55.079 --> 01:03:02.360 did a TDY to CJTFO, you know, our counter terrorism platform in Jibouti, 730 01:03:04.920 --> 01:03:10.480 And so I'd had some experience working with a command staff. And when 731 01:03:12.639 --> 01:03:15.519 two thousand and nine rolled around and there was a big push to get a 732 01:03:15.639 --> 01:03:22.280 civilian complement to the military effort. As we started to surge troops into Afghanistan, 733 01:03:24.079 --> 01:03:30.039 they were looking to fill these billets that had been created by General Ikenberry. 734 01:03:30.840 --> 01:03:34.480 Ikenberry, as you know, had been the commander of the forces over 735 01:03:34.519 --> 01:03:37.719 there, US Forces over there. I don't know if he was commander, 736 01:03:37.719 --> 01:03:39.400 but he was. I guess he was. And then he became ambassador. 737 01:03:39.400 --> 01:03:45.400 He was made ambassador under President Obama. But rather than have a traditional political 738 01:03:45.400 --> 01:03:51.679 advisor that's a State Department person attached to a commanding officer, he had this 739 01:03:51.800 --> 01:03:59.960 idea that as the military elements ramp up and you've got you know, two 740 01:04:00.239 --> 01:04:05.159 all the way up to your you know, command headquarters, that you would 741 01:04:05.199 --> 01:04:11.400 pair civilian leaders that would report back to him and the embassy, but be 742 01:04:11.519 --> 01:04:17.840 sort of co equals with the military commanders at each level as I've described, 743 01:04:17.880 --> 01:04:23.280 you know. So I took one of these jobs. It was a brigade 744 01:04:23.360 --> 01:04:27.639 level. They called it senior civilian representative, so they would have it down 745 01:04:27.679 --> 01:04:30.920 at the you know, battalion level. They even had it down at the 746 01:04:30.960 --> 01:04:35.480 company level in some provinces, so company senior civilian representative, you know, 747 01:04:35.840 --> 01:04:40.920 battalion, brigade, and then division. Up at division, we had an 748 01:04:40.960 --> 01:04:44.960 ambassador rank person or a senior person that was going to be you know, 749 01:04:45.440 --> 01:04:51.039 paired with the generals up there. So I was paired with initially Task Force 750 01:04:51.079 --> 01:04:56.840 Mountain Warrior, and I went down and Randy George, who's now the Chief 751 01:04:56.840 --> 01:05:01.480 of Staff of the Army is you know the uh he's you know, was 752 01:05:01.519 --> 01:05:10.639 the brigade commander and UH sixty five hundred troops. We were responsible for N 753 01:05:10.679 --> 01:05:16.679 two KL so that was Nangahar, Kunar, Logman and Norristan. And you 754 01:05:16.719 --> 01:05:19.719 know, we didn't have a lot of presence up in Norris Stan at that 755 01:05:19.800 --> 01:05:27.239 time. Uh, you know, but we had thirty five cops and fobs 756 01:05:27.679 --> 01:05:32.360 scattered throughout the four provinces. Uh, and it was you know, pretty 757 01:05:32.400 --> 01:05:40.440 intense combat operations. The main effort was under the crystal and it was down 758 01:05:40.519 --> 01:05:46.159 south, so we were, you know, the supporting effort per the campaign 759 01:05:46.239 --> 01:05:53.599 plan. But you know it was very clear that we needed we were you 760 01:05:53.599 --> 01:05:58.000 know, going heavy into coin. Well this was this was this was a 761 01:05:58.079 --> 01:06:02.199 coin centered approached to the to the war. So, I mean we've talked 762 01:06:02.239 --> 01:06:06.679 a lot about on the show, including about Nurse Stand specifically from a military 763 01:06:06.800 --> 01:06:11.559 infantry special ops perspective. I mean, what was it like for you as 764 01:06:11.599 --> 01:06:15.400 a diplomat to dovetail with that effort and as you talk about, you know, 765 01:06:15.559 --> 01:06:20.880 wage of accounter insurgency. So you know, again we talked a little 766 01:06:20.920 --> 01:06:27.559 before the show that it was interesting because when I was in Liberia, the 767 01:06:28.400 --> 01:06:33.519 command element from the JTF. They sent a liaison from the ships into my 768 01:06:33.679 --> 01:06:39.079 office, right and you know, I said, take this space, set 769 01:06:39.119 --> 01:06:41.800 up what you need to set up. We're going to be hand in glove. 770 01:06:41.840 --> 01:06:45.920 But you're coming in on an embassy platform under Chief Admission authority because it 771 01:06:46.000 --> 01:06:50.039 was not an active combat role. I mean it was they were in a 772 01:06:50.079 --> 01:06:56.719 combat zone, but you're fundamentally embedding with us to achieve the diplomatic outcome, 773 01:06:57.960 --> 01:07:02.599 you know, in Afghanistan, and the civilians were embedded and relied one hundred 774 01:07:02.599 --> 01:07:08.280 percent on the military downrange. We were opening some consulates. We had a 775 01:07:08.320 --> 01:07:12.760 couple of consulates open up in Bombyan for example, that you know had a 776 01:07:12.920 --> 01:07:16.920 slightly different footprint because the Taliban had just not penetrated there the same way they 777 01:07:16.960 --> 01:07:26.760 had self drive for example. But I was embedded, and this civilian complement 778 01:07:26.800 --> 01:07:30.079 to the military was going to be you know, development experts, So yeah, 779 01:07:30.159 --> 01:07:36.079 USAID, Department of Agriculture, and then you know, you State Department, 780 01:07:36.119 --> 01:07:43.639 diplomats. The idea in the you know, counterinsurgency operation of course, 781 01:07:43.800 --> 01:07:45.280 was that you were going to work by with and through your partners, and 782 01:07:45.320 --> 01:07:51.679 you were going to build governance in the in the provinces, because the core 783 01:07:51.960 --> 01:08:00.599 issue in Afghanistan fundamentally was nobody liked the government, and the government each didn't 784 01:08:00.679 --> 01:08:05.199 go down to the village level. I mean two thousand and nine, ten 785 01:08:05.280 --> 01:08:13.559 years into the war. Nine years into the war, you know, you 786 01:08:13.679 --> 01:08:18.199 had a unitary government that would appoint people down to the district level, but 787 01:08:18.279 --> 01:08:25.640 those people were not from the district. The people were not from the province 788 01:08:25.640 --> 01:08:31.119 at the provincial level. So the idea, of course was to instill We 789 01:08:31.159 --> 01:08:34.840 also had rule of law experts like lawyers that went out and the idea was 790 01:08:34.880 --> 01:08:42.960 to first explain to the Afghan people the constitution that the Afghan people had crafted 791 01:08:42.960 --> 01:08:46.279 for themselves, right because it was just not understood, explain to them the 792 01:08:46.319 --> 01:08:53.079 benefits of kabble to people who had very little interaction with Kabble other than the 793 01:08:53.119 --> 01:08:57.560 officials that were given that they could see very clearly were kind of looting the 794 01:08:57.600 --> 01:09:01.760 money that we were pouring in. So, but this is the idea right 795 01:09:02.079 --> 01:09:08.439 now, when the structure is such that we're embedded. The truth is is 796 01:09:08.600 --> 01:09:12.479 you know, you you know, it's going to take a commander who is 797 01:09:12.640 --> 01:09:15.720 also given the task of doing governance and development. It's actually built into their 798 01:09:16.399 --> 01:09:23.159 subordinate plans. Right. So you're talking to a battalion commander. They're supposed 799 01:09:23.199 --> 01:09:27.760 to go out and they have the relationship with the provincial governor, They've got 800 01:09:27.760 --> 01:09:32.439 the relationship with their company. Commander has the relationship with people the state department 801 01:09:32.479 --> 01:09:36.640 person in theory should lead on that. But you know, I think in 802 01:09:36.680 --> 01:09:42.159 Afghanistan, given that these were military leads and the military was providing all the 803 01:09:42.399 --> 01:09:45.960 platform and sustainment, where it was effective, Where it worked in terms of 804 01:09:46.000 --> 01:09:51.680 the civilian military relationship was where the civilian understood, how can I be of 805 01:09:53.560 --> 01:09:56.880 use to you, the commander? Right, And again I say, in 806 01:09:56.920 --> 01:10:00.119 my own organization, this is a controversial position. You're supposed to lead. 807 01:10:00.159 --> 01:10:03.960 Well, I'm not leading a brigade commander with sixty five hundred people. I 808 01:10:04.000 --> 01:10:10.560 had forty people in four provinces that are all reliant on what the command provides. 809 01:10:10.880 --> 01:10:17.920 Right. So the dynamic you work out is that it's partially advisory, 810 01:10:18.039 --> 01:10:26.239 partially consultative. But I also just you know, road right, So when 811 01:10:26.279 --> 01:10:30.439 we needed to do things that would help brief up, we could brief up. 812 01:10:30.439 --> 01:10:34.560 I also report it. This was an interesting dynamic because what you find 813 01:10:34.760 --> 01:10:40.600 is is that in a true embedded relationship, by being out of channel, 814 01:10:41.319 --> 01:10:47.840 I could provide the commanders because I wasn't reporting to them, I could provide 815 01:10:47.880 --> 01:10:51.239 them a perspective, frank conversation. The other thing is is I could send 816 01:10:51.239 --> 01:10:58.399 things up my channels. He could send things up his channels if we had 817 01:10:58.439 --> 01:11:01.479 blockages in there of our channels that were trying to get done, so you 818 01:11:01.520 --> 01:11:05.119 could you could work, you know, the embassy could hear something that could 819 01:11:05.159 --> 01:11:09.760 be useful that could be then spoken to at the senior command level because the 820 01:11:09.760 --> 01:11:13.159 commander can't speak to up the chain that way, right, So there's there's 821 01:11:13.199 --> 01:11:18.600 these interesting dynamics that develop in that in that thing. But you know, 822 01:11:18.640 --> 01:11:25.439 fundamentally you're an in bed and what you're trying to do collectively is to essentially 823 01:11:25.520 --> 01:11:30.119 instill confidence in a government that nobody had confidence. It's due to the nature 824 01:11:30.159 --> 01:11:34.359 and structure of this government. It sounds like you really accepted this role and 825 01:11:34.520 --> 01:11:38.399 kind of dove into it in this sense that you weren't a subbortinate, but 826 01:11:38.439 --> 01:11:42.319 you also weren't a superior. It was a partnership. Even though that was 827 01:11:42.479 --> 01:11:46.760 that's not the standard role for State department when dealing with the military. Are 828 01:11:46.800 --> 01:11:49.800 you aware of and you don't have to spill any tea or anything, but 829 01:11:49.880 --> 01:11:56.760 are you aware of other instances where that type of relationship was not so successful 830 01:11:56.760 --> 01:11:59.399 when it was? No? Absolutely, listen, I had you know, 831 01:12:00.439 --> 01:12:04.640 there was heavy pressure to show civilian leadership, right, and that that was 832 01:12:04.880 --> 01:12:09.239 all the way through, and so all the time you would see in the 833 01:12:09.279 --> 01:12:15.239 field, even in my aor people that were subordinate to me that were reporting 834 01:12:15.319 --> 01:12:18.119 up to me, but they didn't have a good relationship. Their sense was, 835 01:12:18.319 --> 01:12:23.159 Hey, this battalion commander, they're supposed to take me to my meeting. 836 01:12:23.560 --> 01:12:26.720 Yeah, you know, it's not happening. You're in the middle of 837 01:12:26.800 --> 01:12:32.479 combat operations. These are combat foot patrols. If you're engaging, the engagement 838 01:12:32.720 --> 01:12:40.800 is with intentionality that has to meet the commander's intent for both force pro and 839 01:12:40.960 --> 01:12:45.640 to generate the effects that they're being asked to do as part of the counterinsurgency 840 01:12:45.640 --> 01:12:48.439 effort. And you would see those relationships break down, and you would walk 841 01:12:48.479 --> 01:12:55.600 into a combat outpost and you would see your military command on one side, 842 01:12:56.279 --> 01:13:01.920 or your security detail for example, for civilians eating in the cafeteria on the 843 01:13:01.920 --> 01:13:06.319 other side, you know, and you know that's not an effective relationship in 844 01:13:06.359 --> 01:13:11.600 a combat se right, So so you know there's that would break down. 845 01:13:11.600 --> 01:13:15.640 And then of course you know in other areas, right, there's just this 846 01:13:17.159 --> 01:13:21.840 You know, you have to come at it from a sense of mission and 847 01:13:21.960 --> 01:13:27.199 trust, and you have to have the mindset of, hey man, we 848 01:13:27.279 --> 01:13:32.119 are here. You know, General Miller always used to ask people in Afghanistan, 849 01:13:32.560 --> 01:13:36.840 why are you here? The answer is to protect the homeland? Right 850 01:13:38.479 --> 01:13:42.920 in Afghanistan, that was very much so we were there because fundamentally this tied 851 01:13:42.960 --> 01:13:45.760 back to nine to eleven, Right, that's the core purpose of being there. 852 01:13:45.760 --> 01:13:54.520 But that can break down in you know, the day to day operational 853 01:13:54.640 --> 01:14:00.520 things and we go into our tribal put on our tribal hats of I'm supposed 854 01:14:00.520 --> 01:14:04.039 to do governments or you guys think short term, we think long term or 855 01:14:04.039 --> 01:14:10.000 whatever whatever the tropes are that they breed the agency during this timeframe. I 856 01:14:10.039 --> 01:14:14.600 mean, for you and the people you worked with, I mean, how 857 01:14:14.760 --> 01:14:17.319 how did the capacity building side of it go? Like success is failures? 858 01:14:17.359 --> 01:14:24.399 I mean, what do you think you know? For me, there was 859 01:14:24.439 --> 01:14:27.119 a part in my biography we didn't touch that much on. I was a 860 01:14:27.119 --> 01:14:30.800 corporate lawyer right before I came right for two years, I did finance and 861 01:14:30.840 --> 01:14:34.000 insolvency. What else is So we talked about what was happening in Liberia, 862 01:14:34.199 --> 01:14:41.479 what was happening in two thousand and nine in Afghanistan. Afghan back in the 863 01:14:41.520 --> 01:14:47.720 States, the financial crisis boring billions of dollars. In Afghanistan, we had 864 01:14:47.800 --> 01:14:54.880 senior leaders talking glowingly about our burn rate and our spend rate. I'm sitting 865 01:14:54.880 --> 01:15:00.560 there with the private sector view going, this is absolutely unsustainable. What effects 866 01:15:00.600 --> 01:15:05.159 are we achieving? Well, I remember, you know. Then Colonel George 867 01:15:05.680 --> 01:15:12.880 said, Okay, we got Commander's Emergency Response funds right, you know, 868 01:15:13.359 --> 01:15:19.000 the SERP program right to you know, allow our commanders on the ground to 869 01:15:19.359 --> 01:15:23.880 sort of build things for people. So you're gonna win hearts and minds, 870 01:15:23.880 --> 01:15:29.119 classic hearts and mind stuff. So he said, can I get a roll 871 01:15:29.199 --> 01:15:32.359 up of all the SERP projects that we've done in the nine years we've been 872 01:15:32.399 --> 01:15:36.680 here in you know, Nangahar, for example. Okay, can we overlay 873 01:15:36.720 --> 01:15:43.359 that with the projects that the UN has done in the area, and then 874 01:15:43.399 --> 01:15:47.000 can we also ask what the USAID has done and what the you know why, 875 01:15:47.680 --> 01:15:54.159 because here's the kind of stuff we were doing. You're in the Kunar 876 01:15:54.279 --> 01:16:04.239 River Valley. It's rocks. They've had rocks for millennia. They know how 877 01:16:04.279 --> 01:16:11.840 to do retaining walls for their farms. We were paying two hundred thousand dollars 878 01:16:12.199 --> 01:16:19.319 to build a retaining wall. We were hyper inflating this economy while you knew 879 01:16:19.359 --> 01:16:24.359 the American public would have been outraged because the American public is losing six hundred 880 01:16:24.399 --> 01:16:29.479 thousand jobs a year and freaking out and we're in you know, you know, 881 01:16:29.479 --> 01:16:34.720 we're hitting ten percent on unemployment and you could see this disconnect. So 882 01:16:34.800 --> 01:16:45.119 what effects are being achieved? A growing insurgency, massive wastage of US government 883 01:16:45.159 --> 01:16:54.560 resources, and a great construction boom in Dubai for all the Afghan officials that 884 01:16:54.600 --> 01:16:58.279 we were funding, right, this is what was happening. And if you 885 01:16:58.520 --> 01:17:02.319 asked Afghans, which anybody who was out there with Afghans did, corruption was 886 01:17:02.359 --> 01:17:09.039 their number one issue. The Taliban was not it. Right, of course, 887 01:17:09.279 --> 01:17:16.279 if you were frontline shinwar in Nangahar, you've got tribal and issues with 888 01:17:16.359 --> 01:17:23.039 the Taliban. But remember most villages were ungoverned. I mean they're governed by 889 01:17:23.039 --> 01:17:29.279 their own village rules. The unitary state didn't come down there, so you 890 01:17:29.319 --> 01:17:33.159 could see very clearly that this was not achieving the effects. The second thing 891 01:17:33.279 --> 01:17:41.079 is is that as part of counterinsurgency, part of the initial thing was protect 892 01:17:41.119 --> 01:17:45.159 the population centers right go to the collapse into the population centers, because what 893 01:17:45.199 --> 01:17:49.760 we had done was a theory of interdiction for a while. If you got 894 01:17:49.760 --> 01:17:55.079 there. In you know, two thousand and one, we started to expand 895 01:17:55.119 --> 01:17:59.399 the ink spots out through places like Norris Stan and we're putting you know, 896 01:17:59.479 --> 01:18:05.159 these common outposts out there. Why oh, because the guys are coming through 897 01:18:05.920 --> 01:18:12.359 these ungoverned spaces. I think it was the you know, I think the 898 01:18:12.439 --> 01:18:16.800 mindset that we collectively as a government had was been Lodden planned nine to eleven 899 01:18:16.880 --> 01:18:21.279 from a cave, right. I think this is the what led. So 900 01:18:21.359 --> 01:18:26.319 you got to go out there to the Corngall. You've got to go into 901 01:18:26.520 --> 01:18:32.399 capillary valleys off capillary valley of capillary valleys to find these guys. The reality 902 01:18:32.640 --> 01:18:38.199 was, and you know, General George was always articulate on this. He 903 01:18:38.239 --> 01:18:42.239 said, the reason we're being shot at in the corn Cornngall is because we're 904 01:18:42.279 --> 01:18:46.359 in the cornball, right, Yeah, and if you looked at it from 905 01:18:46.359 --> 01:18:53.199 an interdiction standpoint, if they wanted to pass the corn gall you just go 906 01:18:53.359 --> 01:18:58.439 on the opposite side of the ridge. Remember we're also pre drone. We 907 01:18:58.520 --> 01:19:00.880 had started to you know, like this is like the very early days. 908 01:19:00.920 --> 01:19:04.520 I remember seeing a kid somebody opened it up and you know, there was 909 01:19:04.520 --> 01:19:09.199 like a tiny little it was like the old balsa would thing that you would 910 01:19:09.239 --> 01:19:11.560 fly as a kid. You know, they put a camera on. But 911 01:19:11.600 --> 01:19:15.640 like, we didn't have hardly any of the real you know surveillance. We 912 01:19:15.720 --> 01:19:18.680 had you know, stuff up in the sky, uh, you know, 913 01:19:18.800 --> 01:19:25.359 much higher altitude. But again, you guys will know competing demands, limited 914 01:19:25.439 --> 01:19:29.239 resources. So you've got all of these things. If these guys wanted to 915 01:19:29.279 --> 01:19:32.039 bypass us, they could just hike right past. You would have no ideas. 916 01:19:32.079 --> 01:19:36.079 So and then where did where was bin Laden in the end? Right? 917 01:19:36.479 --> 01:19:41.720 Where was his command and control? Probably in play? Probably this is 918 01:19:41.760 --> 01:19:45.800 pure speculation, but is in places like Jalalabad. Why because they have access 919 01:19:45.840 --> 01:19:48.880 to you know, food, resource, communications, the internet and you know 920 01:19:48.920 --> 01:19:54.319 the road that never got hit? Ever, what was the road that never 921 01:19:54.399 --> 01:19:59.319 got hit in Nangahar? All of our guys were getting hit with massive IEDs 922 01:19:59.399 --> 01:20:02.119 every time they We're on all of the all of the surface streets. It's 923 01:20:02.159 --> 01:20:06.319 the main road, you know, from the Kyra Pass to the base. 924 01:20:08.560 --> 01:20:13.359 So this also tells you what we knew. Everybody knew it. I don't 925 01:20:13.359 --> 01:20:16.600 know it as a factual. Here's the specific intel that I'm now referring to. 926 01:20:16.800 --> 01:20:23.920 We all knew the Taliban a making money off the war. The Afghan 927 01:20:24.039 --> 01:20:27.199 government's making money off the war. Everybody's invested in it. So you ask 928 01:20:27.239 --> 01:20:30.039 what kind of effects you're achieving. You could see very clearly we're not achieving 929 01:20:30.760 --> 01:20:39.199 the sustained you know, self government government. You know, the sustained self 930 01:20:39.239 --> 01:20:43.000 government. You know, where are the revenues coming from that Afghanistan is going 931 01:20:43.039 --> 01:20:48.399 to use to run itself while doing this, the government is largely funded by 932 01:20:48.520 --> 01:20:57.479 the international community, and the security forces were funded by US. So it's 933 01:20:57.640 --> 01:21:01.800 it's not a self sustaining model. Yeah, that's that's where we were. 934 01:21:02.000 --> 01:21:08.479 It was knowable, it was seeable, so you know, and I think 935 01:21:08.520 --> 01:21:15.279 anybody down range would have would have felt felt that. So after a few 936 01:21:15.359 --> 01:21:19.399 years when we started, you know, to come out. You know, 937 01:21:19.439 --> 01:21:23.680 I actually wrote on this in twenty eleven, after I had left, I 938 01:21:23.680 --> 01:21:27.800 said, we should be honest with where this is going. This is like 939 01:21:27.800 --> 01:21:30.720 twenty eleven, twenty twelve, I wrote this, and I said we should 940 01:21:30.800 --> 01:21:36.000 just be honest that the core thing, particularly after we got in Laden, 941 01:21:36.199 --> 01:21:42.840 was we we have achieved the national security objective, which was to take bin 942 01:21:42.920 --> 01:21:47.479 Laden off the off the off the board. That's a good thing. We 943 01:21:47.640 --> 01:21:51.800 also gave Afghanistan. Look, we've poured resources into other countries. They've stood 944 01:21:51.880 --> 01:21:56.520 up, you know, obviously, the famous examples of Germany and Japan and 945 01:21:56.920 --> 01:22:00.720 South Korea. You know, South Korea, you know, we So there's 946 01:22:00.760 --> 01:22:03.399 a It's not like pouring in resources to a partner means a partner is going 947 01:22:03.439 --> 01:22:10.239 to be forever dependent. It's just the way Afghanistan ended up developing, the 948 01:22:10.279 --> 01:22:14.960 way the economy developed, the way the officials chose to interact with us, 949 01:22:15.199 --> 01:22:17.279 what they chose to do with the resources. You know. One of the 950 01:22:17.279 --> 01:22:24.359 things I like when I think back on Afghanistan is you can see it as 951 01:22:25.119 --> 01:22:28.079 a failure from a certain perspective, but on the other hand, I look 952 01:22:28.119 --> 01:22:33.039 at it as we achieved national security effects that we needed to achieve. We 953 01:22:33.199 --> 01:22:39.119 gave our partners every chance to go in a different route. The fact that 954 01:22:39.159 --> 01:22:45.920 it didn't go there is not for lack of you know, generations of soldiers, 955 01:22:45.960 --> 01:22:51.760 civilians, contractors, you know, people who put good faith into trying 956 01:22:51.760 --> 01:22:57.319 to make it work. That to me, that work doesn't go away. 957 01:22:58.039 --> 01:23:01.680 And for all of us who have Afghan friends, you know, people that 958 01:23:01.760 --> 01:23:06.760 we know have experienced difficulty, who are still stuck back there, some who've 959 01:23:06.800 --> 01:23:11.680 made it out. I mean, you know, that partnership was real, 960 01:23:12.600 --> 01:23:17.720 you know, but it was overcome by the structures that we're employee. Yeah, 961 01:23:17.760 --> 01:23:23.199 Afghanistan is really interesting because, like you, I feel like people talk 962 01:23:23.239 --> 01:23:25.840 about losing the war in Afghanistan and it's sort of like, well, we 963 01:23:25.920 --> 01:23:29.359 won, like we won in the first thirty days. Then we decided to 964 01:23:29.520 --> 01:23:33.600 just stay after the party was already over, and then it was just became 965 01:23:33.760 --> 01:23:38.840 very nebulous. And you know you mentioned like you know Germany and Japan, 966 01:23:39.279 --> 01:23:43.920 Well there you're funding a government that is building projects in a tribal area, 967 01:23:43.960 --> 01:23:46.680 which I don't think. I don't know if any administration ever really got in 968 01:23:46.720 --> 01:23:54.000 a tribal area like Afghanistan. That's not there's no there's no Afghanistan National identity. 969 01:23:54.079 --> 01:23:58.640 Really like when you fund somebody, you're funding a tribe and it's going 970 01:23:58.640 --> 01:24:02.279 to their tribe members who they install in all the different regions. Like it's 971 01:24:02.760 --> 01:24:05.760 we went in there and we tried to impose a federal system where we have 972 01:24:05.960 --> 01:24:09.119 Yeah, it's like, no, it's a system of tribes, Like, 973 01:24:09.159 --> 01:24:11.800 well, shut up, you're going to have a federal system. Yeah, 974 01:24:11.960 --> 01:24:15.800 yeah, I mean, I you know, I strongly agree with that. 975 01:24:15.880 --> 01:24:18.920 As as the as the core it's a unitary state where people were being appointed 976 01:24:18.960 --> 01:24:25.760 from a central government. I always the way I always looked at it was 977 01:24:26.680 --> 01:24:30.079 imagine, look, I'm a New Yorker man, if I'm if you send 978 01:24:30.079 --> 01:24:34.000 me to Texas to tell somebody how to run their town, it's not going 979 01:24:34.079 --> 01:24:38.439 to go that way, right. And so as a result, you know, 980 01:24:38.880 --> 01:24:45.520 it was interesting that we as a as a as a as a core 981 01:24:45.000 --> 01:24:49.520 self government like govern your own like this is the core of in the DNA 982 01:24:49.560 --> 01:24:55.600 of America, that we were fundamentally supporting a structure that does have models of 983 01:24:55.720 --> 01:24:58.760 Pakistan runs that model. There are other countries in the region. It's not 984 01:24:58.760 --> 01:25:01.079 like it's a you know, and they had a history of a monarch in 985 01:25:01.119 --> 01:25:05.560 Afghanistan, they used to central authority, but that we would be the ones 986 01:25:05.560 --> 01:25:12.960 to say that this is the model that has to be and not approach it 987 01:25:13.000 --> 01:25:17.319 differently, because obviously the model they got constructed and put together was put together 988 01:25:17.399 --> 01:25:23.840 by people from the diaspora and things like that, and you know, yeah, 989 01:25:23.880 --> 01:25:28.199 they brought in, you know, a number of constituents, but fundamentally 990 01:25:28.399 --> 01:25:34.279 it was our money that kept backing that particular system. So it made it 991 01:25:34.359 --> 01:25:40.800 hard I think for us, you know, as a government to reassess that 992 01:25:41.760 --> 01:25:48.000 just the collective weight the accretion of the project over years. The other thing 993 01:25:48.000 --> 01:25:54.520 though, in the accretion though, is interesting because remember that Rumsfeld on this 994 01:25:54.640 --> 01:25:59.479 case didn't want troops on the ground, right, It felt strongly that we 995 01:25:59.520 --> 01:26:04.079 shouldn't get ourselves involved. Now he contradicts himself by then running the whole Iraq 996 01:26:04.159 --> 01:26:10.800 war, right, And it's a contradiction is the reasons he had were very 997 01:26:10.800 --> 01:26:14.439 well founded to not get involved in Afghanistan. He just blew those out of 998 01:26:14.479 --> 01:26:20.399 the water in a rock. But the accretion of our forces there came from 999 01:26:20.439 --> 01:26:27.640 a demand signal from the Afghans and also international partners, including the NGO community, 1000 01:26:27.680 --> 01:26:30.520 who was saying, hey, there's not enough security you can't go in 1001 01:26:30.560 --> 01:26:34.920 this war in Iraq and just forget Afghanistan. So it was a weird dynamic 1002 01:26:34.960 --> 01:26:42.119 where there was a demand signal from communities that you wouldn't naturally say would have 1003 01:26:42.119 --> 01:26:45.640 a demand signal for US forces. Now by two thousand and nine, when 1004 01:26:45.640 --> 01:26:47.399 you're coming in with a heavy footprint, suddenly that signal is, oh my 1005 01:26:47.439 --> 01:26:51.680 god, you're escalating the war. But it was you know, I think 1006 01:26:51.680 --> 01:26:59.159 that we we ended up having multiple missions, right, because it's also backed 1007 01:26:59.159 --> 01:27:03.920 in the whole you know, neo conservative worldview, which is create democratic society. 1008 01:27:04.039 --> 01:27:11.359 So one is democratic society is as partners for us and expand democracy that 1009 01:27:11.399 --> 01:27:14.680 came out of the bush hears. You know, you're doing that with your 1010 01:27:14.720 --> 01:27:17.000 aid people who are like, hey, the reason for this is to because 1011 01:27:17.000 --> 01:27:20.239 we can't abandon the people. If you abandon the people, you know you're 1012 01:27:20.279 --> 01:27:26.760 going to end up with an ungoverned space, a humanitarian catastrophe. So that's 1013 01:27:26.760 --> 01:27:30.640 irrationale for the war, and we sort of drifted away from Hey, the 1014 01:27:30.640 --> 01:27:33.680 core reason we're we're the Taliban is they didn't turn over bin Laden, and 1015 01:27:33.760 --> 01:27:38.920 had they turned over been Laden, we wouldn't have been at war, but 1016 01:27:39.000 --> 01:27:44.319 we went into a whole bunch of other justifications, and you know, so 1017 01:27:44.760 --> 01:27:47.640 that's how we ended up where we were. Well to fast forward a bit. 1018 01:27:47.680 --> 01:27:51.439 I mean, you've had some other experiences too. I hope if we 1019 01:27:51.479 --> 01:27:57.079 can't get into tonight another time for sure, but I want to fast forward 1020 01:27:57.079 --> 01:28:00.000 a little bit because you were involved in sort of the end game Afghanistan as 1021 01:28:00.000 --> 01:28:03.399 well. I was wondering if you could talk to us a bit about that. 1022 01:28:03.680 --> 01:28:09.399 Yeah, sure, I was. You know, I got an assignment. 1023 01:28:09.640 --> 01:28:15.079 There was a unique assignment that in twenty eighteen, they stood up a 1024 01:28:15.439 --> 01:28:20.439 peace and reconciliation section in the embassy, thinking that we needed to get a 1025 01:28:20.479 --> 01:28:27.439 peace process going because there was no discussions of note with the Taliban. And 1026 01:28:28.600 --> 01:28:33.399 they started this section with the idea that there would be bottom up, that 1027 01:28:33.439 --> 01:28:38.760 we would be reaching out to the provinces and at the district level and trying 1028 01:28:38.760 --> 01:28:45.479 to see if there are folks out there that can reach out and start to 1029 01:28:45.560 --> 01:28:54.800 build some consensus around a national way forward that comes bottom up. But about 1030 01:28:54.840 --> 01:29:00.119 a year after they stood that up, or almost soon after they stood it 1031 01:29:00.199 --> 01:29:03.000 up, not even a year soon after they stood that up, President Trump 1032 01:29:03.039 --> 01:29:08.399 came into office. And decided that we should just do a top down approach, 1033 01:29:09.039 --> 01:29:15.239 that it's time to rept this war up, and that means a direct 1034 01:29:15.239 --> 01:29:24.319 negotiations with the Taliban. And so this section which reported to Ambassador Bass through 1035 01:29:25.319 --> 01:29:31.560 the DCM. Karen Decker also served as Ambassador Khalil Zad, who became the 1036 01:29:31.600 --> 01:29:38.479 special envoy that was going to take on the direct negotiations. It was going 1037 01:29:38.520 --> 01:29:43.039 to support him when he was in Kabble because the negotiations were not going to 1038 01:29:43.079 --> 01:29:46.279 happen in Kabble. The negotiations, you know, the Taliban were not in 1039 01:29:46.359 --> 01:29:53.319 Kabble at the time. They were in Doha and they were in Pakistan and 1040 01:29:53.399 --> 01:29:57.199 so where we were going to engage them was going to be somewhere other than 1041 01:29:57.279 --> 01:30:03.319 Kable. But we had to keep the government closely informed. It was a 1042 01:30:03.479 --> 01:30:10.880 choice to and you know, certainly a Taliban ask that we negotiate directly with 1043 01:30:10.960 --> 01:30:16.880 the Taliban and not include the government of Afghanistan. The Taliban always were clear 1044 01:30:16.960 --> 01:30:23.119 that they only wanted to negotiate with us, that the central government was a 1045 01:30:23.159 --> 01:30:28.880 proxy government for us, and so as a way to catalyze the negotiations, 1046 01:30:29.479 --> 01:30:36.720 we were going to talk to the Taliban directly and then essentially keep the government's 1047 01:30:36.760 --> 01:30:44.279 equities close at heart and keep them briefed very closely of what we would be 1048 01:30:44.399 --> 01:30:49.960 doing. The government never felt that they were a true partner in the Afghan 1049 01:30:50.039 --> 01:30:54.760 government never felt that they were a true partner in that process ever. But 1050 01:30:55.600 --> 01:30:59.840 this was the arrangement. And so when Ambassador Khalil's out in his team came 1051 01:30:59.880 --> 01:31:03.479 in to Kabble, my office became the support structure to go to all the 1052 01:31:03.520 --> 01:31:09.680 meetings, take the notes, and provide feedback and input into that process. 1053 01:31:10.039 --> 01:31:16.960 But again working for Ambassador Bass, so it was an interesting dynamic. And 1054 01:31:17.000 --> 01:31:26.560 then what happened was after we got to agreement, I left and I came 1055 01:31:26.720 --> 01:31:32.680 back for the last let's say five months in Doha working directly for Ambassador Jhalilzad. 1056 01:31:34.279 --> 01:31:41.720 We had a military touch point that was under General Miller's command with the 1057 01:31:41.760 --> 01:31:45.399 Taliban. So for the last, you know, year after the agreement, 1058 01:31:45.479 --> 01:31:50.199 this was to kind of give the Taliban a touch point with us because they 1059 01:31:50.319 --> 01:31:56.439 would keep complaining that we violated the agreement, and we could from a military 1060 01:31:56.479 --> 01:32:00.439 perspective explain, no, no, no, no, we're in complyingiens with 1061 01:32:00.479 --> 01:32:08.800 the agreement. And I became the ambassador Khalilzad's representative on that group that was 1062 01:32:08.840 --> 01:32:14.920 reporting to General Miller. Can you tell us what so Trump wanted out of 1063 01:32:14.960 --> 01:32:19.439 Afghanistan? You guys were trying to make it happen. What were the US's 1064 01:32:19.520 --> 01:32:24.640 chief goals and you know, sort of hardlaments, soft liments. What were 1065 01:32:24.680 --> 01:32:29.279 the Taliban's chief goals their hard limits, their soft limits for making this agreement 1066 01:32:29.319 --> 01:32:33.079 happen. Well, I think for making the agreement happen. You know, 1067 01:32:33.199 --> 01:32:38.720 I was not in the room for the negotiation phase of the agreement. I 1068 01:32:38.760 --> 01:32:42.079 got there when the agreement was all but done, and we can talk a 1069 01:32:42.079 --> 01:32:45.199 little bit about that period, you know, when I arrived on the scene. 1070 01:32:45.239 --> 01:32:49.880 But you know, the Taliban were always clear that it would be basically 1071 01:32:49.960 --> 01:32:55.079 to give them the government. That was it, that there was going to 1072 01:32:55.079 --> 01:32:58.479 be a new government, and it was going to be a Taliban led government. 1073 01:32:58.520 --> 01:33:04.239 That was their objective from the beginning. The real question was whether there 1074 01:33:04.359 --> 01:33:12.159 was any accommodation possible, meaning you know, the goal ultimately for US would 1075 01:33:12.159 --> 01:33:15.840 be that they would be brought into the existing construct in some way, shape 1076 01:33:15.920 --> 01:33:20.359 or form, so you can call it power sharing, not predetermined by US 1077 01:33:20.720 --> 01:33:25.319 so Ambassador khalilza did not want us to predetermine it. But what the goal 1078 01:33:25.399 --> 01:33:30.399 was to get the Afghan government leadership into the room with the Taliban to negotiate 1079 01:33:30.479 --> 01:33:36.079 that. So his objectives, Ambassador Khalilzad's objectives and what I think, you 1080 01:33:36.159 --> 01:33:42.279 know, essentially the deal with the administration was was if we're coming out and 1081 01:33:42.319 --> 01:33:46.359 the intent is to end this war, the American war in Afghanistan, if 1082 01:33:46.399 --> 01:33:50.600 we just come out, it'll be chaotic, it'll be dangerous, and we 1083 01:33:50.680 --> 01:33:56.159 get nothing. There's nothing we leave behind, right we At the time, 1084 01:33:56.880 --> 01:34:01.399 the thinking was that it would be likely a civil war that the Taliban couldn't 1085 01:34:01.439 --> 01:34:06.840 just win because there's so many other constituencies in a loaded country, right that 1086 01:34:06.920 --> 01:34:12.479 you would have a rerun of the early nineties where there was this horrific civil 1087 01:34:12.479 --> 01:34:16.079 war. You know, the Taliban had done a lot of work and this 1088 01:34:16.239 --> 01:34:23.279 obviously became apparent later eroding all of those other constituencies, either buying them off. 1089 01:34:23.720 --> 01:34:29.479 Something was happening, because in the end we did not see a civil 1090 01:34:29.520 --> 01:34:32.720 war breakout. We saw the Taliban take Cobble with less than three thousand people 1091 01:34:34.359 --> 01:34:39.680 six million people, less than three thousand people there were more than enough capabilities 1092 01:34:39.680 --> 01:34:43.199 to defend Cobble, and you know, yet everybody went to ground. The 1093 01:34:43.239 --> 01:34:46.800 whole thing dissolve. So that tells you that the Taliban had made a lot 1094 01:34:46.840 --> 01:34:50.439 of inroads all around the countries, particularly in the north. You know, 1095 01:34:51.359 --> 01:34:57.920 for anybody who had been up there in previous years to then go back in 1096 01:34:57.960 --> 01:35:01.560 twenty nineteen and twenty twenty and find out the North is basically you know, 1097 01:35:02.359 --> 01:35:08.520 you know, Mazarli, Mazar sharif Is is basically nearly under Taliban control. 1098 01:35:08.560 --> 01:35:11.199 You're like, you've lost the how can you lose the problems? For me, 1099 01:35:11.439 --> 01:35:15.560 I knew things were over when it was a couple of weeks is maybe 1100 01:35:15.720 --> 01:35:19.359 maybe it was a month before Ghani fled the country. His office put out 1101 01:35:19.359 --> 01:35:24.960 like a press release about building a hydro electric dam in Kunda's and like, 1102 01:35:24.960 --> 01:35:27.239 we have this big plan, We're going to build this hydro electric dam. 1103 01:35:27.279 --> 01:35:30.520 It's like, well, Kunda has already fell of the Taliban, you're talking 1104 01:35:30.520 --> 01:35:33.600 about building it, Like the priorities are so off and so weird. Yeah, 1105 01:35:33.640 --> 01:35:36.680 that is like you just knew this wasn't going to end. It was 1106 01:35:36.760 --> 01:35:41.399 sort of there were a lot of mismatches going on there. But so the 1107 01:35:41.720 --> 01:35:46.319 core objectives that that Investad Khalilza was trying to get at was one to get 1108 01:35:46.359 --> 01:35:53.399 the Taliban to break with al Qaeda and transnational terrorism al Qaida specifically because of 1109 01:35:53.439 --> 01:35:58.520 the history, but also transnational terrorism, that you're not going to use Afghanistan 1110 01:35:58.560 --> 01:36:02.399 as a platform to attack other entries. Second, and you know, second 1111 01:36:02.960 --> 01:36:11.880 equally, you know, critical priority is that our withdrawal be not a hostile 1112 01:36:11.920 --> 01:36:15.960 withdrawal, that that when we come out, they're not going to be attacking 1113 01:36:15.039 --> 01:36:17.800 us on the x filtration. That we're going to get to an agreement. 1114 01:36:18.399 --> 01:36:27.640 You know. The third critical point was that the Afghans would have the opportunity 1115 01:36:27.720 --> 01:36:31.920 to come to a peace agreement that we would be committing to, you know, 1116 01:36:32.840 --> 01:36:39.199 a peace agreement. And so, you know, he viewed these goals 1117 01:36:39.279 --> 01:36:45.800 as all very interlocking goals. There's four elements and I am forgetting one. 1118 01:36:45.960 --> 01:36:50.840 But so was there any sort of was there any with that peace agreement or 1119 01:36:50.960 --> 01:36:57.479 or aside from that, was there any sort of thought of amnesty for like 1120 01:36:57.520 --> 01:37:01.960 the Afghan national forces who'd against the Taliban, or was there any like no, 1121 01:37:02.000 --> 01:37:08.640 because because it was never presupposed, never that the Afghan government would collapse. 1122 01:37:08.760 --> 01:37:12.760 You know, what you're dealing with in peace agreements. Often in these 1123 01:37:12.840 --> 01:37:17.239 kind of piece agreements is what we euphemistically call security sector reform, which means 1124 01:37:17.520 --> 01:37:23.000 you bring the irregular elements. In this case, it would be the Taliban 1125 01:37:23.399 --> 01:37:28.000 into the professional military that has been built right. Right, So we've all 1126 01:37:28.079 --> 01:37:31.640 seen the images of these guys driving around in our funded APCs, right, 1127 01:37:31.720 --> 01:37:34.840 But the idea would have been, rather than to have the unit dissolved, 1128 01:37:34.960 --> 01:37:42.319 the expertise dissolved, the logistics supply channel dissolve, they're coming into these existing 1129 01:37:42.359 --> 01:37:48.000 structures that in theory are functional and operational, right, and we're not losing 1130 01:37:48.039 --> 01:37:55.159 all of that capacity to a civil war. So it was never amnesty for 1131 01:37:55.239 --> 01:37:58.119 the Afghan government. If anything, the question would be, Oh, the 1132 01:37:58.159 --> 01:38:02.000 other thing that the Taliban very much wanted was removal of sanctions. Individual Taliban 1133 01:38:02.000 --> 01:38:08.000 are all sanctioned because they're terrorists, right, Okay, so you know they've 1134 01:38:08.079 --> 01:38:12.760 killed people, including Americans, so they're on sanctions, you know, individual 1135 01:38:12.800 --> 01:38:15.880 sanction, financial travel, et cetera. So the Taliban of course wanted that 1136 01:38:16.800 --> 01:38:20.840 that peace removed. But for us, it's okay, you know, if 1137 01:38:20.880 --> 01:38:25.199 we're going to go down that path, you are going to break the ties 1138 01:38:25.239 --> 01:38:29.479 with al Qaeda, and you are going to commit to not becoming a terrorist 1139 01:38:29.600 --> 01:38:32.680 state, right to state sponsors terresponding to that, well, I mean they 1140 01:38:32.760 --> 01:38:41.159 negotiated that they would essentially do that. The reality on the ground is that 1141 01:38:41.199 --> 01:38:47.640 we killed you know, Zawahiri, who was celebrating, you know. With 1142 01:38:47.680 --> 01:38:53.359 that said, I will say that's a good example of why it was once 1143 01:38:53.399 --> 01:38:58.399 we got out, we actually achieved the biggest, the second biggest effect that 1144 01:38:58.439 --> 01:39:01.119 we could have achieved, probably because we weren't there, because he's not being 1145 01:39:01.199 --> 01:39:04.079 hidden by those guys and he thought he was in a safe space. Right 1146 01:39:04.159 --> 01:39:09.600 So, so in some senses we achieved the effect on that particular target, 1147 01:39:09.680 --> 01:39:15.439 and that is a significant target, right. So, but but it is 1148 01:39:15.479 --> 01:39:19.239 in the agreement, right the county that their counter terrorism commitments are in the 1149 01:39:19.319 --> 01:39:25.159 agreement, and you know, even you know, to this day, there's 1150 01:39:25.399 --> 01:39:30.880 you know, you can see that they have gone full Taliban right in terms 1151 01:39:30.920 --> 01:39:33.560 of how they're governing the country, in terms of where they are. But 1152 01:39:35.479 --> 01:39:41.640 you know, there's still the idea for the Taliban, and it will eventually 1153 01:39:41.680 --> 01:39:45.319 fade that there could be some sort of arrangement with the United States that can 1154 01:39:45.359 --> 01:39:49.479 achieve these other effects that they want, and so that that element is there, 1155 01:39:50.119 --> 01:39:56.000 the core thing that that was achieved because the other pieces didn't come together. 1156 01:39:56.319 --> 01:40:01.239 The governance piece, the peace agreement between Taliban in the Afghans was not 1157 01:40:01.880 --> 01:40:10.439 tied to the timetable of our withdrawal. Right, so in theory we would 1158 01:40:10.439 --> 01:40:14.800 come out and that wouldn't have been didn't necessarily have to be done. The 1159 01:40:14.880 --> 01:40:17.920 idea was to have it done. But you know, it wasn't. It 1160 01:40:17.960 --> 01:40:20.479 wasn't. It didn't talk to us a little bit about that. It's I 1161 01:40:20.560 --> 01:40:26.039 mean, the deal is negotiated. Eventually we signed a deal. Yeah, 1162 01:40:26.560 --> 01:40:29.800 what happens next? And how do things? You know, I think we 1163 01:40:29.880 --> 01:40:32.439 all agree that the way we ended up pulling out of there was not ideal. 1164 01:40:32.560 --> 01:40:39.439 Yeah, so so first of all, you know, there were some 1165 01:40:39.479 --> 01:40:43.119 stops and starts to to to how that that came forward. You know, 1166 01:40:43.159 --> 01:40:47.239 Trump hit a pause after a US soldier was killed, right, you know, 1167 01:40:47.439 --> 01:40:50.640 on the eve of the signing, and was that sort of like if 1168 01:40:50.680 --> 01:40:56.840 we if we follow through this now, it'll look like it like it's an 1169 01:40:56.880 --> 01:41:00.000 image issue or they're not holding their their deal. They're not I can't. 1170 01:41:00.079 --> 01:41:03.840 I can't speak for President Trump. I mean we know his words. He 1171 01:41:03.880 --> 01:41:06.840 said, what kind of people are these? You know? You know, 1172 01:41:06.880 --> 01:41:11.920 I think the thinking, you know, the Taliban explanation was we weren't in 1173 01:41:11.960 --> 01:41:14.600 the scope of the peace agreement yet because we hadn't signed it, right, 1174 01:41:15.640 --> 01:41:18.479 I mean, that's that was their mentality. He's like, hey, you're 1175 01:41:18.520 --> 01:41:21.640 gonna you know, that's what he said. What kind of people would do 1176 01:41:21.680 --> 01:41:28.960 this? Yeah, so he he hit he hit the pause button. We 1177 01:41:30.239 --> 01:41:39.520 then conducted negotiations in Doha that were off book negotiations where Ambassa khalilza the the 1178 01:41:39.600 --> 01:41:45.119 agreement, the US Alberian agreement was all but done and then it was paused 1179 01:41:45.439 --> 01:41:48.159 and there was no It was called off I mean we didn't know whether it 1180 01:41:48.159 --> 01:41:51.640 was a permanent pause. When you say off book, you mean like informal 1181 01:41:51.880 --> 01:41:57.960 essentially, I'm going to say informal to not use other words. You know 1182 01:41:58.039 --> 01:42:03.640 it was. It was because we were no longer negotiating with the Taliban formally, 1183 01:42:03.800 --> 01:42:08.279 right, but behind the scenes, I now do that, so now 1184 01:42:09.359 --> 01:42:12.720 each other. So now you know, Inbassador Khalilzad said, well, let's 1185 01:42:12.760 --> 01:42:17.119 not lose what we have. We've got the US to alband agreement is basically 1186 01:42:17.119 --> 01:42:21.119 ready to go. We can make some adjustments. I would like to take 1187 01:42:21.159 --> 01:42:25.239 a run at how can we get the Taliban? The Taliban said, hey, 1188 01:42:25.239 --> 01:42:27.560 we'll come back to the table. But it's you guys, you know, 1189 01:42:28.119 --> 01:42:32.239 so what is ambassador you know Leo Zady? He One of the big 1190 01:42:32.560 --> 01:42:38.359 goals of the Trump administration was free American hostages. They put a lot of 1191 01:42:38.359 --> 01:42:43.039 time and effort into that that they felt that Americans should not be left overseas. 1192 01:42:43.119 --> 01:42:46.319 Now, you know, I think all of us understand the very difficult 1193 01:42:46.359 --> 01:42:50.640 choices made with Americans that are hostage overseas. And you know, we've had 1194 01:42:50.640 --> 01:42:58.840 a long standing policy that we weren't going to negotiate on hostages. And there's 1195 01:42:59.199 --> 01:43:02.479 a very good reason for that, which it introduces moral hazard. You pay 1196 01:43:02.520 --> 01:43:05.720 four million dollars for somebody, the next person is eight, it becomes an 1197 01:43:05.760 --> 01:43:11.359 economy and or it becomes a series of political objectives that they can get. 1198 01:43:11.399 --> 01:43:15.720 And we always pay a lot more, you know, for Americans. We 1199 01:43:15.840 --> 01:43:19.439 trade a lot more, We give up a lot more than other people you 1200 01:43:19.479 --> 01:43:24.640 know, are willing to do. But you know, it's not just the 1201 01:43:24.640 --> 01:43:29.760 Trump administration, you know, this administration, every administration has committed to you 1202 01:43:29.760 --> 01:43:33.239 know, it's our top thing is protecting Americans overseas. So you make trade 1203 01:43:33.239 --> 01:43:40.920 offs when you deem that there's an opportunity. So what Investador Leo Zad realizes, 1204 01:43:41.840 --> 01:43:45.800 we could bring somebody home safely. And what we're going to do is 1205 01:43:46.279 --> 01:43:50.560 use this as an opportunity to sort of go back and test a few things. 1206 01:43:51.720 --> 01:43:55.840 And one of the things was whether the Taliban really had command and control, 1207 01:43:56.640 --> 01:44:01.279 whether they could deliver what roll Miller was asking for, which is, 1208 01:44:02.079 --> 01:44:05.319 if we're going to go into a US Taliban scenario, we need to see 1209 01:44:05.319 --> 01:44:10.600 a reduction of violence, a serious reduction of violence. Because the Taliban view 1210 01:44:10.720 --> 01:44:14.800 was always we're not going to attack you, but we are going to come 1211 01:44:14.880 --> 01:44:18.119 after the Afghan government because they're not party to the agreement, of course, 1212 01:44:18.359 --> 01:44:21.319 because they didn't want them to party the unit. They wanted the power. 1213 01:44:21.880 --> 01:44:28.680 And our point to the Taliban was always, Okay, you know that's not 1214 01:44:28.800 --> 01:44:32.720 good. You should be negotiating with the government, but if you attack our 1215 01:44:32.760 --> 01:44:36.880 partners, we are going to defend our partners, right, Okay. So 1216 01:44:38.960 --> 01:44:42.920 we were still engaged in combat operations against the Taliban, but it was not 1217 01:44:43.399 --> 01:44:47.159 in theory, not direct right. So one of the things to test was 1218 01:44:47.239 --> 01:44:51.560 whether you could actually have a ceasefire, whether you could get to a point. 1219 01:44:51.960 --> 01:44:56.159 We couldn't get in ceasefire, but we were going to have a reduction 1220 01:44:56.239 --> 01:45:01.960 of violence. And so one of the operations for these negotiating to get the 1221 01:45:02.239 --> 01:45:09.720 return our people was we needed to have the Taliban stand down in an area 1222 01:45:12.119 --> 01:45:16.640 and not attack if we were sending our special operations forces in to the area 1223 01:45:16.720 --> 01:45:20.920 to pick up a guy that you don't even know if he's alive. Right, 1224 01:45:21.960 --> 01:45:28.920 So we worked out that agreement. The mission happened. The Taliban did 1225 01:45:28.960 --> 01:45:31.760 have a ceasefire. They actually ended up in a firefight with the Afghan government 1226 01:45:31.760 --> 01:45:38.039 at one point, which they blamed on the government, and we spent months 1227 01:45:39.000 --> 01:45:44.279 trying to unstick in this military touch point. It all worked, The agreement 1228 01:45:44.359 --> 01:45:48.560 was eventually signed, We returned to the table, we got a hostage freed, 1229 01:45:50.479 --> 01:45:56.640 and the agreement happens. I exit the scene for a while at that 1230 01:45:56.720 --> 01:46:00.680 point. Now we go into implementation. We're drawing down. But we had 1231 01:46:00.720 --> 01:46:05.239 COVID, so it that, you know, really jacked up a lot of 1232 01:46:05.239 --> 01:46:09.880 things. You know, there were a lot fewer meetings within Afghanistan. A 1233 01:46:09.880 --> 01:46:15.279 lot of stuff was being done virtually at this point, you know, and 1234 01:46:15.359 --> 01:46:19.800 part of the agreement was prisoner releases. So this was a huge thing. 1235 01:46:19.840 --> 01:46:25.119 The Taliban were supposed to get back FI up to five thousand prisoners. The 1236 01:46:25.159 --> 01:46:28.079 government didn't want it. They didn't negotiate for it, so they didn't want 1237 01:46:28.079 --> 01:46:30.359 to give them up, and so we did a lot of stop and start 1238 01:46:30.439 --> 01:46:35.119 over these prisoners, trying to get the two sides to the table. All 1239 01:46:35.159 --> 01:46:43.560 of this was happening while we're drawing down, and the Taliban were slowly making 1240 01:46:43.600 --> 01:46:49.960 some inroads, right, So I get recalled back and you know, they 1241 01:46:49.960 --> 01:46:53.319 started calling me and say, hey, we have this this gap. We 1242 01:46:53.359 --> 01:46:58.359 need somebody to be in their military touch point, to be partnered with the 1243 01:46:58.439 --> 01:47:02.920 general General Klein. It was General Tooley who was the main guy for fifteen 1244 01:47:02.960 --> 01:47:09.880 months talking to the Taliban every day. You know, that guy wore one 1245 01:47:09.920 --> 01:47:12.199 out for him. Yeah, pour one out for him, I mean, 1246 01:47:12.800 --> 01:47:16.520 you know, really truly, but nearer to the end. As as as 1247 01:47:16.520 --> 01:47:21.279 we got closer to the end, he was replaced by General Klein, and 1248 01:47:21.319 --> 01:47:26.279 so I was going to be the civilian counterpoint to this. So Zol's representative. 1249 01:47:26.760 --> 01:47:30.640 These guys are reporting to General Miller, they're conveying essentially to the Taliban. 1250 01:47:30.680 --> 01:47:35.840 Hey, we are we are on the trajectory that we said we're on, 1251 01:47:36.760 --> 01:47:40.720 which was for April first, right, well it was I think it 1252 01:47:40.720 --> 01:47:48.399 was May first, because the Taliban were not attacking us in a way you 1253 01:47:48.399 --> 01:47:53.880 know, of course some you know, and it was a deconfliction channel too, 1254 01:47:53.960 --> 01:47:56.359 like, okay, so if you're not attacking us, why why did 1255 01:47:56.399 --> 01:48:00.319 we have seven rounds drop on Bogrum last night? Oh it wasn't us, 1256 01:48:00.399 --> 01:48:02.479 Or we're going to investigate, or it's a rogue command or whatever, you 1257 01:48:02.520 --> 01:48:06.600 know, but you're you're trying to deconflict so you don't get people killed on 1258 01:48:06.640 --> 01:48:13.760 the way out. And so I came back to that, and what had 1259 01:48:13.760 --> 01:48:16.239 happened was we have the change in administration. And during the change in administration, 1260 01:48:17.159 --> 01:48:20.720 you can understand, you come in, you've got a deal on the 1261 01:48:20.760 --> 01:48:27.520 table to get out. There's a lot of equities in Washington saying okay, 1262 01:48:28.960 --> 01:48:32.079 let's let's not come out. I mean, you know this is this was 1263 01:48:32.119 --> 01:48:40.399 a controversial thing, yeah, that President Trump did because look, huge equities 1264 01:48:40.479 --> 01:48:46.279 within the defense establishment we're operating under the mow the grass theory that it's a 1265 01:48:46.720 --> 01:48:51.640 relatively low cost to stay in Afghanistan and this will not become a terroristaent and 1266 01:48:51.880 --> 01:48:56.920 we cannot be kicked out. With some number of troops that are supporting the 1267 01:48:57.359 --> 01:49:00.159 are enabled, you can keep like two thousand people in the contrary and just 1268 01:49:00.279 --> 01:49:04.119 maintain a counter terroristy. So I'm not going to put numbers because that was 1269 01:49:04.119 --> 01:49:09.520 always a controversy. Yes, a small platform, but again with our Afghan 1270 01:49:09.600 --> 01:49:14.199 enablers and with or sorry with our enablers for the Afghans. But also remember 1271 01:49:14.199 --> 01:49:16.119 the Europeans are also in there, NATO is in there. So you know 1272 01:49:16.119 --> 01:49:18.680 when we looked at we had eight thousand troops, well we're actually at a 1273 01:49:18.720 --> 01:49:23.600 sixteen thousand troops strength because you have your partner nations are in there, right, 1274 01:49:23.680 --> 01:49:27.800 so you're at a higher level. But you can understand. So there 1275 01:49:27.840 --> 01:49:31.920 was a constituency within the Defense Department which was very much like why are we 1276 01:49:31.920 --> 01:49:35.359 doing that? There's still the neo, you know, conservative approach of a 1277 01:49:35.600 --> 01:49:41.159 ungoverned space. Then there's people who are like you're on the doorstep of Pakistan, 1278 01:49:41.359 --> 01:49:47.039 China, Iran rushes over there, strategic environment to be there, right, 1279 01:49:47.680 --> 01:49:51.880 you know. And then there's the State Department, which is you know, 1280 01:49:53.039 --> 01:49:57.920 hey, we educated a generation of women, We've got partners in here. 1281 01:49:58.279 --> 01:50:02.920 This is a valuable partner in the region. And let's economic we're also 1282 01:50:03.000 --> 01:50:09.159 emotionally tied to this subject. And there's the emotional ties to the entire US 1283 01:50:09.239 --> 01:50:15.960 government establishment that has worked under the GAT framework for twenty years building this thing. 1284 01:50:15.159 --> 01:50:19.920 Right, We're deeply vested. So, you know, I think President 1285 01:50:19.920 --> 01:50:27.560 Trump made very much the right decision because, as you guys know back home, 1286 01:50:28.199 --> 01:50:32.800 outside of the foreign policy establishment, it's why are we still in Afghanistan. 1287 01:50:33.159 --> 01:50:36.239 I don't think we should be spending any money over there. I don't 1288 01:50:36.239 --> 01:50:41.600 know why people are dying over there. Why are we fighting a war even 1289 01:50:41.640 --> 01:50:45.960 though we could convince ourselves that this war was against somebody else. So I 1290 01:50:45.000 --> 01:50:50.159 think, you know, President Trump made a decision that was difficult to make. 1291 01:50:50.279 --> 01:50:54.359 That's why people don't make it because if you, if you choose to 1292 01:50:54.439 --> 01:51:00.640 come out, you're the one who gave up the al Qaeda scenario. Parties 1293 01:51:00.680 --> 01:51:02.560 were kind of done with this war. Well, so here's this is where 1294 01:51:02.600 --> 01:51:05.960 I'm going with this, right, So when the new administration comes in, 1295 01:51:06.079 --> 01:51:11.079 it's got to take on board all of these inputs. This is a logical 1296 01:51:11.119 --> 01:51:15.840 thing for any new administration. Sure, let's examine and remember President Biden's position 1297 01:51:15.920 --> 01:51:19.159 from back in two thousand and nine was not come out entirely, but keep 1298 01:51:19.239 --> 01:51:26.279 it just as a counter and it's a CT presence. Now we know that 1299 01:51:26.359 --> 01:51:31.000 the CT presence was enabled by the military flight print. Right, the logistics 1300 01:51:31.039 --> 01:51:35.600 of a landlocked country through which you've got to go through in Afghanistan don't really 1301 01:51:35.680 --> 01:51:42.239 allow you that pure CT presence if you have two thousand people. But his 1302 01:51:42.920 --> 01:51:48.399 position wasn't radically different from President Trump's position, with the exception he would have 1303 01:51:48.520 --> 01:51:53.319 kept a CTVY. Now would President Trump if that had been you know, 1304 01:51:53.399 --> 01:51:56.760 sort of at the end, would that have been you know, an outcome 1305 01:51:56.920 --> 01:52:02.079 because we don't know, because you know, there there were still moments at 1306 01:52:02.119 --> 01:52:08.199 which you could have paused this trajectory, right, So we don't know the 1307 01:52:08.239 --> 01:52:13.720 administration chain they took. The Biden administration took a prudent pause. There's no 1308 01:52:13.840 --> 01:52:15.920 question you have to take the inputs. You have to come with a fresh 1309 01:52:15.960 --> 01:52:19.680 set of eyes, assess this, and remember you're getting it from a lot 1310 01:52:19.720 --> 01:52:26.000 of other people. The problem is is we had a deal and that deal 1311 01:52:26.079 --> 01:52:29.720 was May first, and as part of that deal, the Taliban we're not 1312 01:52:29.800 --> 01:52:35.439 attacking the ex filtration. So if you're going to abrogate that particular term of 1313 01:52:35.479 --> 01:52:41.199 the deal, you are exposing us to risk. General Miller, as the 1314 01:52:41.239 --> 01:52:48.960 commander, understood that crystal clear. Right. So the advice that tends to 1315 01:52:49.000 --> 01:52:54.640 go up is, well, I think we should keep a certain level and 1316 01:52:54.720 --> 01:52:59.119 maintain because we've got force pro we've got all these other equities. But if 1317 01:52:59.159 --> 01:53:02.600 they were going to come out, which is what they ended up doing, 1318 01:53:04.760 --> 01:53:11.199 then you better get out under the terms that we agreed because otherwise the Taliban 1319 01:53:11.239 --> 01:53:14.640 are telling us and where are the Taliban telling us? In the military touch 1320 01:53:14.680 --> 01:53:17.920 point? Right, you're telling us this in the military touchpoint. So the 1321 01:53:18.039 --> 01:53:24.840 people that we're interacting directly face to face with the Taliban are very few in 1322 01:53:24.920 --> 01:53:30.319 the US government. There's Ambassador Khalilzad directly his deputy from time to time, 1323 01:53:30.359 --> 01:53:38.159 but really Ambassador Khalilzad, right, and General Miller through is a military touch 1324 01:53:38.199 --> 01:53:42.600 point, right, that's it, right, This is how we're communicating with 1325 01:53:42.720 --> 01:53:47.119 the Taliban, and what we're hearing is, hey, what are you doing? 1326 01:53:47.279 --> 01:53:50.600 What is this pause? What's going on? Okay, now we're be 1327 01:53:50.720 --> 01:53:55.960 on the scope. When the Biden administration came and said August thirty first, 1328 01:53:56.640 --> 01:54:00.039 and first they said September eleventh, I think prudently back to to August thirty 1329 01:54:00.079 --> 01:54:06.920 first. The Taliban said, we don't accept that. Where did they say 1330 01:54:06.960 --> 01:54:12.119 it? They told us in this touch point. They didn't accept it, 1331 01:54:12.119 --> 01:54:16.720 but they said we don't trust you. You know, we heard you were 1332 01:54:16.720 --> 01:54:19.399 coming out before. You know, again under the Obama mystery, we were 1333 01:54:19.399 --> 01:54:24.840 supposed to have a significant drawdown and it just ended up being ramped back up. 1334 01:54:25.000 --> 01:54:30.600 So we had to keep delivering the message we are coming out militarily. 1335 01:54:30.840 --> 01:54:35.920 But you guys got to get to the peace talks, and we did start 1336 01:54:36.000 --> 01:54:40.640 to get the Afghan government and the Taliban to finally meet face to face. 1337 01:54:40.800 --> 01:54:45.840 The problem was is as we started to move out district after districts started to 1338 01:54:45.880 --> 01:54:51.560 fall, they just can you can come up with any theory you want. 1339 01:54:53.199 --> 01:54:59.119 The reality was I mean, and look, the beauty of Afghan maps was 1340 01:54:59.199 --> 01:55:03.199 again always goes to that village level. Right that you look at the map, 1341 01:55:04.439 --> 01:55:10.079 it says, hey, this is this is Afghan government controlled if you 1342 01:55:10.119 --> 01:55:13.159 looked at at the village level, none of the villages where Afghan. They 1343 01:55:13.199 --> 01:55:15.439 may have been Taliban, they may not have been, but they certainly weren't 1344 01:55:15.479 --> 01:55:21.439 governed. The district center was controlled. That was the space. So now 1345 01:55:21.439 --> 01:55:26.800 those district centers are gone, and now you're seeing, okay, well they 1346 01:55:26.800 --> 01:55:32.039 haven't gone after the provincial capitals, but you're watching the map go red from 1347 01:55:32.159 --> 01:55:38.680 May June July, and this is all open source stuff that you know they 1348 01:55:38.680 --> 01:55:42.560 did. You know, I found I don't you know, use Twitter anymore 1349 01:55:42.600 --> 01:55:45.520 at all, gotten off that platform. But at the time they were Twitter 1350 01:55:45.560 --> 01:55:55.000 accounts from rando's doing spectacularly good. This battle happened, or the Taliban have 1351 01:55:55.119 --> 01:56:00.399 now taken this village, this village, this thing with pin drops. I 1352 01:56:00.439 --> 01:56:04.920 would then call my Afghan contacts or talk to the Taliban and they would confirm 1353 01:56:05.159 --> 01:56:10.119 that these places are gone. And I don't know who the randos are that 1354 01:56:10.159 --> 01:56:15.520 are dragging the stuff on open source. The military is briefing in the Commander 1355 01:56:15.640 --> 01:56:18.399 Update brief. There's a lot of open sources feeding into that stuff because what 1356 01:56:18.399 --> 01:56:23.920 are we also losing. We're losing intelligence networks, and we're losing our intelligence 1357 01:56:23.920 --> 01:56:30.640 network because we're reducing all those not only that we're losing assets because now Syncom's 1358 01:56:30.640 --> 01:56:35.600 losing assets to pake on, you know, because you have the larger battle 1359 01:56:35.640 --> 01:56:40.520 for resources within our government. So this all starts happening and you can kind 1360 01:56:40.520 --> 01:56:45.159 of see the thing coming down. So a I think a prudent decision made, 1361 01:56:45.119 --> 01:56:51.479 which is that we we stick to the agreement. An irritant that produces 1362 01:56:51.520 --> 01:57:01.600 a significant vulnerability and the reality now shifting on the ground. I think there 1363 01:57:01.600 --> 01:57:05.199 are a lot of people who will argue, okay, well that you know 1364 01:57:06.199 --> 01:57:12.399 that it was a red flags and all of this stuff right. The challenges 1365 01:57:12.640 --> 01:57:17.279 is when you look at it from a Washington perspective, and again, you 1366 01:57:17.319 --> 01:57:25.399 know, I can't emphasisize enough. You guys know, people working on Afghanistan 1367 01:57:25.600 --> 01:57:29.359 worked in good faith. You know, we're trying to get to the right 1368 01:57:29.359 --> 01:57:32.680 outcome. There's very few there are cases where you say, oh, what 1369 01:57:32.800 --> 01:57:35.680 did we do this? This government, we overthrew this government, we tried 1370 01:57:35.720 --> 01:57:40.000 to do is no. People were trying, you know, working to try 1371 01:57:40.039 --> 01:57:44.840 to get you know, from your line soldiers to your diplomats, to Inveassador 1372 01:57:44.880 --> 01:57:49.920 Khaliozad to General Miller, different perspectives, different approaches, but definitely trying to 1373 01:57:49.960 --> 01:57:54.520 do the right thing for the United States and also for our Afghan partners. 1374 01:57:55.119 --> 01:57:59.159 So if you look at it from Washington's perspective, the analog, the historical 1375 01:57:59.199 --> 01:58:04.680 analog is the civil war. And you have to think that with thousands of 1376 01:58:04.760 --> 01:58:14.319 Afghan police and officers and the armaments that we dumped into Cobble itself, that 1377 01:58:14.399 --> 01:58:19.279 at a minimum you would have a several large inkspots as provincial centers, maybe 1378 01:58:19.279 --> 01:58:23.920 the Taliban would sweep through parts of the country, but that at the end 1379 01:58:24.039 --> 01:58:27.439 you're going to have some sort of bad civil war if you can't get to 1380 01:58:27.479 --> 01:58:30.119 a deal. And certainly that was Ambassador Jalilzad's analysis, that it would be 1381 01:58:30.119 --> 01:58:36.159 a civil war, not an outright victory, not a dissolution of the Afghan 1382 01:58:36.199 --> 01:58:44.359 forces. So I think what was happening was the reality was we were built 1383 01:58:44.359 --> 01:58:48.239 on quicksand again, you know, the agency said, hey, you know, 1384 01:58:48.279 --> 01:58:51.359 I think there was some assessment at some point where they said it's got 1385 01:58:51.399 --> 01:58:55.560 six months or whatever, you know, earlier in the process, that it's 1386 01:58:55.600 --> 01:58:59.439 not going to last maybe a year or whatever. But I think it is 1387 01:58:59.479 --> 01:59:04.199 a really good argument that the Afghan government would defend itself, at least in 1388 01:59:04.319 --> 01:59:09.239 Kabble, that they were equities of all of these troops and all of these 1389 01:59:09.239 --> 01:59:14.479 families, that they would defend themselves, which meant that your time horizon would 1390 01:59:14.520 --> 01:59:20.359 be longer. Right. General Miller clearly said, once we're beyond the agreement, 1391 01:59:20.439 --> 01:59:25.840 we've got to come out faster. And so they were pulling out, 1392 01:59:25.920 --> 01:59:32.319 and you know, I think my assessment is that no matter how you came 1393 01:59:32.359 --> 01:59:36.720 out the twenty year relationship, once that military piece is out, it was 1394 01:59:36.760 --> 01:59:45.199 going to be chaotic. Are there mitigants that could have you know, stopped 1395 01:59:45.680 --> 01:59:49.520 you know, some of the scenes that we saw. Yeah, there are 1396 01:59:49.600 --> 01:59:57.720 things that we can do better as a government, right, But in the 1397 01:59:57.840 --> 02:00:03.039 end, the outcome was the right outcome, right, And that's fundamentally what 1398 02:00:03.079 --> 02:00:08.399 we have to focus on, because you know, I said this to you, 1399 02:00:08.399 --> 02:00:11.199 you know, before we were taping. If you look at the world 1400 02:00:11.239 --> 02:00:18.079 today and the battle space and the change in technology, if we're opposing Russia 1401 02:00:19.159 --> 02:00:27.439 in Ukraine and we're you know, crosswise with you know, Iran, and 1402 02:00:27.479 --> 02:00:31.840 you see the damage the Huthis are inflicting, I find it impossible to believe 1403 02:00:31.920 --> 02:00:38.159 that that stuff wouldn't be hitting US forces and US diplomats if we were still 1404 02:00:38.199 --> 02:00:42.720 in Afghanistan today, because you know, we would be beyond the scope of 1405 02:00:42.720 --> 02:00:47.319 any agreement. And it's also folks that the Taliban do business with, you 1406 02:00:47.319 --> 02:00:51.319 know, are ramped up and the technology has changed because for the first time 1407 02:00:51.359 --> 02:00:56.359 ever, some of your guess appoint is you have to look to the air 1408 02:00:56.439 --> 02:01:00.960 now in a way that we've never had to look to protect embassy platform. 1409 02:01:00.560 --> 02:01:04.119 It's also a question of like priorities. We're trying to counter Russia, China, 1410 02:01:04.199 --> 02:01:10.960 Iran, and then somewhere after that, we're also looking at the global 1411 02:01:10.960 --> 02:01:15.399 war on terror, counter terrorism North Korea. I mean, you get to 1412 02:01:15.439 --> 02:01:18.560 a certain point where it's like, can we maintain these long term you know, 1413 02:01:18.680 --> 02:01:24.800 quote unquote sustainable counterinsurgency campaigns in places like Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, 1414 02:01:25.079 --> 02:01:30.399 and elsewhere while also trying to confront some of these larger nation states. The 1415 02:01:30.560 --> 02:01:38.439 logistics chain, the cost I mean, there are many in our defense establishment 1416 02:01:38.520 --> 02:01:41.479 and you know, and you know, also on the state side. I 1417 02:01:41.479 --> 02:01:45.880 think that would argue that these costs are relatively minimal. I don't. I 1418 02:01:45.920 --> 02:01:48.960 don't agree with that, and I don't think most Americans would agree that. 1419 02:01:49.039 --> 02:01:54.079 You know, nine billion dollars a year or whatever whatever cost is just simply 1420 02:01:54.119 --> 02:02:00.560 because again the complexity of sustaining operations in Afghanistan was immense. And saw that 1421 02:02:00.239 --> 02:02:04.359 when BOGRAM closed. Because now you've got a single point of failure, which 1422 02:02:04.399 --> 02:02:11.000 is that runway at Karzai International Airport one way in and one a out. 1423 02:02:11.319 --> 02:02:15.800 Could you convoy outshore? But you're convoying hours and hours and hours. I 1424 02:02:15.800 --> 02:02:19.720 mean it's very very easy to you know, take out those you know, 1425 02:02:19.920 --> 02:02:25.960 convoys. So I mean this is operationally, you're you're stuck at that point. 1426 02:02:27.399 --> 02:02:30.159 So when you look at this, you know, sort of global force 1427 02:02:30.239 --> 02:02:36.880 posture and global diplomatic posture. This cost if you're under if you're really drawn 1428 02:02:36.960 --> 02:02:41.520 deeper into the war, which we would have been had we stayed, because 1429 02:02:41.520 --> 02:02:45.600 again, you know, all of this technology would have flowed in there. 1430 02:02:45.600 --> 02:02:47.399 The Russians would have loved to hit us. I am sure, and I'm 1431 02:02:47.399 --> 02:02:53.199 not a Russian expert. It just stands to reason that you know that we 1432 02:02:53.239 --> 02:02:58.399 would have more Tower twenty two's if we were still there. So the outcome 1433 02:02:59.439 --> 02:03:03.279 was the right outcome. And you know, again, you know what I 1434 02:03:03.359 --> 02:03:09.439 mentioned before is what's unique about this is we had two presidents that are from 1435 02:03:09.720 --> 02:03:16.319 radically different perspectives on virtually everything. Right, that understood I think where the 1436 02:03:16.359 --> 02:03:24.399 American public was on this issue and understood the American public was not, you 1437 02:03:24.439 --> 02:03:31.279 know, aware of supportive of pouring money into this particular war anymore. And 1438 02:03:31.359 --> 02:03:40.359 so the decision was made across both administrations. So when we go back to 1439 02:03:40.399 --> 02:03:44.479 execution again, things that you can do, some of the things are just 1440 02:03:44.520 --> 02:03:46.680 going to be what they were. I'll give you a very good example. 1441 02:03:48.720 --> 02:03:54.760 You know, it's a really tough conversation for State Department people when we have 1442 02:03:54.800 --> 02:03:57.560 to pull up out of an embassy. When I was in Liberia and it 1443 02:03:57.760 --> 02:04:00.520 was a potential for us to pull up star and pull out, and sometimes 1444 02:04:01.199 --> 02:04:08.319 the security posture and the logistics to sustain the place are not viable. Maybe 1445 02:04:08.319 --> 02:04:12.680 the country wants us out, maybe we're directly under attack, so it's not 1446 02:04:12.800 --> 02:04:18.359 viable. The large number of people who work for the embassy that run generators, 1447 02:04:18.399 --> 02:04:24.840 that run your human resources in many countries are our foreign service nationals. 1448 02:04:24.840 --> 02:04:32.319 These are local Liberians, local Hong Kongers, local you know people, many 1449 02:04:32.359 --> 02:04:38.880 of whom have put twenty thirty year careers in with US. Right, just 1450 02:04:39.119 --> 02:04:43.199 like all the military interpreters that we hear about that in Afghanistan worked with US 1451 02:04:43.199 --> 02:04:51.760 for ten fifteen years in traditional evacuation. By traditional I mean historical evacuations. 1452 02:04:54.279 --> 02:04:59.279 The answer is they stay in place. We don't take them out. If 1453 02:04:59.359 --> 02:05:02.600 they are in titled to a special immigrant visa, they've worked for US for 1454 02:05:02.680 --> 02:05:08.159 a certain amount of time, we can bring them and their families home. 1455 02:05:08.199 --> 02:05:12.079 But it's not happening generally in evacuation. This would be the normal course. 1456 02:05:12.119 --> 02:05:16.319 If you work your twenty years, you apply, an interagency committee looks and 1457 02:05:16.359 --> 02:05:19.319 says, this person is who they say they are. They've got recommendations through 1458 02:05:19.319 --> 02:05:24.119 the years, and we're going to give their family a chance to come to 1459 02:05:24.159 --> 02:05:30.159 the States and say a reward. And you know, in places where people 1460 02:05:30.800 --> 02:05:35.199 you know don't have difficult circumstances, you don't use a lot of SIVs where 1461 02:05:35.199 --> 02:05:39.600 they have difficult circumstances. It's an option. Most people don't want to really 1462 02:05:39.720 --> 02:05:43.199 leave their country, but it's a nice thing. Now. In Afghanistan, 1463 02:05:44.359 --> 02:05:46.520 you heard we had a lot of people that would be targeted, and so 1464 02:05:47.079 --> 02:05:56.239 we had a bigger program, but we worked with people across the spectrum for 1465 02:05:56.399 --> 02:06:01.119 twenty years that we've invested in relationships that anybody who was in country has friends 1466 02:06:01.239 --> 02:06:04.880 or you know, contacts or that was a good person or people that they've 1467 02:06:04.920 --> 02:06:11.840 saved your life, right, literally saved your life. So in Afghanistan, 1468 02:06:12.439 --> 02:06:16.359 sorry, in a normal situation, the answer is to local staff is you 1469 02:06:16.760 --> 02:06:20.119 don't come. We will try to help you. We will try to keep 1470 02:06:20.119 --> 02:06:24.239 your salary on the books for another year. We'll try to get back. 1471 02:06:24.359 --> 02:06:28.920 But you and I had to have those conversations in Liberia. We cannot take 1472 02:06:28.960 --> 02:06:32.560 you out. That is a hard conversation. You are keeping the lights on 1473 02:06:32.920 --> 02:06:36.079 so I can get the messages back to work the diplomacy. But if I 1474 02:06:36.119 --> 02:06:44.000 am ordered to leave, I can't take you in Afghanistan because like in Iraq, 1475 02:06:44.039 --> 02:06:46.039 we had this we basically, if you worked for us for a short 1476 02:06:46.079 --> 02:06:49.640 period of time, we were going to give you the option of an SIV. 1477 02:06:50.279 --> 02:06:55.399 Basically most of our staff had an option. And then we had all 1478 02:06:55.479 --> 02:07:02.760 these other relationships that were you know, contracting relationships with people meaning they didn't 1479 02:07:02.800 --> 02:07:05.880 work for the embassy, but they may have worked for a military contractor who 1480 02:07:05.960 --> 02:07:15.199 was supporting our fob Right, we felt a certain obligation to try to get 1481 02:07:15.479 --> 02:07:20.159 a lot more people out. And then we also had made twenty years of 1482 02:07:20.159 --> 02:07:26.279 commitment to Afghan women girls. There were vulnerable groups of people that we've We've 1483 02:07:26.279 --> 02:07:29.439 had our Congress sit with them, we've had you know, and then you 1484 02:07:29.880 --> 02:07:32.359 look and you say, well, here's a woman author. For example, 1485 02:07:32.399 --> 02:07:36.960 there's a book, The Secret Gate that came out about this about a DS 1486 02:07:38.319 --> 02:07:43.680 agent who became a State Department Foreign Service officer. Well DS is foreign service, 1487 02:07:43.720 --> 02:07:47.319 but he became a political officer and he came in and you know, 1488 02:07:49.439 --> 02:07:54.039 evacuated an author. Why did the author come out? The author came out 1489 02:07:54.039 --> 02:07:57.399 because as a matter of policy, we said, we're going to try to 1490 02:07:57.439 --> 02:08:00.840 take out some of you know, as many of our friends as we can 1491 02:08:00.920 --> 02:08:07.199 and vulnerable people. So if you're looking at an after action, what did 1492 02:08:07.199 --> 02:08:09.159 that do? That was a magnet for everybody to come to the airport. 1493 02:08:11.239 --> 02:08:16.199 Now, if you've worked the issue, are you really going to criticize and 1494 02:08:16.239 --> 02:08:20.439 say, hey, just leave everybody, just leave. By the way, 1495 02:08:22.920 --> 02:08:26.880 you know, there's a ton of American citizens in Afghanistan, but a lot 1496 02:08:26.920 --> 02:08:33.560 of folks who you know, were Afghan and now they're American, So we 1497 02:08:33.640 --> 02:08:35.119 have an obligation to them but what were they doing there. They were doing 1498 02:08:35.119 --> 02:08:39.199 there because they were trying to get They were there on vacation, visiting family, 1499 02:08:39.479 --> 02:08:41.880 you know, things that we wouldn't conceive of in a war zone. 1500 02:08:43.239 --> 02:08:46.600 But they're there because they thought the state was going to be there. Right 1501 02:08:46.640 --> 02:08:50.319 now, they're caught off guards, but they also have very tough choices. 1502 02:08:50.239 --> 02:08:56.520 Do you leave the family that is under US immigration law under all that not 1503 02:08:56.800 --> 02:09:01.439 entitled to come out? Right? But now you have these moral questions. 1504 02:09:01.520 --> 02:09:05.920 The American citizen is saying, hey, you know, I've got one daughter 1505 02:09:05.960 --> 02:09:09.800 who's in America, but my other daughter came back with me, you know, 1506 02:09:11.159 --> 02:09:13.319 right, Or my other daughter was here, she was in the immigration 1507 02:09:13.520 --> 02:09:18.119 process. All of those people, some of them are entitled to come out. 1508 02:09:18.640 --> 02:09:24.359 Many are attached to people who are entitled to come out. If you 1509 02:09:24.479 --> 02:09:30.880 say no, right, you might mitigate people trying to get to the airport, 1510 02:09:30.920 --> 02:09:33.680 but probably you wouldn't because people would not, you know, have a 1511 02:09:33.720 --> 02:09:37.600 sense. And so as a result, there was a magnet coming to the 1512 02:09:37.680 --> 02:09:39.920 airport and what did that do? That introduced a ton of vulnerabilities, and 1513 02:09:39.960 --> 02:09:45.840 we saw the very tragic outcome of that. Do you want to tee up 1514 02:09:45.840 --> 02:09:50.000 the question. Yeah, for Dante, you know, I'm curious because something 1515 02:09:50.119 --> 02:09:52.680 you mentioned has kind of stuck with me, Like when I wonder if, 1516 02:09:52.720 --> 02:09:56.640 for you know, people in state, people in the Department of Events, 1517 02:09:56.680 --> 02:10:00.479 people in the administrator like administration of workers, when they look get it an 1518 02:10:00.520 --> 02:10:03.520 effort in Afghanistan and they say, well, you know, for nine billion 1519 02:10:03.560 --> 02:10:07.000 a year or whatever like that, or how much ever it is for nine 1520 02:10:07.000 --> 02:10:11.159 billion dollars, like that's not a high price to pay. I wonder if 1521 02:10:11.600 --> 02:10:16.920 how many of those opinions would change if they were forced to go out and 1522 02:10:16.960 --> 02:10:20.159 walk patrols with the troops walking. There's you know that that like we look 1523 02:10:20.199 --> 02:10:26.239 at this as a monetary thing, but there's also you know, a generation 1524 02:10:26.640 --> 02:10:31.279 of war fighters who are also living with you know, sort of the consequences 1525 02:10:31.479 --> 02:10:35.399 of that war and then the moral injury of how we left, how we 1526 02:10:35.479 --> 02:10:37.199 left, you know a lot of the Afghan partners and things like that. 1527 02:10:37.600 --> 02:10:43.359 Listen, this is an excellent question, right, and it's a core question 1528 02:10:43.439 --> 02:10:46.399 that any of us have worked on the issue. Because I will tell you 1529 02:10:46.479 --> 02:10:52.920 that the way you framed it, you would say, okay, it was 1530 02:10:52.000 --> 02:10:56.159 people. People who have that perspective are only looking at the monetary costs. 1531 02:10:56.319 --> 02:11:00.920 Right. You know, some of the people who are framing are those same 1532 02:11:01.039 --> 02:11:09.800 people who are out there because because there's still the theory that we operate under, 1533 02:11:09.880 --> 02:11:16.720 which is it's better to take the fight into the field forward rather than 1534 02:11:16.840 --> 02:11:20.479 have to fight it back here. Now there's another theory, which is it 1535 02:11:20.520 --> 02:11:28.199 really doesn't matter what happens in Afghanistan if we protect the homeland. In the 1536 02:11:28.239 --> 02:11:33.079 homeland, your border control is working, your port access is working. We 1537 02:11:33.159 --> 02:11:37.079 all take off our shoes at the airport so we don't get a shoe bomber. 1538 02:11:37.399 --> 02:11:41.319 Right, that's a these are This is a theory. There's no right 1539 02:11:41.359 --> 02:11:46.720 answer. But those people I would still say, would say, yeah, 1540 02:11:46.720 --> 02:11:52.479 I don't minimize the physical cost of families, the cost and loss of lives, 1541 02:11:54.680 --> 02:11:58.159 but we're trying to protect the homeland. And if so, again, 1542 02:11:58.199 --> 02:12:01.680 I come back to good eight. I don't run into a lot of people 1543 02:12:01.760 --> 02:12:09.800 who are dismissive it's just that cost. But but I do agree that the 1544 02:12:09.960 --> 02:12:15.199 further you are from the front, the further you are from a combat outpost 1545 02:12:15.319 --> 02:12:18.640 or an embassy, the easier it is to put it in economic terms rather 1546 02:12:18.680 --> 02:12:22.640 than the human toll. I agree with that but some of the people making 1547 02:12:22.680 --> 02:12:28.399 those decisions do have that. But it's the calculus is you know what, 1548 02:12:30.560 --> 02:12:33.199 three thousand people were lost in nine to eleven, so we're trying to prevent 1549 02:12:33.199 --> 02:12:35.199 a nine to eleven. We're trying to prevent you know, what the houthis 1550 02:12:35.199 --> 02:12:41.399 are doing right now. So but it's a great question. Okay, M 1551 02:12:41.439 --> 02:12:43.319 Corbyn, thank you very much. How big of a headache is the leasing 1552 02:12:43.359 --> 02:12:50.319 agreement for Jibouti? But now you're talking my current job, you know, 1553 02:12:50.520 --> 02:12:56.319 listen, I have to go into State Department speaking. Jibouti is a critical 1554 02:12:56.399 --> 02:13:00.399 counter terrorism partner. We can see the we can see the challenges the Red 1555 02:13:00.439 --> 02:13:05.399 Sea, so we want to make sure that our partners feel, you know, 1556 02:13:07.039 --> 02:13:15.239 that we appropriately view the relationship as a strong strategic partner. Out of 1557 02:13:15.239 --> 02:13:20.279 curiosity, have you ever had from any of these partners? Obviously there's there's 1558 02:13:20.359 --> 02:13:24.359 the monetary there, you know, all types of diplomat diplomatic things. Has 1559 02:13:24.359 --> 02:13:28.399 there ever been a really weird request that just caught you off guard or you 1560 02:13:28.439 --> 02:13:33.560 know anything that that like the an ambassador or something like anything, not an 1561 02:13:33.600 --> 02:13:37.600 ambassador, but like, have there ever been concessions that they wanted or or 1562 02:13:37.720 --> 02:13:46.600 things that struck like you or or like Americans is odd, you mean, 1563 02:13:46.640 --> 02:13:54.840 from our partners, from our partners. You know, there's I mean, 1564 02:13:56.319 --> 02:14:01.399 you know, when you're in a foreign country, you there's just different things 1565 02:14:01.479 --> 02:14:07.119 happen and you don't really understand. I'm not going to give an example. 1566 02:14:07.600 --> 02:14:09.600 The example I want to give you is a funny one because it just popped 1567 02:14:09.640 --> 02:14:15.680 into my mind, not because I'm you know, trying to avoid a formal 1568 02:14:15.720 --> 02:14:20.319 government request. I just didn't have one right away. I'm negotiating with General 1569 02:14:20.399 --> 02:14:28.199 Cobra, and we're trying to get General Cobra to withdraw his forces from Liberia 1570 02:14:28.760 --> 02:14:33.520 from Monrovia, and he ends up doing it. So then I go back 1571 02:14:33.520 --> 02:14:41.600 to his headquarters, right and they're trying to sort of figure out what their 1572 02:14:41.680 --> 02:14:46.279 new posture will be in the sort of post war era. And this is 1573 02:14:46.319 --> 02:14:52.399 what he figured out. He throws down a giant lump of stone and he 1574 02:14:52.479 --> 02:14:58.760 goes, this is a raw diamond. You and me, we can sell 1575 02:14:58.800 --> 02:15:05.800 this. And I was like, General Cobra, I don't want to read 1576 02:15:05.840 --> 02:15:07.920 you kindle the war. I don't want to get shot. I'm like, 1577 02:15:09.319 --> 02:15:11.600 you know, this is a great I you know, sorry, I this 1578 02:15:11.720 --> 02:15:15.159 is not my laying, you know, and I'm trying to so, I 1579 02:15:15.199 --> 02:15:18.479 mean, things come. You know, you don't quite know what is uh 1580 02:15:18.479 --> 02:15:22.399 what you're going to be dealing with it on a daily basis, but uh, 1581 02:15:22.840 --> 02:15:24.640 yeah, that's the example that pops into my is. It was not 1582 02:15:24.680 --> 02:15:28.319 a formal government request, but it was yeah, ahead of the of the 1583 02:15:28.600 --> 02:15:33.279 rebel contingent. Thank you, Devin. Thank you very much, very generous. 1584 02:15:33.640 --> 02:15:37.239 I would like to know your action in a nuclear war setting. Wait, 1585 02:15:39.560 --> 02:15:41.640 if a nuclear bomb dropped, what would you do? Die? Probably? 1586 02:15:43.640 --> 02:15:46.199 What would I do in a nuclear by Yeah, I mean, look 1587 02:15:46.319 --> 02:15:50.199 like everybody, if I'm not vaporized immediately, I'm going to go find my 1588 02:15:50.279 --> 02:15:54.520 family and you know, try to go to ground. Thanks definitely appreciate it. 1589 02:15:54.760 --> 02:16:00.359 Uh Colly, thank you very much. We define success in Afghani stand 1590 02:16:00.760 --> 02:16:09.079 as a strong, stable central government ignoring ignoring reality. Did this mislignement ensure 1591 02:16:09.159 --> 02:16:18.319 failure? I would say that again. I want to be clear. I 1592 02:16:18.359 --> 02:16:22.640 think we achieved our core strategic mission in Afghanistan, which is we took the 1593 02:16:22.760 --> 02:16:31.840 leadership of al Qaida off the board and the ideological gravity center of that organization 1594 02:16:31.960 --> 02:16:35.639 off the board. And that's the organization that killed you know, three thousand 1595 02:16:35.639 --> 02:16:41.879 Americans. Right, So I feel strongly that that core national security objective. 1596 02:16:41.879 --> 02:16:46.360 Now when you're talking about what came and what we were trying to achieve in 1597 02:16:46.440 --> 02:16:52.200 terms of the stability, it's less sort of that objective. Then. I 1598 02:16:54.000 --> 02:17:01.200 think there are alternate history lines as we've talked about that certainly us. I 1599 02:17:01.239 --> 02:17:09.520 think the bigger, you know, the bigger mistakes that were made were hyper 1600 02:17:09.559 --> 02:17:16.280 inflating an economy that couldn't handle it, that it blatantly enabled corruption. So 1601 02:17:16.319 --> 02:17:24.159 we fueled a completely dependent structure that wasn't serving the benefit of the people that 1602 02:17:24.479 --> 02:17:28.440 in theory, we were trying to help. And again it gets back to 1603 02:17:28.440 --> 02:17:33.079 why we as Americans supporting a unitary state. By unitary state, I mean 1604 02:17:33.200 --> 02:17:39.959 a central government that appoints the governing structures the governors and the district governors of 1605 02:17:41.000 --> 02:17:45.440 the provinces in the outlying areas, and all the resources flow back to centrally 1606 02:17:46.000 --> 02:17:50.559 led ministries. This is the type of stuff that drives us crazy in America. 1607 02:17:50.680 --> 02:17:54.840 And so I, you know, the fact that we worked so much 1608 02:17:54.920 --> 02:18:00.840 on that project, if I had had a stronger say, you know, 1609 02:18:01.600 --> 02:18:05.360 and had been a senior person I would have been looking more at, you 1610 02:18:05.399 --> 02:18:09.159 know, what are the relationships of the tribes, and how do we do 1611 02:18:09.680 --> 02:18:18.360 you know, a looser confederation of peoples that you know will fundamentally be willing 1612 02:18:18.399 --> 02:18:24.159 to accept some money far smaller amounts to tell us when al Qaeda shows up 1613 02:18:24.159 --> 02:18:28.200 and ted them over and that's it, and then leave the Afghans to sort 1614 02:18:28.239 --> 02:18:33.319 out a different construct, rather than we didn't fully impose it, but we 1615 02:18:33.680 --> 02:18:37.440 funded it so much that so I think the you know, you know, 1616 02:18:37.600 --> 02:18:41.440 I hope I'm being responsive to the answer. I don't think it was a 1617 02:18:41.520 --> 02:18:46.079 preordained failure, but I do think that the structure as it developed was definitely 1618 02:18:46.120 --> 02:18:50.319 not the right structure, and there are other things that probably could have should 1619 02:18:50.319 --> 02:18:54.719 have been tried earlier in the process. I mean, once we were, 1620 02:18:54.319 --> 02:18:56.920 once I got there in two thousand and nine, we were we were far 1621 02:18:58.040 --> 02:19:03.000 down the road supporting a unitary state, and that was our problem. I 1622 02:19:03.040 --> 02:19:07.760 think we should have looked at other models. That's my own view, Ian 1623 02:19:07.760 --> 02:19:13.040 Brown, Thank you very much. What are Dante's thoughts about the Diplomatic Security 1624 02:19:13.079 --> 02:19:18.239 Service? How did he work with him? Thanks? Guy. I mean, 1625 02:19:18.280 --> 02:19:26.440 I can't say enough positive things about my colleagues in diplomatic security and again 1626 02:19:26.479 --> 02:19:30.399 the marine security guards that work for them at embassies. I'm a field person. 1627 02:19:30.959 --> 02:19:35.879 Most of my career has been overseas. You know, those folks are 1628 02:19:35.920 --> 02:19:41.600 responsible for not only our safety of us, safety of the chancery, but 1629 02:19:41.680 --> 02:19:48.000 they're maintaining the relationships with all the local security apparatus, right because fundamentally we're 1630 02:19:48.000 --> 02:19:52.200 in somebody else's country, we are relying on them. You know, a 1631 02:19:52.399 --> 02:20:01.639 strong RSO and a strong RSO contingent is completely tie in and has the context. 1632 02:20:01.959 --> 02:20:05.319 So when you need to evacuate somebody from a country when there's a real 1633 02:20:05.399 --> 02:20:09.600 crisis, that person being able to do it. And you know, my 1634 02:20:09.680 --> 02:20:13.719 colleagues are excellent. The other thing is is that they are tasked with and 1635 02:20:13.799 --> 02:20:16.959 you guys know this. If you look at threat streams, we would close 1636 02:20:18.000 --> 02:20:22.959 everywhere because you're constantly under thread, right if your focus is on threatstreams, 1637 02:20:22.000 --> 02:20:26.399 and the RSO has to have the judgment, and they do. We have 1638 02:20:26.479 --> 02:20:33.079 exceptional RSOs throughout the world who are looking at these threat streams that we're all 1639 02:20:33.120 --> 02:20:35.680 seeing in different channels and they have to go to the ambassador, the chief 1640 02:20:35.719 --> 02:20:43.639 of mission and say, hey, we got this or it's time to go. 1641 02:20:43.040 --> 02:20:48.639 And so like in Liberia, if you can imagine the pressure that Ted 1642 02:20:48.680 --> 02:20:52.399 Collins and Brad Lynn are rs and aarso we're under. You not only have 1643 02:20:52.440 --> 02:20:56.559 the Washington pressure, but it's if I give the ambassador the wrong advice, 1644 02:20:58.000 --> 02:21:00.520 I don't think we can hold that. If I say I think we can 1645 02:21:00.559 --> 02:21:03.639 hold this compound, the compound's overrun, right, I mean not only do 1646 02:21:03.680 --> 02:21:09.000 I maybe get killed, I get the ambassador killed, but I've you know, 1647 02:21:09.520 --> 02:21:15.159 destroyed the US credibility in the region. We've lost a platform, I 1648 02:21:15.159 --> 02:21:20.799 mean huge ramification. The ambassador, as the chief of mission with the authority, 1649 02:21:22.639 --> 02:21:28.079 will make the final call unless it's taken away and Washington decides we don't 1650 02:21:28.079 --> 02:21:31.200 think the ambassador has it right. We're gonna We're gonna order the ambassador out. 1651 02:21:31.920 --> 02:21:35.879 But the RSO is the critical counsel to the ambassador on how to handle 1652 02:21:37.120 --> 02:21:41.120 the riot that is out front of your embassy, how to handle uh, 1653 02:21:41.239 --> 02:21:43.920 you know, the civil war uh that that's broken out. You know, 1654 02:21:45.360 --> 02:21:50.479 what does this mean for the security of our personnel? So I can't say 1655 02:21:50.559 --> 02:21:54.200 enough positive things about it because you don't see, you know, all of 1656 02:21:54.239 --> 02:21:58.600 the things that are prevented on a daily basis by that, you know. 1657 02:21:58.799 --> 02:22:03.639 Uh, I again, thank you very much. Hit the likes, guys, 1658 02:22:03.719 --> 02:22:05.559 let's get to that one hundred. Hopefully we got there already. Thanks. 1659 02:22:05.639 --> 02:22:11.399 Thanks again. We appreciate Collie. Thank you very much. Does the 1660 02:22:11.520 --> 02:22:18.799 United States government facilitating private hostage negotiations example of the Burnham's undermine the stated policy 1661 02:22:20.120 --> 02:22:24.840 no negation, no negotiation with good question? So this is a really good 1662 02:22:24.920 --> 02:22:28.159 question. I really have to caveat it that it's you know, I'm not 1663 02:22:30.200 --> 02:22:35.280 familiar with that particular example in terms of what what that means the facilitation. 1664 02:22:37.600 --> 02:22:43.479 I'll say this that, uh, it's a very that you know, hostage 1665 02:22:43.879 --> 02:22:48.840 negotiation stuff is very, very difficult. We have a commitment as a government 1666 02:22:48.959 --> 02:22:56.639 to recover our people safely, right, but there's a moral hazard every time 1667 02:22:56.760 --> 02:23:01.440 you're doing it, and you're dealing with the emotions and lives of family members 1668 02:23:01.840 --> 02:23:07.399 and communities. But you're balancing that against the reality that the more you pay 1669 02:23:07.440 --> 02:23:11.760 into a system, and I don't mean monetary, but whatever transactions you do 1670 02:23:11.840 --> 02:23:20.559 on hostage release can introduce more hostages. So these are very very tough calls 1671 02:23:20.639 --> 02:23:28.000 on whether or not that's right. So in terms of is there moral hazard? 1672 02:23:28.040 --> 02:23:30.760 And I can't answer that specific case because I don't know it, but 1673 02:23:30.959 --> 02:23:35.639 as a general principle, you know, negotiations introduced that and then you know, 1674 02:23:37.280 --> 02:23:41.840 we have to The Burnhams were in the Philippines and it was a big 1675 02:23:41.879 --> 02:23:46.799 deal in the early two thousands getting them out of there. There were missionaries 1676 02:23:46.360 --> 02:23:50.639 and when they were finally rescued, I believe the wife made it out. 1677 02:23:50.639 --> 02:23:56.000 In the husband I believe was killed if I remember correctly. Yeah, I'm 1678 02:23:56.079 --> 02:23:58.840 not. I'm not familiar with it. I will say that, you know, 1679 02:23:58.879 --> 02:24:05.479 there's some you know, again not my area of expertise, there's some 1680 02:24:05.719 --> 02:24:09.520 areas of policy that are you know, under consideration because we I think we 1681 02:24:09.639 --> 02:24:15.360 used to have a law that private citizens couldn't do their own negotiation. You 1682 02:24:15.440 --> 02:24:18.239 sort of understood it because again it was to try to prevent the moral hazard 1683 02:24:18.760 --> 02:24:24.479 and try to prevent people from getting deeper into a situation that they're unfamiliar with 1684 02:24:24.559 --> 02:24:30.799 and you know, producing something. But you know, a change in policy 1685 02:24:30.799 --> 02:24:33.440 there would make some sense in the sense that, look, if a family 1686 02:24:33.440 --> 02:24:37.440 member wants to try, they should be aware of the risks that they're undertaking. 1687 02:24:37.520 --> 02:24:41.799 But we as a government shouldn't you know, I think there's a strong 1688 02:24:41.920 --> 02:24:46.559 case to be made that it's not our role to stop it, right, 1689 02:24:46.399 --> 02:24:52.159 but you know, but it's because of those kind of very very difficult situations 1690 02:24:52.200 --> 02:25:00.200 that the policy gets gray. Sure, tell us a little bit about where 1691 02:25:00.239 --> 02:25:03.440 you're at now, you're the Director of East African Affairs at the State Department. 1692 02:25:03.440 --> 02:25:11.840 What does that entail. That entails you know, an office within the 1693 02:25:11.879 --> 02:25:16.440 State Department, in a what we call a regional bureau, is sort of 1694 02:25:16.479 --> 02:25:20.600 your primary touch point for the embassies in the reporting back. So when an 1695 02:25:20.639 --> 02:25:26.959 embassy reports what's going on in a country, you know, they will you 1696 02:25:26.959 --> 02:25:33.159 know, feed their views and that information into a policy process on how we 1697 02:25:33.200 --> 02:25:37.200 respond to whatever the country is doing. If somebody wants to you know, 1698 02:25:39.040 --> 02:25:41.920 join bricks, do we have a do we have a policy response? Should 1699 02:25:41.959 --> 02:25:46.159 we encourage them not to? Should do we have an alternative for them? 1700 02:25:46.559 --> 02:25:50.200 You know those kind of things. So the office is the primary pooler and 1701 02:25:50.319 --> 02:25:56.879 gatherer of information for the embassies. And then the second thing is is where 1702 02:25:56.920 --> 02:26:07.360 the you know, we provide a regional and country specific perspective into interagency deliberations 1703 02:26:07.399 --> 02:26:11.959 over whatever policy is being cooked up. Hey, we want to you know, 1704 02:26:13.959 --> 02:26:18.280 we want to train police. Okay, good ideas. Should we be 1705 02:26:18.319 --> 02:26:22.239 training these police? Right? You know, how are we balancing the human 1706 02:26:22.319 --> 02:26:31.319 rights considerations with the hardcore national security considerations. So it's a lot of it's 1707 02:26:31.360 --> 02:26:35.159 a lot of internal conversation. And then of course we are a touch point 1708 02:26:35.200 --> 02:26:46.399 for the embassies here from the foreign missions. You know, in places where 1709 02:26:46.399 --> 02:26:50.479 we have intensive negotiations, we may support those negotiations. Maybe there's a trade 1710 02:26:50.520 --> 02:26:54.680 treaty, there's that they bring in our expertise on. Maybe there's some other 1711 02:26:54.840 --> 02:27:00.360 kind of bilateral dialogue. We support a lot of things like that. You 1712 02:27:00.399 --> 02:27:05.559 bring their foreign minister over, we bring the secretary together and we discuss the 1713 02:27:05.639 --> 02:27:11.959 issues. So you're trying to manage the relations with countries where there's sort of 1714 02:27:11.000 --> 02:27:20.600 primary regional policy expertise on that. And folks out there that are interested in 1715 02:27:20.639 --> 02:27:24.120 your book, which I mean, I think you described it to me before 1716 02:27:24.600 --> 02:27:28.000 that it's really about what it's like to be existing in a crisis in a 1717 02:27:28.120 --> 02:27:33.000 US embassy abroad. In this book. Where can people find it? They 1718 02:27:33.000 --> 02:27:39.360 can find it on Amazon. The book is the Embassy Story of War and 1719 02:27:39.399 --> 02:27:46.120 Diplomacy. Just a couple quick points on it. It is designed, it's 1720 02:27:46.120 --> 02:27:50.680 written in narrative nonfiction. There's a brief section that you've got to get through 1721 02:27:50.719 --> 02:27:52.600 and intro. You don't have to read it on history a little dry. 1722 02:27:54.280 --> 02:27:58.520 What I do is the reason I wrote it is to put you in an 1723 02:27:58.520 --> 02:28:03.959 embassy in a crisis. So it was based on my own personal observations and 1724 02:28:03.079 --> 02:28:09.840 experiences. But I also did extensive interviews with everybody that was involved in the 1725 02:28:09.879 --> 02:28:13.079 crisis at the time, and I was sort of at the nerve center. 1726 02:28:13.159 --> 02:28:18.719 So you've got, you know, chapters built around the perspective of the rso 1727 02:28:18.760 --> 02:28:24.559 more or less chapters built around the perspective of the ambassador, of a local 1728 02:28:24.600 --> 02:28:31.399 staff member, and they're woven together to take you through an extraordinary summer in 1729 02:28:31.479 --> 02:28:35.319 which again three rebel attacks, the X, the end of the Charles Taylor 1730 02:28:35.360 --> 02:28:41.399 regime, and a peace agreement that has endured to today. That's fantastic. 1731 02:28:41.600 --> 02:28:43.879 I don't know if I've ever heard of a book of that nature work. 1732 02:28:45.120 --> 02:28:50.680 Coolly, Yeah, yeah, yeah, I'm looking forward to it. And 1733 02:28:50.280 --> 02:28:52.840 is there anything else that you want to plug? Is there where can people 1734 02:28:52.879 --> 02:28:58.879 find you? I know you're currently a government official. Do you have any 1735 02:28:58.879 --> 02:29:03.639 sort of public faith seeing places that you want to direct people at the shop 1736 02:29:03.799 --> 02:29:07.239 or yeah, no, no, I might you know, if you if 1737 02:29:07.280 --> 02:29:11.680 you want to see the uh the travel version of the Foreign Service and see 1738 02:29:11.680 --> 02:29:16.600 some you know, travel photography, you can go to my Instagram account parody 1739 02:29:16.639 --> 02:29:18.559 so d X if you just want to reach out to me and you have 1740 02:29:18.680 --> 02:29:22.639 further questions. You know, I think one of the things that your platform 1741 02:29:22.719 --> 02:29:26.840 does is give people a chance to connect. So you can just find me 1742 02:29:26.920 --> 02:29:31.600 on LinkedIn under my name, because you know, I'm always happy to engage 1743 02:29:31.639 --> 02:29:37.280 people and you know, build the community of interests for for people who might 1744 02:29:37.799 --> 02:29:46.159 be interested in pursuing the field of foreign service. What like what's a good 1745 02:29:46.200 --> 02:29:48.840 age to start that, what are some good in roads and what does the 1746 02:29:48.840 --> 02:29:54.719 Foreign Service look for in candidates? Yeah, I mean the Foreign Service. 1747 02:29:54.959 --> 02:29:58.440 There are a couple of ways in I'm not that familiar with the sort of 1748 02:29:58.479 --> 02:30:03.559 non traditional mid career ways. They're trying to open up that process and make 1749 02:30:03.559 --> 02:30:09.120 it a little more flexible. The traditional way is there's a Foreign Service exam. 1750 02:30:09.680 --> 02:30:13.920 You should find out from State gut doug gov where you can you can 1751 02:30:13.959 --> 02:30:18.760 find the information on the exam and it's a written exam, followed by an 1752 02:30:18.879 --> 02:30:22.920 oral exam, followed by security and medical clearances if you pass it. You 1753 02:30:22.920 --> 02:30:30.959 know, the preparation for the career can be varied. Obviously, Folks with 1754 02:30:31.399 --> 02:30:37.159 you know, military background is excellent. We're fortunately getting a lot of folks 1755 02:30:37.200 --> 02:30:39.559 that are using it as a second career. You can enter at any point. 1756 02:30:41.280 --> 02:30:45.559 The retirement age is sixty five. You know, you're going to have 1757 02:30:45.639 --> 02:30:48.600 to come in, you know, in your late fifties if you want a 1758 02:30:48.600 --> 02:30:52.200 couple tours overseas. The thing is is that you know, you're not going 1759 02:30:52.239 --> 02:30:56.399 to become an ambassador if you start when you're fifty five, right, because 1760 02:30:56.399 --> 02:31:00.920 it's just you're not going to be have the time to work your way up 1761 02:31:00.959 --> 02:31:05.200 through the system. But there's a tremendous number of uh, you know, 1762 02:31:05.399 --> 02:31:11.280 great assignments out there. There's a lot of different aspects to foreign service life. 1763 02:31:11.719 --> 02:31:15.760 So, you know, I'm a political officer by you know, by 1764 02:31:15.920 --> 02:31:18.040 they call it cone. What do you what do you guys call it skill 1765 02:31:18.079 --> 02:31:24.840 code? Right, political officer that's you know, essentially reporting on the political 1766 02:31:24.920 --> 02:31:30.680 dynamics in a country. But there are also management officers that just sort of 1767 02:31:30.799 --> 02:31:33.440 run the affairs of an embassy. You know, make sure that we have 1768 02:31:33.479 --> 02:31:37.680 our motor pool set, you know, make sure that your financial stuff is 1769 02:31:37.680 --> 02:31:43.200 being run. We have public affairs officers and of course consular officers. And 1770 02:31:43.239 --> 02:31:48.639 if you know, immigration is your thing and you want to help, you 1771 02:31:48.680 --> 02:31:50.719 know, bring people to the States, you want to keep people out of 1772 02:31:50.760 --> 02:31:54.680 the states. You know, you're going to be working on visas, You're 1773 02:31:54.680 --> 02:31:58.959 going to be working on family reunification, and the critical component of American city 1774 02:32:00.200 --> 02:32:03.719 and services, which is, you know, when somebody's in trouble overseas, 1775 02:32:03.959 --> 02:32:07.879 you get thrown in jail, the embassy is going to visit track you. 1776 02:32:07.239 --> 02:32:11.360 We can't run your court case for you, but it's it's those kind of 1777 02:32:11.360 --> 02:32:16.159 things, sort of helping Americans through evacuations, in extremists and all that. 1778 02:32:16.360 --> 02:32:20.760 Those are all aspects. And then there are specialized roles, which is you 1779 02:32:20.799 --> 02:32:24.360 know, like diplomatic security. Those are you know, folks come in in 1780 02:32:24.440 --> 02:32:30.159 diplomatic security or it t people you know, if you have a general interest 1781 02:32:30.239 --> 02:32:37.280 in living overseas representing the country, but you know, are not as as 1782 02:32:37.360 --> 02:32:45.239 interested in the the core diplomatic sit in the meeting with the foreign minister and 1783 02:32:45.600 --> 02:32:48.920 write reports on that. Then you know some of those other roles or ways 1784 02:32:48.959 --> 02:32:54.200 to contribute, you know, you know, to the inner agency platform. 1785 02:32:54.719 --> 02:32:58.319 And I want to you know, shout out everybody that is part of an 1786 02:32:58.559 --> 02:33:03.959 embassy team, because State Department provides the core platform, right, but a 1787 02:33:05.079 --> 02:33:09.600 country team at an embassy, you know, like if you go to Thailand, 1788 02:33:09.639 --> 02:33:11.200 it's like fifty four agencies. I didn't even know we had fifty four 1789 02:33:11.239 --> 02:33:16.159 agents. Yes, right, I'm like, I don't know there's d A. 1790 02:33:16.079 --> 02:33:20.840 I can go through the entire litany of the US government and apparently and 1791 02:33:20.879 --> 02:33:24.840 find it in Tily. You go to a smaller embassy, you know, 1792 02:33:24.000 --> 02:33:28.159 you're going to find two or three agencies. Usually you're going to have a 1793 02:33:28.159 --> 02:33:31.360 Defense attache there and you might have a USA I D person or whatever. 1794 02:33:31.399 --> 02:33:35.520 So it really depends. There's a lot of you know, folks that are 1795 02:33:35.520 --> 02:33:41.159 doing foreign affairs and doing embassy work, so they should all get credit for 1796 02:33:41.200 --> 02:33:46.239 that. Dante, thank you so much for coming in to do this interview 1797 02:33:46.280 --> 02:33:50.040 tonight, even if you came in under an alias, that's okay. I 1798 02:33:50.079 --> 02:33:54.760 really appreciate it. And we will be back on Wednesday with Adam Gamal, 1799 02:33:54.879 --> 02:34:00.639 the author of the unit. So that's Wednesday at noon, so it'll be 1800 02:34:00.840 --> 02:34:05.200 a neon interview. It'll odd for us, but I hope you guys will 1801 02:34:05.280 --> 02:34:09.040 check out the embassy. The books available on Amazon, and there's going to 1802 02:34:09.079 --> 02:34:11.600 be a link down the description as well. You guys can go and check 1803 02:34:11.600 --> 02:34:16.159 it out. Thank you, And you know, I hope that we can 1804 02:34:16.159 --> 02:34:18.840 have you back sometime in the future because there's a few other things here that 1805 02:34:18.920 --> 02:34:26.440 we didn't quite get to tonight and could probably yeah, no, it absolutely 1806 02:34:26.559 --> 02:34:31.040 could. And you know, I have no idea maybe you'll have another book 1807 02:34:31.079 --> 02:34:35.639 to come and talk about as well. Yeah, it's great. It's a 1808 02:34:35.760 --> 02:34:39.239 it's a real honestly and honor to be here. And you know, you 1809 02:34:39.280 --> 02:34:43.319 guys have you know, phenomenal guests. You know, love this love this 1810 02:34:43.399 --> 02:34:46.600 program, and it's thank you. We all learned, we all learned from 1811 02:34:46.639 --> 02:34:50.680 it. Yeah, thank you, appreciate it. And uh so that's it. 1812 02:34:50.719 --> 02:34:54.319 We'll see you guys on Wednesday. Take care out there, have a 1813 02:34:54.360 --> 02:34:54.920 nice weekend.