These are the properties of the rational soul. It sees itself, analyzes itself,
and makes itself, such as it chooses the fruit which it bears itself
enjoys for the fruit of plants, and that in animals, which corresponds to
fruits others in joy. It obtains its own end wherever the limit of life
may be fixed, not as in a dance and in a play, and
in suchlike things where the whole action is incomplete, if anything cuts it short,
but in every part, and wherever it may be stopped, it makes
what has been set before it full and completes, so that it can say,
I have what is my own. And further, it traverses the whole
universe and the surrounding vacuum, and surveys its form, And it extends itself
into the infinity of time, and embraces and comprehends the periodical renovation of all
things. And it comprehend hinds that those who come after us will see nothing
new, nor have those before us seen anything more. But in a manner,
he who is forty years old, if he has any understanding at all,
has seen, by virtue of the uniformity that prevails all things which have
been and all that will be. This too is a property of the rational
soul, love of one's neighbor, and truth and modesty, and to value
nothing more than itself, which is also the property of law. Thus,
then right reason differs not at all from the reason of justice. Thou wilt
set little value on pleasing song and dancing and the pancreatium. If thou wilt
distribute the melody of the voice into its several sounds, and ask thyself as
to each, if thou art mastered by this, for thou wilt be prevented
by shame from confessing it. And in the matter of dancing, if at
each movement and attitude thou wilt do the same, and the like also in
the matter of the pancasium. In all things, then, except virtue and
the acts of virtue, remember to apply thyself to their several parts, and
by this division, to come to value them little. And apply this rule
also to thy whole life. What a soul that is which is ready if
at any moment it must be separated from the body, and ready to be
extinguished or dispersed, or continue to exist. But so that this readiness comes
from a man's own judgment, not from mere obstinacy, as with the Christians,
but considerately and with dignity, and in a way to persuade another without
tragic show. Have I done something for the general interest? Well, then
I have had my reward. Let this always be present to thy mind,
and never stop doing such good. What is thy art to be good?
And how has this accomplished? Well? Except by general principles, some about
the nature of the universe, and others about the proper constitution of man.
At first, tragedies were brought on the stage as means of reminding men of
the things which happen to them, and that it is according to nature for
things to happen so, and that if you are delighted with what is shown
on the stage, you should not be troubled with that which takes place on
the larger stage. For you see that these things must be accomplished thus,
and that even they bear them who cry out o sytheon. And indeed some
things are said well by the dramatic writers, of which kind is the following,
especially me and my children. If the gods neglect this has its reason
too. And again we must not chafe and fret at that which happens,
and life's harvest reap like the wheat's fruitful ear, and other things of the
same kind. After tragedy, the old comedy was introduced, which had a
magisterial freedom of speech, and by its very plainness of speaking, was useful
in reminding men to beware of insolence. And for this purpose too, Diogenes
used to take from these writers. But as to the middle comedy which came
next, observe what it was, and again for what object the new comedy
was introduced, which gradually sunk down into a mere mimic artifice. That some
good things are said, even by these writers, everybody knows, but the
whole plan of such poetry and dramaturgy, to what end does it look?
How plain does it appear? That there is not another their condition of life
so well suited for philosophizing as this, in which thou now happenest to be
a branch cut off from the adjacent branch, must of necessity be cut off
from the whole tree. Also so to a man, when he is separated
from another man, has fallen off from the whole social community. Now as
to a branch, another cuts it off But a man by his own act,
separates himself from his neighbor when he hates him and turns away from him,
and he does not know that he is at the same time cut himself
off from the whole social system. Yet he adds this privilege certainly from Zeus,
who frames society. For it is in our power to grow again to
that which is near to us, and again to become a part which helps
us to make up the whole. However, if it often happens this kind
of separation, it makes it difficult for that which detaches itself to be brought
to unity and to be restored to its former condition. Finally, the branch,
which from the first grew together with a tree and has continued to have
one life with it, is not like that which, after being cut off,
is then ingrafted. For this is something like what the gardeners mean when
they say that it grows with the rest of the tree, but that it
has not the same mind with it as those who try to stand in thy
way. When thou art proceeding according to right reason, will not be able
to turn thee aside from thy proper action. So neither let them drive thee
from thy benevolent feelings towards them, But be on thy guard equally in both
matters, not only in the matter of steady judgment and action, but also
in the matter of gentleness towards those who try to hinder or otherwise trouble thee.
For this is also a weakness to be vexed at them, as well
as to be diverted from Thy course of action, and to give way through
fear. For both are equally deserters from their post, the man who does
it through fear and the man who is alienated from him, who is by
nature a kinsman and a friend. There is no nature which is inferior to
art, for the arts imitate the natures of things. But if this is
so, that nature, which is the most perfect and the most comprehensive of
all natures, cannot fall short of the skill of art. Now, all
arts do the inferior things for the sake of the superior. Therefore the universal
nature does so too, And indeed, hence is the origin of justice,
and injustice the other virtues have their foundation. For justice will not be observed
if we either care for middle things things indifferent, or are easily deceived and
careless and changeable. If the things do not come to thee, the pursuits
and avoidances of which disturb the still in a manner, thou goest to them.
Let then thy judgment about them be at rest, and they will remain
quiet, and thou wilt not be seen either pursuing or avoiding. The spherical
form of the soul maintains its figure when he is neither extended toward any object,
nor contracted inwards, nor dispersed, nor sink'st down, but is illuminated
by light by which it sees the truth, the truth of all things,
and the truth that is in itself. Suppose any man shall despise me,
let him look to that himself. But I will look to this, that
I be not discovered doing or saying anything deserving of contempt. Shall any man
hate me, let him look to it. But I will be mild and
benevolent towards every man, and ready to show even him his mistake, not
reproachfully, nor yet as making a display of my endurance, but nobly and
honestly, like the great Phocion, unless indeed he only assumed it. For
the interior parts ought to be such, and a man ought to be seen
by the gods, neither dissatisfied with anything, nor complaining, for what evil
is it to thee? If thou art now doing what is agreeable to thy
own nature, and art satisfied with that which, at this moment is suitable
to the nature or the universe, since thou art a human being placed at
thy post in order that what is for the common advantage may be done in
some way, men despise one another and flatter one another, and men wished
to raise themselves above one another and crouched before one another. How unsound and
insincere is he who says, I have determined to deal with THEE in a
fair way? What art out doing? Man? There is no occasion to
give this notice. It will soon show itself by acts. The voice ought
to be plainly written on the forehead, such as a man's character is.
He immediately shows it in his eyes, just as he who is beloved forthwith
reads everything in the eyes of lovers. The man who is honest and good
ought to be exactly like a man who smells strong, so that the bystander,
as soon as he comes near him, must smell, whether he choose
or not. But the affectation of simplicity is like a crooked stick. Nothing
is more disgraceful than a wolfish friendship. Avoid this most of all. The
good and simple and benevolence. Show all these things in the eyes, and
there is no mistaking as to living in the best way. This power is
in the soul if it be indifferent to things which are indifferent, and it
will be indifferent if it looks on each of these things separately and altogether,
and if it remembers that not one of them produces in us an opinion about
itself, nor comes to us. But these things remain immovable, and it
is we ourselves who produce the judgments about them, And as we may say,
write them in ourselves, it being in our power not to write them,
and it being in our power if perchance these judgments have imperceptibly got a
mission to our minds, to wipe them out. And if we remember also
that such attention will only be for a short time, and then life will
be at an end. Besides, what trouble is there at all in doing
this? For if these things are according to nature, rejoice in them,
and they will be easy to thee. But if contrary to nature, seek
what is conformable to thy own nature, and stride towards this, even if
it bring no reputation, For every man is allowed to seek his own good.
Consider whence each thing is come, and of what it consists, and
into what it changes, in what kind of a thing it will be when
it is changed, and that it will sustain no harm. If any have
offended against thee, consider first what is my relation to men? And that
we are made for one another. And in another respect, I was made
to be said over them as a ram over the flock, or a bull
over the herd. But examine the matter from first principles. From this,
if all things are not mere atoms, it is nature which orders all things.
If this is so, the inferior things exist for the sake of the
superior, and these for the sake of one another. Second, consider what
kind of men they are, at table, in bed, and so forth,
and particularly under what compulsions in respect of opinions they are, And as
to their acts, consider with what pride they do what they do. Third,
that if men do rightly what they do, we ought not to be
displeased. But if they do not right it is plain that they do so
involuntarily and in ignorance. For as every soul is unwillingly deprived of the truth,
so also it is unwillingly deprived of the power of behaving to each man
according to his deserts. Accordingly, men are pained when they are called unjust,
ungrateful, and greedy, and in a word, wrong doest to their
neighbors. Fourth, consider that thou also doest many things wrong, and that
thou art a man like others. And even if thou dost abstain from certain
faults, still thou hast the disposition to commit them, though either through cowardice,
or concern about reputation, or some such mean motive, thou dost abstain
from such faults. Fifth, consider that thou dost not even understand whether men
or doing wrong or not, For many things are done with a certain reference
to circumstances, And in short, a man must learn a great deal to
enable him to pass a correct judgment on another man's acts. Sixth, consider,
when thou art much vexed or grieved, that man's life is only a
moment, and after a short time we are all laid out dead. Seventh,
that it is not men's acts which disturb us, for those acts have
their foundation in men's ruling principles, but it is our own opinions which disturb
us. Take away these opinions, then, and resolve to dismiss thy judgment
about an act as if it were something grievous, and thy anger is gone.
How then, shall I take away these opinions by reflecting that no wrongful
act of another brings shame on THEE, far less that which is shameful is
alone bad. Thou also must of necessity many things wrong, and become a
robber and everything else. Eighth, consider how much more pain is brought on
us by the anger and vexation caused by such acts than by the acts themselves
at which we are angry and vexed. Ninth, consider that a good disposition
is invincible if it be genuine and not an affected smile in acting a part.
For what will the most violent man do to THEE if thou continuest to
be of a kind disposition towards him, and if, as opportunity offers,
thou gently admonishest him and calmly correctest his errors at the very time when he
is trying to do THEE harm, saying not so, my child. We
are constituted by nature for something else. I shall certainly not be injured.
But thou art injuring thyself, my child, and show him with gentle tact
and by general principles, that this is so, and that even bees do
not do as he does, nor any animals which are formed by nature to
be gregarious. And thou must not do this, neither with any double meaning,
nor in the way of reproach, but affectionately and without any rancor in
thy soul. And not as if thou wert lecturing him, nor yet that
any bystander may admire, but either when he is alone and if others are
present. Remember these nine rules as if thou hadst received them as a gift
from the muses, and begin at last to be a man while thou livest.
But thou must equally avoid flattering men and being vexed at them, for
both are unsocial and lead to harm. And let this truth be present to
thee in the excitement of anger, that to be moved by passion is not
manly, but that mildness and gentleness, as they are more agreeable to human
nature, so also are they more manly. And he who possesses these qualities
possesses strength, nerves, and courage, and not the man whose subject of
fits of passion and discontent. For in the same degree in which a man's
mind is nearer to freedom from all passion, in the same degree also is
it nearer to strength. And as the sense of pain is a characteristic of
weakness, so also is anger. For he who yields to pain and he
who yields to anger, both are wounded, and both submit. But if
thou wilt receive also a tenth present from the leader of the muses, Apollo.
And it is this that to expect bad men not to do wrong is
madness. For he who expects this desires an impossibility. But to allow men
to behave so to others, to expect them not to do thee any wrong
is irrational and tyrannical. There are four principal aberrations of the superior faculty,
against which thou shouldst be constantly on thy guard, And when thou hadst detected
them, thou shouldst wipe them out, and say, on each occasion,
thus this thought is not necessary. This tends to destroy a social union.
This which thou art going to say, comes not from the real thoughts,
for thou shouldst consider it among the most absurd of things for a man not
to speak from his real thoughts. But the fourth is when thou shalt reproach
thyself for anything, For this is an evidence of the diviner part within Thee
being overpowered and yielding to the less honorable and to the perishable part the body,
and to its gross pleasures. Thy aerial part and all the fiery parts
which are mingled in thee, though by nature they have an upward tendency,
still in obedience to the disposition of the universe. They are overpowered here in
the compound mass the body, and also the whole of the earthy part in
THEE and the watery though their tendency is downwards, still a based up and
occupy a position which is not the natural one. In this manner, then
the elemental parts obey the Universal, For when they have been fixed in any
place perforce, they remain there until again the Universal shall sound the signal for
dissolution. Is it not then strange that thy intelligent part only should be disobedient
and discontented with its own place, and yet no force is imposed upon it,
But only those things which are conformable to its nature. Still it does
not submit, but is carried in the opposite direction, for the movement towards
injustice and intemperance, and to anger and grief and fear, as nothing else
than the act of one who deviates from nature. And also when the ruling
faculty is discontented with anything that happens, then two it deserts its post.
For it is constituted for piety and reverence towards the gods, no less than
for justice. For these qualities also are comprehended under the generic term of contentment
with the constitution of things, And indeed they are prior to acts of justice.
He who has not one and always the same object in life cannot be
one and the same all through his life. But what I have said is
not enough unless this also has added what this object ought to be. For
as there is not the same opinion about all the things which, in some
way or other are considered by the majority to be good, but only about
some certain things, that is, things which concern the common interest, so
also we ought to propose to ourselves an object which shall be of a common
kind, social and political. For he who directs all his own efforts to
this object will make all his acts alike, and thus will always be the
same. Think of the country mouse and of the town mouse, and of
the alarm and trepidation of the town mouse. Socrates used to call the opinions
of the many by the name of lemie bugbears to frighten children. The Lacedaemonians,
at their public spectacles used to set seats in the shade for strangers,
but themselves sat down anywhere. Socrates excused himself to Perdicas for not going to
him, saying, it is because I would not perish by the worst of
all ends, that is, I would not receive a favor and then be
unable to return it. In the writings of the Ephesians there was this precept
constantly to think of someone of the men of former times who practice virtue.
The Pythagoreans bid us in the morning look to the heavens, that we may
be reminded of those bodies which continually do the same things and in the same
manner perform their work, and also be reminded of their purity and nudity.
For there is no vail over a star. Consider what a man Socrates was
when he dressed himself in a skin, after Zuntippe had taken his cloak and
gone out, And what Socrates said to his friends, who are ashamed of
him, and drew back from him when they saw him dressed. Thus,
neither in writing nor in reading, wilt thou be able to lay down rules
for others, before thou shalt have learned to obey rules thyself. Much more
is this so in life a slave thou art. Free speech is not for
thee, and my heart laughed within Odyssey nine for thirteen, and virtue they
will curse speaking harsh words. He Siad works in Days one eighty four.
To look for the fig in winter is a madman's act, such as he
who looks for his child when is no longer allowed Epictetus three twenty four eighty
seven. When a man kisses his child, said Epictetus, he should whisper
to himself tomorrow perchance thou wilt die. But those are words of bad omen.
No word is a word of bad omen, said Epictetus, which expresses
any work of nature, or if it is so, it is also a
word of bad omen. To speak of the ears of corn being reaped Epictetus
three twenty four eighty eight, the unripe grape, the ripe bunch, the
dried grape. All our changes not into nothing, but into something which exists
not yet Epictetus three twenty four. No man can rob us of our free
will Epictetus three twenty two one o five. Epictetus also said, a man
must discover an art or rules. With respect to giving his assent, and
in respect to his movements, he must be careful that they be made,
with regard to circumstances, that they be consistent with social interests that they have.
Regard to the value of the object, And as to sensual desire,
he should altogether keep away from it, and as to avoidance, he should
not show it with respect to any of the things which are not in our
power. The dispute, then, he said, is not about any common
matter, but about being mad or not. Socrates used to say, what
do you want souls of rational men or irrational souls of rational men? Of
what rational men sound or unsound sound? Why then do you not seek for
them because we have them? Why then do you fight and quarrel