WEBVTT 1 00:00:00.200 --> 00:00:05.480 Sixty Seconds of Service. This sixty seconds of Service is presented by T Mobile. 2 00:00:05.639 --> 00:00:10.720 T Mobile offers exclusive discounts for veteran and military families and are proud supporters 3 00:00:10.759 --> 00:00:14.599 of the National Defense Network. Visit t mobile dot com to learn more about 4 00:00:14.599 --> 00:00:19.199 how they support our military community. Near San Diego, California, Imperial Beach, 5 00:00:19.320 --> 00:00:22.960 veterans and active military personnel now have a new way to help shape the 6 00:00:23.000 --> 00:00:27.399 way their city addresses issues affecting their population. Earlier this month, the city 7 00:00:27.399 --> 00:00:32.359 Council approved the creation of the Veterans and Military Affairs Committee and outlined its duties. 8 00:00:32.719 --> 00:00:36.840 We have a very vibrant and active veteran and military community within our community, 9 00:00:36.880 --> 00:00:40.799 said Mayor Palomo Agiar. I think having this committee will help us just 10 00:00:40.840 --> 00:00:44.439 guide our work better. Agiar, whom voters elected as mayor last year, 11 00:00:44.759 --> 00:00:49.520 introduced the idea of establishing such a committee after campaigning and hearing across the board 12 00:00:49.600 --> 00:00:52.759 there is a need for that. The coastal city of about twenty six thousand 13 00:00:52.799 --> 00:00:56.960 people is home to more than sixteen hundred veterans. For more great veteran stories, 14 00:00:57.240 --> 00:01:12.719 just go to National Defense Network dot com. Welcome to Veterans Chronicles. 15 00:01:14.000 --> 00:01:18.879 I'm Greg Corumbas. Our guest in this edition is Ernie Savage. He is 16 00:01:18.920 --> 00:01:23.400 a US Army veteran of the Vietnam War and served in the Battle of Landing 17 00:01:23.519 --> 00:01:27.000 Zone X Ray as part of the larger Battle of Aya Drang and Ernie, 18 00:01:27.079 --> 00:01:30.400 it's a great honor to have you with us, thank you very much. 19 00:01:30.480 --> 00:01:34.040 Should point out that Ernie served in the first Battalion of the seventh Cavalry in 20 00:01:34.120 --> 00:01:41.480 the first Air Cavalry Division, which was a groundbreaking unit in the Vietnam War. 21 00:01:41.519 --> 00:01:44.200 And we'll talk more about that in a little bit. But Ernie, 22 00:01:44.200 --> 00:01:47.879 where were you born and raised? I was born in Alabama, Race Stair 23 00:01:47.920 --> 00:01:51.599 as well. And had there been a history of military service in your family? 24 00:01:52.159 --> 00:01:55.760 Yes, I had three brothers. You served in the Marine Corps, 25 00:01:55.799 --> 00:02:00.120 Air Force, and Army. You guys covered the branches pretty well. Oh 26 00:02:00.239 --> 00:02:04.840 yeah, When did you join the service and why did you choose the Army. 27 00:02:05.799 --> 00:02:08.719 I joined in sixty nineteen sixty two. I was originally going to go 28 00:02:08.719 --> 00:02:14.000 into Air Force with the guys that are always going with couldn't pass the tests, 29 00:02:14.199 --> 00:02:17.680 so we all went in the Army together. Where did you do your 30 00:02:17.800 --> 00:02:22.360 training? I did my basic training in Fort Raley, Kansas. At what 31 00:02:22.439 --> 00:02:28.240 point did you have the opportunity to serve in this emerging Air Cavalry division. 32 00:02:29.159 --> 00:02:31.840 I served in Korea is sixty two sixty three and when I came out of 33 00:02:32.080 --> 00:02:39.560 Korea, I came to Fort Beating and joined the leveled air assault tests that 34 00:02:39.639 --> 00:02:44.759 sport. They were tests in the aeros concept for the Army, explained the 35 00:02:44.800 --> 00:02:50.759 concept your concept was and still riding around wheel retract vehicles or jumping out of 36 00:02:50.759 --> 00:02:54.639 the air and walking. We were from point A to point me on helicopters, 37 00:02:55.360 --> 00:03:00.800 so the transports it very quickly. You get up and move out quickly, 38 00:03:00.120 --> 00:03:06.280 and you wouldn't you were would more out for walking. Half of we 39 00:03:06.360 --> 00:03:08.599 did walk quite a bit. People thought we flew, but we did do 40 00:03:08.840 --> 00:03:13.960 quite a bit of walking. How did you train for that before you were 41 00:03:13.960 --> 00:03:17.280 in combat? When you're here in the States testing this concept, what does 42 00:03:17.319 --> 00:03:22.520 that look like? Well, basic infantry training on the ground is the same. 43 00:03:23.000 --> 00:03:28.000 You know, your train is your your squad and platoon company level type 44 00:03:28.039 --> 00:03:31.280 of operation BADAIA level top orporation. Do your concept with with the air cowb 45 00:03:31.280 --> 00:03:37.360 which that you moved everybody by a helicopter and in our test we tested against 46 00:03:37.360 --> 00:03:43.080 the age second airborne into four brag and uh, of course stay again jumps 47 00:03:43.080 --> 00:03:46.319 out of a plane. They had to walk and we could move from point 48 00:03:46.360 --> 00:03:50.319 A to point B to snap of your finger, so we would always show 49 00:03:50.400 --> 00:03:53.439 up where we're supposed to be. So we gave them a pretty hard time 50 00:03:53.919 --> 00:03:57.919 tests. So were you trying to perfect how quickly you could unload and load 51 00:03:58.000 --> 00:04:00.800 and take off and land and that sort of thing. Yeah, you could. 52 00:04:00.840 --> 00:04:03.560 You could go into places where you know, where wheel vehicles couldn't go, 53 00:04:03.919 --> 00:04:08.400 and uh, later on the Vietnam just played off because you know, 54 00:04:08.520 --> 00:04:12.280 you could fly over to the jungle and drop down where the enemy was hiding. 55 00:04:12.719 --> 00:04:15.680 Uh, and it would be very difficult to determine where you were coming 56 00:04:15.720 --> 00:04:20.120 from or when you were coming and the same with that where it worked as 57 00:04:20.160 --> 00:04:24.920 well. In the tests. What kind of helicopters were you using and how 58 00:04:24.959 --> 00:04:30.199 many guys could fit on there? We were using a Huet UH one helicopter. 59 00:04:30.480 --> 00:04:33.160 You could pretty well hit a squad on there with the equipment. And 60 00:04:33.199 --> 00:04:36.639 that depends also on the weather. It was really hot, you Uh, 61 00:04:36.800 --> 00:04:42.120 that helicopter couldn't pick up as much weight as it could if it was cooler. 62 00:04:42.600 --> 00:04:45.639 But you could normally put a nine man squad on there with equipment. 63 00:04:46.319 --> 00:04:49.040 All that temperature difference is good to know when it comes to Vietnam because, 64 00:04:49.120 --> 00:04:53.160 oh yeah, a couple of times we ran in trouble with that. When 65 00:04:53.160 --> 00:04:58.199 did you first deploy to Vietnam. We've deployed to Vietnam in August of nineteen 66 00:04:58.240 --> 00:05:03.360 sixty five. We went over by ship. We went on the US in 67 00:05:03.519 --> 00:05:10.079 this Rows. Everybody that was owned that ship called it the Rembling Rows because 68 00:05:10.120 --> 00:05:14.800 when we went across the Pacific, we had to go around a hurricane, 69 00:05:15.480 --> 00:05:18.399 so we were like an extra week or so, had to take a d 70 00:05:18.560 --> 00:05:23.839 tour. So where did you land in Vietnam and where did you go from 71 00:05:23.879 --> 00:05:28.439 there? We landed Quantam Bay, Vietnam. That's where most of the ship 72 00:05:28.600 --> 00:05:31.240 stuff were coming in at the time, and then we went from there to 73 00:05:31.279 --> 00:05:36.560 an k which was our base count. What were your early assignments? The 74 00:05:36.600 --> 00:05:41.279 first thing we did. We got there, and of course we the area 75 00:05:41.279 --> 00:05:45.879 had already been selected. It had been sung clearing and designated where the units 76 00:05:45.879 --> 00:05:48.120 would go. But other than that, it was bear land. So we 77 00:05:48.160 --> 00:05:53.759 had to go in there and pretty well clean up. We were going to 78 00:05:53.800 --> 00:05:57.639 set our tents and stuff up, and we ended up saying in two ben 79 00:05:57.759 --> 00:06:01.879 tents. We were in two intents two or three months there, and the 80 00:06:01.959 --> 00:06:05.439 first couple of days we're there, it rained really hard and we learned very 81 00:06:05.519 --> 00:06:10.360 quickly. You got it, put trainings, ditches, surrounders in the washing 82 00:06:10.720 --> 00:06:15.160 everything you had down the hill. So we went in the background and set 83 00:06:15.199 --> 00:06:20.360 up two mantians. You mentioned the frequent rain there and heavy rain. What 84 00:06:20.519 --> 00:06:25.680 else did you notice about the climate? The terrain as soon as you got 85 00:06:25.720 --> 00:06:28.759 there? What the monsoons is of course when you have the most rain, 86 00:06:28.839 --> 00:06:33.160 but you'd have rain frequently. The temperature was very hot, very humid. 87 00:06:33.439 --> 00:06:36.600 And what was the land like a lot of vegetation, right, a lot 88 00:06:36.639 --> 00:06:40.959 of vegetation, but depending on what area was operating in, you had a 89 00:06:41.000 --> 00:06:44.639 lot of RoCE petties. On the areas that was not jungle type, and 90 00:06:44.680 --> 00:06:48.000 there's flatter land there were ross petties, so we operated a lot around ross 91 00:06:48.000 --> 00:06:55.360 petties and then do the double canopy jungles. But uh, all the jungles 92 00:06:55.360 --> 00:07:00.360 we operated dinners was fairly clear underneath the kennopy because the trees were so high 93 00:07:00.639 --> 00:07:08.720 and they well blocked out sound. Then to the underbrush. The fighting that 94 00:07:08.720 --> 00:07:13.040 we're going to be talking about at x Ray is November of nineteen sixty five. 95 00:07:13.120 --> 00:07:15.439 But give us a little bit of the background that led up to this 96 00:07:15.519 --> 00:07:20.519 mission. What was happening that your commanders felt that you needed to respond there 97 00:07:20.959 --> 00:07:27.240 well, play me on special Force account was under siege by the North Fifties 98 00:07:27.360 --> 00:07:30.839 Army. It was basically a siege. They didn't really want to take an 99 00:07:31.240 --> 00:07:38.120 outpost, but they wanted to ambush to reinforcements coming in. And basically what 100 00:07:38.160 --> 00:07:43.560 happened on there there was a make arvenue. The Republic Army reperfect with Vietnam 101 00:07:43.759 --> 00:07:47.639 Army. Army unit moved in, but it had American advisors with it who 102 00:07:47.759 --> 00:07:53.360 knew basically what the proy was that they were pulling, and so they were 103 00:07:53.360 --> 00:07:57.519 ready for artillery and air support. And when it's Throng do An Bush did 104 00:07:57.560 --> 00:08:03.160 pretty well wiped out to the ambushing units. And we knew about that and 105 00:08:03.319 --> 00:08:07.839 UH before we went into the x Ray itself, we were in a security 106 00:08:09.560 --> 00:08:13.800 of the UH, the Brigade headquarters UH for a couple of days, and 107 00:08:13.519 --> 00:08:18.839 then they moved from there to play meet Count UH where we stayed to go 108 00:08:18.879 --> 00:08:22.120 into l Z X ray. So we'd been out about a week or sol 109 00:08:22.279 --> 00:08:26.879 training patrolling, UH before we win the X trade. So explain the plan. 110 00:08:28.519 --> 00:08:31.320 The plan basically from what I understood for the operation orders was, you 111 00:08:31.360 --> 00:08:35.960 know, we knew that the NVA was somewhere out there that didn't know exactly 112 00:08:35.000 --> 00:08:39.679 where they were. We knew they were they were withdrawing from their tackle play 113 00:08:39.759 --> 00:08:43.000 meeting. We found out later though, there were a lot of new units 114 00:08:43.000 --> 00:08:48.159 that came in we weren't we weren't aware of. So we were more or 115 00:08:48.240 --> 00:08:52.720 less like a search destroyer type operation. We were going into the area. 116 00:08:52.759 --> 00:08:56.840 They talked to her where they were located at. The NVA was located there, 117 00:08:56.840 --> 00:09:01.799 but we wasn't sure exactly what was going on. It was because tell 118 00:09:01.840 --> 00:09:05.240 us a little bit about your leader, Lieutenant Colonel hal Moore. He's a 119 00:09:05.360 --> 00:09:11.480 legend now, but from all the air Calf guys that I've spoken with, 120 00:09:11.159 --> 00:09:16.720 his qualities were evident long long ago. So what made him such a great 121 00:09:16.799 --> 00:09:20.600 leader. He was a great leader technically and technically proficient, a very good 122 00:09:20.639 --> 00:09:24.360 personality. You get right down in the French as you're talking at your level. 123 00:09:26.039 --> 00:09:31.000 His leadership was superb. He'd been to a lot of things that improved 124 00:09:33.240 --> 00:09:39.879 training for us and the leadership training. Specifically, he had one program to 125 00:09:41.039 --> 00:09:45.679 call for drop out your dead. Basically he could walk up to a leader 126 00:09:45.720 --> 00:09:48.919 and kill him, so you're dead. And then you know there had to 127 00:09:48.960 --> 00:09:52.440 be somebody prepared to jump in that position, because once you did, of 128 00:09:52.519 --> 00:09:56.399 course you keep saying any thing. We're always trained from the lawyer's level up 129 00:09:56.399 --> 00:10:00.600 at least one or two levels up that we could take over if we had 130 00:10:00.679 --> 00:10:03.320 to. Well, that turned out to be a very good idea. Well 131 00:10:03.399 --> 00:10:07.000 we did, yeah, one level, we sure he did. Okay, 132 00:10:07.080 --> 00:10:11.960 So let's get to that day now, this is mid November of nineteen sixty 133 00:10:11.039 --> 00:10:18.399 five. Explain what happened as you landed and began there. Well, first 134 00:10:18.399 --> 00:10:22.559 of all, when we came from security for Brigade, we flew into play 135 00:10:22.639 --> 00:10:26.240 Me Camp, which had been on the siege. We were flew in there 136 00:10:26.279 --> 00:10:30.159 on what she knew, helicopters, and when we got off the helicopters there 137 00:10:30.240 --> 00:10:33.279 was a big pile of trash which we thought was shresh and when we walked 138 00:10:33.320 --> 00:10:39.480 pil we realized that it was Vietnam vieing these army soldiers who had been pulled 139 00:10:39.519 --> 00:10:43.320 who had been police up out of the wire and around the camp had been 140 00:10:43.399 --> 00:10:48.240 piled up in position to have a mess burial. So that is self, 141 00:10:48.320 --> 00:10:52.320 you know, alertic, you hate. Things are a little different what you 142 00:10:52.399 --> 00:10:56.039 were used to because the only thing we had come in contact with wore was 143 00:10:56.120 --> 00:11:00.960 the grittles and the black and the black pajamasus. These guys were there were 144 00:11:01.000 --> 00:11:07.080 professionals. When we flew out of there on a Huey helicopters, I can 145 00:11:07.159 --> 00:11:11.240 remember as we approached the l Z, I could see the smoke coming off 146 00:11:11.320 --> 00:11:15.240 of it because the huge When we first fly like that, we fled at 147 00:11:15.279 --> 00:11:18.360 a higher level paybe five thousand feet in the air, and you could see 148 00:11:18.360 --> 00:11:22.000 a long waist. But when you start approaching to the l Z, he 149 00:11:22.159 --> 00:11:28.080 dropped down what would call tree top level and basically kadeer at the tree tops. 150 00:11:28.399 --> 00:11:31.200 You're doing one hundred and sixty knots at the tree tops in training, 151 00:11:31.279 --> 00:11:35.440 you know, every once in a while, the branches would hit the bottom 152 00:11:35.440 --> 00:11:39.559 of the schedule the helicopter, you know, and he was scared the hell 153 00:11:39.600 --> 00:11:43.399 out of her. But going into the l Z, you know, we 154 00:11:43.519 --> 00:11:48.159 weren't too concerned about the limbs because we could see what was going on for 155 00:11:48.519 --> 00:11:52.559 Smoker off the l Z on the prep far. That's Ernie Savage, a 156 00:11:52.720 --> 00:11:56.600 US Army veteran of the Vietnam War and the intense fighting at Landing Zone x 157 00:11:56.720 --> 00:12:03.279 Ray as part of the Battle of Ayadrone in November nineteen sixty five. The 158 00:12:03.399 --> 00:12:07.679 service of Savage and many others in the first Battalion, seventh Cavalry in the 159 00:12:07.759 --> 00:12:13.600 first Air Cavalry Division is immortalized in the book We Were Soldiers Once and Young, 160 00:12:13.159 --> 00:12:16.960 which was later made into a feature film. In just a moment, 161 00:12:18.399 --> 00:12:22.720 mister Savage picks up his story and explains what happened when he landed at x 162 00:12:22.840 --> 00:12:26.360 Ray, how his platoon got cut off from other American forces, and how 163 00:12:26.480 --> 00:12:33.080 he was suddenly thrust into leadership. All that and much more is still ahead. 164 00:12:33.679 --> 00:12:39.919 I'm Greg Corumbus, and this is Veterans Chronicles. This is Veterans Chronicles. 165 00:12:39.159 --> 00:12:43.279 I'm Greg Corumbus. Our guest in this edition is Ernie Savage, a 166 00:12:43.480 --> 00:12:48.879 US Army veteran of the Vietnam War and the intense fighting at Landing Zone x 167 00:12:48.000 --> 00:12:52.840 Ray as part of the Battle of Ayaedrang in November nineteen sixty five. We 168 00:12:54.000 --> 00:12:58.240 now pick up his story as mister Savage describes everything that happened once they arrived 169 00:12:58.480 --> 00:13:03.320 at land Zone X ray. Then when we landed, nothing happened. When 170 00:13:03.360 --> 00:13:07.080 we went in, the machine guns or the door gunners were firing into the 171 00:13:07.639 --> 00:13:11.480 sides of the off the sides of the LC which that was a that was 172 00:13:11.919 --> 00:13:16.120 sop through that, And we jumped out of the helicopter and ran out to 173 00:13:16.200 --> 00:13:20.559 the edges of the of the LZ like you should to secure it. The 174 00:13:20.639 --> 00:13:26.039 helicopters took off and then it was dead silence, not in that thing. 175 00:13:26.559 --> 00:13:31.759 Nobody fired around, nothing really quiet. Nothing was going on at that time. 176 00:13:31.080 --> 00:13:35.519 For about ten to fifteen minutes, I know, we were sitting there 177 00:13:35.759 --> 00:13:39.879 waiting and tour platoons had been sent off towards the mouth, and we were 178 00:13:39.960 --> 00:13:43.159 only one company on the ground at the time, Provo Company John Harron's company 179 00:13:43.840 --> 00:13:48.240 and my patoon was still sort of held back. And the two platoons that 180 00:13:48.279 --> 00:13:54.320 went out made contact with the NVA soldiers coming off a Choupong Mouth. Captain 181 00:13:54.360 --> 00:13:58.039 Harry sent my platoon up to hook up to the right side of the first 182 00:13:58.080 --> 00:14:03.639 platoon. So Lieutenant Harrit got us up and we took off up to cover 183 00:14:03.759 --> 00:14:07.519 the right flank of the first of the first platoon, and by the time 184 00:14:07.559 --> 00:14:15.480 we approached the first platoon, then uhr Herd turned the platoon and chased off. 185 00:14:15.919 --> 00:14:18.759 What I found out later was NVA soldiers. Because I was a trail 186 00:14:18.840 --> 00:14:22.799 squad, so I didn't really know what was going on up front. I 187 00:14:22.879 --> 00:14:26.039 knew that we were going where we shouldn't be going, and we were going 188 00:14:26.919 --> 00:14:31.440 away from the company itself, And so we went up five six hundred yards 189 00:14:31.559 --> 00:14:37.639 up there and uh as to come up on a little no we run head 190 00:14:37.720 --> 00:14:43.799 on into a unit coming down the valley in Va was probably an NVA battalion. 191 00:14:43.279 --> 00:14:48.360 We were sure, we didn't know what it was. The first two 192 00:14:48.399 --> 00:14:52.120 squads went down and took him under the fire. And I was a trail 193 00:14:52.200 --> 00:14:58.159 squad and me and machine guns flanked our front, went out front and flanked 194 00:14:58.440 --> 00:15:03.279 the enemy. We actually flanked the enemy and fired on them before they fired 195 00:15:03.320 --> 00:15:07.039 on us. And then you had to. Then I looked and I seen 196 00:15:07.200 --> 00:15:11.200 like two batoons of NBA flanking trying to flank us to the right. There 197 00:15:11.320 --> 00:15:16.039 wasn't firing, they were just moving quickly to the right, trying to get 198 00:15:16.080 --> 00:15:20.480 into our floint and about that time the machine gun we had two machine guns 199 00:15:20.720 --> 00:15:24.919 who had set up off to my right flank. They started firing and we 200 00:15:26.080 --> 00:15:31.000 fired, and my squad far maneuvered back to where the batoon was at and 201 00:15:31.320 --> 00:15:35.360 just got burried up with the platoon when the main part of the force hit 202 00:15:35.480 --> 00:15:41.960 us and started to fire, and we ended up losing the platoon leader, 203 00:15:41.559 --> 00:15:50.279 platoon sergeant, weapon, squad leader, artillery, fol mortar fo all went 204 00:15:50.360 --> 00:15:54.879 in by the first five minutes on the battle and it was a very intense 205 00:15:56.679 --> 00:16:03.200 fired back and forth there for about twenty to thirty minutes initially to and the 206 00:16:03.480 --> 00:16:07.960 morefold guy had come around to my flak and he got hit and killed out, 207 00:16:07.000 --> 00:16:10.919 hit in the head. He had a radio. He had dropped the 208 00:16:10.960 --> 00:16:15.200 hands of the radio and he was trying to get artillery in. I tried 209 00:16:15.240 --> 00:16:18.120 to reach over the log and get it, but when I did that, 210 00:16:18.080 --> 00:16:22.960 all kinds of fires started hitting the log. Warder in view was faring at 211 00:16:22.000 --> 00:16:26.720 me, and I had to reach under the log. I reached under the 212 00:16:26.799 --> 00:16:30.080 log and pulled a handset and started just the R two rate and I adjusted 213 00:16:30.120 --> 00:16:34.840 the artillery around us, and all fire is going on at this time back 214 00:16:34.919 --> 00:16:40.720 and forth, very tense. It was so loud you could hardly think clearly. 215 00:16:41.600 --> 00:16:45.519 There's so much ammunition being fired out. And I finally trying to get 216 00:16:45.559 --> 00:16:49.080 the artillery adjusted in. And when I was given to a gun target line, 217 00:16:49.600 --> 00:16:56.799 not a gun observer target line, they couldn't adjust that, but I 218 00:16:56.840 --> 00:17:02.639 could hear the archery firing and the distance. So I went to a gun 219 00:17:02.840 --> 00:17:06.640 target line, which means I know where you're firing from, and I know 220 00:17:06.680 --> 00:17:11.000 where you're firing to, and my adjustice will be from that. And so 221 00:17:11.359 --> 00:17:15.720 I made the adjustibation on the gun target line and quickly got the artillery and 222 00:17:15.799 --> 00:17:21.960 around us, and I called it in very close around the where we were 223 00:17:21.960 --> 00:17:26.720 at, so close one time that when they fired for effect, a couple 224 00:17:26.759 --> 00:17:30.680 of rounds fell on the opposite side of where they were firing at. The 225 00:17:30.759 --> 00:17:34.039 main thing with the artillery saves us their and we kept the artillery going all 226 00:17:34.279 --> 00:17:41.319 afternoon. Uh. And I set up target reference points all around the perimeter, 227 00:17:42.000 --> 00:17:47.000 and the log those at the artillery site. So later on when I 228 00:17:47.079 --> 00:17:51.400 had to call for artillery, I would just call for that target reference point 229 00:17:51.720 --> 00:17:55.079 and I could get a fire for effect. That's all the gun fired at 230 00:17:55.119 --> 00:18:00.880 one time on that point. So we fought more that afternoon, and then 231 00:18:00.920 --> 00:18:06.359 it started backing off of the bent around five o'clock in the afternoon. We 232 00:18:06.400 --> 00:18:10.839 were still getting people fired back and forth, but the most intense part took 233 00:18:10.920 --> 00:18:14.400 place for probably thirty five to forty minutes, you know. But then we 234 00:18:14.519 --> 00:18:18.319 had killed a whole lot of them, and did also killed a whole lot 235 00:18:18.359 --> 00:18:22.839 of us. But they took by artillery that I ain't known because the l 236 00:18:22.960 --> 00:18:29.359 Z was under at that But the whole time I never remember hearing the artillery 237 00:18:29.480 --> 00:18:32.880 firing on the l S or the small arts far from the l Z. 238 00:18:33.079 --> 00:18:37.519 I guess because the artillery was so close that it it hurt my ears. 239 00:18:37.880 --> 00:18:41.119 I know I can already hear it now anyway, but I think it just 240 00:18:41.279 --> 00:18:45.960 forty drowned it out everything I was hearing other than right around me. But 241 00:18:45.119 --> 00:18:48.680 during the night they run into us a couple of times jurer the night, 242 00:18:48.960 --> 00:18:52.400 either deliberately or by accident. There was a short firefight and they would back 243 00:18:52.440 --> 00:18:57.079 off because I would have called the artillion. And then I know that a 244 00:18:57.200 --> 00:19:02.759 major unit was rousing down the bottom about three o'clock in the morning, and 245 00:19:02.839 --> 00:19:07.160 they stopped right at one of my refuge boards on the target reference points, 246 00:19:07.519 --> 00:19:10.400 and I called a fire for effect on that, and I think they fired 247 00:19:10.440 --> 00:19:14.519 twelve guns on that. They fired a lot of artillery, so they killed 248 00:19:14.519 --> 00:19:19.000 a lot of the folks that was coming down the autumn. And they had 249 00:19:19.039 --> 00:19:25.319 tried to reach us a couple of times the afternoon the day before. They 250 00:19:25.359 --> 00:19:27.680 weren't able to get anywhere. In years, I never seen them, never 251 00:19:27.720 --> 00:19:32.359 heard them, but they lost a few people trying to get to us. 252 00:19:32.680 --> 00:19:36.759 I do remember that. The next morning they called and said they were coming 253 00:19:36.799 --> 00:19:40.920 in. I think the battalion of the first fifth Calve had came in, 254 00:19:41.119 --> 00:19:45.359 and some of the secondest seventh calv had came in, and then they left 255 00:19:45.359 --> 00:19:48.359 the Elsie and came up and caut us. They got us about eleven o'clock 256 00:19:51.319 --> 00:19:56.000 the next morning, about eleven o'clock, and uh, we had lost eight 257 00:19:56.119 --> 00:20:02.680 ki's out of the patuone between the twenty seven people there. All of the 258 00:20:02.759 --> 00:20:08.960 twenty seven people, one was a company medic, one was an artillery for 259 00:20:10.240 --> 00:20:15.279 reserver, one was a mortar observer. So three of them didn't even belong 260 00:20:15.319 --> 00:20:18.240 to pratoon. So we had a fight to four for only twenty four people. 261 00:20:19.440 --> 00:20:23.000 Basically what was doing well. Everybody's fighting, but only twenty four people 262 00:20:23.400 --> 00:20:30.359 actually belonged to the platoon. But they gay got us about eleven o'clock and 263 00:20:30.480 --> 00:20:36.319 it took just about the whole company to move all of the wounding and dead 264 00:20:36.400 --> 00:20:40.920 back to theos. That's Ernie Savage, a US Army veteran of the Vietnam 265 00:20:40.960 --> 00:20:45.680 War and the intense fighting at Landing Zone X Ray as part of the Battle 266 00:20:45.720 --> 00:20:51.440 of Ayadrang in November nineteen sixty five. Coming up, mister Savage reflects on 267 00:20:51.559 --> 00:20:53.839 what it was like to take command of the platoon while under heavy fire, 268 00:20:55.559 --> 00:21:00.839 making critical decisions while surrounded by the enemy, and why he was nervous before 269 00:21:00.960 --> 00:21:07.279 combat but not once the fighting began. I'm Greg Corumbus and this is Veterans 270 00:21:07.359 --> 00:21:12.480 Chronicles. This is Veterans' Chronicles. I'm Greg Corumbus. Our guest in this 271 00:21:12.720 --> 00:21:18.839 edition is Ernie Savage, a US Army veteran of the Vietnam War and the 272 00:21:18.960 --> 00:21:22.480 intense fighting at Landing Zone X Ray as part of the Battle of Ayadrang in 273 00:21:22.599 --> 00:21:27.920 November nineteen sixty five. We just heard mister Savage explain how his platoon was 274 00:21:29.039 --> 00:21:33.359 finally able to rejoin American forces after many hours of being surrounded by the enemy 275 00:21:34.240 --> 00:21:38.200 coming up. In this final segment of our conversation, mister Savage tells us 276 00:21:38.200 --> 00:21:44.720 about returning to the fight almost immediately after his platoon rejoined American forces, and 277 00:21:45.079 --> 00:21:48.240 how he trained fresh troops for the Air Cavalry after many of the others got 278 00:21:48.279 --> 00:21:53.000 to go home. But first we'll hear how he realized he was thrust into 279 00:21:53.039 --> 00:21:57.400 command, what he was thinking as he took command of his platoon under extremely 280 00:21:57.480 --> 00:22:03.279 stressful circumstances, and why he wasn't all that nervous once the fighting began. 281 00:22:03.240 --> 00:22:07.599 No, I found out out when they went down. The opportunitier died right 282 00:22:07.680 --> 00:22:11.400 behind me. The Patuta charger died right behind me, The FO died right 283 00:22:11.480 --> 00:22:15.599 in front of me, and the artiller the fort was behind me. He 284 00:22:15.759 --> 00:22:19.279 was hitting the head, didn't kill him, but he incapacitated. He knocked 285 00:22:19.319 --> 00:22:22.440 him out. He was out just a BYuT the whole time we were there, 286 00:22:22.559 --> 00:22:26.559 so I knew everybody was dead. The only ones I didn't know for 287 00:22:26.680 --> 00:22:30.440 sure was dead was the weapon squad would have hurt because both of those guns 288 00:22:30.720 --> 00:22:36.319 had fired. I guess all the AMMO and then when they quit fire, 289 00:22:36.480 --> 00:22:40.480 they were overrun and everybody down there was killed. But I didn't know that 290 00:22:40.640 --> 00:22:44.279 at the time, So you knew that you were in charge. Then I 291 00:22:44.359 --> 00:22:48.119 knew I was in charge as soon as I grabbed that radio. When the 292 00:22:48.440 --> 00:22:51.880 FO went down in front of me, I knew the lieutenant was already down, 293 00:22:52.160 --> 00:22:56.440 and I knew the platoon charges had been hit, but he was He 294 00:22:56.519 --> 00:22:59.720 could still talk, but he couldn't do very much. And the canade came 295 00:22:59.799 --> 00:23:03.640 in and roll right eg next is back that killed him. And so you 296 00:23:03.759 --> 00:23:08.319 mentioned earlier how you had trained to be ready in case something like this happened. 297 00:23:10.119 --> 00:23:12.799 I don't know if you could necessarily train for this particular situation though, 298 00:23:12.960 --> 00:23:18.240 So were you basing your decisions on training on instinct based on the situation? 299 00:23:18.480 --> 00:23:23.599 How are you deciding what should happen next? All of the book, while 300 00:23:23.599 --> 00:23:27.240 you were talking about the situation and your training, it all comes in. 301 00:23:29.000 --> 00:23:33.240 When you get an intense battle like that, your training takes over, your 302 00:23:33.319 --> 00:23:37.839 drenaling gets high, your fear is basically could go. And my experience in 303 00:23:37.960 --> 00:23:45.000 Vietnam was you're afraid right before it happens, but once it starts you're drenaling 304 00:23:45.039 --> 00:23:52.119 takes over and you're you're more like you're you're not really there, you're outside 305 00:23:52.240 --> 00:23:56.000 looking at what you're doing, and your training takes over and you do what 306 00:23:56.119 --> 00:23:59.359 you we're trained to do. Now, the way that you arranged your men 307 00:23:59.680 --> 00:24:03.839 to pret tacked your position, Ultimately nobody else was killed once you did that. 308 00:24:04.559 --> 00:24:07.079 Was that something you had been trained to do, or was that your 309 00:24:07.200 --> 00:24:11.359 reaction to the situation. Well, first of all, you had two other 310 00:24:11.440 --> 00:24:17.359 squadaders there at the time, and they had their own squads. Two of 311 00:24:17.400 --> 00:24:22.079 those squads were already down in position, as you remember I told you earlier. 312 00:24:22.359 --> 00:24:25.400 They went down in a position and took the enemy on the fire. 313 00:24:25.920 --> 00:24:30.160 And as soon as they realized what was doing, they adjusted their people and 314 00:24:30.319 --> 00:24:36.640 I integrated my people in the complete circle on it, told them to redistribute 315 00:24:36.680 --> 00:24:41.240 ammunition. We took ammunition of all the dead, every grenades and AMMO and 316 00:24:41.319 --> 00:24:48.759 stuff like that, and redirected. We took the signal operator destruction, SOI 317 00:24:48.279 --> 00:24:52.000 we burned it. The reason we burned it because the enemy got a hold 318 00:24:52.079 --> 00:24:56.960 of it, they would be able to read our codes they were going out 319 00:24:56.000 --> 00:25:00.039 on the radio, So we burned it. So I knew that had to 320 00:25:00.079 --> 00:25:03.640 be done, and we did it because we didn't know where we were going 321 00:25:03.720 --> 00:25:07.720 to survive or not as a patune or as anybody. So what kind of 322 00:25:07.759 --> 00:25:14.759 communication did you have? The only communication I had is that one radio that 323 00:25:14.920 --> 00:25:21.920 I was talking to the artillery for deserver and kept your hair as well over 324 00:25:21.960 --> 00:25:25.920 the same frequency. Matter of fact, some guys try to dig in. 325 00:25:26.039 --> 00:25:29.640 The guy next to one of my guys was trying to dig in and he 326 00:25:29.759 --> 00:25:33.599 got about six inches down. You hit like rock and stuff, and I 327 00:25:33.640 --> 00:25:34.799 say, hey, man, let me have your fox. Always say you 328 00:25:36.000 --> 00:25:37.400 have you want to sor you can get it. Doesn't know. I want 329 00:25:37.440 --> 00:25:41.680 to put this damn radio in there so it doesn't get hit, because that's 330 00:25:41.720 --> 00:25:45.680 all we got communicate with. So I put the radio in the hole, 331 00:25:45.799 --> 00:25:48.480 he doug. Now, you mentioned a couple of positions that ran out of 332 00:25:48.519 --> 00:25:56.119 ammunition and the enemy over ran them. How did you manage to have enough 333 00:25:56.160 --> 00:25:59.960 ammunition at your position to hold out the position we're talking about? I will 334 00:26:00.079 --> 00:26:03.039 runners of machine guns. They were separate from us. They were to have 335 00:26:03.240 --> 00:26:07.440 the hill from us, and they actually wanted to provided far fire against the 336 00:26:07.519 --> 00:26:11.480 image. It allowed me to pull my squad back and they stayed in position. 337 00:26:11.599 --> 00:26:15.000 That's why they ended up getting killed. Everybody getting killed. Now far 338 00:26:15.079 --> 00:26:18.559 as AMMO was concerned, we had a lot of ammunition. We had the 339 00:26:18.680 --> 00:26:23.759 old equipment, the M fourteen ammunition pouches for the M fourteen would only hold 340 00:26:23.799 --> 00:26:30.160 two twenty round magazines. For the M sixteen, each palch would hold five 341 00:26:30.799 --> 00:26:34.920 twenty rue magazines, and everybody had two paluchies, so they had at least 342 00:26:34.960 --> 00:26:40.119 ten ten magazines in the pouches, and a lot of them had extra magazines 343 00:26:40.319 --> 00:26:45.200 and grenades in the backpack. So we had ceny AMMO going in. When 344 00:26:45.240 --> 00:26:48.720 the people got killed, we took the ammon reistributed. How much did you 345 00:26:48.799 --> 00:26:52.400 have left when you finally reconnected. We've probably still had a basic load, 346 00:26:52.440 --> 00:26:55.279 but I think it basic loans, like one hundred and twenty rounds At the 347 00:26:55.400 --> 00:26:57.759 time we were each one who had at least three hundred plus. What did 348 00:26:57.799 --> 00:27:02.880 you learn about yourself that day and that night and the men around you? 349 00:27:03.400 --> 00:27:06.559 Well, you always wonder what you would do in a situation like that, 350 00:27:07.359 --> 00:27:10.759 and you just end up doing it, you know. And as far as 351 00:27:10.799 --> 00:27:14.119 all night and the concern your dreaming, our adrenaliness, stayed up all night 352 00:27:14.240 --> 00:27:18.319 basically the whole time we were there, because he was always to thread or 353 00:27:18.359 --> 00:27:21.200 the anybody to be the firing on us, or we knew he was getting 354 00:27:21.240 --> 00:27:25.960 ready to fire on us or attack us. And so I was well trained, 355 00:27:26.359 --> 00:27:29.880 so I knew exactly what to do. And I trained with all those 356 00:27:29.920 --> 00:27:32.880 guys that were up there with me, and I knew they knew what to 357 00:27:32.960 --> 00:27:34.839 do, and I knew that they would do what they were supposed to do. 358 00:27:36.400 --> 00:27:41.440 So I had confidence in myself as far as capabilities concerned, and I 359 00:27:41.519 --> 00:27:45.319 had confidence in the squads, all of them do my opportune. We trained 360 00:27:45.319 --> 00:27:48.480 to get there over a year, year and a half. What did you 361 00:27:48.559 --> 00:27:52.359 do once you reconnected? Once they brought us back, they brought us back 362 00:27:52.400 --> 00:28:00.880 to the ELZ and everybody was either wounded or dead except me and a couple 363 00:28:00.000 --> 00:28:04.640 other guys, and they put us at the battalion headquarters there in the LC 364 00:28:06.359 --> 00:28:08.680 and we stayed about an hour or so like that, and I told the 365 00:28:08.759 --> 00:28:11.359 colonels say, hey, sir, we don't need to be back here. 366 00:28:11.359 --> 00:28:15.480 We need to get back up on the line, you know, because we 367 00:28:15.599 --> 00:28:19.440 felt safer actually over the line, but the back. And he said okay, 368 00:28:19.440 --> 00:28:22.559 if what you won't go ahead? So we were back on the line. 369 00:28:23.279 --> 00:28:26.480 And who did you fold in with if most of your men were injured? 370 00:28:27.559 --> 00:28:32.160 Just me and two other guys there and one one of them got a 371 00:28:32.240 --> 00:28:34.079 machine gun, got up on the line, and the other guys joined the 372 00:28:34.160 --> 00:28:41.079 other rifle one and I was in the ditch behind everybody but the two guys 373 00:28:41.079 --> 00:28:45.559 I had rejoined another patoon. Because that was all of us. There were 374 00:28:45.640 --> 00:28:51.400 just three people out of the whole batoon. They're still a Bravo company still 375 00:28:51.480 --> 00:28:53.960 with Bravo coming you. And then what was that fighting like? Well, 376 00:28:55.799 --> 00:28:57.240 there was a little bit of fighting when we got it in the ditches there. 377 00:28:57.519 --> 00:29:03.480 I think people guys Theyden wounded out there, and I've seen three or 378 00:29:03.519 --> 00:29:07.039 four people running around. They may have been trying to get their buddies something 379 00:29:07.160 --> 00:29:11.400 like that. But there was no major attack on Bravos area, but it 380 00:29:11.519 --> 00:29:17.279 did. I think world Charlie Company was before they had a major attack over 381 00:29:17.319 --> 00:29:22.519 there that night or the next morning. That's when the second sever had taken 382 00:29:22.640 --> 00:29:27.039 the position of Charlie Company, and uh they got attacked by a least the 383 00:29:27.119 --> 00:29:33.240 battalion on that side the next morning. So Bravo Company is doing a little 384 00:29:33.240 --> 00:29:37.039 bit better. Charlie Company is under heavy fire. What happens after that? 385 00:29:37.440 --> 00:29:42.680 What Charlie Company had the company commandity? Charlie Company had hit the day before, 386 00:29:44.440 --> 00:29:47.680 and so the company they came in there was Delta was from a second 387 00:29:47.720 --> 00:29:52.079 to seventh or sister battalion. They moved into Charlie Company's area. Of course, 388 00:29:52.200 --> 00:29:59.160 Charlie Company had a lot of klas and they just shifted to a little 389 00:29:59.200 --> 00:30:03.279 bit and the other and moved in between them. And of course what was 390 00:30:03.359 --> 00:30:07.880 left the charge company was still there, but the major fight was the secretary 391 00:30:07.960 --> 00:30:11.119 sebbnth. But after that, you know, the uh, that was the 392 00:30:11.200 --> 00:30:15.119 day that we pulled out. The next day we pulled out. How did 393 00:30:15.160 --> 00:30:22.359 you go over what had happened? How did you dissect it and learn from 394 00:30:22.400 --> 00:30:25.920 it and figure out what to do the next time you're and I don't think 395 00:30:25.960 --> 00:30:27.359 there's a whole lot of dissect to do to it, you know, and 396 00:30:27.440 --> 00:30:30.079 figure out what you're going to do next time. You realize you know that 397 00:30:30.480 --> 00:30:34.680 the training we had had paid off greatly and that we were still alive, 398 00:30:34.839 --> 00:30:41.599 most of us were still alive. But then we had all those people who 399 00:30:41.680 --> 00:30:48.440 were not killed who de ros That means they were getting discharged from the army. 400 00:30:48.920 --> 00:30:52.119 A lot of those people killed there were supposed to be discharging the army 401 00:30:52.160 --> 00:30:56.119 about two weeks because they were draft these two year guys, and we've been 402 00:30:56.160 --> 00:31:02.599 training with them eighteen months or so, so most some were ready to rotate 403 00:31:02.720 --> 00:31:07.839 out. Would have rotated out if we came back from that mission without hitting 404 00:31:07.880 --> 00:31:11.880 elsik Ray. Most of those guys are killed would have went home. But 405 00:31:11.000 --> 00:31:17.319 then the ones that weren't killed or wounded, majority of those did rotate out. 406 00:31:17.720 --> 00:31:22.359 Once we get back to base camp I had we had nobody left in 407 00:31:22.440 --> 00:31:26.240 the Betune, very few people left in the company, so we uh we 408 00:31:26.400 --> 00:31:30.200 had to have not they all were killed or anything like that and are wounded, 409 00:31:30.920 --> 00:31:33.480 they were discharged from the army. So we had to take a group 410 00:31:34.039 --> 00:31:38.880 a new people in, integrated them and train them. But we used our 411 00:31:38.960 --> 00:31:45.680 experience in training and our experience and what we went through and how we trained 412 00:31:45.720 --> 00:31:49.119 those people, and so we did have a few of the good and the 413 00:31:49.200 --> 00:31:52.880 CEO's left. We had a lot of them that were killed, and my 414 00:31:52.880 --> 00:31:56.559 opportunity. The two of the major ones were the platoon charger and the weapon 415 00:31:56.599 --> 00:32:01.279 squad leader and the other rest of them wounded. Uh So I was one 416 00:32:01.319 --> 00:32:05.160 of the n c os left that went over. Originally we didn't have that 417 00:32:05.319 --> 00:32:09.599 many, so we had to uh help integrate the new n c os in 418 00:32:09.680 --> 00:32:15.000 and new ones we were getting and as well as uh trained the new people 419 00:32:15.200 --> 00:32:19.880 had we had. Did the new people get up to speed pretty quickly? 420 00:32:20.400 --> 00:32:22.599 Oh? Yeah, they had heard all about what went on, you know. 421 00:32:22.680 --> 00:32:25.920 They were they were very interested in learning what to do correctly. Uh. 422 00:32:27.079 --> 00:32:30.920 They had heard what happened in the LC. See some of them were 423 00:32:30.960 --> 00:32:36.319 back in base camp and just landed there and did not hadn't been brought to 424 00:32:36.359 --> 00:32:38.839 the field when that happened. So they were they knew what was going on, 425 00:32:39.559 --> 00:32:45.000 and so once we started training, they paid very close attention. How 426 00:32:45.160 --> 00:32:50.079 soon were you back in action? We trained those guys probably uh month or 427 00:32:50.119 --> 00:32:52.119 so off and on, but we were still out there playing with the with 428 00:32:52.279 --> 00:32:59.039 the VC. We call them trainers training four, which was because they can 429 00:32:59.119 --> 00:33:02.160 shoot as well as the regular guys. But in January we went to bonk 430 00:33:02.279 --> 00:33:07.519 Sun, which was along the coast, mostly ross Patties. We run into 431 00:33:07.519 --> 00:33:14.440 the NVA down there also were in Bonkton for forty five days straight and just 432 00:33:14.480 --> 00:33:20.160 about every every day we were in contact make contact with the enemy. Sometime 433 00:33:20.240 --> 00:33:22.920 we fight them four or five hours and they would take it. He'd get 434 00:33:23.039 --> 00:33:27.279 dark and it would take off and we would jump on the helicopters and catch 435 00:33:27.359 --> 00:33:30.759 them ten to fifteen minutes. I remember said, damn, let him go 436 00:33:30.880 --> 00:33:34.279 for a while. Yeah. But yeah, it was forty five days there, 437 00:33:34.279 --> 00:33:37.079 and we lost quite a few people there as well. And I found 438 00:33:37.119 --> 00:33:42.119 out one thing from that, you know, the old vets we had left, 439 00:33:42.440 --> 00:33:45.519 we probably didn't lose any more of those guys. So experience makes a 440 00:33:45.599 --> 00:33:51.200 difference in combat. If you experience combat, you're change to the survival or 441 00:33:51.240 --> 00:33:55.039 much greater. And if you're with the well trained unit, your experiency survival 442 00:33:55.240 --> 00:33:59.519 are much greater when everybody knows what they're doing. But if you got new 443 00:33:59.599 --> 00:34:04.039 guys and something happened, they don't know exactly what to do, to hesitate 444 00:34:04.400 --> 00:34:07.160 or to do the wrong thing, and they caused them to get killed or 445 00:34:07.200 --> 00:34:10.840 get hit. And that proved yourself very well in Boks. How long did 446 00:34:10.880 --> 00:34:15.119 you stay on that tour? I left in July of sixty six, July 447 00:34:15.239 --> 00:34:17.920 six, sixty years. How many tourists. Did you serve there? One? 448 00:34:19.119 --> 00:34:22.280 I know you served until the early eighties. Where are their assignments did 449 00:34:22.360 --> 00:34:27.440 you have? I was assigned to Fort mcclull Alabama when I came back from 450 00:34:27.559 --> 00:34:30.800 Vietnam in sixty six. There was a training base there where were training the 451 00:34:30.920 --> 00:34:36.480 infantry advanced training at Fort McCloughan, and I was there for about a year. 452 00:34:36.920 --> 00:34:39.840 Then they ship me to Alaska, Fairbanks, Alaska. I was in 453 00:34:39.920 --> 00:34:44.280 fair Bak, Alaska for two and a half years and then I got out 454 00:34:44.320 --> 00:34:49.880 of shurs three years. So fich belittle zero, make Alabama boar won't to 455 00:34:49.920 --> 00:34:54.719 get out? That'll do it. So the story of Landing Zone X Ray 456 00:34:54.800 --> 00:35:01.800 and Aya Draang is an incredibly powerful story, but it really became well known 457 00:35:01.840 --> 00:35:07.480 thanks to the book that Colonel Moore and eventually General Moore wrote with Joe Galloway. 458 00:35:07.000 --> 00:35:14.320 So what's it like to have what you lived become a very well read 459 00:35:14.400 --> 00:35:17.719 story and then turn into a movie, And so your story becomes a story 460 00:35:17.800 --> 00:35:22.280 that a lot of people know. Well when the book first came out, 461 00:35:22.360 --> 00:35:25.360 you know, I read the whole book, which is the book itself includes 462 00:35:25.559 --> 00:35:30.440 in letting his own Albany as well, it was the actually just one part 463 00:35:30.480 --> 00:35:34.320 of that of that battle, you know, And the book is probably ninety 464 00:35:34.480 --> 00:35:39.440 ninety five percent true because they interviewed everybody was in the fights, so the 465 00:35:39.519 --> 00:35:45.039 information they wrote the book on it is based on actual memories of the guys 466 00:35:45.320 --> 00:35:52.119 that faulted. Now, the movie itself is probably seventy percent accurate as far 467 00:35:52.199 --> 00:35:57.599 as historical is concerned, and the rest of his thirty visioness Hollywood. You 468 00:35:57.679 --> 00:36:00.360 know, it's a lot of things they showed in the Hollywood. Any other 469 00:36:00.440 --> 00:36:05.360 thing on the movie is they take a three day fight and they try to 470 00:36:05.440 --> 00:36:08.559 put it into two hours. When you do that, everybody's fighting all the 471 00:36:08.679 --> 00:36:15.639 time. To have it historical account or what happened, you know, and 472 00:36:15.480 --> 00:36:20.719 you're very proud of the people who were there with you, and that includes 473 00:36:21.320 --> 00:36:27.079 Joe Gallaway and Gillen Moore from for actually doing the book. It felt because 474 00:36:27.480 --> 00:36:30.960 I think it's one of the most accurate books done at the time, and 475 00:36:31.039 --> 00:36:36.400 the movie itself was as well, because a lot of the movies were strictly 476 00:36:36.480 --> 00:36:42.360 based on what Hollywood thought was going on in Vietnam, and this movie was 477 00:36:42.440 --> 00:36:46.679 based on an actual book telling what went on. And of course they took 478 00:36:47.440 --> 00:36:53.000 Hollywood license to change it the way they thought should should sell sell tickets. 479 00:36:53.000 --> 00:36:58.239 Imagine, as you look back at your career, what are you most proud 480 00:36:58.280 --> 00:37:04.159 of both and that operation and throughout your twenty years in the service. Well, 481 00:37:04.199 --> 00:37:07.840 I'm proud of that outfit, you know, and anybody who was served 482 00:37:07.880 --> 00:37:14.360 with it will tell you that the first Sevil has stayed together Gid Moore's battalion 483 00:37:14.800 --> 00:37:19.519 as far as the reunions, better than I think any other battalion. We 484 00:37:19.639 --> 00:37:22.840 had close to two hundred people show up at our last reunion we had and 485 00:37:24.239 --> 00:37:30.559 in Georgia and there was seventy eighties showed up to one we had the other 486 00:37:30.679 --> 00:37:35.199 day, and there will probably been more. But it's very close to when 487 00:37:35.199 --> 00:37:38.800 they're having the reunion in d C for November eleventh, and a lot of 488 00:37:38.840 --> 00:37:45.480 guys go to that. The CALF has its own reunion there during that time 489 00:37:45.599 --> 00:37:47.840 too, so a lot of people wouldn't go to both places. I was 490 00:37:47.960 --> 00:37:53.199 very proud to serve that union. I was very proud to done a career 491 00:37:53.679 --> 00:37:59.679 in the army or wouldn't change anything to have done. And as a Georgia 492 00:37:59.719 --> 00:38:04.039 as I'm sure you know that military base, I think it's Fort Benning now 493 00:38:04.119 --> 00:38:07.280 is being renamed for General Moore and his wife? Yes, he is renamed 494 00:38:07.280 --> 00:38:09.400 for his General Moore and his wife is for more now, Yeah, we 495 00:38:09.519 --> 00:38:14.800 intend to be renaming of it just about all the guys that could come there 496 00:38:14.840 --> 00:38:19.199 from one seventh Colt. General Moore's off here, we're there. What does 497 00:38:19.239 --> 00:38:22.559 that mean to you that he gets that honor and then as a result of 498 00:38:22.920 --> 00:38:25.639 his story, which is also your story, lives on even more. I 499 00:38:25.679 --> 00:38:29.960 would say if they's going to have to rename the post, they did it 500 00:38:30.400 --> 00:38:34.760 for the appropriate guy because he really deserved it, and his wife as well. 501 00:38:34.880 --> 00:38:38.679 Now you got to remember that she did things that has effective. Way 502 00:38:38.760 --> 00:38:45.239 the Army treats casualties now even to now there hasn't changed. And if you've 503 00:38:45.440 --> 00:38:52.119 seen the movie or read the book, you know that taxes used to deliver 504 00:38:52.280 --> 00:38:59.119 the telegram telling someone their their husband or brother or sister or whatever had been 505 00:38:59.239 --> 00:39:04.559 killed. Has he changed that? And so including ears part of it was 506 00:39:04.599 --> 00:39:08.519 appropriate. Well, it's an incredible legacy, and I know how much all 507 00:39:08.599 --> 00:39:15.480 of you revered General Moore, and the fact that this brotherhood continues now nearly 508 00:39:15.519 --> 00:39:21.719 sixty years later is a testament to his work and your own work as well. 509 00:39:21.800 --> 00:39:24.480 So that's true. Like I say, there's no battalion he sticks together 510 00:39:24.800 --> 00:39:29.559 as much as this one one seven. So thank you very much for your 511 00:39:29.599 --> 00:39:32.360 time today, and thank you very very much for your incredible service to our 512 00:39:32.400 --> 00:39:37.639 country. Take you sure we've been speaking with Ernie Savage. He's a US 513 00:39:37.760 --> 00:39:40.360 Army veteran of the Vietnam War, serving the Battle of Landing Zone x Ray 514 00:39:40.480 --> 00:39:44.920 as part of the larger Battle of Aya Edrang. He was also part of 515 00:39:44.960 --> 00:39:50.159 the first Battalion, seventh Cavalry, first Air Cavalry Division. I'm Greg Corumbus. 516 00:39:50.440 --> 00:40:02.320 This is Veterans Chronicles. Hi, this is Greg Corumbus, and thanks 517 00:40:02.360 --> 00:40:07.599 for listening to Veterans Chronicles, a presentation of the American Veterans Center. For 518 00:40:07.719 --> 00:40:14.360 more information, please visit American Veteranscenter dot org. You can also follow the 519 00:40:14.480 --> 00:40:20.880 American Veterans Center on Facebook and on Twitter. We're at AVC update. Subscribe 520 00:40:20.920 --> 00:40:24.920 to the American Veterans Center YouTube channel for full oral histories and special features, 521 00:40:25.440 --> 00:40:30.079 and of course, please subscribe to the Veterans Chronicles podcast wherever you get your 522 00:40:30.159 --> 00:40:36.599 podcasts. Thanks again for listening, and please join us next time for veterans Chronicles,